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

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EDMUND S. MUSKIE
Secretaries of State

HODDING CARTER III
WILLIAM J. DYESS
Assistant Secretaries for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor

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REVEREND HESBURGH

Just short of 3 weeks ago, on October 24, this same group of leaders from our various religious faiths and from the various private voluntary organizations met in Washington to discuss what we might do together and in concert to meet the tragedy in Cambodia. The purpose was to consult how the American people, how the American Government, and how the United Nations might best respond to avoid what appeared to be a growing holocaust, already half accomplished, if you will.

We called on the voluntary agencies, first of all, to increase their efforts and to work together to help the Cambodians. We urged Americans to provide them all with financial support, and in a special letter to the President we urged greater U.S. Government efforts in order to assist, as quickly and as effectively as possible, this people in great need.

We met that same day at the White House with the President, and never was a letter answered more quickly.[3] Hardly before the letter was in his hands, he granted us all of the various requests we had for increased aid and said he was willing to do whatever else might be necessary to do to avert this holocaust.

I think today, in the light of the appeal made by United Nations Children's Fund—UNICEF—the International Committee of the Red Cross, the appeals by all of our various voluntary agencies for more than $300 million for Cambodian relief, and after the generous and immediate response of the President of the United States voiced by our Secretary of State, Mr. Vance, at the pledging conference of the United States on Monday, November 5, when many of you were present, and I too, it seemed to us that the time was now appropriate to update our October 24 meeting in an effort to relieve the growing misery of the Cambodians.

It was again against this same background as our last meeting that I, as chairman of the Overseas Development Council, and cochaired by the Reverend Paul McLeary, who is chairman of the American Council on Voluntary Agencies, that we invited this group again, on very short notice, to this second consultation to exchange information on the situation in Thailand and Cambodia after other relief is taking place there.

In this second consultation we have four things we would like to do: first, to find out what the various agencies are now doing; second, what they are planning to do for the near term future; third, what fundraising efforts have been undertaken to date; and fourth, what are the various bottlenecks and needs that we have to move forward quickly and efficiently. There is, of course, a fifth topic which I'm sure will emerge from our discussion with Mrs. Carter, and that is how can we improve and institutionalize exchange of information among ourselves and coordination of the various activities—governmental and nongovernmental and intergovernmental—here and overseas.

It seems to me that the vigor of the pluralistic American response to this Cambodian tragedy is most welcome, but it does raise for all of us a great challenge to work together and, as the President just said, to work together without seeking praise in so doing.

I would like to say that the visit to Cambodia and Thailand in October by Senators Danforth, Sasser, and Baucus, who are here with us this morning, on my left, your right, and also the various Governors and the Congresswomen and, most particularly, of our First Lady, Mrs. Carter—all of this has heightened and increased the consciousness of Americans for the need of all of the generous action we might put forward to alleviate this growing tragedy.

May I say, Mrs. Carter, in introducing you, that we are looking forward to hearing the report from you and your colleagues on the situation with respect to Cambodian refugees in Thailand, and any other recommendations or questions you may have of this group, which represents, I think, the cream of the private voluntary effort. After your comments we will be hearing from all of these various agencies active in Cambodia on the questions posed earlier, and we are looking forward later in the day to discussing our conclusions further with you.

Mrs. Carter, it's with real pride and great satisfaction that I'd like to present you.

MRS. CARTER

Thank you very much. I'm very pleased to have you all here today. I welcome you.

I did go to Cambodia, and I'm very happy to have this opportunity to report to you about my trip, and also to thank you for what you have done already and for what you continue to do, and to work with you on ways that we can better help those who are suffering in this area of the world.

As the President has said, I went to Thailand on his behalf to express the profound concern of the people of our country for the tragedy that is unfolding in Indochina. My visit was very brief, but I think I can say positively that it was one of of the most significant events of my life. I came away filled with admiration for the representatives of your organizations who are there struggling with this massive problem of relief for thousands and thousands of human beings who are starving and homeless and ill and bereaved. And I came away also, as Jimmy said, filled with gratitude for the efforts of the people of Thailand and for the Government of Thailand.

And I'm sure that every person in this room knows what faces us in the coming weeks. The problem is one that is not going away any time soon. We will be faced with it for a long time. While our international efforts have brought vast improvements—and I saw in the refugee camp at Sakeo some beginnings of hope for those few who have been brought back from the very edge of death. The camp, since the time that the Senators were there, has really made progress; in fact, some people told us that a miracle had happened in the last few weeks. The camp is only about 3 weeks old, but people are being fed and are being taken care of in that camp now. You will have a further report on that from some of those who went with me.

But the picture in the near future looks very bleak, because a wave of new refugees is expected to come across the border into Thailand from Kampuchea—a number estimated anywhere from 100,000 to 250,000, maybe 300,000—that are now right at the border, that are expected to come now that the dry season is here and the fighting has begun again. They will be pushed over into Thailand.

And for those of us who have seen with our own eyes the dimension of the problem and the terrible suffering and starvation, the thought of so many more people in the same situation who will be coming into Thailand is almost more than you can bear, when you are there and look at it.

I'd like to tell you briefly about my trip. I was accompanied by some of those here that are here at that head table, who will be reporting to you also. Some of us worked together; some of us dispersed so that we could gather more information, because we were only there for a few hours, a day, 2 days.

We went to the refugee camps in Thailand, Kampuchea, that I have already talked about, Sakeo. We witnessed the disease, the dislocation of persons, suffering, starvation. We saw many, young and old. We saw children separated from their parents, afflicted with malaria and malnutrition.

In the camp at Ubon, for refugees from Laos, conditions were substantially better. There are approximately 37,000 persons there. That camp is 4 or 5 years old. They eat well, but they don't go out of the camp. They have been there, some for 3 or 4 years, waiting to resettle abroad. And although the living conditions are so much better than Sakeo, they are still not anything that you would call good.

It is sad to see them with no purpose. They at first thought they might go back into Laos. Now they know they won't, or don't want to. And they're waiting to be resettled, some of them feeling that they've been forgotten by the world, because the focus has been on the Kampucheans, the focus has been on the boat people. And these people really feel forgotten. I was touched by them. And one of the girls that worked with me said that one of the main problems they have with these people is mental depression, just existing day to day for 4 or 5 years, waiting to see what happens to them.

At the transit center, the refugee transit center in Bangkok, we saw overcrowded and humiliating conditions which refugees awaiting final processing for immigration must endure. These were things that I don't think I'll ever forget. These were people who have already been chosen to go to other countries and have to wait in an unbelievable place, some for a month and a half or 2 months. We try to process ours, the ones that are coming to the United States, much earlier, but still the conditions are unbearable.

While we were there in Bangkok, we had candid discussions with representatives of the international volunteer organizations to discuss their goals, their frustrations, and the need for better coordination. We did have a very good meeting, and everybody, I think, vented their frustrations, and everybody decided that there was a great need for coordination.

We met with the King and Queen of Thailand to discuss the whole spectrum of the refugee problem and the need for further sites, because we must have further sites for this 200,000–300,000 that are expected to come into Thailand from Cambodia—and they're expected to come in in the next 3 or 4 weeks. The situation is urgent.

We had a long discussion with Prime Minister Kriangsak, a fruitful discussion, about the political and foreign policy risks that are facing the Thai Government because of their policies. It is important that the international community provide visible and demonstrable political, economic, and security support to the Thais.

As we flew back to Washington, we got together on the airplane and worked on our report for the President, which stresses the urgency of the situation, and we did lay out some specific recommendations. We will give you that report this morning. In fact, you have in your brochure a folder with our recommendations in it.

We need your careful consideration of our recommendations. We need your creative ideas for how to implement them, your support, and your consensus. I do not know when I have ever felt a sense of urgency more about cutting redtape and unblocking logjams and moving ahead.

I think I can say with some assurance that the American people are ready to help. They are already mobilizing help as you here indicate, and as I have seen and heard through my mail and telephone calls and with people in the whole country concerned about this problem. But they need to know how to help, and they need to know now. They need to know where to turn; they need to know that now. They need to know what is needed, and it's our responsibility to give the people of our country specific information about ways they can reach out to their fellow man. We cannot lose time. Time is—the situation is urgent.

I understand that most of you who are here have prepared briefing papers about your programs and your problems. I know that you will be addressing yourselves to this issue throughout the day, and I look forward to being with you again at the end of the afternoon so that I can have a report for the things that you talk about during the day.

But now I want to call on the members of my traveling party, who've brought back new information which might be helpful to you. Then I would like to share—after we get through with the reports we will look at the recommendations, and I can tell you then some of the steps that we are already taking to implement some of these recommendations. ■

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[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 19, 1979.

[2] For text of the Senators' report, see BULLETIN of Dec. 1979, p. 4.

[3] For text of the President's announcement on Oct. 24, see BULLETIN of Dec. 1979, p. 7.

Pacific Basin

by David D. Newsom

Excerpts from an address before the Pacific Basin Economic Council in Los Angeles on May 15, 1979. Ambassador Newsom is Under Secretary for Political Affairs. The full text of this address may be obtained from the Public Information Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.[1]

" . . . the Pacific Basin [is] a part of the world where, for the United States, at least, the positive elements outnumber the negative. In this area, ancient protagonists appear prepared to talk to each other—with mediators. Clearly, regional cooperation is more than a slogan. The problem in many countries of the region is not how to stimulate growth but how to control it and direct it.

"[Normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China] is of major significance not only for our two countries but for the longer term peace and stability of Asia. Already we are well into a large agenda of trade, legal, and cultural discussions with the Chinese. Of equal importance, we are moving into a better understanding of others' points of view on global issues.

"In the satisfaction of our renewed communication with China, we should not forget that we continue to be two nations quite different in character and with often different perceptions of events in Asia and around the world. We should not be surprised if occasional problems and disappointments arise.

"We have rough spots in our relations with Japan but almost exclusively in the economic field. . . . We are both mindful that the United States and Japan are now the world's two largest non-Communist economies. . . . Considering the breadth of economic contacts and some basic differences in the way the two economies work, it is not

excess capacity and relatively strong external positions. The London economic summit in May 1977 represented an effort to achieve such a coordinated expansion by the leading countries, but it failed in that respect. The United States went ahead anyway.

Largely as a consequence, the U.S. payments position deteriorated relative to that of other major countries. It was recognized at the time that vigorous economic expansion in the United States without concomitant expansion in other countries would worsen the U.S. trade position, and it could have been expected that the emerging imbalance in turn would lead to the depreciation of the dollar relative to some other currencies. A balanced expansion among the leading countries would have avoided this.

Balanced expansion would certainly have been preferable to the actual development, but it was apparently unattainable at the time. Under these circumstances, I believe it was desirable for the United States to go ahead alone, even though that would predictably lead to some depreciation of the dollar. Not to have done so, in my judgment, would have courted far graver dangers for the world economy—extreme financial difficulties for a number of countries and increasing protectionist actions in most of the industrialized countries. Indeed, the highly successful international economic system which was so painstakingly established in the preceding 25 years was in jeopardy. The U.S. external deficit relieved the financial pressures on many countries, and it also reduced protectionist pressures abroad. Still, it would have been preferable to have had in 1977 the kind of concerted action and coordinated expansion which was finally achieved in 1978. Through it, we could have avoided the emergence of such great imbalances in payments and at least some of the consequent turbulence in foreign exchange markets.

Expected Account Imbalances

I mentioned earlier that changes in exchange rates are caused not only by emerging current account imbalances but also by expected imbalances. I want to return briefly to the role of expectations before concluding this discussion of our experience with flexible exchange rates, because the fragility of exchange rate expectations is one of the most disturbing features of our experience during the last 6 years. As I have indicated, the broad direction and magnitude of exchange rate changes are fully explicable by underlying movements of payments positions. Yet there were clearly several occasions—briefly in the fall of 1977 and more notably in October 1978—when exchange rates moved too far, too rapidly. It is difficult to explain the developments in October 1978 in terms of the underlying economic developments I have been emphasizing. Contrary to what was asserted at the time differential inflation rates—actual or reasonably expected—can only go a small distance toward explaining the exchange rate movements during this period. I think, therefore, that we have a problem with highly fragile, easily moved expectations in exchange markets. As a result, governments must be prepared to intervene heavily as stabilizing speculators even in a system of floating exchange rates.

Ten years ago, Federal Reserve Governor Henry Wallich divided mankind—or at least international financial specialists—into four categories: those who advocate fixed exchange rates; those who advocate freely floating exchange rates; those who prefer fixed rates but are nervous about it; and those who prefer floating rates but are nervous about it. I am a nervous floater. We have a floating—or flexible—exchange rate system which works reasonably well. The experience of the last 6 years indicates that exchange rates will change in response to external imbalances, that changes in relative prices caused by changes in real exchange rates have a strong influence on the volume of both exports and imports, and that, therefore, flexible exchange rates can make a significant contribution to the external adjustment process. We must remember, however, in judging the flexible exchange rate system that the short-run impact is not the same as the long-run impact, that exchange rates are not the only determinant of a country's external balance, and that exchange rate changes themselves can be caused by expectations as well as by actual economic developments.

For these reasons, we have to be patient for the equilibrating results of exchange rate changes. From time to time, monetary authorities will have to intervene heavily in exchange markets in order to break bandwagon movements which develop because of the fragility of expectations and the ease with which they are moved around.

The U.S. Dollar

Now let me turn from the recent past to the more distant future. I believe that the U.S. dollar will be the world's leading currency for a long time to come. Very likely, the Japanese yen and German mark, and perhaps other currencies, will grow in relative importance; and diversification out of the dollar into other currencies by both private and official holders will take place. Moreover, the diversification will probably not take place smoothly but in fits and starts that create periodic turbulence in exchange markets. Despite these developments, the U.S. dollar will remain the most important currency used internationally.

I can imagine, however, that by the first or second decade of the next century, the international role now played by the dollar could be assumed to a great extent by a different asset. Gradually over the next 30 years; the economic dominance of the United States will continue to decline, as it has done during the past 30 years. The U.S. share both of world production and of world trade have fallen, (e.g., from 16% of world exports in 1960 to 10% in 1978), and they will continue to fall—not because the United States is doing badly, but because other countries of the world are doing well.

Incomes in many other countries will rise relative to incomes in the United States. Over time, this will reduce the relative attractiveness of the dollar as an international currency. No other national currency will offer a clearly preferable substitute. We should, therefore, begin to explore the possibility of developing an effective alternative.

Feasible Alternatives

These discussions are presently centered on the creation of a substitution account, whereby dollars and other official reserves would be deposited in a new account managed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in exchange for assets denominated by special drawing rights. The substitution account has two basic purposes. The first is to inhibit exchange market disorders which can be associated with periodic switches in assets from one currency to another, especially diversification from dollars to other major currencies, and to channel this diversification outside of exchange markets. The second purpose is to enhance the role of the special drawing rights and to provide an alternative international financial vehicle to those denominated in national currencies.

Conclusion

Let me close by making four observations about the substitution account and the longer run evolution of the international monetary system.

First, it is not a short-run dollar support operation. That point can perhaps be most effectively emphasized by considering a realistic timeframe for the substitution account to emerge. There must first be an extended period of discussion—several differing conceptions of substitution accounts must be aired—followed by a period of negotiation, followed by a period for ratification. An optimistic scenario would not yield a substitution account in place before 1982.

Second, consideration of the substitution account in the near future will stimulate further official discussion of the broader aims and character of the international monetary system, something which has not taken place formally since 1974. This will be a useful contribution even if the substitution account itself fails to materialize.

Third, success in making the special drawing rights an international monetary medium would enable the United States and other reserve currency countries to divorce, or at least greatly attenuate, the responsibility of managing reserve currencies from the responsibilities of sensible national economic policy.

Fourth, to accomplish this ambitious result would require, in my judgment, that special drawing rights-denominated assets be traded extensively in private markets. And this in turn surely has implications for how a substitution account aimed at this ultimate result must be set up.

In the long meantime, between now and a reformed monetary system, we must live with what we have; which as I suggested earlier is not that bad compared with the feasible alternatives. But living with the present system does require looking beyond today's headlines and next week's money supply figures.■

Identifying U.S. Security Interests in U.S.-Soviet Relations

by Marshall D. Shulman

Address before the International Studies Association at the University of Pittsburgh on October 4, 1979. Ambassador Shulman is Special Adviser to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs.

Those of you who work in the field of U.S.-Soviet relations know that in describing the interrelationship of these two countries, one needs to deal not only with their foreign policies and the domestic determinants of foreign policy but with a third element that sometimes is of paramount importance. That third element in the relationship is the terrain of international politics on which the countries meet and to which each of them is reacting. There are many aspects of the international political scene that are relevant, but I would like to speak of two in particular that seem to me to put the stamp on this period and to have a determining influence on the character of U.S.-Soviet relations.

The first and obvious one is the revolutionary development of military technology in our times, which has obviously changed the relationship between war and politics and has also created the major imperative in foreign policy of trying to work our way through the minefield of problems and conflicts with which we are confronted, without its leading to a general nuclear war.

The second aspect of the current international political scene is the extraordinary turbulence and upheaval that characterize every part of the world. We have come in only two generations from the prolonged stability of international politics that characterized the scene at the opening of World War I. We have seen the rapid collapse of political institutions, the weakening of the European states that had driven and dominated international politics, and the emergence on the international scene of the United States as a major world actor together with the Soviet Union and China. Also in the recent past we have seen the consequences of some three decades of rapid, chaotic, turbulent decolonization and the transforming effect this has had and is having on international politics. We have also witnessed the effect of upheavals within industrial societies, including our own, which have resulted in weakening the fabric of these societies, weakening the traditional sources of authority of the state, the family, and the church—or perhaps I will have to amend that as a result of the visit of the Pope.

But nevertheless, it has clearly created a time of disorientation within societies. An age of irascibility tends to influence the domestic climate for foreign policy. In the developing world, you see the desperate effort of new nations to create necessities for the people and to face the manifold sources of conflict arising out of tribal, religious, and ethnic border disputes. And most recently you have seen the added spurt that has been given to this turbulence in Africa as a result of the precipitous collapse of the Portuguese position.

As these elements enter on the scene and these various sources of conflict throw up perturbations to which the United States and Soviet Union, among other nations, find themselves responding—ofttimes without any planning or anticipation—these become perturbations in the Soviet-American relationship. Since we must expect this will continue for a long time, it is quite likely, in my judgment, that we shall not, in the foreseeable future, see any substantial easing of the Soviet-American relationship. We shall not see recreated, I think, in the near term what was by many people called detente as it was thought to exist in 1972.

Against this background, I turn now more directly to the topic of identifying U.S. security interest in U.S.-Soviet relations. First of all, it is evident that what we are talking about is predominantly a competitive relationship between the two countries that emerged on the scene to a leading position among nations by reason of their resources and by virtue of the fact that they are each embarked upon a period in which they have had a surge of national development.

A Competitive Relationship

In seeking to respond to this situation, we need to ask ourselves not *whether* to respond but *how* to respond effectively. The first element here is to face the fact that a military equilibrium is a prerequisite in the relationship. There can be no serious questioning of this necessity, but there is a question about what kind of military equilibrium, and I will return to that point in a moment.

Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights

Following are statements before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 14, 1979, by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Legal Adviser of the Department of State Roberts B. Owen, and Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia M. Derian.[1]

DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER

I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before the committee in support of the four multilateral treaties on human rights transmitted to the Senate by President Carter in 1978: the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the American Convention on Human Rights.[2]

A fifth human rights treaty, the genocide convention, has already undergone extensive hearings before this committee and is, therefore, not before you today. I want to emphasize, however, that ratification of that convention remains one of the most important goals of this Administration's human rights policy. As President Carter said in a message to the Senate [May 23, 1977], the genocide convention ". . . protects the most fundamental of all human rights—the right to live. . . ." And as this committee well knows, its ratification is very long overdue.

In addressing the United Nations about the treaties [March 17, 1977] before you today, President Carter noted that: "The basic thrust of human affairs points toward a more universal demand for fundamental human rights." The treaties—all of which have been signed by large numbers of countries and have already entered into force—are a reflection of that "basic thrust." Our history, and our vital national interests, require that we be a full and active part of it.

In my remarks this morning, I will concentrate on the compelling interests —both foreign and domestic—that call for U.S. adherence to the treaties. Later today Bob Owen, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, and our colleagues from the Department of Justice will discuss in detail the legal dimensions of the treaties, as well as the reservations to them that we recommend. Patt Derian, the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, will address the relationship between the treaties and other aspects of our human rights policy.

At the outset, however, I would like to describe very briefly the contents of the four treaties.

Contents of the Treaties

The racial discrimination convention was signed by the United States in 1966. Its purpose is to define racial discrimination, to condemn and prohibit the practice of racial discrimination by governments, and to encourage the removal of institutional obstacles to the ending of racial discrimination.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signed by the United States in 1977, is a more comprehensive document. It commits participating states to respect many of the rights enshrined in our own Constitution: freedom of speech, religion, association, and movement; the right to vote in secret elections; the right to stand equal before the law; the right to self-determination and to nondiscrimination; the presumption of innocence for those accused of a crime; the right against self-incrimination; and the protections of due process of law.

Unlike the other U.N. treaties, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which was signed by the United States in 1977, looks to the future. It commits states to take steps toward the future realization of certain economic, social, and cultural goals for the individual. These goals are ones to which the United States has long been committed, including the right to work, to social security, to physical and mental health, to education, and to freedom from hunger.

The one non-U.N. treaty being considered here—the American Convention on Human Rights—was adopted by the Organization of American States in 1969 and signed by the United States in 1977. It seeks to guarantee for the peoples of this hemisphere rights similar to those guaranteed by the civil and political covenant.

All four of the treaties before you today also contain reporting procedures and provide for review by independent experts of progress in achieving the treaties' goals.

Domestic Interests

As I suggested earlier, the Administration urges Senate approval of these treaties because adherence to them is so clearly in our national interest. Concern for human rights is one of the foundations of our greatness as a nation. Our observance of human rights contributes profoundly to our leadership in the international community. But to preserve and enhance that leadership role, we must demonstrate our willingness to make human rights a matter of international commitment and policy and not solely a matter of domestic law.

As President Carter noted in his letter to the Senate transmitting the treaties [February 23, 1978], the United States is one of the few important nations in the world that has not yet become a party to the U.N.

Unless the United States is a party to the four human rights treaties we will be unable to contribute fully to this evolving international law of human rights.

treaties. In the eyes of the world, our failure to do so reflects adversely upon our own impressive accomplishments in the human rights field. Even more importantly, our nonadherence to the treaties prejudices U.S. participation in the development of the international law of human rights.

This is not only unfortunate, it is also unnecessary. In essence, the treaties create an international commitment to the same basic human rights that are already guaranteed to citizens of the United States by our own laws and Constitution. U.S. ratification would not endanger any rights that we currently enjoy. On the contrary, ratification would encourage the extension of rights already enjoyed by our citizens to the citizens of other nations, and it would allow the United States to participate in this process.

The fundamental rights enjoyed in this country are a product not only of our Founding Fathers' drafting but also of two centuries of practice and interpretation. Similarly, the rights enunciated in these treaties will be molded by the actions of the states party to them in future years. Unless the United States is a party to the treaties, we will be unable to contribute fully to this evolving international law of human rights.

International Interests

Moreover, ratification of the treaties will remove a troubling complication from our diplomacy. Governments with which we raise human rights concerns will no longer be able to blunt the force of our approaches or question the seriousness of our commitment by pointing to our failure to ratify. I have personally observed that quiet person-to-person diplomacy provides the primary and, in many instances, the best means to obtain improvements in human rights. But I have also observed personally that our effectiveness can be compromised by our own failure to ratify these treaties.

Ratification also gives the United States an additional international forum in which to pursue the advancement of human rights and to challenge other states to meet the high standards set by this nation. We should not deny ourselves this opportunity to help shape the developing international standards for human rights and to encourage the extension to others of the rights we have long enjoyed.

While the treaties are not subject to legally binding sanctions, they do increase the political costs attached to violations of human rights. The committees established to review compliance with the treaties provide a mechanism through which human rights practices throughout the world can be evaluated, compared, and publicized. These committees will develop a sort of human rights caselaw—a body of precedent that can give shape and substance to the basic standards enunciated in the treaties.

It is toward this goal—the operation of the rule of law in the international human rights field—that we should strive. Ratification of these four treaties would be an important step to that end.

U.S. adherence to these treaties would unquestionably promote the international recognition of fundamental human rights. But it would also unquestionably advance the national interests of the United States. As President Carter suggested on the 30th anniversity of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two are inextricably linked. As he said on that occasion:

> . . . human rights are not peripheral to the foreign policy of the United States . . . . Our pursuit of human rights is part of a broad effort to use our great power and our tremendous influence in the service of creating a better world—a world in which human beings can live in peace, in freedom, and with their basic needs adequately met.

For these reasons, I respectfully urge that advice and consent be given to the ratification of these human rights treaties.

MR. OWEN

I feel pleased and privileged to appear before this distinguished committee in order to testify in support of the four treaties on human rights now before you. Deputy Secretary Christopher has already presented the compelling case, in terms of U.S. foreign policy and our domestic system of values, for ratification of these treaties. I shall only reiterate that considerations of the effectiveness of our moral and economic leadership in the world community today, and a deep commitment to the just treatment of men and women everywhere, underlie this Administration's vigorous espousal of ratification.

Everyone here today agrees that every person should have the benefit of freedom from arbitrary and inhumane treatment at the hands of his or her government. Such freedom takes the form of legal rights within the constitutional system of the United States. We cherish these rights and have made great progress in promoting their advancement.

I am here today to support ratification of these treaties as a means for the United States to participate in the furtherance of similar rights in the international sphere. They were drafted under the close scrutiny of representatives of our government at the United Nations and the Organization of American States. We have had them under careful review for a good many years and are satisfied that any problems they still present can be satisfactorily resolved through a reasonable number of reservations, understandings, and declarations. I wish to assure this committee that these treaties will insure a more widely accepted legal framework in which the United States can pursue internationally the values of human freedom and justice under law that we all share.

Since these treaties are extensive, I propose to review their provisions only briefly and then to discuss at some length certain aspects of the treaties and of this Administration's approach to them that some perceive as obstacles to ratification.

Provisions of the Treaties

The racial discrimination convention defines "racial discrimination" to include distinctions and preferences based not only on race, but also on "colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin" whose purpose or effect is to impair the enjoyment of human rights on an equal footing. The substantive provisions of the convention require states parties to undertake to pursue a policy of eliminating such discrimination by refraining from discriminatory practices, by guaranteeing equality before the law with respect to a variety of substantive rights, and by providing for remedies against discriminatory treatment. These undertakings are in keeping with the legislative and judicial strides taken in this country in the last 100 years through the adoption of the 14th amendment and the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s.

The other three treaties under consideration today range far more widely over the spectrum of rights which an individual may enjoy.

Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, states parties undertake to respect and insure a series of rights of individuals that largely coincide with fundamental rights built into our democratic tradition and guaranteed by our Bill of Rights. These treaty rights include the right to vote, to free expression, to freedom of religion, to freedom of association and assembly; rights of the family and of children and a right to nationality; rights to freedom of movement and of residence; and a whole series of procedural rights of the accused to a fair trial, to representation by counsel, and other procedural rights. Each treaty requires that the states parties respect the enumerated rights without discrimination as to race, sex, national origin, or other status.

Special importance attaches to article 4 of the covenant which addresses the need to distinguish, in accordance with internationally agreed standards, between emergencies that warrant reasonable derogations from the covenant's requirements and unwarranted claims of emergency, and between those rights from which reasonable derogation is permissible and those from which no derogation is allowed. In the latter category are such fundamental rights as freedom from torture, from slavery, and from retroactive application of statutes defining criminal offenses.

consultation with the leaders of the Senate.

The Soviets must understand our deep concern.

We will delay opening of any new American or Soviet Consular facilities, and most of the cultural and economic exchanges currently under consideration will be deferred. Trade with the Soviet Union will be severely restricted.

I have decided to halt or reduce exports to the Soviet Union in three areas that are particularly important to them. These new policies are being and will be coordinated with those of our allies.

I have directed that no sales of high technology or other strategic items will be licensed for sale to the Soviet Union until further notice, while we revise our licensing policy.

Fishing privileges for the Soviet Union in United States waters will be severely curtailed.

The 17 million tons of grain ordered by the Soviet Union in excess of that amount which we are committed to sell will not be delivered. This grain was not intended for human consumption but was to be used for building up Soviet livestock herds.

I am determined to minimize any adverse impact on the American farmer from this action. The undelivered grain will be removed from the market through storage and price support programs and through purchases at market prices. We will also increase amounts of grain devoted to the alleviation of hunger in poor countries and we will have a massive increase of the use of grain for gasohol production here at home.

After consultation with other principal grain exporting nations, I am confident that they will not replace these quantities of grain by additional shipments on their part to the Soviet Union.

These actions will require some sacrifice on the part of all Americans, but there is absolutely no doubt that these actions are in the interest of world peace and in the interest of the security of our own nation and they are also compatible with actions being taken by our own major trading partners and others who share our deep concern about this new Soviet threat to world stability.

Although the United States would prefer not to withdraw from the Olympic games scheduled in Moscow this summer, the Soviet Union must realize that its continued aggressive actions will endanger both the participation of athletes and the travel to Moscow by spectators who would normally wish to attend the Olympic games.

Along with other countries we will provide military equipment, food, and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and its national security against the seriously increased threat it now faces from the North. The United States also stands ready to help other nations in the region in similar ways.

Neither our allies nor our potential adversaries should have the slightest doubt about our willingness, our determination, and our capacity to take the measures I have outlined tonight.

I have consulted with leaders of the Congress and I am confident they will support legislation that may be required to carry out these measures.

History teaches perhaps very few clear lessons. But surely one such lesson learned by the world at great cost is that aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease.

The response of the international community to the Soviet attempt to crush Afghanistan must match the gravity of the Soviet action.

With the support of the American people and working with other nations, we will deter aggression, we will protect our nation's security, and we will preserve the peace.

The United States will meet its responsibilities.

AMBASSADOR McHENRY, JAN. 6, 1980[2]

The Security Council meets today, at the request of more than 50 members of the United Nations from all parts of the world and of all political persuasions. We meet to consider a matter of fundamental importance to world peace and to the principles on which the United Nations was founded.

A member state of this world organization has been invaded by massive contingents of troops from another state. Its government has been overthrown. Its leaders have been killed. Its people have been silenced. Its territory has been occupied.

The United States has joined in the call for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the Soviet Union's blatant act of aggression against the territory and people of Afghanistan. We have done so because the action of the Soviet Union not only breaches the peace and violates international law, but also threatens the viability of the fundamental principles that underlie the U.N. Charter.

Sequence of Events

The representative of the Soviet Union has offered us a wide and confusing range of rationales for the so-called "limited" but surely deadly assistance foisted on the people of Afghanistan. Let us look at the chilling sequence of events connected with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

- During the first weeks of December, the Soviet Union secured Bagram airfield, north of the Afghan capital of Kabul, by sending the equivalent of an airborne regiment there. It also landed troops and equipment at the Kabul airport and, at the same time, mobilized enormous forces in areas bordering Afghanistan.
- On December 25 and 26, a massive Soviet airlift into Kabul took place. In over 200 flights, roughly 10,000 Soviet troops were transported into Afghanistan.
- On the evening of December 27, a special Soviet assault unit surrounded the presidential palace in Kabul. Afghan soldiers defending the palace were attacked and overcome, and President Amin was summarily executed. Simultaneously, Soviet troops attacked Afghan forces guarding radio Afghanistan and other key government installations and took them under control.
- The first announcement of the Soviet-engineered coup d'etat, and the replacement of President Amin by Babrak Karmal, who had been in exile in Eastern Europe, was made using frequencies purporting to be Radio Kabul. In fact, the transmitters from which these announcements were made were located in the Soviet Union. We know this because the real Radio Kabul continued normal transmissions for at least 1½ hours after these announcements were first heard. Nothing in these broadcasts from Kabul confirmed the content of the Soviet broadcast disseminated in Afghanistan's name.
- Subsequently, Soviet troops captured all key civilian and military installations in the Kabul area and established a defense perimeter around Kabul. Afghan military forces have been disarmed.
- Immediately after the coup, two Soviet motorized rifle divisions entered Afghanistan by land, one at Kushka and the other at Termez. Elements of the western division arrived at Herat, where fighting between Soviet and Afghan forces was reported. Much of the Termez division proceeded to the Kabul area.

• The Soviet Union now has up to 50,000 troops in Afghanistan. There are indications that other Soviet divisions are moving into the Soviet-Afghan border. Soviet forces have moved out to secure other key towns.

The Soviet Union has claimed that the leadership of Afghanistan requested Soviet military assistance. Which leadership? It is beyond doubt that President Amin was still in office when the Soviet troops attacked the presidential palace and when he was executed. Are we to believe that President Amin invited Soviet troops to come into Afghanistan in order to oversee his own downfall and his own execution? Or was it the leadership of Babrak Karmal, President Amin's Soviet-appointed successor, a man who was not even in Afghanistan at the time of the Soviet intervention but was, rather, in the Soviet Union?

U.N. Principles

The armed intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the presence of an uninvited occupation force in that country is a gross and blatant violation of the most important principles of international law and of the U.N. Charter. What are those principles?

• That one state must not use force against the territorial integrity and political independence of another state;

• That a state must not intervene by force in the internal affairs of another state;

• That all states must respect the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

• That fundamental principles of human rights must be respected by all governments; and

• That states must settle international disputes by peaceful means.

Article 51 of U.N. Charter

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The Afghan people and Afghan army units have resisted this Soviet aggression, despite the overwhelming military superiority of the invader. Fighting continues in several areas of the country.

The facts of the situation are clear. Over a period of months, the Soviet Union carefully planned and prepared to invade Afghanistan, because it was dissatisfied with the degree of subservience of the Amin government and undoubtedly with its performance against Moslem insurgents in Afghanistan who long have been struggling for their rights. The Soviet Union then carried out its military operation—quickly and brutally. They offered no recourse whatsoever to the authorities then in power in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union overthrew the Amin government, which it had previously supported, and replaced it with a puppet regime.

The Soviet claim that it was acting in furtherance of collective self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter is a perversion of the Charter—an insult to the intelligence of the members of this Council. Article 51 can be invoked only "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." From whence came the armed attack on Afghanistan? The only armed attack on Afghanistan was the one launched by the Soviet Union. No one can believe the claim that the Soviet Union was requested by the Afghan Government to intervene in Afghanistan in the fashion in which it did, unless one also believes that President Amin invited the Soviet Union in to overthrow him. Article 51 of the Charter requires that measures taken by members in exercise of their right of self-defense "shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the . . . Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." That neither the Soviet Union, nor the puppet regime it has installed in power in Kabul, has given the required notice to the Security Council under article 51 is itself evidence of the hollowness of the Soviet Union's refuge behind the Charter.

Nor can one believe that the Soviet Union was requested by the Afghan Government to intervene in Afghanistan pursuant to the terms of the so-called Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation it entered into with that country in 1978. For the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan violates the Soviet Union's obligation, under the terms of the treaty, to respect Afghanistan's national sovereignty and to refrain from interfering in its internal affairs.

The U.N. Charter does not give the Soviet Union or any nation, the right to take military action in another country or to replace its government because it disagrees with the policies or performance of the existing government. The fact is that the Soviet Union has flouted international law and has violated regional and international peace and stability. That the Soviet Union has done so with cold calculation and advance planning, in an area of the world which is now experiencing particular instability and tension, makes its act even more egregious and irresponsible. That the Soviet Union is taking military action against a deeply religious and fiercely independent people, who are struggling for human and religious rights, underscores the brutality and illegality of its action.

The Need for U.N. Action

Accordingly, it remains for this Council to take action under the Charter to restore international peace and security.

A terrible miscalculation has been made by Soviet authorities. The ramifications of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan are enormous. For no state will be safe against a larger and more powerful neighbor if the international community appears to condone the Soviet Union's armed intervention. This must be of particular concern to states whose territories lie near the Soviet borders.

It is, therefore, incumbent upon this Council and upon every nation that believes in the rule of law and opposes the use of force in international affairs to denounce this dangerous breach of peace and security. It is incumbent upon this

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U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Donald F. McHenry in the Security Council just before he addressed the Council on December 1, 1979. Seated behind him, from left to right first row, are Senator Frank Church and Congressman Clement J. Zablocki; in the second row are Congressman William S. Broomfield and Ambassador William vanden Heuvel, Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

(United Nations photo by M. Grant)

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The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.

CYRUS R. VANCE
Secretary of State

HODDING CARTER III
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor

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unnatural that we should have problems."

"The Soviet Union, after the collapse of its major effort in Indonesia in the 1960s, had relatively little impact on Southeast Asia. The active Soviet support for the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea threatens to change that. Soviet naval vessels have called at Vietnamese ports. A Soviet airlift has brought extensive supplies to Vietnam. The possibility of greater use by Soviet air and naval forces of facilities in Vietnam would be disturbing, not only to us but to the Japanese and other nations in the area concerned both about the security of sealanes and about preventing major power confrontation in Asia." ■

[1] Press release 132.

World Efforts To Aid Kampucheans

International Appeal—launched Nov. 5, 1979, at U.N. pledging conference

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)–UNICEF	
Relief for 2.5 million Khmer in Kampuchea for 1 year	**$251,000,000**
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	
Relief for Khmer fleeing to Thailand for 8 months	**$60,000,000**
	$311,000,000
Estimated Pledges	**$210,000,000**

ICRC–UNICEF

From mid-October to November 22, ICRC–UNICEF operated a daily airlift from Bangkok to Phnom Penh and received additional flights which brought in 886 metric tons (MT) of relief supplies. By November 18, ICRC–UNICEF, working through the World Food Program (WFP), landed food supplies at Kompong Som port, which, combined with Oxfam shipments, totaled 10,030 MT. Phnom Penh authorities agreed November 4 to open the Mekong River to relief supplies. An Oxfam barge and a French barge, *Ile de Lumiere*, were able to land 2,510 MT at Phnom Penh via the Mekong route. ICRC–UNICEF projects it will reach a monthly goal of 34,500 MT of food supplies during January 1980. Relief efforts are particularly impeded by political restrictions on the radius of distribution and quantity of relief agency personnel. Further, ICRC–UNICEF advises that despite pledges made at the U.N. conference, a critical need for cash funding for the relief effort now exists.

U.N. Response

Currently estimated U.S. contribution

$ 925,000	(FY 1979 funds)
25,000,000	(PL 480 food commodities)
5,000,000	(cash grant to ICRC–UNICEF)
15,000,000	(UNHCR for Khmer in Thailand)
30,000,000	(new funds)[1]
30,000,000	(reprograming authority)
$105,925,000	

As of late November, the U.S. Government had expended $20,257,830 and had either shipped or is in the process of preparing $25,000,000 worth of PL 480 commodities in response to WFP requests. Detailed breakdown follows:

	Amount	To/For	Date
Kampuchea	**$5,000,000**	ICRC–UNICEF for start-up costs	10/79
	2,000,000	UNICEF for rice purchases	11/13
	25,000,000	WFP request for PL 480 commodities. Activity to date: **Kampuchea**—U.S. Department of Agriculture purchases 10,000 MT rice; 2,500 MT en route, remainder arrives late December; 3,781 MT nonfat dry milk (NFDM) to arrive December; 1,000 MT vegetable oil to arrive December. **Thailand**—45 MT instant corn-soya-milk (ICSM) arrived Bangkok 11/12; 2,000 MT corn-soya-milk to arrive December; 1,000 MT vegetable oil; 1,000 MT NFDM–2 shipments arriving November/December.	
Thailand	**$ 300,000[2]**	ICRC grant for border feeding	6/79
	625,000[2]	Catholic Relief Services, border feeding	6/79
	9,000,000	UNHCR for care and maintenance of Khmer	11/20
	100,000	Thai Red Cross, donation by Mrs. Carter	11/11
	450,000	UNHCR for 800 tents	10/79
	290,000	WFP grant for leasing trucks	11/79
	2,500	WFP grant to pay for engineer	11/79
	500,000	Catholic Relief Services, border feeding	10/79
	407,830[3]	Special airlift medical/relief supplies per President's 11/13 decision; arrived Bangkok 11/20	
	168,000	Air transport cost for 11/12 airlift of ICSM to Bangkok	
	27,000	ICRC for two field labs	11/19
	250,000	U.S. Embassy Bangkok for emergency funds for Khmer relief	11/20
	95,000	UNHCR for communications equipment	11/79
	512,500	WFP for food processing	11/28
	20,000	Medical survey team for Khmer camps in Thailand	11/79
	600,000[3]	Airlift cost for cranes—UNICEF	11/28
Total	**$45,347,830**		

Press release 312, Nov. 30, 1979. [1] Not yet appropriated. [2] FY 1979 funds. [3] Estimated cost.

U.S.-China Trade Agreement

by Warren Christopher

Statement before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Finance Committee on November 15, 1979. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.[1]

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on behalf of the Agreement on Trade Relations that we signed with the People's Republic of China July 7 and which the President transmitted to the Congress for approval October 23.[2]

The establishment of diplomatic relations January 1 opened a new era for U.S.-China relations, based on equality, mutual interest, and respect. Diplomatic recognition alone, however, does not automatically insure the development of a normal and mutually beneficial relationship. Thus our task is clear: to build a new relationship in tangible and practical ways.

Barriers to trade pose one hindrance to a fruitful relationship with the P.R.C. The trade agreement you have before you, by reducing these barriers and creating incentives to trade, will go a long way toward cementing the bonds between China and the United States. Nondiscriminatory treatment, credits, insurance, a favorable investment climate, and business facilitation are the lifeblood of trade. Without them, trade with China would wither. With them, we can forge the stable and constructive ties with China that we seek and that will guide us into the 1980's and beyond.

Our new ties with China are of fundamental importance to the United States and to the prospects for a peaceful and prosperous world. We want to encourage China to play a constructive and stabilizing role in Asia. We want to see a prosperous China, a China that can feed and fuel itself.

Every long-term global problem—economic development, population, food, natural resources, or the environment, to cite just a few examples—can benefit from positive contributions from both China and the United States. The trade agreement not only symbolizes our mutuality of interest in promoting closer ties but also our support for a modern China, secure and outwardlooking, which will be part of the solution to such problems.

Failure to approve this agreement would, unfortunately, be viewed as a sign that the United States is not interested in moving toward such a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship with the Chinese. It is in our irterest for China's next generation of leaders to look back in 1990 upon the relationship we are now building with a sense of satisfaction and to view the United States as a reliable partner in development.

The First Year

Beginning with the January visit here by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, we began building the framework of our new relationship. We signed agreements in science and technology, cultural, and consular affairs.

In March former [Treasury] Secretary Blumenthal initialed a claims-assets agreement which removed a significant obstacle to the development of economic and commercial relations between the United States and China. We also established a joint economic committee with China to help coordinate the development of our economic activities. This committee will hold its first meeting early next year under Treasury Secretary G. William Miller.

In May Secretary [of Commerce Juanita] Kreps signed the claims-assets agreement and initialed the trade agreement. During this same period, high-ranking Chinese officials visited this country at the invitations of the Departments of Energy and Commerce in cooperation with private industry. And a number of U.S. oil companies signed contracts to assist China's offshore oil development.

In August Vice President Mondale capped this extraordinary period by signing a hydropower and water conservation agreement, by opening the first U.S. Consulate General on the Chinese mainland in 30 years, and by stating our readiness to extend Eximbank credits and Overseas Private Investment Corporation guarantees to China, as well as giving a boost to bilateral civil aviation and maritime discussions.

Clearly, we have come far in the past year in developing our ties with China. Until this agreement is approved, however, we will remain the only major trading partner that does not have some form of trade agreement with China and that suffers from the competitive disadvantage that lack of nondiscriminatory treatment of commerce entails.

Benefits of Trade

Although small in world terms, our trade with China is expanding rapidly again this year after more than tripling in 1978 to $1.1 billion. Our trade balance with China continues to weigh heavily in our favor.

Trade with the West is critical to China's modernization. Its imports of capital equipment and industrial materials are expected to continue increasing faster than its export earnings. For China the trade equation is simple: It must sell more in order to buy more. Extending most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status to China is fundemental to this equation.

Of course, this agreement will benefit the United States as well as China. The foreign exchange that China earns from sales to the United States will allow it to purchase more goods from us, thereby benefiting U.S. exporters, helping our balance of payments, and reducing, through competition, inflationary pressures. Without this agreement, the United States penalizes its exporters, who will have to face their European and Japanese competitors supported by governments that have already extended lines of credit and MFN to China. In a market with limited foreign exchange, this represents an appreciable advantage for our competition and a disadvantage to us.

I would now like to focus the remainder of my remarks on the political perspective with which this agreement should be viewed.

Political Perspectives

I know that questions have been raised about the implications that submission of this agreement may have for our policy toward the Soviet Union. I want to be clear on this matter. We want to improve economic relations with both countries. But we do not feel that we should make every move with one country dependent on making the same move at precisely the same time with the other. Such a rigid policy would fail to recognize relevant differences in the factual situation with respect to the two nations as well as relevant matters of timing.

We signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union in 1972. We have not yet submitted it to Congress. When we do—which I hope will be soon—it will be because it is warranted by the factual situation, because it is consistent with our policy toward the Soviet Union, and because the timing is

The second primary necessity is to deal effectively with the kinds of issues I have mentioned as thrown up by international political developments. We need to respond to them in their local terms, i.e., with an awareness of their local significance, local politics, local cultures, and not purely in the game theory projection of the East-West encounter.

One of the vulnerabilities we have, I think, in our recent experience is that we have not done so in these terms. We have been inclined to see these manifold problems primarily in their East-West context without a sufficient appreciation of the local factors. Partly I think this is the result of our own insularity or lack of knowledge, lack of sensitivity and familiarity with the cultures, the languages, and histories of the peoples who have been only names in an atlas one day and then front-page preoccupations the next day.

In putting those two elements together, it seems to me they point to our interest in finding ways of regulating the competitive aspects of this relationship and of conducting it effectively. The United States has an interest in regulating the competition and moderating it so that it does not operate at the higher end of the tension scale. It seems evident to me—and I should think it is beyond dispute—that every problem in which we are concerned would be more difficult and more dangerous if the United States and the U.S.S.R. were locked into a high confrontation relationship instead of one of moderated tension.

I would add another general point and that is the necessity of recognizing that though this is—and we should not disguise the fact—primarily a competitive relationship, it is not without significant elements of overlapping interest between the two countries. Such an interest exists, especially in regard to the effort to pass through this period of international politics without having it lead to a general nuclear war which clearly neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can rationally desire.

Finally, a fourth general point—it is necessary not only to conduct this relationship with an eye toward the crisis of the month, the day-to-day problems, but also with some sense of where we would like to see it go over 5 years or 10 years, within our capacity to influence this. What are our interests in the longer term relationship with the Soviets? How would we like to see the Soviet Union evolve, to the extent that we can exercise some influence over the process of evolution, both in its domestic characteristics and in its role in the world?

This question ought not to be lost sight of at a time when the Soviet Union clearly is on the threshold of a wholesale generational turnover of its entire upper structure of leadership. This may bring the Soviet Union into a period of grave uncertainties—a period that is very difficult for us to extrapolate from the past, a period when elements among the secondary and tertiary levels of leadership may become ascendant.

There are many questions that we cannot answer about that process. We do know something about the ascendant generation. We know that, by and large, it is better educated than the present leadership. We know that it is more familiar with the outside world, but beyond that it is clearly not homogeneous in its view of the world. We are not in a position to influence choices that will be made, but we are, I think, in a position to influence the way in which the successor leadership views us, whether there is a series of transitions or something more incisive. We can affect the way in which that leadership examines its options and makes its determinations as to how it sees Soviet self-interest in the world. We have to conduct ourselves now in such a way that if there should be, among the successor leadership, some behind-the-scene appreciation for the Soviet self-interest in responsibility and restraint in the world, they will not feel that option is closed to them by the actions we are taking.

It is necessary for us, I think, to hold out what might be called a twin option policy to them at all times—that is to say, a policy which at the same time makes it clear to them what our response would be if they conduct themselves with restraint and responsibility and also makes them aware of the measures that we would feel it necessary to take if they do not, or if actions on their part have the effect of exacerbating the many sources of conflict. This is related, I think, to a problem that should be dear to your hearts—that of our own self-interest in this strengthening of the international system.

Therefore, one of our objectives has to be to try to do what we can to bring the Soviet Union to the point where it sees self-interest in a cooperative and constructive role in dealing with local issues that confront us all and in participating in the international system in a way it does not at the present time. To some extent the cooperative programs that we have developed—the dozen or so bilateral areas of cooperation in agriculture, transportation, space, health, in the problems of industrial societies, etc.—are tokens of that future intent. They do not go to the centrality of our relationship now. They are not likely to influence the conduct of the Soviet Union in present problems, but they are there as a signal of our intent over the long term.

And now what follows from this? In any effort to move in this direction, there are clearly impediments on both sides to working toward some sensibly regulated relationship against the background of a frank recognition of our differences.

In the Soviet view there is no inconsistency between support for what the Soviet Union calls "national liberation movements" and "peaceful coexistence," or detente.

Impediments on the Soviet Side

On the Soviet side, it is evident that a major impediment in moving in this direction is the Soviet view of what coexistence means, what it includes. In the Soviet view there is no inconsistency between support for what the Soviet Union calls "national liberation movements" and "peaceful coexistence," or detente. There is no inconsistency, in their view, in the exploitation of local conflict situations in order to advance Soviet interests and the development of better relations with the United States. There is no inconsistency, in their view, between their arming and transporting of Cuban soldiers to participate in combat in African conflicts and their relations with us.

But to us there is an inconsistency, and we have not yet reached the point where we are able to work out with the Soviet Union anything like a Marquis of Queensbury understanding about the terms within which we will conduct this competition—what the limits will be on the flow of weapons into troubled areas or on the exacerbation of local conflict.

To some extent there have been tacit understandings that have developed. There were such understandings, for example, at the time when the Ogaden conflict was at its height. There were communications between the two governments in which our respective concerns were expressed, and there were responses that were helpful in insuring against the widening of that conflict. The question is whether we can carry that a step further—whether it is possible to have a clearer understanding between us on the boundaries within which we will act in the prosecution of our respective interests in these conflict situations.

A second obvious impediment to the improvement of relations in the way I suggested has been the Soviet military buildup in the recent period, both in the development of strategic weapons systems and in the development of its military capabilities that bear on the European theater. In both respects these have been of concern to us and to our allies. They seem to us to have gone beyond a reasonable, prudent concern with legitimate Soviet defense requirements.

From the Soviet perspective, no doubt, they may see themselves as still seeking to catch up with the United States, to come out from under the burden of the strategic inferiority under which they labored for so many years. And it may be that one of the problems here is that they and we assess differently the different attributes of the central strategic balance and are inclined to give different weight to those fields in which the other side has an advantage. There may be, therefore, what a reporter recently called the *roshomon* effect of the difference in our respective perspectives on what the actual state of the central strategic balance may be. Nevertheless, this question of the strategic balance has been a source of particular sensitivity to us as a result of the sequelae to our experience in the Vietnam war and the apprehensions that, as a result of that experience, we may have become or may be perceived as becoming weaker or less resolute.

Finally, among the impediments on the Soviet side there is the Soviet system itself and the repressive aspects of that system which are repugnant to those of us who cherish the values of individual freedom and dignity. This has been, of course, an abrasive factor in the recent past as a result of the emergence of the human rights issue as a significant element in U.S. foreign policy, and it is quite likely that it will continue to be an element of disruption in the relationship.

The issue here, I think, is not whether we should seek to express in our foreign policy the basic values of our own society; the issue rather is to learn how to do that in a way that can have productive results. This, I think, we have been learning to do, somewhat imperfectly, as a result of our recent experience. But we have to recognize that there are limits of feasibility within which we can expect to see significant change in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet system. These limits arise from the enormous strength of the political police bureaucracy and the party bureaucracy. The party is determined not to let power slip from its hands, which might be the consequence of a further diffusion of political power within the society.

Impediments on the U.S. Side

From the U.S. side there are also impediments to the development of what one might call a sensibly regulated relationship. First of all, there has been a lack of clarity in perceiving our own interests in this relationship and of even describing to ourselves where we want to go with it, what we would like it to be. This is perhaps in part a result of our own recent political experience—the result of changes in our society which have widely separated the experience of one generation from the next. These changes have occured at a very rapid rate and have involved us in traumatic experiences in the world, the consequence of which has been to heighten the disorientation and anxieties which characterize this period.

Some of these anxieties, whether appropriately or not, have clearly focused upon the Soviet Union as the symbol of our hostilities and made it more difficult to follow a measured course in this relationship. Sometimes in reading the papers one has the impression that the determination of our policy toward the Soviet Union is like ordering an egg at breakfast. It should be either hard or soft. But in truth neither hard nor soft is really very good advice for us in this relationship. Neither extreme is very sensible or is truly in our interest. Either appeasement on one side or bellicosity on the other quite evidently would be likely to encourage a more militant policy on the part of the Soviet Union.

What makes better sense, although it makes less convenient headlines, is a policy of firmness, clarity, and civility in the relationship. We would seek in pursuing such a policy to conduct the relationship in a way that protects and advances our interests but strives at the same time to moderate the level of tension and pays due attention to those areas in which there is an overlapping of interest between the two countries. Civility, I stress, and perhaps I surprised you with the word because there is in our society an evident difference of judgment about how to encourage the Soviet Union to move in the directions we would like to see it move. There are some who feel that the only language the Soviet Union understands is that of a two-by-four across the forehead. It is quite evident from our recent experience that the net effect of an approach to the Soviet Union in these terms is about the same as a similar approach would be to us—causing us to stiffen in our determination to resist movements toward their position.

Rather it seems to me that the model to be followed is that which was followed by President Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis, i.e., while paying attention to the elements of power required in the situation, nevertheless to leave a way open for the Soviet Union to move without a sense of humiliation. The ultimate folly in the conduct of this relationship would be to take on the Soviet style in determining our response to the Soviet Union, instead of speaking in terms that truly reflect our own values, our own civility in our society.

Secondly, the issue has come to the fore in recent days, as Dean Funari said, about linkage of SALT to other issues—in this case to the issue of the Soviet brigade in Cuba. It seems to me that those who would make the ratification of SALT dependent on the Soviet brigade in Cuba, or any other actions of the Soviet Union in the world rather than on the security of the United States, suffer from a terminal case of myopia. It would not advance our interests to do so; it would have the effect of weakening U.S. security; and we would lose an opportunity to operate in an international environment in which it was possible to regulate the strategic military confrontation. Instead, we would face the unknown of an unregulated strategic military confrontation. We would, in effect, be making a choice about which way lies U.S. security—whether our security is best advanced through the effort to stabilize strategic military competition or whether it is better advanced by the effort to attain a superiority which, in fact, it is not possible to attain and which can only

Unlike its partner covenant, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights looks not to the recognition of present rights but to the future. It commits states to take steps toward the future realization of certain economic, social, and cultural goals for the individual, much as many of our domestic enactments and policy statements look toward aspirational goals of full employment, universal health care, and the like. Article 2 requires that ratifying states undertake "to take steps . . . with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant . . . ."

These rights include the right to work and to enjoy just and fair conditions of work; the right to social security, to the enjoyment of a high standard of health, and to an adequate standard of living; the right to the protection of the family and of children; and the right to primary education.

The desirability of realizing these rights is clear and in keeping with policies fostered in the United States for some 50 years at least. It is worth reiterating that no ratifying party thereby commits itself to the present implementation of these rights. Nor does any party commit itself to distribute the benefits foreseen by the covenant to individuals directly. Rather, the covenant obliges governments to work toward the eventual achievement of the minimum standards it sets out. To emphasize that this constitutes an obligation to promote rather than an immediate legal commitment to perform, the Administration has suggested appending a declaration to this effect.

Implementation Procedures

All four of these treaties contain provisions for their enforcement. There are four essential ways by which implementation of these treaty rights may be overseen.

First, common to the racial discrimination convention, the economic and social rights covenant, and the civil and political rights covenant is a reporting procedure requiring states parties to submit reports on the measures they have adopted to give effect to the rights recognized in the treaties. These three treaties call for such reports within 1 year of their entries into force and periodically thereafter.

The reports required by the economic and social rights covenant are to be submitted to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations through the Secretary General; those required by the racial discrimination convention and the civil and political rights covenant are to be submitted, again through the Secretary General, to independent committees established by the treaties. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Human Rights Committee each contain 18 members who are persons of "high moral standing" and "character" and competence, elected by secret ballot from nominees by states parties and who act in an individual capacity.

The American convention reconstitutes a similarly independent seven-member commission called the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The respective bodies reviewing the reports are authorized by the treaties to make general comments based upon examinations of the reports.

The second route of implementation consists of an interstate complaint and conciliation procedure.

Under the racial discrimination convention each state party subjects itself to the interstate procedure, but under the civil and political rights covenant and the American convention, a state party does not so subject itself unless it makes a declaration to that effect. Such a declaration would state that the state party recognizes the competence of the appropriate independent committee to receive and examine allegations from other states parties that it is not fulfilling its obligations under the treaty. The appropriate committee or commission is authorized to examine the complaint and to issue reports with nonbinding recommendations.

The rationale behind the reservations is . . . that we take our international legal obligations seriously and . . . commit ourselves to do by treaty only that which is constitutionally and legally permissible within our domestic law.

The economic and social rights covenant has no comparable provision for interstate complaints and conciliation procedures.

The third type of implementation procedure allows individuals and groups to lodge complaints with the appropriate commission or committee against states parties to the treaties.

Under the racial discrimination convention, a state party subjects itself to such complaints only if it makes a declaration to that effect; under the civil and political rights covenant, a state would be so subject only if it ratifies an optional protocol.

The American convention provides that any individual, group, or organization may lodge complaints of violations by states parties; submission to this procedure is not optional for a ratifying state.

The economic and social rights covenant contains no comparable provision.

The fourth and last means of implementation is set forth only in the American convention: that is, judicial proceedings before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This court, composed of seven judges elected in an individual capacity, has jurisdiction to hear cases submitted by states parties and the commission only if the interstate complaint procedures described above have already been completed and only if the states parties involved have declared themselves subject to the court's jurisdiction. This court provides the only enforcement mechanism that would produce decisions legally binding the states parties concerned.

As is evident from a summary of the substantive provisions of these four treaties, they do not concern themselves solely with the behavior of one state toward another. One of their principal objects and purposes is to subject the behavior of a government toward its people to international legal scrutiny, not generally, but only where that behavior does not meet certain minimum standards of justice and humanity as reflected in the treaties.

As Deputy Secretary Christopher has pointed out, the United States has always striven to conform its treatment of those under its jurisdiction to our constitutional standards and the processes of law; on the whole, we do for our own citizens what the drafters of these treaties contemplated as necessary for the citizens of all countries.

Criticisms of Opponents

But because these treaties do concern themselves with the relations between governments and individuals rather than solely with those between states, objections have been raised to them. It is feared by some that these treaties could be used to distort the constitutional legislative standards that shape our Federal and our State governments' treatment of individuals

within the United States. These criticisms deserve response.

Such objections tend to fall into three categories.

First, it is said that the human rights treaties could serve to change our laws as they are, allowing individuals in courts of law to invoke the treaty terms where inconsistent with domestic law or even with the Constitution.

The second type of objection is that the treaties could be used to alter the jurisdictional balance between our Federal and State institutions. Since these first two objections will be addressed during these hearings by the Department of Justice, I will go into them only briefly.

The third type of objection is that the relationship between a government and its citizens is not a proper subject for the treatymaking powers at all but ought to be left entirely to domestic legislative processes. This last point I shall address in somewhat more detail.

Inconsistencies With Domestic Laws. As others have noted, the treaties do diverge from our domestic law in a relatively few instances. Critics fear that this divergence will cause changes in that domestic law outside the normal legislative process, or at least will subject the relations between the government and the individual to conflicting legal standards.

This fear is not well founded, in our judgment, for two reasons. First, the President has recommended that to each of the four treaties there be appended a declaration that the treaties' substantive provisions are not self-executing. A treaty is self-executing, and thus automatically the law of the land upon entry into force, or non-self-executing, requiring implementing legislation before it becomes a rule for the courts, depending upon its terms and the intention of the parties adhering to it.

It is the Administration's view that the treaties are, on their face and according to their terms, not self-executing and, thus, are not enforceable directly by the courts. A Senate declaration would simply clarify the intention of the United States in this regard. This does not mean that vast new implementing legislation is required, as the great majority of the treaty provisions are already implemented in our domestic law. It does mean that further changes in our laws will be brought about only through the normal legislative process. This understanding as to the non-self-executing nature of the substantive provisions of the treaties would not derogate from or diminish in any way our international obligations under the treaties; it touches only upon the role the treaty provisions will play in our domestic law.

A second reason why we need not fear a confusion of standards due to possible conflicts between the treaty provisions and domestic law rests in this Administration's recommended reservations and understandings. In the few instances where it was felt that a provision of the treaties could reasonably be interpreted to diverge from the requirements of our Constitution or from Federal or State law presently in force, the Administration has suggested that a reservation or understanding be made to that provision.

In our view, these reservations do not detract from the object and the purpose of the treaties—that is, to see to it that minimum standards of human rights are observed throughout the world—and they permit us to accept the treaties in a form consonant with our domestic legal requirements.

Jurisdictional Balance Between Federal and State Institutions. As I have previously noted, a second objection raised by critics to the ratification of these human rights treaties is that they might upset the existing allocation of jurisdiction between our Federal and State institutions. Some of these critics feel that certain matters addressed in the treaties lie exclusively within the jurisdiction of the several States within our Federal system and that subjecting these matters to regulation by treaty or by congressional legislation will infringe upon that State jurisdiction.

Although most of the matters dealt with in the treaties are governed by Federal law at this juncture in our history, the Administration is sensitive to this concern. We have, therefore, recommended a reservation to the racial discrimination convention and the two covenants, stating that the United States shall implement the treaty provisions over whose subject matter the Federal Government exercises jurisdiction and shall encourage State authorities to take appropriate measures with regard to the provisions over whose subject matter the States exercise jurisdiction.

The content of this reservation is already built into article 28 of the American convention. There need be no apprehension that the ratification of the human rights treaties will invade the field of those matters which are properly left to states jurisdiction.

Relationship Between Government and Its Citizens. The third objection that has been raised is that the subject matter of these treaties lies beyond the scope of the treatymaking power. The text of the Constitution, of course, gives no guidance as to what may or may not be the subject of a treaty. The Supreme Court has said a number of times that "[t]he treaty-making power of the United States is not limited by any express provision of the Constitution, and, though it does not extend 'so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids,' it does extend to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations." (*Asakura* v. *Seattle*, 265 U.S. 341 (1923); *Geofroy* v. *Riggs*, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1899); *Ware* v. *Hylton*, 3 Dall. 199 (1796)) Although the Court has not elaborated upon what a "proper subject of negotiation" might or might not be, it has come to be commonly accepted that the treaty power extends to any "matter of international concern." (See *Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, (§40, comment b at 117 (1965))

Although there have in the past been differences of opinion as to what is and is not a matter of "international concern," it seems clear today that no matter how widely or narrowly the boundaries of "international concern" be drawn, a treaty concerning human rights falls squarely within them. States have entered into such treaties since the 17th century.

For example, in 1648 the treaty of Westphalia established the principle of equality of rights for those of the Catholic and Protestant religions. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the Congress of Berlin in 1878 both provided for the free exercise of religion by individuals. Numerous treaties in the 19th century had as their goal the suppression of the slave trade; the United States became party to one of them in 1862. The peace treaties in central Europe following the First and Second World Wars assured protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants without regard to birth, nationality, language, race, or religion and included provisions for the protection of minorities.

In the 20th century, the United States has become party to a number of treaties that address the rights of the individual as against his government, including international labor conventions, the constitution of the International Labor Organization, the 1926 slavery convention, the 1945 peace treaties, the U.N. Charter, and, more recently, the Supplementary Convention on Slavery in 1967 and the Conven-

Council to make the weight of world opinion felt.

We note that the Soviet Union has stated that it intends to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan at some point. We urge the Soviet Union to do so immediately and to allow the people of Afghanistan to conduct their own affairs, to choose their own system of government, to choose their own national leaders without outside pressure and interference. Only in this way can the grave threat to international peace and security created by the Soviet Union be diminished and this most serious challenge to the basic principles of the United Nations be removed.

No state, not even a great power, can be allowed to ignore with impunity the responsibilities, obligations, and commitments it assumed when it became a member of the United Nations. The United States therefore calls on all members of the Council to act vigorously in discharge of their Charter obligations.

DRAFT RESOLUTION, JAN. 7, 1980

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter dated 3 January 1980 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13724 and Add.1 and 2),

Gravely concerned over recent developments in Afghanistan and their implications for international peace and security,

Reaffirming the right of all peoples to determine their own future free from outside interference, including their right to choose their own form of government,

Mindful of the obligations of Member States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

1. *Reaffirms anew* its conviction that the preservation of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State is a fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations, any violation of which on any pretext whatsoever is contrary to its aims and purposes;

2. *Deeply deplores* the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan, which is inconsistent with that principle;

3. *Affirms* that the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and nonaligned status of Afghanistan must be fully respected;

4. *Calls* for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to enable its people to determine their own form of government and choose their economic, political and social systems free from outside intervention, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report on progress towards the implementation of this resolution within two weeks;

6. *Decides* to remain seized of this question.

[Documentation concerning taking the question of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the General Assembly will be published in the February 1980 Bulletin.] ■

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[1] Broadcast live on television and radio from the Oval Office (text from White House press release).

[2] USUN press release 1.

World Opinion on the Holding of U.S. Hostages in Iran

Following is a partial list of public actions taken by governments, international organizations (both governmental and nongovernmental), and prominent persons supporting efforts to assure the safety and release of the U.S. hostages in Iran.

November 4

West European Embassies (Nov. 4–5) inform U.S. of developments in Tehran and offer to assist in efforts for release of hostages

November 6

U.N. Security Council. Issues statement on behalf of Secretary General Waldheim expressing extreme concern about the situation in Iran and offering his assistance.

Canada. House of Commons approves resolution to protest to the Iranian Government against an "act of criminal aggression."

November 7

Turkish Ambassador attempts to visit hostages.

November 8

Liberia. President Tolbert appeals to the Ayatollah Khomeini for release of hostages on humanitarian grounds.

Canadians visit Charge d'Affaires L. Bruce Laingen, the senior U.S. diplomatic official held hostage in Tehran.

U.K. Prime Minister Thatcher announces that the United Kingdom will continue to do everything possible to assist the United States.

November 9

U.N. General Assembly. President Salim Ahmed Salim issues a statement expressing his concern for the safety and security of hostages and announces he is sending a personal message to Khomeini appealing for their release.

U.N. Security Council. President Palacios de Vizzio reads a statement expressing the Council's profound concern over prolonged detention of hostages and states that the taking of hostages is in violation of internationally accepted norms.

European Community Ambassadors join in demarche to Iran's Foreign Ministry, urging access to the U.S. Charge and hostages.

November 10

Cape Verde. *Voz de Povo*, a Cape Verde newspaper which speaks for the government party, comments that "invasion of the American Embassy in Tehran runs counter to all the principles of conduct of relations and coexistence among nations."

Algerian, French, Swedish, and **Syrian Ambassadors** visit hostages.

EC-9 Ambassadors call at the Iranian Foreign Ministry to express their governments' concern over violations of diplomatic immunity.

Swiss Ambassador appeals to Iranian Foreign Ministry to release women hostages as a humanitarian gesture.

November 11–12

Pakistan. In response to Secretary General Waldheim's request, major newspapers report that President Zia Ul-Haq sent a special message to Khomeini appealing for release of hostages.

November 12

EC-9 Ambassadors again visit the Iranian Foreign Ministry.

November 13

Prince Sihanouk, in a message to Khomeini, asks that he grant mercy to the hostages "who are in no way responsible for the actions of their government."

Norway. Undersecretary Holst states that the Norweigen Government views the use of hostages as an intolerable mechanism and points out that it is equally intolerable that Iranian authorities condone the violation of diplomatic immunity.

November 14

Brazil. In columns and editorials, newspapers criticize Khomeini government, and several applaude U.S. restraint.

Netherlands. Foreign Minister van der Klaauw expresses deep concern and states that the principle of inviolability of diplomatic missions and personnel must be upheld.

In Paris, the **International Human Rights Federation,** which denounced the Shah's rule some time ago, states that Iran's demand to return a "sick man" is unjustified and urges unconditional release of hostages.

November 15

West Germany. Economic Minister Lambsdorff states that the F.R.G. will take no action to undermine the U.S. oil embargo.

Kenya. A statement by President Moi, broadcast on the "Voice of Kenya," states in part that "whatever crimes might have been committed by the Shah during his reign," the taking of hostages to coerce the U.S. Government to return him for trial "constitutes a serious breach of diplomatic intercourse and must be viewed with disapproval by the entire international community."

India. The *Times* carries a letter by a prominent Indian Moslem, Badruddin Tyabji, expressing his hope that Khomeini will remind the students of the distinguished Islamic traditions of chivalry, hospitality, and generosity.

Paraguay. Senate, in a unanimous vote, issues a strong statement renouncing the action of Iranian authorities.

New Zealand. Government expresses its profound concern about the Iranian situation and associates itself with the statement made by Security Council President Palacios on November 9 urging immediate release of hostages.

Malaysia. Press refers to U.S. action as "commendably restrained" and

(U.N. photo by Y. Nagata)

Ambassador McHenry confers with Ambassador Kaiser of Bangladesh before the U.N. Security Council meeting on November 27.

News Conference of November 28

For the last 24 days, our nation's concern has been focused on our fellow Americans being held hostage in Iran. We have welcomed some of them home to their families and their friends. But we will not rest nor deviate from our efforts until all have been freed from their imprisonment and their abuse. We hold the Government of Iran fully responsible for the well-being and the safe return of every single person.

I want the American people to understand the situation as much as possible, but there may be some questions tonight which I cannot answer fully because of my concern for the well-being of the hostages.

First of all, I would like to say that I am proud of this great nation, and I want to thank all Americans for their prayers, their courage, their persistence, their strong support and patience. During these past days, our national will, our courage, and our maturity have all been severely tested and history will show that the people of the United States have met every test.

In the days to come our determination may be even more sorely tried, but we will continue to defend the security, the honor, and the freedom of Americans everywhere. This nation will never yield to blackmail.

For all Americans our constant concern is the well-being and the safety of our fellow citizens who are being held illegally and irresponsibly hostage in Iran. The actions of Iran have shocked the civilized world.

For a government to applaud mob violence and terrorism, for a government actually to support and, in effect, participate in the taking and the holding of hostages is unprecedented in human history. This violates not only the most fundamental precepts of international law but the common ethical and religious heritage of humanity. There is no recognized religious faith on Earth which condones kidnapping. There is no recognized religious faith on Earth which condones blackmail. There is certainly no religious faith on Earth which condones the sustained abuse of innocent people.

We are deeply concerned about the inhuman and degrading conditions imposed on the hostages. From every corner of the world, nations and people have voiced their strong revulsion and condemnation of Iran and have joined us in calling for the release of the hostages.

Last night a statement of support was released and was issued by the President of the U.N. General Assembly, the Security Council, on behalf of all of its members. We expect a further Security Council meeting on Saturday night, at which more firm and official action may be taken to help in obtaining the release of the American hostages.

Any claims raised by government officials of Iran will ring hollow while they keep innocent people bound and abused and threatened. We hope that this exercise of diplomacy and international law will bring a peaceful solution, because a peaceful solution is preferable to the other remedies available to the United States.

At the same time, we pursue such a solution with grim determination. The Government of Iran must recognize the gravity of the situation which it has itself created and the grave consequences which will result if harm comes to any of the hostages.

I want the American people to know, and I want the world to know, that we will persist in our efforts, through every means available, until every single American has been freed. We must also recognize now, as we never have before, that it is our entire nation which is vulnerable because of our overwhelming and excessive dependence on oil from foreign countries. We have got to accept the fact that this dependence is a direct, physical threat to our national security. And we must join together to fight for our nation's energy freedom.

We know the ways to win this war: more American energy and the more efficient use of what we have. The U.S. Congress is now struggling with this extremely important decision. The way to victory is long and difficult, but we have the will and we have the human and the natural resources of our great nation. However hard it might be to see into the future, one thing tonight is clear: We stand together.

We stand as a nation unified, a people determined to protect the life and the honor of every American. And we are determined to make America an energy secure nation once again. It is unthinkable that we will allow ourselves to be dominated by any form of overdependence at home or any brand of terrorism abroad. We are determined that the freest nation on Earth shall protect and enhance its freedom.

Q. The Ayatollah Khomeini said the other day—and I'm using his words—he doesn't believe you have the guts to use military force. He puts no credibility in our military deterrent. I'm wondering how do we get out of this mess in Iran and still retain credibility with our allies and with our adversaries overseas?

A. We have the full support of our allies, and in this particular instance we have no adversaries overseas. There is no civilized country on Earth which has not condemned the seizure and the holding of the hostages by Iran. It would not be advisable for me to explore publicly all of the options open to our country. As I said earlier, I'm determined to do the best I can through diplomatic means and through peaceful means to insure the safety of our hostages and their release. Other actions which I might decide to take would come in the future after those peaceful means have been exhausted.

But I believe that the growing condemnation of the world community on Iran will have a beneficial effect.

Q. Why did you reverse your policy and permit the Shah to come into this country when, one, medical treatment was available elsewhere; two, you had been warned by our Charge that the Americans might be endangered in Tehran; and three, the Bazargan government was so shaky that it was questionable whether he could deliver on the promise to protect our Embassy; and last of all, in view of the consequences do you regret the decision?

A. No, the decision that I made personally and without pressure from anyone to carry out the principles of our country, to provide for the means of giving the Shah necessary medical assistance to save his life, was proper. At the same time we notified the Government of Iran. We were assured by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister that our Embassy would be protected, and it was protected for several days, in spite of threats from outside.

Then peremptorily, after Khomeini made an aggravating speech to the crowds in the street and withdrew protection from the Embassy, it was attacked successfully. The Embassy was

right—and not because of our policy toward China or some other third country.

In the last 3 years China's economic, political, and cultural policies have undergone substantial change. There is greater diversity in almost all aspects of Chinese life. Economic decentralization, interaction with the West, and experimentation with new ideas and concepts have been matched by an increased openness and a willingness to admit problems. The Chinese leadership publicly has committed itself to raising the living standards of the people.

These new developments should be kept in perspective. We cannot ignore China's long authoritarian tradition, but neither should we turn our back on what is beginning to happen. It should be a source of satisfaction to us that the Chinese Government is determined to develop a legal system that would prevent the unchecked exercise of official authority.

China's emigration policies, which have undergone substantial change in the last 3 years, are of particular importance to this subcommittee. Under the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, MFN treatment of Communist nations that restrict emigration is prohibited. That prohibition, however, may be waived if the President concludes and reports to Congress that the amendment's requirements pertaining to a country's emigration practices have been satisfied. The Trade Act vests in the President the responsibility to determine whether these requirements have been met. In his report to the Congress the President set forth his conclusion that in the case of the P.R.C., these requirements have, indeed, been met.

The President's conclusion was based upon an analysis and weighing of three factors. These include China's current emigration performance, public statements by Chinese officials, and our confidential diplomatic discussions with Chinese officials.

On the first element, emigration from China has increased dramatically over the past 2 years. In 1978, 71,000 persons emigrated from Hong Kong, the major exit point from the P.R.C. This figure is three times the number who emigrated in 1977. This trend continued in 1979 with 28,000 emigrants entering Hong Kong in the first 3 months alone. The number has slowed somewhat since April due primarily to protests by the Hong Kong Government. Nevertheless, 4,000–5,000 emigrants continue to enter Hong Kong each month.

The U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong received over 10,000 applications from P.R.C. emigrants between November 1978 and April 1979. Chinese emigrants and visa applicants now far exceed the available immigrant visa numbers chargeable to China. Therefore, several thousand have been obliged to wait in China and in Hong Kong until visa numbers become available.

That the P.R.C. has liberalized its emigration policy is confirmed by public statements of Chinese officials. Mr. Liao, the Director of the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs, stated on January 4, 1978: "We should provide . . . for foreign nationals of Chinese descent to visit their relatives in China or make a tour of the country as well as for Chinese citizens to go abroad for reunion with their kinfolk of foreign nationality, simplify the procedure for getting permission to enter or leave China, give warm reception to those entering China, and improve our service." China has followed this theme consistently since this instruction was issued.

Mr. Liao elaborated on this policy in December 1978 when he stated that Chinese who had received visas from other countries should be granted exit permits "immediately." During his visit to the United States in January 1979, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping reiterated this policy publicly before the U.S.-China People's Friendship Association. Adding weight to the Vice Premier's remarks, the consular agreement concluded during his visit contains a commitment by China ". . . to facilitate the reunion of families and [to] process all applications as quickly as possible . . . ."

On the final element, U.S. and Chinese officials conducted confidential conversations in which the Trade Act's emigration requirements and Chinese emigration policy came to be mutually understood. The conversations indicate that the P.R.C. is liberalizing its emigration rules and intends to continue this policy.

We have examined China's emigration record, we have studied the public statements made by their officials, and we have had discussions with the Chinese on their emigration policy. Based upon all of these factors, we are confident, as the President has reported, that the requirements of Section 402 of the Trade Act have been satisfied.

In closing, I seek your support and urge that you give this agreement speedy approval. We are now building the structure of our relationship with China for the 1980's. This relationship is and will continue to be very important to us. Your approval of this trade agreement is a critical step in the process. I am confident of your support. ■

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

[2] For texts of the agreement and the President's message to the Congress, see BULLETIN of Dec. 1979, p. 33.

Agreements With Taiwan

by Warren Christopher

Statement before the Subcommittee for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 16, 1979. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.[1]

I am pleased to appear today before the committee to review our experience with the unofficial arrangements that we have established with Taiwan.

For years the United States, alone among the major nations of the world, refused to accord recognition to the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). This anomaly hindered our diplomacy in Asia and thwarted the development of economic relations with a country that is the home of one-fourth of the world's population.

Following 6 months of intense discussions both here and in Beijing, President Carter announced almost a year ago that the United States would henceforth recognize the P.R.C. as the sole legitimate Government of China. At the same time the President announced our intention to sever official relations with Taiwan.

The development of our relations with the P.R.C. over the past year stands as testimony to the wisdom of the President's decision. As this committee is aware, the Administration has recently submitted to the Congress the Agreement on Trade Relations that would extend most-favored-nation nondiscriminatory trade status to the P.R.C.[2]

While our improved relations with China have been gratifying, I am

equally pleased by the fact that the severing of our diplomatic relations with Taiwan has not adversely affected the welfare of the people nor has it breached the practical ties that exist between Taiwan and the United States.

Taiwan's economy today is even more vigorous than it was before we normalized relations with the P.R.C. Taiwan's GNP is growing robustly, and industrial production is increasing at 9% per year. Projected U.S.-Taiwan trade for 1979 is $10 billion compared with $7.5 billion in 1978. This represents an increase of 33%. U.S. private investment in Taiwan, a very good indicator of confidence in the island's future, was $68.7 million in the first half of this year compared with $27.1 million during the same period in 1978—a striking increase.

AIT and CCNAA

I do not mean to suggest that the transition from official to unofficial relations has been problem free. But the Taiwan Relations Act, the basis for our new relations, has afforded us the flexibility to deal with problems cooperatively and imaginatively. In particular, the unofficial instrumentalities of our new relationship—the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA)—have proved their effectiveness during the transition.

In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, the President issued an Executive order that, among other things, delegates to the Secretary of State the authority to extend functional privileges and immunities on a reciprocal basis to the CCNAA.

AIT provided CCNAA a copy of a draft agreement on privileges and immunities on September 20, 1979, to which CCNAA has responded. Differences are minimal, and agreement between the parties should soon result. In the meantime, the two sides have extended functional privileges to allow for effective operations of the two organizations. To conduct its affairs, the CCNAA has opened nine offices in our country—a number that is appropriate for our new relationship with Taiwan.

Although our unofficial relations with Taiwan are coordinated through the AIT, we have recognized that issues could arise which are beyond the technical competence of the AIT. We have made it clear that, to the extent necessary and appropriate, we would arrange for technical contacts with U.S. Government employees through AIT. Such instances have, in fact, arisen, and the appropriate contacts have been arranged.

I would now like to address for the record some of the issues regarding agreements in an attempt to clarify the Administration's intentions and, I hope, to dispel any misunderstandings.

Existing Agreements

When we normalized our relations with the P.R.C., we made crystal clear our intention to maintain, on an unofficial basis, trade, cultural, and other relations with Taiwan. We believed it essential that our existing agreements with Taiwan would continue to have legal validity, despite the withdrawal of recognition. The President, therefore, issued a presidential memorandum on December 30, 1978, which stated that: "Existing international agreements and arrangements in force between the United States and Taiwan shall continue in force . . . ."[3] The Administration welcomed the addition of Section 4(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act, which approved the continuation in force of such agreements ". . . unless and until terminated in accordance with law . . .," because that provision further removed any doubt about their continuing validity. This treatment of existing agreements by the Administration and Congress stands in contrast to that of most other nations which abrogated their agreements with Taiwan upon recognizing the P.R.C.

Our relationship with Taiwan is not static. It has not been frozen in the status quo that existed at the moment we recognized the P.R.C. Some of our agreements with Taiwan will expire, perhaps calling for replacement with new agreements; some will require changes or updating; and others, having completed their purposes, will become obsolete. However, I want to emphasize that we do not have a policy to convert or terminate all of the treaties and agreements we maintain with Taiwan. Each agreement, as the circumstances require, will be considered on its own merits, on a case-by-case basis.

In that context, we have undertaken a review of these agreements with Taiwan and I will share with you our preliminary views on them. There are five agreements that require current attention.

Scientific Cooperation. First, our agreement on scientific cooperation, which both sides have found beneficial, expires in January 1980. Negotiations for a new agreement will soon begin between the AIT and CCNAA. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, agreements concluded by these unofficial instrumentalities have full force and effect under U.S. law.

Air Transport. Second, the air transport agreement, concluded in Nanjing [Nanking] in 1946, has become a hindrance to development of aviation relations with the P.R.C. It was only after Vice President Mondale, during his trip to China in August, informed Beijing that we planned to replace the Nanjing agreement with a new agreement between the AIT and the CCNAA that the Chinese Government agreed to begin negotiations for a U.S.-P.R.C. civil aviation agreement. In any event, a new basis for air links with Taiwan would be useful in improving U.S.-Taiwan air services. Negotiations currently are underway between AIT and CCNAA on a civil air agreement. Good progress is being made in the talks and we would hope to have a new agreement soon.

Textiles. Third, our textile agreement with Taiwan requires some implementing modification. These are being handled by AIT-CCNAA letters of understanding.

Nuclear Cooperation. Fourth, pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, we are reviewing the nuclear cooperation agreement.

Trade. Fifth, on October 24, CCNAA and AIT exchanged letters implementing multilateral trade negotiations-related reductions in tariff and nontariff barriers.

Having mentioned these five categories that require action, no other agreements appear to require current attention.

Active Programs

A second group of 29 agreements concerns active programs or contains provisions of continuing relevance. For example, this group contains agreements on active programs in the fields of education, fisheries, investment, postal affairs, and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation.

Two agricultural sales agreements, on the other hand, contain provisions of continuing relevance. They relate to commodities which have previously been furnished but for which payment is still being received by the United States. We see no reason at this time to take any action with respect to these agreements.

A third category includes the mutual defense treaty and six agreements in the military field. The Presi-

have the effect of plunging the world into development of more weapons, more widely dispersed, more complex, more difficult to regulate, and all the uncertainty that goes with that.

This is not in any way to diminish the importance of those measures which have been proposed for strengthening the U.S. defense program where it is now not adequate, but it is important to bear in mind that the measures required to deal with those deficiencies would have to be substantially larger in the event there were no effective SALT agreement. In this connection I think it is important to say that the effect of postponing SALT—and we should not deceive ourselves on this—would be to kill the treaty; if we were to seek, 1 year from now, 2 years, 3 years from now to pick up the pieces and try to bring the treaty to realization at that time, we would not be able to start where we left off. The military environment will not stand still; we and the Soviet Union will be moving into systems that will be more difficult of regulation, and we shall have to begin again. No one can foresee the terms that such an effort at regulation might require under those circumstances.

The effect of postponement or of nonratification would be more immediately felt, I think, on Soviet programs than on our own, because most of the programs now being proposed and discussed for rectifying our strategic posture are not prohibited to us under the treaty, whereas many of the measures before the Soviet Union would be. The Soviet Union's practice in recent months of taking out of circulati submarines to offset newer systems as they come into service would no longer be required if the Interim Agreement were not regarded as being in force. Without the SALT II Treaty, there would be no limits on the number of warheads on strategic missiles, which is a matter of great concern to us. The ban on interfering with national technical means of verification would also not be in force. Encryption of Soviet telemetry would then not be barred, in the absence of a treaty. Moreover, I think it is important that we not lose sight of concerns our allies have unanimously expressed about the situation in which they would find themselves should the treaty fall.

Behind many of these concerns is the need for greater rationality in our defense policy. It is evident to all of us that there is a certain accidental quality in the determination of our defense capabilities. It is a resultant of the interplay of pressures and interests having to do with particular systems, rather than the result of an overarching plan which takes account of our needs and at the same time integrates into our defense planning the undoubted security interest we have in trying to stabilize the military competition wherever we can. And it must be, I think, an objective for those of us who work in this field to try to move toward that greater rationality.

In conclusion, we have to bear in mind that the Soviet Union is obviously not our only problem, and except for this one aspect—the danger of nuclear war—it is not the main problem in our foreign policy. In many of the problems we deal with, the Soviet Union is a complicating factor rather than a prime cause of our troubles. It is essential for the effectiveness of our response to the competitive aspects that we should address the real needs of the Third World—the nations of Africa and Asia and elsewhere—so that we are seen as having interests that are not in conflict with theirs and that we help to bring them too into the framework of the international system which is important to us.

It is clear that if we are not successful in doing this, the situation may roll on in its own unguided way toward a disintegrative development of the international system, leading to anarchy and chaos in which the values to which our own society is dedicated shall not flourish and may not survive. ■

Continuity and Commitment

by Matthew Nimetz

Address before the leadership conference of the National Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry in New York City on October 30, 1979. Mr. Nimetz is Counselor for the Department of State.

My purpose today is to speak to you about one of the most important ways in which we are trying to improve the situation for human rights in the East-West context. I speak of the Helsinki process, the dialogue which was formalized in 1975 by the leaders of the 35 nations who signed the Helsinki Final Act. I would like particularly to address my remarks to the thinking of the U.S. Government about where we are and where we ought to go with respect to this process and also to give you the flavor of our thoughts on how to improve the dialogue in the future.

This audience certainly understands the fundamental difference between the Western system of democratic society and the competing Soviet system. The Helsinki process seeks to address our basic foreign policy dilemma: How can these two competing and largely antagonistic systems coexist in a manner that protects our security and at the same time create opportunities to increase areas of cooperation?

The Final Act goes beyond dealing with interests of diplomats for it also seeks to address the universal desire of all peoples for basic human rights and freedoms. For this reason, we do not conceive of the Helsinki process as a bloc-to-bloc confrontation, although we have no illusions that the problem of the East is at present our central consideration. By taking account of the various wishes and hopes of the signatory nations, the Helsinki process helps to keep open channels of communication on many sensitive issues in a way which shows great promise for the improvements we seek. This process, however, can only be kept alive through our commitment to make it work and to use its potential continuously to attain our objectives.

Background of the Final Act

Before I continue with my main theme, let me briefly review the genesis of the Final Act in order to place in perspective my later remarks about the continuity of its application.

We are all familiar with the postwar situation as it developed in Europe following the victory of the allies over Nazi Germany. The nature of the postwar division of territory, people, and value systems is still more than a generation later, at the heart of the current political strains in Europe.

In the period after the Soviet Union consolidated its control over Eastern Europe, Moscow devoted its efforts to legitimize its postwar sphere of domination. To achieve this end, and to exclude the United States from Europe, the U.S.S.R. sought a con erence solely of European states to finalize the frontier arrangements which had existed *de facto* since the end of World War II. The West stood firm against these Soviet desires since we had no interest in unilaterally granting legal recognition to the U.S.S.R.'s territorial gains. The United States and our allies, in addition, saw that such a Soviet-sponsored

European conference would be used by them to weaken the relationship among the United States, Canada, and Western European nations, as institutionalized in the NATO alliance.

In the late 1960s, as a part of the general relaxation of tensions, a European conference became of greater interest throughout the West. The NATO alliance expressed cautious interest in such a conference, provided the United States and Canada took part. Simultaneously during this period, the Federal Republic of Germany introduced its *Ostpolitik* in part to ameliorate various intra-German problems, and the United States was working directly with the Soviet Union on a number of specific questions such as improvements in the Berlin situation, SALT I, nonproliferation, and various other issues.

The policy of Western nations in the early 1970s was to work toward a relaxation of political tension and a reduction of the all too real risks of nuclear war. This effort, of course, is now known by the short-hand term—detente. Someone has said that there must be something wrong with a concept that cannot be described in English. Nevertheless, one of the concrete and continuing results of detente was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which we commonly refer to as CSCE. Preparatory talks opened in Helsinki in late 1972, and negotiations continued there and in Geneva to work out the outlines of the Final Act.

Since security concerns such as SALT, the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations, and other such specific topics were being handled separately in their own restricted forums, the concept of security which the Final Act of Helsinki embodied was understood to be a much broader one. The Helsinki negotiators sought to enhance the sense of security among all the participating nations by expanding cooperation among them, especially between Eastern and Western nations, in a wide range of areas including economic, humanitarian, educational, and cultural.

The practical expression of this organizational concept resulted in the division of the Final Act into three basic areas which have commonly been called baskets. Basket 1 contained a declaration of principles of interstate behavior, such as sovereign equality and restraint from the use of force, principles which were consistent with the U.N. Charter and other declarations of international law.

Basket 1 also contained a very important affirmation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including religious practice, as one of the 10 principles governing the relations among the participating states. The inclusion of this principle was a difficult achievement and was accomplished by careful drafting which produced wording similar to, and consistent with, earlier statements in such documents as the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the U.N. convenants on human rights. In restating this principle, the Helsinki signatories not only affirmed their commitment to such freedoms, they also specifically reaffirmed the earlier and more basic documents. More importantly, perhaps, the signatories implicitly affirmed the principle that true detente—and true security—rested in the final analysis upon respect for human rights.

Also included in basket 1 is an innovative and important security component, called confidence-building measures.

Realizing that the building of trust is an important component of security, the Final Act provides for the prior notification of certain troop maneuvers and movements and the exchange of observers among the signatories at military maneuvers.

Baskets 2 and 3, you will recall, deal with economics, science, and technology, and with cooperation in cultural, humanitarian, and other fields. In these baskets, specific areas of cooperation were outlined which nations could pursue to strengthen interchange and provide for the betterment of the conditions of life in specific ways for their populations.

A great deal more could be said about the elements included in the Final Act, but I suspect you are all quite familiar with them. Among the many who talk readily about the Final Act, few have actually read it and, I further suspect, a significant proportion of that exclusive group is present in this room. For that reason, you are all aware that the Helsinki act is not actually a treaty. It is instead a solemn agreement among the signatories to seek the political objectives outlined in the act. Inherent in the Final Act's provisions was the desire to reduce the level of confrontation between East and West and to contribute to the spirit of detente. Also implicit in the provisions was a commitment to increase the dialogue among the parties, especially between Eastern and Western nations.

The negotiators created a delicately balanced document; it contained items of importance to each participant. All of the participants were, quite obviously, interested in a strengthened sense of security in Europe. For the Soviet Union, CSCE implied a certain degree of acceptance of the post-World War II territorial frontiers in Europe, since the signatories agreed to seek no change in frontiers except by peaceful means. For many of the East European states, it established a framework that permitted greater interaction with Western countries than was previously possible.

For the neutral and nonaligned states, CSCE provided a forum in which to pursue European-wide interests. Thus Switzerland, which is not a member of the United Nations, plays a creative political role in Europe; the Vatican pursues its important moral and institutional goals; while Malta expresses its interests in Mediterranean issues.

For the West, the Final Act gave us a means to promote the exchange of people and ideas and to seek peaceful evolution in the systems that govern the populations of the U.S.S.R. and the countries of Eastern Europe and provided as well a concrete affirmation of the right of states to raise humanitarian concerns in a diplomatic context. In our view, the Final Act achieved an enormous success of making quite explicit the notion that improved human rights would be a permanent factor in the detente equation. This may have been an unexpected turn of events for the Soviet Union, but it quickly became plain that the inclusion of the human rights concept was to be essential to the CSCE process.

Perhaps the most important aspect of Helsinki is that it is more than a document; it is a document that was converted into a vital process. It created a process for continuous dialogue between the East and West, a platform from which the signatory nations legitimately could talk about sensitive concerns with their neighbors, concerns that previously were difficult to voice in a diplomatic context. This was accomplished through the establishment of a unique system of follow-on meetings which allows—or more accurately, requires—the signatory nations to review with each other on a continuing basis the progress being made toward the implementation of the Final Act's provisions. By placing in the text of the act itself the requirement to review the implementation of the political objectives to which they had agreed, the Helsinki signatories initiated a

tion on the Political Rights of Women in 1976.

The United States is party to the Charter of the Organization of American States, which addresses the economic and social rights of the individual, and we are, of course, party to the U.N. Charter, under which members are pledged to take action to promote ". . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." The growth of the U.N. system of reporting, review, and treatymaking arising from this provision—touching on matters from terrorism to the status of refugees—reflects a universal judgment that human rights are properly a matter of international concern and foreign policy interest.

A reporter's note to the Second *Restatement of Foreign Relations Law* states in part as follows.

> Proposed treaties dealing with human rights have raised questions in the U.S. and, indeed, in other countries as to whether or not they deal with matters that are appropriate for settlement by agreement between nations . . . Although such conventions generally specify standards already observed in the U.S., it has an interest in seeing that they are observed by as many states as possible, not merely to protect its own standards, but to promote conditions abroad that will foster economic development and democratic institutions that are conducive to prosperity in the U.S. and achievement of its foreign policy objectives. It cannot effectively urge other states to adhere to such conventions without doing so itself. (Restatement (Second) of *Foreign Relations Law*, §118, Reporter's note at 375).

In sum, it seems now beyond dispute that human rights are properly a matter of international concern.

Criticisms of Supporters

Thus far I have discussed criticisms heard from opponents of ratification of these treaties on human rights. Let me turn now to criticisms heard from supporters of ratification. Some of these supporters—including some of the treaties' most distinguished proponents—are critical of what they perceive as the Administration's efforts to insulate our own domestic system from the impact of the human rights treaties' terms by means of reservations.

It is asserted that the essential object or purpose of these human rights treaties is to change the domestic law of the ratifying states in order to conform with the precise dictates of the treaties' terms. That being the case, it is said, the Administration's recommended reservations violate the purposes of the treaties, because the reservations are designed to harmonize the treaties' requirements with our existing domestic law.

We think it appropriate to suggest, however, that these critics have not fully appreciated the purpose of these human rights treaties. The primary objective is the fostering of international commitments to erect and observe a minimum standard of rights for the individual as set forth by the treaties. This standard is met by our domestic system in practice, although not always in precisely the same way that the treaties envision. By ratification, we would commit ourselves to maintain the level of respect we already pay to the human rights of our people; we would commit ourselves not to backslide; and we would be subjecting this commitment and our human rights performance as a whole to international scrutiny.

Our main goal in suggesting the reservations that I have described is, thus, not to evade the minimum standards imposed by the treaties whenever they touch our system. The rationale behind the reservations is, rather, that we take our international legal obligations seriously and, therefore, will commit ourselves to do by treaty only that which is constitutionally and legally permissible within our domestic law.

In this respect, it should be noted, we are in good company. This has been the approach taken by other countries which share with us the democratic traditions from which these treaties derive their content. Specifically, a number of Western European countries have appended extensive substantive reservations to these treaties. I might add that the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, which is similar to the civil and political covenant in content, explicitly provides for the making of reservations to allow participating countries to make their international commitments by treaty consistent with their domestic legal systems. At least five nations have availed themselves of this opportunity.

Another reason why the Administration has proposed a number of reservations, understandings, and declarations is pragmatic. We believe these treaties to be important and necessary, and we are anxious to secure the advice and consent of the Senate to their ratification. It is our judgment that the prospects for securing that ratification would be significantly, and perhaps decisively, advanced if it were to be clear that, by adopting these treaties, the United States would not automatically be bringing about changes in its internal law without the legislative concurrence of the Federal or State governments.

How Enforcement Has Proceeded

Let me turn to a brief examination of how enforcement of the treaties has proceeded in practice up to this time, for that will give some indication as to whether ratification would unduly expose the United States to unwarranted or unfair attack pursuant to the treaties.

The reporting procedures for the racial discrimination convention and the civil and political rights covenant have, thus far, been the principal enforcement mechanisms. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has been meeting to consider reports submitted by states parties since 1970; the Committee on Human Rights since 1977. Each has begun to build its own set of practices and procedures in that time.

The Racial Discrimination Committee requires the states parties to submit an itemized account of the "legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures" adopted with regard to each of the substantive obligations of the convention. The committee has no independent factfinding authority, but in practice committee members have also gathered outside information in their capacity as "experts." The utilization of such additional information has given the committee the opportunity to raise meaningful questions as to a state's claims of compliance.

The Racial Discrimination Committee has never issued a formal determination of noncompliance with the convention in response to a state's report. On the other hand, it has invited each state party to send a representative to reply to questions of the committee as it considers the state's report, and this practice has given the committee the opportunity to convey to that state its opinion that compliance with the convention's obligations is unsatisfactory, albeit without issuing a formal ruling to that effect.

The attendance of a state representative affords the state a forum in which its practices in the area of discrimination can be directly defended against deserved or undeserved attack.

(There is no provision for cross-examination of the answers to committee questions given by these representatives.)

The system I have just described has generally worked fairly toward those whose compliance has been questioned. On a few occasions, however, particular states have attempted to use the committee to further other political aims. For example, in two cases a reporting state has used its report on its own compliance with the convention as a way of charging another country, not party to the convention, with human rights violations; in one of those cases the United States was the wrongly charged party. Not being a party to the convention, however, the United States had no opportunity to refute the charges before the committee through a state representative of its own choosing or to question the competence of the committee to address what was in substance an interstate complaint through the reporting procedure.

The Committee on Human Rights, charged with implementing the civil and political rights convenant, also avoids formal rulings against states and makes use of state representatives' appearances, just as does the Racial Discrimination Committee. In its shorter history the Human Rights Committee has managed to steer clear of political confrontation, and the questioning of all state representatives—whether from the developing world, Eastern Europe, or Western Europe—has been uniformly tough and searching. British treatment of prisoners in Northern Ireland has come in for severe criticism as have Soviet restrictions on freedom of movement.

The committee members are taking seriously their position as impartial, independent jurists. Although its record is still quite brief, the committee appears to have great potential for shaping attitudes toward, and the language of, human rights standards as they develop over time; participating countries, through their reports, their responses to questioning, and through the individuals they nominate to serve as members will have the opportunity to have a hand in such future developments.

The conclusions we draw from the early practice of the implementing committees are twofold.

First, to the extent that they remain impartial mechanisms for the monitoring of states' compliance with the human rights treaties, as they largely have been so far, the United States would do well to participate and, thus, have a role in the development of an international jurisprudence of human rights.

Second, to the rare extent that the committees do lapse into political confrontation, the United States cannot afford not to be represented so as accurately to set forth its human rights record.

The United States has historically maintained a strong tradition of commitment to the cause of the rights of the individual at home and abroad. The ratification of these four treaties before this committee today would provide a mechanism for upholding this fine tradition internationally. President Carter has described these treaties as a beacon—a guide to a future of personal security, political freedom, and social justice. In order to enhance our contribution to the achievement of such a future, I urge this committee to report favorably on these treaties.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN

I want to thank the committee for this opportunity to speak about the four human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and the American Convention on Human Rights.

My message today is very simple. It concerns the connection between these treaties and the human rights policy of the United States. Our failure so far to ratify them has had a significant negative impact on the conduct of that policy. Ratifying them in the near future will substantially improve our ability to pursue human rights objectives in foreign affairs.

By adhering to these treaties, we strengthen the international legal basis for the protection of basic human rights; we can participate fully in the machinery established by the treaties for their implementation; and we increase the credibility and effectiveness of our own human rights efforts.

Strengthening International Law on Human Rights

These treaties embody the fundamental tenet that international law creates obligations which all governments owe to their citizens. Together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they create an international legal structure for the protection of human rights. They set standards for the world community which reflect the same vision that inspired our own Bill of Rights.

Ratification by the United States will significantly enhance the legitimacy and acceptance of these standards. It will encourage other countries to join those which have already accepted the treaties. And in countries where human rights are generally not respected, it will aid citizens to raise human rights issues.

Our failure to ratify so far has become confusing to our friends and may be exploited by our adversaries.

I would like to elaborate for a moment on this last point. In countries where citizens have few domestic remedies for human rights abuses, they can point to these international standards. Today, dissidents throughout the world are monitoring their own governments' compliance with this body of international law for the protection of human rights. It is cited by wall posters in China, on manifestos of Soviet dissidents, and by families of the disappeared in Latin America. Ratification of the treaties will support their efforts.

Participation in Implementation

The four treaties establish international machinery for monitoring their implementation. The United States has taken a strong position in favor of such machinery. This is because, over the long run, greater respect for human rights depends on the creation of international institutions. Yet because it has not ratified these treaties, the United States cannot participate in the work of these implementing bodies. The United States does not review the reports submitted by states parties on their compliance with the treaties, and it does not have a voice in their interpretation—interpretations which may affect the course of the law of human rights for decades to come.

I would like to describe some of the activities of the monitoring bodies for you. Ratification will enable us to participate in them.

- A U.N. committee on compliance with the covenant on civil and political rights is reviewing reports on Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R., Chile, and Uruguay. By ratifying the covenant, we can participate in this review process.

most state that the United States cannot be expected to bow to pressure by meeting the Iranian Government's demands.

London *Times* states that if the United States were to yield to Iranian Government pressure, such action would invite lawless governments or unscrupulous armed groups worldwide to seize U.S. diplomats as hostages and hold them for ransom.

Resolution is adopted by the **European Parliament** condemning detention of U.S. diplomatic personnel in Tehran and expressing solidarity with all those who oppose the seizure of hostages.

Bangladesh. Daily newspaper, *Ittefaq*, calls the Iranian occupation of the U.S. Embassy and the taking of hostages a disgrace for the entire nation. In the *Sangbad*, often anti-U.S., a columnist says that action by Iranian students violates all practiced diplomatic norms and cannot be supported.

November 17

Paraguay. Press editorial expresses outrage at Iranian action.

Norway. Press is uniformly supportive of President Carter and strongly condemns Iranian authorities for their breaches of diplomatic immunity.

West Germany. Chancellor Schmidt announces West Germany's "full solidarity with the American nation and the American leadership" in the Iranian crisis.

November 18

Swiss Ambassador in Tehran assists in coordinating evacuation of hostages scheduled for release.

November 19

Papua New Guinea. Government states that it regards the seizure of hostages under any pretext as indefensible, and the taking of diplomatic personnel as hostages, in violation of international law and the canons of civilized behavior, as especially reprehensible.

Cyprus. Union of Members of the Foreign Service delivers a message to the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia, expressing to the families of the hostages their sympathy and their support.

Liberia. President Tolbert again writes Khomeini appealing for release of hostages on religious, moral, humanitarian, and international legal grounds.

Dominican Republic. Both houses of Parliament pass resolutions denouncing the taking of hostages and the invasion of the Embassy.

Turkish Ambassador visits Laingen.

November 20

Swedish Ambassador visits Laingen.

Finland. Foreign Minister Vayrynen says Finland considers the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations a central part of international law, and it should be respected by every government.

Netherlands. Parliament passes a resolution condemning the hostage taking and expressing support for Secretary General Waldheim's efforts to reach a peaceful solution.

Portugal. Government issues a statement calling the Embassy takeover a "grave act which collides frontally with the basic norms of international law and coexistence."

EC-9 Foreign Ministers Council condemns "any attempt to exert pressure on governments by the taking of hostages."

Guyana. Foreign Ministry condemns the holding of U.S. hostages.

Australia. Foreign Minister Peacock declares that the holding of hostages conflicts with Iran's obligations under international law and cannot be justified in any circumstances. He adds he would "strongly deplore" any so-called trial of hostages.

Venezuela. President of the Chamber of Deputies, Carlos Canache Mata, writes that Khomeini is a "medieval fanatic" who has "edited God out of the Koran."

Togo. President Eyadema calls for release of hostages.

EC-9 Foreign Minister's Council issues a statement denouncing the holding of hostages and the threat to put them on trial as a breach of international law, concluding that the Iranian Government failed to fulfill its obligations under international law to protect diplomats and embassy premises.

West Germany. Chancellor Schmidt informs President Carter of West Germany's wholehearted support in the U.S.-Iranian crisis and pledges to assist in securing release of hostages.

Secretary General Waldheim, through the U.N. press spokesman, expresses deep concern over the continued detention of hostages. He stresses that the hostage-taking contravenes diplomatic conventions and a U.N. resolution to which Iran was a party.

U.N. General Assembly. President Salim Ahmed Salim issues a statement expressing his personal gratification and appreciation at the release of 13 hostages and recalls the appeal he addressed to Khomeini on November 9.

November 21

Australia. Foreign Minister Peacock states he deplores the taking of hostages.

Honduras. General Paz sends a message to Khomeini appealing for release of hostages.

Sweden. Foreign Minister states that the takeover of the Embassy is of the utmost gravity because a government is behind the violation of international law.

Jamaica. Government issues an appeal to Iranian authorities to insure the release of hostages and cessation of the occupation of the Embassy.

Mexico. Government expresses sympathy with the United States and a desire to be helpful. It publicly declares that the Shah is welcome to return to Mexico.

Tanzania. President Nyerere sends a strong personal message to Khomeini urging the prompt release of hostages.

Zambia. President Kaunda writes Khomeini as a fellow revolutionary.

Zaire. President Mobutu and Foreign Minister Nguza send messages to Khomeini and acting Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr, respectively.

Senegal. On orders from President Senghor, the Prime Minister makes an official protest against the taking of hostages to the Iranian Charge.

Cameroon. President Ahidjo promises a government communique on the situation and views that as the only effective avenue available to Cameroon.

Botswana. In Parliament, Foreign Minister Mogwe makes what the local radio terms "a strong statement" on the Iranian situation.

Sierra Leone. Government issues a statement which is carried on the local media and sent to Iran.

Mauritius. Minister of External Affairs sends a message to Tehran urging release of hostages.

Mozambique. Permanent Representative to U.N. informs the Iranian Charge that Iran's action is unacceptable and is criticized by almost all governments.

Rwanda. Government sends U.S. Embassy a diplomatic note expressing support.

Mauritania. Prime Minister declines public support for U.S. efforts or to intervene with Iranian authorities. The government also turns down an Iranian request for support.

Tanzania. Student organization of the political party at Dar es Salaam University passes a resolution and issues a statement calling the holding of hostages inhumane and indefensible and appeals for their unconditional and immediate release

Guyana. Foreign Minister tells the press he is especially disturbed over the events in Iran. The Foreign Minister announces that he has written to Cuban Premier Castro proposing that the nonaligned movement help resolve the conflict.

Panama. Permanent Mission to U.N. expresses dismay and concern that a large number of Embassy personnel are still held captive and remain a prey to terror and uncertainty. Under the Vienna convention, they call for release of hostages.

France. Government says all must obey rules that govern diplomatic immunity and which conform with universal law.

Canada. Former Prime Minister Trudeau, in Parliament, calls for Canada to do all possible to support the United States in its present situation and to take the lead in mobilizing international support.

Greece. Government, through its Charge d'Affaires in Tehran, participates in a joint action by ambassadors requesting release of hostages.

November 22

Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe notes that Iranian action "constitutes a flagrant violation of the most elementary rules of international law . . . [and] appeals to the Iranian authorities to see that the hostages are released immediately."

Austria. Foreign Minister Willibald Pahr calls the taking of hostages an outrageous violation of international law and the Vienna convention.

Nepal. Student association issues a statement praising Iranian students for their role in bringing down the Shah, but calls their conditions for release of hostages "fanatic" and "bizarre."

Mauritius. National Moslem Council sends a message to Khomeini uring release of hostages to mark the occassion of Muharram.

South Africa. Moslem Judicial Council of Cape Province cables Khomeini seeking release of hostages and stating that holding them for the crime of another is not in accordance with Islamic teachings. The *Cape Times* carries the cable as well.

Singapore. Government appeals to the Iranian Government to release hostages, stating that diplomatic immunity has been the cardinal principle of international relations, and any breach would render it impossible for peaceful exchanges and contacts between nations.

Libya. Radio reports that Libya does not support any action against diplomatic missions and their staff members, and in principle, it is against any action directed against missions and the holding of staff members as hostages.

November 23

Turkey. Prime Minister Demirel states that his government disapproves of events occurring in Iran.

Poland. Primate Stefan Wyszinski appeals publicly to Iran to release hostages.

Spain. Council of Ministers urges release of hostages and stresses acceptance of international relations.

Spain. Leading weekly, *Cambio IG*, carries an editorial by publisher Juan Tomas de Salas, who calls Iranian actions "a current of irrationalism—which threatens to lead humanity into new and frightening holocaust."

Italy. President Pertini urges Khomeini to release hostages; Liberal Party condemns holding hostages; and the foreign affairs spokesman of the Italian Communist Party, Gian Carlo Jajetta, states that Iranian actions "completely violate international law," put Iran in "a difficult position before every other country and international organization, and certainly do not help the government of Tehran in this difficult moment."

East Germany. Publishes a call for the release of hostages.

Swiss Ambassador visits Laingen.

EC-9 Ambassadors visit the Iranian Foreign Minister and stress their anxiety about hostages' well-being.

U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko advocates fulfillment of international convention of respect for diplomatic immunity.

Niger. President Kountche sends message to Khomeini.

Twelfth World Congress of the **International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)** is shocked that Iran blatantly disregards principle of inviolability of embassies in that it condones holding hostages as a means of attaining objectives.

Colombia. National Confederation of Liberal Youth, National Federation of Liberal Youth, and Social Action Brigades of the Conservative Party urge Iranian students to respect the hostages' lives and to release them to show that the Islamic republic respects human rights.

Zaire. In a message to Khomeini, President Mobutu publicly appeals for release of hostages.

November 24

Suriname. Prime Minister calls for release of hostages and condemns Iran's violations of international law.

Nicaragua. Junta members, Ortega and Bobelo, strongly condemn holding of hostages as an act of terrorism. Nicaraguan delegation to the Organization of American States will support OAS consensus resolution on hostages.

Colombia. Youth groups deliver telephone message to Iranian students asking "respect for the lives and personal integrity" of hostages and for their liberation.

Tunisia. Tunis press reports that the government expresses disappointment over the hostage situation to a delegation from the Iranian Revolutionary Council. Iran is asked to consider the consequence of escalation and to conform to the rules of international law.

Senegal. Government issues communique November 22 meeting between Prime Minister Abdou Diouf and the Iranian Charge in which the former "vigorously requested the prompt liberation of the hostages" and expressed his government's "ardent wish to see the tension created by the occupation" of the Embassy "dissipate rapidly."

Mauritius. Prime Minister Ramgoolam appeals to "the head of the Revolutionary Council of Iran" for release of hostages.

Canada. Ivan Head, an international lawyer who is now President of Canada's International Development Center, states that the hostage action

protected by our people for the length of time possible without help from the host government. No embassy on Earth is a fortress that can withstand constant attacks by a mob unless a host government comes to the rescue of the people within the embassy.

But I took the right decision. I have no regrets about it nor apologies to make because it did help to save a man's life, and it was compatible with the principles of our country.

Q. We appear to be in a rather dangerous period of international tension and volatility, especially in the Islamic world, and it comes at a time when we're about to embark on our quadrennial election campaign, with all that that will bring. Have you given any thought to whether, following examples of other national emergencies, it may be wise to try to mute the political fallout of this by trying to bring opponents in and outside of your party into some kind of emergency coalition for this purpose?

A. We have attempted to keep the political leaders in our nation informed, both publicly and through other channels. We have given frequent briefings, for instance, on the Hill, both to the Members of the Senate and to the House. We have encouraged all of those who have become announced candidates for president to restrain their comments which might be misconstrued overseas and to have a maximum degree of harmony among those who might be spokesmen for our country. I, myself, in order to stay close to the scene here where constantly changing events could be handled by me as President, have eliminated the major portion of political oriented activities.

I don't think the identity of the Islamic world is a factor. We have the deepest respect and reverence for Islam and for all those who share the Moslem faith. I might say that so far as I know, all the Islamic nations have joined us in condemning the activities and the actions of the Government of Iran. So I don't think religious divisions are a factor here at all.

But I will have to continue to restrict my own political activities and call on those who might be opposing me in the future for president to support my position as President and to provide unity for our country and for our nation in the eyes of those who might be looking for some sign of weakness or division in order to perpetuate their abuse of our hostages.

Q. What can the United States do now; what can it do to prevent future incidents of the nature of Iran? How can you satisfy the public demand to end such embarrassment?

A. This is an unprecedented and unique occurrence. Down through history, we have had times when some of our people were captured by terrorists or who were abused, and they have obviously been instances of international kidnapping which occurred for the discomforture of a people or a government. So far as I know, this is the first time that such an activity has been encouraged by and supported by the government itself. And, I don't anticipate this kind of thing recurring.

We have taken steps already, in view of the disturbances in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region, to guard our people more closely, to provide them with a higher degree of security, and to make arrangements with the host government to provide assistance if it's needed in the fastest possible way.

Many other nations have reduced severely the number of persons overseas. I think one of the points that should be made is that a year ago, we had 70,000 Americans in Iran—70,000. There were literally thousands of people who were killed in the Iranian revolution, from all nations.

We were able to extract Americans from Iran safely. It was a superb demonstration of cooperation and good conduct on the part of the State Department and other American officials. There will be disturbances in the future, but I think we are well protected as we possibly can be without withdrawing into a shell from protecting American interests in nations overseas.

My own experience, so far, has been that the leaders of nations have recommitted themselves to provide security for embassies of all countries. I think we've learned a lesson from this instance. But, because it is so unique, in the high degree of irresponsibility of the Iranian Government leaders, I don't believe that we'll see another reoccurrence of it any time soon.

Q. Former Secretary of State Kissinger has criticized your Administration's handling of the situation in Iran. He has suggested that it came about because, partly because of the procedure—a weakness in American foreign policy and that it has further damaged America's image as a result. How do you respond?

A. I would rather not respond. There's no reason for me to get into a public debate at this time with former Secretary Kissinger about who is or who is not responsible for the events that took place in Iran. Obviously, what has occurred could not have been predicted. And for 30 years, our country has had a relationship with a fairly stable government there. The changes took place very rapidly. So far as I know, no one on Earth predicted them. And, I think it's not becoming at this moment, and not conducive to better American understanding, to get involved in answering allegations that I or someone else may have been culpable and may have caused a further aggravation of a very difficult situation.

Q. What role did the former Secretary play in your decision to permit the Shah into the country?

A. None. I did not hear at all from the Secretary—former Secretary Kissinger nor did he contact Secretary Vance at any time during the days when we were deciding that the Shah should come into the United States for medical care to save his life. In previous weeks and months, since the Shah was deposed, Secretary Kissinger and many others let it be known that they thought that we should provide a haven for the Shah. But Secretary Kissinger played no role in my decision to permit the Shah to come in for medical treatment.

Q. Speaking of the Shah, if he is well enough to travel, would you like him to leave the country?

A. That's a decision to be made by the Shah and by his medical advisers. When he decided to come to our country, with my permission, I was informed then, and I have been informed since, that as soon as his medical treatment was successfully completed, that his intention was to leave. And I have not encouraged him to leave; he was free to come here for medical treatment, and he will leave on his own volition.

Q. The consequences of the crisis in Iran is drifting the United States into almost a cold war with the Islamic countries. Watching TV news for 25 days, Americans soon will believe the whole Moslem world is hating them. Moreover, they are not told that the Shiites are a very minor minority among the population of the Islamic world, because the most majority is Sunni. Don't you think you get any help from any Islamic country, and what will your policy be toward the Islamic countries under these circumstances?

A. The premise of your question is completely wrong. We are not approaching any sort of cold war with the Islamic countries. So far as I know, every Islamic country has condemned Iran for its capture of our hostages and has been very supportive.

This includes Moslem nations which, in the past, have not been close friends of ours—Iraq, Libya, and others. So I don't see this as a confrontation at all between our nation and the Islamic world. It's certainly not part of the Islamic faith to condone, as I said earlier, blackmail or the persecution or harm of innocent people or kidnapping or terrorism.

So I think that we have a very good relationship with the people and the governments of the Islamic world, and I don't think it's deteriorated in this instance. In some ways we've been drawn closer to these people, because they see what has occurred in Iran as something of a disgrace for their own religious faith, and they don't see this as typical of what Moslems believe.

I might add also that this is not typical of the Shiite faith either. It's the misguided actions of a few people in Iran who are burning with hatred and a desire for revenge, completely contrary to the teachings of the Moslem faith.

Q. There's a feeling of hostility throughout the country toward Iran because of the hostages. Senator Long said that the taking of our Embassy in Iran, in his words, is an act of war. There are rumors, since denied, that our Navy has been called up for service. I ask you, as our Commander in Chief, is war possible? Is war thinkable?

A. It would be a mistake for the people of our country to have aroused within them hatred toward anyone; not against the people of Iran and certainly not against Iranians who may be in our country as our guests. We certainly do not want to be guilty of the same violation of human decency and basic human principles that have proven so embarrassing to many of the Iranian citizens themselves.

We obviously prefer to see our hostages protected and released completely through peaceful means. And that's my deepest commitment, and that will be my goal. The United States has other options available to it which will be considered, depending upon the circumstances. But I think it would not be well-advised for me to speak of those specifically tonight.

Q. We have had 55,000 Iranian students in this country. We've been very good to them, very hospitable. Even the new Finance Minister of Saudi Arabia was a student who once demonstrated in Washington against law and order. Shouldn't we be very careful in letting any of these students come in here? Shouldn't we screen them in the future and make them agree that they will not demonstrate?

A. It's very difficult for an Iranian citizen or a student to get a visa at the American Embassy in Iran at this time. [Laughter] And I think the influx of Iranians to our country now would be minimal.

I'm determined to enforce the law about Iranian students. Some of them have violated the law; they are now being screened, they are being assessed in their commitment and the legality of their presence here. We have already finished this procedure with more than 22,000. About 17,000 have proven to be here completely legally and are, indeed, full-time students. Among the other 5,000, about several hundred have already departed. Others are now having to prove that, contrary to the earliest evidence, they do, indeed, have a right to be in our country. If they are here illegally, they will be expelled.

There is one exception to that rule. If a citizen of Iran can prove that if he or she returned to Iran that they would be executed or abused because of their political beliefs, they can seek asylum here. And if that asylum, in our judgment, is justified, we will provide it for them. But this procedure is going forward in accordance with American law, in accordance with American fairness, in accordance with the full principles of the U.S. Constitution.

Q. Can this crisis go on indefinitely or ought the Ayatollah Khomeini understand that at some point the American people may demand and other nations may expect that you move forward to resolve it by whatever means you find necessary?

A. It would not be possible or even advisable for me to set a deadline about when or if I would take certain action in the future. This is an ever-present consideration on my mind. I'm carrying out all of the duties that normally fall on a President's shoulders, which are adequate, but I never forget one moment that I'm awake about the hostages whose lives and whose safety depend on me, and I am pursuing every possible avenue to have the hostages released.

Any excessive threats or any excessive belief among the Iranians that they will be severely damaged by military action as long as these negotiations are proceeding and as long as legalities can be followed might cause the death of the hostages, which we are committed to avoid. So that's one of the questions that I cannot answer, to set down a certain deadline beyond which we would take extra action that might result in the harm or the death of the hostages.

We are proceeding, I guarantee you, in every possible way, every possible moment, to get the hostages freed and at the same time protect the honor and the integrity and the basic principles of our country. That's all I can do. But I'm doing it to the best of my ability, and I believe we will be successful.

Q. Many Americans view the Iranian situation as one in a succession of events that proves that this country's power is declining. How can you assure Americans tonight that our power is not declining abroad, and how are you reassessing priorities for the 1980s in terms of foreign policy?

A. The United States has neither the ability nor the will to dominate the world, to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, to impose our will on other people whom we desire to be free, to make their own decisions. This is not part of the commitment of the United States.

Our country is the strongest on Earth. We're the strongest militarily, politically, economically, and I think we're the strongest morally and ethically. Our country has made great strides even since I've been in office. I've tried to correct some of the defects that did exist. We have strengthened the military alliances of our country, for instance. NATO now has a new spirit, a new confidence, a new cohesion, improving its military capabilities, much more able to withstand any threat from the East—from the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact—than it was before.

We've espoused again the principles that unite Americans and make us admired throughout the world, raising the banner of human rights. We're going to keep it high. We have opened up avenues of communication, understanding, trade with people that formerly were our enemies or excluded us—several nations in Africa, the vast people and the vast country of the People's Republic of China.

dent has given notice that the mutual defense treaty will terminate on January 1, 1980, and we are committed to taking the steps necessary so that the termination will occur as scheduled. Accordingly, all related military agreements will also terminate with the mutual defense treaty at the end of the year.

In addition, two nonmilitary agreements have been rendered moot by normalization. One agreement calls for entry-free privileges for consular officers, and the other concerns the status of the American Embassy language school. We no longer have consular officers on Taiwan and the American Embassy school in Taiwan ceased to function on February 28. We plan to delete these agreements from the January 1980 *Treaties in Force*.

It is appropriate here to dispel a notion that arises from time to time. There is no substance to the rumor that we are planning an additional 1-year moratorium on new arms sales to Taiwan. When the mutual defense treaty terminates at the end of this year, we shall continue to provide Taiwan access to selected defensive weapons.

The final group concerns 14 agreements that appear to be either fully executed or inactive. These include five agricultural commodities agreements, a fully executed agreement for provision of nuclear research and training equipment, and two agreements relating to our economic aid program to Taiwan. We wish to take more time to review these agreements. AIT will discuss them with CCNAA to assure that they contain no active provisions before deciding on their disposition.

After further review and as changing circumstances warrant, we may want to take further action with respect to certain of our agreements. I want to assure you that we intend to maintain close contact with Congress on this subject. We will, of course, notify Congress of any agreements concluded between the AIT and CCNAA as provided in the Taiwan Relations Act.

Although our new relationship with Taiwan has required creativity and flexibility on the part of officials on both sides, the experience of the past year has demonstrated the viability of that new relationship. Recognition of the P.R.C. has not resulted, as some feared, in the interruption of our relations with Taiwan. Avoiding a dogmatic approach, we have sought to promote those ties with Taiwan that are consistent with diplomatic relations with the P.R.C.

I believe that the evidence demonstrates the success of the transition. At the same time that U.S. trade and investment in Taiwan have increased dramatically, we have successfully preserved the terms upon which we normalized relations with the P.R.C.■

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

[2] For text of agreement, see BULLETIN of Dec. 1979, p. 33.

[3] For full text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 1979, p. 24.

Accounting for MIAs

by Richard Holbrooke

Excerpts from a statement before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 17, 1979. Mr. Holbrooke is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.[1]

I'm pleased to have this opportunity to appear before the subcommittee today to discuss with you the efforts this Administration has made through the Department of State to obtain an accounting of Americans lost in Southeast Asia. You will recall Deputy Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Robert B.] Oakley's appearance before your subcommittee this past May, in which he reviewed the results of our efforts up to that time.[2] I would like to . . . bring you up to date on developments since then.

. . . .

Vietnam's attitude toward the question of an aid commitment and toward normalization with the United States evolved over the summer of 1978 and officials of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (S.R.V.) hinted broadly to other governments that they were on the verge of dropping the precondition. We met with the Vietnamese in New York for direct discussions on issues of mutual concern during the fall of 1978. The Vietnamese indicated officially and clearly they were no longer demanding U.S. aid as a *quid pro quo* for normalization. Discussion on missing-in-action (MIAs) was also positive, and we expected an agreement on normalization might emerge before the end of the year. However, progress was halted due to the emergence in October and November of new Vietnamese policies toward the region, especially on refugees and Kampuchea.

Although progress toward normalization has been suspended, we have continued our efforts to obtain a full accounting.

In February Secretary Vance sent a personal message stressing our continuing strong interest in obtaining Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue.

During May our Embassy in Paris reiterated to the Vietnamese Embassy there our government's continuing deep concern over the fate of those still missing in action. The Vietnamese Embassy said that Hanoi was aware of the humanitarian need to make every effort in this regard.

During the refugee meeting in Indonesia, Deputy Assistant Secretary Oakley made the same point in strong terms directly to Vu Hoang, the S.R.V. official with responsibility for POW/MIA matters.

In response to a suggestion by you, our Embassy in Moscow approached the Soviet Government in May to request that it impress upon the Vietnamese the importance the United States attaches to the MIA issue and urge them to provide us the fullest possible accounting of our missing men. Our Embassy noted that we had contacted the Vietnamese directly on this matter on numerous occasions and that our approach to the Soviets reflected our desire to explore every possible avenue to resolve the MIA issue. A Department of State officer also made a similar approach to a Soviet Embassy officer here in Washington. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Southeast Asia department chief, agreed to pass on our request to his superiors but indicated the "surer" route remained direct contact with the Vietnamese.

In June our Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) liaison officer in Bangkok again met with his counterpart in the Vietnamese Embassy to provide further specific information which we believed might assist the Vietnamese in resolving certain individual cases. In addition, he drew attention to the continuing, strong American public interest in arriving at an MIA accounting and in this connection cited the National League of Families of American Prisoners of War and Missing in Southeast Asia.

Mr. Oakley reiterated in his meetings with the Vietnamese in New York in June and July the intense interest which the Administration, the Congress, and the American people retain in the MIA issue and in obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing men. He noted that the cooperation which the Vietnamese had provided earlier in helping to provide such an accounting had had a direct bearing on the evolution of our relationship and that it was extremely important for Vietnam to make good on its promise to continue to provide information on MIAs. He also urged that your congressional delegation be given the fullest possible cooperation on this matter when it visited Hanoi.

The major recent event on the POW-MIA issue was the visit of your congressional delegation to Hanoi August 10–12. As you know, Mr. Vu Hoang, Chief of Consular Affairs of the S.R.V. Foreign Ministry, reviewed the work of his committee but stated that Vietnam had reduced manpower, funds, and material devoted to recovering MIA remains. He indicated that "periodic" visits by JCRC representative Lt. Col. Paul Mather might be possible and also agreed to discuss with Foreign Minister Thach possible ways of approaching the Lao People's Democratic Republic to arrange talks on MIAs.

We followed up Vu Hoang's indication to you of flexibility on visits by Lt. Col. Mather by sending a message in mid-August via the S.R.V. liaison officer in Bangkok asking for Vietnamese views on the timing and scope of such visits and expressing the U.S. desire to begin them as rapidly as possible. Receiving no reply to this message, Embassy Bangkok raised the issue again on September 5, and we sent a followup message September 10 reiterating our desire to begin such visits at an early date and stressing the interest and importance that the Administration, the Congress, and the American people place on making demonstrable progress in accounting for missing Americans.

On October 3, an officer of the S.R.V. Embassy in Bangkok delivered an oral response to our earlier messages on the proposed visit by JCRC personnel. He stated that a visit by Lt. Col. Mather had initially been discussed during the August visit of the U.S. congressional delegation. Although Vietnam was under conditions of war and threat of invasion, he said, Hanoi had maintained the MIA office and continued to devote scarce resources to resolve MIA cases. Hanoi, he claimed, had always shown goodwill in this matter and has thus far returned the remains of more than 79 MIAs. With regard to the visit of Lt. Col. Mather, he stated that Hanoi will inform the United States later when the time is convenient.

During the discussion which followed, the S.R.V. officer assured us that such visits could take place but at some unspecified future date. He made no attempt to back away from the agreement in principle for such visits.

In response, the U.S. Embassy officer stressed:

- The importance of the MIA issue to the United States and to our bilateral contacts;
- The disappointment that the Congress, particularly the members of your delegation, would feel over the delay;
- Our interest in keeping the MIA issue separated from other issues on which progress is currently not possible;
- Our appreciation of Hanoi's past cooperation, and our desire to accelerate these efforts; and
- Our belief that resolution of the MIA issue is in the interest of the S.R.V. as well as the United States.

The conditions of war and threat of invasion that Hanoi cited are real, but they are conditions that the S.R.V. has brought upon itself by its invasion of Kampuchea. And this should not be used as an excuse to stall on exchanging information on MIAs. We hope that progress can resume shortly; we note that the Vietnamese position does not rule this out.

We raised the subject of Lt. Col. Mather's visit also at the United Nations with the Vietnamese mission there, stressing the importance of the issue and our hope for a resumption of progress.

Also at the United Nations, as requested by this committee, we formally transmitted the text of House Concurrent Resolution 10 and Senate Concurrent Resolution 17 to Secretary General Waldheim. We are consulting with other delegations there to see if there is any sentiment for general action. We have contacted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in New York, and they have agreed to consult with their headquarters in Geneva to determine how they can support this resolution. We will also continue to work with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and with the ICRC and other governments which have representatives in Vietnam in support of our efforts to gain an accounting.

Since your previous hearings on this subject, we have also again expressed directly to the Lao Government—via a letter to the embassy here and approaches by our embassy in Vientiane—the continued interest of the U.S. Government in MIA matters and the importance of making progress on accounting for MIAs. We noted our approaches to the S.R.V. in this regard, recounted Vietnamese statements of willingness to be forthcoming, and asked if Laos could also actively do more to resolve this issue. We repeated the standing invitation for a Lao delegation to visit the JCRC in Hawaii and requested that they consider a visit to Laos by Lt. Col. Paul Mather, or any other group which would be mutually satisfactory, in order to advance the accounting process and increase the exchange of information. Subsequently, as you know, the Lao charge met informally September 26 with a small group of congressmen, including many of you, and passed information related to the four sets of remains the Lao provided last year, giving crash site, approximate date, and plane type associated with each set.

On October 4, I met with the acting Lao Foreign Minister Khamphai Boupha in New York. I expressed our appreciation for the information that the charge had provided Congress and our hope that this would be the first in a series of such actions by the Lao Government. I emphasized the importance of this issue to the American people, the Congress, and the Administration. Our new charge in Laos, Leo J. Moser, is talking with Lao officials about this matter during his initial calls in Vientiane and will continue to do so throughout his assignment there.

As you can see from my remarks, we have consistently addressed the MIA accounting issue in our contacts with the Vietnamese and Lao authorities. There is no doubt that they understand its importance to us. We will continue to work toward eliciting from the Vietnamese and Lao forthcoming and satisfactory cooperation in accounting for our missing personnel. ■

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

[2] For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 1979, p. 39.

process that is as important as the text of the Final Act itself.

U.S. Policy Toward the CSCE

At this point let me try to give you an idea of how the U.S. Government views the current status of the Helsinki CSCE process.

First of all, we think the process is reasonably healthy given the nature of the Soviet system and the state of East-West relations today. The Belgrade meeting of 1977 showed our serious commitment to implementation and to the process itself. Under the distinguished leadership of Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, the U.S. delegation made a strong effort to enhance implementation of the Final Act by all signatories. Although some may have preferred a more anodyne approach to the meeting, we believed that it was important, at the first Helsinki followup meeting, to articulate our determination that the commitments made at Helsinki be taken seriously. Our determination has not diminished.

Since the Belgrade meeting, there have been numerous bilateral and multilateral talks among the signatories as called for in the Final Act. In 1978 and 1979, our government held CSCE consultations with nearly all the members of the Warsaw Pact, with all of our NATO allies, and with most of the neutral or nonaligned signatories such as Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia. We have also met on several occasions with the Spanish, given their important role as hosts for the next review conference in Madrid. Our experience in the bilateral discussions with Eastern countries has been moderately encouraging. Like all diplomatic interchange, they were confidential, but I can assure you they were frank, extensive, and specific.

We intend to continue the process in the next 12 months with the hope that progress can be made in the period before the Madrid meeting. These regular and extensive bilateral meetings are an important development since Belgrade, and the existence of these intensive talks has caused the Helsinki process to take on greater vitality.

Another productive Helsinki activity was the work of the expert groups established by the Belgrade meeting to discuss concrete ways to enhance specific CSCE implementation. A scientific forum under CSCE auspices will take place in Hamburg in February, with Dr. Philip Handler, President of the National Academy of Sciences, as head of the U.S. delegation.

Moreover, the Helsinki Final Act has permeated the day-to-day interchange between nations and within states as well. We find, for example, that CSCE topics now tend to become key agenda items during state visits, and we note increasing references in speeches by the leaders of the signatory nations to the value of the CSCE process and to the need to make a deeper commitment to it, and even an effect on domestic legislation such as that involving our visa laws.

As a result of all this activity, efforts by the signatory nations to create the necessary atmosphere for improved compliance with the Final Act's provisions have been enhanced. I would not tell you that all is well, however. The harsh sentences recently imposed on Charter '77 members[1] by Czechoslovak authorities shocked the world and made a mockery of that country's commitments to its obligations under the Final Act, not to mention its obligation to fundamental concepts of human rights.

American policy toward CSCE remains unchanged. We are committed to the continuity of the Helsinki process and we seek to deepen the commitment of others to this process as well. We are committed to fulfill our obligations under the Final Act, and in this regard, we have been seeking to improve our domestic implementation of the Final Act's provisions. I might mention at this point that the CSCE Commission, under the able and effective leadership of Representative Dante Fascell, is in the process of finalizing a report on this subject which will be released shortly to the public.

Naturally we also continue to review and seek improved implementation of the Final Act's provisions by all parties since it is indisputable that the Helsinki process can be viable only when all signatories honor their commitments. As an adjunct to this desire, the United States continues to search for new ways to build cooperation within the CSCE context and will be working with other governments on ways to enhance implementation through specific proposals for the 1980 CSCE review conference in Madrid, some of which I will talk about shortly.

Lastly, the United States continues to maintain its unflagging interest in the human rights provisions of the Final Act. It is here most of all that we seek the evolutionary change in the East which will result in a true reduction in the political tensions dividing us and which will, in the long run, allow our relations with the East to take on a more normal character and contribute to the betterment of life not only in those countries but throughout the CSCE area.

Current Status of Implementation

Now let me address our view of the current status of implementation. I mentioned earlier that the Heksinki process was causing the signatory nations to make efforts to enhance implementation of the Final Act's provisions. Although this has, indeed, happened, and although the Helsinki process may to some extent be responsible for this happening, it is obvious that not all aspects of the Final Act are being implemented satisfactorily.

In this regard, the United States remains quite unsatisfied with the level of CSCE implementation by the East in the human rights area. The Final Act has provided a yardstick to measure the implementation of human rights in the East and, by all measures, implementation is insufficient to meet the standards expected when the Final Act was signed. We are continuing by all feasible means, and especially in the bilateral and multilateral talks which I mentioned earlier, to make our views known on human rights implementation and the ways we think it can improve.

The U.S. Government has been in the forefront of this effort on human rights; yet at the same time, we recognize there are limitations to what we can accomplish. Being a government engaged in an intense security competition with the Soviet Union, we will always be open to the charge that our human rights concerns are politically and ideologically motivated. For this reason, the U.S. Government continues to believe that private citizens and their organizations in all CSCE countries necessarily play a very important role to encourage CSCE implementation. The very nature of private groups, such as those you represent, puts beyond dispute the humanitarian concerns to which they—and you—are devoted. You are not required to balance competing interests as governments must do. Your concerns are direct and specifically focused. You have an enormous advantage in many respects in bringing to public attention, in a believable and effective way, the areas in which human rights implementation can and must be improved.

For this reason, the U.S. Government, from President Carter on down, is very pleased with the interest and involvement in the Helsinki process which private citizens and their organizations have shown. We feel, furthermore, that your efforts very usefully complement the government's and that the overall result has been to deepen this nation's commitment to the continuity of the Helsinki process.

The Final Act, we believe, specifically encourages relevant private action by providing that individuals shall know, and have a right to act upon, their rights and duties. For this reason, the establishment of CSCE monitoring groups in Eastern countries was a welcome sign, and it is difficult to see how the United States will be able to speak positively about the Eastern performance so long as CSCE monitors continue to languish in detention and are otherwise harassed.

Future Directions

Let me turn to another aspect of the Helsinki process and inform you about our government's current thinking on the future directions it believes the process should take. First of all, as I have already said, the United States is committed to deepening the involvement of all Helsinki signatories in the CSCE process.

It is quite clear to us that a balanced implementation of all aspects and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act is a crucial factor in the deepening commitment to the CSCE process. We know this is so because various signatories often have specific interests in different areas of the Final Act. I mentioned before that the genius of the Final Act was that it contained something of importance for each participant.

In the implementation process, we must apply this genius practically by promoting implementation across a broad spectrum. Some nations, such as ours, tend to place priority on the humanitarian provisions as we seek balanced progress in all CSCE areas. Others, while interested in these concerns, give greater priority to security and economic aspects of the Final Act for geographic, historical, or other reasons. A successful process, and a successful meeting at Madrid, will see progress in a broad range of areas, in which the humanitarian and the security fields must be included.

We have also come to understand that an uneven manner of implementation can damage the entire Helsinki process. Nations whose interests are neglected or whose values are given short shrift will lose interest in the process. There are already Americans who have suggested that we abandon CSCE because progress has been slow in humanitarian fields. There have been some Europeans who have shown irritation over the failure of rapid progress in other fields—for example, the extension of more advantageous trading terms, increased attention to security measures, or extensive Mediterranean discussions.

Based on our experience to date, we must recognize that balanced implementation of the Helsinki Final Act has not been achieved. The United States and its friends among the Helsinki signatories have been emphasizing implementation of the humanitarian provisions of the Final Act. Given the nature of the Eastern response so far, we have been, at best, exploring the fringes of the Eastern nations receptivity to progress in these areas. We know, however, that the East is not monolithic and that their internal regimes and societies differ. Their relations among themselves and with us are distinct, and their record of implementation in the human rights area reflects these differences.

In our discussions, we have achieved some progress in connection with family reunification, a major priority for us. In several countries religious freedom and intellectual diversity are somewhat greater now than before. Advances have been made in greater cultural interchange with a few countries. But the free flow of people and ideas—which CSCE envisions—is certainly far off.

The economic provisions of the Final Act have not been pursued as vigorously as they might have—although it should be noted that other forums exist for this purpose. U.S. legislation links the trade status of the Soviet Union and most nonmarket countries to the emigration question, and this has placed limits on economic relations with several of them. Fulfillment by many Communist countries of Helsinki commitments to provide business information and adequate working conditions for our businessmen has not been satisfactory. Because the commerce of Communist countries is conducted by the state, political considerations often affect economic activity. Despite these difficulties, however, trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has grown over the last few years and has produced a large and rising trade surplus.

At present, many of the Helsinki signatories look to the security provisions of the Final Act as an area that is ripe for improved effort at implementation.

The confidence-building measures presently in the Final Act have worked rather well and thus have proved to be worthy precedents for possible further expansion. There have been several proposals for security enhancement, and the U.S. Government has been closely examining them. Among the most important and creative of these proposals was forwarded by the French a year or so ago for a conference on disarmament in Europe. The proposal was intended to widen the area for conventional arms control by establishing a conference, the first stage of which would develop confidence-building measures to enhance the sense of security among nations.

Another proposal was put forth by the Warsaw Pact states. In their Budapest proposal made earlier this year, they called for a European conference on military detente which would discuss confidence-building measures as well as other Eastern ideas.

These initiatives are currently under active consideration and discussion. The United States and its allies have a deep interest in enhanced security for all states in Europe, and there are aspects of these and similar proposals that may be of interest to us. But three things should be clear.

First, neither we nor our allies will have any interest in arms control exercises that are motivated by a desire to achieve propaganda victories and one-sided advantages or to delay our NATO modernization programs without properly addressing the underlying realities.

Second, we do not want to establish new forums or procedures that might interfere with or endanger the goals we seek through currently established channels of arms control negotiations.

Third, we will not permit the CSCE process to become distorted and its balance lost through excessive weighting in one area at the expense of others.

Thus, we return to our theme of balance since this notion seems to us to provide the best chance of making long-term progress in basic areas. We will not lessen our emphasis on humanitarian concerns, and we expect that other Western nations will stand firmly beside us in demanding better implementation. And, at the same time, we should find a way to deal in a positive fashion with the desire of European states for enhanced security within the CSCE context. Therefore, we are rededicating ourselves to the pursuit of a positive, as opposed to a negative, balance in CSCE—that is, a balance based on greater movement toward implementation in all CSCE areas.

There are several ways in which we can enhance balance in the implementation process. First, perhaps, we should

• In the Western Hemisphere, an Inter-American Human Rights Court has been established to hear disputes, and an Inter-American Human Rights Commission has been established to conduct investigations of abuses. By ratifying the American Human Rights Convention, we will be eligible to nominate and vote for their members.

• The racial discrimination convention applies not only to discrimination on account of race but also on account of ethnic origin. Ratification would enable us to participate in the implementation committee's monitoring of such discrimination around the world.

Credibility and Effectiveness of the U.S. Human Rights Policy

Our human rights policy has raised significantly the priority of human rights in U.S. foreign policy. It has contributed to an increasing level of international consciousness about human rights and to a climate in which improvements have taken place in a number of countries. We can be proud of these achievements. But it is also essential for our nation to ratify the instruments establishing the international legal framework for their observance. Ratification will enhance our ability to remain in the forefront of those who are struggling for the full enjoyment of human rights.

Our failure to ratify so far has become confusing to our friends and may be exploited by our adversaries. In his latest report to the Congress on the Helsinki accords, President Carter noted the criticism directed against this country for not yet ratifying the international human rights agreements.

Ratification of the human rights treaties is also important for U.S. participation in the reviewing process under the Helsinki Final Act. The Helsinki accords, themselves, call on participating states to fulfill their obligations under international human rights declarations and agreements, including the international covenants.

The United Nations last summer established a working group to examine the "circumstances" preventing governments from ratifying the treaties. In my own work, I am asked constantly by representatives of foreign governments why the United States has failed to ratify these agreements, given our fine human rights record, our human rights policy, and our previously active role in drafting these agreements. I have not yet found an acceptable response.

The United States has a long tradition of seeking to fully implement the human rights enshrined in our Constitution and Bill of Rights. Our history has been one of struggle for universal suffrage, for the abolition of slavery, for women's rights, for racial equality, for trade union rights. That struggle continues. To date, the United States has ratified international human rights treaties on slavery, women's rights, and refugees. Ratification of these additional human rights agreements would emphasize our determination to work for a world in which the rights enjoyed by our own citizens are universally respected.

The treaties before the Senate express values in which the people of the United States have believed for a long time. They give expression to human rights that coincide with our own laws and practices.

I join the Deputy Secretary and other witnesses in urging that the advice and consent of the Senate be given to the four human rights treaties. ■

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

[2] For texts of the two international covenants, see BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1967, pp. 107 and 111; for text of the American convention, see BULLETIN of July 4, 1977, p. 28; the convention on racial discrimination was not printed in the BULLETIN.

President Carter Receives Human Rights Award

Following are excerpts from remarks President Carter made on October 24, 1979, upon accepting an international human rights award from the Synagogue Council of America.[1]

Human rights takes on a broad range of meanings. And we've had some notable successes in the last 2½ to 3 years: Prison doors have opened to release literally tens of thousands of those who've been incarcerated for years, even decades. We've seen a massive shift in countries around the world and particularly, I think, in this hemisphere toward giving people the basic human right of shaping their own future, of choosing their own leaders, of modifying and establishing the policies of their own government.

It has not always been easy, even in this country, to maintain a strong commitment to human rights. As Patt Derian [Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs], sitting in the front row, responsible for this position in the State Department, so well knows, there are always delegations who come to me or to her or to Secretary Vance and say: "This particular dictator has been a valuable ally of ours, and when the United States makes a critical remark about political prisoners who are being restrained or in jail or punished or executed, it tends to shake our relationship with that country." We've had to withstand those kinds of pressures, and I believe that in many instances we've been successful in that effort. ■

[1] For full text, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 29, 1979, p. 2009.

Implementing the Human Rights Policy

by Warren Christopher

Statement before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 2, 1979. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.[1]

May I begin by congratulating you on your new position as head of the House Subcommittee on International Organizations [Don Bonker of Washington]. I hope and expect that we will continue the close and productive working relationship that has existed between the subcommittee and this Administration.

As you know, this Administration has placed renewed emphasis on human rights objectives in the conduct of our foreign affairs. In this endeavor, we have had the benefit of this subcommittee's extensive interest and involvement in human rights issues. It has played a vital role, particularly through building a solid legislative foundation for the pursuit of human rights objectives in foreign affairs. Perhaps most significant was a 1976 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act—an amendment that orignated in this subcommittee. It states: "A principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States shall be to promote the observance of internationally recognized human rights."

Today I would like to describe the steps that have been taken in the past 2 years and 4 months to implement that directive. In particular, I would like to discuss three areas in which human rights considerations have become an integral, everyday part of the foreign policy process: first, reporting and evaluating information on human rights conditions; second, incorporating human rights into our diplomacy, both bilateral and multilateral; and third, bringing human rights considerations to bear on our foreign assistance programs.

Reporting and Evaluating Information

A necessary first step in implementing an effective human rights policy is the systematic collection and evaluation of basic data on human rights conditions throughout the world. Without balanced, objective, and detailed assessments of the human rights situation in a country, we cannot hope to have productive discussions with that country about possible improvements in the situation.

In order to develop such assessments, we have sought information from many sources. Of course, a primary source of information is our embassies abroad. All U.S. Ambassadors have been asked to report on human rights conditions in their host countries on a regular and detailed basis.

We also rely on the published reports of nongovernmental human rights organizations, on reports of international organizations, on findings of congressional committees, on discussions with private U.S. citizens, and on other information in the public domain.

Some of this information is inevitably controversial. Reports of serious human rights abuses often elicit official denials. Official claims of significant progress may be challenged by private human rights groups. We are careful to check and recheck the accuracy of critical information and the reliability of its source.

The information we collect is used both for internal decisionmaking and for preparing the annual reports required by the Congress on human rights practices in countries receiving U.S. development or security assistance. I believe that if you compare the reports submitted for the 3 years Congress has required them, you will see a consistent improvement in their coverage and quality. This year's reports cover over 650 pages and 115 countries. They include for the first time an overall assessment of the human rights situation worldwide. Also included is an appendix reporting on the compliance by East European countries with the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.

We recognize, of course, that the assessment of human rights conditions is not an exact science. There are inevitably some questions of judgment on which reasonable people will differ. There are inevitably some elements of subjectivity which the most conscientious process of reporting and evaluation cannot eliminate. And there are inevitably differences in the quantity and quality of data available on human rights practices around the world, depending for example, on the degree of contact of a particular country with the United States and other Western countries or on the extent of foreign press coverage.

Nevertheless, I believe we can have confidence in our overall appraisals and in our identification of trends. And that is an essential predicate for an effective human rights policy.

Diplomacy

Let me turn to the diplomacy of human rights. The primary ingredient in this human rights diplomacy has a seeming simplicity: We frankly discuss human rights in our consultations with foreign diplomats and leaders. This may seem an obvious technique. But it is a dramatic change from past diplomatic practice.

In the past, our diplomats tended to shy away from high-level dialogue on sensitive human rights issues, such as the fate of political prisoners. Now those issues are raised in face-to-face conversation. They are brought to the center of the diplomatic interchange, where they must be addressed rather than being conveniently ignored.

In the case of governments which seriously restrict the rights of their citizens, we have expressed concern over specific abuses. Where countries have good records, we have encouraged such practices and invited support for our efforts. In all cases, we discuss the international legal foundation for recognizing basic obligations owed by all governments to their citizens. We emphasize, in addition, the high priority which the Congress and the American people attach to human rights concerns.

We underline these discussions with actions, such as meeting with opposition political figures or with exiled victims of human rights abuses. For example, when President Carter visited Brazil last year, he met with a Brazilian human rights leader, as well as with officials of the military government.

In some circumstances, a public statement of concern or praise may be appropriate. We generally do not prefer to use public criticism, but we will not shrink from it where it can be effective.

This bilateral diplomacy has been complemented by our multilateral efforts. We are participating actively in the consultations and conferences in which the 35 nations which signed the Helsinki Final Act are reviewing what has been done—and what has not been done. It is clear that the Soviet Union and the East European countries, in varying degrees, have not lived up to their human rights commitments. We have not hesitated to say so publicly. And we are persisting in our efforts to seek fuller compliance. The role of the congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, under the wise and able leadership of Congressmen Dante Fascell, has been indispensable in this work.

At the United Nations, we have pressed for more even-handed treatment of human rights issues. We remain deeply disturbed by the unfair politicization of these issues in that body. But we believe that progress is being made toward establishing fair procedures that can lead to broader and more objective consideration of human rights issues by the United Nations.

In the Western Hemisphere, we are working to strengthen the intergovernmental machinery for protecting human rights. The authority and staff of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission have been increased. Last year the Commission reported on violations in Chile, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay; and the Commission has accepted an invitation to visit Argentina this year.

Foreign Assistance Programs

These and other efforts at quiet diplomacy are in many ways our most effective tools in promoting human rights. But we are also prepared to support our words with actions—to take tangible steps to recognize good human rights performance or to manifest our concern over human rights violations. I would like to discuss one such area—namely, the way we are bringing human rights considerations to bear on our foreign assistance programs.

Our foreign assistance programs are an essential tool in promoting a broad category of internationally rec-

by Iranians violate the law of treaties and the law of diplomatic immunity.

November 25

Guinea. President Sekou Toure strongly condemns the taking of hostages and refers to international law, the Koran, and the Bible.

November 26

Italy. President Pertini outlines his previous record of support for human rights and urges Khomeini to free hostages.

Turkey. Prime Minister Demirel expresses disapproval of the taking of hostages.

Bolivia. Foreign Minister Julio Garret instructs U.N. Security Council President Palacios to do everything possible to help secure release of hostages.

Brazil. Foreign Minister Guerreiro is cited in the press as defending the concept of immunity for diplomats and the inviolability of diplomatic property.

China. Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues a statement saying "principles guiding international relations and accepted diplomatic immunities should be universally respected."

Ghana. Government issues a statement calling for the release of hostages.

Burundi. Issues of the government-controlled newspaper condemns the taking of hostages and cites President Bagaza as stating Burundi's committment to international conventions on diplomatic immunity.

Canada. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Plourde of Ottawa and Dr. W. Gunther Plaut, President of Canadian Jewish Congress, respond to U.S. Ambassador Ender's telegram communicating President Carter's statement asking for special prayers for hostages.

Swedish branch of **Amnesty International** calls for release of hostages.

Morocco. Maroc Sair calls hostage situation a "condemnable act."

Guinea. President Toure condemns the hostage situation as "absolutely contrary" to international law, as well as to the Koran.

Canada. Maxwell Cohen, former Law Dean at McGill University and former Canadian Chairman of the International Joint Commission, calls for respect for the principle of protection of diplomats.

OAS. Approves resolution in special session which condems holding of hostages in Tehran.

November 27

Cameroon. Government-owned *Tribune* carries text of a message from President Ahidjo to Khomeini.

Austria. Foreign Minister Pahr states that hostage-taking is "an outrageous violation of international law and the Vienna diplomatic convention."

Chile. Human rights exponent, Raul Cardinal Silva, Archbishop of Santiago, says in reference to the Iranian situation that "men who say they love God seemingly do not want to respect their brothers; to respect the innocent . . . ."

"Suriname unconditionally condemns the seizure" and supports "international action to undo the occupation of the Embassy."

Iceland. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister announce they have protested to the Iranian Government's takeover of the U.S. Embassy.

A statement is issued by the **Commonwealth High Commissioners** appealing to the Iranian Government to procure the release of all hostages and expressing the hope that the parties will resolve their differences by peaceful means.

Uruguay. Dr. Edwardo Jimenez de Arechaga, former judge and President of the International Court of Justice 1970–79, states: "The conduct of Iranian authorities . . . constitutes the most flagrant violation of the norms of international law . . . . Diplomatic and juridical annals will register the actions of those authorities or the most complete list of infractions against universally recognized norms of international law in matters relating to diplomatic immunity and privileges . . . ."

Senegal. President Senghor denounces taking of hostages, burning of buildings, and murders as means for the solution of conflicts ". . . beyond international law."

Commonwealth Secretary General Ramphal says holding diplomatic personnel hostage violates international law and jeopardizes fabric of international relations.

November 28

Tehran-based Embassies of **Finland,** other **Nordic** countries, **Australia, Austria, Canada, Greece, New Zealand, Spain, Portugal,** and **Switzerland** submit appeal to Iranian Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr for release of Embassy personnel.

France. President Valery Giscard d'Estaing calls the taking of hostages "totally unacceptable."

Non-EC-9 Western Ambassadors meet with Iranian Foreign Minister; **EC-9 Ambassadors** hold similar meeting with Foreign Minister.

Canada. A unanimous resolution adopted by the House of Commons "unequivocally condemns the Government of Iran" for breaching the rule of international law "by allowing and encouraging the taking of American diplomatic staff as hostages within that country."

No Date

Malaysia. Tunku Abdul Rahman, the father of Malaysian independence, strongly denounces the holding of diplomatic hostages and calls for their release.

Amnesty International issues two statements calling for release of hostages.

Belize. Premier Price appeals on grounds of international law and humanity for release of hostages.

The **Dalai Lama** appeals to Khomeini to protect hostages.

Hungary. Television states that the taking of diplomats as hostages should not be condoned.

South Korea. Supports the United States in its public positions.

German Democratic Republic. Calls for adherence to and respect for principle of protection of diplomatic missions extended under international law and in accordance with the Vienna convention, as essential part of the function of normal government-to-government relations. ■

Accomplishments

One of the major achievements is the dramatic increase in world awareness of human rights issues. To quote from the 1978 annual report of a leading private human rights organization, the International League for Human Rights.

Within the past year, human rights has for the first time become a subject of national policy debate in many countries. Human rights concerns have been the focus of greater discussion in international organizations and of greater attention in world media. A most significant factor in this has been President Carter and the U.S. human rights policy.

This new consciousness helps to curb existing abuses and to deter new violations. Moreover, there are many examples of tangible human rights progress. We do not claim credit for particular improvements. But we believe that we have contributed to an atmosphere that makes progress more likely to occur.

In the past year, significant steps toward the transfer of power from the military to civilian democratic institutions were taken in the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Nigeria, Peru, Brazil, and Thailand. In Bangladesh, Sudan, Indonesia, Nepal, and Paraguay, substantial numbers of political prisoners were released, and other prisoner releases occurred in Cuba, Guinea, and the Republic of Korea. In Bangladesh, Brazil, and Thailand more freedom was extended to the press, to labor organizations, and to political parties. Just a few days ago, successful elections were held in Ecuador which help pave the way for civilian rule.

In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, human rights conditions remain a source of serious concern. But even there, we have seen some positive signs: prisoner releases in Poland and Yugoslavia; greater tolerance for dissent in Hungary and Poland; and significant increases in emigration from the Soviet Union. We are particularly gratified that Aleksandr Ginzburg and four fellow dissidents have been released from prison and are now in the United States.

In my view, then, our policy clearly has been effective in improving human rights around the world. Moreover, I believe our policy is also making an important contribution to our security in a changing and often turbulent world. In this regard, our idealism and self-interest coincide.

Our human rights policy responds to the aspirations of more and more people in the Third World for a fuller participation in their government and economy. As Secretary Vance said last night in Chicago, these growing demands for fulfillment of fundamental rights are generally in our national interest, because they are producing new or strengthened democratic institutions in many countries around the world. By helping Third World nations meet popular aspirations in an orderly and peaceful way, we can improve our relations and strengthen our own security, not on a temporary basis of accommodation to a repressive regime but on an enduring basis of a shared commitment to democratic values.

As I have said, I believe our efforts in implementing the human rights policy have been effective. But the distance covered is dwarfed by the distance that still must be traveled. Let me say a few concluding words about this task that remains.

Despite the many improvements I have mentioned and others like them, egregious violations of human rights persist around the globe. Through our words and our actions, we will persevere in our efforts to improve these situations. As progress is achieved, we will set new goals for further attainment.

In these efforts, we seek your support to carry out the common objective of Congress and the President to rekindle the beacon of human rights in American foreign policy. ■

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Political Asylum

by Warren Christopher

Address before the Los Angeles County Bar Association on November 6, 1979. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.

Late last summer, I found myself confronted with one drama of political asylum. As you will recall, the Soviet Dancer Alexandr Godunov had left the Bolshoi Ballet while on tour here and was granted asylum. The circumstances led the State Department to request an interview with his wife, the Bolshoi ballerina Lyudmila Vlasova, so that we could ascertain her wishes. Despite Soviet assurances to Department officials that such an interview would be arranged, Ms. Vlasova suddenly appeared at Kennedy Airport in New York, accompanied by a group of husky Soviet escorts who rushed her aboard an Aeroflot flight for Moscow.

This issue reached my desk on a Friday afternoon at about the same time Ms. Vlasova arrived at the airport. Our laws authorize the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to prevent an alien's departure from the United States when such a departure would be contrary to the national interest. Acting under that statute, I asked the Department of Justice to delay Ms. Vlasova's departure so that we could determine whether her leaving was truly voluntary.

Ms. Vlasova had been taken aboard the aircraft before this order could be carried out—and thus ensued a 3-day standoff at the airport. The "prevention of departure" order issued by INS kept the plane on the ground, while we discussed with the Soviets our insistence that Ms. Vlasova be interviewed in a noncoercive atmosphere. As the weekend wore on, it became clear that the issue was being considered at the highest levels of the Soviet Government.

On day three of this incident, the Soviets finally acquiesced to a suggestion we had made on day one, and the interview was conducted in a mobile lounge at the airport. Our team of experts on the scene was led by Ambassador Don McHenry [then U.S. Deputy Representative to the U.N. Security Council and now U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations] and included both a doctor and Mr. Godunov's attorney. They were convinced that Ms. Vlasova's expressed desire to leave was, in fact, voluntary, and she was, therefore,

In doing so we've not alienated any of our previous friends. I think our country is strong within itself. There is not an embarrassment now about our government which did exist in a few instances in years gone by. So I don't see at all that our country has become weak. We are strong and we are getting stronger, not weaker.

But if anybody thinks that we can dominate other people with our strength—military or political strength or economic strength—they are wrong. That's not the purpose of our country.

Our inner strength, our confidence in ourselves, I think, is completely adequate. And I believe the unity that the American people have shown in this instance, their patience, is not at all a sign of weakness. It is a sign of sure strength.

Q. Serious charges have been placed against the Shah concerning the repression of his own people and the misappropriation of his nation's funds. Is there an appropriate vehicle to investigate those charges, and do you foresee a time when you would direct your Administration to assist in that investigation?

A. I don't know of any international forum within which charges have ever been brought against a deposed leader who has left his country. There have been instances of changing governments down through the centuries in history, and I don't know of any instance where such a leader who left his country after his government fell has been tried in an international court or in an international forum. This is a matter that can be pursued. It should be pursued under international law, and if there is a claim against the Shah's financial holdings, there is nothing to prevent other parties from going into the courts in accordance with the law of a nation or internationally and seeking a redress of grievances which they claim.

But as I said earlier, I don't think there's any forum that will listen to the Iranians make any sort of claim, justified or not, as long as they hold against their will and abuse the hostages in complete contravention to every international law and every precept or every commitment or principle of humankind.■

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 3, 1979.

For other documentation pertaining to the situation in Iran, see p. 37. For Ambassador McHenry's statements and the text of the Security Council resolution, see p. 49.

Report on the Transport of Air Pollutants

The Department of State on October 15, 1979, announced the release of the first annual report of the U.S.-Canada Research Consultation Group on the long-range transport of air pollutants.[1] The release was simultaneously announced in Ottawa by the Canadian Department of External Affairs.

In recognition of its increasing significance, the two governments requested the group to provide them with a clear and concise statement of the nature of the pollutants problem, as well as of its impact on the environment of eastern North America. Such a report was to provide a synthesis of existing scientific information which would make it accessible and understandable to the nonspecialist community of interested persons. It was also recognized that such a report would be of assistance in the ongoing discussions on transboundary air quality.

Research programs in both countries are at an early stage and have benefitted from the coordinating efforts of the group. The data in the report and the conclusions which it advances are of a preliminary nature. The governments are providing this information to the public to encourage discussion of this important bilateral environmental issue. Further reports from the Research Consultation Group are expected in the future.

The bilateral Research Consultation Group was formed in October 1978 through an exchange of letters between the Embassy of Canada and the U.S. Department of State. The group is to consult on ongoing research efforts in Canada and the United States and to facilitate a full exchange of technical information on the long-range transport of air pollutants. Among the responsibilities of the group are:

1. Analysis of currently instituted programs and those under development to determine where gaps may exist in the information base relating to the occurrence and effects of long-range transport of air pollutants;

2. Promotion of measures necessary to insure the intercomparability of data generated by programs in both countries;

3. Promotion of the dissemination of appropriate data and research information;

4. Tendering advice and recommendations to the appropriate agencies in the two governments with respect to modification of existing research programs and/or development of new research programs; and

5. Preparation of a yearly status report to both governments and other reports as deemed necessary.

The group is cochaired by a representative of Environment Canada and of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and is comprised of representatives of a number of Canadian and U.S. agencies with research interests related to pollutants. The group has had two plenary meetings since its formation, as well as frequent contact between researchers in particular specialties.■

Press release 264.

[1] Copies of the report may be obtained from Mr. Conrad Kleveno, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. 20460.

Mrs. Carter Visits Thailand

At the request of the President, Mrs. Rosalynn Carter visited Thailand November 7–10, 1979, to observe first hand the plight of refugees there, particularly the conditions of Kampuchean refugees. Following are remarks made by the President, Reverend Theodore M. Hesburgh, Chairman of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, and Mrs. Carter at a White House meeting on relief efforts and Mrs. Carter's trip.[1]

PRESIDENT CARTER

I'm very grateful that all of you have come to the White House to talk about one of the most important issues that faces humanity and will face it in our lifetime. It's a rare occasion in human memory when there has been a possibility of holocaust, threatening to destroy an entire race of people. It happened, perhaps, in the time of the Armenians, earlier in this century, and later, of course, among Jews and others in the time of Hitler, and now among the people of Cambodia, or Kampuchea, as it's presently known.

There also is a rare occasion when in the life of a great nation, its government and its people can react in an unselfish, dynamic, and effective way to alleviate extraordinary human suffering, such as the case, again, with the refugees and the starving people of the Cambodian region.

I was very pleased that the three Senators, then my wife and Dr. Richmond [Julius B. Richmond, Assistant Secretary for Health and Surgeon General, Public Health Service], Mrs. Young [Jean Young, Chairperson, U.S. Commission on the International Year of the Child] and her group, and now a group of Congresswomen and others have been to that region to dramatize the need for action, and also to bring back tangible recommendations on how the suffering might be alleviated more effectively.

It's a difficult issue to resolve. There are major obstacles to overcome: obstacles of war, over which we have no control in that long-troubled part of the world; the issue of diplomatic bridges that are very hard to cross; and also, of course, the very serious problems in administration, in dealing with the bureaucratic needs, to derive help from those eager to give and actually to deliver it effectively to those who are most in need.

Rosalynn and Senators Danforth, Baucus, and Sasser, Dr. Richmond, and others have brought back very specific recommendations on what might be done.[2] I'm not going to try to preempt their reports to you. They can make their reports much better than can I. I'm one of those who is listening, and, like you, I am eager to act in accordance with the best interests of those who are crying out for assistance.

There are three basic areas of response: One is the U.S. Government itself—and the Congress has reacted very well in approving almost $70 million worth of aid. And I will go to the Congress for additional aid if it's necessary.

Second is an appeal to private organizations, volunteer organizations of all kinds, represented by many of you here. That's a resource of assistance which is eager to be tapped and which has already done yeoman's work, even before governmental help could be effective.

And the third recommendation is concerning international relationships. And I would like to caution you about that: This is a judgment and a decision that we can't make in this room.

One of the vivid reports that Rosalynn brought back to me was that quite often a U.S. initiative is counterproductive in the eventual carrying out of a recommendation. If the initiative comes from one of the less developed nations of the world or comes directly from the United Nations or, perhaps, comes from other countries than we, it's much more effective.

So, I would like to urge you to restrain your own inclinations to give public condemnation or public advice on what the Vietnamese ought to do, what the warring parties in Kampuchea ought to do, what the United Nations ought to do. Let that be handled through diplomatic channels. I can assure you that I will not permit these efforts to be abandoned or ignored. But I think that the public calling for action might be the very thing that would prevent that action being carried out. That's my only caution to you.

I have a second one—I forgot. I think the more all of us forgo credit for action to be taken, the more effective the effort will be. There is a great yearning, I know, within the U.S. Government, within the Red Cross, within UNICEF, within Catholic Charities, within the Protestant churches, within benevolent groups, to want to give aid and then have that assistance be publicly acknowledged and recognized. That is a human trait, but the more we can subjugate those natural, human desires for quiet giving and close cooperation with others, with a minimum of jealousy and a minimum of grasping for recognition, the more effective we'll all be.

I'm sure that's a cautionary word that you don't need, because there's an overwhelming unselfishness and benevolent attitude among this group. And you've taken the initiative, and there's been no evidence of a grasping for recognition. But in the future, this is going to be a long, slow, tedious process, and that needs to be recognized and avoided.

The last point I'd like to make is this: The Thai people and the Thai Government both deserve every possible recognition, expression of gratitude, and thanks. They are a poor country. Many of the Thai people suffer terribly from poverty, disease, and hunger. It's not a popular political thing to bring in enormous numbers of refugees from an alien and antagonistic country, who's been historical enemies on occasion, and still not arouse the condemnation of the Thais, who themselves suffer.

This has been a very great demonstration of both kindness and also courage, political courage. I know that this is something that you'll want to help with. The Thais are not able to accept literally hundreds of thousands of refugees into their country and feed those refugees on their own. We've got to be especially generous to the Thais in our thanks and in our direct help and the recognition of what they are contributing.

I look forward with great eagerness to the summary of your recommendations. I will be getting it through the National Security Council, and through my wife, who always has easy access to me. And I think that her involvement is one that can be of help to you as well. She'll be working with the wives of Senators and other Members of Congress, and female Members of Congress. She will also be working with any of you who want her to help, in providing an avenue to the public and also an avenue directly to me.

But I'm very grateful to all of you for being willing to come. I think this will be one of the most important meetings ever taking place in the White House. And I'm grateful that I am President of people like you.

Flexible Exchange Rates After 6 Years' Experience

by Richard N. Cooper

Address before the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia and the University of Pennsylvania on October 31, 1979. Mr. Cooper is the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

The title of this conference, "Achieving Stability in the International Monetary System," suggests that our hosts may feel that the present international monetary system, with flexible exchange rates at its center, is not stable. There are also those who feel that the flexible exchange rate system has caused a marked deterioration in the overall performance of the world economy, that exchange rate movements have been excessive, and that flexible rates have not made a major contribution to the external adjustment process.

In contrast to this widely held view, I want to take this opportunity today to indicate my judgment that the system of flexible exchange rates works reasonably well, that is to say, it has made a significant contribution to the external adjustment process and, indeed, that it has worked just about as one would expect, given the disturbances the world economy has endured the past 3 years.

Macroeconomic Performance—1973–79

In making this judgement, I have tried to abstract from the week-to-week exchange market turbulences which we have seen at times during the past 6 years. Let us adopt the perspective of looking back on this period from, say, 1982. Equally important, I have tried to avoid confusing the effects of flexible rates themselves with our overall economic performance during the period of flexible rates. By almost any comparative measure, our macroeconomic performance during the period 1973–1979 was worse than our performance during the last several years of the adjustable peg system. For example, if we compare some of the most important measures of economic performance of the major industrial countries during 1973–79 to the previous period, we see a significant difference: Real economic growth was only 60% as fast; unemployment rates were 50% higher; and inflation rates were more than double.

These developments, however, cannot be attributed to the flexible rate system. *Post hoc* does not imply *propter hoc*. To appreciate this, we only need to remind ourselves of two other factors which affected economic performance during the period of flexible rates: the quadrupling of world oil prices in 1973–74 and the further doubling of those prices since then, and the tremendous expansion of international liquidity in 1970–73 associated with the breakdown of the fixed exchange rate system. These factors have forced us to deal simultaneously with high unemployment and high inflation, a task to which our tools of economic management are not well suited.

Movements in Exchange Rates

When we look at the entire 6 years of flexible exchange rates, we find that the broad movement of exchange rates has not been surprising; nor has it been as great as the newspapers have led us to believe. From the viewpoint of balance-of-payments adjustment, what is important is the movement of each country's currency against some average of the currencies of its trading partners, not its movement against another single currency. When the currencies of all industrial countries are weighted by their importance in U.S. trade (which implies, for example, that the Canadian dollar is given a weight of about one-fifth), the U.S. dollar is virtually unchanged today from March 1973, when major currencies were allowed to float against one another.

Moreover, the year-to-year movements during those 6½ years have been relatively modest and have followed a pattern which textbook theory would lead us to expect: The dollar appreciated when U.S. economic activity increased less rapidly than elsewhere (or declined), and the dollar depreciated when U.S. economic activity was more vigorous than that elsewhere. The actual percentage changes in the U.S.-trade weighted value of the dollar relative to other OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] currencies were as follows:

March 20, 1973 to Dec. 31, 1973, +1.5 percent; 1974, −1.4 percent; 1975, +4.9; 1976, +0.7; 1977, −3.5; 1978, −5.4; 1979 through Oct. 26, +3.1; or, for the total period March 1973 to October 1979, +0.4).

Neither have the movements in exchange rates been surprising if we adopt a perspective across countries. If we had forecast accurately in December 1976, for example, the current account imbalances which in fact emerged, we would also have forecast quite accurately the changes in exchange rates which have taken place. At least we would have forecast accurately the rank ordering of exchange rate changes; we might have been off on the exact magnitude, which is a more complicated question.

The Swiss franc is at one extreme. It appreciated 34% against the U.S. dollar between December 1976 and December 1978. But we must also observe that by mid-1978 Switzerland had a current account surplus equal to 6% of its GNP. By any standard, this is an enormous surplus, and it is not at all surprising under a system of flexible exchange rates that the Swiss franc appreciated sharply relative to other currencies.

Japan's surplus in 1978 was much larger in absolute terms, but was smaller relative to its economy. As with the Swiss franc, it is not surprising that the yen increased in value during this period. The yen is followed by the German mark and the other European currencies that are linked to it. Again, there is a clear relationship between the value of the mark and Germany's current account surplus.

Even the appreciation of the British pound can be readily explained in these terms. Recall that in 1976 the pound was under severe external pressure, and Britain ran a large current deficit. By 1978 Britain's financial situation and the current account had both improved substantially and the pound appreciated. Comparable developments took place in Italy.

In contrast, the United States moved from current account surplus in 1976 to a very large deficit in 1978, and Canada also showed a deterioration. Under these circumstances, is it surprising that the U.S. dollar depreciated relative to European currencies and the yen and that the Canadian dollar depreciated relative to the U.S. dollar? The rank order of movement in exchange rates relative to movements in current account positions is almost perfect. France is an exception. The French franc was especially depressed in late 1976 by the prospect of a Socialist-Communist victory in the French elections of March 1977. The election results differed from those expected, and the French franc recovered accordingly.

This pattern of observations is exactly what we would expect of exchange rates if they are to function as a key element in the external adjustment process. Deficits lead to depreciation and surpluses lead to appreciation. I should also note, however, that it is not only actual current account balances which cause changes in exchange rates. When a country's economic policies are judged to be inadequate to correct expected current account imbalances, an expectation about future exchange rates is created. As often happens in any financial market, these expectations about future prices have an effect on present prices as well. Long-term capital flows must also be entered into the calculation.

If my judgment that the pattern of exchange rate changes is what we would expect if they are to function as a key element in the adjustment process seems at variance with the popular impression of an unstable exchange rate system, the difference is due to the fact that the financial press exaggerates the economic importance of changes in exchange rates by typically reporting the widest movements in bilateral rates. What is relevant from the point of view of the adjustment process is a trade-weighted average movement in exchange rates for each country's currency.

As I noted above, these movements have been very much less than press reports would lead us to believe. For example, Germany is Switzerland's largest trading partner, so movements in the Swiss franc-U.S. dollar rate greatly exaggerate the effective movement of the Swiss franc. Similarly, Canada is the largest trading partner of the United States, so movements between the dollar and the German mark do not capture adequately the effective movement of the U.S. dollar.

Trade and Service Flows

Of course, if movements in exchange rates are to be a key element in the adjustment process, trade and service flows must respond to these movements in exchange rates. I have argued that exchange rates moved in response to imbalances in goods and services. But will trade and service flows in turn respond to movements in exchange rates? I think the answer is affirmative, provided it is clear that we are talking about real, rather than nominal, exchange rates changes and that we are talking about the long-run effect rather than the short-run effect. Those who take the view that flexible exchange rates do not work have mistakenly focused on nominal exchange rate changes or have, against all evidence, expected a quick response in current account positions.

The changes in exchange rates that we have observed between major currencies have been influenced by differential rates of inflation between countries. A country's competitive price position is, of course, not affected to the extent that movements in nominal exchange rates only compensate for differential movements in price levels. The movements in exchange rates we have seen in the last 6 years can be only partially explained by differential rates of inflation among the industrial countries. They are, therefore, largely "real" and may be presumed to account for some part of the shifts in current accounts we are now seeing.

Long-Run vs. Short-Run Effects

In judging the efficacy of the flexible exchange rate system, it is also important that we look at the long-run effect rather than the short-run effect. Formal studies generally show that price elasticities of demand in virtually all industrial countries are statistically significant and reasonably large over the long run, defined as 2 years or more, but are much smaller in the short run. If one looks only at the short-run effects of exchange rate changes, it would be possible to conclude that the adjustment process does not work. In the short run, import prices (in domestic currency) increase more rapidly than import volume decreases, resulting in a worsening of a country's trade balance. In the long run, however, this trend is reversed, producing the J-curve effect, and the trade balance improves. Changes in real income also have an important impact, and macroeconomic policy must be used to reinforce changes in exchange rates.

When we adopt a long-run perspective, we find that trade flows seem to be responding to the changes in real exchange rates which have taken place. The Japanese and German surpluses are declining and the American deficit is also declining. We now expect that the U.S. current account deficit in 1979 will be under $4 billion, compared with about $14 billion in both 1977 and 1978. Furthermore, we expect a surplus next year of over $5 billion. This is strong, if still incomplete, evidence that flexible exchange rates have worked well. But we need patience for the relevant factors to work themselves out. If we are not patient, we may well find that we cannot function with a system of flexible exchange rates, not because it does not work in economic terms, but because in a world of instant gratification, we find the delays psychologically intolerable.

Effects of Domestic Economic Policies

A complete analysis of the flexible exchange rate system must also ask how the large current account imbalances arose in the first place. An analysis of domestic economic policies may seem inappropriate for a conference focused on the international monetary system, but it is an essential part of the picture. What we find is that current account imbalances were closely related to domestic economic policies. Again, take the case of Switzerland.

Switzerland adopted a medium-run policy, historically the only case of which I am aware, of negative growth. From 1974 to 1977, Switzerland's labor force fell by about 9%, through the reduction of foreign workers by 25%. Since industrial capacity did not shrink correspondingly, but domestic demand fell, it is not surprising that the export surplus grew to enormous (relative) proportions.

In the United States, we had experienced a long recession which put great strain on the world economy and on the international financial system, especially in terms of its effects on developing countries. By late 1976, the world economy was in a very precarious situation. Unemployment was high in the United States; it was high and rising in Europe. Many countries, including some of the large industrialized countries as well as many developing countries, found themselves with a very large burden of external indebtedness. Those countries had to engage in economic and financial retrenchment. Yet that alone would have aggravated and prolonged the world recession, making corrective actions in all countries more difficult. Under these circumstances, for both domestic and foreign policy reasons, the United States undertook a program of economic expansion to end the recession.

Balanced Expansion

It would have been desirable for the world economic recovery to have been led by a balanced expansion in the leading industrial economies and most notably in the United States, Japan, and Germany. These countries all had

explore more systematically the relations between trade and economy and security and human rights so that we can see the interdependent factors in each of these areas. Second, when we consult bilaterally and multilaterally with the Helsinki signatories, we can widen the scope and expertise available on all areas of the Final Act. Third, we can suggest that, in the interim between regular CSCE review conferences, there could be more experts or high-level meetings on specific and concrete CSCE subjects, such as we have seen in a limited way after the Belgrade meeting. There would be fruitful areas for intensive work in the coming years, for example in the areas of security, family reunification, freer travel, and emigration.

All of these suggestions offer ways to implement the Final Act in an evenhanded manner and to give us the tools we need to seek greater commitment to the implementation of those concerns in which we have a specific interest.

Preparations for the Review Conference

Now that I have given you an idea of our current thinking about the CSCE process, I would like to say a few words about our preparations for the followup review conference in Madrid and the period beyond.

Our policy is to have the Madrid meeting be a constructive one which will review compliance, seek to enhance implementation in the future, and explore concrete ideas for improving cooperation. In the area of human rights, there is absolutely no doubt that we will continue vigorously to seek full implementation, particulary of principles seven and basket 3. I have mentioned earlier the high level of interest in this area, and given your own continuous involvement in these concerns, I am sure our commitment to effective human rights implementations will deepen.

In this regard, among the many areas which we will be examining at Madrid, we will do our utmost to encourage Eastern countries to accord respectful and humane treatment to the courageous individuals who have established citizens' committees to monitor and stimulate compliance with the Helsinki Final Act. Related to this will be efforts to alleviate the suffering and obtain freedom for those who have been imprisoned because of their political and religious beliefs and for espousing compliance with the Final Act.

Of specific concern to this leadership conference will be our continuing interest in a more humane approach to emigration and improved emigration procedures, with special emphasis on and continuing sympathy for the plight of Soviet Jews and other religious adherents who wish to emigrate, as well as for the elimination of harassment of those who have been refused exit visas. We remain concerned about implementation of the provisions involving the freedom of journalists to pursue their work without interference.

We see no reason why there could not be substantial progress in these areas in the period before Madrid; positive developments here would be a powerful stimulus to making the Madrid meeting the type of success we all wish it to be.

For the sake of balance, and to enhance our ability to obtain compliance with all aspects of the Final Act, we will be working with other signatories to improve implementation of the security provisions of the Helsinki agreement by looking at ways to heighten the effect of the confidence-building measures written into the Final Act. Since the Final Act also encourages the parties to make further efforts which could lead to developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence, we will be willing to explore ways to implement these provisions in a manner that accommodates some aspects of the French proposal and Warsaw Pact proposal within the CSCE context in the period after the Madrid meeting.

In the economic fields, we will also look for ways to facilitate trade and other forms of economic cooperation.

The scientific forum, which will be held in Hamburg this coming winter, will allow distinguished private scientific figures, as well as the CSCE signatories, to see where further efforts can be made in this important field. In Geneva in November we will sign the Convention of Transboundary Air Pollution worked out in the CSCE context under the auspices of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe. We will also try to see where other environmental problems of common interest can be cooperatively examined. We intend to further cooperation and exchanges in the fields of science and culture as well. These questions will be taken up bilaterally and multilaterally as we prepare for the Madrid review conference.

What I have attempted to do in these remarks is to describe for you the U.S. Government's continuing interest in the well-being of the Helsinki process and our deepening commitment to the implementation of all Final Act provisions agreed to by the signatories. Of all the methods we have for dealing with the East, of all the concrete means established to work out the parameters of detente, and of all the forums that have been constructed to improve what is, at best, a tense relationship with a strong and determined adversary, the Helsinki process is by far the broadest and most politically workable.

For the long-term, however, the Helsinki process can lead us beyond the bloc-to-bloc relationship and disseminate understanding for the concepts of openness, pluralism, and humanity in the world. For this reason, the United States remains deeply committed to the Helsinki process and to the effort being made by all 35 signatories to improving their relationships by means of this unique diplomatic and public process. ■

[1] A private group in Czechoslovakia established to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.

CSCE Semiannual Report and 1980 Madrid Meeting

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DEC. 5, 1979[1]

On behalf of President Carter, Secretary Vance on December 4, 1979, transmitted the seventh semiannual report on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act to Chairman Dante Fascell of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. These reports are submitted to assist the commission in its function of monitoring implementation of the Helsinki accords. The present report covers the period June 1–November 30, 1979.[2]

The next followup meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will start in Madrid on November 11, 1980. A major feature of that meeting will be a review by the signatories of implementation of the Final Act. The United States intends to speak frankly and honestly about successes and failures in im-

plementation. Our comments will reflect the record of progress at that time.

Thus far, the record has been uneven. Advances in some areas have been coupled with serious failures with respect to other aspects of the Final Act. For example, during the period covered by the report, there have been encouraging developments in the reunification of divided families and the general area of human contacts but continued repression of individuals seeking to exercise rights which their governments have pledged to respect.

The Final Act recognizes respect for human rights as an integral part of the basis for the development of security and cooperation among the 35 participating states. It is in the area of human rights that certain states have had the most difficulty in meeting the commitments which they voluntarily made at Helsinki. The United States, during the coming year and at the Madrid meeting, intends to continue to encourage all signatories to implement the Final Act in its entirety. ■

[1] Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

[2] Copies of the report may be obtained from the Public Information Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

I am extremely pleased that the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe has taken the lead in assessing U.S. implementation and identifying areas where American performance can be improved. The commission's report, "Fulfilling Our Promises: The United States and the Helsinki Final Act"—released on November 8—is the first comprehensive review by any CSCE signatory which takes into account criticism from other Helsinki states as well as domestic observers.

CSCE signatory states which suppress human rights cannot, in good conscience, justify their record of compliance. But I believe our record of implementation has been second to none, even among the other democracies among the 35 participating states. American political history is testimony to the firm foundation of civil liberties enshrined in our own Constitution with its Bill of Rights, long before Helsinki.

As this report points out, our work is never complete. Our own traditions, reinforced by the Helsinki Final Act, pledge us to strive constantly for improvement in both domestic, civil, and economic rights and in the expanded cooperation with other participating states. This report should go far to persuade other CSCE governments that the United States is serious about its obligations under the Helsinki accords.

I also hope that it will stimulate other Helsinki countries to undertake similar public assessments of their performance. Implementation of the Final Act is critical to peace and security in Europe and for our own nation. We cannot permit the Helsinki agreement to become meaningless words on parchment. We must bring it to life, and I believe the CSCE Commission has made a major contribution to that end. ■

Helsinki Agreement on Human Rights

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, NOV. 30, 1979[1]

My Administration is deeply committed to the cause of human rights both here and abroad. As a means to promote respect for fundamental freedoms and the development of a more peaceful, stable world, the United States attaches great significance to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This document, signed in 1975 at Helsinki by the leaders of 33 European nations, Canada, and the United States, pledges its signers to work toward lowering barriers and improving cooperation between East and West. Each nation made solemn promises to take steps to improve the lives of its citizens. These obligations required some adjustments in the foreign and domestic policies of all 35 nations.

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 3, 1979.

Visit of Irish Prime Minister Lynch

Prime Minister Jack Lynch of Ireland made an official visit to the United States November 7–15, 1979. While in Washington (November 8–10), he met with President Carter and other government officials. Following is the press statement issued at the conclusion of his meeting with the President on November 8.[1]

The President met today with Prime Minister Jack Lynch of Ireland. Prime Minister Lynch, in addition to being the Head of Government of Ireland, is for the last half of 1979 also the President of the European Council of Heads of State or of Government of the nine countries of the European Community.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the close relations between their two countries and discussed a number of key world issues which are of particular concern to the European Community, with which the United States enjoys close cooperation, based on common interests and values.

The President and the Prime Minister also discussed at length the tragic communal problems in Northern Ireland. They condemned support for organizations engaged directly or indirectly in campaigns of violence which only delays the day when peace and reconciliation can come to Northern Ireland. They noted with interest the proposal of the British Government to convene a conference of the principal political parties in Northern Ireland and shared the hope that progress could be made toward a form of administration acceptable to both parts of the community there. The President reaffirmed his statement of August 1977 looking to support for American investment in Northern Ireland when the violence is ended.

The official visit of Prime Minister and Mrs. Lynch to Washington and to several other American cities demonstrates the great friendship between the two nations and also the great respect of the American Government and people for a country which in recent years has enjoyed rapid economic growth and taken its place among the industrialized nations of the world. The Prime Minister spoke of the contribution of American investment to this growth and reiterated his government's continuing support for such investment.

The Prime Minister invited the President to visit Ireland at a mutually agreeable date and the President accepted the invitation with pleasure. ■

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 12, 1979, which also carries the texts of President Carter's and Prime Minister Lynch's remarks made at the welcoming ceremony on Nov. 8, their remarks to reporters following a meeting on Nov. 8, and their dinner toasts that evening.

ognized human rights—rights to fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care, and education. In the face of severe budget pressures, the President proposed significant increases in development assistance for 1979 and 1980. At the same time, we are attempting to channel a growing share of our economic aid to countries that respect the human rights of their people. The President reaffirmed this policy a few months ago when he said:

> In distributing the scarce resources of our foreign assistance programs, we will demonstrate that our deepest affinities are with nations which commit themselves to a democratic path to development.

Congress has played an active role in this area by mandating that human rights considerations be taken into account in decisions to provide aid to some countries and deny it to others. It has enacted a broad range of statutes which restrict the flow of economic and military assistance to countries with serious human rights problems. Restrictions of varying kinds apply, for example, to our economic assistance, our military assistance and sales, our PL–480 food aid, and our votes on loans in the World Bank and other international development banks.

Congress passed many of these provisions before the Carter Administration came into office and others more recently. For example, in the last session of Congress, new legislation was passed requiring the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to take into account human rights considerations in the conduct of its programs abroad. In that same session, Congress also strengthened the restriction on providing security assistance to serious human rights violators.

We are commited to carrying out the letter and the spirit of these laws. To assist in these efforts, the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance was established in the early months of the Administration to provide a broad and open forum for discussion within the executive branch of human rights issues relating to foreign assistance programs. The membership includes representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Labor, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, from the National Security Council and the Agency for International Development, and from other agencies that have a potential interest in the deliberations of the group.

In applying the relevant statute to a particular loan, grant, or program, this interagency group generally considers a wide range of factors, including the following:

- The present human rights situation in the recipient country and any positive or negative trend;
- The political, economic, and cultural background of the country and the level of human rights performance that can reasonably be expected of the country in light of that background;
- The other fundamental U.S. interests with respect to that country;
- The extent to which a loan will directly benefit the needy; and
- The effectiveness of a decision to defer or oppose a loan in comparison or in combination with any of the available diplomatic tools for indicating our concern about human rights violations.

The interagency group is by no means the only forum in which issues relating to human rights and foreign assistance are discussed. For example, human rights aspects of arms transfers are generally considered by the Arms Export Control Board, which is responsible for formulating our security assistance programs.

Over the past 2 years, the agencies participating in these and other groups have gained valuable experience in carrying out the new function of systematically bringing human rights considerations to bear on foreign assistance decisions. Working groups have been established which, in an increasing number of cases, are able to develop consensus recommendations that eliminate the need for higher level review.

Perhaps most useful in promoting the smooth functioning of this interagency process has been the emergence of a number of general principles which have come to guide our decisionmaking. We have not tried to formalize these principles because we wished to proceed cautiously and deliberately in implementing a new and controversial policy and because we wished to respond flexibly to the widely varying circumstances presented by particular countries and particular programs.

U.S. Guidelines

However, I think it is now appropriate to mention a few of these guidelines that have developed over the more than 2 years that we have been addressing these problems.

- We attach fundamental importance to all three basic categories of internationally recognized human rights—that is, personal, economic, and political rights. We are prepared to react to flagrant denials of any of these rights, but we have found in practice that we are most often called to respond to flagrant violations of personal rights such as widespread systematic torture or arbitrary executions.
- The most effective strategy for obtaining human rights improvements is one that combines the full range of diplomatic approaches with a willingness to adjust our foreign assistance programs as required. No element in the overall strategy can be as effective alone as in combination with others. In addition, the use of these various elements must be calibrated and sequential, conveying our concerns in a steady, even way while avoiding sudden escalations.
- Bilateral or multilateral economic assistance that directly benefits the needy is rarely disapproved, even to governments with poor human rights records. Disapproval could penalize the poor because of their government's misdeeds.
- Only compelling considerations of national security can justify providing security assistance to countries with very serious human rights problems. Even where these considerations require us to go forward with military sales to such a country, we still restrict sales to the police or others involved in human rights abuses. And we take particular care to convey our human rights concerns through other diplomatic instruments.
- Decisions to extend or withhold assistance are often taken on the basis of trends in human rights conditions, as well as the overall level of performance.

It should be apparent from these five principles that we do not rigidly adopt the same approach to foreign assistance decisions just because two countries have a similar human rights situation. Our decisions are influenced by other factors—factors such as the presence of other important U.S. interests, conditions, and traditions unique to a particular foreign country and considerations of effectiveness and tactics. What does remain constant in our approach to human rights problems around the world is our determination to bring these concerns to bear on foreign assistance programs in a conscientious process that fully reflects the will of Congress.

I have discussed the implementation of the human rights policy in three areas—reporting, diplomacy, and foreign assistance. Let me turn now to address briefly what I believe we have accomplished with this policy.

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Following are President Carter's address to the nation on January 4, 1980, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Donald F. McHenry's statement in the Security Council on January 6, and the text of the draft Security Council resolution cosponsored by Bangladesh, Jamaica, Niger, the Philippines, and Zambia. When the Council voted on the draft resolution on January 7, it was vetoed by the Soviet Union and not adopted (a veto by a permanent member of the Council prevents adoption of a resolution). Members of the Council which voted in favor of the draft resolution were Bangladesh, China, France, Jamaica, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Zambia. The Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic voted against the resolution.

PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS, JAN. 4, 1980[1]

I come to you this evening to discuss the extremely important and rapidly changing circumstances in Southwest Asia.

I continue to share with you the sense of outrage and impatience because of the kidnapping of innocent American hostages and the holding of them by militant terrorists with the support and approval of Iranian officials.

Our purposes continue to be the protection of the long-range interests of our Nation and the safety of the American hostages.

We are attempting to secure the release of the Americans through the International Court of Justice, through the United Nations, and through public and private diplomatic efforts. We are determined to achieve this goal. We hope to do so without bloodshed and without further danger to the lives of our 50 fellow Americans. In these efforts we continue to have the strong support of the world community. The unity and the common sense of the American people under such trying circumstances are essential to the success of our efforts.

Recently there has been another very serious development which threatens the maintenance of the peace in Southwest Asia. Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small non-aligned sovereign nation of Afghanistan, which had hitherto not been an occupied satellite of the Soviet Union.

Fifty thousand heavily armed Soviet troops have crossed the border, and are now dispersed throughout Afghanistan, attempting to conquer the fiercely independent Muslim people of that country.

The Soviets claim falsely that they were invited into Afghanistan to help protect that country from some unnamed outside threat. But the President, who had been the leader of Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion, was assassinated—along with several members of his family—after the Soviets gained control of the capital city of Kabul.

Only several days later was the new puppet leader even brought into Afghanistan by the Soviets.

This invasion is an extremely serious threat to peace—because of the threat of further Soviet expansion into neighboring countries in Southwest Asia, and also because such an aggressive military policy is unsettling to other peoples throughout the world.

This is a callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter.

It is a deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people.

We must recognize the strategic importance of Afghanistan to stability and peace.

A Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a stepping stone to possible control over much of the world's oil supplies.

The United States wants all nations in the region to be free and to be independent. If the Soviets are encouraged in this invasion by eventual success, and if they maintain their dominance over Afghanistan and then extend their control to adjacent countries—the stable, strategic and peaceful balance of the entire world will be changed. This would threaten the security of all nations including, of course, the United States, our allies and our friends.

Therefore, the world simply cannot stand by and permit the Soviet Union to commit this act with impunity.

Fifty nations have petitioned the United Nations Security Council to condemn the Soviet Union and to demand the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

We realize that under the United Nations Charter the Soviet Union and other permanent members may veto action of the Security Council.

If the will of the Security Council should be thwarted in this manner, then immediate action would be appropriate in the General Assembly of the United Nations where no Soviet veto exists.

In the meantime, neither the United States nor any other nation which is committed to world peace and stability can continue to do business as usual with the Soviet Union.

I have already recalled the United States Ambassador from Moscow to Washington. He is working with me and my other senior advisors in an immediate and comprehensive evaluation of the whole range of our relations with the Soviet Union.

The successful negotiation of the SALT II Treaty has been a major goal and a major achievement of this Administration—and we Americans, the people of the Soviet Union, and indeed the entire world will benefit from the successful control of strategic nuclear weapons through the implementation of this carefully negotiated Treaty.

However, because of the Soviet aggression, I have asked the United States Senate to defer further consideration of the SALT II Treaty so that the Congress and I can assess Soviet actions and intentions and devote our primary attention to the legislative and other measures required to respond to this crisis.

As circumstances change in the future we will, of course, keep the ratification of SALT II under active review i

permitted to depart without further delay.

While we were able, in this case, to uphold the principle of no forced repatriation, the procedures employed were not ideal. As I shall discuss a little later, we are now working with the Justice Department to improve them.

Since then, a number of spectacular defections and asylum cases has been in the news. In September two more Bolshoi dancers sought and received asylum here in Los Angeles. A pair of Soviet Olympic skating champions sought asylum in Switzerland. A Soviet journalist appeared at our Embassy in Tokyo to ask for asylum, and he, too, is now in the United States. An East German family fled to West Germany in a homemade hot-air balloon. And recently, reports appeared in the press suggesting that a champion Soviet canoeist, who had received asylum in West Germany, has disappeared under mysterious circumstances, perhaps in a case of forced repatriation.

Such dramatic cases are, in many ways, a tribute to the West and its free institutions. Certainly we in the United States can take pride in the fact that citizens from other countries are willing to risk their lives in order to breathe the free political and cultural air of America.

But we should not let pride blind us to the complexities that surround the subject of asylum. While asylum is an essentially humanitarian issue, it can have far-reaching international ramifications. In controversial cases, when charges and countercharges are traded back and forth—involving undiplomatic words like "persecution," "kidnapping," and "espionage"—tensions inevitably increase, and the whole range of relations between countries can be affected.

For a nation like ours, the decision to grant or deny asylum in a particular case cannot turn on a cool calculation of the international pros and cons. Because of our historical role as a country of refuge for the oppressed, because of our firm national commitment to human rights, we must insure that our actions in such cases comport not only with the law but also with the dictates of conscience.

So let us explore the theory and practice of asylum—in the belief that the United States can handle these sensitive matters with intelligence and compassion and with more efficiency as well.

Theory of Asylum

The concept of asylum appears to be almost as ancient as the idea of human mercy. And the law of asylum, like so much of our law, has its roots in primitive magic and taboo: Ancient tribes and societies had their sacred places—temples or the houses of chiefs—where bloodshed and revenge were prohibited. The Incas had fortified places to which women and children repaired for safety in time of hostilities. Some of the Greek city-states even sought to formalize a basic law of asylum.

In modern times—to leapfrog over a great stretch of history—the right of asylum is enshrined in both national and international law.

Asylum is granted to persons who are already in the United States and want to stay. Refugee status is granted to those who are somewhere else, but who want to come to the United States.

Before discussing the legal principles, I should note that when I speak of asylum, I am actually referring to what is properly called territorial asylum, which involves refuge sought by foreign persons within U.S. territory. The related concept of diplomatic asylum, involving refuge in diplomatic missions abroad, is widely recognized in some parts of the world. But it is strictly limited by U.S. law. It is longstanding U.S. policy to grant temporary refuge in our diplomatic posts abroad only to persons in immediate physical danger. Of course, Cardinal Mindszenty's 15-year stay in our Embassy in Budapest demonstrates that the rule is not totally inflexible, but that example also demonstrates the kind of practical problems that can arise when diplomatic missions become places of refuge.

We should also differentiate between asylum and the related issue of refugees. While the legal distinction is not clear cut, it is useful to think of the difference this way: Asylum is granted to persons who are already in the United States and want to stay. Refugee status is granted to those who are somewhere else, but who want to come to the United States.

Legal Principles

The starting point in discussing the law of asylum is the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which declares that: "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." Similarly, the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, passed by the U.N. General Assembly in 1967, provides that no person seeking territorial asylum ". . . shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier . . . or compulsory return to any state where he may be subjected to persecution."

While these declarations are aspirational in nature, the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees has the force of a treaty and, therefore, the force of law. This protocol provides that no signing state shall return a seeker of asylum who would face a threat to his life or freedom ". . . on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion."

Our own domestic legislation adopts a similar standard. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General is authorized to "withhold deportation" of an alien seeking asylum who would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion.

This statutory standard *sounds* fairly straightforward, but there are some significant ambiguities. For example, what constitutes "persecution" under the act? Is "persecution" necessarily political in nature—or is the concept of "persecution on account of . . . political opinion" broad enough to encompass restrictions on the ability of a painter or sculptor to express herself fully? Or on a dancer's right to the fullest artistic expression? Or the highest pay? Can extreme economic deprivation amount to "persecution"? Hundreds of would-be immigrants from Haiti claim that it does and are currently pressing their claims in a U.S. District Court in Florida.

Many asylum cases involve no complications and are handled each year by our immigration authorities without fanfare and with only routine advice from the State Department. But in politically sensitive cases—where the safety of the seeker of asylum may be in doubt, where there is the danger of forcible repatriation, or where sensitive relations between nations could be affected—the State Department may be involved from the outset.

It is in such cases, involving not only high diplomatic stakes but the problems of coordination among various government agencies, that the dangers are greatest that missteps and mistakes will occur. Our laws and regulations governing the granting of asylum are, in my judgment, generally fair and adequate. It is in trying to execute them with compassion and dispatch that problems may arise. And it is here that we are working to improve our performance.

Potential Problems

One problem arises from the fact that a request for asylum may occur almost anywhere, at any time. A request may be encountered, in spite of our best efforts, by people who simply do not know what to do.

In 1970, for example, a Lithuanian seaman leapt from his Soviet ship onto the deck of the U.S. Coast Guard cutter *Vigilant*. A sad scenario was played out in which the proper authorities were not notified; the standard procedures for handling asylum requests were not begun; and judgments were made on the spot to return the seaman to his ship, where he was beaten unconscious.

The story of the seaman, Simas Kudirka, has a happy ending. As it turned out, he was an American citizen by birth and was later granted entry to the United States. But the incident on board the *Vigilant* should have been handled very differently.

Another potential problem we are likely to encounter in the future, as we did with Ms. Vlasova, concerns the question of whether a foreign citizen is departing the United States voluntarily or under duress.

More specifically, when are we justified in delaying someone's departure from the United States, in the face of the person's express desire to leave, in order to determine whether he or she is acting under duress? As I suggested earlier, there was a reasonable basis for our concern about the circumstances surrounding Ms. Vlasova's hasty departure. Our request for an interview in a noncoercive environment was amply justified by both U.S. and international law. I am convinced, however, that we do need to strengthen our regulations on this point and to clarify the procedures to be followed when such incidents occur.

Improving Procedures

To deal with all these and with other problems, we are taking several steps, in cooperation with the Justice Department.

First, we are updating and clarifying the State Department's official guidelines for dealing with asylum cases. These guidelines will be issued to other government agencies, to local officials, and to police agencies across the nation so that those who may become involved in asylum cases will be aware of the specific steps to be taken.

Second, we are amending the regulations governing the departure of aliens from the United States to deal more explicitly with the problem of possible involuntary departure. This involves two steps. We will make clear in the proposed new regulation that where doubt exists whether an alien is departing voluntarily, such departure would be prejudicial to the interest of the United States and may, therefore, be temporarily delayed while an inquiry is conducted. And we will propose that immigration officers be granted the power to subpoena persons who in our judgment should be interviewed. This will make clear their authority to conduct an investigation into the question of whether an impending departure is voluntary or forced.

Third, we are studying how best to handle the problem of protecting a person who may be in danger of forced repatriation. As lawyers, you will readily understand the complexity of affording such protection without violating the constitutional rights of the person involved.

In a very real and often dramatic way, the issue of political asylum is a barometer of humanity's yearning for freedom. Asylum was traditionally granted to political figures who needed protection from their own governments in the wake of wars or revolutions. Today, increasingly, we see not only political figures but writers, dancers, musicians, and others seeking asylum as a means of free expression—artistic or even athletic expression. And we see ordinary people seeking asylum for reasons of religion or personal belief.

For us in the United States, these requests for refuge may create temporary abrasions and difficulties. But they are a tribute to our way of life—and to the values we represent in the world. They are also a recurring challenge to our support for human rights.

The steps I have outlined today represent our continuing effort to do not only what the law requires but what conscience compels, so that in the future we can respond to that challenge with imagination, skill, and the generosity that are the hallmarks of our people. ■

U.S. Takes Case Against Iran to the International Court of Justice

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, NOV. 29, 1979[1]

The United States on November 29, 1979, took its case against Iran to the International Court of Justice. In an action filed with the Court in The Hague, the United States charges that the Government of Iran has violated fundamental principles of international law in not protecting the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, in supporting the actions of those holding the American hostages, and in threatening to subject the hostages to trial.

In particular, the United States charges Iran has violated the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, the 1955 U.S.-Iran Treaty of Amity, and the Charter of the United Nations.

The United States will seek an urgent hearing before the Court and has requested the Court to issue forthwith a preliminary order directing Iran to secure the release of the hostages and to insure their safety.

Following are the texts of the U.S. Application to the Court, its Request for Interim Measures of Protection, and a letter from Secretary of State Vance to the President of the Court. The papers were filed by the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, Mr. Roberts B. Owen, who will represent the United States in the action.

LETTER TO ICJ

Dear Sir Humphrey:

The Government of the United States is today filing with the Court an Application and a Request for Interim Measures of Protection in a case against the Government of Iran for the seizure, and holding as hostages, of members of the United States Embassy in Tehran. As you are aware, at least fifty United States nationals are being subjected to prolonged and inhumane detention. They have already been held

The British should have a chance to resolve the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian problem. It is not in our national interest to move before they do. Our most effective role is to reinforce the British effort to bring the talks to a successful conclusion. We have been doing precisely that, and we shall continue to do so.

While the negotiations continue, the British are maintaining most of their sanctions. They have stated these sanctions will remain in force until the British Governor arrives in Salisbury. No other country has terminated sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Under these circumstances, there is no reason why the United States should stand alone in the international community.

As we look to the future, we should bear in mind that a peaceful settlement will benefit not only the people of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia but neighboring countries as well. Because of the hostilities, Zambia and Mozambique have suffered, and important lines of transportation and communication have been disrupted. The surrounding countries have also had to cope with a steady influx of refugees which has strained their economies and their societies. The process leading to an independent and internationally recognized government in Zimbabwe will allow the recovery process to begin throughout the region.

The Lancaster House conference is in its concluding moments. The goal we share is within sight. We urge the Congress not to take precipitous action by lifting sanctions now.

DEC. 5, 1979

. . . .

Since the announcement of the President's determination, there have been important developments at the Lancaster House conference. On November 15, the Patriotic Front delegation agreed to the transition arrangements, which were the focus of the second stage of the conference. These arrangements provide for a British Governor who will assume all legislative and executive authority and manage the elections. In the same sense that the earlier agreement on constitutional proposals provided for majority rule, the transition proposals provide an impartial framework for the holding of elections. These are extremely important and significant accomplishments. They are entirely consistent with our previous objectives when we sought to obtain a negotiated settlement to the Rhodesian problem.

Subsequently and during the past 2½ weeks, the conference has addressed the cease-fire issues. This constitutes the last phase of the negotiations. The Salisbury delegation has agreed to the cease-fire proposals which were tabled by the British on November 16 and were amplified on November 22. Lord Carrington provided a more detailed description of these proposals to the Patriotic Front on November 28 and asked for a positive response to them so that technical discussions could be conducted to work out the final details for the implementation of a cease-fire.

As of the time of the preparation of this statement, the Patriotic Front has not replied favorably to Lord Carrington's request. The Patriotic Front has advanced counterproposals on cease-fire arrangements, and discussions are continuing.

Under these circumstances, the Administration continues to believe that this is not the moment to lift sanctions. The negotiations have not been concluded; the British are retaining most of their sanctions at this point; and the British Governor has not arrived in Salisbury and assumed authority. No other country has ended sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. If we were to lift sanctions now, we would stand alone and isolated in the international community.

On December 3, the Secretary of State informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that when the British Governor arrives in Salisbury to implement an agreed Lancaster House settlement and the electoral process begins, the President will take prompt action to lift sanctions. The Secretary said that this will be done no later than 1 month after the Governor's arrival.

The Secretary also took the position that if an agreed settlement is not reached at the conference, we will consult with the respective committees of the Senate and the House regarding the course of action which best serves the national interest.

I would emphasize, however, that in view of the agreements which have been reached at Lancaster House, the prospects for a successful conclusion to the negotiations remain very good. We believe that the talks can be concluded quickly and the terms of the agreements can soon thereafter be implemented. If this is achieved, the Administration will move to terminate sanctions for there would be no reason to maintain sanctions under these conditions.

Our principal objective in the immediate days ahead should be to lend full support to the British effort to bring the conference to a successful conclusion promptly. This has been our overriding purpose ever since the conference began, and I believe that we have been helpful to the negotiating process. We must never lose sight that the United Kingdom has primary responsibility for Rhodesia and that they should have the opportunity to resolve this problem. After 15 years of failed negotiations, I do not believe this is too much to ask.

The parties are now close to an agreement. When the record of the last 3 months is reviewed, it is remarkable that so much has been accomplished. We must give great credit for this result to the skill that Prime Minister Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Carrington have shown during the negotiations. Until we know the final outcome at Lancaster House, however, we should not risk jeopardizing that process by lifting sanctions now. ■

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committees and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE, NOV. 14, 1979[1]

Subject: Maintenance of Sanctions Against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Under Section 408(b) of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981.

Pursuant to Section 408(b) of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981 (93 Stat. 405), I hereby determine that it is in the national interest of the United States to continue sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia at this time.

You are requested, on my behalf, to report this determination promptly to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

You are further requested to report to me immediately upon the conclusion of the present Constitutional Conference on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia being held in London, describing the conclusions of that confer-

ence and your recommendations for action by the United States with respect to the termination of sanctions.

This determination shall be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

JIMMY CARTER

Justification for Presidential Determination Under Section 408(b) of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981 Concerning Sanctions Against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia

Problem

Section 408(b) of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981, requires that sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia be terminated by November 15, 1979, unless the President determines that it would not be in the national interest of the United States and so reports to the Congress.

Justification

Encouraging progress has been made in recent months toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia; however, the negotiations presently being conducted by the United Kingdom with the parties have not yet been concluded, and differences still remain. A termination of sanctions at this stage could lead all the parties to harden their positions and would jeopardize the chances for a successful settlement for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

The British Government has not yet concluded negotiations that would end the rebellion in Rhodesia. They have stated that this will occur when the British Governor arrives in Salisbury and assumes authority. At the present time, the great bulk of British sanctions remain in force and none of our major allies has taken action to terminate sanctions.

The negotiations are now at a critical stage. We hope they will be rapidly and successfully concluded. While the talks continue, it would be premature for the United States to alter its position on sanctions. We would, however, be prepared to lift sanctions when a British Governor assumes authority in Salisbury and a process leading to impartial elections has begun. Our policy will continue to be that no party should have a veto over fair settlement proposals.

This issue will be kept under continuous review and the President will promptly notify the Congress when conditions warrant the lifting of sanctions. ■

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 19, 1979.

Southern Rhodesia Settlement

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DEC. 6, 1979[1]

The U.S. Government welcomes the news of an agreement on cease-fire arrangements for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The historic accomplishments of the Lancaster House negotiations reflect great credit on all of the participants who have displayed a seriousness of purpose and a willingness to compromise in the interest of ending the bloodshed.

Although a few issues remain to be dealt with in detail, the United States is confident that a settlement is near and urges all the parties to conclude the historic task in which they are engaged. In doing so, the British Government and the parties have the full support of the American Government.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DEC. 12, 1979[2]

The United States welcomes and urges prompt acceptance of the now complete British proposals for a settlement in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Those parts of the proposals already agreed to by the parties provide for a democratic constitution with protection of individual rights and elections for an independent government in which all parties can participate freely.

The final proposals for implementation of the cease-fire certainly would appear to assure that voters could choose their government in peace, free from intimidation by any faction.

We strongly urge the Patriotic Front to accept the cease-fire implementation proposals and join in the settlement. It would be tragic if this remarkable chance for peace were lost in last-minute efforts to gain military advantage.

As the President has said, our policy will continue to be that no party should have a veto over fair settlement proposals.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DEC. 15, 1979[3]

With the arrival of the British Governor in Salisbury on December 12, the United Kingdom has assumed legal and constitutional authority in Rhodesia, and a process leading to impartial elections and independence has begun. The British Government has taken this action on the basis of proposals developed by the parties at the Lancaster House conference.

On the Governor's arrival, ordinances have come into effect which establish the powers of the Election Commissioner and make provision for the Election Council. All parties which agree to campaign peacefully will be able to do so freely. All parties which wish to participate in the elections have been invited to register. The British Government is taking the legislative action necessary to bring into force those parts of the independence constitution required for elections to be held.

It has been heartening that the two delegations led by Bishop Muzorewa and Messrs. Nkomo and Mugabe have accepted the basic principles of all the proposals elaborated by the British delegation in the Lancaster House negotiations. The remaining issues relate to some aspects of the implementation of the cease-fire. On December 11, British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington presented detailed cease-fire proposals which we believe provide the assurances necessary for the Patriotic Front to have confidence in the conditions under which the elections will take place.

Having studied all the British proposals presented at Lancaster House for the constitution, the transitional arrangements, and the cease-fire, it is our judgment that they are fair and make possible an impartial election leading to a just settlement of the Rhodesian conflict.

In these circumstances, it seems clear that the aims and objectives of the U.N. sanctions as set forth in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, have, in fact, been achieved.

President Carter, in explaining his November 14 decision to maintain sanctions against Rhodesia, stated that he would be prepared to lift sanctions when a British Governor assumes authority in Salisbury and a process leading to impartial elections has begun. These conditions have now been met, and the President has ordered, effective midnight the 16th of December, that U.S. sanctions against Rhodesia be lifted.

have the strength and the will to be able to decide for ourselves, through sober assessment, the requirements of our defense. This unique group of free nations, valuing our sovereign independence and collective values, will never permit others to dictate the terms of our security.

With the understanding and support of our peoples, we are now taking action to preserve the peace. We are acting to strengthen our strategic forces in the United States—to modernize our theater nuclear forces in Europe and to improve our conventional posture.

I am convinced that the alliance is on the right track. Our Long-Term Defense Program, our commitment to 3% real increases in annual defense spending, and our decisions to modernize theater nuclear forces promise to take us into the 1980s with a sense of real security. It has been clear to all that we will maintain the fortitude and determination necessary to carry these decisions forward.

The strength of our alliance remains the essential underpinning of our efforts to strengthen the framework for more productive relations with the East. It is clear to all that we will pursue security for Europe through negotiations as well as through military preparedness. Here also we need to move forward on a broad front.

- In SALT and theater nuclear force negotiations, we look forward to a more intensive alliance consultative mechanism. We must insure that the promise this mechanism holds for closer coordination within the alliance is matched by our determination to make progress in the negotiations themselves.
- In MBFR, our persistent and patient negotiations will continue to explore vigorously all promising avenues for achievement of an agreement.
- In CSCE, we will couple creative new proposals for building military confidence with a determination to preserve the integrity of the Final Act; to maintain progress across the board on CSCE issues, including those that most directly affect people's lives.
- In East-West relations, we understand that security in the broadest sense is not achieved by weapons alone. The members of the alliance will continue to show willingness to increase official, individual, and commercial exchanges. These exchanges can grow as a mutual commitment to better relations between East and West grows. As better understanding between East and West is pursued, all our people benefit from the lessening of tensions.

This alliance draws strength from our determination to achieve both mutual security and a lessening of tensions. This very important meeting provides an opportunity to match the challenges that we face with the decisions of wisdom—decisions that will reinforce our preparedness, strengthen the confidence of our peoples in our readiness, and enhance the prospects for greater security through the agreed control of arms.

Whenever we assemble, and especially at such moments of great decision as today, I believe that each of us is touched by the past, by recollections of the wisdom of the founders of this alliance. They knew that people who live in freedom are people at their strongest. They knew that collective decisions, made in freedom, are the strongest decisions. And they knew that free nations, acting together, draw strength from each other as they work for peace.

COMMUNIQUE, NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, DEC. 14, 1979

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Brussels on 13th and 14th December 1979.

Ministers accepted with pleasure the invitation of the Turkish Government to hold the next Ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council in Ankara in the spring of 1980.

2. Ministers renewed their faith in the North Atlantic Treaty which guarantees the freedom, security and well-being of their peoples and the preservation of peace and international stability. Because their governments are based on the consent of their peoples, on democratic institutions and on the principle of equality and the rule of law, the members of the Alliance have the strength, enhanced by the will to assist each other, to face the challenges which lie ahead. Looking forward to the 1980's, Ministers expressed their confidence that, by maintaining the strength and cohesion of their Alliance and pursuing the complementary goals of arms control, disarmament and the improvement of relations between East and West in general, their governments would continue to make a major contribution to peace and stability in Europe and the world.

3. Reviewing developments in East-West relations since they last met, Ministers noted that the conclusions of the study undertaken in 1978 remain valid. They recalled their commitment to detente and stressed the defensive nature of the Alliance. Events since their previous meeting showed the continuing influence of forces not conducive to the consolidation of international stability and security. They expressed concern over the direct or indirect actions of the Soviet Union and some of its Allies in a number of troubled areas concurrently with a very considerable build-up, both qualitative and quantitative, in Warsaw Pact military strength, and particularly with growing Soviet theatre nuclear and conventional capabilities. Ministers noted that these developments were a cause for legitimate disquiet and were not compatible either with assurances by the Warsaw Pact countries that they do not seek military superiority or with their publicly-declared intention to promote detente, particularly in the military sphere. Ministers reiterated their view that detente must be worldwide and indivisible in character.

4. Ministers confirmed that their governments were resolved to take steps to reduce the growing imbalance of forces by improving their military capabilities and thus maintain an adequate level of deterrence and defence across the full spectrum. They recalled the determination of their governments to achieve, as a key element in conventional force modernization, more effective use of available resources through co-operative equipment programmes and increased standardization and interoperability of weapons systems. They noted with satisfaction the initial progress that has been achieved in these respects, they repeated that through the transatlantic dialogue they would continue to work towards more balanced relations among the European and North American members of the Alliance in the field of armaments development and production in order to enhance the availability and quality of new defence equipment. They noted the contribution which is being made by the Conference of National Armaments Directors in this respect, and the need to bear in mind the interests of the less industrialized members of the Alliance.

5. Ministers believed that efforts to achieve agreement in fields of arms control, disarmament and confidence building should go hand in hand with defence efforts of the Allies. They noted that recent proposals put forward by the Eastern countries echoed in part the Western proposals and they saw in them a hopeful indication of the evolution of these countries towards a more positive attitude in the search for common ground. Ministers considered ways of advancing appropriate discussions and negotiations.

6. Ministers recalled that the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on 18th June reflected their desire for genuine arms control measures which should contribute to the stability of East-West relations. Ministers observed that the Treaty makes it possible to maintain a strong US strategic nuclear deterrent, which remains vital to the defence of the Alliance. Thus this Treaty, which will have the effect of

curbing the build-up of strategic nuclear weapons in the world, improves the prospects for detente without jeopardizing the security interests of the members of the Alliance. Ministers expressed the hope that the Treaty would soon come into force. They looked forward to the early continuation of the SALT process, on the basis of further close consultations within the Alliance, leading to additional United States and Soviet reductions and qualitative limitations in the nuclear field. They also expressed the belief that ratification of the Treaty would contribute to other possibilities of progress in the field of arms control.

7. Ministers believed that the process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe made a most valuable contribution to the strengthening of detente, and offered further opportunities to develop existing and new areas of dialogue in the search for agreement. They expressed the hope that the CSCE follow-up meeting to be held at Madrid in 1980 will be a major step forward in that process. Tangible progress in the meantime in implementing the principles and provisions of the Final Act and adequate preparation are of great importance for the success of the Madrid meeting and could provide a basis for participation at the political level. Although there have been certain welcome measures of relief, in particular the granting of amnesty, and some improvement in other fields, Ministers noted with concern that in certain countries the situation remained unsatisfactory or had even deteriorated as regards respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including cases where citizens continue to be subject to harassment and imprisonment for no reason other than their efforts to bring about the full implementation of the Final Act. Ministers also noted that process in the field of human contacts was uneven and expressed their concern that the level of implementation of the provisions dealing with a freer flow of information and working conditions for journalists had remained low and, in some cases, had deteriorated. They noted with satisfaction, however, that the Final Act increasingly has become the standard by which the actions of signatory states are judged.

8. Ministers expressed their intention to devote increasing efforts to preparations for the Madrid meeting during the period ahead, emphasizing the importance of consultations among Allies as well as with the other participating states and of maintaining balance among all sections of the Final Act. They confirmed that they intended to approach and conduct the Madrid meeting in a constructive frame of mind and in a manner which would permit a thorough, frank and measured review of the implementation of all provisions of the Final Act. In this spirit, they will be ready to put forward new proposals and to discuss proposals from other participants calculated to bring concrete and balanced progress in all fields covered by the Final Act and thereby contribute to the vitality of the CSCE process. Ministers recognized the importance for the Alliance of developing the confidence building measures and the other provisions of the Final Act relating to certain aspects of security and disarmament, and hoped for concrete results in this regard at the Madrid meeting.

They reviewed with interest the proposals made in these fields by different CSCE participants, whether Western, neutral and non-aligned or Warsaw Pact countries, including those made by the latter in May and December 1979. They considered that the proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe put forward by France is a useful concept providing a basis upon which to continue developing their approach in this field to bring about such a conference.

They agreed to work towards the adoption during the Madrid meeting, as part of a balanced outcome, of a mandate for further negotiations under the aegis of the CSCE on military significant and verifiable confidence building measures, applicable to the entire continent of Europe. These, if agreed, would help create conditions conducive to limitation and reduction of arms in the same geographical area. This process should take account of both the varied aspects of the existing security situation and of the current negotiations on other aspects of arms control and disarmament concerning the European continent.

9. The Ministers of countries participating in the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions reemphasized their determination to work for a successful outcome which would enhance stability, peace and security in Europe. They noted, however, their concern that despite representations made at the highest level by Western leaders to the Eastern participants, the East has made no effort to resolve the data question. These Ministers noted that agreement on the starting size of forces to be reduced is not only an essential prerequisite to any reductions, but can also serve to build confidence that a reduction agreement is being observed and that mutual security is being enhanced.

In order to advance the negotiations toward an early result, these Ministers approved a proposal for an interim Phase I agreement consistent with the objectives of their governments in the negotiations, in particular the establishment of parity in the form of a common collective ceiling on ground force manpower and agreement on a combined common collective ceiling on air and ground force manpower of each side in the area of reductions. Their new in tiative aims at simplifying existing proposals for a Phase I agreement by focussing on US and Soviet manpower withdrawals and limitations, based on agreed US-Soviet data, and on associated measures applied on a multilateral basis. This interim Phase I agreement would open the way for a subsequent Phase II agreement, based on agreed overall data, providing for a common collective ceiling on ground force manpower for each side at approximately 700,000 and for agreement on a combined common collective ceiling on air and ground force manpower for each side at approximately 900,000.

These Ministers called attention to the package of associated measures which forms an integral part of their proposal for an interim Phase I agreement. This package of measures is designed to promote military stability and confidence, to ensure adequate verification of an MBFR agreement and to help safeguard undiminished security for flank countries.

These Ministers urged Eastern participants to give prompt and serious consideration to their initiative, which takes account of negotiating proposals of both sides and which is in accordance with the agreed aim of the negotiations to contribute to the creation of a more stable relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. They view this new Western initiative as an integral part of the arms control initiatives agreed upon during this Ministerial meeting.

10. Turning to the question of negotiations on disarmament and arms limitation in other fora, Ministers reaffirmed the importance which they attached to the adoption of effective, balanced and verifiable measures. They welcomed as positive elements the discussions during the first session of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission in New York. They attached importance to the frequent and active consultative on these questions within the permanent machinery of the Alliance.

11. Ministers discussed developments with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole. They noted that since their last meeting the climate in and around Berlin had continued to remain relatively calm. Ministers reaffirmed their conviction that an undisturbed situation in Berlin and on the access routes is an essential element of detente, security and cooperation in Europe, and noted the continuing relevance of the London declaration of 9 May 1977 and the Tokyo declaration of 29 June 1979. Ministers noted with satisfaction the improved climate in the relations between the two German states after a period of reserve and welcomed the conclusion of new agreements and the continuation of negotiations. Ministers consider this as a positive element in the process of detente in Europe, having at the same time beneficial effects for Berlin.

12. Ministers noted the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions and underlined again the necessity of maintaining the balance of forces in the whole area. They requested the Council in permanent session to continue to consult on the question and submit a further report at their next meeting.

13. Ministers welcomed the continuation of the dialogue between Greece and Turkey in search of a peaceful solution to the differences between the two countries and they expressed the hope that in this manner positive results could be attained in the near future.

First, our historical values and beliefs provide a humanitarian basis for our efforts to help alleviate world poverty. As a free people with one of the highest standards of living in the world, we must respond to the staggering picture of world hunger, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, and disease and the misery that these words represent in human terms.

Second, we have vital global interests that require collaboration with developing countries. These include the need to control world population growth and the need to manage better the world's deteriorating natural resource base. The promotion of international human rights and democratic values vitally depends on our cooperation with Third World countries. Developing countries cannot adequately respond to these challenges without our assistance.

Third, foreign aid serves our economic and political interests. Third World development means more trade and more jobs for Americans.

• The developing countries are a major—and the fastest growing—market for U.S. goods. They already buy over one-third of our exports—the same share as for Europe and the Communist countries combined. One out of every three acres of American farmland produces food for export, much of it to the Third World, and 1.2 million American manufacturing jobs now depend on exports to the developing countries.

• The United States is increasingly dependent on Third World countries for essential raw materials vital to our economy and security. We import from developing nations 85% of the bauxite required for aluminum products. We obtain 93% of our tin from developing countries. The importance of oil imports from the Third World has been repeatedly, almost bitterly, brought home to us. I will focus on energy a bit later in my remarks.

• Our country earned more than $16 billion from our direct investments in the developing world in 1978. Last year U.S. firms invested nearly $6 billion in the developing world.

• Our economy also benefits substantially from aid dollars spent here to buy commodities and services. For every dollar we have paid into the multilateral development banks, U.S. GNP increased roughly $3 as a direct result of bank lending activities.

A developing country's commitment to its equitable growth is the most important factor in determining its own economic development. Basic policies concerning trade, investment, commodities, and technology transfer have an enormous impact on the development process. But external aid also plays a vital role, and this will continue for the foreseeable future.

Earlier this month I visited Bangladesh, Thailand, and Indonesia and saw how important the programs of AID, the multilateral banks, and the international organizations are to the development goals of these countries. The problems are enormous. I found the pressures of overpopulation in Dacca frightening, for example. Every aid program, of course, can be strengthened. But they are making a major contribution.

World peace and security interests are served by foreign aid because developing countries are key participants in the quest for peaceful resolution of disputes, regional stability, arms restraint, nonproliferation, and other basic foreign policy objectives. Good relations with developing nations are essential in a wide range of areas that affect our security.

Human economic and social progress, promoted by effective development, mitigates against conflict resulting from poverty, inequitable distribution of resources, and denigration of basic human rights. The words of Pope John XXIII come to mind: "In a world of constant want there is no peace. . . ."

The United States has committed substantial amounts of foreign aid over the past years—acting bilaterally and through multilateral development banks and international institutions. But since 1975, our contributions to development assistance as a share of U.S. gross national product have been only about ¼ of 1%. This year the figure is less than that—.22%, which ranks the United States 13th out of 17 major donor countries. All foreign economic aid amounts to only about 1% of our national budget: $7.3 billion for FY 1979. Given the importance of U.S. interests at stake, a major priority of all our efforts must be to seek support throughout this country for stronger development assistance efforts in the future.

Role of IDCA

An important step in that direction came earlier this fall when the new International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA) was established. The IDCA, which came into being on October 1, 1979, plays the central role in U.S. development assistance efforts. It is primarily responsible for formulating U.S. international development policies for the President and for serving as his principal spokesman on those matters.

As the principal adviser to the President on international development, IDCA must insure that our varied bilateral and multilateral development efforts are coordinated, efficient, and effective. The agency just prepared the first comprehensive foreign assistance budget and will present it next year to the Congress and the American people.

The component parts of IDCA include AID, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and—if approved by Congress—a new Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation. IDCA's concern and responsibility is economic development, and from this perspective it shares with the State Department responsibility for U.S. involvement in the U.N. system; with the Treasury Department, responsibility for U.S. participation in the multilateral development banks; and with the Department of Agriculture, the direction of the U.S. Food for Peace Program.

Finally, the new agency has been mandated by the President and Congress to insure that our economic relations with developing nations are taken into account in the full range of U.S. international policies, including trade, commodity arrangements, and financial matters.

In short, IDCA has a broad range of responsibilities that extend beyond U.S. bilateral assistance. The agency should lead the way in analyzing and understanding the full complexity of U.S. economic relations with developing nations and provide advice on the development aspects of these relationships. In that role, we need your help—we need the partnership of your institutions in many areas, just as it exists in agriculture. Let me use energy as an example.

Challenge of Energy Development

Among development problems, none is more challenging than energy. Many universities—and many of you, their leaders—have already become involved in the complex issues that the dynamics of energy have thrust on us. Energy concerns are plainly global. Domestic solutions alone cannot adequately deal with our own energy problems. The enormity of the task of the transition to a postpetroleum era requires our best

minds and efforts in cooperation with their counterparts in the Third World.

As events of the past weeks have made increasingly clear, the totality of our relations with the developing countries is interwoven with energy economics.

- More than one half of world oil production is in developing countries.
- Nine out of every 10 barrels entering the international market come from developing countries.
- Developing countries currently use about one-sixth of the world's oil, a figure likely to approach one-fourth within a decade.

The oil-importing developing countries have been hit very hard by petroleum price rises. Expensive imported fuel is exacerbating balance-of-trade problems. Many countries are postponing needed investment projects, holding down the growth of essential social services, and going more heavily into debt. Stagflation and the dangers of protectionism in industrialized countries, as well as the overall slower growth in the countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, have seriously affected most developing countries.

Developing countries' demand for commercial energy is likely to double by 1990. Many of these economies are entering energy-intensive phases of growth, much as we did during the last century.

What is too often not understood, or overlooked, is that most of the people in developing countries rely on so-called traditional fuels for their direct energy needs. In the rural areas of the Third World, between 80% and 90% of nonanimate energy is provided by wood, charcoal, and crop and animal wastes, as well as simple forms of solar, water, and wind energy. Growing populations are straining these supplies. Firewood shortages are especially serious. The ever-demanding search for firewood diverts villagers from agricultural tasks and denudes the landscape causing widespread soil erosion. The shortages of wood leaves people without fuel to cook and boil water for health needs. Here are a few examples of how serious is the firewood crisis.

- At current rates of depletion, the world's tropical forests, which are mostly in developing countries, will disappear in only 60 years.
- At least 12 countries, with a combined population of about 150 million people, are currently using fuelwood in excess of sustainable yields.
- The pace at which the firewood crisis is expanding, and the economic and environmental damage it portends, present a clear and present danger to future generations throughout the planet.

Policymakers and planners in the Third World are now paying much more attention to energy problems than in the past, just as we are. Virtually all developing countries have begun to take concrete steps to manage their energy sectors more efficiently. These steps include more rational energy prices, expanding investment in domestic energy resources, organizing energy ministries, and funding research on locally suitable energy techniques.

It is also becoming increasingly clear, however, that foreign assistance is needed to expedite this process. Rapid development of their energy sectors is limited by lack of:

- Basic knowledge of their own resources;
- Appropriate technology;
- Financial resources; and
- Adequately trained personnel.

Moreover, most developing countries are just beginning systematic energy planning. Much of what must be done will be new, experimental, and innovative. As a new and growing area of major concern, IDCA is making energy a priority area of focus. Today, I want to share with you some of the actions that are underway.

Energy Assistance Programs

At both the Bonn and Tokyo summits, the United States and other Western countries agreed to increase aid for energy conservation and supply. President Carter has emphasized the U.S. commitment to increased energy assistance. I reiterate that pledge to you. The United States will continue to support vigorously bilateral and multilateral programs for balanced energy development.

- With strong U.S. backing, the World Bank recently approved a major new lending program for petroleum, natural gas, and coal projects. We anticipate that lending will rise to an annual level of $1.5 billion by 1983.
- We are further urging the World Bank to take a more active role in coordinating the energy assistance programs of bilateral and multilateral agencies, especially in the areas of renewable energy.
- We will continue to encourage all multilateral development banks to consider expanding their energy programs. This process has begun at the Asian and Inter-American Development Banks, and we are encouraged that the World Bank is now preparing a policy statement on renewable energy.
- The U.S. strongly supports the planned 1981 U.N. Conference on New and Renewable Energy. Preparations are underway for active U.S. participation at all levels, including helping less developed countries with their own conference preparations.
- The United States is currently funding, on a bilateral basis, a substantial range of assistance projects in the energy field.
- The Department of Energy and AID have undertaken energy sector assessments in Egypt, Peru, Indonesia, Portugal, and Argentina. These efforts undertaken in collaboration with those governments, establish an essential data base for planning.
- A Peace Corps energy program has been established to strengthen energy-related volunteer training, identify rural energy needs, and develop village-level energy projects. I anticipate that such volunteer efforts will become an increasingly important part of our energy assistance.
- AID's funding for pilot energy projects in rural areas has more than doubled in the past 2 years.
- We are taking steps to insure that energy concerns and needs are integrated as a matter of standard procedure into all rural development assistance projects that the United States supports.

The lack of properly trained technical manpower is a serious constraint to accelerated and diversified energy production in the Third World. AID is already funding several training programs related to energy. Two are at your member institutions—a course in energy sector management at the Stoneybrook Campus of the State University of New York and a course on alternate energy technology at the University of Florida. I am convinced that much more can, and should be, done.

Recognizing that the U.S. higher education system is the most significant asset we have for transferring technical skills, I am pleased to announce to you that we are preparing a new program to provide support for long-term training in science and engineering fields related to energy. The program will offer fellowships for training ranging from internships to doctoral-level studies, with heavy emphasis on existing master's degree programs. I hope that by September 1981, the first students will

attempt to extend its colonial domination of others and have demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Moslem world is especially and justifiably outraged by this aggression against an Islamic people. No action of a world power has ever been so quickly and so overwhelmingly condemned.

But verbal condemnation is not enough. The Soviet Union must pay a concrete price for their aggression. While this invasion continues, we and the other nations of the world cannot conduct business as usual with the Soviet Union.

That's why the United States has imposed stiff economic sanctions on the Soviet Union.

I will not issue any permits for Soviet ships to fish in the coastal waters of the United States.

I've cut Soviet access to high-technology equipment and to agricultural products.

I've limited other commerce with the Soviet Union, and I've asked our allies and friends to join with us in restraining their own trade with the Soviets and not to replace our own embargoed items.

And I have notified the Olympic Committee that with Soviet invading forces in Afghanistan, neither the American people nor I will support sending an Olympic team to Moscow.

The Soviet Union is going to have to answer some basic questions: Will it help promote a more stable international environment in which its own legitimate, peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will it continue to expand its military power far beyond its genuine security needs, and use that power for colonial conquest?

The Soviet Union must realize that its decision to use military force in Afghanistan will be costly to every political and economic relationship it values.

The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance. It contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz—a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.

This situation demands careful thought, steady nerves, and resolute action, not only for this year but for many years to come. It demands collective efforts to meet this new threat to security in the Persian Gulf and in southwest Asia. It demands the participation of all those who rely on oil from the Middle East and who are concerned with global peace and stability. And it demands consultation and close cooperation with countries in the area which might be threatened.

Meeting this challenge will take national will, diplomatic and political wisdom, economic sacrifice, and, of course, military capability. We must call on the best that is in us to preserve the security of this crucial region.

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

During the past 3 years you have joined with me to improve our own security and the prospects for peace, not only in the vital oil producing area of the Persian Gulf region but around the world.

• We've increased annually our real commitment for defense, and we will sustain this increase of effort throughout the 5-year defense program. It's imperative that the Congress approve this strong defense budget for 1981 encompassing a 5% real growth in authorizations without any reduction.

• We are also improving our capability to deploy U.S. military forces rapidly to distant areas.

• We have helped to strengthen NATO and our other alliances. And recently we and other NATO members have decided to develop and to deploy modernized intermediate-range nuclear forces to meet an unwarranted and increased threat from the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union.

• We are working with our allies to prevent conflict in the Middle East. The Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel is a notable achievement which represents a strategic asset for America and which also enhances prospects for regional and world peace. We are now engaged in further negotiations to provide full autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza, to resolve the Palestinian issue in all its aspects, and to preserve the peace and security of Israel. Let no one doubt our commitment to the security of Israel. In a few days we will observe an historic event when Israel makes another major withdrawal from the Sinai and when ambassadors will be exchanged between Israel and Egypt.

• We've also expanded our own sphere of friendship. Our deep commitment to human rights and to meeting human needs has improved our relationship with much of the Third World. Our decision to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China will help to preserve peace and stability in Asia and in the western Pacific.

• We've increased and strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and we are now making arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used by our forces in the region of northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf.

• We've reconfirmed our 1959 agreement to help Pakistan preserve its independence and its integrity. The United States will take action—consistent with our own laws—to assist Pakistan in resisting any outside aggression. And I'm asking the Congress specifically to reaffirm this agreement. I'm also working, along with the leaders of other nations, to provide additional military and economic aid for Pakistan. That request will come to you in just a few days.

• In the weeks ahead, we will further strengthen political and military ties with other nations in the region.

• We believe that there are no irreconcilable differences between us and any Islamic nation. We respect the faith of Islam, and we are ready to cooperate with all Moslem countries.

• Finally, we are prepared to work with other countries in the region to share a cooperative security framework that respects differing values and political beliefs, yet which enhances the independence, security, and prosperity of all.

. . . I have notified the Olympic Committee that with Soviet invading forces in Afghanistan, neither the American people nor I will support sending an Olympic team to Moscow.

All these efforts combined emphasize our dedication to defend and preserve the vital interests of the region and of the nation, which we represent, and those of our allies in Europe and the Pacific and also in the parts of the world which have such great strategic importance to us, stretching especially through the Middle East and southwest Asia. With your help, I will pursue these efforts with vigor and with determination. You and I will act as necessary to protect and to preserve our nation's security.

The men and women of America's Armed Forces are on duty tonight in many parts of the world. I'm proud of the job they're doing, and I know you share that pride. I believe that our volunteer

forces are adequate for current defense needs. And I hope that it will not become necessary to impose the draft. However, we must be prepared for that possibility. For this reason, I have determined that the selective service system must now be revitalized. I will send legislation and budget proposals to the Congress next month so that we can begin registration and then meet future mobilization needs rapidly if they arise.

We also need clear and quick passage of a new charter to define the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies. We will guarantee that abuses do not recur, but we must tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information. And we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America's ability to collect intelligence.

The decade ahead will be a time of rapid change, as nations everywhere seek to deal with new problems and age-old tensions. But America need have no fear—we can thrive in a world of change if we remain true to our values and actively engage in promoting world peace.

We will continue to work as we have for peace in the Middle East and southern Africa. We will continue to build our ties with developing nations, respecting and helping to strengthen their national independence, which they have struggled so hard to achieve. And we will continue to support the growth of democracy and the protection of human rights.

In repressive regimes, popular frustrations often have no outlet except through violence. But when peoples and their governments can approach their problems together—through open, democratic methods—the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and far more enduring. That is why our support for human rights in other countries is in our own national interest as well as part of our own national character.

Peace—a peace that preserves freedom—remains America's first goal. In the coming years as a mighty nation, we will continue to pursue peace. But to be strong abroad we must be strong at home. And in order to be strong, we must continue to face up to the difficult issues that confront us as a nation today.

The crises in Iran and Afghanistan have dramatized a very important lesson: Our excessive dependence on foreign oil is a clear and present danger to our nation's security. The need has never been more urgent. At long last, we must have a clear, comprehensive energy policy for the United States.

As you well know, I have been working with the Congress in a concentrated and persistent way over the past 3 years to meet this need. We have made progress together. But Congress must act promptly now to complete final action on this vital energy legislation. Our nation will then have a major conservation effort, important initiatives to develop solar power, realistic pricing based on the true value of oil, strong incentives for the production of coal and other fossil fuels in the United States, and our nation's most massive peacetime investment in the development of synthetic fuels.

The American people are making progress in energy conservation. Last year we reduced overall petroleum consumption by 8% and gasoline consumption by 5% below what it was the year before.

Now we must do more. After consultation with the governors, we will set gasoline conservation goals for each of the 50 States, and I will make them mandatory if these goals are not met. I've established an import ceiling for 1980 of 8.2 million barrels a day—well below the level of foreign oil purchases in 1977. I expect our imports to be much lower than this, but the ceiling will be enforced by an oil import fee if necessary. I'm prepared to lower our imports still further if the other oil consuming countries will join us in a fair and mutual reduction. If we have a serious shortage, I will not hesitate to impose mandatory gasoline rationing immediately.

The single biggest factor in the inflation rate last year—the increase in the inflation rate last year—was from one cause: the skyrocketing prices of OPEC oil. We must take whatever actions are necessary to reduce our dependence on foreign oil and at the same time, to reduce inflation.

As individuals and as families, few of us can produce energy by ourselves. But all of us can conserve energy—every one of us, every day of our lives. Tonight I call on you—in fact all the people of America—to help our nation. Conserve energy. Eliminate waste. Make 1980 indeed a year of energy conservation.

Of course, we must take other actions to strengthen our nation's economy.

First, we will continue to reduce the deficit and then to balance the federal budget.

Second, as we continue to work with business to hold down prices, we will build also on the historic national accord with organized labor to restrain pay increases in a fair fight against inflation.

Third, we will continue our successful efforts to cut paperwork and to dismantle unnecessary government regulation.

Fourth, we will continue our progress in providing jobs for America, concentrating on a major new program to provide training and work for our young people, especially minority youth. It has been said that "a mind is a terrible thing to waste." We will give our young people new hope for jobs and a better life in the 1980s.

And **fifth,** we must use the decade of the 1980s to attack the basic structural weaknesses and problems in our economy, through measures to increase productivity, savings, and investment.

The Soviet Union is going to have to answer some basic questions: Will it help promote a more stable international environment in which its own legitimate, peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will it continue to expand its military power far beyond its genuine security needs, and use that power for colonial conquest?

With these energy and economic policies, we will make America even stronger at home in this decade—just as our foreign and defense policies will make us stronger and safer throughout the world.

We will never abandon our struggle for a just and a decent society here at home. That's the heart of America, and it's the source of our ability to inspire other people to defend their own rights abroad. Our material resources, great as they are, are limited. Our problems are too complex for simple slogans or for quick solutions. We cannot solve them without effort and sacrifice. Walter Lippmann once reminded us:

> You took the good things for granted. Now you must earn them again. For every right that you cherish, you have a duty which you must fulfill. For every good which you wish to preserve, you will have to sacrifice your comfort and your ease. There is nothing for nothing any longer."

Our challenges are formidable. But there's a new spirit of unity and resolve in our country. We move into the 1980s with confidence and hope and a bright vision of the America we want:

- An America strong and free;
- An America at peace;

only a strong defense, including prudent measures to modernize our forces, can remove any doubts about our resolve—doubts which themselves would make genuine arms limitations less likely.

Let me explain how this dual policy will manifest itself in our decisions in the coming decade—decisions concerning strategic, theater nuclear, and conventional forces.

The Balance of Strategic Forces

Strategic nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union is, and will remain, a central fact of international security. Efforts by either side to resist this central fact, or to evade it, will inevitably threaten the world's stability and security—for neither side will allow the other to attain superiority.

Over the past decade, the Soviet Union has steadily increased its strategic capabilities. Without new investments on our part in our strategic forces, this Soviet momentum could jeopardize a stable balance at the strategic level. So we are making those investments in each leg of our strategic triad.

- We are developing advanced cruise missiles for our B–52 bombers.
- We are now deploying the new Trident I missile in some existing submarines, and by 1981 we will be deploying the new Trident submarine.
- And we are moving forward with the MX missile program to assure the survivability of our land-based strategic missiles.

These improvements represent the most vigorous American strategic weapons program in more than a decade.

Our purpose in these efforts is not only to maintain essential equivalence in strategic forces, it is also to maintain flexibility in our strategic nuclear options. For, while we accept the idea that mutual vulnerability is a deterrent to war, we do not accept the notion that our options should be limited to mutual assured destruction. We must have in our strategic quiver more than the single arrow of Armageddon.

It is both our policy and our practice, therefore, to maintain a variety of strategic forces, capable of absorbing the heaviest blows possible and still retaining the power to retaliate against the entire spectrum of military and economic targets. We refuse to lock ourselves into either of two doctrines: the doctrine of reliance on massive retaliation alone or a doctrine which emphasizes so-called limited nuclear exchanges directed by each side against the other's strategic forces.

There must be a deliberate uncertainty about precisely what our response to attack might be—for that very uncertainty strengthens deterrence. Our doctrine of flexible response, and our wide range of strategic forces, preserve that uncertainty.

We will maintain a secure strategic balance and a credible deterrent, at whatever level of effort is required. But we know that there can be no ultimate security in relentless escalations of strategic power. Both we and the Soviet Union have a compelling national interest in stabilizing the strategic competition and achieving balanced reductions through negotiation.

The SALT process demonstrably serves these ends. And SALT provides a striking illustration of the dual approach I have described—the mutual reinforcement of arms control and force modernization. For it is clear that authentic arms control progress would not be possible without our determination to maintain the balance in any environment—whether with arms control or without it. But it is clear, as well, that in a nuclear age, true security will elude us unless we are equally determined in our diplomacy—in the search for dependable and balanced controls on nuclear arms.

The SALT II Treaty is now before the U.S. Senate. It is my hope and belief that it will be ratified in the near future. Once that step is taken, the agreed goal of SALT III will be to achieve substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals.

Throughout this process we have benefited from consultations with our European allies. We have worked to assure that European security interests and options are fully protected. In the next phase, SALT III, those consultations will be even more intense; the role of the allies in shaping our approach will be even more direct, as the talks take up issues of long-range theater, as well as strategic, forces.

But the same central principles will guide us: a commitment to have whatever arms we need to maintain the balance while we press for progressively more stringent mutual limits through negotiations.

Theater Nuclear Forces

Maintaining stability and deterrence is important not only in the field of intercontinental strategic weapons but at the theater nuclear level as well.

Indeed, the emergence of parity in these strategic systems focuses attention on NATO's long-range theater nuclear forces as a stone in the arch of deterrence.

For many years, NATO's European allies have had the assurance that the threat posed to Western Europe by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces is ultimately deterred by the intercontinental nuclear striking power of the United States.

That assurance is undiminished. Our strategic nuclear forces would be used if necessary for Europe's defense. The vital interests of the United States are so engaged in Europe, our commitments so deep, and our ties so strong that it could not be otherwise.

But NATO's chief aim is to prevent aggression. We must, therefore, be sure that no problem arises with regard to Soviet perceptions, for it is on those perceptions that deterrence rests.

It is crucial that the Soviets not be tempted to believe—however wrongly—that strategic parity between the superpowers means that Europe's defense could be separated from that of the United States or that the Soviet Union itself could remain immune from a military conflict in Europe. Thus deterrence requires that NATO have a full range of capabilities to respond to any level of military challenge. It requires that there be no gap in this continuum of forces; that every stone in the arch of deterrence be sound.

Such a gap could emerge if we should fail to modernize NATO's long-range theater nuclear forces. For the Soviet Union, having achieved strategic parity, appears now to be driving toward nuclear preponderance in the European theater.

We can see the evidence in the Soviet Union's vigorous program to modernize and expand its long-range theater nuclear forces.

The most dramatic development in this regard—and the matter of greatest concern to us—is the rapid, ongoing Soviet deployment of the SS–20 mobile missile.

Let us make no mistake: The SS–20 is not an upgrading of an old system. It is an entirely new system—the first mobile, land-based, long-range missile system in the European theater. Each SS–20 launcher can reload and refire.

Each missile can deliver not one but three nuclear warheads. The SS-20 can reach everywhere in Europe from bases deep within Soviet territory.

Add to the SS-20 system the growing numbers of Backfire bombers deployed in the European theater and the conclusion is inescapable: This Soviet buildup goes beyond what is necessary to upgrade their armaments or to meet developments in NATO's forces.

Yet Soviet spokesmen tell us that any moves by NATO to redress this situation could undermine detente and launch a new period of East-West tensions in Europe. They have insisted that we accept, in the name of detente, a trend toward manifest inequality.

The West cannot be passive in this situation. From a political standpoint, to do so would constitute a curious approach to detente. It would say to the world that Western security decisions are the business of both East and West but that those of the East are for Moscow to make alone. For the West to acquiesce in such a notion could tempt Moscow to risk other kinds of pressure on other issues. I need not remind this audience how gravely this would undermine the only sensible basis for cooperation between East and West—the principle of mutual security.

So it is essential for the United States and the NATO allies to maintain deterrence across the whole military spectrum.

This week in Brussels, therefore, the NATO Defense and Foreign Ministers will decide upon a set of proposals providing for theater nuclear modernization and arms control.

In this connection, let me say that the staunchness of the German Government and Chancellor Schmidt and the resolution passed here in Berlin last week by the Social Democratic Party Congress are far-sighted contributions which will add to the unity and determination of the alliance as we meet in Brussels.

The pending modernization proposals call for deployment by NATO in Western Europe of long-range theater nuclear weapons—a mix of land-based cruise and ballistic missiles.

By replacing aging long-range theater nuclear systems with highly survivable and more capable systems, the deployments will reduce the chance that the Soviet Union might perceive, however incorrectly, a gap in NATO's spectrum of deterrence. And by improving NATO's deterrent posture, they will raise the most significant threshold—that between peace and war.

This deployment will permit NATO to reduce its overall nuclear stockpile in Europe as part of the rationalization of its theater nuclear forces. And it will signal to the Soviet Union that its buildup promises no real military or political advantages—because NATO will respond to the challenge.

At the same time, we firmly believe that our security can be enhanced through genuine arms control: through concrete agreements to regulate force levels. Such agreements hold the promise of preventing unrestrained competition and providing greater stability in the theater nuclear field.

But arms limitation cannot be unilateral; it must be achieved through a process that is truly mutual.

Because we are committed to seeking genuine arms control, our modernization decisions will be coupled with an important arms limitation offer—an offer aimed at limiting long-range theater nuclear forces on both sides. NATO's proposal will call for verifiable limits that are significant and based upon the principle of equality.

This arms control initiative will test the sincerity of the Soviets on limiting these systems. Since the first NATO systems will not be fielded until 1983, there will be ample time to pursue serious arms control negotiations.

There are those, I know, who argue that NATO should delay its deployment decision until such talks can be held. We must not delay, for two important reasons.

First, we cannot know in advance that such talks will succeed. It would make little sense for the allies to fall farther and farther behind in the mere hope that the talks might succeed. And given the present momentum of Soviet efforts, any delay in NATO modernization increases an already troubling disparity.

Second, the West must demonstrate its seriousness about modernization or the Soviets will have no visible incentive to negotiate reductions in forces.

So our position is clear: The United States and the NATO allies will strive to reduce forces through negotiations. But we will do all that is necessary to maintain a credible deterrent across the entire spectrum of nuclear and conventional forces.

We cannot, however, accept unilateral restraint by NATO as a prerequisite to negotiations, and we will not. The restraint must come from both sides.

The Balance of Conventional Forces

The policy I have described—a policy of maintaining deterrence by force improvements where necessary and by arms control where possible—is also our strategy in the field of conventional forces.

Because improvements in Soviet conventional forces continue and because conventional forces are central to the alliance's deterrent, it is essential that the allies hold to their comprehensive modernization program. NATO's Long-Term Defense Program will assure us a modern, better integrated, and more effective conventional force for the 1980s. The NATO goal of 3% real annual increases in member defense spending will provide the resources essential to finance these improvements in conventional forces, which consume the largest share of defense budgets.

But here again, we are determined both to maintain deterrence and to neglect no opportunity for progress in arms limitation.

One significant opportunity for progress lies in the mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. Here our hope is to give practical meaning to the concept of balance in the conventional field—just as the SALT process has sought to do in the strategic field.

The goal of the MBFR talks—a goal now accepted by both sides—is to negotiate common collective ceilings at lower levels for NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in central Europe. But progress toward that goal has been hobbled by Eastern unwillingness to resolve the data issue. There is still a very large discrepancy between the figures provided by East and West regarding the level of Eastern forces in the area.

Let me reaffirm today that the Western side is eager to make progress toward agreement—progress which can come only if such basic issues as the data problem and verification methods can be resolved.

The announcement by Chairman Brezhnev of a Soviet withdrawal of up to 20,000 troops, 1,000 tanks, and some other equipment is a positive step. However, the basic issues of the MBFR negotiations must still be resolved.

Progress toward greater stability and mutual confidence in Europe can also come through the effort to implement the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed in 1975 by 35 nations at Helsinki.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, DEC. 17, 1979[4]

Today, final agreement was reached at Lancaster House on a Rhodesian settlement. The world can celebrate a triumph of reason and an extraordinary diplomatic success. A long, destructive, and tragic conflict is ending.

This settlement is a tribute to the parties concerned, who rose above bitterness and suspicion to agree upon a formula for peace. It is a tribute to the United Kingdom, whose leaders took the issue directly in hand and applied a remarkable combination of wisdom, courage, persistence, and skill. The concerned African states played a vital role.

Active American involvement in the search for a Rhodesian settlement began in the last Administration. In cooperation with the British we intensified that effort and, since last summer, have given our full support to the British negotiations.

The settlement which has been attained can lead to an enduring peace in Zimbabwe and promote tranquillity in the region. It is founded upon majority rule with protection of minority rights and reflects the interest of all of the parties.

As the process leading to an independent Zimbabwe unfolds, it will be incumbent upon the international community, and especially the surrounding states, to support and respect the electoral process and its outcome.

For its part, the United States looks forward to the day when an independent Zimbabwe can be welcomed to the family of nations. ■

[1] Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.
[2] Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston.
[3] Made available to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston.
[4] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 24, 1979.

Group Formed for Development

For the purpose of strengthening their economic assistance effort in sub-Saharan Africa, representatives of Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have met in Paris, on the French Government's initiative, in order to work toward coordination of resources for joint projects within the framework of a concerted action for development in Africa. They are prepared to consider widening the circle of donor countries to other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The six countries, aware of the fact that Africa has a great need for substantial assistance from the international community, are resolved to take this necessity into account. They have more particularly in mind projects of a regional character related, for example, to the opening-up of land-locked regions, the development of agricultural resources, or the effects of problems such as drought or tropical diseases, since these action areas require efforts which are still only partially covered by the national or international programs.

They deem it indispensable that this new action should be elaborated in close collaboration with the Africans concerned on the continental, regional, or national levels in such a way that projects which are selected for joint action conform to priorities set by the Africans themselves. This means that the concerted action should harmonize with the existing international and national programs.

The projects shall be identified and carried out according to appropriate procedures which will be worked out during periodic meetings of representatives of donor countries. A permanent liaison will be insured by means of a group of officials in Paris beginning January 1, 1980. ■

Unnumbered press release of Dec. 28, 1979.

Delay Requested for SALT II Treaty

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JAN. 3, 1980[1]

After consultation with the Senate leadership, the President has asked Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd to delay consideration of the SALT II Treaty on the Senate floor.

While the President continues to believe that ratification of SALT II is in the national security interest of the United States, he has concluded that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in defiance of the U.N. Charter, has made consideration of the SALT II Treaty inappropriate at this time.

The President has asked that the delay continue while he and the Congress assess Soviet actions and intentions and devote their attention to legislative and other measures required to respond to the crisis created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

LETTER TO SENATOR BYRD, JAN. 3, 1980[2]

In light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I request that you delay consideration of the SALT II Treaty on the Senate floor.

The purpose of this request is not to withdraw the Treaty from consideration, but to defer the debate so that the Congress and I as President can assess Soviet actions and intentions, and devote our primary attention to the legislative and other measures required to respond to this crisis.

As you know, I continue to share your view that the SALT II Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States and the entire world, and that it should be taken up by the Senate as soon as these more urgent issues have been addressed.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER ■

[1] Read to news correspondents by White House press secretary Jody Powell (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 7, 1980).
[2] Text from Weekly Compilation of Jan. 7.

Wildlife Protection

by William A. Hayne

Statement before the Subcommittee on Resource Protection of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works on November 7, 1979. Mr. Hayne is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.[1]

These hearings are timely. They coincide with an upsurge of activities involving international conservation issues and efforts by the Department of State to increase international wildlife protection, drawing on the considerable expertise of U.S. Government agencies, especially the Department of Interior. We are also helped by other Federal agencies such as the Council on Environmental Quality and the Smithsonian, the private sector, and international organizations to define specific needs and develop domestic and international activities to implement them. The Department of State is firmly committed to development of environmentally sound strategies and programs.

Until recently many nations, particularly the less developed ones, regarded environmental protection as a luxury of the rich. Now we see growing recognition that unless the natural resource base is protected, future economic development is impossible. This translates into increased willingness to protect soil resources and tropical forests. While there is yet in our view some distance to go in recognizing the value of wildlife—apart from the obvious tourist attractions—the forests at least help preserve needed habitat. But on the whole, increasing populations engage in a never-ending quest for food, land, and raw materials. These pressures on the Earth's grasslands, oceans, forests, and croplands are unrelenting.

The only visible means of support for these new millions are the Earth's wildlands and a more intensive use of those areas already dominated by man's activities. Unknown numbers of species are slated for extinction unless countries working together can devise new strategies for protecting wildlife and their habitat until population growth can be contained. Wildlife is our canary in the coal mine. Its decline signals our own.

Framework for Protection

Today's hearings focus on channels available to the United States for the protection of international wildlife. The most important is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, negotiated in 1973 and ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1975. The convention established an international system for controlling trade in endangered and threatened species and created a cooperative network of scientific and management authorities in signatory countries to administer the trade controls and advise the 54 member governments on the status of species covered by the convention.

Other international conventions and agreements collectively provide an institutional and programmatic framework within which nations are now making significant progress toward improved protection of wildlife species.

Before I move on to habitat degradation, the most important factor in wildlife decline internationally, I would like to note a couple difficult issues that reoccur in wildlife protection negotiations. Your committee may wish to review these issues and consider legislating clearer guidelines. At any rate, airing them as problems will serve notice that we don't like the situation any better than do some of our constituent groups.

One of the first difficult issues is that of Federal-State relationships. During the negotiation of a Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals in Bonn, and again recently in our preparations for negotiating with the Canadians a treaty on migratory caribou, the concern of State groups that the Federal government would use international agreements to encroach upon traditional State rights to manage wildlife has caused confusion. Lack of a clear understanding of the State and Federal roles brought widespread opposition from State fish and wildlife groups to the migratory species convention; it may happen as well to the caribou treaty. This ambiguity should be resolved.

Another issue is that of habitat protection in international agreements. We, as well as most other nations, resist any outside suggestions—especially those of a compulsory nature—affecting the use to which we will put our land. We are not always certain what economic activities are compatible with maintaining wildlife populations. Furthermore, we and other nations are faced with possible difficult choices.

To illustrate this problem, I invite the committee's attention to the proposed treaty with Canada on migratory caribou. Complete habitat protection is in possible conflict with petroleum exploration. Access highways on both sides of the border expose herds to sports hunters. What is the relative importance of these uses to the traditional needs of local people who use caribou for essential food needs?

Other issues that arose in connection with the negotiation in Bonn of a treaty to protect migratory species involved possible conflicts with U.S. Law of the Sea positions. We were also restricted by possible overlapping jurisdictions with existing treaties applicable to marine mammals and particularly by possible application to all marine species, including commercial fish species.

As the commitee may be aware, the United States and a number of other major countries were unable to sign this convention at Bonn.

Habitat Degradation

There is growing recognition that the major issue is the loss of critical habitat in many regions. Accordingly, our wildlife conservation efforts now center on the advancement of habitat protection strategies. This is most difficult to do effectively; the United States has supported and assisted a number of recent international efforts that support this goal including the world conservation strategy (in preparation by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and National Resources), UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere Program, and the Global Plan of Action to Combat Desertification.

Chief among our efforts, however, has been development of a series of recommendations for the President on U.S. goals, strategies, and programs to help protect and conserve world forests.

Forests. One of our highest priorities is tropical deforestation. Forest cover in most of the world's tropical countries is disappearing at an accelerating rate to meet an increasing demand for cropland, rangeland, firewood, and commercial wood and wood products. One of the most alarming aspects is that mankind stands to lose critical habitat for hundreds of thousands of plants and animal species. This committee has heard from other witnesses about the importance of maintaining genetic diversity and about the potential benefits of many indi-

14. Ministers considered a report by the Secretary General on the particular problems faced by economically less advanced member countries which constitutes a sound basis for action. While noting with satisfaction the special efforts that had been made over recent months, they stressed the need to give further momentum to the efforts to provide, in the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, assistance to those countries, so as to reach concrete and timely results. They reaffirmed their continuing political support for this process which will, indeed, constitute an essential element for the fulfillment of the contributions by those countries to collective defence.

15. With respect to the Middle East, the Ministers affirmed the importance of elaborating and implementing a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338 and with the participation of all the parties concerned, including representatives of the Palestinian people. Ministers noted with satisfaction the progress achieved by Egypt and Israel in the implementation of Resolution 242 insofar as their mutual relations are concerned. They reaffirmed that a lasting peace requires the solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and the achievement of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in the context of a negotiated settlement that ensures the security of all states in the region including Israel.

16. Ministers warmly welcomed the agreement reached in the constitutional conference on Rhodesia. They expressed the hope that the cease-fire proposals agreed at that conference would quickly become fully effective, and that peace would return to Rhodesia and the neighboring countries. Ministers looked forward to the day when the independent Republic of Zimbabwe would take its place as a full member of the international community.

17. Ministers, recalling that the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) had been set up in 1969, took note of the Committee's achievements during its first ten years. They commended its innovative and flexible approach to many problems of the human environment in fields such as energy conservation, alternative energy sources and pollution. Ministers noted the studies launched in 1979, including those of the restoration and conservation of monuments, and on man's impact on the stratosphere, as well as projected studies on the management of technology.

18. The Ministers who participated in the special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers on 12th December, 1979 noted with satisfaction that the decisions taken today by the North Atlantic Council in their opinion complemented those adopted at that meeting. Taken together, along with continuing activities flowing from decisions reached at the London and Washington meetings, they constitute a comprehensive programme of action. This programme comprises measures to reduce the military imbalance through concrete improvement and modernization of long-range theatre nuclear and conventional forces, and the following wide range of initiatives particularly in the fields of confidence building and arms control designed to improve mutual security and co-operation in Europe:

- An offer to negotiate for substantial reductions in the level of long-range theatre nuclear forces as well as intercontinental strategic forces within the framework of SALT III;
- Unilateral withdrawal of one thousand US nuclear warheads from Europe as part of the 12th December decision;
- A proposal for an interim Phase I agreement for mutual and balanced force reductions, designed to give fresh impetus to the MBFR negotiations;
- A proposal for a package of associated measures in MBFR designed to ensure compliance with the agreement and to make military activities more transparent, thereby improving mutual confidence;
- In furtherance of the CSCE process, readiness to examine proposals concerning confidence building measures and a conference on disarmament in Europe.

These Ministers are determined that the 1980's should see a fundamental change for the better in the situation between East and West and will make every effort to bring this about. The programme of action which they envisage offers the best opportunity for creating more constructive relations between East and West for which their citizens have hoped for so long.

These Ministers considered that this programme represents a major new opportunity for the countries of the Warsaw Pact to translate into action the interest they have signalled in improving the situation in Europe. They call on the Warsaw Pact Governments to respond to this offer by making a determined effort, in all available negotiating fora, to achieve substantial results which will enhance security and mutual trust.

SECRETARY'S NEWS CONFERENCE, DEC. 14, 1979

Let me say at the outset that I believe that this has been one of the most productive ministerial meetings of NATO in many years. The achievements were solid, and a sense of common purpose was impressively high. After this meeting and the NATO summit meetings in 1977 and in 1978, I think we can say that we have set the alliance on a sound course for the next decade.

Let me review for you briefly, before we get into the questions, what has taken place.

On Wednesday [December 12], as you all know, the Ministers reached agreement on an important program to modernize the theater nuclear forces and to start negotiations on limiting theater nuclear forces in the SALT III framework. Yesterday, the alliance issued a declaration on the situation in Iran, and we had a very useful discussion of this subject, and I was heartened by the support shown us by all of those around the table.

Today the alliance has issued a communique which I think you have probably now seen which presents, in my judgment, a challenge to the Warsaw Pact to translate into action the interest that they have signaled in improving the situation in Europe.

The Ministers have agreed on a comprehensive program of action in the field of arms control which is designed to improve security and cooperation in Europe, and I'll sketch very briefly for you the principal items of this comprehensive program.

The first is an offer for substantial reductions in the level of long-range theater nuclear forces as well as intercontinental strategic forces to be discussed within the framework of SALT III.

Next, a withdrawal of 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe as part of the theater nuclear decisions which were taken on Wednesday.

Third, a proposal for an interim phase-one agreement for mutual and balanced force reductions designed to give fresh impetus to the MBFR negotiations.

Next, a proposal for a package of associated measures in MBFR designed to insure compliance with the agreement and to make military activities more transparent and, as a result, producing and improving mutual confidence.

And finally, in furtherance of the CSCE process, readiness to examine proposals concerning confidence measures and a conference on disarmament in Europe.

The United States will be shortly transmitting to the Soviet Union the communique of the December 12 meeting which contains the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the alliance to negotiate arms limitations on long-range theater nuclear forces, and to propose to the Soviet Union to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the lines contained in the December 12 communique.

We also promptly moved within the alliance to implement the December 12 decision by constituting a special high-level consultative body to support the U.S. negotiating effort on theater nuclear weapons in SALT III. I think it is a comprehensive and a very impor-

tant program which was unanimously supported today.

Q. The American proposal for deploying missiles in Western Europe was put forward on the theory that it would stimulate arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. And yet the reaction of the Soviet Union and their allies has been a negative one. Do you take that reaction as being just an instant reaction, or does it suggest something about their unwillingness to see the proposal the way you do and to negotiate?

A. I take it as an initial reaction. It is my judgment that when they see and study the proposal that has been put forward that they will treat it as a serious proposal, and I believe that it does form the basis for negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States acting in consultation with its allies.

Q. What effect do you think events in Iran will have on the autonomy negotiations for the West Bank and Gaza, because the U.S. chief negotiator is a pessimist regarding the May 25 target date?

A. I do not think that the situation in Iran will affect the negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza. As to whether or not the May target date can be met, I think it's too early yet to see. We've always said that that was going to be a very difficult set of negotiations. There are very tough issues to be resolved in those negotiations. Some progress has been made. There's a long way to go on that road. People are going to do their best to meet that target date. I can't say for sure whether it can be met or not.

Q. Did you say that the negotiations about the reduction of the long-range theater nuclear forces will take place in the framework of SALT III? Does that mean that nothing can be started until SALT II is ratified by the U.S. Senate?

A. What it means is that we will start consultations with our allies in January in the consultative group which I referred to earlier, and there will be constant consultations with them on a regular and periodic basis. I would say that they would occur at least at a quarterly basis and my guess is more frequently.

In addition to that, I intend to communicate to the Soviet Union in a few days—probably next Monday—the proposal which resulted from our deliberations here. I think it is possible to have preliminary discussions, but insofar as actual negotiations are concerned they would await the start of the SALT III negotiations.

Q. Does the United States now contemplate, either in SALT or in these theater nuclear force negotiations, adding our forward base systems to the mix in exchange perhaps for the Backfire?

A. Insofar as the Backfire is concerned, as I indicated yesterday, Backfire is one of the issues which must be taken care of in the SALT III negotiations, and it is a key and important issue. On the question of forward base systems, they were excluded from the prior negotiations. We will have to wait and see what the Soviet position is in the SALT III negotiations.

Q. Some U.S. officials in recent weeks have characterized the NATO arms control package as the most comprehensive arms control proposal ever made concerning Europe. Would you agree with that characterization?

A. That what we arrived at today is the most comprehensive? Yes, I think it is because it's a comprehensive proposal that cuts across the entire spectrum. And when you see that, also coupled with the fact that insofar as central systems are concerned—we will be discussing central systems as well—it is indeed the most comprehensive that's ever been put forward.

Q. Could you repeat the concrete proposals you are going with to Moscow which were very vague in the communique? Could you be more concrete on that?

A. I think it's quite concrete. I've just been through an outline; what all they covered just a moment ago.

Q. If we now add yet another echelon in the disarmament field of a conference—the 35 nation conference—how are you going to keep the kind of lines of what each is doing clear? What's the point of adding yet another conference to this process?

A. The negotiations with respect to theater nuclear forces do add a complexity to the discussions in SALT III. There's no question about that. And it will be a much more complex set of negotiations than were the negotiations in SALT II, because they include not only central systems but theater systems as well. Insofar as the question of a conference on disarmament is concerned, that I think is a constructive idea which has been put forward by France, and it's a useful concept which may provide a basis for putting forward—on which to continue developing their approach in this field to bring about a conference where one could discuss confidence-building measures.

Q. Would you please outline for us what you think the accomplishments have been this week in terms of your efforts to get the hostages in Iran free and what future steps are contemplated?

A. I have had a series of very useful meetings with a number of the heads of government of several of the European nations. In this I have been able to explore with them the current state of the discussions and activities which are going on in the diplomatic field and various actions which are underway and various actions which are contemplated. This has been very useful to us in helping to chart our own course of action, and I have been very pleased by the solidarity that I have found in the discussions with the various heads of government.

In addition to that I have had a chance here to meet with the Foreign Ministers of the 14 nations and to discuss with them also, in a very full but less detailed sense, the same matters which I discussed with the heads of state. I think I have outlined to them not only what the situation is but what the immediate prospects are for the days immediately ahead of us, and, again, I feel encouraged by the very obvious and clear solidarity that was shown by all of our allies.

Q. You are speaking of solidarity. What I want to know is really whether you have asked, and whether you got some support by the European governments, in joining the United States of America, if eventually you will decide to apply sanctions against Iran.

A. I have discussed with our colleagues the possibility of having to go to the Security Council for chapter 7 sanctions if action is not forthcoming in the release of the hostages. And I have discussed that at quite some length with not only the Foreign Ministers but with the heads of government, and I have been much encouraged by the response I've gotten. ■

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[1] Press release 326 of Dec. 19, 1979.

[2] Issued at the conclusion of the joint meeting of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers.

have enrolled, many of them at your institutions. This could eventually become one of the largest single economic development training programs ever undertaken by the U.S. Government for people from developing nations.

Against this background, I underscore the important role that you and your institutions can play in the energy area and in other development sectors as well. Training programs relevant to the Third World need to be expanded. There will be a need to absorb more students. There is a need for new curricula, especially in emerging fields such as energy sector management and renewable energy technologies. Similarly research on new energy technologies will have to take into account developing country circumstances.

A strong partnership between development agencies and universities is essential given the task before us. Development is a taxing and often discouraging process. It will be even more difficult in the future. Our commitment to Third World development will require even more sacrifice and dedication. But no effort is more worthwhile in terms of the world's future and the future well-being of our children.

Just 2 years ago, Senator Hubert Humphrey, who first proposed the International Development Cooperation Agency, spoke at the Famine Prevention Symposium. It was his final public speech. His words apply today as they did 2 years ago.

So, as I said, it is appropriate for these institutions which are in title XII—that have such a responsibility—begin to play a vital and integral role in the agricultural development of countries around this planet. But, may I say to my friends of the diplomatic corps that are here today, it won't work if we just have to come knocking at your door. We have to join hands. You may have to knock at our door or we at yours, but more importantly we have to understand we can help each other. . . . ■

The Nonaligned Movement After the Havana Conference

by Charles William Maynes

Keynote address before the National Conference on the Third World at the University of Nebraska in Omaha on October 25, 1979. Mr. Maynes is Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs.

Once in a while an act can symbolize an age: This summer Garry Davis asked to come home.

Who is Garry Davis? A highly patriotic bombardier in World War II, Davis renounced the United States for a citizenship of the world to dramatize his view that nationhood was incompatible with peace. Over the years he drew tens of thousands of Europeans to world government rallies and upset immigration officials by appearing at their borders with a 42-page "World Citizens Passport." Now he wants to come home.

But Garry Davis' return poses a problem for those of us interested in American foreign policy, particularly those of us interested in U.S. policy toward the Third World. Many of us undoubtedly thought Garry Davis' quest for world government foolish. Yet in an extreme way, he represented an underlying and coherent current in the postwar American approach to the world. In the wake of the devastation of World War II—with the evidence of the monumental inhumanity which the traditional game of international politics can bring—we thought we knew what we wanted. We also thought we knew what the rest of the world wanted. Even if few believed in world government, many believed we were in the process of creating a tightening web of international institutions and laws which would make the world a better place to live. The process of change in the Third World seemed almost reassuring. With these new nations, the world could begin afresh.

At first things seemed to work out. Self-determination, a word American Presidents minted for international coinage, swept the world. New states took their place on the international stage, most verbally supporting our values, most visibly copying our institutions. They joined the United Nations. They asked for our help. We seemed to have new friends and new interests.

Then it seemed to go sour. In country after country, democratic structures crumbled under military or mob assault. Or the very men and women who controlled the new democratic institutions appeared intent on subverting them. When even India, dear to American internationalists, temporarily moved out of the democratic camp, the whole postwar vision of the way the world would develop seemed bankrupt, and many wanted to withdraw from the area of the world we never understood very well in the first place—the developing world, the Third World, the nonaligned world.

So many Americans in recent years came home like Garry Davis. Yet once home, they soon faced a paradox. They no sooner retired from the developing world—declared it was outside the "core of U.S. interests"—than everyone began hinting it was important after all. Angola, Ethiopia, Rhodesia, and Namibia suggested that not only [former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.] Andy Young considered Africa important. Many had downgraded the importance of Indochina until the Vietnamese occupied Cambodia and threatened Thailand. Commentators considered the Caribbean of secondary importance until revolutions began to sweep the area. South Asia was not even on the back pages until the coup in Afghanistan, the revolution in Iran, and the nuclear moves in Pakistan. Suddenly and surprisingly, everyone agreed the Third World was important.

Suddenly everyone agreed we came home too soon. So I would like to spend the rest of my time discussing the following questions. Who is in the Third World? Why do we have trouble talking to them? What should our policy be?

Organization of the Nonaligned Movement

Let's begin with the so-called nonaligned movement. What does it represent? What are its priorities?

The current membership is 95. Burma having just detached itself in protest to Cuban intimidation tactics in Havana, the nonaligned movement now consists of 91 nations and four liberation movements, nearly two-thirds of

the U.N. membership. The nonaligned movement has no charter, no executive, no secretariat. It is usually the host country for each summit meeting which assumes the presidency for periods of 3 years.

The summit remains the authoritative organ. It reviews events since the previous summit, debates and takes positions on the issues, and then adopts action programs for a 3-year period. Each summit initiates a new 3-year cycle of nonaligned movement meetings. In the first year, there is a meeting of the 36 Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau at the Foreign Minister level and there is a plenary meeting of Foreign Ministers. In the final year, a new round of plenary meetings of Foreign Ministers is followed immediately by the summit of heads of state and government.

Membership criteria in the nonaligned movement are vague, largely determined by members' attitudes toward a particular applicant. So, one has major actors of international politics in the group such as India or Nigeria, important ones such as Yugoslavia or Cuba, harried ones such as Kampuchea, and insigificant ones such as some of the smaller island states. It has Communist members such as North Korea, anti-Communists such as Argentina and Indonesia, Communists who fight each other such as Vietnam and Cambodia, rich ones such as OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries], and poor ones who are most of the rest.

How could, one might ask, such a group hold together? Their cohesiveness is explained perhaps best by not what they are but what they are not. They are not white, though Yugoslavia was a founding member; they are not rich, though that has changed as far as the OPEC countries are concerned; they are not members of the big power blocs, though that must be taken with a grain of salt when one thinks of North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam; they are not countries with democratic governments, though its largest members such as India and Nigeria are, and the trend is somewhat more promising than a few years ago.

Evolution of Causes

The nonaligned movement was founded by Tito, Nehru, Sukarno, and Nasser, but its genealogy includes the Bandung conference; Zhou Enlai; and an assortment of attempts to seek third roads, third camps, and third worlds. While each of its founders had a pet big power to be wary of, this movement, as most movements do, emerged as a reaction to, rather than as an initiative for, something.

Thus, the nonaligned were countries situated in what used to be called "grey areas" of conflict in the cold war, from which they wanted to stay out. Trying to avoid overdependence on the superpowers and trying to enhance their own influence internationally through expressions of solidarity on major issues, the nonaligned movement began, with its first summit in Belgrade in 1961, as a concerted effort to mediate in the cold war. But it quickly emerged that this common denominator did not provide a sufficient impulse to unity. Over the next few years, therefore, nonaligned emphasis shifted to a campaign to speed up the decolonization process. This was the overriding nonaligned issue at the Cario summit in 1964.

The economic issues—always a concern—gained nonaligned attention on par with the cold war and decolonization only at the Lusaka summit in 1970. At Lusaka, a separate summit declaration on economic issues—the first such—emphasized self-reliance, mutual assistance, and cooperation. This thrust achieved new momentum at the Algiers summit in 1973 with the adoption of a comprehensive nonaligned economic program calling for fundamental revision of the world economic order, the forerunner of the controversial new international economic order. Nearly one-half of the recent Havana summit's final declaration is devoted to aspects of these same economic issues, as was a major portion of the October 12 U.N. General Assembly speech of Fidel Castro, the current chairman of the nonaligned movement.

Is the evolution of causes of the nonaligned movement a theater in search of a play? The nonaligned movement, as most movements, does not define itself by strict rules of adherence to a core ideology. Nor is it an alliance based on contract with fine print. Faithfulness to the original spirit that spawned the movement is its best characteristic, and this is where the sharpest battles are fought—not unlike most denominational movements. The integrity of original principles is where Tito put most of his efforts at the recent Havana summit. It is to his credit that the section on principles and on philosophy of the movement in the final declaration was largely satisfactory to those members who attach special importance to the independence of the movement. The Yugoslavs and others succeeded at Havana in rebuffing the Cuban drive toward a nonaligned movement-Soviet "natural alliance" and in gaining confirmation of the movement's traditional posture as an independent nonbloc force.

Yet this should not be viewed as a defeat of the Soviets, much less a victory for the West, nor should it be dismissed as an inconsequential victory of principles over expediency. It was a battle fought for reasons hardly flattering to any major military power.

The *raison d'etre* of the nonaligned movement, at least in the minds of its founders, was to raise as high as possible the psychological barriers to the use of force in international relations since Third World countries were the most probable victims of the use of force. The reason the Yugoslavs and others resisted the Cuban drive to support Vietnam in its campaign to occupy Cambodia is precisely because they fear Vietnam's success will lower the barriers for many even more powerful countries to intervene in Third World affairs.

Anticolonialism

One will notice I referred to intervention in Third World affairs. Nonaligned movement members have concentrated their criticism and joint opposition to the historic ability of the colonial countries to intervene in Third World internal affairs. They have denounced the least threatening action of former colonial countries in their region while remaining silent on more threatening developments in other parts of the world—for example, Soviet actions in Eastern Europe. The global reach of the Soviet Union, using Cuban and Vietnamese proxies, has increasingly called into question this double standard which has understandably troubled us.

The nonaligned movement concentration on principles does not obviate the continuing search of the movement for animating causes. The movement's earlier emphasis on anticolonialism and traditional stand against the cold war no longer serve effectively to insure solidarity of the nonaligned countries. There are reasons for this.

- The decolonization process is nearly concluded; indeed, we are working with our allies and with the front-line African states to bring about internationally acceptable solutions in

• An America with equal rights for all citizens and for women guaranteed in the United States Constitution;

• An America with jobs and good health and good education for every citizen;

• An America with a clean and bountiful life in our cities and on our farms;

• An America that helps to feed the world;

• An America secure in filling its own energy needs;

• An America of justice, tolerance, and compassion.

For this vision to come true, we must sacrifice, but this national commitment will be an exciting enterprise that will unify our people. Together as one people let us work to build our strength at home. And together as one indivisible union, let us seek peace and security throughout the world. Together let us make of this time of challenge and danger a decade of national resolve and of brave achievement. ■

[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980.

State of the Union Message

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from President Carter's message to the Congress of January 21, 1980. [1]

My State of the Union Address will be devoted to a discussion of the most important challenges facing our country as we enter the 1980s.

Over the coming year, those challenges will receive my highest priority and greatest efforts. However, there will also be many other significant areas which will receive my personal commitment, as well as that of my Administration, during the 2nd Session of the 96th Congress.

It is important that Congress, along with the public, be aware of these other vital areas of concern as they listen to my State of the Union Address. In that way, the context of the Address, and my Administration's full message for 1980, can best be understood.

For that reason, I am sending this State of the Union Message to the Congress today, several days before my State of the Union Address.

. . . .

RECORD OF PROGRESS

When I took office in 1977, our Nation faced a number of serious domestic and international problems:

. . . .

• no national energy policy existed, and our dependence on foreign oil was rapidly increasing;

. . . .

• our defense posture was declining as a result of a continuously shrinking defense budget;

• the strength of the NATO Alliance was at a post-World War II low;

• tensions between Israel and Egypt threatened another Middle East war; and

• America's resolve to oppose international aggression and human rights violations was under serious question.

Over the past 36 months, clear progress has been made in solving the challenges we found in January of 1977:

. . . .

• the decline in defense spending has been reversed; defense spending has increased at a real rate of over 3% in 1979, and I am proposing a real increase in the defense spending level of more than 20% over the next 5 years;

• the NATO Alliance has been revitalized and strengthened through substantially increased resources, new deterrent weapons, and improved coordination; increased emphasis has also been given to conventional force capabilities to meet crises in other areas of the world;

• Egypt and Israel have ended more than 30 years of war through a Peace Treaty that also established a framework for comprehensive peace in the Middle East;

• the commitment of our Nation to pursue human rights throughout the world, in nations which are friendly and those which are not, has been made clear to all;

• our resolve to oppose aggression, such as the illegal invasion of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan, has been supported by tough actions.

LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES

In the coming legislative session, the last in this Presidential term, I am deeply committed to finishing the agenda that I have placed before the Congress. That agenda has been comprehensive and demanding, but it has also been absolutely essential for our Nation's well-being.

I do not plan to add significantly to the agenda this year. Because of the importance of enacting the proposals already before the Congress, and the relatively short Congressional session facing us, I will be limiting my major *new* proposals to a critical few:

. . . .

• Initiatives implementing my response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

I am convinced that these new initiatives, along with the major proposals I previously made to the Congress, can be enacted this year, if we have a dedicated, all-out effort on the part of the Administration and the Congress. I pledge such an effort on my part, and that of my Administration.

As in the previous three years, I will be working with you toward the basic goals of:

. . . .

- Building America's military strength;
- Working to resolve international disputes through peaceful means;
- Striving to resolve pressing international economic problems;
- Continuing to support the building of democratic institutions and protecting human rights; and
- Preventing the spread and further development of nuclear weapons.

My highest legislative priorities in each of these areas this year will be:

. . . .

Building America's Military Strength

- *Defense Department Authorizations and Appropriations*—I will be proposing a defense budget containing a 3.3% real growth in outlays. It is essential that the Congress support an increase of that amount if we are to strengthen our defense capabilities.

Working to Resolve International Disputes

- *Refugee Legislation and Funding*—This legislation is necessary to improve our refugee program and to provide needed domestic assistance to refugees. Prompt House action would assure that we have a sound framework within which to accommodate the increasing flow of refugees.

Striving to Resolve International Economic Problems

- *Bilateral and Multilateral Foreign Assistance*—I will be proposing foreign assistance legislation which provides the authority needed to carry forward a cooperative relationship with a large number of developing nations. Prompt Congressional action is essential.
- *China Trade Agreement*—I will be seeking early approval by the Congress of the Trade Agreement reached with China; the Agreement represents a major step forward in the process toward improved economic relations with China.

Continuing to Support the Building of Democratic Institutions and Protecting Human Rights

- *Special International Security Assistance for Pakistan*—I am sending to Congress a military and economic assistance program to enable Pakistan to strengthen its defenses. Prompt enactment will be one of my highest legislative priorities.
- *Human Rights Conventions*—I will continue to press the Senate to ratify five key human rights treaties—the American Convention on Human Rights, the Convention on Racial Discrimination, the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights, and the Genocide Convention.

Preventing the Spread and Further Development of Nuclear Weapons

- *SALT II*—I firmly believe that SALT II is in our Nation's security interest and that it will add significantly to the control of nuclear weapons. But because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I do not believe it is advisable to have the Senate consider the Treaty now.

I. ENSURING ECONOMIC STRENGTH

. . . .

Trade

This past year was one of unmatched and historic achievement for a vital component of the U.S. economy—exports and trade. In 1979, nearly 3 million jobs in our manufacturing industries, or one out of every seven jobs in manufacturing, depended upon our export performance in overseas markets. Our exports were a key contributor to the growth of the U.S. economy in 1979.

Exports of agricultural and industrial goods grew by an unparalleled $35 billion, reaching a level of $180 billion. This represented an increase of 25% over exports in 1978. This record increase in exports, coupled with a slower rate of growth of imports, resulted in substantial improvements of $5 billion in our balance of trade. Furthermore, a rapid growth of service exports in 1979 led to a $13 billion improvement in the current account, bringing that account from a deficit in 1978 to near balance in 1979.

I expect that in 1980 our exports will continue to strengthen and that, if we can continue to further conserve and limit imports of oil, we will further improve our trade balance position and that of the dollar. The future for American exports is bright, and will remain so, despite the necessity of suspending certain exports to the Soviet Union.

This Administration has accomplished several goals in the last year in assuring that there will continue to be greater exports and, therefore, job possibilities for U.S. workers and farmers.

To improve the condition of access of U.S. exports to foreign markets, I signed into force in July of last year a new trade act which reflected two years of hard bargaining in the recently concluded round of multilateral trade negotiations. These negotiations, which included all major developed and lesser developed countries, resulted in agreements to strengthen the rules of conduct of international trade and open new markets to U.S. exports. These negotiations were of historic importance in their scope and accomplishment, and their success is attributable to close cooperation that existed during and after the negotiations between the Congress, the private sector and the Administration.

Our negotiating success now challenges us to take advantage of the opportunity for improving further our export performance. To meet this challenge, I proposed in 1979 a major reorganization of the government's trade policy and export promotion activities. That reorganization will strengthen government coordination in the trade field and provide an improved basis for protecting American interest in the recently negotiated trade agreements. I put this reorganization into effect, with Congressional approval, earlier this month. With the changes initiated in my trade reorganization, we will ensure that trade between the United States and its trading partners will be conducted fairly and openly.

. . . I am proposing a real increase in the defense spending level of more than 20% over the next 5 years.

Consistent with my decisions on suspending certain types of trade with the Soviet Union, my Administration will be seeking this year to find additional ways to foster U.S. export ex-

The Final Act is an historic document, for it transcends normal state-to-state relations to deal with concrete problems that have divided East and West. Compliance with its obligations would enrich the lives of people and ease the tensions between East and West.

The Final Act offers a potential framework for reducing military tensions in Europe and building greater confidence with respect to military activities.

There have been a number of suggestions that this objective could be advanced through a meeting of the CSCE states to deal with security issues. The Government of France has put forward a useful proposal in this regard.

Clearly such a meeting would only make sense, however, as part of a balanced and healthy CSCE process. Thus it is important, first, to conclude successfully the review in Madrid. As we approach that meeting, the United States will keep in mind, above all, the importance of implementing all the provisions of the Final Act, not just the security provisions. We are particularly concerned about the provisions dealing with humanitarian issues that directly affect the daily lives of our citizens and those elsewhere in Europe.

We will work to insure that the discussions in Madrid take place in a constructive atmosphere, free of polemics. But we will not avoid providing an honest assessment of problems simply to project a positive image.

Conclusion

The realities of military security I have discussed, and the opportunities for progress in arms limitation, argue for a special attitude on the part of the allies as we face the 1980s—an attitude I would describe as sober optimism.

We must be sobered by the prospect that deep and fundamental differences will persist between East and West—differences rooted in geography, in history, and in the assumptions underlying our political systems. Neither our differences nor our weapons systems will be dismantled overnight. So we would do well to keep ourselves free of illusions based solely on hope.

But we should never abandon hope. For in spite of our historic differences, East and West have come a long way in their relations. The range of contacts among the countries of Eastern and Western Europe has broadened; their relations have taken on an increasing air of normality.

Clearly, the future of East-West relations will be marked by deep differences. But we should at the same time seek to broaden the areas of cooperation between us.

Neither prospect should unsettle us in the West, for we bring to the future an impressive record of achievements and an equally impressive array of strengths.

- For 31 years, the deterrent shield of the NATO alliance has worked successfully.
- The economies of the Western alliance are more than three times as productive as those of the Warsaw Pact.
- Our societies are free and open, hospitable to innovation and creativity, unafraid of change.
- Though we cannot dominate events in our world, our power is immense to influence those events and to shape them in ways that improve the prospects for humanity.

If we preserve these strengths and build upon them, if in the future we find within ourselves the same qualities of statesmanship we have always found, we need not fear the 1980s or the decades beyond. We will be strong—strong enough to protect ourselves and strong enough, if our adversaries are also willing, to cooperate in pursuit of peace.

Indeed, just as we will do whatever necessary to maintain stability and deterrence in Europe, so are we deeply committed to a relaxation of tensions between East and West. We stand ready to propose and consider new ideas, to follow unconventional paths, to respond to every sign of good faith from the other side, for we want to build a future in which the peace of Europe—East and West—is never again disturbed. ■

[1] Press release 321.

Interview on the "Today" Show

Secretary Vance was interviewed in Washington, D.C., on the "Today" Show on January 11, 1980, by Richard Valeriani, NBC News diplomatic correspondent and Tom Brokaw, host of the "Today" Show.[1]

Q. What other measures is the Administration planning to take in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan?

A. We are not planning, at this point, to take any other measures. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union crossed a new threshold and it required a very strong and a very resolute response. That response was given by President Carter in the speech which he made.

We have two purposes in the actions which we have taken. First, to make it very clear to the Soviet Union that they will continue to pay a heavy price as long as their troops remain in Afghanistan. And secondly, to make sure that they understand that aggression will be faced up to whenever it occurs. It's too early to say at this point what the long-range effect is going to be on the U.S.-Soviet relationship. That depends upon Moscow and actions which will be taken in Moscow.

I do want to make a point, which I think is a very important point to make. And that is that the invasion of Afghanistan underscores the importance of pursuing the policies which we have been embarked upon. What are those policies? Let me outline them for you very briefly.

- Continuing to strengthen America—we have been in the process of doing that during the past 3 years through a wide variety of steps in the strategic fields and the field of theater nuclear weapons and in the field of conventional weapons as well. That will continue.
- Secondly, we will continue to play an active diplomatic role throughout the world, taking the kind of actions such as we have taken in the past to help preserve the peace in the Middle East and in southern Africa.
- We will also continue to play an active role in the Third World, dealing with Third World problems on Third World basis, and not trying to impose solutions from the outside, from external forces.
- In addition to that, we will continue to pursue an active policy in terms of democratization and the support and

protection of human rights throughout the world, and will continue to pursue our policy of seeking mutual and balanced arms control progress wherever necessary.

Q. Getting back to Afghanistan, would the United States consider helping the Afghan insurgents?

A. The question of what happens internally is a question I'd prefer not to get into.

Q. As you know, the Administration has drawn considerable criticism over some of the measures it's taken: the withholding of the sale of grain and advanced technology to the Soviet Union. And the question is, why should the American farmer, why should the American businessman pay the price that you're talking about?

A. I think it's very important, as I indicated earlier, that we take firm, clear, and resolute action. And this required steps across the board. We took not only action in the field of cutting back on the grain shipments in a very substantial way but also steps in denying to the Soviet Union high technology. And another major area was cutting back on the fish allocations so that it would be no longer any fish allocations to the Soviet Union in the future.

These kinds of strong steps were necessary. And all of us are going to have to share in the sacrifices that are necessary to make this demonstrated stand to reflect the view which we hold about the importance of the principles which are involved here.

Q. How long will these measures remain in effect? And I ask that in light of what happened with the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968. Six months, a year later, we were back doing business as usual.

A. They will remain in effect as long as is necessary. And I believe it will be a protracted period. That may not be the case. That would be fortunate if that were the case. But I do not believe that is the case. We must assume it will be for a protracted period.

You're absolutely right. When you look back at what took place at the time of the Hungarian invasion, that was soon forgotten in a period of weeks. The same thing was true in the case of Czechoslovakia. The Soviets must understand that this will not be a passing thing, that aggression will not be rewarded.

Q. What about the economic reprisals that we've taken thus far? Aren't they largely symbolic? There's a wide body of opinion that they really will have no effect on the Russian quality of life or certainly on the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, that they were done primarily to make us feel better and to send up some kind of a signal; but it's really no more than a signal.

A. No, I would respectfully disagree very strongly with you. The steps taken insofar as grain are concerned are going to have, in our judgment, a major impact on the livestock program in the Soviet Union. The denial of grain to them is going to require a sharp cutback in livestock production. This is a very important program to the Soviets, and it's had the strong backing of Mr. Brezhnev. The denial of high technology is something which is also of great importance and has been for many years. Therefore, I think that that will have a substantial impact. The cutting back in the fish allocations is of lesser importance but, again, an important step.

Q. What about the Olympic games? Vice President Mondale is now suggesting that they be moved to Canada. Is that the official Administration policy?

A. The official policy was stated by the President at the time that he made his speech. At that time he said that we prefer the games would go forward, but that we would have to watch and see what happens, and he would make his decision in the future, after seeing how the situation develops in terms of what the Soviets would now do.

Q. —take the Olympic Games out of Moscow is something that would probably really hurt the Russians. Is there much sympathy for that among our allies, other Western countries, Third World countries?

A. It's mixed.

Q. Is that something you're going to push?

A. We are going to watch and see what happens. It remains a possibility which may be exercised.

Q. Let me ask you about Iran now. Do you expect the Soviet Union to veto the Security Council resolution against sanctions?

A. I don't know. It remains a real possibility. As you know, we'll probably vote on the sanctions issue either tonight at the United Nations or tomorrow morning. I believe that the vote will be a positive vote, but the Soviet Union may veto.

Q. What will you do if there's a veto?

A. We will go ahead and take action as if the sanctions had indeed been put into effect.

Q. Would you consider a naval blockade to back it up?

A. I do not rule it out.

Q. What if the Soviets begin to move out of Afghanistan and toward the warm-water ports of the Persian Gulf, as a lot of people are speculating that they may. Does that mean that we have to begin to move troops to that area?

A. I do not want to speculate on events which are not facing us at this time. We'll deal with them when we have to cross that bridge. ■

[1] Press release 10 of Jan. 15, 1980.

vidual tropical species threatened with extinction which have, to date, never even been examined for their social and economic values.

In June 1978, the Department of State and the Agency for International Development (AID) cosponsored a "U.S. Strategy Conference on Tropical Deforestation" to obtain a better assessment of the nature of the problem, to clarify U.S. interests in addressing it, and to obtain views on an appropriate U.S. response. One result was the establishment by the State Department of an interagency task force on tropical forests to provide a government-wide focal point for policy and prog:am planning and coordination. The conference also recommended that a comprehensive "U.S. policy strategy and program" on tropical forests be developed to shape and guide future U.S. efforts in this area; we anticipate transmitting recommendations on this to the President next month.

I believe that we must mobilize an expanded U.S. effort on tropical forest management which will catalyze and support a much larger effort by the international community as a whole. In pursuit of this, the United States raised the deforestation issue at the U.N. General Assembly earlier this week and over the past year in other major U.N. forums. Last May, the Governing Council of the U.N. Environment Program overwhelmingly approved a U.S.-sponsored resolution calling for an international meeting of experts to develop proposals for a coordinated action program, and a division of labor, to insure better management of tropical forests. That meeting is now scheduled for February 1980 in Gabon.

Given the fact that the U.S. possesses less than 1% of the world's tropical forests, it is clear that international cooperation is the key to any success we wish to achieve in this area.

Acid Rain. Moving closer to habitat in our own forests and lakes, we see a problem, particularly in the Northeast, of acid rain. This is a widely recognized problem as was illustrated earlier this month when 800 people gathered in Toronto for a "action seminar on acid precipitation" under the sponsorship of the National Clean Air Coalition and a number of environmental groups. We anticiapte that President Carter and Canadian Prime Minister Clark will discuss this topic when they next meet. Next week Douglas M. Costle, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, will sign for the United States, in Geneva, a Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution.

Acid rain has been linked to sharp declines in the number of fish in many lakes and streams. Some freshwater lakes in Canada, the United States, and Scandanavia are totally unable to support fish life. We are less certain of our facts with respect to the effect on vegetation, but there is evidence to show that tree growth is slowed and agricultural crops are affected adversely.

Negotiations have been begun with Canada with a view to conclude a treaty concerning the transboundary acid rain problem.

Meanwhile, we and the Canadians are engaged in a number of joint programs to attack this problem pending the negotiation of a treaty. By their signature to the Economic Commission for Europe treaty in Geneva, both Canada and the United States will accept the broad and rather general obligations specified in that convention concerning transboundary air pollutions. Efforts are now underway to implement the extensive programs to combat acid rain set out in President Carter's environmental message of August 2. These measures have a direct bearing on our transboundary acid rain problem and on wildlife habitat in the United States and Canada.

Tropical deforestation and acid rain are two very different types of habitat disruption for the many species of wildlife that call the forests, both tropical and temperate, home. On both fronts the Department of State is looking for solutions before the situation deteriorates further.

Trade in Elephant Products

Earlier in the year Chairman John Murphy of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee introduced H.R. 4685, a bill to provide for the control of the importing into, and the exporting from, the United States of elephants and elephant products. The bill authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to permit importation of elephant products only from nations actively managing and conserving elephant populations.

The Administration, while in sympathy with the intent of the bill, opposed H.R. 4685, largely because it was not certain that an elephant product import ban would actually help save elephants.

In response to Chairman Murphy's request that the State Department canvas its sources for African elephant range state views on the legislation and on the elephant conservation situation in general, we found division among countries on the question of whether H.R. 4685 would help conserve African elephants.

We found consensus on a couple other points. First, while range states appreciate our good intentions in seeking ways to assist them in controlling illegal trade in elephant products and generally regard the convention on trade in endangered species as useful, they do not have the financial wherewithal to build the wildlife management infrastructure sufficient to bring them into compliance with either the convention or what H.R. 4685 would do if enacted.

Secondly, approximately two-thirds of responding states were interested in various types of technical assistance, ranging from wildlife training programs and equipment supply to help with creating and managing national parks and wildlife reserves. One range state spokesman commented that developed countries do not seem to understand fully the expensive demands on developing countries' limited resources entailed by compliance with the convention. He urged priority attention by developed countries to increasing funds available to elephant range states for enforcement of their conservation and antipoaching laws and for training of the necessary wardens and other staff.

We cannot set standards for issuance of permits to countries if there is no visible means to achieve those standards. If we are going to continue to press poor countries to join the convention on trade in endangered species, we must find a way to marshal existing monies and personnel into projects that offer multiple benefits. A pooling of agency resources through an interagency coordinating mechanism might aid the Department of State and other Federal agencies in this difficult task.

Many of the African elephant range states are AID or Peace Corps countries. AID is developing a number of natural resource protection projects which will also aid the elephant and provide environmental training for host country personnel. The Peace Corps has environmental projects in over 30 countries. Approximately 200 volunteers are involved in forestry, soil conservation, and watershed protection. Approximately 20 Peace Corps volunteers are involved in wildlife management and another 200 in fisheries management. Perhaps 200 more are involved in various water supply and agricultural projects which are beneficial to wildlife habitat.

The African elephant is not the only African species threatened with extinction. As populations grow and

development increases, many more will disappear. The most feasible course would seem for the Federal Government, conservationists, and the Congress to turn away from single species approaches and work toward training wildlife and natural resource managers in regional centers such as the College of African Wildlife Management in Mweka, Tanzania, and the Wildlife School at Garoua, Cameroon. We must redouble efforts within the international organizations such as the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, the U.N. Development Program, the U.N. Environment Program, and the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization which are engaged in wildlife management and ecosystem protection efforts.

Future Needs

As mentioned above, the greatest present need is the protection of wildlife habitat. As this frequently puts wildlife needs in competition with people for agricultural land or resource development, solutions are not easy.

Depending upon the priority we in the United States are prepared to give to the protection of international wildlife, we should be able to extend additional help. It might be possible to coordinate better international activities of U.S. Government agencies with a view to protecting wildlife.

Greater use might possibly be made of Federal personnel assigned to temporary duty in countries which request training assistance. Sometimes agencies can spare someone for a 1 or 2 month assignment, when an entire year wouldn't be possible. Short training courses would double or triple the wildlife management expertise in many countries and help countries achieve the standards we might wish for them, in the process saving their resident wildlife from extirpation.

The Department of State does not have suggestions at this time for statutory changes that might facilitate our work. If we develop any suggestions, we will be glad to submit them for the record.■

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

NATO Ministers Meet

Secretary Vance departed Washington, D.C., December 9, 1979, to meet with officials in London (December 10), Paris (December 10–11), Rome (December 11), and Bonn (December 11–12). He then headed the U.S. delegation at a special meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers of NATO members (December 11–12) and at the regular semiannual session of the North Atlantic Council (December 13–14) in Brussels before returning to Washington on December 14.

Following are the Secretary's statement in the special meeting, the communique, a statement issued by Secretary Vance, and the text of a joint news conference by Secretary Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown on December 12 and Secretary Vance's statement in the North Atlantic Council on December 13 and the communique and Secretary Vance's news conference of December 14.

SECRETARY VANCE, SPECIAL MEETING, DEC. 12, 1979

The Foreign and Defense Ministers of NATO have just concluded a successful meeting of extraordinary importance. We have decided to proceed with a plan to deploy 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe. At the same time, we have decided to pursue vigorously with the Soviets a meaningful and equitable arms control agreement on long-range theater nuclear forces.

The far-reaching decisions we have made here attest to the determination and common purpose of NATO's member states. The 2 years of intensive consultations which led up to these decisions give evidence of the mutual trust that prevails in the alliance.

Before Secretary Brown discusses the details of the steps taken here to strengthen NATO's defense posture, I would like to sketch for you the political context of these decisions.

The Atlantic alliance is committed to a reduction of tensions between East and West. But our pursuit of detente, including balanced arms control agreements, must rest on a firm foundation of military security. Relaxation of tensions is possible only when each side has confidence in its own strength. Serious negotiations can only proceed when neither side doubts the will and capacities of the other. Steps to consolidate and strengthen NATO's collective defense thus are central not only to a secure deterrence of military threats; they also provide a basis for broader efforts to find a relaxation of tensions.

In a political as well as military sense, defense modernization and the pursuit of detente are twin paths along the road of security. In recent years, the Soviet Union has improved significantly its nuclear forces in Europe. The Soviet deployment of modern MIRVed SS–20s, and the Backfire bomber, threatens to provide the Soviets with nuclear preponderance in the European theater. In response, the alliance has developed parallel programs of modernization and arms control.

In deciding to deploy new long-range nuclear forces in Europe and to support the United States in its pursuit of a serious arms control agreement involving theater nuclear forces, the alliance is giving new meaning and force to its policy of deterrence, defense, and detente. Our deployment decision gives evidence of the continued vitality and cohesiveness of the alliance. This decision has strengthened our spirit as well as our forces, and it has conveyed the clear message that we define detente as a search for mutual and balanced, rather than unilateral, advantage.

In this context, we are prepared to enter into serious negotiations on long-range theater nuclear forces, within the framework of SALT III. Any agreement reached must—like SALT II—be balanced and adequately verifiable. We will not entertain any notion of a freeze which would confirm a Soviet preponderance in long-range nuclear forces in this theater. But we are prepared to negotiate an equitable agreement on U.S. and Soviet deployments of these systems at reduced levels. This would mean a reduction of the Soviet threat and a reduction in NATO's deployment program.

The modernization decision that we have made here also makes it possible for us to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe. In addition to this reduction, for each of these weapons we deploy, we will withdraw one existing weapon from Europe. Thus, far from increasing NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons, our

Visit of British Prime Minister Thatcher

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom made an official visit to the United States December 16–18, 1979. While in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 16–17), she met with President Carter and other government officials. Following is the text of the White House statement issued on December 18.[1]

The President met December 17 with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom. Prime Minister Thatcher is making an official visit to the United States, her first to this country as Prime Minister.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the exceptionally close relations between their two countries and discussed a number of key world issues which are of particular concern to both. These included the Iran crisis, the Rhodesia settlement, Middle East, Northern Ireland, theater nuclear force modernization and arms control, strategic cooperation, SALT, the comprehensive test ban talks, international economic issues and energy, common approaches to the Caribbean and aid to developing countries, trans-Atlantic defense trade, and bilateral economic and commercial issues.

The President expressed his appreciation and that of the entire American people for the United Kingdom's assistance and support in connection with the international effort to secure release of American hostages held by Iran in defiance of universally accepted standards of decency and law. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the principle of civilized behavior and the rule of law, vital to the whole world community, is at stake in the present crisis. The Prime Minister made it clear that Britain shared the anguish of America and would do its utmost to convince the Iranian authorities to release all the hostages unharmed.

The President congratulated the Prime Minister on her government's vigorous role in the Lancaster House negotiations and the potential these have for contributing to peace and stability in southern Africa. The Prime Minister expressed warm appreciation for the full support of the United States for an all-party solution to outstanding issues and its readiness to promote further progress in Rhodesia toward a fully democratic, independent state, within the framework of the arrangements agreed upon by the parties directly concerned.

The Prime Minister explained the British Government's recent political initiative in proposing a conference of the principal political parties in Northern Ireland with the aim of finding an acceptable way of giving the people of Northern Ireland more responsibility for their own affairs. Both leaders condemned support for organizations and individuals engaged directly or indirectly in campaigns of violence and agreed that such campaigns only delay the day when peace and reconciliation can come to Northern Ireland. The President reaffirmed U.S. policy concerning the tragic problem of Northern Ireland as set forth in this statement of August 1977.

In security matters directly affecting their two countries, the President and the Prime Minister: (1) applauded the decision taken last week by NATO governments to proceed with effective modernization and deployment of theater nuclear forces and with arms control proposals designed to reduce, on a basis of equality, nuclear weapons of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact; (2) agreed that the earliest possible ratification of the SALT II treaty would significantly contribute to a safer and more stable international security environment.

The President and Prime Minister agreed on the importance of maintaining a credible British strategic deterrent force and U.S.-U.K. strategic cooperation. The leaders agreed that their governments should continue their discussions of the most appropriate means of achieving these objectives for the future. In this connection the President and Prime Minister discussed the importance of increased efforts to strengthen NATO's defenses, both nuclear and conventional. The President reviewed the new U.S. 5-year defense plan, noting that in order to carry out that plan the United States will be increasing defense spending, in real terms, steadily over the next 5 years.

The President and Prime Minister reaffirmed their strong support for the NATO Long-Term Defense Program and for the NATO aim of 3% real growth in annual defense spending. The Prime Minister noted plans for further significant increases in the U.K. defense budget to improve the effectiveness of United Kingdom conventional forces, including provision of modernized equipment and reserves. The Prime Minister agreed that it was essential for America's European allies to share equitably in any collective defense buildup to meet the needs of the common defense.

During her visit to the United States, the Prime Minister is also meeting with Secretary of Defense Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Jones, and other senior defense officials; Members of Congress; Chairman Volcker of the Federal Reserve Board; U.N. Secretary General Waldheim, and the President of the U.N. General Assembly.

Prime Minister Thatcher invited the President to visit the United Kingdom at a mutually agreeable date, and the President accepted the invitation with pleasure. ■

Prime Minister Thatcher and President Carter.

(White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 24, 1979, which also contains President Carter's and Prime Minister Thatcher's exchange of remarks at the arrival ceremony and following a meeting on Dec. 17 and their toasts at the state dinner that evening.

U.S.-U.K. Atomic Energy Agreement

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, NOV. 28, 1979[1]

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, pursuant to Section 123d of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2153), the text of an amendment to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes of July 3, 1958, as amended, and my written approval, authorization and determination concerning the agreement. The joint classified and unclassified memoranda submitted to me by the Secretaries of Energy and Defense which provide a summary analysis of the amendment are also enclosed.

The amendment extends for five years (until December 31, 1984) those provisions which permit the transfer of nonnuclear parts, source, by-product special nuclear material and other material for nuclear weapons and special nuclear material for fueling military propulsion reactors.

In my judgement, the proposed amendment meets all statutory requirements. The United Kingdom intends to continue to maintain viable nuclear forces. In light of our previous close cooperation and the fact that the United Kingdom has committed its nuclear forces to NATO, I have concluded that it is in our security interest to continue to assist them in maintaining a credible nuclear force.

I have approved the amendment and authorized its execution and urge the Congress give it favorable consideration.

JIMMY CARTER

MEMORANDUMS FOR THE SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE AND ENERGY, NOV. 28, 1979[1]

Subject: Proposed Amendment to the US-UK Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes

I have reviewed your joint letter to me of November 2, 1979, recommending approval of a proposed Amendment to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. I note from your joint recommendation that the United Kingdom is participating with the United States pursuant to an international agreement by substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security. The proposed Amendment will permit cooperation which will further improve our mutual defense posture and be in support of NATO.

I hereby:

- Approve the program outlined in the proposed Amendment to the 1958 Agreement;
- Determine that cooperation under the proposed Amendment will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security; and
- Authorize the execution of the proposed Amendment for the Government of the United States in a manner specified by the Secretary of State.

JIMMY CARTER ■

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 3, 1979.

16th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, NOV. 28, 1979[1]

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 95–384, I am submitting the following report on progress made during the past 60 days towards the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.

In my last Cyprus report to the Congress, dated September 25, I noted that the recess in the intercommunal talks continues despite persistent and intensive efforts by UN Secretary General Waldheim and his staff to bring the two parties back to the conference table. I regret to report that in the intervening 60 days these efforts have still not borne fruit.

The United States shares the view that only sustained intercommunal talks can lead to a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem. We believe that the continuing good-offices efforts of the Secretary General are the most promising way to achieve a serious negotiation. I am pleased that our November 1978 proposals provided impetus for the current UN initiative. We have strongly supported that initiative since it began, and we shall continue to do so. In part due to our support, the Secretary General and his staff are making progress toward finding a formula on the basis of which the talks might resume.

The current session of the UN General Assembly is creating opportunities to explore avenues of progress on the Cyprus question. Secretary Vance had meetings with President Kyprianou in New York on September 26 and October 4. Other U.S. officials are in contact with principals in the Cyprus dispute, and with interested third parties, to prepare for the General Assembly debate on Cyprus. We hope that after the General Assembly completes its discussion of Cyprus, both sides will find it possible to resume the intercommunal negotiations. It is essential that they not allow the quest for short-term advantage to erode their mutual objective of finding a settlement which meets the basic needs of all people on the island.

The long and tortuous history of the Cyprus problem demonstrates that peaceful progress has never been easy. The obstacles, while formidable, are not insurmountable. We continue to believe that progress is achievable, and we are vigorously seeking it. Toward that end, we remain in close touch with all parties to the Cyprus dispute, the United Nations, our European allies, and other states which have a legitimate role to play and which desire to contribute to the achievement of our common goal.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER ■

[1] Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 3, 1979).

CORRECTION

In the November 1979 issue of the BULLETIN, page 35, the Secretary's statement on "U.S. Commitment to Western Europe," in the first paragraph, the last sentence should read: "The substantial forces we have deployed to Europe are one concrete evidence of that commitment." Through a typographical error, the word "one" was printed as "not."

southern Africa, the final bastion of colonialism.

• We have tried where we could to lower the level of East-West confrontation, but we have been prepared to respond vigorously to protect our interests.

While neither colonialism nor the cold war provides a single unifying *raison d'etre*, nonaligned movement members now discuss nearly every important international issue. At the recent Havana summit, for example, the nonaligned movement:

• Strongly supported liberation groups in Rhodesia and Namibia while pointing to the importance of efforts toward negotiated settlements;

• Was on record in favor of a political settlement of the Kampuchea problem, consistent with the principles of noninterference and withdrawal of foreign forces and also came down for humanitarian efforts to deal with the refugee and famine issues in Indochina;

• Was critical of U.S. policy in Latin America while rebuffing Castro's efforts to condemn the Rio pact and the Inter-American system;

• Condemned the Camp David agreements, thanks largely to Cuban intimidation and manipulation tactics at the summit. I might add that this decision was not sustained in a meeting of nonaligned Foreign Ministers a couple of weeks later in New York.

But while the nonaligned movement at Havana considered a broad range of international political questions, summit discussions of them have demonstrated a significant lack of consensus. In the post-Havana period, this lack of consensus has been even more notable; for example, the Havana declaration's position on the representation of Kampuchea was promptly revised by the U.N. General Assembly.

The key point I am trying to make is that none of these many issues has provided the movement with an effective replacement for colonialism or for the cold war as unifying themes.

The New International Economic Order

That leaves the movement with the economic issues—the new international economic order—as the cause which can again bring unity and results. But there are differences between decolonization and development as issues for confronting the industrialized world.

Anticolonialism involved a clearly identifiable opponent who accepted part of the nonaligned critique. The same is not true with respect to the new international economic order. Admittedly, it can be said—and it is being said—that so-called neocolonialism is the main evil. After all, the former colonialists who once controlled foreign territory continue to control much of the capital, resources, technology, and information which flow in international channels. The difficulties reside in the differences. In the case of colonialism, Western nations admitted to behavior in conflict with Western values. This ethical disjuncture engendered a feeling of guilt; and in fact, Western nations could neither legitimize nor hold on to their colonial empire—which in time, and in any event, they considered a burden, not an asset.

Over the issues where the battle is now joined, however, most in the West do not see any fundamental conflict between Western behavior and Western value systems. They, therefore, feel no sense of guilt. Moreover, unlike the case with colonialism, they believe that this time around the West is being asked to shed policies bringing it not weakness but ultimately strength. Consequently, while the West does not seek victory in the battle, it does not want to come out a loser. It, therefore, offers formulas for compromise and stresses mutual advantages. In this respect, although some portions of Fidel Castro's speech did stress mutual advantage, his recent U.N. call on the North to aid the South as an act of retribution for past sins represents for the North-South dialogue a dead end and a disservice. The call cannot be received because the language is not understood. Castro is trying to apply a strategy which brilliantly succeeded on one issue—colonialism—but which will inevitably fail on another—North-South relations.

Cumulative Impact of LDCs on Western Countries

Yet if all this is true, it is also incontestable that the Third World is much more important to U.S. security and welfare than it has ever been. In the past, less developed countries (LDCs) commanded superpower attention because they were weak and breeding grounds for East-West conflict. That concern remains and in some regions of the world even grows. But in addition, they now command attention because, collectively, they have on some issues more strength than before and are raising questions relevant to the West's own future economic welfare. Thus, many LDCs have acquired the capacity to affect international events in significant ways. Some of them, like Brazil, India, and Nigeria, have potentially preponderant regional influence because of location, population, and military power. Others, such as Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, have substantial oil power. Particularly, the countries in East Asia play major roles in international trade. There are, in short, new loci of political and military power in the Third World, and the cumulative impact of unified action in many areas is, at least on paper, considerable.

Yet, like us, the members of the nonaligned movement confront many contradictions in the foreign policy goals they pursue. Together with the need for unity, they share the importance of maintaining direct and responsive relationships with industrialized states for reasons that are economic, military, and political or a combination of all these. For example, some oil states have an indisputable ability to shake the foundations of the international financial system and wield considerable political influence in the Mideast and Persian Gulf regions. Yet they remain vulnerable to military attack from their neighbors, and their wealth depends on Western stability. They cannot act alone. For them, as for us, close bilateral and multilateral relationships are crucial to their security and economic viability.

These considerations underscore the compelling argument for some sort of world order vision which can replace the one we have lost. If neither the traditional powers nor the newly emerging centers of influence can impose their will on the others, nor survive without each other, then we need to strive for some common framework, some neutral understanding.

Yet it is not enough to underscore the mutuality of interests between the developing countries and the industrialized world. Nor is it enough to appeal to fear, since apocalyptic warnings, unless real and immediate, remain unconvincing. Rather we must patiently strive for common ground.

"Moderation"—Key Objective to World Order Politics

The objective of world order politics, to use Stanley Hoffman's phrase, must be "moderation plus"—neither Utopia nor resignation. Notwithstanding the disci-

pline it requires, we must begin with moderation. Rhetorical fulminations against the Third World are no more effective with them than their rhetorical excesses are with us. This is not to say that we should not expose rhetorical posturing when it takes place and adjust our bilateral relationship accordingly. Nor does it mean that the United States should not respond vigorously to countries that unfairly abuse or challenge our legitimate interests. If for no other reason than self-respect, that will be necessary. But we should not expect more from confrontation than it can yield. Even when we are forced to act vigorously, we should make clear that the U.S. bias is to return to moderation and dialogue.

If we can maintain moderation and provided that others maintain it too, then the "plus" we need can be introduced into the new global politics. That "plus" requires that we go beyond thinking of the current dilemma as an essentially North-South dichotomy or as a question of economics.

In a way, we have to go back to the drawing board and negotiate not about who gets what and who yields what but whether the rules which all in the end can accept can be applied more equitably to all the players.

Several examples come to mind which suggest that, in fact, we are—with the Third World—haltingly doing precisely that already. In recent months and even days, the United States has joined, and is participating in, international conferences and negotiations which specifically deal with the equitable application of the rules of access to global wealth, resources, and power.

The Law of the Sea negotiations, the Vienna Conference on Science and Technology for Development convened by the United Nations, and the World Administrative Radio Conference, now in process in Geneva, each deal with this issue. In each of these fora, delegations and negotiating teams are confronting extremely difficult challenges in devising international regimes which regulate access and utilization of global resources.

In all of the debates on equity of access and utilization of the global commons, sides have been drawn along pluralistic lines. Across the board, the problem has been whittled down to one basic point—after the consensus is reached on objectives, are the rules of the game being fairly applied?

System of Rules

This has been in almost every instance the crux of the negotiating process. In every case, we have supported a strict policy of rule-adherence, where they already existed, and rulemaking, when they did not, as the basis for negotiation. We have defended or sought fair and impartial rules.

In all these questions of equitable access and sharing, we, for our part, have maintained that it is inherently unfair for the developing countries to share in the proceeds without sharing in the effort according to their abilities. The developing countries in turn have maintained that they cannot accept a system under which they may share in the benefits but do not share in the operation and management.

So for all practical purposes, "charity" is out, but common interest is in, as it should be where one is negotiating over "rules" which must rest on common interest and not "relief" which must develop from shared compassion.

In the Law of the Sea negotiations, we see the operative example of how this new system of rules may work, where developed and developing nations have exhausted debate and have gotten down to compromise. The product is a relatively strong model of co-

95 MEMBERS OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT

Afghanistan
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Cuba
Cyprus
Djibouti
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Grenada
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Jordan
Kampuchea
Kenya
Korea (North)
Kuwait
Laos
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Peru
Qatar
Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Syria
Tanzania
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Uganda
United Arab Emirates
Upper Volta
Vietnam
Yemen (Aden)
Yemen (Sana)
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia

African National Congress
Palestine Liberation Organization
Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe
South West Africa People's Organization

pansion. We are studying the possibility of further agreements on expanded trade with both traditional and newer trade partners, including China. I look forward to working with the Congress on ways we can continue to improve our trading position which, in turn, will help maintain a prosperous American economy.

. . . .

II. CREATING ENERGY SECURITY

Since I took office, my highest legislative priorities have involved the development of our Nation's first comprehensive energy policy. The struggle to achieve that policy has been difficult for all of us, but the accomplishments of the past three years leave no doubt that our country is finally serious about the problems caused by our overdependence on foreign oil. The accomplishments can be lost, however, and the progress stopped, if we fail to move forward even further this year. There is no single panacea that will solve our energy crisis. We must rely on and encourage multiple forms of production—coal, crude oil, natural gas, solar, nuclear, synthetics—and conservation.

It is therefore essential that Congress enact the major energy bills I proposed last year; and their enactment will be my most immediate and highest legislative priority this year.

. . . .

III. ENHANCING BASIC HUMAN AND SOCIAL NEEDS

. . . .

Refugees

In 1979 my Administration made significant progress in resolving a number of problems arising from the increase in refugees. Last March, I proposed comprehensive refugee legislation, and I regard its passage as a high priority this year. The legislation—which is the first comprehensive reform of our refugee immigration and domestic resettlement policies in twenty-eight years—will bring common sense and cohesion to an unnecessarily fragmented approach to international and domestic refugee needs. Under vigorous new leadership, the Office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, which I created last year, will aggressively address the needs of refugees at home and abroad. We will also encourage greater cooperation with the private sector and other actions to ensure successful refugee resettlement.

. . . .

VI. PROTECTING AND DEVELOPING OUR NATURAL RESOURCES

. . . .

AGRICULTURE

Agricultural Progress

While much work remains to be done, America's agriculture is by far the best in the world. Efforts made by my Administration, in cooperation with Congress, to secure economic stability for the farmer, have produced results.

In 1979, we experienced another record year for farm production. Net farm income jumped to $32 billion in 1979, a $4 billion increase over 1978. Agricultural exports also reached new highs, rising 18% in 1979 to $32 billion. Despite the suspension of exports to the Soviet Union, we can expect a continued healthy export picture for our Nation's farmers.

Last year the Secretary of Agriculture travelled around the country and conducted an extraordinarily detailed and creative dialogue with the Nation's farmers. He obtained invaluable suggestions on economic and social issues concerning farm life; as we prepare our farm program for this year and beyond, the advice of our Nation's farmers will clearly be reflected in the policies we develop with the Congress.

Soviet Grain Suspension

In response to the Soviet armed invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve, I took several actions to demonstrate our Nation's resolve to resist such hostile acts of aggression against a sovereign, independent nation. One of the most important of these actions was the suspension of grain sales to the Soviet Union beyond the 8 million tons provided under our 1975 grains agreement. The Soviet Union had intended to purchase an estimated 25 million tons of U.S. wheat and feed grains. Thus, the suspension of sales above the 8 million ton agreement level is expected to result in the freeing of about 17 million tons.

My decision to suspend these sales was a difficult one, but a necessary one. We could not continue to do business as usual with the Soviet Union while it is invading an independent, sovereign nation in an area of the world of strategic importance to the United States. I am fully committed to a policy of promoting international trade, and particularly the expanded export of U.S. agricultural products. I am proud of my Administration's record in this regard. Because of the aggressive efforts of American farmers and businessmen, working in cooperation with Federal representatives, and the provision of new authorities by Congress, we have set new trade export records in each of the past 3 years. Even with the Soviet suspension, we intend to set still another record in the coming year. In making my decisions on the suspension, I believed it would be unfair to ask the American farmer to bear a greater share of the burden and sacrifice than their fellow Americans were asked to bear. Farmers should not be penalized simply because they are part of an agricultural machine that is of growing strategic importance in the world.

To protect American farmers from the price depressing effects of the grain suspension, I directed the Secretary of Agriculture to take several actions:

- The Commodity Credit Corporation will assume the contractual obligations for grain previously committed for shipment to the Soviet Union.
- The Department of Agriculture, acting through the Commodity Credit Corporation, will purchase wheat contracted for export to the Soviet Union for the purpose of forming an emergency international wheat reserve. In this connection, I will propose legislation authorizing release of this wheat for international aid purposes.
- To encourage farmers to place additional grain in the farmer-held grain reserve, the Secretary of Agriculture has made several modifications in that important program.
- The Commodity Credit Corporation will purchase corn at the local level to alleviate the congestion within the transportation system caused by the refusal of the International Longshoremen's Association to load grain up to the 8 million metric ton level.

In combination, these actions are expected to isolate from the market an amount of grain equivalent to that not shipped to the Soviet Union, thereby avoiding a decline in grain prices. I am pleased to report that these actions are having the desired results and that American farmers are being protected from the effects of the suspension.

If further actions are necessary to insure that American agriculture does not bear a disproportionately large share of the burden associated with this action, I will not hesitate to take them.

. . . .

International Emergency Wheat Reserve

The Congress has not yet acted on the proposal I made in the last Session to create an International Emergency Wheat Reserve. This reserve of up to 4 million tons of wheat would be used to assure recipient nations that we will meet our international food aid commitments. The suspension of further grain sales to the Soviet Union provides an appropriate opportunity to provide this authority, and thereby establish guidelines for the release of wheat now being acquired by the Commodity Credit Corporation.

FOREIGN POLICY

From the time I assumed office three years ago this month, I have stressed the need for this country to assert a leading role in a world undergoing the most extensive and intensive change in human history.

My policies have been directed in particular at three areas of change:

- the steady growth and increased projection abroad of Soviet military power—power that has grown faster than our own over the past two decades.
- the overwhelming dependence of Western nations, which now increasingly includes the United States, on vital oil supplies from the Middle East.
- the pressures of change in many nations of the developing world, including the year old revolution in Iran and uncertainty about the future in many other countries.

As a result of those fundamental facts, we face some of the most serious challenges in the history of this Nation. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a threat to global peace, to East-West relations, and to regional stability and to the flow of oil. As the unprecedented and overwhelming vote in the General Assembly demonstrated, countries across the world—and particularly the non-aligned—regard the Soviet invasion as a threat to their independence and security. Turmoil within the region adjacent to the Persian Gulf poses risks for the security and prosperity of every Western nation and thus for the entire global economy. The continuing holding of American hostages in Iran is both an affront to civilized people everywhere, and a serious impediment to meeting the self-evident threat to widely-shared common interests—including those of Iran.

But as we focus our most urgent efforts on pressing problems, we will continue to pursue the benefits that only change can bring. For it always has been the essence of America that we want to move on—we understand that prosperity, progress and most of all peace cannot be had by standing still. A world of nations striving to preserve their independence, and of peoples aspiring for economic development and political freedom, is not a world hostile to the ideals and interests of the United States. We face powerful adversaries, but we have strong friends and dependable allies. We have common interests with the vast majority of the world's nations and peoples.

There have been encouraging developments in recent years, as well as matters requiring continued vigilance and concern:

- Our alliances with the world's most advanced and democratic states from Western Europe through Japan are stronger than ever.
- We have helped to bring about a dramatic improvement in relations between Egypt and Israel and an historic step towards a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement.
- Our relations with China are growing closer, providing a major new dimension in our policy in Asia and the world.
- And across southern Africa from Rhodesia to Namibia we are helping with the peaceful transition to majority rule in a context of respect for minority as well as majority rights.

The central challenge for us today is to our steadfastness of purpose. We are no longer tempted by isolationism. But we must also learn to deal effectively with the concentration of the world—the need to cooperate with potential adversaries without euphoria, without undermining our determination to compete with such adversaries and if necessary confront the threats they may pose to our security.

We face a broad range of threats and opportunities. We have and should continue to pursue a broad range of defense, diplomatic and economic capabilities and objectives.

I see five basic goals for America in the world over the 1980s:

- First, we will continue, as we have over the past three years, to build America's military strength and that of our allies and friends. Neither the Soviet Union nor any other nation will have reason to question our will to sustain the strongest and most flexible defense forces.
- Second, we will pursue an active diplomacy in the world, working—together with our friends and allies—to resolve disputes through peaceful means and to make any aggressor pay a heavy price.
- Third, we will strive to resolve pressing international economic problems—particularly energy and inflation—and continue to pursue our still larger objective of global economic growth through expanded trade and development assistance.
- Fourth, we will continue vigorously to support the process of building democratic institutions and improving human rights protection around the world. We are deeply convinced that the future lies not with dictatorship but democracy.
- Fifth, we remain deeply committed to the process of mutual and verifiable arms control, particularly to the effort to prevent the spread and further development of nuclear weapons. Our decision to defer, but not abandon our efforts to secure ratification of the SALT II Treaty reflects our firm conviction that the United States has a profound national security interest in the constraints on Soviet nuclear forces which only that treaty can provide.

Continuing close cooperation between the Congress and the Executive Branch will be required to achieve these goals. My most immediate legislative priorities include:

Exports of agricultural and industrial goods grew by an unparalleled $35 billion, reaching a level of $180 billion. This represented an increase of 25% over exports in 1978.

Deputy Secretary Christopher Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher was interviewed on CBS's "Face the Nation" on January 6, 1980, by George Herman, CBS News (moderator); Marvin Kalb, CBS News; and Henry Trewhitt, Baltimore Sun.

Q. I think the question that almost every American is asking himself or herself today, reading the headlines about Soviet denunciations of President Carter and American sanctions, if you like, against the Soviet Union, is are we now embarking on a second cold war?

A. I don't think it is very helpful to use terms like that. We are in a period of making a strong response to what we regard as an extraordinary event. You have to consider the degree of the aggression of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan. They go in with 50,000 troops, they are involved in wiping out the head of the country, they install a puppet regime, they are bearing down on the Moslem minority. This is the kind of an event that calls for the strong response that President Carter has made.

We will have to see in the future how U.S.-Soviet relations work out. I don't think it is time to pronounce the death of detente, but I think we need to deal with an important and serious reality for America.

Q. In your first answer, you said we will have to wait and see in the future what our relations with the Soviet Union are going to be. That sort of brings to mind the idea that you feel it is a temporary situation—this crisis over Afghanistan. If we have this embargo on grain and all these other things afoot, what will it take on the Soviet Union's part to end it? What is the minimum Soviet action which will stop this threat of a second cold war?

A. Let me respond to that by telling you what our goals are. We are determined to show the Soviet Union that their aggression into Afghanistan is not without considerable cost to them. We are also determined to make it clear to them that any subsequent event of the same kind will be subject to very severe penalties.

Now, if we can make those points, then the Soviet response will, I think, determine what our relationship will be with them in the future.

Q. Isn't there some danger, however, that if you simply withdraw these sanctions after the Soviet Union has consolidated its position in Afghanistan, that you will be seen in something of the ambivalent position you have in the past as with the combat brigade in Cuba, that sort of thing?

A. We don't intend to set any time for withdrawing the sanctions. I think one of the lessons coming out of the Czechoslovakia crisis is that the response needs to be determined and of considerable duration. When I was in Europe last week, I was struck by the number of officials there who had gone through the Czech crisis and who regretted the fact that their response was of such short duration. I think we need to be determined and persistent here.

Q. Could you—pointing out this West European possible allied response—could you point out for us what you expect, what you have worked out with the European allies?

A. We are in the early stages of that. But there are a number of things we do expect. First, we expect our allies will not move in to supply the grain that we are denying to the Soviet Union.

Q. That is Canada, Australia, Argentina.

A. That is Canada, Australia, and any of the other European countries which may have some grain stocks which could be substituted for ours.

Second, I think we expect them to terminate their aid programs for Afghanistan. It is one thing to aid a nonaligned country; it is quite another thing to aid a puppet regime of the Soviet Union.

We expect them to take some action with respect to their diplomatic representation. We also expect them to take actions which are somewhat parallel to ours in the economic field. Every country will have to do what it can do best. For example, I would expect some of the countries there to deny export credits that they have been giving in the past.

Now we are in the early stages of working through this kind of a response. The United States took a long step when President Carter announced his program on last Friday; the NATO group will be meeting this week to consider what actions they will take in response. In my meetings with our NATO allies, I am sure that they are as concerned about this action of the Soviet Union as we are, and I expect their response to be determined and firm.

Q. What about the French? There have been reports that the French really don't see it quite the same way that the United States does.

A. I will have to see it as that develops. In the comparable situation in Iran, France has been very supportive of the United States, and I didn't see any difference in talking with my French colleague as to his analysis of the gravity of the Soviet step. Everyone recognizes that it is a new departure in Soviet policy.

Q. The American position regarding the Olympic games is unclear to me. Now I see the Saudis have withdrawn from the games next summer. What is the United States really recommending in that regard? Are you considering withdrawing support of the games, recommending voluntary nonparticipation by Americans? What is the American position?

A. First let me comment on the Saudi reaction which I think is very interesting here. We have a leading Moslem country feeling so strongly about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that they are pulling out of the Olympic games.

Our position is the one stated by President Carter on Friday night. We would much prefer to be able to go to the Olympic games, but the aggressive behavior of the Soviet Union puts at some risk both the athletes and the fact that individuals will be going to the Soviet Union. So we have not reached a decision on that subject. It is under review and will continue to be.

Q. On the question of SALT, which is of interest to a lot of people, the Administration tried so hard to complete the process of negotiating SALT. You went to the Congress, held up in the Senate Afghanistan, and suddenly you are pulling back and shelving it for the time being. At the same time, it is made very clear that we are going to abide by the terms of the treaty as it was negotiated and it seems why the ratification process, in a sense? But why stick with the terms?

A. Under international law, a country is obligated to stick to the terms of a treaty that has been negotiated and which is in the process of ratification. We intend to do that for our part. But we also intend to keep our eye on the Soviet Union, and if we find some deviation from the terms of SALT II on their part, then, of course, we will be in quite a different position ourselves.

Q. Listening to your answers earlier to what our intentions were on this Soviet-Afghanistan incursion or invasion, you said we wanted to show that such an action was not without cost to them, that it would incur very severe penalties.

It sounds—now correct me if I am not getting the diplomatic language exactly right—it sounds as though what this means is you do not expect our actions to roll back the Soviet action, you just are trying to say that any future actions of this kind will be expensive.

A. No. We hope both.

Q. Realistically?

A. We hope both. We hope that they will roll back their actions in Afghanistan, and we hope to make the point that any consequent actions of that same kind will incur very heavy penalties.

Q. You also said—I just am trying to clear up a few loose ends on this very opening point, I asked about the cold war. You said it is too early to call it that, yet you quoted various diplomats who regretted our response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was so brief, and it sounds to me a little bit as though you are hinting that our reaction at this time, or displeasure, should be longer.

A. I would not think our reaction will be a brief one this time. I don't expect to go back to business as usual with the Soviet Union for some time to come. We have taken severe actions in this country. It will result in a loss to the Soviet Union of 17 million tons of grain this year, 360,000 tons of fish, a good deal of high technology. Those are strong actions. We intend to carry them out for long enough so that the Soviet Union incurs some cost for this really quite unprecedented action that they have taken in moving into Afghanistan.

Q. I wonder if I could get into this area. Did you have intelligence before the Russians moved in that they would do such a thing?

A. We knew that there was a buildup across the border of Soviet troops. And we have been warning, backgrounding, talking about this prospect for some time. But until they flew in the 250 planes in a 30-hour period, of course, we didn't know that they were going to do that. Indeed, there had been some signs that they were going to shore up the Amin regime, but when they flew in the 250 planes, when they went across the border with two divisions, then, of course, we had an entirely new situation on our hands.

Q. What I am trying to get at really—that suggests surprise by the dimension of the Soviet action, the boldness of it. What about our intelligence? There has been a problem with that in the past, expressed by the President himself concerning Iran, and I am wondering if the same problem is not manifest here. In talking to your colleagues, I find that they were taken quite by surprise by the boldness of this Soviet action. Isn't that in itself worse?

A. I think we ought to recognize that this is the first time since World War II that the Soviet Union has used its troops outside the Warsaw bloc. Now the very audacity of that move is one that caused us to be taken aback. We didn't think the Soviet Union would take such a great risk, and, having taken it, I think we are determined to respond in a way that is commensurate with the risk.

Q. That leads directly to the question of why they were willing to take that risk. Do you think they felt that the United States had become, in order to borrow a phrase from the past, "a pitiful, helpless giant" and simply would not react in a substantive way?

A. It is very hard to speculate about Soviet intentions. I do not think we are a weak or pitiful giant in any respect. As a matter of fact, I think our country's military posture is a good deal stronger than it was when we came into office 3 years ago with the strengthening of NATO, with the cruise missile, and the other defense steps that we have taken.

There are a number of reasons why the Soviet Union might have done what they did. They might be in Afghanistan for a specific reason, or there might be reasons that extend beyond.

Q. Which is it?

A. I don't think anybody knows at the present time, but I think the United States has to be ready for either one of the alternatives.

Q. —put it the other day in terms of the steppingstone. He said the Afghan action was a steppingstone toward some broader strategic aim.

A. I think we believe it could be a steppingstone to some broader aim, perhaps to their historic interest in a warm water port, perhaps to their interest in oil.

Q. Do you see this as an effort by perhaps a new group within the Kremlin, a new hard faction? There are some of your intelligence people who talk about the rise once again of Mikhail Suslov to greater prominence in the Politburo. Is this possible to explain what the Russians have done?

A. I wouldn't want to get into factions. This was an action taken by the Soviet Government. They have the responsibility for it. I wouldn't want to get into a good-guys, bad-guys situation within the Soviet Government. They are responsible as a government.

Q. That leads in turn again to the question about their objectives in Pakistan, which is a neighbor that clearly feels threatened. How far is the United States prepared to go in setting aside its concern over the development of nuclear weapons in Pakistan in order to help the Pakistanis rearm?

A. We retain our concern over the development of nuclear weapons there. Our nuclear nonproliferation policy is one of our important policies. On the other hand, it is only one of the tenets of our foreign policy. This is an exceptional situation and we will be prepared to help the [Pakistanis] in this exceptional situation if they do desire.

Q. Do they so desire? Are you in communication with them on this?

A. We are in communication with them and I think the next week or two will give us an opportunity to indicate how we and to what extent we will be helpful to the [Pakistanis].

Q. Would you have to balance aid to Pakistan with some kind of aid to India, or some help, something to keep from tilting as the previous Administration once said?

A. We are determined to maintain relations with India, but India ought to see the action of the Soviet Union as a threat to India as well as the other countries in the region. After all, India—

Q. Do you see signs that they do?

A. I see signs that some elements of the government do. They are in the process of an election campaign. I think we will have a fuller response for them after the campaign.

Q. I would like to ask you about China and Defense Secretary Brown's visit there. There has been speculation that the United States, while not in any sense choosing at this point to establish a military relationship with the People's Republic of China, is not beyond considering with Peking the possibility of stationing radar facilities in

decisions will result in a significant reduction in the size of NATO's overall nuclear stockpile in Europe.

Our willingness to enter into negotiations on theater nuclear forces in the SALT framework is but one of a comprehensive set of arms control initiatives which the alliance is now developing. Mutual and balanced force reductions and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are other negotiations which the alliance members are pursuing with equal vigor.

The political effects of the decisions taken here today are considerable. Faced with a real challenge to the security of Western Europe, the alliance has reacted decisively, prudently, and in a way that invites the pursuit of arms control initiatives. I believe that our governments can be proud of this memorable achievement, and that the free peoples of the alliance will show overwhelming support for the decisions made here today.

COMMUNIQUE, SPECIAL MEETING, DEC. 12, 1979[1]

1. At a Special Meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers in Brussels on 12 December 1979:

2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 Summit where governments expressed the political resolve to meet the challenges to their security posed by the continuing momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up.

3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe. This situation has been especially aggravated over the last few years by Soviet decisions to implement programs modernizing and expanding their long-range nuclear capability substantially. In particular, they have deployed the SS–20 missile, which offers significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, which has a much better performance than other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theater role. During this period, while the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in LRTNF [long-range theater nuclear forces] both quantitatively and qualitatively, Western capabilities have remained static. Indeed these forces are increasing in age and vulnerability and do not include land-based, long-range theater nuclear missile systems.

4. At the same time, the Soviets have also undertaken a modernization and expansion of their shorter-range TNF [theater nuclear forces] and greatly improved the overall quality of their conventional forces. These developments took place against the background of increasing Soviet inter-continental capabilities and achievement of parity in inter-continental capability with the United States.

5. These trends have prompted serious concern within the Alliance, because, if they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theater nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in inter-continental systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression.

6. Ministers noted that these recent developments require concrete actions on the part of the Alliance if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to remain credible. After intensive considerations, including the merits of alternative approaches, and after taking note of the positions of certain members, Ministers concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance would best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization and arms control.

7. Accordingly Ministers have decided to modernize NATO's LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of US ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing US Pershing I-A, and 464 GLCM [ground-launched cruise missiles], all with single warheads. All the nations currently participating in the integrated defense structure will participate in the program: the missiles will be stationed in selected countries, and certain support costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. The program will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons. In this connection, Ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF modernization, 1,000 US nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. Further, Ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level, which necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges. In addition they noted with satisfaction that the Nuclear Planning Group [NPG] is undertaking an examination of the precise nature, scope, and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armor as a whole. This examination will form the basis of a substantive report to NPG Ministers in the Autumn of 1980.

8. Ministers attach great importance to the role of arms control in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West and in advancing the process of detente. This is reflected in a broad set of initiatives being examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and detente in the 1980's. They regard arms control as an integral part of the Alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member states and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcome the contribution which the SALT II treaty makes towards achieving these objectives.

9. Ministers consider that, building on this accomplishment and taking account of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of concern to NATO, arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain US and Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems. This would reflect previous Western suggestions to include such Soviet and US systems in arms control negotiations and more recent expressions by Soviet President Brezhnev of willingness to do so. Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the USSR to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the Alliance:

A. Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems.

B. Limitations on US and Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on US and Soviet land-based long-range theater nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of *de jure* equality both in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.

10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted within the Alliance to support the US negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defense Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations at their semi-annual meetings.

11. The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defense and thus maintain the security of its member states. A modernization decision, including a commitment to deployments, is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defense needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet build-up can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF modernization requirements, and promote stability and detente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defense and detente as enunciated in the Harmel Report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, DEC. 12, 1979[2]

The Foreign and Defense Ministers of NATO have just concluded a successful meeting of extraordinary importance.

We have decided to proceed with a plan to deploy 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe. At the same time, we have decided to pursue vigorously with the Soviets a meaningful and equitable arms control agreement on long-range theater nuclear forces.

The far-reaching decisions we have made here attest to the determination and common purpose of NATO's member states. The 2 years of intensive consultations which led up to these decisions give evidence of the mutual trust that prevails in the alliance.

Before Secretary Brown discusses the details of the steps taken here to strengthen NATO's defense posture, I would like to sketch for you the political context of these decisions.

The Atlantic alliance is committed to a reduction of tensions between East and West. But our pursuit of detente, including balanced arms control agreements, must rest on a firm foundation of military security.

Relaxation of tensions is possible only when each side has confidence in its own strength. Serious negotiations can only proceed when neither side doubts the will and capacities of the other. Steps to consolidate and strengthen NATO's collective defense thus are central not only to a secure deterrence of military threats; they also provide a basis for broader efforts to find a relaxation of tensions. In a political as well as military sense, defense modernization and the pursuit of detente are twin paths along the road of security.

In recent years, the Soviet Union has improved significantly its nuclear forces in Europe. The Soviet deployment of modern MIRVed SS–20s, and the Backfire bomber, threatens to provide the Soviets with nuclear preponderance in the European theater. In response, the alliance has developed parallel programs of modernization and arms control.

In deciding to deploy new long-range nuclear forces in Europe and to support the United States in its pursuit of a serious arms control agreement involving theater nuclear forces, the alliance is giving new meaning and force to its policy of deterrence, defense, and detente. Our deployment decision gives evidence of the continued vitality and cohesiveness of the alliance.

This decision has strengthened our spirit as well as our forces, and it has conveyed the clear message that we define detente as a search for mutual and balanced, rather than unilateral, advantage.

In this context, we are prepared to enter into serious negotiations on long-range theater nuclear forces, within the framework of SALT III. Any agreement reached must—like SALT II—be balanced and adequately verifiable.

We will not entertain any notion of a freeze which would confirm a Soviet preponderance in long-range nuclear forces in this theater. But we are prepared to negotiate an equitable agreement on U.S. and Soviet deployments of these systems at reduced levels. This would mean a reduction of the Soviet threat and a reduction in NATO's deployment program.

The modernization decision that we have made here also makes it possible for us to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe. In addition to this reduction, for each of these weapons we deploy, we will withdraw one existing weapon from Europe. Thus, far from increasing NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons, our decisions will result in a significant reduction in the size of NATO's overall nuclear stockpile in Europe.

Our willingness to enter into negotiations on theater nuclear forces in the SALT framework is but one of a comprehensive set of arms control initiatives which the alliance is now developing. Mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) are other negotiations which the alliance members are pursuing with equal vigor.

The political effects of the decisions taken here today are considerable. Faced with a real challenge to the security of Western Europe, the alliance has reacted decisively, prudently, and in a way that invites the pursuit of arms control initiatives. I believe that our governments can be proud of this memorable achievement and that the free peoples of the alliance will show overwhelming support for the decisions made here today.

SECRETARIES VANCE AND BROWN, NEWS CONFERENCE, DEC. 12, 1979

Secretary Vance: I think you've all got a copy—and if you haven't got it, you'll get it shortly—of a short press statement which I have issued. I'd like to say a few words of introduction and then Harold and I would be glad to answer any of your questions.

As you know from your meeting with the Secretary General, the Foreign and Defense Ministers have just concluded a successful meeting of extraordinary importance. We decided at that meeting that we would go forward with the program to modernize our long-range nuclear theater forces. And at the same time we decided to pursue vigorously our program for arms control agreement in the long-range nuclear theater forces area with the Soviet Union. As you know, the subject has been under study for approximately 2 years now, and the recommendations of the two study groups made their presentations to the group today and the final decision was taken. The decision, I think it is important to note, was a unanimous decision on the part of the alliance to go forward with the program.

Q. Did you bring up the subject of the Iran crisis at any point in the proceedings? What did you ask of the alliance and what response did you get?

Secretary Brown: It didn't come up today in the joint meeting between Defense and Foreign Ministers. I did raise it this morning with the Defense Ministers, and it was along the same line that Secretary Vance has been speaking to, and I'll let him answer it.

Secretary Vance: It will be coming up again tomorrow morning in the meeting which we are going to be having, and I will be reporting to the Council on the situation in Iran. It will be taken up in restricted session, and we will have a discussion of the Iran issue, and in my judgment we will probably issue a statement of the 15 nations, as 15 nations—not as NATO but as 15 nations.

Q. Could you comment on the restrictions made by the Dutch and the Belgian Governments on the installation and the difficulties for the decision to go on with the production of the new arms?

Secretary Brown: First, I would say that the decision was a very successful one in deciding to respond to Soviet modernization and increased deployments of its theater nuclear forces; that the agreement provides a solid basis for the United States to proceed with production of the missiles. The agreement did call for that, and you will recall that President Carter has insisted that if the United States is to

National Security and U.S.-Soviet Relations

by Matthew Nimetz

Address at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, on November 19, 1979. Mr. Nimetz is Counselor for the Department of State.

Forty years ago, Winston Churchill—in a now famous piece of rhetoric—described the Soviet Union as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." He spoke, of course, before the creation of a wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and Great Britain and the United States, before the detonation of the first nuclear device, before the onset of the cold war and the division of much of the world between East and West, before the Cuban missile crisis, before the era of detente, and before the SALT process.

Our relations with the Soviet Union have undergone much change in the intervening years, punctuated with major developments and occasional crises, but the aura of mystery and unpredictability still remains. Both sides have yet to arrive at a common understanding of each other, much less a common approach to participating in the wider international environment.

That this should be so is not a reflection upon the wisdom or skills of the officials who have managed our bilateral relations in the past decades. There has been no lack of desire to carve out a peaceful and productive relationship with the Soviet Union, but we remain, however, two nations with fundamentally different points of view. Our moral values, social beliefs, and economic systems are very different. Our approach to international problem areas is often widely divergent. Our perceptions of the strategic military balance are probably quite dissimilar. Our approach to the Third World, to development issues, to the creation of a harmonious approach to North-South questions is not the same and often intensely competitive. Our methods of formulating foreign policy—including the assimilation of domestic viewpoints—are notably different. And our relationship often is influenced by developments in the international environment which neither country can control.

In large part the differences between our two countries are inescapable, and we must recognize that our bilateral relationship must reflect the fact that we are dealing with a nation and a set of leaders whose background and principles and sense of national interests are very different from our own. The frustration and disappointment that sometimes accompany the periodic setbacks in our dealings with the Soviet Union are understandable; but we should not despair that overall progress cannot be made. We should continue to seek out those areas of accommodation that are possible while accepting the fact that the Soviet leadership will measure progress in our relations by a yardstick of their own construction.

It has historically been true that the United States and the Soviet Union have had only very few areas of contact. Our genesis as a nation was primarily in Western Europe, and our ties to that continent have traditionally been close and fruitful. Russia, on the other hand, on the periphery of Europe, retained a powerful tie to native Slavic and Central Asian traditions and culture that were untouched by the Renaissance and only superficially affected by 17th and 18th century humanism. The physical breadth and wealth of our two nations insured a degree of insularity to our two societies. We are both continental nations; the United States being surrounded by two oceans, and Russia being separated from major Western European centers by vast distances with uncertain communication.

Consequently, trade between our two countries has historically been very slight. Prior to 1917, our interests in terms of global developments centered on different portions of the world. Cultural developments and industrialization took place in each country largely independent of developments in the other. Perhaps most importantly, we developed a system of government that drew upon principles of individual liberty, representative government, and the subservience of the state to its citizens—all markedly different from the historical and cultural determinants that shaped the character of czarist rule and the Government of the Soviet Union.

National Security

Thus, the historical background alone should caution us against being too sanguine about the degree to which the interests and attitudes of our two nations can be closely reconciled. We shall continue to remain fundamentally opposed on a variety of important issues. What has changed in the last four decades is not the degree to which the world views of the United States and the Soviet Union have converged but the number of areas in which our direct interests have intersected and occasionally clashed.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the field of national security. We have entered a world since 1945 in which the growing arsenals of both countries and the revolutionary change brought about by the development of nuclear weapons has made it impossible for us to ignore the potential challenges of Soviet military power. Dealing with this new factor in the U.S.-Soviet equation is perhaps the central foreign policy problem we face today. How we respond to the fact that the Soviet Union has at last emerged as a global military force, with all the political and diplomatic consequences that stem from that development, will influence the course of our international policies for some time to come and profoundly affect the character, the stability, and even the continuation of the entire international order.

Until recently, the military forces of the Soviet Union were largely oriented toward territorial defense and control of the Eastern European members of the Warsaw Pact. The U.S.S.R. has always maintained a large standing army, but these combat forces were trained and equipped primarily to fight in defense of the homeland or on the periphery of the Soviet Union. Similarly, until the present decade, the Soviet Navy lacked a significant ocean-going capability, concentrating instead upon the deployment of smaller craft designed for coastal purposes. The Soviet Air Force, although impressive in many areas, was largely made up of tactical interceptors, and the U.S.S.R. has never emphasized the development of a significant intercontinental bomber force.

Beginning in the 1960s, the leadership of the Soviet Union began a major, sustained campaign to improve Soviet military capabilities across the board. Real increases were made in the Soviet defense budget on the order of 3% every year. Significant resources

were funneled into an extensive program of military research and development. New weapons were acquired and eventually assigned to combat units.

As a result, major changes have taken place in the power and sophistication of the Soviet military establishment. New generations of ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], equipped with multiple warheads, have gradually been introduced into the Soviet rocket forces. The Soviet Air Force has greatly expanded its ability to strike deep within an adversary's territory and carry out naval strike and interdiction roles. The Soviet Navy has now become a truly "blue water" force, capable of operating in all oceans of the planet and confronting us for the first time with a significant danger of interference with vital western sea lines of communication.

Why the Soviet leadership has chosen to emphasize military strength at a time when the Soviet economy is having great difficulty in meeting even the most basic domestic needs is unknown to us. Given the bitter differences in views among Marxist states and parties—among the Soviet bloc, China, Yugoslavia, Albania, and the Euro-Communists—it is hard to believe that the leaders of the Kremlin still pursue the dream of Lenin and Trotsky to subjugate the world under the unified rule of a Russian-based Communist dictatorship. To rational men those goals must long have perished as the ideological appeal of the Soviet Union has steadily diminished throughout the world. Whatever the motive, it seems obvious to us that the extent and degree of this Soviet military buildup is far in excess of what is reasonably required to protect the basic security interests of the Soviet people.

We should bear in mind that our definition of national security is not necessarily shared by Soviet defense planners. The Soviets obviously are concerned not only about the United States and our allies but about an unfriendly China on their border. Recent history plays a major role as well. Our country has not, after all, been subjected to an actual military invasion in this century. The U.S.S.R. has—twice—and with devastating results. The national calamity of World War II, with some 20 million casualties in the Soviet Union, is an experience that is deeply etched in the minds and psyches of every member of the Soviet Politburo. It has been pointed out that such a trauma contributes to a policy that errs generously on the side of overpreparedness.

But we, as careful trustees of our nation's destiny, must base our planning on what we see and assume that current Soviet military planning springs from pragmatic and calculated geopolitical considerations. As dedicated as our nation may be to the peaceful resolution of international disputes, it is an indisputable fact that military power counts in the modern world. It counts not only in the direct application of force to the settlement of conflicts, or in the threat of its use, but also in the effects that the knowledge of superiority of military power inevitably has upon the actions that nations may choose to take or to forego when faced with a stronger and better armed adversary. There is no doubt that military strength is a powerful aspect of diplomatic relations, even if it is never actually used and never actually threatened.

U.S. Policy

Our policy in the United States has been to meet the challenge of the Soviet military buildup in two ways.

First, we are determined that our overall military capabilities remain essentially equivalent to those of the Soviet Union and that they are sufficient to deter any aggression against the United States, our allies, or our military forces overseas.

Second, when we can reach agreement with the U.S.S.R. on the basis of enlightened self-interest, we are committed to pursuing those arms control initiatives which will reduce the likelihood of armed conflict, enhance our own national security, and contribute to international stability.

These twin goals are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Together, they will help us in managing the U.S.-Soviet military balance in the years to come.

To insure parity between the defense forces of the two sides is not to insist upon a strict numerical equilibrium based upon the accountant's ledger or the unyielding comparison of any given set of static indicators. Simply counting up the number of tanks, ships, and other weapons deployed on each side would reveal a military balance that is inherently misleading in terms of what it indicates about the relative effectiveness of the two military forces. We do not need a defense structure that is a mirror image of the Soviet Union's. Perfect symmetry will not in itself guarantee the fulfillment of our true defense needs. Our geography is different; our relations with our neighbors are different; our economies are different; and our allies are different.

What we do need is a defense effort that is adequate to guarantee our national security, the security of our allies, and our worldwide interests. We are spending enough now to meet that goal, but the trends in Soviet military expenditures mean that we shall have to do more in the years to come. The Soviet military is currently outspending us, although it is worth remembering that the U.S.S.R. defense effort must draw upon a civilian economy that is much less efficient than our own. They also began their current buildup from a position of clear inferiority, so that we have had a marginal advantage for many years that has made it relatively less important that our defense expenditures match those of the Soviets.

Indeed, for most of the years in the past decade, our own military spending has actually declined when measured in constant dollars or as a percentage of gross national product. In 1960, for example, national defense expenditures amounted to $115 billion (in 1978 dollars) and constituted slightly more than 9% of our gross national product. Those figures rose during the latter half of the decade due to our involvement in Southeast Asia, but they then began to decline. By 1977, we were actually spending $12 billion less on defense in real terms than we were in 1960, and the percentage of our GNP allotted to the military had fallen to 5.3%.

Meanwhile, the Soviet military buildup continued unabated. (You should know that the Soviets devote about 13% of their GNP to defense.) As Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has noted, the U.S.S.R.'s commitment to rising defense budgets has been unaffected by the decisions we have made with regard to defense spending: "As our defense budgets have risen, the Soviets have increased their defense budget. As our defense budgets have gone down, their defense budgets have increased again."

Given these facts, we have arrested the downward spiral in U.S. military spending. Last year, the Administration was successful in obtaining a real increase in the defense budget of 3%, and the President has made clear his commitment to an increase in the next budget of at least 3%. We have

operative, joint venture—of fairness, if you will.

The basis of this treaty dealing with the mining of seabeds calls for the creation of parallel regimes. A private firm winning a concession must help the international community mine a parallel track.

I was particularly intrigued by the analysis of one of the major architects of this tentative agreement—Ambassador M.C.W. Pinton from Sri Lanka. In describing the rationale for this international regime, he stated: ". . . the 'common heritage' of these resources is not '*res nulius*' to be had for the taking; is not '*res communis*' simply for enjoyment or use in common; it is more akin to property held in trust—held in trust for 'mankind as a whole,' for the public. It is, therefore, closest to '*res publicae*,' the property of the people to be administered by the people and for the people."

His prescription is a rejection of social Darwinism in global politics yet does not make the opposing error of Utopian regimes. In an age of diminishing resources, growing scarcities but also growing threats, I am reminded of Jefferson's words that such '*res publicae*' is the only form of government which is not eternally at open or secret war with the rights of mankind."

In the continuing dialogue on the rules for a new international order, as in a republic, even the rules must be debated according to the rules. Neither the demands of the Third World nor our interests can be satisfied in conditions of global anarchy.

But within the rules we have interests to protect and principles to uphold. We cannot agree to rules that unfairly tax our interests just as we cannot expect the developing world to abide by rules which unfairly violate theirs.

We are conscious of the unfair treatment history has given some countries or groups within countries, including our own. But both at home and abroad the sins of the past cannot be the foundation of the future. We must lay aside charges of guilt and focus on the duty of common obligations.

There is no other way to forge the global coalition necessary for achieving the reforms we need to make the world safer and more prosperous. As Fidel Castro, speaking as the chairman of the nonaligned, acknowledged in his report to the General Assembly on the Havana conference, worldwide economic crisis will harm everyone—from Socialist state to capitalist investor.

Consequently, everyone according to his abilities must participate in the solution. In today's integrated world economy, we can no longer allow the choice of opting out of one's responsibilities.

Common obligations in a new world order imply a division of labor but not a division of the world into competing blocs plus one more bloc to remain on the sidelines. If the Third World has obligations and interests, if the West has obligations and interests, so do the Soviets and their allies. If they are affected by the cycles of economic recession, so must they share in offering concrete remedies to avoid them.

This is not to say that we will always be able to communicate with the nonaligned as a movement. Just as NATO members speak with one voice multilaterally yet often differ bilaterally, so do the nonaligned. Precisely for this reason, the Administration has not sought relations with the nonaligned as a movement but with countries in the movement which have power to influence problems we believe must be resolved.

We have, therefore, established close relations with some members of the nonaligned and maintain strained relations with others. We will continue to act accordingly. We will judge the nonaligned movement as a movement. We regard the movement's record as very mixed, with commendable balance displayed on some issues and high irresponsibility in evidence on others. Nevertheless, we will judge its members as individual countries and will find we can work with some and must resist others. To do otherwise—either to reject the nonaligned countries in their entirety or to embrace them in their collectivity—would only damage U.S. interests.

Conclusion

Where then does this leave us in terms of U.S. policy toward the Third World? I would like to suggest a policy based on three components: responsibility, resources, and realism.

Responsibility in the sense that the Third World must show it as well as expect it. Colonialism was a historic mistake which had to be eradicated. So long as it existed, the primary responsibility was on the shoulders of the powers which were called on to decolonialize. But we are approaching the end of that era.

With the new issues there are—there must be—reciprocal obligations for all parties. These obligations may take into account different circumstances, but reciprocity is critical to final agreement.

Resources in the sense that the Third World needs help and we must play a larger role in providing that help. The way that we have allowed our aid program to deteriorate is a national disgrace. It is time we stated the issue starkly. There is no way that the United States can compete for influence in the world, as the critics of the Administration are urging, without the resource commitment which those same critics are denying.

Realism in the sense that we look at the Third World as it really is—as an area in flux, of concern, and with importance. In flux, because the popular stereotypes of a region headed for authoritarian darkness are wrong. Some of the most heartening developments of the Third World have been the liberalizing trends in the powerhouses of the Third World—in India, in Nigeria, in Brazil, and even in China. Indeed, were it not for the tragedy in Kampuchea, the past year would be seen as a banner year for human rights in the Third World as four of the most vicious tyrants since Hitler and Stalin have been overthrown—Idi Amin, Pol Pot, Bokassa, and Macias.

Of concern because the thesis that American security need only be concerned with the industrial heartlands of Western Europe and Japan was wrong when it was formulated and clearly is wrong today.

With importance because issues such as oil, nonproliferation, strategic location, and trade document the vital nature of the Third World to our security and well-being.

A policy built on responsibility, resources, and realism can succeed. It will not give us the world government Garry Davis sought, but it can make the world safer and the United States more secure. And that, in the end, is what a sound foreign policy is all about. ■

Missing and Disappeared Persons

by Patricia M. Derian

Statement before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 18, 1979. Ms. Derian is Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.[1]

I welcome this opportunity to appear before you and your colleagues and commend the committee for its initiative in conducting these hearings on missing or disappeared persons. We consider this problem to be one of the most serious human rights issues confronting the world today, necessitating attention and action not only by the United States but by all members of the international community. This was the view expressed by the U.S. Representative to the Human Rights Commission to Committee III of the United Nations last December and reiterated by him at the U.N. Human Rights Commission earlier this year. It remains our view today.

In your previous hearings, distinguished witnesses from a variety of nongovernmental human rights organizations have provided considerable detail on the disappearance phenomenon. We believe their accounts were carefully researched and accurate. I do not intend to rehearse those details at any great length. Previous testimony has made them painfully familiar to all of us.

What I should like to do today, in accordance with your letter to Secretary Vance requesting my appearance, is to:

- Provide you the Administration's views and response to this relatively new violation of human rights;
- Discuss some of the remedies being proposed both on the bilateral and multilateral levels; and
- Examine the role of our embassies and human rights officers in those countries where disappearances are reliably reported.

Finally, I shall give you a status report on our efforts to give effect to U.N. Resolution 33/173 on disappeared persons adopted by the General Assembly on December 20, 1978.

Views on and Response to Disappearances

As I stated at the outset, the United States views the use of officially sanctioned political kidnappings as one of the most serious problems confronting the international community. Disappearances have become one of the more tragic and insidious instances of human rights abuse occurring in today's world. Coupled with the failure of governments to account for those missing, this disturbing development has been causing intense anguish and suffering for countless individuals and families in many parts of the world. As you know, the word "disappeared" itself has become a euphemism for what often appears to or does amount to political murder, preceded by intensive interrogation and torture of those not charged with any crime.

Forms of Disappearances

I would like to review very briefly the forms that disappearances take. In one, governmental policy directs the security forces, military, and/or police to round up all persons suspected of subversion to get them out of circulation, to obtain information, to halt specific acts, and to demoralize the "opposition." There are no constraints of any kind placed on those charged with the roundup.

In another, security or police forces operate "unofficially," generally in civilian clothes, with the tacit approval or acquiescence and under the umbrella of protection from the state.

In a third, groups of "civilians," often with official urging or approval, operate their own terrorist forces. (When "unauthorized" groups bring too much embarrassment to the government or when the government wishes to end their actions, it often finds that is has set in motion a force which eludes its control. They are then faced with the problem of trying to contain a group which is nominally its own.)

In all forms, people are abducted from their homes, offices, or while moving about in public. Sometimes operations are strictly clandestine—no one sees the pickup, no phone calls or messages are delivered; people simply vanish. On other occasions, a street or an area is blocked off by unmarked cars, a force of armed men—nearly always in civilian clothes—storms a building or house and emerges with the person or persons who are taken away. Or a group of armed men stops their car in traffic, leaps onto the street with drawn guns, and wrestles the victim into a car and speeds away.

The victims are taken to secret places of detention, often military installations, and tortured for periods ranging from hours to months. Sometimes they die as a consequence of torture, sometimes they are killed in detention, and sometimes they are set up for death in a flamboyant and public way. They may be loaded into a car or van, told to drive away after being given arms without ammunition, followed, and killed in a "shootout." A few endure and eventually find themselves in a regular place of detention. These people may be held indefinitely without trial or charges or they may be charged, tried, and sentenced to official jail terms by military or civilian courts. A miniscule number are released at some stage of the process.

At no point do any parts of the system of justice or the rule of law or due process operate on behalf of the disappeared. They disappear not only literally but also as legal entities.

They do not disappear from the thoughts of their families, however. And what becomes of them? Sometimes they are too frightened to take any action or tell anyone what has happened; this is often the case in the first period of disappearances.

Sooner or later, though, an inquiry is made to some official unit. They are told that there is no record of an arrest; there is no information. Occasionally, the family will receive an anonymous phone call which might say that the disappeared person will be released soon, is all right, or if an infant or child has been taken, might request some item for the child or tell where the child can be picked up if the child is not to be held. But the search is fruitless unless a body is found or the person finally surfaces in prison. Otherwise, the family members wait in tense anguish for months or years. For some there will probably never be an answer.

Responsibility for remedying the tragic phenomenon of disappearances rests with the government which shuts its eyes to or colludes in or engineers disappearances. Whether these disappearances are the result of authorized actions, unauthorized excesses by law enforcement and security agencies,

(1) Defense Department Authorization and Appropriation Bills
(2) Special International Security Assistance, for Pakistan and other countries
(3) Bilateral and Multilateral Foreign Assistance Bills, including Central America supplemental
(4) The China Trade Agreement
(5) Intelligence Charters
(6) Refugee Legislation and Funding
(7) Human Rights Conventions
(8) And, when appopriate, the SALT II Treaty.

One very immediate and pressing objective that is uppermost on our minds and those of the American people is the release of our hostages in Iran.

We have no basic quarrel with the nation, the revolution or the people of Iran. The threat to them comes not from American policy but from Soviet actions in the region. We are prepared to work with the government of Iran to develop a new and mutually beneficial relationship.

in which democracy and freedom are still challenged, a world in which peace must be re-won every day."

We must have both the military power and the political will to deter our adversaries and to support our friends and allies.

We must pay whatever price is required to remain the strongest nation in the world. That price has increased as the military power of our major adversary has grown and its readiness to use that power been made all too evident in Afghanistan.

The U.S.-Soviet Relationship

We are demonstrating to the Soviet Union across a broad front that it will pay a heavy price for its aggression in terms of our relationship. Throughout the last decades U.S.-Soviet relations have been a mixture of cooperation and competition. The Soviet attack on Afghanistan and the ruthless extermination of its government have highlighted in the starkest terms the darker side of their policies—going well beyond competition and the legitimate pursuit of national interest, and violating all norms of international law and practice.

This attempt to subjugate an independent, non-aligned Islamic people is a callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter, two fundamentals of international order. Hence, it is also a dangerous threat to world peace. For the first time since World War II, the Soviets have sent combat forces into an area that was not previously under their control, into a non-aligned and sovereign state.

On January 4 I therefore announced a number of measures, including the reduction of grain sales and the curtailment of trade and technology transfer, designed to demonstrate our firm opposition to Soviet actions in Afghanistan and to underscore our belief that in the face of this blatent transgression of international law, it was impossible to conduct business as usual. I have also been in consultation with our allies and with countries in the region regarding additional multilateral measures that might be taken to register our disapproval and bolster security in Southwest Asia. I have been heartened by the support expressed for our position, and by the fact that such support has been tangible, as well as moral.

The destruction of the independence of Afghanistan government and the occupation by the Soviet Union has altered the strategic situation in that part of the world in a very ominous fashion. It has brought the Soviet Union within striking distance of the Indian Ocean and even the Persian Gulf.

It has eliminated a buffer between the Soviet Union and Pakistan and presented a new threat to Iran. These two countries are now far more vulnerable to Soviet political intimidation. If that intimidation were to prove effective, the Soviet Union might well control an area of vital strategic and economic significance to the survival of Western Europe, the Far East, and ultimately the United States.

It is clear that the entire subcontinent of Asia and specifically Pakistan is threatened. Therefore, I am asking Congress, as the first order of business, to pass an economic and military aid package designed to assist Pakistan defend itself.

As the unprecedented and overwhelming vote in the General Assembly demonstrated, countries across the world—and particularly the non-aligned—regard the Soviet invasion as a threat to their independence and security.

But that will not be possible so long as Iran continues to hold Americans hostage, in defiance of the world community and civilized behavior. They must be released unharmed. We have thus far pursued a measured program of peaceful diplomatic and economic steps in an attempt to resolve this issue without resorting to other remedies available to us under international law. This reflects the deep respect of our Nation for the rule of law and for the safety of our people being held, and our belief that a great power bears a responsibility to use its strength in a measured and judicious manner. But our patience is not unlimited and our concern for the well-being of our fellow citizens grows each day.

ENHANCING NATIONAL SECURITY—AMERICAN MILITARY STRENGTH

The maintenance of national security is my first concern, as it has been for every President before me.

As I stated one year ago in Atlanta: "This is still a world of danger, a world

Defense Budget

For many years the Soviets have steadily increased their real defense spending, expanded their strategic forces, strengthened their forces in Europe and Asia, and enhanced their capability for projecting military force around the world directly or through the use of proxies. Afghanistan dramatizes the vastly increased military power of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has built a war machine far beyond any reasonable requirements for their own defense and security. In contrast, our own defense spending declined in real terms every year from 1968 through 1976.

We have reversed this decline in our own effort. Every year since 1976 there has been a real increase in our defense spending—and our lead has encouraged increases by our allies. With the support of the Congress, we must and will make an even greater effort in the years ahead.

The Fiscal Year 1981 budget would increase funding authority for defense to more than $158 billion, a real growth of more than 5% over my request for Fiscal Year 1980. Therefore, requested outlays for defense during Fiscal Year

1981 will grow by more than 3% in real terms over the preceding year.

The trends we mean to correct cannot be remedied overnight; we must be willing to see this program through. To ensure that we do so I am setting a growth rate for defense that we can sustain over the long haul.

The defense program I have proposed for the next five years will require some sacrifice—but sacrifice we can well afford.

The defense program emphasizes four areas:

(a) It ensures that our strategic nuclear forces will be equivalent to those of the Soviet Union and that deterrence against nuclear war will be maintained;

(b) It upgrades our forces so that the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact will continue to deter the outbreak of war—conventional or nuclear—in Europe;

(c) It provides us the ability to come quickly to the aid of friends and allies around the globe;

(d) And it ensures that our Navy will continue to be the most powerful on the seas.

Strategic Forces

We are strengthening each of the three legs of our strategic forces. The cruise missile production which will begin next year will modernize our strategic air deterrent. B-52 capabilities will also be improved. These steps will maintain and enhance the B-52 fleet by improving its ability to deliver weapons against increasingly heavily defended targets.

We are also modernizing our strategic submarine missile force. The first new Trident submarine has already been launched and will begin sea trials this year. The second Trident will be launched in the spring of 1980. The first of our new Trident missiles, with a range of more than 4,000 miles, have already begun operational patrols in Poseidon submarines.

The new MX missile will enhance the survivability of our land-based intercontinental ballistic missile force. That is why I decided last spring to produce this missile and selected the basing mode best suited to enhance its capability. Further the MX will strengthen our capability to attack a wide variety of Soviet targets.

Our new systems will enable U.S. strategic forces to maintain equivalence in the face of the mounting Soviet challenge. We would however need an even greater investment in strategic systems to meet the likely Soviet buildup without SALT.

Forces for NATO

We are greatly accelerating our ability to reinforce Western Europe with massive ground and air forces in a crisis. We are undertaking a major modernization program for the Army's weapons and equipment, adding armor, firepower, and tactical mobility.

We are prepositioning more heavy equipment in Europe to help us cope with attacks with little warning, and greatly strengthening our airlift and sealift capabilities.

We are also improving our tactical air forces—buying about 1700 new fighter and attack aircraft over the next five years—and increasing the number of Air Force fighter wings by over 10%.

We are accelerating the rate at which we can move combat aircraft to Europe to cope with any surprise attack, and adding to the number of shelters at European airbases to prevent our aircraft from being destroyed on the ground.

Rapid Deployment Forces

We are systematically enhancing our ability to respond rapidly to non-NATO contingencies wherever required by our commitments or when our vital interests are threatened.

The rapid deployment forces we are assembling will be extraordinarily flexible: They could range in size from a few ships or air squadrons to formations as large as 100,000 men, together with their support. Our forces will be prepared for rapid deployment to any region of strategic significance.

Among the specific initiatives we are taking to help us respond to crises outside of Europe are:

- the development and production of a new fleet of large cargo aircraft with intercontinental range;
- the design and procurement of a force of Maritime Prepositioning Ships that will carry heavy equipment and supplies for three Marine Corps brigades.

In addition, responding to the Soviet military presence in Cuba and the proxy role of Cuba on behalf of the USSR, we have taken or are taking the following actions in support of the rapid deployment force:

(1) We are substantially increasing our ability to monitor Cuban and Soviet/Cuban activities;

(2) We have established a Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters which improves our ability to respond to events in the region;

(3) We are increasing regional military exercises; and,

(4) We are intensifying assistance to countries in the region that are threatened by Soviet or Cuban intervention.

Naval Forces

Seapower is indispensable to our global position—in peace and also in war. Our shipbuilding program will sustain a 550-ship Navy in the 1990s and we will continue to build the most capable ships afloat.

The program I have proposed will assure the ability of our Navy to operate in high threat areas, to maintain control of the seas and protect vital lines of communication—both military and economic—and to provide the strong maritime component of our rapid deployment forces. This is essential for operations in remote areas of the world, where we cannot predict far in advance the precise location of trouble, or preposition equipment on land.

Military Personnel

No matter how capable or advanced our weapons systems, our military security depends on the abilities, the training and the dedication of the people who serve in our armed forces. I am determined to recruit and to retain under any foreseeable circumstances an ample level of such skilled and experienced military personnel.

We have enhanced our readiness and combat endurance by improving the Reserve Components. All reservists are assigned to units structured to complement and provide needed depth to our active forces. Some reserve personnel have also now been equipped with new equipment.

Mobilization Planning

I have also launched a major effort to establish a coherent and practical basis for all government mobilization planning. Begun last May, this is the first such effort conducted at Presidential level since World War II. It involves virtually every Federal agency, with the aim of improved efficiency and readiness.

China to replace, for example, some of those lost in Iran. Is there that kind of halfway-house military relationship possible with the Chinese?

A. Let me say in general terms that we don't intend to let the misconduct of the Soviet Union keep us from developing a normal relationship with the People's Republic of China.

On the other hand, we have said, and we continue to maintain, that we do not intend to furnish arms or weapons to the People's Republic of China. Now Secretary Brown is there. He will be having conversations with respect to many subjects, including the new Afghan invasion by the Soviet Union, and I think that out of that will come an important indication to us as to how we can cooperate in that area. But as I say, we will not be in a military relationship of supplying arms or weapons to the People's Republic.

Q. But short of the supply of American weapons to China, will the United States try to explore with the Chinese the possibility of using Chinese territory for the basing of radar-type facilities?

A. On that subject I really wouldn't have any comment except to say that we will be discussing with them, for example, their possible aid to other countries in the region which might be threatened by the Soviet behavior.

Q. In Pakistan, for example?

A. If Pakistan desired, we would be talking to a number of countries around the world about aiding Pakistan. So I would put Pakistan in that group.

Q. Let me direct your attention to Afghanistan's other boundary. The impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been sort of peculiar in Iran. On the one hand you have the Moslems from Afghanistan invading the Soviet Embassy in Tehran; on the other hand you have the militants who hold the 50 Americans demanding three more Americans. Do you have any kind of evaluation as to what the adventure in Afghanistan is going to do to the holding of American hostages in Tehran?

A. If the people in Iran are thinking clearly about the matter, I would think that it would cause them to want to end their controversy with the United States and the obscene holding of our hostages and direct their attention to the greater threat which comes from Soviet domination of Afghanistan.

Q. But what have you seen or sensed?

A. I have some reason to think that a number of the leaders of that country sense the importance of ending the problem with the United States. How high that goes in that government is, of course, a puzzle.

Q. But there is no guarantee at all that reasonable thought has dominated the people who hold the hostages in the Embassy. Do you see any evidence whatever that the transition in the government, if that is what is happening, appreciation of strategic reality or whatever, is having an influence on the willingness of the people who are in that Embassy to release the hostages?

A. We haven't seen it yet but I have to believe that the people of that country are concerned about their own welfare, concerned about their own future, and that the combination of actions that the United States is taking—the seeking of sanctions, the condemnation of the world community, and now the threat from Afghanistan—that combination of events may bring the people of Iran, including the terrorists who hold our hostages, bring them to their senses.

Q. Is it your sense that if the Ayatollah Khomeini should give a direct order through whatever gradual process for the people in the Embassy to release those hostages, that they would do it?

A. It is my judgment that the Ayatollah could give such an order and have it carried out.

Q. You seemed to be suggesting a moment ago when you said there might be some members of the government who would like to end all of this and get on with better relationships with the United States, that these were lower ranking members. What about Khomeini who seems to have the power? Is there anything from all of your diplomatic activities and ventures over the last 9 or 10 weeks to suggest that he has changed his basic approach to this crisis?

A. No, I don't have any indication of a change in his mind. I hope one will be forthcoming.

Q. What help, what support can the American people realistically hope for from the United Nations in bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union over Afghanistan?

A. Well I think the fact that 50 countries have gone to the United Nations from all over the world seeking a resolution in the Security Council of condemnation against the Soviet Union is an important fact in itself. This is outcrying of international opinion against this invasion that has its own importance, Beyond that, I think you can look forward perhaps to a debate in other organs of the United Nations which once again could focus world opinion, add to the costs that the Soviet Union is paying for their actions.

Q. During this and other Administrations, I think specifically of some of the statements by Ambassador Moynihan as he was then, there was a strong feeling in this country that the independent nations, the Third World, tended more to support the Soviet Union than the United States. Does this sudden end of, at least temporary end, of detente begin to push the balance in the United Nations a little more in our favor?

A. Well there have been a number of interesting indications along those lines. You know it is important to remember that on Iran, the vote in the Security Council was 15 to nothing. The vote at the International Court of Justice in favor of the United States was 15 to nothing. The Third World countries on these two issues—both Iran and Afghanistan —are lining up behind the United States policy, and I think that is a very important change.

Q. What about the question of America being able to use not bases but military facilities in the Persian Gulf region? We have read stories about the possibility of Oman providing facilities, Kenya, Somalia. Could you tell us something about that?

A. Let me back up just a minute on that and say President Carter's speech on Friday night was primarily directed to bilateral steps that might be taken between the United States and the Soviet Union. Now in addition to that, the United States is in the process of important steps to improve its military posture in the Middle East. A carrier task force, to be operating in the Indian Ocean, building up our facilities at Diego Garcia, and in that connection we will be seeking additional facilities in those three countries to service the fleet and to give us a greater capacity, additional facilities, both ports and airfields.

Q. Could I pursue that, because perhaps even more sensitive than the three countries Mr. Kalb mentioned would be the possibilities of facilities in Egypt and Israel, both of which would be receptive to that kind of arrangment. What is the U.S. attitude on that?

A. They are under consideration as well, along with the others.

Q. There is a movement in this country now to end that old traditional thing—bipartisan foreign policy. Will the beginning of Republican and other Democratic attacks on this Administration have any impact on our ability to conduct our foreign policy and to make it stick?

A. I think the people of the United States are unified. Some of the politicians may not be at the moment. I thought it was rather strange and ironic last night that those who call out most loudly for a stronger U.S. position against the Soviet Union were criticizing the single strongest step we took—the grain embargo.

I might say in this connection that the Administration will be announcing tomorrow a major new gasohol program, one that will use the equivalent of 5 million tons of corn during the next year. This will lead, during 1980, to the production of over 500 million gallons of gasohol. Indeed, by the end of 1980 over 10% of a particular kind of gasoline will have alcohol added to it.

[Later in the week, the Administration announced a gasohol program which will seek to create, during 1981, the capacity to use 5 million tons of biomass products, most of which will be corn, in the production of more than 500 million gallons of ethanol. This would replace about 10% of the anticipated U.S. demand for unleaded gasoline.]

This is the kind of thing that we can do to compensate for the grain and corn that is not being sold to the Soviet Union. I think it is an important development. I think our farmers would rather be growing grain to solve our energy problems than they would for the Soviet Union's herds.

Q. So you don't think that the end of bipartisanship hurts your ability to conduct foreign policy?

A. I don't think there is an end to bipartisanship among the people. There may be among some of the political leaders. ■

Negotiations on Southern Rhodesia

by Richard M. Moose

Statements before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 27, 1979, and the Subcommittees on Africa and International Organization Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on December 5.[1]

NOV. 27, 1979

I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today. I want to discuss the President's determination on sanctions and the relationship of that decision to the negotiations on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia now underway at Lancaster House in London.

As you are aware, the President informed the Congress on November 14 of his determination that it is in the national interest to continue sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia at this time. In the justification which accompanied his determination, he noted that the negotiations presently being conducted by the United Kingdom have not yet concluded.

If the United States lifts sanctions now, it could jeopardize the chance for a successful conclusion to those negotiations. A termination of sanctions at this stage could lead all the parties to harden their positions on the remaining issues.

The President made it clear that we are prepared to lift sanctions when a British Governor assumes authority in Salisbury and a process leading to impartial elections has begun. With this objective in mind, he instructed the Secretary of State to report to him immediately upon the conclusion of the conference and to recommend action by the United States with respect to the termination of sanctions.

The London conference started with a sober appreciation that this could be the last chance to achieve a peaceful settlement for Rhodesia. Important obstacles subsequently have been overcome. It is remarkable that so much has been accomplished in bridging the differences between the parties to the conflict.

Agreement has been reached on two of the fundamental goals we have pursued for so long—a democratic constitution providing for majority rule and protection of minority rights and an impartial transition government which would manage elections open to all parties.

The constitution to which the parties have now agreed corrects the inadequacies of the previous constitution. While the white minority will not be able to exert disproportionate influence, the rights of every individual—white as well as black—would be protected. This would include property rights. And the minority would be guaranteed a special 20% representation in Parliament for the first 7 years of independence.

The parties have also agreed to transition arrangements. They provide for a British Governor who will assume all legislative and executive authority and manage the election. The Governor would be assisted by senior British civil servants and police, who would thoroughly supervise the day-to-day operations of government, the elections process, and the maintenance of law and order by the existing civil police. Commonwealth observers would be invited to observe every aspect of the elections. All parties would be represented on an Election Council, which would be concerned with the fair conduct of elections. Political prisoners would be released, bans against political parties lifted, and all parties allowed to campaign freely.

These are enormous achievements. It has been possible because of the statesmanship shown by the parties and the skill with which [British Foreign Secretary] Lord Carrington has conducted the negotiations. And it has been possible, as well, because we—the United States as well as the United Kingdom—did not choose sides in a tragic conflict. By maintaining our own impartiality among the parties, we have been able effectively to assist Britain in pressing for agreement to arrangements which are both workable and fair.

The conference is now addressing the cease-fire issues, which form the third and last phase of the negotiations. The British tabled their elaborated cease-fire proposals on November 22. We believe the prospects are good that the British will be able to obtain agreement on a cease-fire very soon. For us to change our policy at this delicate moment would be unnecessary and unwise.

produce the missiles, there must be a previous decision on the part of NATO to deploy them. The Belgian Government, along with the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy, has decided to deploy the missiles. It has also decided that it will examine the question of implementing that decision in about 6 months on the basis, among other things, of the success reached during that time in arms control of theater nuclear forces.

The Dutch position is that they will make a decision on whether to accept deployments within 2 years. But it should be noted that of the total number being contemplated for deployment, only about 15% or 20% are to be deployed in those two countries.

Q. We have three countries that have agreed to station these systems. The Germans have said that they will not be the only country that would take them on the continent. If Italy were, during the next 2 years, to decide for one reason or another to pull out, couldn't this decision quickly unravel?

Secretary Brown: The Germans consider their conditions to have been met. As I noted, Belgium, as well as Italy, has made a decision to deploy.

Q. Are you optimistic over a positive response by Russia on the offer of negotiating on the long-range theater nuclear weapons? And can you figure out how long it will take to start off—months or years?

Secretary Vance: I am optimistic that negotiations will get underway between ourselves and the Soviet Union on the question of arms control, in the field of long-range nuclear theater forces. As to when the discussions can get underway, I am merely speculating.

Let me say that the first step will be to assemble the consultative group which is to be established pursuant to the plan which has been developed. That is a consultative group including ourselves and our allies. We will be working to put together the final touches on what we will be sending forward to the Soviet Union, and following that there will be discussions with the Soviet Union. I do not rule out some preliminary discussions, but they would be only of a preliminary nature sometime in the next month or two. At what pace those negotiations will proceed is a different question, because it is the decision that these negotiations can best be carried out in SALT III. And we, therefore, have the factor of when we can get to SALT III in order to get the starting date for actual negotiations.

Q. Given the Belgian and Dutch reservations, are you confident that Congress will provide them $5 billion to finance this program, and moreover, what kind of signal of this lack of unity within the alliance do you think NATO is sending the Soviet Union?

Secretary Vance: Let me say first that I think that it is wrong to characterize this as a lack of unity. The decision taken across the board was that the program was accepted and that we would go forward with the program.

Secretary Brown: Indeed, this was a unanimous decision to proceed with the program, and these countries will all participate in the infrastructure funding, which is a part of the operations funding of these systems. The Congress, as you know, has been very interested and very concerned about the imbalance of theater nuclear forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and as a consequence of this decision, I would expect that Congress will, indeed, support the program. They have been supporting the research and development; they have been saying, tell us when you have a place to put most of these, and we now have that.

Secretary Vance: Let me just add from somebody who sees it from a slightly different perspective, because I deal with different committees than Harold does in the Congress. I find the same interest and importance attached to the modernization of our theater nuclear forces, and I would expect that we would find support in the Congress.

Q. What was your reaction to the Danish proposal?

Secretary Vance: Insofar as the Danish proposal was concerned—which called for a deferral for 6 months or a postponement of making any decision—I have felt all along that we could not and should not postpone this decision. The time had come, after 2 years of study, when all the work was done; we've got to get on with the process of modernizing our forces. We've also got to get on with the companion program of discussions in the arms control area so that the sooner the better, and, therefore, I was against any postponement.

Secretary Brown: Moreover, that proposal found no support from any other country, partly because I think it was realized that during that 6 months, the Soviet deployment of SS–20s, which continues at the same or perhaps even an accelerated rate as part of their theater nuclear force increase and modernization, would have deployed about 200 additional nuclear warheads against the countries of Western Europe.

Q. [Inaudible] by the Defense Minister includes a specific reference of assumption that SALT II will have been ratified by the end of this 2-year period. Before this meeting, there had been, over some period, indications that the ratification of SALT would have an important influence on European positions. Do you feel that if SALT had been ratified by now, all the alliance members would have been able to stay on the same line?

Secretary Vance: I don't know the answer to that. But let me say—because I don't know enough about the internal politics of a number of the various countries—that I think all of you are familiar with the reasons that the hearings on SALT have fallen behind schedule in the Congress. It not only came about as a result of the need to get through vital energy legislation that is before the Congress right now, but of course, we have been seized with the Iranian crisis which has not only taken most of the waking hours of those of us in the executive branch but also has consumed a great amount of the attention and time of the congressional leadership and the Members of the Congress. As a result of these factors, Senator Byrd decided that he would delay, until about the fourth week in January, the bringing forward of the SALT debate to the floor. I believe that it will come forward at that time, and it is still my strong belief that we will, in those hearings, come out with a successful conclusion.

Q. Don't you have any fears that the Soviet Union might consider the restrictions which have been put forward by Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark as a sign of weakness, as a breach in NATO solidarity and that they will seek political profit from it?

Secretary Vance: No, I don't think so. I think that there are obviously very difficult problems, political problems, in various countries. However, the decision was taken in Belgium, as Harold Brown has previously indicated

to you, to make a positive decision with respect to the problem and to the issue of deployment with the caveat that they wanted to take a look at the situation in 6 months to see whether there had been enough progress in the arms control field to change their mind. Otherwise, the decision is made; they are going forward.

Q. Could you just tell us whether the United States is going to ask any other country, besides the five, on deploying the missiles in the coming 2 years?

Secretary Brown: The program was made up by a military-civilian group, a so-called high-level group, and these were the candidate countries. I don't rule out further studies, but the program we are proceeding with is the program that the high-level group came up with.

Secretary Vance: Let me add one thing to that. We decided how many additional warheads were required in the modernization program. Having made that determination, the next step was to determine how it might be best to allocate the deployment, and the most sensible course of action developed by the group which was studying it was the five countries which we have referred to. And, that's how we arrived at the group that is included now as the deployment sites for the new missiles.

Q. If I understood well, it will take at least 2 or 3 years before these modern weapons are going to be installed here. What about if the Soviet Union, in the meantime, produces or creates a more modern weapon? What will happen?

Secretary Vance: This is the very problem that Harold was talking about because as the months go by, more and more weapons are being deployed, and this is obviously a matter of great concern to us. This is the reason that we have both the modernization program and the arms control program. So that it is necessary not only that we take the steps to move forward to produce and deploy these new weapons but also to proceed vigorously with the arms control aspect of this bilateral program.

Q. Given your answer on possible timing of any negotiations, what do you think the Belgians will have in 6 months time to change their minds?

Secretary Vance: Quite honestly, I would say that there probably will be not a great deal. I think negotiations will have been started by that time, but as anybody knows who has been involved in negotiations in the strategic nuclear field, these are very complicated matters. They proceed extremely slowly. We also took 6½ years to negotiate the SALT II agreement, and I would expect that this is going to be even a more complex negotiation than the ones which we've had so far in SALT II.

Secretary Brown: Again, I'm not sure that we've gotten across to the public the very substantial existing imbalance in theater forces. The Soviets have far more warheads, far more missiles, of intermediate range than the NATO alliance, and they are adding SS–20 warheads at the rate of about one a day.

Q. To what extent does the Dutch and Belgian decision represent a message that they are sending to the American Congress on SALT? To what extent did you find the agreement that you reached here in effect depends upon ratification of the SALT Treaty?

Secretary Vance: I think that as I said earlier, they continue to attach great importance to ratification of SALT. But, at the same time, they attach great importance to dealing with the theater nuclear problem. So, I think that it sends forward two messages to the Congress: number one, they stand just as strongly as they did before in urging and hoping that we can get on to ratification of SALT, and at the same time they want to get us moving in the theater nuclear field not only on the development, production, and deployment side but also on the arms control side.

Q. Secretary General Luns said that the infrastructure financing would be done by NATO as a whole, which would seem to imply that all the systems are single systems and that the level of financing is rather lower than what Secretary Brown mentioned in The Hague what the United States might hope for. Or are you satisfied with what—

Secretary Brown: The United States is going to pay for the development and production of the missiles. That is likely to run into several billions of dollars. The operation and maintenance costs including the guard force, security force, etc., construction of some base equipment, will be arranged through infrastructure and that cost will be shared. The United States unquestionably will carry the great bulk of the cost.

Q. Can you move ahead with negotiations on theater nuclear weapons if you don't get a ratification of SALT II?

Secretary Vance: I think the answer is yes we can. But it will be much more difficult to do. Therefore, I think it's incumbent on us to get SALT II ratified and get moving on both aspects of the problem, negotiating SALT III insofar as central systems are concerned and also insofar as theater systems are concerned.

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, DEC. 13, 1979

Before leaving Washington for this session of the North Atlantic Council, I reviewed our forthcoming meeting with President Carter. He has a deep interest in our work here this week and asked me to extend to all of you his greetings. I would also like to extend a special welcome to the Ministers joining the Council for the first time.

In the history of the alliance, this meeting will be remembered as a moment of special significance. Issues central to NATO are always important. But on this occasion, the issues before us are so important. Our decisions are of such deep meaning for the continued security of the alliance and for the strengthening of peace in Europe that our deliberations merit well the word "historic."

We meet at the opening of a new decade. None of us believes that the times ahead will be easy. But turbulent times can call forth the best that is in us. Such challenges can rally our societies to greater achievements. Our peoples have shown such strength throughout the history of our alliance. They will do so again.

We of this alliance, which has been so successful in the past, should look with confidence to the future. Our systems are strong and flexible. Our economies are resilient and innovative. Our peoples are steadfast. With continuing hard work and cooperation, we will maintain the healthy and strong societies on which our security ultimately depends.

It was the quest for security that brought us together in this alliance. Today, no less than 30 years ago, we

certainly not been standing still during the past 10 years, but it is equally clear that further efforts are required if we are to be successful in maintaining the military balance for the future.

We have, as I say, made some impressive strides in modernizing and expanding our capacity to respond to military conflicts throughout the world. In the field of strategic nuclear weapons, the President has decided to improve the survivability of our land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force through the development and deployment of the new, mobile MX missile system. We have just put the first of the new Trident submarines to sea, and we are currently in the process of deploying the improved Trident I submarine-launched ballistic missile. In 1981, we shall begin fitting many of our B–52 strategic bombers with long-range, air-launched cruise missiles that will serve to extend the useful life of the B–52 force well into the 1980s.

We have also sought to upgrade our capabilities in the field of conventional weapons. Together with our NATO allies, we have agreed upon a long-term defense program for Western Europe that will vastly improve the alliance's ability to respond to any military threat or incursion from the Warsaw Pact. We have accelerated our programs for the acquisition of sophisticated antitank weapons and other precision-guided munitions. We have generally upgraded the overall effectiveness of our conventional forces, and we are exploring new ways of organizing military units—such as the proposed rapid deployment force—that will enable us to meet military situations in a flexible and effective manner. A major watershed in the deployment of theater nuclear weapons will occur next month when the NATO governments meet to decide upon the emplacement of a new generation of medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

SALT

Military competition can be managed, however, in ways other than mutual buildup of forces. For this reason we pursue arms control initiatives, perhaps the most important of which is SALT. SALT—the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—is certainly not a panacea that will solve all our problems, and it is also not a substitute for the increased effort we are making in terms of defense outlays. For one thing, SALT deals only with a limited category of weapons—those that are nuclear capable and that are deliverable from the territory of the United States to the Soviet Union, or vice versa. The talks have not dealt with conventional weapons or with shorter range, theater nuclear devices. These systems continue to be unconstrained by the arms control process.

Secondly, the SALT II agreement that is currently before the Senate of the United States does not go as far as we would like in limiting and restraining the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that are included in the agreement. Both the United States and the Soviet Union will be able to modernize their strategic arsenals to some degree even with the SALT II agreement in force. We do plan, however, to make further progress in obtaining greater controls on strategic weapons in the context of the SALT III negotiations.

SALT II is an important step for the United States, however, because we will slow the momentum of Soviet strategic deployments in several crucial areas. The agreement will last until 1985, and we could well be facing a more dangerous strategic environment in that year without the controls that SALT II will provide.

- We know, for example, that the Soviet Union currently has four and possibly five new types of ICBMs either on the drawing boards or in the early stages of development. Without SALT II, the U.S.S.R. could deploy all five news types. With SALT II, they will be limited to one totally new missile system.
- Without SALT II, the Soviet Union could deploy as many as 3,000 strategic missile launchers and heavy bombers by 1985. With SALT II, they will be limited to no more than 2,250.
- Without SALT II, the Soviet Union could have in place by 1985 as many as 1,200 ICBMs equipped with multiple warheads. With SALT II, they will be limited to a maximum of 820.
- Without SALT II, the Soviet Union could deploy 30 or 35 individual warheads on each of their largest land-based missiles. With SALT II, they will be limited to no more than 10.
- Without SALT II, it is questionable whether the Soviet Union would choose voluntarily to make real reductions in its nuclear arsenal. With SALT II, the U.S.S.R. will be forced to dismantle some 250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that are now targeted on the United States.

The SALT II agreement, therefore, will enhance our ability to meet the challenge of rising Soviet defense expenditures. It will do so without constraining any significant military programs that we plan to inaugurate during the term of the agreement. It will be a useful complement to our regular defense programs, and it will aid us in predicting the future course of Soviet defense decisionmaking.

Other U.S. Strengths

We should also remember that national security is made up of a number of important factors, of which military strength is only one. By most other indicators, the United States is clearly the most powerful nation in the world. In terms of our economic strength, the vitality of our basic science and technology, the appeal of our democratic lifestyle to other nations, and the political and social vitality of our society, the Soviet Union does not rank as even a distant second. Our allies and friends—Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand—add overwhelmingly to Western influence and strength, particularly when compared to the demoralized and often reluctant supporters of the Soviet Union.

Let me mention the sphere of ideas—the competition for the minds of people—as another arena of competition where I believe we have a decisive advantage, albeit one we have not used as adeptly as we might. The Soviets, trained in the Marxist-Leninist tradition, place heavy emphasis on propaganda and on ideology, while we tend to feel less comfortable with heavy-handed verbal posturing.

But we should make no mistake about the importance of articulating our values strongly, continuously, and persuasively. Western ideals of individualism, personal dignity, and representative government strike responsive cords everywhere. The results can clearly be seen in the movement of people. The Soviet Union and other Marxist states expend great effort, including the crude use of walls and barbed wire, to keep their people from leaving. Our problem, as we review our immigration and refugee policy, is to decide how many of the millions who want to participate in our society we can reasonably accept.

It is only in the area of military strength that the U.S.S.R. has approached equivalence with us. We should not undervalue the enormous potential and capacity of the United States in nondefense matters. But we must also be realistic about preserving our ability to defend our interests, should that become necessary. For this reason, we see a new realism pervading

the American polity—a realism about the world that is neither defeatist nor cocky. The next decade will require strengthened defense programs, tough negotiations, and a firmness and constancy of principle. I have no doubt that we will meet that challenge. I have no doubt that the fundamental advantages, now and for the future, lie with the West, not the East. ■

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Approaching Common Issues With Developing Countries

by Thomas Ehrlich

Address before the Council of Presidents of the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges in Washington, D.C., on November 27, 1979. Mr. Ehrlich is Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency.

It is a pleasure to be here today. I am honored to speak before the representatives of institutions that have played a vital role in the development of this country and many other nations as well. My hope today is to underscore my commitment to a partnership in international economic development between the Federal Government and State universities and land-grant colleges and to suggest some of the ways in which that partnership can be strengthened, using the energy field as an example.

Your institutions have been a major force in increasing American and global agricultural production since the last part of the 19th century. They deserve much of the credit for our country's ability not only to feed its own citizens but also to serve as the granary of the world. Your universities have made powerful contributions, not only in educating students but also in sponsoring innovative research and, through unique extension services, in applying its benefits to communities throughout the world.

Our system of State universities and land-grant colleges is a particularly important asset to the developing nations of the world, where more than 75% of the world's people—over 3 billion human beings—live. Far too many people in these countries exist in conditions of abject poverty—more than 1 billion are continually hungry and malnourished, more than 700 million persons in developing countries are illiterate, and 2½ billion do not have adequate health care.

We should all be proud of the 30-year history of cooperation between your universities and the Agency for International Development (AID) and its predecessors. Research, extension services, and training facilities planned and implemented by your universities—in collaboration with your colleagues abroad—have helped develop vital technology and services for poor families in the Third World. Many of the leaders in every walk of life in the Third World were educated in universities represented here today. The U.S. Government relies heavily on you for the expertise and training to manage many of our assistance efforts.

In 1975 Congress reaffirmed the vital role of U.S. universities in alleviating world hunger by passing title XII of the Foreign Assistance Act. The title mandates AID to utilize the skills and experience of American universities. It goes on to provide means for strengthening the capacities of agricultural universities to assist developing countries in increasing their food production.

As a former university dean, I understand the importance of government support in planning, building, and maintaining specialized capabilities. Concerns are increasingly expressed in some quarters, however, that foreign aid funds may merely subsidize American universities and not go significantly to meet the pressing development needs of poor countries. These concerns arise when there is a perception that development assistance funds are not being used directly to address the basic human needs of people in developing countries.

Our efforts should be and will be carefully scrutinized, especially in times of fiscal restraint. The ultimate success of those efforts rests on our ability to deal with the challenges represented in these questions. Your universities, the U.S. Government, the American people, and, especially, poor people throughout the world have an enormous stake in insuring that our cooperative arrangements are implemented in the most effective manner possible and that they are carefully and fully explained to the American people and their representatives in Congress.

Purposes of Foreign Aid

U.S. interests are at stake in a wide range of problems that foreign economic assistance addresses. Our own prosperity and security, to a large extent, will depend on how effectively we assist developing countries in advancing their economic growth and meeting the basic needs of their citizens.

Our foreign aid serves both the development aspirations of the Third World and U.S. interests in three fundamental ways.

paramilitary or private groups, governments are responsible for bringing them under control, even in times of emergency. In confronting domestic violence or terrorism, there is no justification under domestic or international law for such violations.

Governments furthermore cannot argue that they do not know. Governments are custodians of the law. When they engage in their own campaign of terror, they jeopardize the rule of law and their right to govern. They are no different at those times than the worst of their opponents.

International law, as set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 4), the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (article 15), and the American Convention on Human Rights (article 27) prohibits states, even in times of public emergency, from abandoning certain fundamental guarantees afforded the individual.

Under no circumstances can a state arbitrarily deprive its citizens of their lives or subject them to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment. Death sentences can be imposed only in accordance with due process of law. Governments are responsible for the safety and protection of those detained. They are also responsible for rendering an accounting of the whereabouts and fate of those apprehended.

There is now available a well-developed body of human rights standards and precedents. It is up to individual countries to realize them. The United States tries to influence other nations to live up to common international obligations. In the final analysis, the decision to comply with international law—and to do what is right—rests with the individual country. While our ability to influence other nations' human rights performance varies from country to country, I can assure you we are assiduous in our efforts to persuade governments to halt disappearances and accompanying excesses and to insure that those guilty of such practices must be punished in accordance with law.

We urge all governments in whose countries there are disappeared persons to release prisoners arbitrarily detained, to provide the guarantee of fair trial, to publish lists of those missing, and to provide death certificates for those known to be killed. We also urge that they return remains to relatives and establish governmental mechanisms, together with the courts, to trace missing people and clarify their status for their relatives.

In my discussions with the families of the disappeared—both here in Washington and abroad—they emphasize that it would be easier for them to suffer the knowledge of the death of their relatives than to suffer continuous uncertainty about their fates. In most countries, this would represent an act of strength and courage on the part of the government and indicate a desire for national reconciliation peace, and return to the rule of law.

In our discussions with a variety of governments, we have pointed out that ample precedents exist in international law for dealing with the problem of accounting for those taken prisoner as a result of domestic and international conflicts. During periods of armed conflict and occupation, the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War require parties to implement a variety of reporting and other mechanisms to account for prisoners of war and "protected persons."

More recently in July 1977, additional protocols to the Geneva conventions set forth, in the context of armed conflict, even more detailed provisions for tracing the missing and the dead and for protecting the human rights of those held in captivity.

Protocol I asserts "the right of families to know the fate of their relatives," requires governments to gather and transmit all relevant information concerning persons reported missing by an adverse party, and imposes several obligations concerning the remains of all persons who have died for reasons related to hostilities. These legal requirements make available to countries standards and procedures for dealing with prisoners of war and other detained or interned persons and for handling the problem of missing persons in a humane manner.

Let me digress for a moment and explain a dilemma with which we are sometimes faced. In certain countries there have been efforts by some authorities to eliminate the disappearance phenomenon. The numbers of disappeared may decline dramatically. The question then arises of how the United States should respond. Quite clearly, even one person disappearing is one too many. But if we elect not to recognize this "progress," we may perhaps run the risk of strengthening the hands of individuals in or outside a repressive government who may argue that the U.S. human rights appetite is insatiable. If, on the other hand, we choose to recognize the "progress" that has been made, certain governments may incorrectly conclude that we are reconciled to some irreducible minimum of disappearances or other human rights violations. These are not easy questions to resolve. Difficult judgments and hard choices are required. We confront such problems every day, and in almost every case there are honest differences of opinion on how we can best resolve them.

It is also appropriate to note here that this, like other forms of official human rights violations, is not endemic to any country and is not an inevitable concomitant of political unrest or instability. Some of today's worst offenders have long previous histories of high respect for individual rights, even in times of crisis, which gives us hope that they can return to their best traditions. And in recent times, some whose practices have been most deplored have, indeed, done so and thereby not only regained the respect of the world community but also set an example for others.

Role of Embassies and Human Rights Officers

Permit me now to speak about the role of our embassies and the human rights officers in embassies in countries where disappearances take place.

Each embassy has a human rights officer usually in the Political Section whose responsibility is to report on human rights conditions and to present the U.S. Government's views to the host government. Our Ambassadors are charged with human rights responsibilities as personal representatives of the President. They are deeply conscious of the priority he has assigned to human rights in our foreign policy. As the President noted in his remarks to the Hispanic Caucus on September 13th: "From the day that I took office, I have sought to place at the top of my agenda and to awaken the conscience of the world and to bring that conscience about human rights to bear on the world's leaders."

An important part of a human rights officer's responsibilities is to maintain contact with individuals and groups most aware of human rights conditions in the country in which he/she works. He or she must be active and energetic in seeking out these contacts. These include private human rights groups; representatives of the religious community, the legal profession, political opposition, and dissident groups;

State of the Union Address

Following is the text of President Carter's address before a joint session of the Congress on January 23, 1980.[1]

These last few months have not been an easy time for any of us. As we meet tonight, it has never been more clear that the state of our union depends on the state of the world. And tonight, as throughout our own generation, freedom and peace in the world depend on the state of our union.

The 1980s have been born in turmoil, strife, and change. This is a time of challenge to our interests and our values, and it's a time that tests our wisdom and our skills. At this time in Iran 50 Americans are still held captive, innocent victims of terrorism and anarchy. Also at this moment, massive Soviet troops are attempting to subjugate the fiercely independent and deeply religious people of Afghanistan. These two acts—one of international terrorism and one of military aggression—present a serious challenge to the United States of America and indeed to all the nations of the world. Together, we will meet these threats to peace.

I am determined that the United States will remain the strongest of all nations, but our power will never be used to initiate a threat to the security of any nation or to the rights of any human being. We seek to be and to remain secure—a nation at peace in a stable world. But to be secure we must face the world as it is. Three basic developments have helped to shape our challenges:

- The steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders;
- The overwhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East; and
- The press of social and religious and economic and political change in the many nations of the developing world—exemplified by the revolution in Iran.

Each of these factors is important in its own right. Each interacts with the others. All must be faced together—squarely and courageously.

We will face these challenges. And we will meet them with the best that is in us. And we will not fail.

In response to the abhorrent act in Iran, our nation has never been aroused and unified so greatly in peacetime. Our position is clear. The United States will not yield to blackmail. We continue to pursue these specific goals:

- First, to protect the present and long-range interests of the United States;
- Secondly, to preserve the lives of the American hostages and to secure as quickly as possible their safe release;
- If possible, to avoid bloodshed which might further endanger the lives of our fellow citizens;
- To enlist the help of other nations in condemning this act of violence which is shocking and violates the moral and the legal standards of a civilized world;
- To convince and to persuade the Iranian leaders that the real danger to their nation lies in the north in the Soviet Union and from the Soviet troops now in Afghanistan and that the unwarranted Iranian quarrel with the United States hampers their response to this far greater danger to them.

If the American hostages are harmed, a severe price will be paid. We will never rest until every one of the American hostages is released. But now we face a broader and more fundamental challenge in this region because of the recent military action of the Soviet Union. Now, as during the last three and one-half decades, the relationship between our country—the United States of America—and the Soviet Union is the most critical factor in determining whether the world will live in peace or be engulfed in global conflict.

Since the end of the Second World War, America has led other nations in meeting the challenge of mounting Soviet power. This has not been a simple or a static relationship. Between us there has been cooperation, there has been competition, and at times there has been confrontation.

- In the 1940s, we took the lead in creating the Atlantic alliance in response to the Soviet Union's suppression and then consolidation of its East European empire and the resulting threat of the Warsaw Pact to Western Europe.
- In the 1950s, we helped to contain further Soviet challenges in Korea and in the Middle East, and we re-armed, to assure the continuation of that containment.
- In the 1960s, we met the Soviet challenges in Berlin and we faced the Cuban missile crises, and we sought to engage the Soviet Union in the important task of moving beyond the cold war and away from confrontation.
- And in the 1970s, three American Presidents negotiated with the Soviet leaders in attempts to halt this growth of the nuclear arms race. We sought to establish rules of behavior that would reduce the risks of conflict, and we searched for areas of cooperation that could make our relations reciprocal and productive—not only for the sake of our two nations, but for the security and peace of the entire world.

In all these actions, we have maintained two commitments: to be ready to meet any challenge by Soviet military power and to develop ways to resolve disputes and to keep the peace.

Preventing nuclear war is the foremost responsibility of the two superpowers. That is why we've negotiated the strategic arms limitation talks—treaties SALT I and SALT II. Especially now in a time of great tension, observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms of these treaties will be in the best interest of both countries and will help to preserve world peace. I will consult very closely with the Congress on this matter as we strive to control nuclear weapons. That effort—to control nuclear weapons—will not be abandoned.

The 1980s have been born in turmoil and change. This is a time of challenge to our interests and our values, a time that tests our wisdom and our will.

We superpowers will also have the responsibility to exercise restraint in the use of our great military force. The integrity and the independence of weaker nations must not be threatened. They must know that in our presence they are secure. But now the Soviet Union has taken a radical and an aggressive new step. It's using its great military power against a relatively defenseless nation. The implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War.

The vast majority of nations on Earth have condemned this latest Soviet

Our Intelligence Posture

Our national interests are critically dependent on a strong and effective intelligence capability. We will not shortchange the intelligence capabilities needed to assure our national security. Maintenance of and continued improvements in our multifaceted intelligence effort are essential if we are to cope successfully with the turbulence and uncertainties of today's world.

The intelligence budget I have submitted to the Congress responds to our needs in a responsible way, providing for significant growth over the Fiscal Year 1980 budget. This growth will enable us to develop new technical means of intelligence collection while also assuring that the more traditional methods of intelligence work are also given proper stress. We must continue to integrate both modes of collection in our analyses.

It is imperative that we now move forward promptly within the context of effective Congressional oversight to provide America's intelligence community with Charters which can permit it to operate more effectively and within a national concern codified by law.

REGIONAL POLICIES

Every President for over three decades has recognized that America's interests are global and that we must pursue a global foreign policy.

Two world wars have made clear our stake in Western Europe and the North Atlantic area. We are also inextricably linked with the Far East—politically, economically, and militarily. In both of these, the United States has a permament presence and security commitments which would be automatically triggered. We have become increasingly conscious of our growing interests in a third area—the Middle East and the Persian Gulf area.

We have vital stakes in other major regions of the world as well. We have long recognized that in an era of interdependence, our own security and prosperity depend upon a larger common effort with friends and allies throughout the world.

The Atlantic Alliance

At the outset of this Administration I emphasized the primacy of our Atlantic relationship in this country's national security agenda. We have made important progress toward making the Atlantic Alliance still more effective in a changing security environment.

We are meeting the Soviet challenge in a number of important ways:

First, there is a recognition among our allies that mutual security is a responsibility to be shared by all. We are each committed to increase national defense expenditures by 3% per year. There remains much work to be done in strengthening NATO's conventional defense; the work proceeding under the Alliance's Long Term Defense Program will help achieve this objective.

Last month, we and our NATO allies took an historic step in Alliance security policies with the decision to improve substantially our theater nuclear capabilities. The theater nuclear force modernization (TNF) program, which includes the deployment of improved Pershing ballistic missiles and of ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, received the unanimous support of our allies. The accelerated deployment of Soviet SS-20 MIRVed missiles made this modernization step essential. TNF deployments will give the Alliance an important retaliatory option that will make clear to the Soviets that they cannot wage a nuclear war in Europe and expect that Soviet territory will remain unscathed.

While we move forward with our necessary defense efforts in Europe, we are also proceeding with our efforts to improve European security through arms control.

As an integral part of the NATO TNF decisions, the Alliance has made it clear that it is prepared to negotiate limitations on long-range theater nuclear missiles.

On our part, our TNF modernization efforts will make possible a streamlining of our nuclear weapons stockpile in Europe, allowing us to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads over the next year.

In the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks, we and our allies have recently put forward new proposals that are designed to simplify the negotiations and improve the prospect for early progress in limiting conventional military forces in Europe.

In a very real sense the accomplishments of the past year answered a critical question concerning NATO's future: can the Western Alliance, which has provided the foundation for one of the longest periods of peace and prosperity that Europe has ever enjoyed, still summon the essential cohesion, relevance, and resolve to deal with fundamental security issues likely to affect its member nations well into the next century? NATO's consensus in favor of modernizing and negotiating about its nuclear arsenal while continuing to improve conventional forces, dramatized Allied capacity to respond effectively to both the military and political threats posed by the Soviet Union.

Relations with our allies and friends in Europe are taking on ever broader dimensions. Our security agenda remains central; we are addressing new concerns as well.

I met with an unprecedented number of European statesmen in Washington during the year just past, including the leaders of Great Britain, West Germany, Austria, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden, and the European Community; in all of these meetings a common theme was the changing realities of political and economic interdependence and, as we enter a new decade, the need to promote more equitable conditions of peaceful growth and stability throughout the world.

This approach has achieved tangible form in a number of ways. For example, every West European government supports us as we have continued by every peaceful means to seek the release of American hostages held in Tehran in defiance of universal standards of international law and decency. We are consulting and cooperating closely in our responses to the Soviet Union's invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.

In the NATO area itself, we moved together vigorously to meet the serious economic problems faced by Turkey and thereby strengthen a vital part of NATO's southern flank and we have signed a new base agreement with Turkey. This action, though indispensible in its own right, also supported our continuing efforts to promote a solution to the Cyprus problem and to bring about the reintegration of Greece within the military framework of the Atlantic Alliance, objectives which retain high priority this year.

Asia

The United States is a Pacific nation, as much as it is an Atlantic nation. Our interests in Asia are as important to us as our interests in Europe. Our trade with Asia is even greater than our trade with Europe. We have pursued and maintained these interests on the basis of a stable balance of power in the region. Our partnership and alliance

with Japan is central to our Asian policy. We are strengthening our new relationship with China. We have expanded our ties with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member governments.

My trip to the Far East helped forge closer working relationships with Japan and Korea.

Asian Security

The balance of power is fundamental to Asian security. We have maintained that balance through a strong United States military posture in the region, as well as close ties with our allies, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Korea. Over the past year I have worked to stabilize the United States military presence in Asia by concluding an amended base agreement with the Philippines that will last until 1991. We have fostered the closest degree of security cooperation with Japan in the history of our two nations—exemplified by joint planning for the defense of Japan, increased Japanese contributions to United States base costs in Japan, and large-scale Japanese purchases of United States defense equipment. After examining in detail new intelligence estimates of North Korean military strength, I decided to maintain our troop strength in the Republic of Korea at its present level until at least 1981. The reaffirmation of our commitment to Korean security has been of great importance to the Koreans as they make necessary political adjustments in the wake of President Park's assassination.

Response by nations in East Asia to the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan has been gratifying. Australia in particular deserves recognition for the forthright stand it has taken. Japan and the ASEAN nations have also been strongly supportive.

China

Over the last year we have expanded our new relationship with the People's Republic of China to ensure that where our interests coincide, our separate actions will be mutually reinforcing. To this end we have enhanced our consultative relationship. We have also sought to develop an enduring institutional framework in the economic, cultural, scientific, and trade areas.

This process has been facilitated by the successful visits of Vice Premier Deng to the United States and Vice President Mondale to China; through the signing of over 15 commercial, scientific, and cultural agreements; through numerous Cabinet-level visits; and through a significant expansion of trade and the flow of people between our two countries.

During Secretary of Defense Brown's recent trip to the People's Republic of China, wide-ranging talks were held on global and regional issues, arms control, technology transfer, and ways to sustain bilateral contacts. Although we may differ with the Chinese on some issues, our views coincide on many important issues, particularly with respect to the implications for the region of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

In 1980 I look forward to passage by Congress early in the year of the China Trade Agreement and of authorization of OPIC operations in China; we plan to conclude civil aviation, maritime, and textile agreements; and continue to expand our commercial, cultural, and scientific relations, particularly, through ExImBank credits to the People's Republic of China.

Southeast Asia

The countries comprising ASEAN are central to United States interests in Southeast Asia.

Throughout the past year, our relations with ASEAN have continued to expand as our consultative arrangements were strengthened.

We are demonstrating to the Soviet Union across a broad front that it will pay a heavy price for its aggression in terms of our relationship.

The stability and prosperity of Southeast Asia have been severely challenged by Soviet-supported Vietnamese aggression in Cambodia. During this year we will continue to encourage a political settlement in Cambodia which will permit that nation to be governed by leaders of its own choice. We have taken all prudent steps possible to deter Vietnamese attacks on Thai territory by increasing our support to the Thais, and by direct warnings to Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. The other members of ASEAN have stood firmly behind Thailand, and this in great measure has helped to contain the conflict. We have been gratified by Thailand's courageous and humane acceptance of the Cambodian refugees.

Middle East—Persian Gulf—South Asia

Events in Iran and Afghanistan have dramatized for us the critical importance for American security and prosperity of the area running from the Middle East through the Persian Gulf to South Asia. This region provides two-thirds of the world's oil exports, supplying most of the energy needs of our allies in Europe and Japan. It has been a scene of almost constant conflict between nations, and of serious internal instability within many countries. And now one of its nations has been invaded by the Soviet Union.

We are dealing with these multiple challenges in a number of ways.

Middle East. First, it has been a key goal of my Administration since 1977 to promote an enduring resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict—which is so essential to bringing stability and peace to the entire region. Following the Camp David Summit of August 1978, in March 1979, I helped bring about the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel—the first time in 30 years of Middle East conflict that peace had shined with such a bright and promising flame. At the historic signing ceremony at the White House, Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat repeated their Camp David pledge to work for full autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza.

Since then Egypt and Israel have been working to complete this part of the Camp David framework and to provide an opportunity for the Palestinian people to participate in determining their future. I strongly support these efforts, and have pledged that we will be a full partner in the autonomy negotiations. We will continue to work vigorously for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, building on the unprecedented achievements at Camp David.

At the same time, I have reinforced America's commitment to Israel's security, and to the right of all nations in the area to live at peace with their neighbors, within secure and recognized frontiers.

Persian Gulf. In recent years as our own fuel imports have soared, the Persian Gulf has become vital to the United States as it has been to many of our friends and allies. Over the longer term, the world's dependence on Persian Gulf oil is likely to increase. The denial of these oil supplies—to us or to others—would threaten our security

hostage for more than three weeks, and threats have been made that they may be placed on trial.

In view of the extraordinary urgency of this case, which is unlike any before submitted to the Court, I respectfully suggest that you, as President of the Court, urge the Government of Iran to act immediately to appoint its Agent in the case. I further urge that the Court in any event hold any hearing on the request for Interim Measures as soon as it has a quorum. My Government earnestly hopes that the Court will issue an Order indicating appropriate interim measures within days. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations has informed the Security Council, the present crisis constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security.

May I further respectfully suggest that you, as President of the Court, immediately request the Government of Iran to ensure that no steps are taken to inflame opinion against the hostages, to heighten the danger to which they are exposed, or to place them on trial.

I have designated the Legal Adviser of the United States Department of State, the Honorable Roberts B. Owen, as Agent of the United States in this case.

Sincerely

CYRUS VANCE

Sir Humphrey Waldock,
President,
International Court of Justice,
The Hague.

APPLICATION TO THE COURT

Sir,

I have the honor to refer to the following:

(1) the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, and Article I of the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of that Convention;

(2) the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, and Article I of the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of that Convention;

(3) Article XXI(2) of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran of 1955, and

(4) Article 13(1) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973.

Under the jurisdiction thereby conferred upon the Court, I hereby submit, in accordance with Article 40(1) of the Statute and Article 38 of the Rules of Court, this application instituting proceedings in the name of the Government of the United States of America against the Government of Iran in the following case:

I. Statement of Facts

At about 10:30 a.m., Tehran time, on November 4, 1979, during the course of a demonstration of approximately 3,000 persons, the United States Embassy compound in Tehran was overrun by several hundred of the demonstrators. The Iranian Government's security personnel on duty at the Embassy compound apparently made no effort to deter or discourage the demonstrators from the takeover. Access to the compound and Chancery building was gained by cutting chains and removing bars from a Chancery basement window, and control of the first floor of the Chancery was rapidly seized. In the process the invaders took hostage the Embassy security officer, who had come out of the Chancery to negotiate with them, and four of the Embassy's Marine guards. A large group of Embassy personnel, including consular and non-American staff and visitors, took refuge on an upper floor of the Chancery.

About two hours after the beginning of the attack, and after the invaders had attempted to set fire to the Chancery building and to cut through the upstairs steel doors with a torch, the demonstrators gained entry to the upper floor and seized the remaining personnel.

During the two hours of attack on the Embassy, no Iranian security forces were sent to relieve the situation, despite repeated calls for help from the Embassy to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and despite the efforts of the United States Charge d'Affaires, who made contact with the Prime Minister's office and Foreign Ministry officials at the time the attack occurred. No attempt was made by the Government of Iran to clear the Embassy premises, to rescue the personnel held hostage, or to persuade the invaders and demonstrators to terminate their action. Nor did the Government of Iran take any action when, shortly after the Embassy seizure, the U.S. consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz were also seized.

Since the time of the takeover, the Embassy personnel have been held hostage in the compound under threatening and inhumane conditions. Some hostages have been paraded in sight of the crowd outside, blindfolded and hands bound, in full hearing of menacing, chanting crowds. Inside the buildings the hostages have been kept bound, often by hand and foot, forced to remain silent, subjected to other forms of coercion, and denied communication with their families and U.S. officials. Embassy records have been ransacked.

During the entire time and with the support and assistance of the Iranian authorities, demonstrations have been occurring outside the compound, often quite vociferous. A crowd of hundreds of thousands of demonstrators converged on the Embassy on November 22.

Those holding the hostages have refused to release them and have conditioned their release on various unacceptable demands. They have threatened on several occasions that, in certain circumstances, the hostages would be put to death. While 13 hostages were released on November 18 and 20, at least 50 Americans remain in captivity, virtually all of whom are diplomatic agents of the United States or members of the administrative and technical staff of the Embassy. The group holding the Embassy has asserted that the remaining hostages are guilty of espionage and will be tried for their "crimes" if their demands are not met. Non-Iranian outside observers have been permitted only limited access to the hostages. It is not certain that all persons held have been seen, and the conditions during these few visits did not permit free communication with the hostages.

During this continuing ordeal, the Government of Iran is failing and refusing to make any effort to secure the release of the hostages and the return of the Embassy and consular premises to the United States' control. The Government has refused any direct substantive contact with United States Government officials in Tehran or at the United Nations. It refused to admit the special emissaries sent to Iran by the Government of the United States. The United States Charge d'Affaires, who was at the Foreign Ministry at the time the attack began, has been confined to the Foreign Ministry and denied free access both to his diplomatic colleagues from other Embassies and to senior Iranian officials.

Moreover, the Government of Iran, from an early stage of the crisis, has given direct support and encouragement to the group holding the Embassy. Members of that group have been permitted to come and go freely from the compound. The Government of Iran has refused or ignored the repeated requests of the Government of the United States to free the hostages and to restore the Embassy compound to the possession of the United States. The Government of Iran has supported the demands of those holding the hostages, has endorsed the charges of espionage leveled against Embassy personnel, and has threatened to place the personnel on trial for espionage.

II. The Jurisdiction of the Court

Under Paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, the jurisdiction of the Court encompasses "all matters specially provided for . . . in treaties and conventions in force." The United States and Iran are, as members of the United Nations, parties to the Statute, and are also parties to three international conventions, each of which independently establishes the Court's jurisdiction over the present dispute.

First, the United States and Iran are parties to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (done at Vienna, April 18, 1961) and to its Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. As set forth separately in this application, the actions of Iran bearing on this dispute constitute multiple and profound violations of that Convention. Article I of the Protocol provides:

"Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an

application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol."

Second, the United States and Iran are parties to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (done at Vienna, April 24, 1963) and to its Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. Article I of that Protocol is identical in its terms to Article I of the Protocol to the Convention on Diplomatic Relations, *supra*.* The present dispute involves numerous violations of the Consular Convention.

Finally, the United States and Iran are parties to the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, signed in Tehran on August 15, 1955 (284 U.N.T.S. 93). As set forth below, numerous and serious violations of this treaty are also involved in the present dispute. Article XXI, Paragraph 2 of the treaty provides:

"Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific means."

That a dispute exists between the United States and Iran is clear. The present dispute has not been satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, Iran is continuing in its violations, and Iran has refused to discuss pacific settlement of the dispute.

In addition to the foregoing, the United States and Iran are parties to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (done at New York, December 14, 1973). Serious violations of this Convention are also involved in the present dispute. Article 13, Paragraph 1 of the Convention provides:

"Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is not settled by negotiations shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of them may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court."

In light of the urgency of rectifying the present violations of the Convention and Iran's refusal to meet with United States emissaries on the subject, which renders impracticable and infeasible any prior resort to arbitration, it is submitted that the Court is competent to hear the United States' claims under this Convention in connection with its other claims.

III. The Claims of the United States

The Government of the United States, in submitting the dispute to the Court, claims as follows:

(a) Pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to ensure that the persons of United States diplomatic agents be kept inviolate from "any form of arrest or detention" and that every such diplomatic agent shall be treated "with due respect" and protected from "any attack on his person, freedom, or dignity." The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

(b) Pursuant to Article 37 of the same Convention, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to ensure that members of the administrative and technical staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran, and members of the families of United States diplomatic agents and of administrative and technical staff, enjoy the relevant privileges and immunities specified in Article 29 of the Convention. The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

(c) Pursuant to Article 31 of the same Convention, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to ensure that its diplomatic agents shall be absolutely immune "from the criminal jurisdiction" of Iran and that, under Articles 31 and 37 of the Convention, such immunity is accorded to members of the administrative and technical staff of the United States Embassy as well as to the families of diplomatic agents and of administrative and technical staff. By its threats of prosecution, the Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

(d) Pursuant to Article 22 of the same Convention, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to ensure that United States diplomatic premises in Iran "shall be inviolable." The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating this obligation.

(e) Pursuant to Articles 24, 25, 27, and 47 of the same Convention, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to ensure the inviolability of the archives and documents of the United States Embassy in Tehran, to accord full facilities for the performance of the functions of the Embassy, to permit and assist Embassy personnel to depart from Iran, and to preclude discrimination between States in the application of the Convention. The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

(f) Pursuant to Articles 28, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 40 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to ensure that the United States enjoys full facilities for the performance of consular functions; that United States consular premises, documents, and archives are kept inviolate; that the consular personnel of the United States shall enjoy freedom of movement and travel in Iran; that such personnel shall enjoy the right to communicate and contact other United States nationals; that the consular personnel of the United States be treated with respect and protected from attack on their persons, freedom, and dignity; and that United States consular officers be free from arrest or detention. The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

(g) Pursuant to Article 4 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to cooperate in the prevention of crimes against the official premises and the staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran, including an obligation to take all practicable measures to prevent preparations in its territory for the commission of such crimes. The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

(h) Pursuant to Article 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to submit to competent Iranian authorities for the purpose of prosecution all those persons who, since November 4, 1979, have been engaged in committing crimes against the official premises and the staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran. The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligation.

(i) Pursuant to Articles II(4) and XIX of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, the Government of Iran is under international legal obligation to the United States to ensure that nationals of the United States shall receive "the most constant protection and security" within the territory of Iran; that such nationals shall, if placed in custody, receive reasonable and humane treatment; that the United States shall have the full opportunity to safeguard the interests of such detained nationals; and that such nationals shall, while in custody, have full access to United States consular officials and services. The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

(j) Pursuant to Articles XIII and XVIII of the foregoing Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to accord to United States consular officers and employees the privileges and immunities accorded to officers and employees of their rank and status by general international usage and, in particular, immunity from local jurisdiction for acts done in their official capacities and within the scope of their authority; to accord to such consular officers and employees the opportunity to exercise all functions which are in accordance with general international

how rich—can prosper on its own.

With few exceptions, the peoples of North Africa, the Middle East, and Southwestern Asia want a good working relationship with us. They value our know-how, our practicality and inventiveness, our technology, our educational system, and share many of our values. They know we respect their right to solve their own problems and to preserve their own freedom. They know that we do not ask them to be like us but only to work with us in a shared desire for an orderly and peaceful world. Our acceptance of a pluralistic world enables us to contribute rather than to dominate. While they recognize we have our own interests in the area, they also recognize that we will pursue them with respect for their integrity.

Strategy for Peace

This brings me to the third point I mentioned in opening—that the only sensible policy for us in the Middle East is one designed overall to permit us to pursue all our interests simultaneously in conditions of orderly change.

Our problem is that interests as diverse as ours sometimes come into conflict with one another. The most obvious example is the difficulty over the years of pursuing steadfast support for Israel while preserving and developing the relationships we need in the Arab world; nor can we totally thwart Soviet designs on the region or pursue humanitarian aspirations to end the plight of refugees and release valuable resources for economic development so long as the Arab-Israeli conflict is allowed to fester and periodically explode.

We have discovered over the past 6 years that a strategy centered on finding an Arab-Israeli peace best meets our interests. It allows us to work closely with all of the key nations in the Middle East in pursuing a common, if difficult, objective. We have been helped by the common perception in the area that we are the one outside nation able to help obtain settlement by diplomatic means rather than the military means which have proved so fruitless.

We do not delude ourselves that this is an easy task. It is extremely difficult. Nevertheless, this active search for peace not only enables us to pursue the full range of our national interests in the Middle East, it also can claim full support of the American people, harmonizing as it does the strategic, economic, political, moral, and humane interests of this nation. In the Middle East we need not be torn between current perceptions of strategic interests and our humane and moral interests as we were during the decade of Vietnam.

Egyptian-Israeli Peace

The progress of the past year in moving toward an Arab-Israeli peace has been historic. Today after three decades of recurrent war without hope, the prospect for peace in the Middle East is real. For the first time negotiations are directed toward lasting peace—not just temporary armistice. They are built on real achievement by brave and dedicated leaders who have had the courage to put aside fatalistic assumptions about the insolubility of the conflict between them—President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and President Carter. The Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel signed on the White House lawn last March 26 opened the door to negotiated peace between Israel and all its neighbors.

The first gigantic step came in September of last year, when the leaders of Egypt and Israel agreed at Camp David on two "framework" documents for peace in the Middle East. The first set forth the principles for a comprehensive peace and established the basis for proceeding with negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza, where Palestinians would participate in determining their own future. The second document established the basic terms governing an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. When those terms were actually translated into a contractual peace agreement last March 26, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin signed a joint letter addressed to President Carter setting forth a time frame for the West Bank-Gaza negotiations.

Americans can take pride in the role their country played in this historic event. Both leaders have paid tribute to the key role of President Carter. I can say as a professional that without the courage, vision, and persistence of our President, this first practical step in 30 years toward peace in the Middle East would not have been taken.

The Egyptian-Israeli treaty is now being scrupulously implemented. It was reached through mutual concessions—Egypt, by breaking the pattern of confrontation and giving full recognition to Israel; Israel by agreeing to withdraw completely from the Sinai. The treaty opens new avenues for trade and communications; for economic, scientific, and social betterment; and for the enhancement of learning and cultural exchange. Its achievement against heavy odds is a demonstration of men and women everywhere that human reason, common sense, goodwill, hard work, and faith can prevail. Its careful implementation is demonstrating that even those who have been adversaries for generations can overcome enmity and make peace.

Status of the Peace Process

As important as the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty is, it is not an end in itself. It is still only the first step on the long and difficult road to a comprehensive peace. Peace has come to Egypt and Israel; it has not come to the other peoples involved. Until it does, the peoples of Egypt and Israel cannot realize fully the benefits of their peace, and there can be no end to the tension and hostility which have plagued the Middle East. All the governments at Camp David have committed themselves to a comprehensive peace. The process outlined in September 1978, by President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and President Carter at Camp David continues.

The principal unfinished item on the Middle East agenda is the relationship between Israel and its other neighbors, particularly between Israel and the Palestinian Arab people. What we seek, as full partner in continuing negotiations, is a permanent basis for assuring the full security of Israel and, at the same time, satisfaction of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

To that end, Egypt, Israel, and the United States have entered the next phase of negotiations set out in the Camp David framework. For the first time in 30 years, we have begun a negotiation which concentrates on issues of concern to the Palestinians as well as protection of Israel's security. We have embarked on negotiating the series of practical steps laid out at Camp David by which more than 1 million Palestinians living on the West Bank and Gaza—and eventually those displaced by war now living elsewhere—can participate in determining their future.

These negotiations have been underway since late May with Ambassador Robert Strauss heading the American negotiating team. It is important to understand their objective. They are a first stage in dealing with the issues of the West Bank and Gaza. What we are attempting to do is build a political structure—a self-governing authority—on the West Bank and Gaza that takes into account the legitimate interests of both Israelis and Palestinians. This step is designed to pave the way, over a succeeding 5-year transi-

tional period, for working out the final status of these territories. This first step is to give them full autonomy to run their lives through their own self-governing body and to participate in negotiations on the final status of these territories.

This is complicated. No one before has defined "full autonomy" in such circumstances. The three parties to the present talks are developing a transitional arrangement, not deciding the final status of the territories. Yet that self-governing authority must be meaningful and credible so that Palestinians will be willing to vote and participate in picking leaders who will represent them in the next round of negotiations during the 5-year transitional period. Obviously, many deep differences exist at this early stage. Over the past 5 months, the negotiating teams and their two working groups have been laying the technical basis for deciding just what will be the content of autonomy.

Progress has been slow, painstaking, and not highly visible. But it is there in the steady achievements of the working groups. The achievements, though modest, are building blocks for turning autonomy into a reality. As you know, we have a May 1980 target date for completing these first negotiations. It is essential to insure that genuine, if slow, progress is being made, that substantial progress is there by next year, that we are on the way to resolving the remaining difficult issues in order to insure the credibility of the peace process.

This credibility is essential if we are to encourage Palestinians and other Arab nations and leaders to join in the negotiations. They must see that these negotiations are a genuine beginning. It is no secret that a sizable body of opinion in the Arab world remains unconvinced that our course is the right one. Rather than a step toward a comprehensive peace, they see the Egypt-Israel treaty as a separate peace destructive of Arab unity. We hope that attitudes will become more positive as the world sees that these negotiations can produce concrete results.

One of the positive elements in the present situation is that parties on all sides are taking a fresh look at their interests in the present fluid situation. Signs exist that the Palestinians and other Arabs are watching the negotiations closely, that they are carefully considering their next steps, and that a certain sense of realism is emerging in parts of their relationship.

In Israel, too, awareness is growing of the need for creativity and imagination in dealing with the Palestinian problem. As for the United States, we see evidence all around us that more and more Americans understand the need to resolve the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Success will not come overnight. Violence continues to poison the environment. Years of hatred and suspicion are not easily overcome. At Camp David we all recognized this truth. Since the gap between Israeli and Palestinian and other Arab perceptions of each other's motives cannot be bridged in one stroke, the Camp David framework sets up a process for evolving a negotiated solution over time. Each success and the trust which comes with genuine accommodation form the basis for tackling still harder issues in later stages and a context for testing the results of negotiations. What remains for us all is to persevere in the course we have set. This we intend to do—for our own interests in the Middle East, as well as for those of the peoples living there.■

Security Council Meets on Iranian Situation

Following are statements made by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Donald F. McHenry to the press following a Security Council meeting on November 27, 1979, in Security Council sessions on December 1 and 4, and the resolution unanimously adopted by the Council on December 4.

AMBASSADOR McHENRY, NOV. 27, 1979[1]

I can say on a preliminary basis that what you have seen the Council do this afternoon has been to respond to the call of the Secretary General for an immediate meeting and to reject the idea that a situation can be so urgent as to require action under article 99 and then wait until one party finds it convenient to appear.

What we sought to do was to, in a sense, bend over backward to insure that there was no excuse for the consideration of the Council on the issue before it, and that issue, stripped of all of the rhetoric which may be present, is the question of the illegal detention of the American diplomatic personnel and the occupation of the American diplomatic premises in Iran in violation of every principle of international law.

There has been a great deal of discussion within the Council in the consultations over the last several days with regard to the procedure which was to be followed. And some of the discussions went on at interminable length.

Basically what the Council has done has been to publicly and formally not only restate the important principle involved here, which is the inviolability of diplomatic personnel, but to both restate and reiterate that principle and the call for release despite the excuses which have been offered for the action which has been taken. Our effort here was to insure that that was done even while trying to accommodate and to insure that there was no excuse, no impediment to the work of the Council.

I think it is clear from the reiteration of the statement by the President of the Council, on the behalf of all of its members, that the position of the Council with regard to the holding of hostages is one which is unanimously held. In my own experience here in the last 3 weeks since this unbelievable event occurred, I have not come upon any single delegate, whether they are in agreement with the United States on other issues or in disagreement with the United States on other issues, I have yet to find one delegate who has defended the action which has been taken by the authorities in Iran.

I think that one thing is clear, one additional thing is clear, and it is that the unanimity which is present in the Security Council and in the General Assembly as a whole is one which is also present with regard to the American public. Despite efforts to try and take advantage of differences which may exist within our own society, Americans are at one, whether they are women or men, white or black; they are at one in the insistence that American diplomatic personnel held in Iran be released and be released safely and promptly. I think in view of the gravity of the situation, the restraint which has been shown by the American public is a restraint which is both admirable, and I would suggest to you one which must not be misunderstood. It would be a mistake to interpret the restraint which exists as one which in any way acquiesces with the action which has been taken in Iran.

dation of UNICEF that we should continue to place emphasis on providing basic services to the poorest children in the low income countries.

UNICEF has performed admirably as the lead agency for the International Year of the Child. My government looks forward to continued cooperation with UNICEF in the lead agency role as we move into the follow-up phase. At the same time, we urge other U.N. agencies to maintain an awareness of the needs of children in all of their programing.

Let me reiterate our concern about the intolerable situation for many of the children of the world and particularly about the desperate need to save the children of Kampuchea. The governments of the world, together with international organizations, have the ability to vastly improve this situation. My government has supported and will support efforts toward this end. We urge other governments to continue to support and cooperate with these efforts so that children everywhere can have the love and care that they need and which the world requires to advance the common humanity of us all. ■

[1] USUN press release 93.

Central America at the Crossroads

by Viron P. Vaky

Statement before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 11, 1979. Mr. Vaky is Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.[1]

I welcome the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss the situation in Central America. I would like to consider first the overall Central American scene, then the various national contexts and regional aspects, and conclude by reviewing our policy response.

OVERVIEW

Much of Central America—particularly the northern tier—is gripped by a polarizing dynamic of pressure for change, terrorism, and potential radicalization. These wrenching instabilities are rooted in basic underlying structural problems and vulnerabilities. The impact of recent events in Nicaragua is assuredly a factor in the internal politics of all countries in Central America. But even without Nicaragua the situation would be volatile.

The nations of the region face a number of common, interrelated social and economic problems, most of which produce direct pressures for political and systemic change.

• With the exception of Costa Rica, and to some extent Panama, societies in the region are characterized by deep class and, in some cases, ethnic divisions, endemic violence, political atomization, and distrust. Inequalities of opportunity mark the social, political, and class structures in varying degrees. The demands of new middle class entrepreneurs and professionals—an educated, informed, articulate, and generally ambitious group—for a greater national role and share of political power have frequently not been accommodated. The minimal needs of workers and peasants, whose ranks have been swollen by the population explosion, have also remained unmet in varying degree. Growing social tensions and defeated aspirations have, therefore, become natural breeding grounds for alienation, opposition, and violence.

• With the possible exception of Costa Rica and Panama, virtually all of these countries are characterized by unequal and inequitable economic growth, national poverty, and maldistribution of income. While statistically many of these nations show respectable growth, the benefits of progress have, in most cases, accrued to traditional elites; the masses of the people find their situation little changed. Malnutrition and illiteracy rates remain high among the poor majority. Unemployment and underemployment are high and growing.

• Again with the exception of Costa Rica, and to some degree Panama—although the system there is not yet fully open—political institutions have, in the past, tended to be authoritarian and resistant to change. As pressures build up, governments have tended to rely on repression of dissent. Movements expressing pressures for modernization or more basic demands for equity have too often been frustrated by electoral manipulation and violence, censorship of the media, outlawing of political parties, and suspension of constitutional guarantees. Where legitimate channels of redress are choked off, the political situation tends to polarize to the extremes and the likelihood of peaceful evolution and change is reduced.

Political Parties and Groups in Central America

EL SALVADOR

Political Parties and Groups

• National Conciliation Party (*Partido de Conciliacion Nacional*—PCN). The official party; backs progovernment candidates but has few other functions.

• Nationalist Democratic Organization (ORDEN). A rural, military-sanctioned civilian force with an estimated strength of about 30,000. It is ostensibly dedicated to civic education and law enforcement but is occasionally used in political activity. Owing to its record of alleged human rights violations, ORDEN has become a major target of the government's critics at home and abroad.

• United National Opposition (*Union Nacional Opositora*—UNO). Now shaky opposition coalition which includes:

Christian Democratic Party (*Partido Democrata Cristiano*—PDC). The largest opposition party; left-of-center.

National Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Nacional*

• Institutions of all kinds—from public order and social services to press and political parties—are being undermined by socioeconomic strains, human rights violations, and terrorism. These dynamics in turn produce obsession with survival and a temptation to blame external causes for the region's difficulties.

• Economic stress in the form of world inflation, fluctuating commodity prices, and recession have decreased real incomes and lessened the ability of governments to meet popular needs. Petroleum costs have quadrupled, with increasingly severe cumulative effects.

• New political lines and new economic challenges have been drawn in the region. Sandinista Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama will not communicate easily with the passionately antileftist governments of the northern tier. Yet if communication is imperfect, regional tensions will grow, and the cooperation necessary to sustain a strong regional economy and Central American common market will be impeded. Fortunately, indications are that these potential costs are recognized, and tentative but significant efforts at "bridge-building" are in train by all national actors.

In sum, deep grievances; legitimate needs for reform, growth, and modernization; and basic demands for equity are all coursing through the region. These give rise to equally deep pressures for political and systemic change. As in other parts of the world, those aspirations and demands are so fundamental that change cannot be avoided. Defense of the status quo cannot prevent it or cap instability for long; it can only radicalize the dynamics at work.

A complicating factor is that Castroist/Marxist and extreme insurgent groups have seized upon these legitimate aspirations and unstable situations to advance their own objectives. Thereby, they may exacerbate the tensions and the violence, but they do not cause them. The upsurge of terrorism and subversion unfortunately often confuses perception of the realities and strengthens tendencies by those benefiting from the status quo to misidentify the issues and focus on insurgency rather than on the underlying core problems.

If there is any one central motif that characterizes Central America today, it is this intense—and essentially inevitable—pressure for change which has swept into the region. The central issue, in turn, is not whether change is to occur but whether that change is to be violent and radical—or peaceful and evolutionary and preserving individual rights and democratic values.

THE NATIONAL CONTEXTS

The trends, problems, and vulnerabilities described above come together in different, even idiosyncratic, ways in individual countries.

Let me first deal with Nicaragua, whose revolution cannot help but affect its neighbors' political future. Then the "south"—Panama and Costa Rica, each different but representing progressive and moderate forces for change in Central America. Finally, the "northern tier"—Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, now led by conservative establishments where the winds of change are blowing the hardest.

Impact of Nicaragua

For both Latin America and the United States, Nicaragua now presents a critical challenge and a major opportunity. The course of events will influence prospects for democracy else-

Revolucionario—MNR). Small, left-of-center party associated with Social Democratic circles.

National Democratic Union (*Union Democrata Nacional*—UDN). Communist influenced party often considered a legal front.

• Salvadoran Popular Party (*Partido Popular Salvadoreno*—PPS). Small, rightwing party.

Illegal Groups

• Popular Revolutionary Bloc (*Bloque Popular Revolucionario*—BPR). A coalition of teacher, student, and peasant groups claiming a membership of 60,000–80,000. Largely directed or controlled by the FPL (see below); beneficiary of the political polarization.

• The United Popular Action Front (*Frente de Accion Popular Unido*—FAPU). Smaller mass front group controlled by FARN; estimated 8,000–15,000 members.

• Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (*Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion*—FPL). The strongest guerrilla group, professing a revolutionary Marxist creed; probably numbers about 800.

• Armed Forces of National Resistance (*Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional*—FARN). Second most important terrorist group; about 600 strong.

• Popular Revolutionary Army (*Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo*—ERP). Smallest terrorist group.

GUATEMALA

Political Parties and Groups

• National Liberation Movement (*Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional*—MLN). Ultraconservative, linked to rightest terrorist groups; now in opposition, controls more congressional seats than any other party.

• National Action and Reconstruction Party (*Partido de Accion y Reconstrucion Nacional*—PARN). Small, conservative party of former Chief of State Peralta Azurdia.

• Institutional Democratic Party (*Partido Institucional Democratico*—PID). Small, conservative party.

• Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario*—PR). The most powerful party in the government. Originally embracing all elements of the left, it is now centrist, liberal, and mildly nationalistic.

• United Revolutionary Front (*Frente Unido de la Revoluccion*—FUR). Leftwing. Founded by Vice President Villagran Kramer. Formerly led by Manuel Colom Argueta.

• Christian Democratic Party (*Partido Democrata Cristiano*—PDC). Liberal, reformist.

Illegal Groups

• Guatemalan Labor Party (*Partido Guatemalteco de los Trabajadores*—PGT). Communist-led, small; has engaged in some guerrilla actions.

• Rebel Armed Forces (*Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes*—FAR). Left terrorist group.

• Guerrilla Army of the Poor (*Ejercito Guerillero de los Pobres*—EGP). Most potent insurgent force, formed in 1974; about 300 members.

• Guatemalan Workers Militia (*Milicias Obreras Guatemaltecas*—MOG). Rightwing counterterrorist group.

• Secret Anti-Communist Army (*Ejercito Secreto Anticomunista*—EST). Rightwing counterterrorist group.

HONDURAS

• Nationalist Party (*Partido Nacionalista de Honduras*—PNH). Traditional, conservative party; founded in 1911 but with roots in the old liberal-conservative division that characterized Central American political life in the last century.

• Liberal Party (*Partido Liberal de Honduras*—PLH). Traditional liberal party, founded in 1870; now moderately reformist.

• Innovation and Unity Party (*Partido de Inovacion y Unidad*—PINU). Small, centrist; lacks historical base of two major parties.

Agreement relating to the Port Meteorological Office. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement relating to Article II of the agreement in implementation of Article III of the Panama Canal Treaty concerning establishment of a Coordinating Committee. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement relating to Article III of the Panama Canal Treaty concerning the establishment of a Consultative Committee. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement relating to Article III of the agreement in implementation of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty concerning establishment of a Joint Committee. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement relating to the agreements in implementation of Articles III and IV of the Panama Canal Treaty with respect to tax on movable property. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement relating to Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty concerning establishment of a Combined Board. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement relating to Article VI of the Panama Canal Treaty concerning establishment of a Joint Commission on the Environment. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement relating to electric power. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement relating to tropic testing in accordance with the provisions of the agreement on certain activities of the U.S. in Panama. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Sweden

Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters, with patent addendum. Signed at Washington Oct. 30, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 30, 1979.

Tunisia

Agreement concerning cultural cooperation. Signed at Tunis Sept. 28, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 28, 1979.

Turkey

Treaty on extradition and mutual assistance in criminal matters. Signed at Ankara June 7, 1979.[1]

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 28, 1979.

Treaty on the enforcement of penal judgments. Signed at Ankara June 7, 1979.[1]

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 30, 1979. ■

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[1] Not in force.
[2] With reservation.
[3] Not in force for the U.S.
[4] With declaration and reservation.

November 1979

Events pertaining to Iran can be found on page. 44.

Nov. 1
- Secretary Vance departs for Seoul to attend President Park Chung Hee's funeral.
- U.S. announces normalization of diplomatic relations with Equatorial Guinea.

Nov. 2
- A military junta headed by Bolivian Col. Alberto Natusch Busch overthrows the government of President Walter Guevara Arze.
- U.S. suspends assistance to Bolivia in reaction to military takeover.

Nov. 4
- Bolivia's new military government declares martial law.

Nov. 5
- U.N. General Assembly holds Pledging Conference for Emergency Humanitarian Relief to the people of Kampuchea; $210 million in aid is pledged by representatives of 51 nations.

Nov. 6
- U.S. pledges $69 million to help check starvation among Kampucheans.
- UNESCO meeting on Communication Development Activities held Nov. 6-9 at State Department.
- UNHCR sends $60 million to aid Kampuchean refugees in Thailand.

Nov. 7
- Mrs. Carter leaves on fact-finding tour of Kampuchean refugee camps in Thailand to focus international attention on the problem, Nov. 7-10.
- Irish Prime Minister Jack Lynch visits U.S., Nov. 7-15.
- Col. Natusch of Bolivia suspends martial law and press censorship, but remains silent on military-civilian junta.

Nov. 8
- Shelling incident occurs during Mrs. Carter's visit to the Thai-Kampuchean border resulting in significant number of deaths and injuries to innocent civilians.
- Kenya's parliamentary elections are held with both President Moi and Vice President Kabiki returned to office. As in previous elections, a large number of Cabinet Ministers and over half the Parliament were defeated in their bids for reelection.

Nov. 12
- Turkish Prime Minister Demirel announces formation of a government consisting of 28 Ministers in the new Cabinet.
- U.S. and Chinese officials hold first round of talks in Beijing aimed at conclusion of a bilateral consular convention. The talks provide an opportunity for a general review of the positions of the two parties.

Nov. 13
- Israeli Ambassador to Portugal is wounded and his bodyguard killed in an attack on the Israeli Embassy in Lisbon.

Nov. 14
- Palestinian mayors in Israeli-occupied territory resign in protest against the imprisonment and threatened deportation of Nablus Mayor Bossam al-Shakuaa. U.N. Security Council issues unanimous statement expressing its concern.

Nov. 16
- Bolivian Congress, for the first time, selects a woman, Lydia Gueiler, as interim President.
- People's National Party of Ghana wins 8 of 10 parliamentary seats contested in last round of byelections.

Nov. 18
- Thailand opens its borders to 560,000 Kampucheans camped along its frontier.

Nov. 19
- Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko arrives in Spain for a 3-day official visit. While there, he expresses Soviet opposition to Spain's joining NATO.
- Semiannual U.S.-Economic Community high-level consultations held Nov. 19-20 at State Department.

Nov. 20
- Armed fundamentalist Moslems, believed to be from Iran, seize Grand Mosque in Mecca.

Nov. 21
- U.S. Embassy in Pakistan is stormed and partially burned. A U.S. Marine guard is killed and 100 persons are trapped for 5 hours in the security vault before being led to safety by Pakistani Armed Forces.
- Former Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau resigns as leader of the Liberal Party.

Nov. 25
- Minority government of Turkish Prime Minister Demirel wins a vote of confidence in Parliament with the support of the Fundamentalist Nationalist Salvation Party, the National Movement Party, and several Independents. The vote in the 450-seat assembly was 229 to 208, with 13 members abstaining.
- Israel gives up Alma oilfields in the Gulf of Suez to Egypt.

Nov. 26 Newly appointed ambassadors to the U.S. presented their credentials to President Carter—Rafael **Solis** Cerda (Nicaragua), Redha Malek (Algeria), Nicholas F. Parkinson (Australia), Ricardo **Midence** Soto (Honduras), Budimir Loncar (Yugoslavia), and Dr. Peter Hermes (Federal Republic of Germany).

Nov. 27 Soviet leadership promotes Nicolai A. Tikhonov to full membership in the Communist Party ruling Politburo.

Nov. 28 South Africa's Ambassador to El Salvador Archibald G. Dunn, is kidnapped by a group calling itself the Popular Liberation Force.

Nov. 30 State Department announces sanctions against Chile affecting diplomatic, military, and financial relations in response to Chilean failure to carry out a diligent and prompt investigation of murder charges against three former secret police officers accused of the assassination of Orlando Letelier, a Chilean exile, and Ronnie Moffitt, an American citizen, in Washington 1976.

Several thousand people demonstrate near the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait. Kuwaiti security personnel, using tear gas, disperse crowd.

Several explosive devices go off simultaneously on the grounds of the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok. ■

Department of State

November 19–30

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*300	11/19	Harry Roberts Malone sworn in as Ambassador to Rwanda (biographic data).
*301	11/19	U.S., Malaysia amend textile agreement, Oct. 4 and 12.
*302	11/19	U.S. Organization for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), study group 1, Dec. 13.
*303	11/20	Robert B. Oakley sworn in as Ambassador to the Republic of Zaire (biographic data).
*304	11/21	U.S. Organization for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), study group A, Dec. 19.
*305	11/21	Asian-American Foreign Policy Conference, Dec. 1.
*306	11/23	Joint statement following U.S.-Andean Pact meeting.
*307	11/27	Anne Forrester Holloway sworn in as Ambassador to the Republic of Mali (biographic data).
*308	11/27	U.S., Pakistan amend textile agreement, Nov. 13 and 16.
*309	11/28	U.S., India amend textile agreement, Oct. 26 and Nov. 6.
*310	11/28	U.S., Singapore amend textile agreement Sept. 12 and Oct. 16.
311	11/29	U.S. initiates action against Iran in International Court of Justice.
312	11/30	International and U.S. efforts to aid Kampuchean famine.
313	11/30	President of ICJ issues call to parties in hostage case. ■

*Not printed in the BULLETIN.

U.S.U.N.

Press releases may be obtained from the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.

No.	Date	Subject
*71	8/24	Young: Palestinian question, Security Council.
72	8/29	Young: Lebanon, Security Council.
*73	8/31	Announcement of U.S. contribution of $102.9 million as 1979 partial payment toward the U.N. regular assessed budget.
*74	9/4	Cardwell: apartheid and women, preparatory committee for the World Conference of the Decade for Women.
*75	9/4	Ambassador to lead trade mission to Africa.
*76	9/11	McHenry: death of Angolan President Neto.
77	9/12	Hormats: world economy, Committee of the Whole, Sept. 12.
*78	9/12	Petree: admission of Saint Lucia, Security Council.
*79	9/18	McHenry: admission of Saint Lucia, General Assembly.
80	9/18	U.S. representatives and alternate representatives to the 34th U.N. General Assembly (biographic data).
81	9/21	Petree: Kampuchean credentials, General Assembly.
82	9/21	Reis: Venda, Security Council.
83	9/24	Vance: opening session of the General Assembly.
*84	9/27	Busnell: Nicaraguan relief and reconstruction assistance, ECLA Committee of the Whole.
*85	10/1	Saddler: financial reports and accounts, Committee V.
*86	10/8	Graham: foreign economic interests, Committee IV.
*87	10/11	Graham: foreign economic interests, Committee IV.
*88	10/11	Dunfey: foreign economic interests, Committee IV.
89	10/12	Rosen: energy, Committee II.
*90	10/16	Rosenthal: atomic radiation, Special Political Committee.
*91	10/16	Brecher: assistance to Nicaragua, Committee II.
*92	10/16	Saddler: program budget, Committee V.
93	10/17	Young: IYC, General Assembly.
*94	10/18	Coopersmith: racial discrimination, Committee III.
95	10/18	Seignious: arms control, Committee I.
*96	10/18	Jill Schuker named Counselor for Public Affairs (biographic data).
*97	10/19	Rosenthal: UNRWA, Special Political Committee.
*98	10/19	McHenry: Special Committee Against Apartheid's Day of Solidarity With South African Political Prisoners.
99	10/22	McHenry: economic dialogue, General Assembly.

usage; and to ensure that consular offices are not entered by the police or other local authorities except in case of fire or other disaster. The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

(k) The Government of Iran, or persons acting with its support and approval, are holding United States citizens as hostages and are threatening the lives of these hostages in order to coerce the United States into taking actions which the United States has no international legal obligation to take. This exercise of coercion is in violation of Iran's obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, particularly Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, and Article 33.

(l) The Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to respect and observe, and ensure respect for and observance of, the obligations of Iran under customary international law to ensure the immunities of the diplomats and staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran, the inviolability of its Embassy, and the protection of its nationals. The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

IV. Judgment Requested

Accordingly, the United States requests the Court to adjudge and declare as follows:

(a) That the Government of Iran, in tolerating, encouraging, and failing to prevent and punish the conduct described in the preceding Statement of Facts, violated its international legal obligations to the United States as provided by

- Articles 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 37 and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
- Articles 28, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 40 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
- Articles 4 and 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, and
- Articles II(4), XIII, XVIII, and XIX of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights Between the United States and Iran, and
- Articles 2(3), 2(4), and 33 of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) That pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations, the Government of Iran is under a particular obligation immediately to secure the release of all United States nationals currently being detained within the premises of the United States Embassy in Tehran and to assure that all such persons and all other United States nationals in Tehran are allowed to leave Iran safely;

(c) That the Government of Iran shall pay to the United States, in its own right and in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, reparation for the foregoing violations of Iran's international legal obligations to the United States, in a sum to be determined by the Court; and

(d) That the Government of Iran submit to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution those persons responsible for the crimes committed against the premises and staff of the United States Embassy and against the premises of its Consulates.

The Government of the United States further requests the Court to indicate interim measures of protection as set forth in a separate request filed concurrently with this Application.

The Government of the United States has designated the undersigned as its Agent for the purposes of these proceedings. All communications relating to this case should be sent to the Embassy of the United States, The Hague, Lange Voorhout 102.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERTS B. OWEN
The Legal Adviser

The Registrar,
International Court of Justice,
The Hague.

APPENDED STATEMENT

I, David D. Newsom, certify and declare the following:

1. I am Under Secretary for Political Affairs of the United States Department of State. I have been vested by the Secretary of State with overall responsibility within the Department for matters relating to the crisis in Iran.

2. In this capacity, I have closely monitored events since the attack on the United States Embassy in Tehran began. The facts stated in the Application of the United States to the Court are, to the best of my knowledge, true.

DAVID N. NEWSOM

REQUEST FOR INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION

The Registrar
International Court of Justice

Sir,

1. I have the honor to refer to the Application submitted to the Court this day instituting proceedings in the name of the Government of the United States of America against the Government of Iran and to submit, in accordance with Article 41 of the Statute of the Court and Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court, an urgent request that the Court indicate provisional measures which ought to be taken promptly to preserve the rights of the Government of the United States.

2. The compelling reasons for this request are set out in the Statement of Facts of the Application of the United States to the Court. The facts set forth therein have been verified in the appended statement of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs of the United States Department of State. The premises of the Embassy and Consulate of the United States in Tehran have been invaded by large numbers of persons acting with the support and under the apparent authority of the Government of Iran, and remain occupied without the authorization of the United States. At least fifty United States citizens, virtually all of whom are diplomatic agents or administrative and technical staff of the Embassy, are being held hostage. The conditions of their detention are harsh, demeaning, dangerous and in flagrant violation of international law. The Iranian authorities have stated that the hostages will be kept until the United States complies with various demands. The Government of Iran has also threatened to submit the hostages to criminal trial and punishment, despite their entitlement to diplomatic and other immunities. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has convoked the United Nations Security Council because of this "grave situation". In exercise of his exceptional powers under Article 99 of the United Nations Charter, he has informed the Security Council that "the present crisis poses a serious threat to international peace and security".

3. The Government of the United States submits that the interim measures of protection requested are urgently needed to preserve the rights of the United States. The United States in its Application primarily requests the Court to adjudge and declare that Iran shall release immediately and permit to depart from Iran immediately all hostages and other members of the Embassy of the United States who are not of Iranian nationality, shall restore to the United States its embassy premises, shall be held in violation of multiple international legal obligations, and shall pay to the United States reparations for numerous grave violations of the international legal rights of the United States. Interim measures of protection are required to preserve the following rights of the United States: the rights of its nationals to life, liberty, protection and security; the rights of inviolability, immunity and protection for its diplomatic and consular officials; and the rights of inviolability and protection for its diplomatic and consular premises. The Court can grant and Iran can execute a decision providing effective and meaningful redress only if the lives and physical and emotional well-being of the hostages are preserved. In the volatile circumstances existing in Tehran, the hostages are, to an anguishing degree, in continuing jeopardy; their situation could sharply deteriorate at any moment. In the absence of effective measures of protection, a tragedy of an irreparable kind could result. It is these possible consequences of the Court's not indicating provisional measures that so urgently impel the United States to request them.

4. Moreover, the Government of the United States submits that the urgent need for interim measures of protection is reinforced by the dangers to the fabric of diplomatic relations and international law which are posed by the continued detention of United States diplomatic personnel. Each day that this condition continues causes irreparable damage to principles of international law and the fundamentals of diplomatic relations. Indeed, recent events in other countries demonstrate that continuation of this situation in Tehran presents a clear and present danger to the safety of the diplomatic community at large. Moreover, should the Government of Iran proceed to implement a possible course of action which it has threatened, namely, to place diplomats on trial for alleged criminal acts of espionage, the principles of international law and the fundamentals of diplomatic relations will have been irreparably damaged. No judgment of the Court will be able to undo the taking of so lawless and extraordinary a step.

5. In view of the considerations referred to in the foregoing paragraphs and in the Application of the United States, I respectfully request, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, that, pending final judgment in this suit, the Court indicate forthwith the following:

(a) That the Government of Iran immediately release all hostages of United States nationality and facilitate the prompt and safe departure from Iran of these persons and all other United States officials in dignified and humane circumstances.

(b) That the Government of Iran immediately clear the premises of the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulate of all persons whose presence is not authorized by the United States Charge d'Affaires in Iran, and restore the premises to United States control.

(c) That the Government of Iran ensure that all persons attached to the United States Embassy and Consulate should be accorded, and protected in, full freedom within the Embassy and Chancery premises, and the freedom of movement within Iran necessary to carry out their diplomatic and consular functions.

(d) That the Government of Iran not place on trial any person attached to the Embassy and Consulate of the United States and refrain from any action to implement any such trial.

(e) That the Government of Iran ensure that no action is taken which might prejudice the rights of the United States in respect of the carrying out of any decision which the Court may render on the merits, and in particular neither take nor permit action that would threaten the lives, safety, or well-being of the hostages.

6. In view of the gravity of the current situation caused by the actions taken and threatened by the Government of Iran and by persons acting under its authority or with its support, the Government of the United States urges that this request be treated as a matter of extreme urgency. In this connection, the attention of the Court is invited to the letter from the Secretary of State of the United States to the President of the Court, a copy of which is attached, which is submitted in conformity with Article 74, paragraph 4, of the rules of the Court. In view of the extreme urgency of the case, the United States further respectfully requests that the Court set a hearing on this request at the earliest possible date.

7. The undersigned is authorized by the Government of the United States of America to appear before the Court in any proceedings or hearings relating to this request which the Court may convene in accordance with the terms of Article 74, paragraph 3 of the Rules of the Court.

ROBERTS B. OWEN
Agent for the Government of the
United States of America

RESPONSE FROM THE ICJ, NOV. 30, 1979[2]

The Registrar of the International Court of Justice has sent on November 30, 1979, the following communication to Roberts B. Owen, the Legal Adviser of the State Department, who is representing the United States in the case the United States has brought against Iran before the Court:

I have the honor to refer to the Application of the United States of America, instituting proceedings against Iran on 29 November and to simultaneous request filed by the United States for indication of provisional measures. The President directs me to express his hope that the two governments concerned will take into account the fact that the matter is now *sub judice* before the International Court. This being so the President, in conformity with Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, draws the attention of both parties to the need to act in such a way as will enable any order the Court may make on the request for provisional measures to have its appropriate effects. A similar communication addressed today to Government of Iran. Court will hold public hearings at an early date to afford parties the opportunity of presenting their observations on request for interim measures. Projected date and time for such hearings is Monday, 10 December, at 3 p.m.

The provisional measures which the United States has requested and to which the Registrar referred were as follows:

(a) That the Government of Iran immediately release all hostages of United States nationality and facilitate the prompt and safe departure from Iran of these persons and all other United States officials in dignified and humane circumstances.

(b) That the Government of Iran immediately clear the premises of the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulate of all persons whose presence is not authorized by the United States Charge d'Affaires in Iran, and restore the premises to United States control.

(c) That the Government of Iran ensure that all persons attached to the United States Embassy and Consulate should be accorded, and protected in, full freedom within the Embassy and Chancery premises, and the freedom of movement within Iran necessary to carry out their diplomatic and consular functions.

(d) That the Government of Iran not place on trial any person attached to the Embassy and Consulate of the United States and refrain from any action to implement any such trial.

(e) That the Government of Iran ensure that no action is taken which might prejudice the rights of the United States in respect of the carrying out of any decision which the Court may render on the merits, and in particular neither take nor permit action that would threaten the lives, safety, or well-being of the hostages.

The United States welcomes the action of the President of the International Court of Justice and urges that the hearing take place at the earliest feasible time. ■

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[1] Press release 311.

*Articles II and III of the Protocols to the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations both provide that the parties may agree on alternate procedures—arbitration or conciliation—in lieu of proceeding directly to this Court. No such agreements have been made. Indeed, the Iranian authorities have refused to discuss the dispute—still less modes of settlement of it—with United States emissaries. The terms of the preambles to both Protocols demonstrate the intent of the protocols to make recourse to the Court unconditional and not dependent upon joint pursuit by the parties of the options of arbitration or conciliation. They provide that: "*expressing their wish* to resort *in all matters* concerning them in respect of *any* dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, *unless some other form of settlement has been agreed upon by the parties within a reasonable period . . . .*" (Emphasis supplied.) [Text in Original.]

[2] Press release 313.

(United Nations photo by M. Grant)

General view of the Security Council on December 4, 1979, when the 15 members (U.S., Norway, Portugal, U.K., Gabon, France, Bolivia, Bangladesh, U.S.S.R., Zambia, Nigeria, Czechoslovakia, China, Jamaica, and Kuwait) unanimously adopted a resolution calling on Iran to immediately release the U.S. personnel being held in Tehran.

Our expectation is that the Council will meet on Saturday. We specifically insisted that it not only have a day given but that the Council would have to set a time, and we insisted that the Iranians had to submit a letter to the President of the Security Council this morning, prior to any agreement on this afternoon's activities, indicating that they would be present and indicating the individual who would be present.

Our hope is that the efforts of the Secretary General over the last 3 weeks will be facilitated by the process which has been set in train.

There is one final point which I wish to make. I have read some of your statements in terms of dissension within the Council and I think that in some instances individuals, members of the Council, are done a disservice by the interpretations, snippets here and there, because I think as was indicated by the unanimous statement which the President read, the Council is at one on the question of the release of the hostages and maintains that position despite the effort to put this in a broader context.

AMBASSADOR McHENRY, DEC. 1, 1979[2]

Twenty-seven days ago, 63 Americans, as well as personnel of other nationalities, were seized when an armed, disciplined group of demonstrators invaded the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Eighteen of those captured have been released. At least 50 Americans remain captive.

As with diplomats everywhere, the individuals who were taken hostage are entitled to the protection of the Government of Iran by the most solemn commitment nations can give—the sovereign pledge of governments by treaty and international obligation.

Governments retain the right to require that foreign diplomatic personnel leave their soil. But every standard of international behavior, whether established by practice, by ethics, by treaty, or by common humanity, supports the principle that the personnel of a diplomatic mission and diplomatic property are inviolate. Even in the darkest moments of relationships between countries, the security and well-being of diplomatic personnel have been respected.

Iran asks that its grievances be heard and acted upon. Yet Iran, and the authorities who speak for it, are violating the most basic obligation of nations. They hold hostage the very people who facilitate those communications that can resolve differences and lead to understanding and agreement among nations.

None of us, whatever our differences on other issues, can ignore the implications for all of us of this event. Nor can the world ignore that these diplomatic representatives are being held under degrading conditions. They are threatened, kept bound, isolated, not allowed to speak, denied mail. Even their whereabouts are uncertain. All of us at this table are also diplomatic representatives of our countries, charged with the same duties and protected by the same laws and rules of conduct as those now held captive in Tehran. It is for all of us to speak up to demand their release and to insist upon basic conditions of humanity for their care pending that release, including daily visitation by impartial observers.

Many members of the United Nations, including some members of this Council, have had ambassadors murdered, diplomatic personnel injured, embassy facilities destroyed. On each occasion the delicate framework of our international community has been harmed, but efforts were made to repair the wounds. The situation in Tehran has a feature unlike other assaults on the diplomatic ties that bind our world. In Iran, the government itself defends the violence which holds diplomats hostage. Such a position is intolerable.

The United States insists that its diplomatic personnel be released and its diplomatic premises restored. These are not negotiable matters. The United States will hold the authorities in Iran fully responsible for the safety of the Americans held captive.

I speak today for hostages who are endangered by the frenzy and uncertainty of events, by the inhumane conditions under which they are held, and by the threat of the authorities in Iran to compound unjust acts through trials.

Around the world, nations of East and West, North and South, in individual and collective statements, have expressed their opposition to this violation of international law and called for the immediate release of the hostages. We express our appreciation for this overwhelming expression of international concern and support in behalf of principles that lie at the heart of civilized international behavior.

In this spirit, the President of the Security Council, speaking for the members of this body, has twice urgently appealed for the release of the hostages. The President of the General Assembly has twice spoken eloquently in support of this plea. The Secretary General of the United Nations has worked unceasingly to resolve this crisis.

There has not been a satisfactory response, and the hostages are still not free. We gather here to determine what more can be done.

None of us is deaf to the passionate voices that speak of injustice, that cry out against past wrongs, and that ask for understanding. There is not a single grievance alleged or spoken in this situation that could not be heard in an appropriate forum.

In addition, as we have said from the beginning, the United States remains ready, upon the release of the

hostages, to discuss with the Iranian authorities the differences which exist between us and to seek their resolution.

But no country can call for justice while at the same time denying it to the defenseless. No country can breach the most fundamental rules of the community of nations and at the same time expect that community to be helpful in the problems which it perceives for itself.

In the simplest terms, no country can break and ignore the law while seeking its benefits.

What is it that the world can agree upon if not the protection and respect for those whom we appoint to represent our sovereignty and resolve our differences?

The United States insists that its diplomatic personnel be released and its diplomatic premises restored. These are not negotiable matters.

How tragic for Iran, how tragic for the world that threats to peace are being driven to a new crescendo. The most powerful voices in Iran are encouraging violence in neighboring countries and condoning bloodshed rather than condemning it. In addition, totally unfounded charges which can only inflame the situation are being made against the United States with respect to the current crisis.

The United States, in all the years of its history, has had as a fundamental principle the freedom of all people to worship as they choose. Out of this history and long association, we honor and respect the leaders and the nations of Islam.

The principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations is both a tenet of the United Nations and of the foreign policy of the United States, and that includes, of course, respect for the territorial integrity, political independence, and sovereignty of Iran. We respect the right of the people of Iran to determine their own future through institutions of their own choosing. All of us must accept their decisions.

The President of the United States, speaking for a unified and determined nation, has made it clear that we are seeking a peaceful resolution to this conflict so that the wounds of the past can be healed. In this spirit, the United States has turned to the Security Council and the Secretary General in the search for a peaceful solution. In this spirit, the United States has begun proceedings in the International Court of Justice.

There is in the United States a unity of purpose, a disciplined sensitivity to the needs of peace, a determination to search out all peaceful means to bring this dispute to a just conclusion, and also a determination to do what must be done to protect our fellow citizens and the rule of law. That unity of purpose is shared by all Americans. But make no mistake. Beneath that discipline is a seething anger which Americans properly feel as they witness on daily television new threats and outrages against their fellow citizens. The hostages must be freed.

AMBASSADOR McHENRY, DEC. 4, 1979[3]

The 15 members of the Security Council in their action today have given unanimous expression once more to their urgent call on the Government of Iran for the immediate and unconditional release of the hostages of our Embassy being held in Tehran. They have called on the Government of Iran to provide the hostages protection and to allow them to leave the country.

It is clear from this vote and from the debate of the last 4 days, in which representatives from all parts of the world have participated, that the family of nations speaks with one voice in calling for the immediate release of the hostages. We are deeply appreciative.

We hope that this call of the Security Council will be heeded and carried out by the Government of Iran in a matter of hours. Whatever the time required, we urge the Secretary General, in the exercise of his good offices, to provide all humanitarian support possible to those being detained against their will. We remain deeply concerned for their safety, their well-being, and their health on this, their 30th day of suffering and isolation.

The United States wishes to place on the record that the adoption of this resolution by the Security Council clearly is not intended to displace peaceful efforts in other organs of the United Nations. Neither the United States nor any other member intends that the adoption of this resolution should have any prejudicial impact whatever on the request of the United States for the indication of provisional measures of protection by the International Court of Justice.

With the hostages released, the resolution calls on the Governments of Iran and the United States to take urgent steps to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States is fully prepared to cooperate with this call.

Many speakers in this debate have also referred to the grievances of the people of Iran. I myself did so when I remarked that: "None of us is deaf to the passionate voices that speak of injustice, that cry out against past wrongs, and that ask for understanding. There is not a single grievance alleged or spoken in this situation that could not be heard in an appropriate forum." The Security Council has now also noted those grievances in its acknowledgment of the Iranian letter of November 13, 1979.

Neither the United States nor the other members of the community of nations has a desire to isolate Iran. We are all members of the United Nations. Let us then, all of us, be true to the purposes and principles of the charter which we have pledged ourselves to honor.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 457[4]

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter dated 25 November 1979 from the Secretary-General (S/13646),

Deeply concerned at the dangerous level of tension between Iran and the United States of America, which could have grave consequences for international peace and security,

Recalling the appeal made by the President of the Security Council on 9 November 1979 (S/13616), which was reiterated on 27 November 1979 (S/13652),

Taking note of the letter dated 13 November 1979 from the Foreign Minister of Iran (S/13626) relative to the grievances of Iran,

Mindful of the obligation of States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered,

Conscious of the responsibility of States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Reaffirming the solemn obligation of all States Parties to both the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1962 to respect the inviolability of diplomatic personnel and the premises of their missions,

where and have an important impact on U.S.-Latin American relations.

The new Government of National Reconstruction (GNR) took office July 20 in a country left without functioning political, economic, or security institutions. Almost half of Nicaragua's population was displaced, and the country is now struggling with massive problems of hunger and unemployment. The loss of life and physical destruction were staggering. The United Nations has reported that 45,000 persons were killed, 160,000 wounded, and 40,000 orphaned, while Agency for International Development (AID) figures indicate some 1 million in need of food and 250,000 in need of shelter. Economic losses approach $2 billion. The Nicaraguan economy is completely disrupted.

Initially formed in exile, the new Nicaraguan Government is a coalition comprised of former guerrilla and civic leaders. It consists of a five-member junta as the executive authority, a 19-member Cabinet, and a 33-member National Council still in the process of formation. The Sandinista National Directorate, made up of guerrilla leaders, some with close ties to Cuba, wields major influence.

Since the GNR formally took office July 20, the following have become clear.

- Nicaragua's humanitarian and reconstruction needs are immediate and too great to be met by Nicaraguans alone.
- Administrative confusion and improvisation remain widespread, but the change of government is popularly accepted, and there is definite movement toward restoration of public order.
- The GNR has shown generally moderate, pluralistic tendencies in its initial policies. It is not distinguishably Marxist or Cuban in orientation, although Marxist figures are present in key positions. It has restrained reprisals, promulgated a decree guaranteeing individual rights, and permitted an independent press and radio. It has promised free elections. In foreign affairs the GNR has indicated a desire for friendly relations with all countries including their northern neighbors. Nicaraguan leaders have denied any intention of "exporting revolution."
- Nevertheless, the political situation remains very fluid, with heterogeneity, confusion, and flux in the power dynamics. The country's political and economic future thus remain unclear, and many outcomes or scenarios are still possible within the framework of the Sandinista revolution.

The central issue in the Nicaraguan situation, therefore—whether in terms of its internal system, its relations to Cuba, its attitude toward its neighbors—is the extent to which a moderate, pluralistic, and equitable democratic order can emerge in a country with few democratic traditions and whose new and inexperienced leaders could resort to authoritarianism to cope with the enormous tasks facing them.

The course of the Nicaraguan revolution will thus depend in part on how the United States perceived it and relates to it. Indeed, Nicaragua's future internal policies and relationships with the outside world will, in fact, be determined by those Nicaraguans who best define and meet the country's needs during the reconstruction period. The individual leaders who do so will necessarily have outside contacts. But who they will be and the terms on which they relate to each other and to outsiders will not be predetermined by the past guerrilla war against Somoza. It will depend on the reconstruction of Nicaragua from that war.

The "South"

Costa Rica has long had an excellent functioning democracy, and Panama has been moving toward a more open political system. Economic and social problems exist but the process of change and accommodation functions sufficiently well to keep the internal situation fairly stable.

Both countries have established close and cooperative relationships with the Nicaraguan Government. Having supported the Sandinista cause, they are not disposed to see the Nicaraguan revolution turn out "radical." The leaders of these countries will continue to use their influence to urge moderation. Both countries have, relative to their resources and capacities, extended significant amounts of technical and material assistance to Nicaragua.

Panama. U.S. interests in Panama, though more extensive than the presence of the Panama Canal, revolve primarily around the canal. The Panama Canal treaties of 1977 enter into force on October 1. With that date approaching very fast, we are trying to insure the continued smooth and orderly functioning of the canal under the new treaty relationships with Panama. For this reason, I hope that the Senate and the House will proceed promptly to enact the implementing legislation necessary to exercise our responsibilities under the treaty.

- Christian Democrat Party (*Partido Cristiano Democratico*—PCD). Organized in 1962 but not yet accorded legal recognition by the government. Associated with a Christian Democratic trade union confederation (CGT) and a Christian Democratic peasant association (UNC).
- Communist Party of Honduras (*Partido Communista de Honduras*—PCH). Soft-line Communist Party; outlawed since 1963. Funded largely by the Soviets. Negligible electoral strength; has pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions.

COSTA RICA

- Unity Party (*Partido Unidad*—PN). Government coalition; constituent groups are:

  Democratic Renovation Party (*Partido de Renovacion Democratica*). President Carazo's party.
  Calderonista Republican Party (*Partido Republicano Calderonista*). Traditional conservative party originally founded by Ramon Calderon; now led by Foreign Minister.
  Christian Democratic Party (*Partido Democratica Cristiano*).
  Popular Union (*Union Popular*). Small, rightwing group.

- National Liberation Party (*Partido de Liberacion Nacional*—PLN). Founded by Jose Figueres. Reformist, non-Marxist.
- United People (*Pueblo Unido*). Coalition of leftwing groups. Components are:

  Popular Vanguard Party. Orthodox Communist.
  Partido de Accion Socialista. Communist splinter group.
  Partido Obrero. Small radical group linked to Sandinista movement.
  Frente Popular. Small, leftist group.

PANAMA

Parties are officially suspended. The suspension was relaxed prior to the 1978 elections, but no candidates were permitted to run on party tickets. Main parties are:

- *Partido Panamenista*. One of two major pre-1969 parties (the other being the PLN). Led by the charismatic former President Arnulfo Arias.
- *Partido Liberal Nacional*. Stems from the Colombian Liberal Party. Led by David Samudio.
- *Partido Revolucionario Democratico*. Left-of-center Torrijista party. Organized in 1978.

Other opposition parties are:

- *Partido Democrata Cristiano*
- *Movimiento Independiente Democratico*
- *Partido del Pueblo de Panama*. The Communist Party. ■

Panama has been relatively stable since the 1968 coup that deposed President Arnulfo Arias. We have expressed concern about human rights conditions in the past. Constitutional reforms and other measures taken since 1977 have provided for movement toward a more open and democratic political system and for more engagement of the people in reform measures and in developmental projects. Although opposition parties are pushing for more and faster political reforms, we do not see at this time a real threat to the civilian government of President Royo.

Panama's current economic situation is difficult. Problems stem largely from the same factors that are affecting the United States—inflation and energy imports. Economic pressures and issues have caused disaffection with the government and will continue to do so until the situation eases through new investment, improved official economic management, and a possible increase in confidence when the treaties enter into force.

Some 10 opposition parties have formed a National Opposition Front for the purpose of seeking prompt reforms, particularly the holding of early elections for a new government. The two major participants in the front—the Panamanistas, headed by Arnulfo Arias, and the Liberals—have no foreign links and are themselves often at odds over tactics. The smaller Christian Democratic Party is linked to the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America and Western Europe.

Costa Rica. Costa Rica continues to enjoy a stable democratic political system. Strong democratic traditions have served to give the country an outstanding human rights record. Freedom to participate in the political process is provided for in the constitution and respected in practice. Elections are free, open, and highly competitive.

Normally one of the best managed economies in the region, Costa Rica is experiencing internal stresses stimulated by oil price increases, internal labor difficulties, and the spillover of turmoil from neighboring Nicaragua. The security situation is stable.

Our bilateral relations with Costa Rica are close and cordial. Problems are dealt with in a friendly, straightforward, and pragmatic manner.

The "Northern Tier"

The Governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras tend to see the world through a different lens than that used in the "south." They are apprehensive over the Nicaraguan revolution and what its impact will be. Anxiety over their future pervades these governments, which expect to have to contend with a new rash of insurgency.

Although circumstances vary among them, all three societies are relatively closed. Political systems and processes are relatively restricted. Economic development is at varying levels, but a small elite is the main beneficiary in each country, and opportunities for upward mobility remain limited. The incidents of violence, repression, and human rights violations are high in Guatemala and El Salvador.

With limited channels of redress or free political flow, dissent tends to back up into pressure and instability. Political and social tensions, instabilities, and polarization are considerably higher here than in the rest of the region, although domestic circumstances vary. El Salvador is the most volatile, given conflict between activated and polarized political and social groups, while Honduras is the most tranquil with optimistic prospects for social and political modernization.

El Salvador. El Salvador—the smallest and most densely populated country in Central America—presents a classic setting for social and political unrest. Its population density—at 565 persons per square mile—is the highest of any country in the Western Hemisphere. Population growth of 3.2% and agricultural land pressures have pushed the unemployment-underemployment rate above 30%. New jobs in industry absorb less than one-sixth of labor force entrants, and agriculture provides jobs for only one-half of new job seekers. Many Salvadorans, faced with poverty and lack of opportunity, have chosen to emigrate.

The export-oriented economy is characterized by a highly skewed distribution of income, wealth, and land. In agriculture, for example, 2% of the population owns almost 60% of the land. A small oligarchy controls much of industry and agriculture and has great influence on the quasimilitary government. The class structure is one of the most rigid in Latin America. Human rights violations have been serious, as noted in the Department's report on the human rights situation submitted to the Congress last January.

Under a constitutional system in place since 1962, military candidates have been regularly elected to the presidency under the banner of the official *Partido de Conciliacion Nacional*. The political system has not accommodated dissent and demands for change well.

Political, economic, and social rigidities under successive regimes have not allowed a sufficient outlet for rising frustration and dissatisfaction. This atmosphere has spawned a dramatic increase in leftist terrorism, and terrorist movements have flourished, their actions accelerating a drift toward revolutionary violence.

The country has thus been caught in a chronic national crisis; antigovernment activity is rampant, often begetting violence, and trust is lacking on all sides. In these circumstances polarization is far advanced, and the prospects for avoiding insurrectional violence are rapidly dimming.

Fortunately, however, there are signs that President Romero, the moderate opposition, and the private sector are crucially aware of this spiraling polarization and some evidence of a desire to find some reconciliation. In mid-August President Romero announced a series of significant electoral measures, which if they can be effectively implemented, hopefully would go far to end the spiraling violence, frustration, and polarization. Halting human rights abuses against the integrity of the person will also be crucial to allowing an atmosphere to develop which will permit these reforms a realistic chance of success.

President Romero's commitment to free municipal and legislative elections in March 1980 and to measures to reform and open up the electoral system is particularly encouraging. He also invited all political exiles to return, has asked the Organization of American States (OAS) for observers and advisors to assist in electoral reform, and has invited the International Red Cross to visit the prisons to judge conditions there.

Guatemala. Guatemala is the most populous and the most economically significant country in Central America. The nation's population is divided into two distinct ethnic groups, each with its own languages and culture. The Indians, embracing 20 distinct indigenous tongues, make up 40% of the total population and remain both physically and culturally separate from the larger Spanish-speaking group. The urban population growth rate of 4.4% is among the region's fastest. Even so, rural areas still account for over 60% of the population.

The economy is largely agrarian, with agriculture employing 55% of the labor force and contributing a little

100	10/24	McHenry: address before the Appeal of Conscience Foundation awards dinner, New York, Oct. 23.
*101	10/24	Vanden Heuvel: human rights, Committee III.
*102	10/25	Morgenthau: food, Committee II.
*103	10/26	Vanden Heuvel: Czechoslovak dissidents, Committee III.
*104	10/31	Dunfey: TTPI, Committee IV.
*105	10/31	Coopersmith: torture, Committee III.
*106	11/1	Dunfey: U.S. Virgin Islands and American Samoa, Committee IV.
*107	11/1	Petree: outer space, Special Political Committee.
*108	11/2	Rosen: environment, Committee II.
*109	11/5	Dunfey: U.N. visiting mission to Guam, Committee of 24.
*110	11/2	Petree: Angolan complaint, Security Council.
*111	11/5	Winn: IAEA report, General Assembly, Nov. 2.
112	11/5	Vance: pledging conference for Kampuchean refugees, General Assembly.
*113	11/6	Coopersmith: religious intolerance, Committee III.
*114	11/6	Fisher: arms control, Committee I.
115	11/8	Dunfey: apartheid, General Assembly.
*116	11/9	Rosen: operational activities for development, Committee II.
*117	11/12	Rosen: U.N.–OAU cooperation, plenary, Nov. 9.
*118	11/13	Vanden Heuvel: situation in Kampuchea, plenary.
*119	11/13	Rosenthal: information, Special Political Committee. ■

*Not printed in the BULLETIN.

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U.S. Embassy Marine Security Guards

Marine security guards have a long and proud tradition of providing security guard coverage at U.S. Embassies and Consulates abroad.

Shortly after World War II, the Department of State recognized a need for a guard force of young, alert, well-trained, and highly disciplined American military personnel to man its Embassies and Consulates. The evolution of the present-day Marine Security Guard Battalion, based at Quantico, Va., began in 1947. In that year, a proposal was made that the Department of War furnish Marine Corps personnel for Foreign Service guard duty under the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Two years later, on Jan. 28, 1949, the first Marines departed Washington, D.C., for their assignments.

A normal tour for Marine security guards is 30 months, broken into two 15-month tours at different posts. Usually, a new Marine security guard will be assigned to a hardship post where there are restricted recreation and social activities. Examples are Moscow and Brazzaville (Congo), which are 12-month tours. Tour length in Iran has been 6 months.

The largest detachment is in Paris, with 35 Marines. Other large posts are London (19) and Tokyo (20). The smallest posts have six Marines, such as the one at Bridgetown, Barbados.

While on post, Marine security guards are under direct operational control of the Chief of Diplomatic Mission. The primary mission of Marine security guards is to provide protection of classified and administratively controlled material and other assigned U.S. Government property and personnel.

In the event of large-scale riots and demonstrations directed against U.S. diplomatic installations, the role of the Marine security guards is twofold: (1) to delay entry of a hostile group into the installation long enough to allow for the destruction of classified material and (2) to aid in safeguarding the lives of American and locally hired personnel.

Their duties, therefore, are defensive in nature, entailing both the protection of classified information and the provision of an "in-house" deterrent to counter small-scale acts of violence directed against U.S. personnel and facilities.

Overall protection of U.S. Embassies and assigned personnel is the responsibility of the host governments. This is generally provided by national police or other paramilitary organizations. The host government is bound by the "Vienna convention" to protect the lives and property of assigned diplomats. Contingency plans concerning use of Marine security guards in a "delaying action" presuppose that the host government will honor its obligations. Marine security guards are not intended to be a fighting force ready and able to engage a hostile population in pitched battle.

There are presently about 1,100 Marine security guards on duty. They man 118 posts in 105 countries around the world. There are 15 women serving with the Marine security guards, who are part of a pilot program. No more women will be admitted to the program until it has been evaluated. They are serving at Kingston, Jamaica; Seoul, Korea; Belgrade, Yugoslavia; Amman, Jordan; Quito, Ecuador; and Karachi, Pakistan. ■

International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It was created by the U.N. Charter in 1945 as the successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Statute of the ICJ forms an integral part of the U.N. Charter. The Court's principal functions are to decide such cases as are submitted to it by states and to give advisory opinions on legal questions at the request of intergovernmental bodies authorized pursuant to the Statute of the Court and the U.N. Charter.

The Court is composed of 15 judges, no two of whom may be nationals of the same state, elected by the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council, voting independently. The electors are mandated to bear in mind the qualifications of the individual candidates and the need for the Court as a whole to represent the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world. Members of the Court are elected for 9 years, one third of the total number of judges being elected every 3 years.

The membership of the International Court of Justice at the present time is as follows: President, Sir Humphrey Waldock (United Kingdom); Vice President, Taslim Olawale Elias (Nigeria); and Judges Manfred Lachs (Poland), Isaac Forster (Senegal), Andre Gros (France), Richard R. Baxter (United States of America), P. D. Morozov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Jose Sette Camara (Brazil), Jose Maria Ruda (Argentina), Nagendra Singh (India), Abdullah Ali El-Erian (Egypt), Hermann Mosler (Federal Republic of Germany), Shigeru Oda (Japan), Salah El Dine Tarazi (Syrian Arab Republic), and Robert Ago (Italy). ■

Situation in Iran

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT, NOV. 14, 1979[1]

The President has today acted to block all official Iranian assets in the United States, including deposits in U.S. banks and their foreign branches and subsidiaries. This order is in response to reports that the Government of Iran is about to withdraw its funds. The purpose of this order is to insure that claims on Iran by the United States and its citizens are provided for in an orderly manner.

The order does not affect accounts of persons other than the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, and other controlled entities. The precise amounts involved cannot be ascertained at this time, but there is no reason for disturbance in the foreign exchange or other markets.

The President is taking this action pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which grants the President authority "to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States."

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, NOV. 14, 1979[1]

Pursuant to Section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1703, I hereby report to the Congress that I have today exercised the authority granted by this Act to block certain property or interests in property of the Government of Iran, its instrumen-

talities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran.

1. The circumstances necessitating the exercise of this authority are the recent events in Iran and the recent actions of the Government of Iran.

2. These events and actions put at grave risk the personal safety of United States citizens and the lawful claims of United States citizens and entities against the Government of Iran and constitute an extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.

3. Consequently, I have ordered blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or which are or come within the possession of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. I have authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to employ all powers granted to me by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to carry out the blocking.

4. Blocking property and property interests of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran will enable the United States to assure that these resources will be available to satisfy lawful claims of citizens and entities of the United States against the Government of Iran.

5. This action is taken with respect to Iran for the reasons described in this report.

JIMMY CARTER

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, NOV. 17, 1979[2]

We welcome this announcement that some of the Americans held in the Embassy of Tehran will be released. We are thankful the ordeal may be over for them and that they may be soon reunited with their families.

We strongly urge that the authorities in Iran now move to secure the safe release of all those still being held. Their ordeal is not over. The U.S. Government will continue to work in every channel open to it to achieve that end.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, NOV. 17, 1979[2]

As we approach our traditional day of national Thanksgiving, the hearts of all Americans are heavy with concern for the safety of those held hostage in Iran.

We join with people of all faiths throughout the world who adhere to fundamental principles of human rights and international law. We are united with them in seeking an end to acts of terrorism against innocent people.

On Thanksgiving Day and during the holiday weekend, I ask all Americans to make a special prayer at churches and synagogues and places of public meeting.

Let us seek God's guidance in our search for peace and human brotherhood and pray for the safe return of those whose lives are threatened. May we come with gratitude for our abundant blessings and humility before the heavy burden of world responsibility that our blessings and power have brought.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, NOV. 19, 1979[2]

Three of our hostages in Tehran have been released and have left Iran. After a brief period of rest and care, they will be reunited with their families here in the United States.

The remaining hostages must also be released. Their detention is without justification. The Government of Iran is responsible for achieving their immediate and safe release, and the United States has the right to expect that Iran will do so.

The specter has been raised of other American diplomatic hostages being placed on trial. Such a step would be a further flagrant violation of elementary human rights, religious precepts, and international law and practice. Worldwide outrage at the detention of the hostages would be greatly heightened by any attempt to put these diplomatic personnel on trial.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, NOV. 20, 1979[2]

There are reports that the American citizens being illegally held as hostages in Tehran with the support of the Iranian Government might soon be put through some sort of "trial." This would be a flagrant violation of international law and basic religious principles, and the Government of Iran would bear full responsibility for any ensuing consequences. The United States is seeking a peaceful solution to this problem through the United Nations and every other available channel. This is far preferable to the other remedies available to the United States. Such remedies are explicitly recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. The Government of Iran must recognize the gravity of the situation it has created.

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, NOV. 28, 1979[3]

This morning I have received the credentials of the Ambassadors of several nations. This is a very important and a very solemn occasion for me whenever I have this opportunity. There is a vivid reminder in this ceremony of the importance of diplomatic relationships. In looking down this row of representatives, who are quite distinguished in their own right, the differences among us are apparent. We represent countries with different backgrounds, different political systems, different customs, heritage, commitments, goals, opportunities, different levels of income, different alliances with widely varying countries.

The only way to bridge the inherent gaps between countries and to maintain peace and proper relationships is through the honoring of the integrity of diplomatic immunity. It's extremely important that mob violence be controlled and that international terrorism not be permitted to reign. All countries are afflicted at times with mob violence and terrorism.

The tragedy of the occurrences in Iran is that in a departure from accepted custom and tradition down through the centuries, in this instance, the Government itself has both condoned and encouraged the seizure of an American Embassy and our personnel through mob violence and through terrorism.

The inviolability of embassies is absolutely indispensable in easing tensions and resolving problems that exist among nations and in searching for a common ground of peace and communication among people. This is vital to every country. It's particularly vital to those countries which are small and which are weak and which do not have military power or economic power to exert in defending one's own institutions and one's own rights.

In this principle, the attitude of our own country, our efforts to have our hostages released and to restore the integrity of our diplomatic institutions, is an effort not only for the rights and benefits of the United States but for the rights and benefits of all nations. Some of the countries represented here, almost all of them, have strongly supported the condemnation of the Iranian Government's actions in seizing our Embassy and holding our hostages captive. We need the help of all countries. The rule of law is only as strong as the efforts of those who are committed to defend it. We are very grateful for the help of those nations

1. *Urgently calls* on the Government of Iran to release immediately the personnel of the Embassy of the United States of America being held in Teheran, to provide them protection and allow them to leave the country;

2. *Further calls* on the Governments of Iran and of the United States to take steps to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them to their mutual satisfaction in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations;

3. *Urges* the Governments of Iran and of the United States to exercise the utmost restraint in the prevailing situation;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to lend his good offices for the immediate implementation of this resolution and to take all appropriate measures to this end;

5. *Decides* that the Council will remain actively seized of the matter and requests the Secretary-General to report urgently to it on developments regarding his efforts. ■

[1] USUN press release 129.
[2] USUN press release 134.
[3] USUN press release 138.
[4] Adopted unanimously on Dec. 4, 1979.

Agenda of Global Economic Issues

by Howard T. Rosen

Statement in Committee II (Economic and Financial) of the U.N. General Assembly on October 12, 1979. Mr. Rosen is a U.S. delegate to the U.N. General Assembly.[1]

We meet in the 34th General Assembly of the United Nations at a critical time in international economic relations. The global economy faces serious challenges:

- The traditional fuel supply of our planet is shrinking while its population is burgeoning.
- Economic growth is slowing while the aspirations of the world's citizens are soaring.
- The shocks of high oil prices are undermining economic stability.
- Joblessness is increasing and inflation eroding the real value of income.
- Exchange markets are moving erratically and gold prices are rising irrationally.
- Protectionist pressures are mounting even as international trade is becoming increasingly important to the health and prosperity of all nations and their people.
- The interdependence of our destinies is becoming clearer, yet the call for protectionism is growing louder.

These challenges must be met and they must be met urgently. All of our futures, and those of our children, will depend on the outcome of our endeavors. We will succeed in restoring balance to the world economy and promoting national and international growth and prosperity if we demonstrate the will to take strong actions domestically and globally. We will fail if we procrastinate or seek to avoid hard decisions by casting all the blame for the current malaise elsewhere. New initiatives will be required, but older programs and institutions, whose effectiveness has been tested, must continue to be utilized and strengthened.

A cooperative international approach is imperative for the orderly and mutually beneficial management of the world economy. Such an approach requires that all nations set their domestic houses in order as well as seek international solutions to issues of global significance.

On the national level the industrialized countries must curb inflation while maintaining employment, stimulate growth, seek to insure that their economic actions do not adversely affect others, and undertake effective measures to produce more energy and moderate their consumption.

The developing countries must increase domestic savings and investment, utilize scarce economic resources more effectively, and make difficult trade-offs between growth rates and indebtedness.

The oil-exporting nations must accept, in their pricing and production policies, the responsibilities for global economic health and stability thrust on them by their position as suppliers of the world's chief source of energy.

And the countries with centrally planned economies must follow internal programs and policies which both reflect the reality of their increasing participation in the global economic system and enable them to assume their responsibilities vis-a-vis the developing countries.

U.S. Domestic Actions

Let me briefly note several recent actions taken by President Carter to strengthen the U.S. economy and contribute to international economic prosperity and stability.

Determined to maintain a reasonable balance in our external accounts and to insure that the dollar is sound and stable, my government has implemented policies to strengthen underlying economic conditions and to counter market disruptions with forceful exchange market operations. In 1980 we expect a strong current account surplus. We are confident that budgetary stringency measures and policies announced last week to raise interest rates, slow monetary growth, and increase reserve requirements will moderate significantly our inflation rate, sharply reduce inflationary expectations, and strengthen the dollar. These efforts will be reinforced by the new national accord with labor that provides, among other things, for an effective voluntary program of wage and price restraints. We will overcome our energy difficulties; the President is committed to hold down oil imports, to raise domestic oil prices to market levels, and to assist the development of domestic alternate energy supplies, including new and renewable sources of energy.

These unilateral actions by the United States, and equally appropriate ones by other nations—developed and developing, producer and consumer—are necessary for internal and global prosperity. But by themselves they are not sufficient. We face many common problems—global problems—where complementary national actions are essential, or we all suffer. And most of these problems cannot accurately be characterized as North-South issues that demand action by one group of countries for the primary benefit of another. Instead they are global concerns that require action by all and entail gains to all.

Energy

The subject of energy is the most obvious. The farmer buying diesel fuel in Iowa and the farmer buying kerosene near Khartoum must both cope with rising world petroleum prices. Governments in the richest countries and those in the poorest must deal with the impact of higher energy costs and rising energy demand on their national economies.

Those who suffer most as we enter the era of energy scarcity are to be found in the countries emerging from centuries of deprivation. In the developing nations, 3 billion people need energy at prices they can afford if they are to rise from lives of bare subsistence. The oil-importing developing countries will face an oil bill in 1979 of more than $35 billion, an increase of $10 billion over only a year earlier.

The distinguished Minister of External Affairs of India spoke last week of the special problem that energy poses to many developing economies: they are marked by limited substitution possibilities for priority uses such as transport, by the high capital intensity of alternative energy sources, and by the difficulty of reducing further a level of consumption already at bare and essential minimums.

Even the oil-exporting countries themselves cannot regard the effects of the price and supply policies on the world economy with complacency, for the effects adversely impact on them. Some are poor countries, despite their oil production. All have ambitious development plans that can be undermined by global inflation and recession, which are related in part to rising oil prices.

Much needs to be done. Secretary Vance indicated in the General Assembly a key question today is whether the oil-exporting nations are prepared to stabilize prices and, to the extent it is in their control, to insure adequate supply. All nations must use energy more efficiently. They must also intensify efforts to develop their domestic sources of energy. National and international efforts should aim at the research, exploration, and development of petroleum and its alternatives as part of an overall strategy for increasing world supply.

No single subject is in such need of study, agreement, and action by this body as energy. Yet in an interdependent world, there are other vital issues which must be addressed if we are to have a healthy world economy.

Food

Food and nutrition are also economic problems of global dimensions. Despite the "green revolution" and rising food production worldwide, demand generated by burgeoning populations and improved eating habits is rapidly outdistancing supply. There are alarming predictions of widespread famine in several parts of the world in the 1980's. The situation is much more critical than most believe. As with energy, a major international effort is required.

Our world cannot tolerate that one in every five of its citizens is sick or weak or hungry because he or she does not have enough to eat. We must act together to increase food production, improve its distribution, and promote better nutrition, particularly with regard to the world's poorest.

The United States is contributing in a major way to dealing effectively with the international problem. Our bilateral assistance alone in the agricultural area, including concessionary food assistance, will surpass $2 billion this year. In various international fora, we are pressing for progress on world food security, including rapid completion of a new food aid convention and for increased international funding for agricultural research. We are also stressing the importance of adoption by governments of food sector strategies which can help increase domestic food production and improved nutritional levels.

Trade

The experiences of the past 30 years have demonstrated the value to all nations of an increasingly open international trading system. The recently concluded trade negotiations—the most recent of several major liberalizations since World War II—resulted in major tariff cuts, significant reductions in nontariff barriers, and an intensified framework agreement that permits special and differentiated treatment for developing countries. Though less than many of us would have desired, the multilateral trade negotiations did produce benefits for all. It is in the interests of developing countries to sign the various codes at an early date and participate actively in their implementation to insure that their respective interests are advanced.

Other Issues

Other global issues require continuing attention by the international community—managing the growing deficits of a number of countries; providing better health care worldwide; spreading the benefits of science and technology around the world; increasing employment opportunities and improving living conditions of the poor in whichever country they are found; and protecting the political, economic, and social rights of all human beings.

Most economic questions of major consequence to the world economy are under discussion in international fora. The exception is energy. This General Assembly could make a significant contribution to global economic health and stability by agreeing to a program for getting discussion of the world energy situation underway.

We have an extremely full international calendar before us, in Committee II and elsewhere. In addition to our own work, the negotiations on the common fund and commodities under the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development are in progress; in Belgrade the Development Committee recently agreed to recommend that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund study several important financial issues; and the implementation of new codes negotiated in the multilateral trade negotiations will soon begin in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In addition, if approved by the General Assembly, the Committee of the Whole will begin consultations in January on the most effective way of conducting a new round of global negotiations. The special session next year will consider the international development strategy and decide on the new round of global negotiations. In 1981, the United Nations will hold the important Conference on New and Renewable Energy.

Our full calendar is a positive sign that the international community recognizes the urgency of dealing with the global issues.

The following story, told to me by a South American diplomat, makes a point we should ponder in our work. He said a college professor established a model farm in a remote rural area of his country. The local farmers were astounded by the excellent crops that resulted from his new, innovative agricultural methods. One day the professor announced that he was going to train his horse, a fine stallion, to survive without food or water. Even though they were astounded by the plan, in view of his previous record, the farmers thought it might be possible for the professor to succeed. After a week had passed, one of the farmers asked the professor about the progress of his stallion. He replied that the stallion had been learning very rapidly and was on the verge of a breakthrough until—for no apparent reason—it had unexpectedly expired.

Clearly, if we do not act vigorously and with urgency, the international community may fail in meeting the challenges of the global economic issues, to the detriment of all nations.

With the conclusion of our general debate, let us then turn to our work with a spirit of dedication and a determination to make our session productive and meaningful. Let us approach our task in a manner that will insure that our efforts here contribute to concrete progress in dealing with the economic issues of concern to all nations. Unfortunately, we have little time to accomplish all that is before us. For that reason, I will not deal specifically

more than one-fourth of GDP. Alongside the agricultural base is a developed manufacturing sector—the largest in the region. Although manufactured exports account for less than one-third of foreign sales, it is the most dynamic sector in terms of employment and growth.

Benefits of Guatemala's generally solid economic performance have been unevenly distributed. For three-fourths of the population, annual per capita income is still less than one-half of the national average. Neither the rural poor nor labor have proportionately benefitted from growth in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. Widespread poverty and a major need for land reform are probably among the major factors contributing to instability and political violence.

Politically, Guatemalan society is polarized and has been for many years. Violence is widespread and virtually institutionalized. Subversive groups of the extreme left are capable of terrorist operations; the extreme right is similarly organized with their own terrorist organizations. Reciprocal acts of terrorism have cycled through Guatemalan society for many years. The list of assassinated political reformists is long, as is the list of government officials who have been assassinated by leftwing terrorists.

While presidential succession takes place with regularity every 4 years, the political process is relatively closed. The political opposition is divided. New parties of the right and center left have been intimidated by the assassination of their most prominent leaders. The labor movement is relatively weak. Human rights violations have been described in the Department's report to the Congress.

While enjoying something of a resurgence since being decimated in the early 1970's, leftist guerrilla groups are relatively weak. They are isolated from the large but unassimilated Indian population in rural areas and outgunned in the cities. Moreover, they lack broad-based front groups like El Salvador's Popular Revolutionary Bloc to organize and direct popular dissent.

Guatemala thus suffers similar socioeconomic imbalances and political polarization as its neighbors, but the conflicts have not yet reached the same degree of intensity as in El Salvador.

Honduras. Honduras is the poorest of the Central American countries, but at the same time it suffers from far less internal polarization and enjoys greater domestic calm than other countries in the region. Class differences are far less marked and rigid, and wealth is considerably more evenly distributed than in its northern tier neighbors. Although Honduras has a high population growth, it remains comparatively underpopulated with fewer people and five times the land area of neighboring El Salvador. Land is relatively abundant and fairly evenly distributed.

The current military government has experienced a general continuity since December 1972 when a Superior Defense Council took power from the elected Nationalist Party president. Admittedly de facto, the government is committed to a return to constitutional rule beginning with elections for a constituent assembly in April 1980

The government, while ruling as a de facto regime, is generally not repressive. Human rights performance and civil liberties are reasonably good. The government, and the military institutions are much more sensitive to popular aspirations and pressures than in the other countries, and the government is committed to development programs aimed at bettering the lot of the ordinary citizen, especially in the rural areas.

Honduras has no current guerrilla problem, and it faces the least serious threat to stability from internally generated insurgent action, at least in the short term. Several factors have helped insulate Honduras from an insurgent threat—relatively benign military rule, a favorable land-labor ratio, and an economic distribution pattern that has avoided the sharp economic polarization and deep gaps between rich and poor that exist, for example, in El Salvador.

EXTERNAL FACTORS

Cuba

The most important single factor governing possible Cuban involvement in subversive activities in the northern tier will be its perception of opportunities.

Profiting from its experience in the 1960's, Cuba has generally followed a policy of cultivating and maintaining contact with leftist rebel movements; in some cases providing subsistence-level support, safehaven as needed, and various types of training; urging disparate opposition forces to unite; counseling recipients of their aid to expand grassroots support; and waiting for the development of objective conditions propitious for additional support.

Given events in Nicaragua, Cuba is certain to increase its attention to Central America. Cuba, however, may now seek a period of assessment and digestion of the results of Nicaragua. Thus, we should not be surprised if the Castro regime carefully weighs pros and cons of each situation as it arises and, rather than trying to force events to happen, should decide to react to events as they occur. In assessing opportunities Castro is very likely to consider such factors as the internal dynamism in each country, the U.S. reaction, the impact on members of the nonaligned movement, the degree of support or tolerance from other Latin American countries, the complexities of logistical problems, the extent of Cuban influence with the insurgent groups, and, ultimately, the chances of success.

The major question in the minds of interested neighbors is what kind of ultimate relationship with Cuba Nicaragua will develop. While Havana certainly has the gratitude of the Sandinista leadership for the assistance it provided, and considerable ties with key figures in the revolution, it is not automatic that—whatever Havana's intentions—the interests of the Sandinistas as the Government of Nicaragua will become indentical with those of Cuba. There is, indeed, every reason to suppose that Nicaraguans would prefer independent development.

Certainly there are significant forces at work to produce something better than a worst-case model in Nicaragua. Practical considerations may work to constrain radical impulses within the Sandinista movement: a period of relative calm needed to rehabilitate the country; the diplomatic shelter that a broad-based policy affords in contrast to a provocatively Communist tilt; the potential for growing power and authority of moderate elements in the government and the society; and the support and cooperation of non-Communist countries and international financial institutions in and outside of Latin America.

Other Latin American Countries

Moderate governments of Latin America, especially the Andean group, have shown a keen interest in Central America. Venezuela, particularly, has chosen to play an active role of assistance and contact with these governments, and an official Venezuelan mission recently visited the northern tier countries. Mexico, too, has a major interest in developments in this geographically close region.

These governments have indicated their goal of fostering peaceful change in the region generally and supporting pluralism in Nicaraguan domestic and foreign policies. It can be expected that these nations will play an increasingly significant and constructive role.

U.S. POLICY RESPONSES

Central America's geographic proximity creates special U.S. interests in Central American peace, prosperity, and cooperation, enhanced by the symbolism from deep past involvement. Our interests embrace:

- The existence of reasonably stable and friendly governments free from domination by outside powers;
- Security against use of the region by forces hostile to us;
- Human rights, including the development of viable democratic institutions; and
- Economic and social development through domestic reform and increased regional cooperation and integration.

Given the volatile circumstances and vulnerabilities described, the inevitability of change, and the dangers of polarization and radicalization, we would hope to see those vulnerabilities reduced by peaceful change consistent with individual liberties and democratic values and more open, pluralistic, and equitable societies.

To help assure peaceful and evolutionary change, we want to work with the nations of Central America and with other hemisphere countries to achieve:

- An evolution toward more open, pluralistic political systems, maintaining contact with all elements in Central America, including labor and youth organizations, the media, private sector groups, and public officials;
- Social and economic development through bilateral and multilateral assistance programs;
- Positive relationships with the region's governments on a basis of nonintervention, equality, and respect for human rights; and
- Regional cooperation in dealing with common economic problems.

Let me now summarize our major policy lines toward Nicaragua and the countries of the northern tier.

Nicaragua

We seek to develop positive relationships with the Government of National Reconstruction on the basis of nonintervention, equality, and mutual respect. I am confident that our new relationships will reflect efforts to foster respect for human rights and democracy.

We support a humane and pluralistic evolution, based on Nicaragua's own needs, without outside intervention from anyone. We plan to maintain contact with all elements in Nicaragua, including the church, the media, and the private sector, as well as public officials.

We will encourage Nicaragua and its neighbors to build bridges, to dampen tensions, to remove the possibility of involvement in each other's domestic political affairs, and to promote regional cooperation and security.

We are already helping alleviate human suffering and hope to assist concretely in the massive reconstruction task facing that nation, thus insuring the best possible climate for the establishment of a normal democratic order with respect for human rights.

We plan to cooperate with other nations and public and private institutions in assisting Nicaragua's economic recovery and progress.

Economic Cooperation, Integration

Despite very real progress in the early years, the integration movement is in considerable disarray. Currently new large-scale opportunities for import substitution are limited. Political problems abound. Optimism over future progress for economic integration is rare. The obstacles to major progress include:

- The current situation in Nicaragua and its major political and economic impact, which ranges from interrupted transportation between Costa Rica and the rest of Central America to problems due to instability and border closings;
- The deteriorating security situation in El Salvador and Guatemala;
- The longstanding dispute between El Salvador and Honduras that has yet to be resolved;
- The failure to obtain any agreement to date on restructuring a substitute for the Common Market treaty which expires in 1981; and
- The Honduras position that it has not received equivalent benefits from the Common Market and the unwillingness to date of the other countries to agree to structural changes to insure that Central America's only less developed country receives relatively favorable treatment.

Nevertheless there is still enough interest in the Common Market either because of its perceived benefits or because of belief in a regional commitment to keep its institutions and arrangements functioning even when ad hoc arrangements are required.

The strength of the historical, social, and psychological basis for continued regional cooperation in the area does not rest solely on the progress of economic integration. The realization that Central America was one country before 1823; similar legal codes; similar climate; production of coffee, sugar, and cotton; good transportation and communications; intermarriage among families; easy movement of people within the region; similar cultures; same language; and country sizes (small) all lead to a sense of community within the region which permitted the Central American Common Market experiment and holds together a cooperative structure today.

After over a decade of relatively rapid economic growth, per capita incomes for the countries of the region have risen substantially. There is a considerable variance in per capita incomes however, ranging from the low in Honduras of $400 to the middle income levels of $1,100+ in Panama and Costa Rica.

While still agriculturally based, the economies of the Central American countries have become more diversified and a recent study by the Regional Office for Central America and Panama and the Secretariat for Central American Integration attributes the creation of over 150,000 jobs in the modern sector to the effects of the economic integration movement. Even in the face of great difficulty, intraregional trade has grown to about $1 billion annually.

Nontraditional exports are increasing due at least in part to the period of protection provided under the Common Market arrangements. Whether the Common Market can be rejuvenated depends largely on whether it can become a means for cooperation in producing exports from the Common Market to other parts of the world, particularly Europe and Japan in addition to the United States. Since the easy opportunities for import substitution have been seized, growth within the market is expected to be only that induced by the growth of the constituent countries. Reform of industrialization and export incentives in the region may be easier to bring about on a group basis than by the individual countries acting alone.

Regional Institutions

Some regional institutions are technically strong although financial support from the countries in the area is often disap-

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

which have joined us in this effort.

The harming of innocent people is condemned by every law of mankind and by every law of God, no matter what religious principles or economic or political principles prevail in a country. We are determined to work as peacefully as possible to achieve the release of our hostages as early as we possibly can and, of course, commensurate with that, to defend and to protect the unchanging principles on which our nation and other nations are founded.

My hope is that all countries represented here and those others who have representatives in our Capital City will join with us in bringing a quick and peaceful resolution to the problem which afflicts not only the United States but all countries. ■

[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 19, 1979.

[2]Text from Weekly Compilation of Nov. 26, 1979.

[3]Made in the Oval Office when he received diplomatic credentials from the newly appointed Ambassadors from Nicaragua, Algeria, Australia, Honduras, Yugoslavia, and West Germany (text from Weekly Compilation of Dec. 3, 1979).

Chronology of Events in Iran, November 1979

Nov. 4 Iranian students seize U.S. Embassy in Iran and hold 100 hostages (65% American) protesting that the deposed Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, be returned to Iran to stand trial. Promised host government help never arrives.

Nov. 5 Iran announces cancellation of 20-year-old defense agreement with U.S. and scraps portions of a 1921 treaty with Russia.

U.S. rejects students' demands to return the Shah to Iran and expects Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan's government to live up to its assurances for protection of American diplomatic staff and premises.

Nov. 6 Prime Minister Bazargan's provisional revolutionary government dissolves, yielding power to the Islamic authority of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his secret Revolutionary Council.

Iranian students publicly threaten to kill American hostages if U.S. attempts rescue.

PLO announces that it is sending representatives to Iran to seek release of hostages.

At President Carter's request, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and Mr. William Miller, U.S. Senate committee senior staff official, leave Washington for Tehran carrying a message from the President to Iranian authorities seeking the release of American hostages and to discuss U.S. relations with Iran.

Iranian authorities agree to receive emissaries.

Nov. 7 Khomeini rejects talks with President Carter's special envoys Clark and Miller stating that if the U.S. gives up the Shah and stops espionage, negotiations may be possible.

PLO officials announce that a two-member delegation, headed by a leader of Al Fatah (the main guerrilla group), arrives in Tehran in efforts to protect the lives of the hostages.

Deposed Shah offers to leave U.S but is dissuaded by doctors.

Nov. 8 Secretary Vance declares that the U.S. holds Iranian authorities responsible for safety of hostages.

Iranian students reject negotiations with PLO.

Iranian students protest in Washington, and American students stage counterdemonstration.

President Carter announces postponement of Canada visit until 1980.

Iran cuts supplies to some oil concerns by 10% for rest of 1979.

Nov. 9 U.N. Security Council President urges Iran to free hostages.

U.S. announces suspension of deliveries of about $30 million in military equipment and spare parts to Iran.

Egyptian President Sadat invites Shah to Egypt for further medical treatment and political asylum and attacks Khomeini as a "lunatic who misrepresents Islam."

Pope John Paul II sends a message to Khomeini asking him to insure the safety of the hostages.

Nov. 10 President Carter directs Attorney General Civiletti to deport any Iranian student who is in the U.S. illegally.

Officials of the PLO fail in their efforts to free hostages.

Abolhassan Bani-Sadr becomes Iran's acting Foreign Minister and reaffirms demands that the U.S. return the Shah.

Khomeini receives Papal Nuncio but rejects Pope's appeal.

Nov. 12 President Carter orders suspension of purchases of Iranian oil to U.S. Shortly after, Iran announces that it is cutting petroleum shipments to the U.S.

Bani-Sadr asks the Security Council to hear charges against the U.S., accusing America of being a "threat to peace."

Mexico announces it is closing its embassy in Iran.

Nov. 13 American and British naval vessels start maneuvers in the Arabian Sea. Iran, charging the U.S. with war threats, calls for a meeting of the Security Council.

Nov. 14 Iran's Foreign Minister announces that Iran will withdraw its funds from American banks.

President Carter acts to block all official Iranian assets in the U.S. including deposits in U.S. banks, their foreign branches, and subsidiaries.

With Secretary of State Vance's support, the Security Council declines to debate Iran's charges against the U.S. until hostages are freed.

Nov. 15 Iranian officials hint that women and blacks among the hostages are to be freed. Students holding them strongly reject the possibility.

Iran announces it will no longer sell oil to American companies.

Defense Department discloses that it may end training in the U.S. for Iranian military men.

Khomeini cancels all appointments until Dec. 5 because of fatigue and illness.

President Carter accuses Iranian Government of encouraging embassy takeover and warns Tehran that U.S. "will not yield to international terrorism or blackmail."

Nov. 16 Iranian students warn that hostages will pay if Shah is allowed to go anywhere but to Iran.

150 Iranians are ordered by U.S. Government to leave U.S. voluntarily in 30 days or face deportation.
President Carter discourages public recriminations against all Iranians living in U.S.
Federal Judge orders President Carter to lift ban on demonstrations by Iranians and Americans on Federal property calling the ban "a substantial infringement on their First Amendment rights."

Nov. 17 Khomeini orders students to release all women and blacks among hostages.

Nov. 18 Khomeini declares U.S. hostages face being tried as spies.
Iranian students announce that three hostages will be released—a woman and two black men.

Nov. 19 U.S. demands all remaining hostages in American Embassy in Tehran be released and says that if any are tried on espionage charges, it would be "a further flagrant violation" of "human rights, religious precepts, and international law."
Iranian officials announce they will stop using dollars to pay for imports and asks OPEC not to accept dollars for their oil exports.

Nov. 20 A second group of 10 hostages are released and arrive at a U.S. air base near Frankfort, West Germany.
U.S. suggests to Iran that it might resort to military force if the remaining 49 hostages are not freed.
Khomeini repeats threat to try the 49 remaining hostages.
President Carter orders a second naval task force, including the aircraft carrier *Kitty Hawk*, into the Indian Ocean to join the carrier *Midway* and four other ships in the Arabian Sea.

Nov. 21 Students warn that all hostages will die if U.S. attacks and the embassy will be blown up.
Security Council offers Iran two forums in which to state its case in return for the release of hostages.
First stage of the deposed Shah's medical treatment ends.

Nov. 22 Thirteen hostages freed from U.S. Embassy in Tehran arrive in Washington; they are met by Secretary Vance and other senior State Department officials.
Khomeini urges all Moslems to rise up against the West to fight "blasphemy."
U.S. pledges to maintain presence in Islamic world.
President Carter instructs U.S. Embassies around the world to undertake greater security precautions and for host governments to do all they can to protect embassies.
U.S. again warns Iran that it will be held "strictly accountable" for the safety of the hostages.

Nov. 23 Bani-Sadr declares that all Iranian foreign debts are repudiated.
PLO officials say Yasir Arafat never tried to mediate the release of hostages because "we are allies of the Iranian revolution."
Israel announces in a broadcast that it has a plan for rescuing hostages.

Nov. 24 Khomeini accuses U.S. and Israel of attempting to seize two of the most sacred Moslem mosques in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

Nov. 25 A U.N. Security Council session is called by Secretary General Waldheim because Iran fails to respond to an appeal to release U.S. hostages. It is only the second time in 19 years that a Secretary General has requested such a meeting.
U.S. Congressman George Hansen (Idaho), on a self-appointed peace mission to Tehran, visits some of the U.S. hostages.

Nov. 26 State Department orders embassies in 11 Moslem countries to evacuate "voluntarily" dependents, nonessential diplomats, and private businessmen to minimize risks in the aftermath of events in Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries.
The U.N., in a new appeal for immediate release of hostages, moves to bring U.S. diplomats together with a responsible figure in the Iranian regime. Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr, who had planned to fly to the U.N. headquarters in New York, is overruled by Iran's ruling Revolutionary Council which decides that no leader can leave Iran until Ashura, the holiest period of the Shiite Moslem calender, ends.
Bani-Sadr plans to come to the U.N. on Dec. 1 when talks could begin.
Italian President Pertini urges Khomeini to free the hostages on humanitarian grounds.

Nov. 27 State Department recommends that only essential travel by U.S. citizens be undertaken to United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Libya, Bahrain, the Yemen Arab Republic, and Bangladesh.
Officials at New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center announce that the deposed Shah of Iran is able to leave the hospital and return to Mexico within a week.
Khomeini attacks plans for a session of the Security Council claiming the outcome had been dictated by the U.S.
Security Council receives written promise that Iran's acting Foreign Minister will arrive for the Dec. 1 session.
A statement issued by the Commonwealth High Commissioners appeals to the Iranian Government to procure the release of all hostages and expresses the hope that the parties will resolve their differences by peaceful means.

Nov. 28 Bani-Sadr is dismissed as Iran's acting Foreign Minister. Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, Director of Iranian television, is named to the post.
Deposed Shah's health is improved and a plane is reported standing by at Kennedy International Airport to return him to exile in Mexico.
President Carter denounces the "inhuman and degrading conditions" imposed upon the hostages and again warns Iran that it would suffer "grave consequences" if hostages are harmed.
Iranian Government files suit in New York against the deposed Shah and his wife asking $56.5 billion in damages.

Nov.29 U.S. initiates actions against Iran in the International Court of Justice.
Mexico announces it will not renew visa for deposed Shah.

Nov. 30 U.S. expects Shah to leave country despite Mexico's refusal to renew his visa. The Shah announces he intends to leave U.S. in hopes that his departure would "end the tragic situation in Iran."
President Carter cancels six-state political tour because of Iranian crisis.
Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh announces Iran will not at-

in these remarks with all of the key items on our agenda; I will put forward the U.S. positions as we come to the individual subjects. My delegation will contribute constructively to our common Herculean task of completing our work in this committee. ■

[1] USUN press release 89.

Arms Control

by George M. Seignious II

Statement in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. General Assembly on October 18, 1979. Mr. Seignious is Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.[1]

I am pleased to have this opportunity to address the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. This is my first visit to the United Nations as Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I am honored to be here.

The fact that some $450 billion is spent the world over every year for arms, the fact that 1,000 missile warheads could kill more than 100 million people, the fact that conflict anywhere could result in destruction everywhere—these facts make the pursuit of peace a necessity for all humanity.

The fact that this committee now deals only with disarmament and security, the fact that more nations than ever before are actively participating in the consideration of disarmament issues, the fact that there are some nine international arms control conventions in effect which have been adhered to by most of the nations of the world—these facts testify to a simple conclusion: arms control and disarmament are the province of all nations.

We have an immense task ahead of us. It is difficult enough psychologically for any nation or people to share responsibility for their security with other nations. How much more of a revolution in thinking is required for nations to see security as a function of reducing the very arms that often have been the only means that they have had to insure their security. Arms control, in short, does not come naturally, and any progress—although it may fall short of our hopes—should be welcomed as a step toward security through restraint of arms and as a step away from the tradition of security only through arms.

Because so many challenges remain, progress should not mean complacency. We cannot be satisfied with the security of the world as it is. The weapons we have within our collective hands are too numerous and too awesome to entrust our common destiny to good fortune and chance. We must actively seek a safer world and never falter in that search.

My government has negotiated and supported two SALT treaties, because we believe that strategic arms limitations that are equitable can enhance the security of all nations. No agreement constructed on unilateral gain or fiat can long endure, even if it were possible to achieve in the first place. Consensus on SALT between two nations, or on any other arms control issues among many nations, is a difficult but unyielding prerequisite for success, for we are dealing with fundamental issues of security and survival.

The process of SALT confirms that serious negotiations, seriously conducted, can move forward provided they do not bear impossible burdens. No arms control talks will succeed if they must right every age-old wrong. And no arms control talks can make progress if political advantage, rather than the enhancement of mutual security, is the principal purpose. My government is firmly committed to arms control agreements based on principles of equity and improved security—for all.

Today, I want to discuss five arms control subjects that I know are of interest to this committee. All of them demonstrate that our task ahead is not without challenge as it is also not without hope.

SALT II Treaty

I want to begin with the new agreement—SALT II—to limit strategic offensive nuclear arms. I have said over and over to my fellow citizens that SALT II is not the millenium, nor will it stop competition, nor will it guarantee permanent stability. But it is still a remarkable accomplishment.

- The United States and the Soviet Union have established, for the first time, equal ceilings on strategic nuclear forces.
- We have negotiated equal subceilings on strategic systems carrying multiple independently targetable warheads.
- We have begun the much-desired process of reductions.
- We have taken major steps to control the technological arms race, such as limiting the numbers of warheads allowed on each missile.
- We have broken new ground in verification procedures.
- We have renewed our commitment to the long-term process of strategic arms limitation. In crafting a framework of equality between two different strategic forces, SALT II is an essential bridge to deeper reductions and further qualitative restraints in SALT III.

I want to reaffirm before you the commitment of the United States and President Carter—as expressed in the SALT II agreement itself—to begin negotiations to achieve further limitations and deeper reductions in nuclear arms promptly upon entry into force of SALT II. We take this obligation with the utmost seriousness. It is an obligation between two nations, and it is an obligation of two nations to all nations.

In this regard, let me state in this forum what President Carter makes clear every day in Washington. The Administration is making strenuous efforts to insure early ratification and entry into force of SALT II.

Comprehensive Test Ban

I would like to turn now to the subject of the comprehensive nuclear test ban, for no arms control measure has been consistently assigned a higher priority in this chamber over many years. Indeed, the very fact that negotiations are underway on such a treaty can be attributed in part to the dedicated efforts by many nations and individuals to build strong international support for such a ban.

That support is well founded. A comprehensive test ban will place an important qualitative constraint on the nuclear arms competition, and it will be an important contribution to the international community's efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The trilateral negotiations are proceeding actively in Geneva. Agreement has already been reached on many of the features of the treaty, including some issues that just a few years ago seemed insurmountable obstacles. Verification of a comprehensive test ban is extremely important. Innovative cooperative measures will be

required—as both sides have recognized. Work is now continuing on these and other aspects. A number of these problems have been less susceptible to prompt solutions than we had hoped. But my government continues to place great importance on the conclusion of these negotiations. Success will require hard work. But success, I believe, would be a statement of hope no nation could ignore.

Chemical Weapons

As with the negotiations for a comprehensive test ban, progress in the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on chemical weapons has not been rapid, but it has been substantial. Two-and-a-half months ago, our two nations provided a detailed report on these negotiations to the Committee on Disarmament.

A treaty providing for the elimination of chemical weapons would be a unique and far-reaching accomplishment.

- For the first time, an entire class of weapons that has been used in a major conflict would be banned and eliminated.
- The international community would be establishing, and participating in, cooperative measures of verification of great breadth and complexity.
- A technology capable of inflicting widespread and horrible destruction of human life would be safeguarded for peaceful uses.

These are some of the reasons why my government attaches high importance to the chemical weapons negotiations. We fully recognize that many other countries have a direct interest in chemical weapons prohibition. Many nations could produce them on short notice. And all nations that adhere would be affected by the verification procedures that are a necessity if such an agreement is to promote stability and confidence. In this connection, I would like to note that my government is grateful for the important work on verification which is being pursued by a number of countries.

The Committee on Disarmament has a vital role to play in the process of achieving a chemical weapons convention. The United States fully appreciates the importance of that committee's role, and we are giving serious thought to how we can contribute to making the committee's work in this area most effective in advancing the objective we all seek.

The complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons has been an important goal of the international community for many decades, ever since, in the first great world war of this century, these weapons were used on a massive scale. Even though that war is receding in time, I can still remember, as a boy, the vision of men returned home, but gasping for breath forever. That is a vision we should eradicate entirely from the memory of man.

Radiological Weapons

We could be haunted by another class of weapons never used but with a similarly dreadful potential—radiological weapons. The number of facilities producing radioactive by-products has multiplied manyfold in recent years and the accumulation of materials is accelerating.

I am pleased to note that significant progress was achieved this year to deal with such weapons. My nation and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have presented a joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament to ban all radiological weapons. The United States hopes that the General Assembly will encourage the Committee on Disarmament to build on this achievement and to elaborate an international convention.

Nonproliferation Treaty

August 1980 will mark the date of the second review conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty. The SALT II agreement, with its commitment to continuing the process in SALT III, reflects the determination of the United States and the Soviet Union to fulfill their obligation under Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty. My government is deeply conscious of its obligations to the nations party to this treaty which have forsworn nuclear weapons. Their continued restraint, and that of other non-nuclear-weapons states, is essential to preventing a dangerous multiplication of the risk that conflict or miscalculation could lead to nuclear war.

In this regard, the United States welcomes the recent adherence of the nations of Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Bangladesh.

We can further buttress nonproliferation and nuclear stability by the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The full realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America is drawing closer. We continue to hope that the necessary steps to bring the treaty of Tlatelolco into force for all concerned states within the region will be taken in the near future.

Additionally, the United States strongly supports efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world—in accordance with the criteria which we believe can permit the successful establishment of zones that promote the security of the participants.

The development of effective international arrangements for assuring that nations that forswear nuclear weapons will not be threatened by nuclear attack is an effort which deserves our serious consideration. Such arrangements would help create a climate of confidence and would reduce incentives for additional countries to develop nuclear weapons. The United States would like to reiterate its proposal made last July in the Committee on Disarmament that there be a General Assembly resolution setting forth the various undertakings made by the five nuclear powers to give assurance to non-nuclear-weapon states against the use of nuclear weapons.

In concluding this brief review of the important questions with which this committee is concerned, I am also happy to refer to the progress which has been made on a number of significant and potentially useful studies currently underway, such as the pilot test of a standard format for reporting military budgets, the study on the relationship between disarmament and development, and the study of regional arms control. The United States, for its part, will continue to give these studies wholehearted support. They are investments in the future.

My life has been dedicated to the security of the United States. Yet, I see no greater security for my nation than peace among all nations. We share a common goal—peace with security. For we share, in this nuclear age, a common bond for survival and a common search for the ability of us all to live in a secure world.

We are all involved in an undertaking to shape our destiny. As President Carter said in Vienna: "If we cannot control the power to destroy, we can neither guide our own fate nor preserve our own future."■

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[1] USUN press release 95.

El Salvador

We are encouraging the government and other democratic elements in the very delicate political transition process now underway in El Salvador. This is of critical importance to the future of El Salvador. Putting an end to human rights violations of the integrity of the person is crucial to the overall atmosphere in the country.

We believe the establishment of a real and credible electoral process, leading to free municipal/legislative elections in March 1980, is crucial to El Salvador's peaceful evolution and to arresting the critical polarization and frustration that can lead almost certainly to violent confrontation between right and left.

President Romero's August 1979 proposals offer a constructive and hopeful beginning. They represent significant promises that now must be given life by both government and opposition in restoring trust and agreeing to program specifics. The concrete steps already taken are encouraging, but the overall assessment of the situation is uncertain.

We will support real and serious reform with appropriate cooperation and assistance.

Honduras

We have been impressed by the Honduran Government's demonstration of social awareness and its commitment to return that country to constitutional rule next year.

It is also clear that geography gives Honduras a central role in the prevention of regional conflict, incursions, and potential infiltrations both ways between revolutionary Nicaragua and its conservative northern neighbors.

Honduras is thus central to the "bridge-building" process we hope will emerge in Central America. We will encourage Honduras to play such a role and will encourage both El Salvador and Honduras to reach an early settlement on their border dispute.

We will provide cooperation and assistance to the government to help it achieve its goals.

Guatemala

We see no crisis in the months immediately ahead, but we recognize the country faces severe and fundamental longer term socioeconomic and political questions.

We would encourage the Government of Guatemala to work toward a more open electoral process, to take effective action to halt spiraling political violence, and to play a constructive role in regional cooperation.

Conclusion

This brings me full circle to my opening comments. Central America is a region in which deep demands for change exist, in which serious inequities and structural problems create political pressures, in which legitimate grievances result in basic demands for equity and redress. In the northern tier these instabilities have run up against relatively closed or rigid processes that permit their accommodation or venting with great difficulty. The consequent tensions result in polarization that unless relieved will invite radicalization and the capture and perversion of legitimate causes by extreme elements.

There is in all this a difficult and agonizing dilemma—the legitimacy of grievances and inequities and the inevitability and drive for systemic change and reform, on the one hand, and the effort by Castroist/Marxist elements, on the other, to exploit these currents for their own use in order to disguise and legitimize their ulterior objectives. Clearly, helping resolve the

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pointing. The Common Market Secretariat (SIECA) has suffered from insufficient backing for its proposals by the Ministers of Economy. The impact of the new Secretary General remains to be seen. The Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) is now an established lending institution which has had real success in financing regional infrastructure projects, particularly highways and telecommunications.

There are several institutions, such as the Center for Tropical Agricultural Research (CATIE), the Nutrition Institute for Central America and Panama (INCAP), and the Central America Institute of Research and Industrial Technology (ICAITI), which have substantial technical staffs which can address common development problems in the area, such as agricultural research, nutrition, energy, technology, and the environment.

International Inputs

The World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Agency for International Development (AID), and other international and bilateral assistance programs are active in Central America. There is a clear willingness on the part of the World Bank to finance additional bilateral projects as they materialize. This is demonstrated by its current plan to establish, along with the U.N. Development Program, a project design team in Central America. The Inter-American Development Bank is currently lending even larger amounts than the World Bank. AID programs are relatively much smaller but still have a major impact as trailblazers.

All three institutions have provided substantial support to projects designed to have a direct impact on the rural poor, although the banks continue to finance major infrastructure projects as well.

Commerce and Trade

Well over half of current exports from Central America are to the United States (excluding trade with other countries in the region). However, the Central American countries have not taken maximum advantage of general system of preferences (GSP) under current U.S. legislation. Commercial opportunities have not, therefore, been exploited to the extent they can be.

Realistically, however, any major increase in exports to the U.S. in such areas as textiles or shoes or even fruits and vegetables, can run into major political opposition in the United States. As a result there are very real limitations on export expansion to the United States in any area where these exports are in direct competition with U.S. products.

Similarly, the European Common Market presents limited opportunities in many products, with the additional problem that many primary products benefit from preference arrangements with former colonies in Africa and the Caribbean. Nevertheless, possibilities for major export expansion do exist in many areas and products, especially nontraditional exports and processed agricultural products. Beef and beef products are examples. Japan could become a major market as it already is for cotton. Assembly operations in fields such as electronics for reexport offer other possibilities.

An important conclusion about the Central American countries is that given the relative importance of the external sector in these economies and their relative openness, U.S. trade policy may be an important element in determining the parameters of further growth in the region. ■

former in a peaceful, democratic, moderate way is the best defense against the latter. Communism's greatest ally is a rigid, indiscriminate defense of the status quo and intolerance of change and dissent. As I noted, defense of the status quo will not avoid change; it will only radicalize it. Instability cannot be capped, nor repression maintained, indefinitely without sowing the seeds of a violent and radical denouement. Failure on our part to identify with the legitimate aspirations of the people in these countries—and with those democratic elements who seek peaceful constructive change—respect for human rights, and basic equity will put us on the wrong side of history.

Our task, therefore, is how to work with our friends to guide and influence change, how to use our influence to promote justice, freedom, and equity to mutual benefit—and thereby avoid insurgency and communism. Nowhere will this task be more crucial than in Nicaragua. As Dr. Hans Morgenthau once wrote: "The real issue facing American foreign policy . . . is not how to preserve stability in the face of revolution, but how to create stability out of revolution." ■

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, NOV. 14, 1979[1]

I transmit herewith, for Senate advice and consent to ratification, the Convention on the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (the Convention) which was signed at Washington on March 6, 1979. For the information of the Senate, I also transmit the report of the Department of State with respect to the Convention.

The Convention is a revision of the 1944 Convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences. It clarifies the 1944 Convention and strengthens and broadens the mandate of the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences (the Institute).

Membership in the Institute under the Convention is open to states which are members of the OAS [Organization of American States] and the existing Institute, or other American states whose admission is accepted by the Inter-American Board of Agriculture.

Under the Convention, the Institute will consist of three principal organs—the Inter-American Board of Agriculture, the Executive Committee, and the General Directorate. The Inter-American Board of Agriculture will be the highest organ of the Institute and will consist of one representative from each Member State. The new Convention stipulates that such representatives should preferably be persons connected with agriculture or rural development. This Board will be responsible for setting policy and budgetary priorities of the Institute.

To reflect the changed responsibilities of the Institute, its name has been changed to the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture.

The Convention will enter into force when two-thirds of the states parties to the 1944 Convention have deposited instruments of ratification. Correspondingly, the 1944 Convention will cease to be in force for those states for which the new Convention is in force.

I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Convention and advice and consent to ratification.

JIMMY CARTER ■

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 19, 1979.

Chile

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, NOV. 30, 1979[1]

The Government of the United States has been reviewing our relations with the Government of Chile, in light of Chile's actions with respect to the assassination of Orlando Letelier, a former Ambassador of Chile to the United States, and Ronni Moffitt.

Mr. Letelier and Mrs. Moffitt were killed in Washington in September 1976 by a bomb attached to their car. On August 1, 1978, a Federal grand jury handed down a number of indictments in the case. Three officers of the Chilean intelligence service (Messrs. Contreras, Espinoza, and Fernandez) were indicted for having planned and directed the killings. Michael Townley, a member of the Chilean intelligence service, pleaded guilty and was sentenced for his role in the crime, and two of his Cuban accomplices were subsequently tried and convicted in the U.S. District Court in Washington. The United States sought the extradition from Chile of the three Chilean officials, but on October 1 that request was denied by the Chilean Supreme Court. The court also chose not to call for a Chilean investigation of the murder charges.

The Government of Chile bears a twofold responsibility in this matter. First, the three men indicted for having planned and directed the killings were officials of that government and included the former head of Chile's intelligence service. The overwhelming body of evidence amassed by the Department of Justice makes it likely that the charges against these officials would be upheld if a fair trial could be held. Second, for over 20 months the Government of Chile has made no serious effort to investigate or prosecute these crimes on its own.

The Government of Chile has thus, in effect, condoned this act of international terrorism. It now seems likely that the men who planned and directed this crime, committed on the streets of our nation's capital, will go unpunished. We believe it is essential that we make clear, both to the Government of Chile and to others throughout the world, that such acts of terrorism cannot be tolerated.

Accordingly, the President has concluded that the following measures should be taken.

• We shall reduce the size of our mission in Chile.

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Great Seal of the United States.

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CYRUS R. VANCE
Secretary of State

HODDING CARTER III
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor

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tend the meeting of the Security Council stating that "there is no basis for negotiations over the hostages except the return of the deposed Shah for trial in this country." He also announces that Laingen and two other embassy officials are not hostages and "are free to leave at any time" although he could not guarantee their safety to the airport.

Registrar of the ICJ issues call to parties of hostage case stating that the "Court will hold public hearings at an early date to afford parties the opportunity of presenting their observations on request for interim measures. Projected date and time for such hearings is Monday, 10 December, at 3 p.m."■

The Challenge of Peacemaking

by Harold H. Saunders

Address before the Conference on U.S. Vital Interests in the Middle East in St. Louis on November 6, 1979. Mr. Saunders is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

I am delighted to be here in St. Louis to speak about the challenge of war and peace in the Middle East, and we appreciate the interest all of you have shown in coming to share this day with us. Conferences such as these give us in your Department of State a valuable opportunity to exchange perceptions with informed and interested citizens about what is at stake for all of us in this key area of the world—an area which Americans in many walks of life increasingly recognize can affect their lives and interests.

At the root of our exchange of views are some basic questions.

- Why is the United States so deeply involved in the search for peace in the Middle East?
- Does that involvement serve our national interests or threaten them?
- What are those national interests, and just how should we pursue them in this unstable region where change is taking place with unprecedented rapidity?

The answers to these questions begin to define the elements of a truly national policy toward this troubled region. For years, Middle East policy was the preserve of a few specialists. Today it is the concern of all Americans.

The purpose of this conference has been to stimulate thought and to contribute to a greater understanding of the ingredients of our policy. For, without a national consensus about what the United States is trying to do in such a critical area and why, no policy—no matter how designed and executed from Washington—can succeed.

At the outset let me make three central points about the Middle East, and then develop them in relation to the peacemaking process.

- More important and yet different American interests converge in the Middle East today than in any other area of the developing world. The United States no longer has the choice of distancing itself from what happens there.
- Fundamental changes are taking place in the Middle East at breathtaking speed. Some of the richest and fastest modernizing nations in the world live side-by-side with some of the poorest and most traditional nations, and all are coping with the impact of rapid change. Instability of some kind is inevitable. The issue is not whether we can avoid instability but how we deal with it.
- Within this environment of high stakes and diverse interests, the only sensible policy for us is one which permits us to pursue all of our interests at the same time in conditions of orderly change. We must avoid being forced to make choices among our various interests because none is so unimportant that it can be sacrificed. This is in our interest. It is in the interest of our friends in the Middle East.

Important U.S. Interests

Any discussion of American interests in the Middle East today must begin with some thought about how American perceptions of the Middle East and our interests there have changed in recent years. Only after such reflection do we see what is at stake.

For years, the Middle East was thought of mainly in schoolbook geography terms as a "strategic crossroads," as a "land bridge" joining Asia, Africa, and Europe and forming the "life line" of the British Empire. In the 1950s and 1960s, the area took on new geopolitical importance because of the oil it provided to our NATO allies and Japan and because of the importance of Turkey and Iran in containing Soviet expansion to the south toward that oil. Even during those years, however, the Middle East still did not seem to have direct overriding importance to the United States itself. We could still make the choice of standing a step back from direct involvement in its problem.

That situation has changed markedly in the 1970s. If we can just look for a moment at the five areas of primary interest which the United States has today in the Middle East we will see the extent of the change.

The **first** relates to the Soviet Union. While we have long recognized the importance of denying to the Soviet Union a predominant influence in the Middle East, we have also learned in the heat of two crises that we have a particular concern to avoid confrontation with the Soviets there in this nuclear age. The Soviet Union, for reasons of power, oil, geographic proximity, and ethnic and cultural ties between elements of its population and peoples of the Middle East also considers that it has interests in the area.

Our interest is to help the nations of the area preserve their independence against any foreign domination. But unlike Europe, where the lines between the Soviets and us are drawn both geographically and by precedent, the lines are not clearly drawn in the Middle East. Either by accident or by escalation, the two superpowers could end up in confrontation. Messages exchanged between Moscow and Washington in the heat of crisis in both the 1967 and the 1973 wars made that specter all too clear.

So today we are more acutely aware than ever before of the challenge of avoiding confrontation, while making certain that nations of the area preserve their independence.

Our **second** major interest is the security and well-being of Israel. Every American President since the establishment of Israel in 1948 has declared the unwavering American commitment to that end. Our two peoples have deep cultural and emotional ties which make relations between our two countries both unique and indestructible. We have stood by Israel through its wars and given generously to its development and defense. As President Carter has put it: "For 30 years we have stood at the side of the proud and independent nation of Israel. I can say without reservation, as President of the United States of America, that we will continue to do so not just for another 30

years, but forever. The United States will never support any agreement or any action that places Israel's security in jeopardy.

Today this traditional interest in Israel has new dimensions.

During the early days of the 1973 war, Israeli reverses shook Israel's faith in its military prowess and led to a further military buildup. But those reverses also raised questions about whether, over time, Israel could depend solely on its military strength to survive.

Now the peace treaty with Egypt signed last March finally provides a practical complement. Today, for the first time, Israel has a realistic hope of assuring its future not just by arms alone—though these will always be necessary—but by developing peaceful relationships with its neighbors as an accepted member of the Middle East community of nations. In helping Israel realize this dream of peace with its largest neighbor, President Carter has given a new dimension to our commitment to Israel. We now have the historic challenge and opportunity to help determine what is necessary to provide Israel with security in peace as well as in war.

Our **third** interest is in the supply of Middle Eastern oil. We have long held that this oil must be available "at reasonable prices" to our allies who were so dependent on it. In this decade we see that oil in a different light. That dependence has hit closer to home. We need only remember the impact of the oil embargo of 1973–74, or again more recently the gas lines of early summer, to note that the United States itself now is deeply affected by imported oil, much of it from the Middle East. Because the greatest reserves are there, those nations also have the capacity to affect price as well as supply.

The **fourth** American interest, closely tied to the third, is maintenance of close and friendly ties with key moderate Arab nations. The reasons are both political and economic. Politically, the moderate leaders of the Middle East will set the character of that area for the remainder of the century. They control the forces which will be the first line of defense against any foreign domination. Economically, the Middle East is among the fastest growing markets in the world. We have an obvious interest in developing trade which will help offset the cost of oil. We also have a larger foreign policy interest in the growing network of relationships that link the people of this area to the people of the United States in common pursuits.

Furthermore, the oil-producing nations of the Middle East, with their large supplies of capital, also have the capacity to influence world economic stability and to provide help to the developing nations with everything from expensive development projects to aid in meeting high energy costs.

Our **fifth** and no means last interest in the Middle East is a humanitarian one. We remain a nation concerned about the people of the area. For years we have provided assistance to refugees, whether from the Holocaust in Europe or from Arab villages in Palestine. We are now trying to help end the cycle of violence in southern Lebanon which has caused so much suffering to innocent civilians and caused 200,000 refugees to flee north from their homes. We have contributed to economic development of the poorer nations and have provided necessary technology to those nations which have oil money.

Until the Palestinian refugees can find dignity and hope in a future . . . there can be no final peace in the Middle East.

Today exciting new opportunities exist. With the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty as the first step toward a comprehensive peace settlement, we have realistic hope of progress in resolving the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. We can look to the day when the refugees will no longer define their future in the hopelessness of the camps. This is a complex problem but also a vital human one. Until the Palestinian refugees can find dignity and hope in a future—until they can have a voice in the determination of that future and feel that peace in the Middle East has something in it for them—there can be no final peace in the Middle East. In facing this tragic human problem, we are deeply conscious that, as President Carter has said, it sometimes takes more courage to wage peace than to wage war.

Forces of Change

In considering these diverse and important interests—and our sharpened national perception of them—we must consider the forces of change which define the environment in which those interests are pursued.

With rapid change comes instability. In the past year, we have witnessed a revolution in Iran, a coup d'etat in Afghanistan and spreading insurrection there, continued internal strife in Lebanon, and the escalating dispute over the western Sahara in North Africa. All reflect unending turmoil which outsiders are powerless to control. The issue for the United States, therefore, is not whether change will occur but how we deal with it.

Our tendency too often has been to consider change as threatening. That need not be so. After all, our country has been and remains one of the fastest changing in the world. Our heritage is revolutionary. Our society has thrived on change. The spirit of innovation has produced human and technological achievements which cause other developing societies to look to us for leadership. These achievements are the hallmarks of our capacity to advance the human condition through harnessing change.

Dangers do exist in the Middle East. We cannot ignore them. At the same time, I propose that we look at the changes occurring there as an opportunity to build, not solely as a danger to destroy. As Secretary Vance said in Chicago last May, the United States must be seen as a power that uses its tremendous resources—diplomatic, military, economic—to promote healthy change and not as the power employing its military might to repress change.

Our task is to work with the moderate governments of the area, to try to help them direct change into constructive channels. It is they who have to cope with the consequences of an economic revolution, where in some, fast increases in oil revenues have produced new power of global dimensions at a time that their societies are experiencing the painful stresses and strains of rapid modernization. Nor are any governments there immune from the pressures of new-found nationalism, of the Islamic revival, of the traditional rivalries within the region, which, together with the economic revolution, feed change and instability.

For our part, we have great assets in helping these nations meet the challenge. While some are just beginning to enjoy the independence and power which their resources provide them, they are also finding that interdependence is equally a force in the modern world. Whether it be in food production and imports, acquiring industrial and consumer goods, importing skilled and unskilled labor, no nation—no matter

International Year of the Child

by Jean Young

Statement to the U.N. General Assembly on October 17, 1979. Mrs. Young is Chairperson of the U.S. National Commission on the International Year of the Child.[1]

The International Year of the Child (IYC) has been a celebration of the inestimable value of the child in all the countries of the world. Activities associated with the IYC have done much to concentrate the attention of the world's people not only on the importance of children but also on the international obligation to meet perhaps the most pressing and heart-rending need of the day—to improve the lot of suffering children in so many parts of the world and most especially in the developing world. It is thus fully appropriate that this meeting focus on the follow-up to the International Year of the Child and that the follow-up concentrate on methods to improve the situation of children of the world, especially in developing countries.

In his report on the work of the organization, the Secretary General states: "In the International Year of the Child we have been reminded very forcefully of the stark deprivations suffered by children in many parts of the world and we have seen that all too often children are also victims of violations of human rights. It is absolutely intolerable that children should be made to suffer in this manner in our day and age."

It is absolutely intolerable that children should suffer so in our day and age. But they are suffering in varying degrees in all parts of the world.

We in the United States have prided ourselves in caring not only adequately but very well for our children. We provide free education. We have good child labor laws. We have extensive safety regulations to protect them. Good hospitals and clinics exist in all our States. Food is plentiful, and we have a high standard of living as compared with the rest of the world.

Yet, even as a nation of such immense resources, we recognize that there are, indeed, children suffering. There are children in the mountains of Appalachia, in rural areas, in the urban ghettos, on Indian reservations, in Hispanic barrios, and in migrant camps who lack the basic necessities of life. There are other children who do not receive an equal opportunity in this great nation because of language, race, economic status, or mental or physical handicaps. There are still other children who suffer neglect, abuse, or indifference.

Nevertheless, we recognize that in comparison with the world statistical averages that our children fare very well. But we recognize also that if a single child suffers anywhere in the world, we must be concerned. This is why, in addition to appealing to Americans to understand and resolve the problems of their own children, we have also committed ourselves to reaching out to help the most desperate of the world's children. The National Commission initiated this goal with the theme: "The World's Children—A Joy to Share, A Responsibility to Care."

Through more than 350 nongovernmental organizations and 52 States and territories, the commission shared information on the status of refugee children, abandoned children, and children in need in developing nations. This effort has been followed up with fund-raising plans to culminate at Thanksgiving. We will give thanks by giving to children without. In addition to giving funds, we are urging Americans to give programmatic and legislative support to meeting the needs of the world's children.

Plight of Children

It has been estimated that 55 million children in the world under the age of 15 must work. Millions of children in our world know virtually no childhood at all. They must take on the role of adults in many cases even before they are old enough to begin school. Poverty is the reason for much of this but so also is greed, and it is a problem of the developed countries as well as the developing. Children are employed in hazardous jobs, at hard labor. Many must beg, and many barely into puberty are forced to become prostitutes. In some places, because child labor is cheap, children work at adult jobs while adults are unemployed.

In recent history there have been particularly distressing conditions that have highlighted rather dramatically the deprivation of children. We witnessed the tragedy of children in southern Africa. We saw the heart-rending plight of "boat people" children. We have seen the 9- and 10-year-old children of Northern Ireland and the Middle East brandishing weapons.

Millions of children in our world suffer from malnutrition which hampers their physical and mental development. Many receive little or no education. Many are homeless and many are without parents.

In some areas where the plight of children is so appallingly bad at the best of times, it has become immeasurably worse as children become the innocent victims of warfare. The world community for years has tried to cope with the suffering of refugee children. Especially in Africa and Asia, extensive efforts have been taken to alleviate the suffering of refugee children, as well as, of course, that of adults. Our own government, as well as the international community, has responded massively to this need and much has been done, although so much more remains to be done. This problem will be before us for the foreseeable future and demands our continuous attention.

Children of Kampuchea

Even sadder than the tragic plight of refugee children—though a greater sadness than that seems inconceivable—is that of the child victims of war who have yet to be reached by the relief efforts of the international community. The most recent case involves the children of Kampuchea, who represent 45% of that country's population.

Professional relief experts have reported that in that unhappy land, very few children under the age of 5 have survived the famine and associated diseases that have resulted from prolonged warfare; the validity of these observations is supported by the virtual absence of young children among Khmer refugees. The few who do survive the famine and fighting in Kampuchea will undoubtedly bear permanent mental and physical scars as a result of severe malnutrition.

Scientific research has proven conclusively that malnutrition in early childhood is closely related to later developmental disabilities. One recent survey of a Khmer refugee group along the Thai-Khmer border indicated that 96% of the surviving children in that group were suffering from malnutrition. A generation of Khmer may already have been lost, and thousands of older children are likely to perish unless urgent actions are undertaken by the international community.

An international effort to provide relief to Kampuchean civilians is underway. UNICEF has been designated by the Secretary General as the lead agency for the U.N. system in this effort. Together with the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNICEF deserves our particular appreciation for its initiative and perseverance in attempting, under the most difficult con-

ditions, to alleviate the suffering of Kampuchean children and mothers as well as others in need.

It is the fervent hope of my government that as a fitting contribution to the International Year of the Child, all member nations will join in support of this effort to save the children of Kampuchea and also join in urging all involved parties, particularly the parties in the area, to support and cooperate in relief efforts. We trust that this session of the General Assembly will receive a comprehensive report on the status of children in Kampuchea and on the progress of efforts to assist them.

Confronted with the appalling situation of so many of the children of the world, we must reject despair and attack the problems with resolution. Governments must do more for the welfare and protection of the children in their jurisdiction and to the extent that they are able to help other governments cope with their problems. UNICEF and other agencies of the U.N. system must continue and expand the work they have been doing. My government hopes, for instance, that the International Labor Organization will continue to study to seek ways to resolve the complex problem of child labor and that other U.N. agencies and governments will cooperate in this vital effort.

The International Year of the Child has done great service in increasing our awareness of the problems of children, and there have been many small successes in meeting those needs. All those associated with its conception and implementation deserve our gratitude. That this increased awareness also has brought increased determination to deal with the demands of the situation is demonstrated by the Secretary General's commendable compilation of special messages on the IYC by heads of state or government. It is well to remember in the face of intolerable tragedy that improvement is possible and that the determination to improve is great.

Special credit to the success of the IYC must go to UNICEF and the IYC Secretariat for their excellent work in involving all the countries of the world in the year. My special admiration goes to Dr. Estefania Aldaba-Lim, the Secretary General's special representative for the IYC, for her skill in stirring the imagination and participation of so many countries.

The Government and the people of the United States were among those who responded enthusiastically to these efforts. In his message to the Secretary General, President Carter said: "Working through UNICEF and other United Nations agencies and through the leaders of other nations, I think we can enhance the opportunity for better clothing, housing, food, medical care, education and the protection against suffering on the part of children of all nations. So I am very eager to be a part of it. It is a sobering prospect to know that perhaps once in a lifetime we have an opportunity to focus attention on such a neglected group in the world's population."

U.S. National Commission Activities

The President appointed a National Commission for the International Year of the Child and did me the honor of asking me to be its Chairperson. Throughout this year, the commission has initiated and conducted a dialogue for the purpose of increasing public awareness of the special needs of children in such areas as health, nutrition, education, justice, recreation, and the arts. In addition, we dealt with equal opportunity, the impact of media on children, and the needs of children around the world.

Because of this effort many people learned for the first time that many among the one-third of our population who are children are inadequately provided for in these areas. Many were shocked to learn that 17 million children in the United States do not have an adequate standard of living. Many of them receive inadequate nutrition, medical care, and educational opportunity. Many, and not necessarily the poor, are denied the warmth and security of a loving home. In some of our large cities, juvenile crime and juvenile exploitation are serious problems.

The response to the commission's activities from the public, from governments at the municipal and State levels, from the interagency committee at the Federal level, and from nongovernment organizations of many kinds was enthusiastic. Activities were far too numerous to list in this speech, let alone describe. However, a detailed description is contained in the commission's report to the General Assembly. I will say just a few words about how the National Commission approached its work.

The commission set itself the following goals:

- To stimulate a national dialogue on issues facing children, both at home and abroad and thus create a broad-based support group concerned and knowledgeable about children and their problems;
- To form lasting coalitions of concerned citizens at the local, State, and national levels to serve as continuing advocates for children's needs, both at home and abroad long after 1979;
- To motivate people from all walks of life—private as well as public organizations, parents as well as children, individuals as well as groups, government agencies as well as charitable institutions, organized labor as well as corporations—and at all levels from the local to the national to evaluate the needs of children in their communities and take concrete steps toward meeting these needs;
- To provide a celebratory opportunity for children, families, and communities to come together in a joyful event;
- To persuade legislative bodies to take legislative actions and governmental agencies to review and refine regulations and policies that affect the well-being of children and their families;
- To discover the concerns, feelings, and aspirations for children from all across our country, including those of children themselves; and
- To reach out beyond our own country for information exchange and cooperation in confronting common problems.

In each of these goals we have received a very positive response from the American people. We have begun to see progress in all areas. We look for this momentum to be sustained through existing organizations and governmental channels. In light of this we are presenting to our President not a final report but a "challenge report"—a challenge to our country to continue the work begun on behalf of children here and around the world.

The International Year of the Child will soon be behind us and the matter at hand is the follow-up to the year. The U.S. Government supports a vigorous follow-up to the accomplishments of this year. We hope that the General Assembly will make a strong statement on the continuing need to focus on children's welfare as a major element of government policies in all countries. We believe the IYC has demonstrated that its focus on children can serve as an organizing principle to mobilize government actions as well as community support and participation for development activities benefiting the country as a whole. We hope that UNICEF at its next executive board session will recommend steps to be taken to continue the momentum that has been created. We agree with the recommen-

• By January 1, 1980, we will terminate the foreign military sales (FMS) "pipeline" to Chile and will thereby terminate all deliveries of military equipment to the Government of Chile by the U.S. Government.

• The military group now stationed in our Embassy in Santiago will be phased down as the FMS pipeline is reduced; at the end of this year, we will assess whether the military group should be completely eliminated.

• Pursuant to the Export-Import Bank Act and to authority delegated by the President, Secretary Vance has determined that suspension of Exim financing in Chile would "clearly and importantly advance U.S. policy" in combating international terrorism. Exim is, therefore, immediately suspending all such financing.

• The Overseas Private Investment Corp. will not approve any further guaranties or undertake any new activities in Chile.

Chile's deplorable conduct in this affair, and in particular its refusal to conduct a full and fair investigation of this crime, demand the actions we are taking today, which constitute a strong reaffirmation of our determination to resist international terrorism. ■

[1] Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture
Convention on the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at Washington Mar. 6, 1979.[1]
Ratifications deposited: Barbados, Oct. 24, 1979; Canada, July 11, 1979.

Arbitration
Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970.
Ratification deposited: Jordan, Nov. 15, 1979.

Aviation
Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air and additional protocol. Concluded at Warsaw Oct. 12, 1929. Entered into force Feb. 13, 1933; for the U.S. Oct. 29, 1934. 49 Stat. 3000.
Accessions deposited: Chile, Mar. 2, 1979;[2] Uruguay, July 4, 1979.
Notification of succession: Bangladesh, Feb. 13, 1979.

Additional protocol No. 3 to amend the convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000) as amended by the protocols done at The Hague on Sept. 28, 1955 and at Guatemala City on Mar. 8, 1971. Done at Montreal Sept. 25, 1975.[1]
Ratification deposited: Brazil, Aug. 16, 1979.[2]

Montreal protocol No. 4 to amend the convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000) as amended by the protocol done at The Hague on Sept. 28, 1955. Done at Montreal Sept. 25, 1975.[1]
Ratification deposited: Brazil, Aug. 16, 1979.[2]

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accession deposited: Kuwait, Nov. 27, 1979.

Biological Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 8062.
Ratification deposited: Argentina, Nov. 27, 1979.

Customs
Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex. Done at Brussels Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4, 1952; for the U.S. Nov. 5, 1970. TIAS 7063.
Accession deposited: Mauritania, Oct. 2, 1979.

Environmental Modification
Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 5, 1978.[3]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 28, 1979.

Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund formulated at Bretton Woods Conference July 1–22, 1944. Opened for signature at Washington Dec. 27, 1945. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.
Signature and acceptance: St. Lucia, Nov. 15, 1979.

Human Rights
American convention on human rights. Done at San Jose Nov. 22, 1969. Entered into force July 18, 1978.[3]
Ratification deposited: Nicaragua, Sept. 25, 1979.

Judicial Procedure
Convention abolishing the requirement of legalization for foreign public documents with annex. Done at The Hague Oct. 5, 1961. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1965.[3]
Senate advice and consent to accession: Nov. 28, 1979.

Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490), on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Adopted at London Oct. 17, 1974. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1978. TIAS 8606.
Acceptance deposited: Argentina, Oct. 8, 1979.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Adopted at London Nov. 14, 1975.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Liberia, Nov. 19, 1979.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Adopted at London Nov. 17, 1977.[1]
Acceptances deposited: Canada, Finland, Nov. 19, 1979.

Red Cross
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the

protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), with annexes. Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.[3]
Ratifications deposited: Sweden, Aug. 31, 1979;[4] Tunisia, Aug. 9, 1979.

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of noninternational armed conflicts (Protocol II). Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.[3]
Ratification deposited: Sweden, Aug. 31, 1979; Tunisia, Aug. 9, 1979.

Sugar
International sugar agreement, 1977, with annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978.
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 30, 1979.

Trade
Protocol extending the arrangement regarding international trade in textiles of Dec. 20, 1973 (TIAS 7840). Done at Geneva Dec. 14, 1977. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1978. TIAS 8939.
Ratification deposited: Guatemala, Oct. 29, 1979.

Whaling
Amendments to the schedule to the international convention for the regulation of whaling, 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at the 31st meeting of the International Whaling Commission, London July 9–13, 1979.
Entered into force: Oct. 24, 1979 except for the provision concerning the catch limit of 143 fin whales for the Spain-Portugal-British Isles stock of the North Atlantic, which shall enter into force Jan. 22, 1980.

Wheat
Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.
Accessions deposited: Belgium, Nov. 29, 1979; Ireland, Dec. 3, 1979.
Ratification deposited: Cuba, Dec. 3, 1979.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.
Accessions deposited: Belgium, Nov. 29, 1979; Ireland, Dec. 3, 1979.

Bilateral

Argentina
Agreement concerning hide exports and other trade matters. Signed at Washington Aug. 10, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 19, 1979.

Colombia
Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 3, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9515), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Bogota Aug. 30 and Sept. 7, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 7, 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 3, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9515), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Bogota Sept. 6 and 7, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 7, 1979.

Egypt
Agreement concerning U.S. Government and other claims, with exchange of notes. Signed at Cairo May 19, 1979.
Entered into force: Nov. 5, 1979.

Finland
Extradition treaty. Signed at Helsinki June 11, 1976.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 29, 1979.

France
Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in the regulation of nuclear safety. Signed at Paris Oct. 25, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 25, 1979.

Germany, Federal Republic of
Treaty concerning extradition, with protocol. Signed at Bonn June 20, 1978.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 29, 1979.

Greece
Agreement concerning the grant of defense articles and services under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens Aug. 30, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1979.

Hungary
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington Feb. 12, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 18, 1979.
Proclaimed by the President: Nov. 28, 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of July 7, 1972, as amended and extended (TIAS 8640), on scientific cooperation. Signed at Washington and Budapest Oct. 24, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1979.

Program of cooperation and exchanges in culture, education, science and technology for 1980 and 1981, with annex. Signed at Washington Oct. 25, 1979. Enters into force Jan. 1, 1980.

India
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036, 9232), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Nov. 6, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 6, 1979.

Israel
Memorandum of understanding for technical cooperation in mineral technology. Signed at Washington and Jerusalem Aug. 14 and Sept. 19, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 19, 1979.

Agreement relating to cash assistance to Israel during fiscal year 1980 to support the economic and political stability of Israel. Signed at Washington Nov. 15, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 15, 1979.

Japan
Treaty on extradition, with exchange of notes. Signed at Tokyo Mar. 3, 1978.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 30, 1979.

Kiribati
Treaty of friendship, with agreed minute. Signed at Tarawa Sept. 20, 1979. Enters into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Malaysia
Agreement amending the agreement of May 17 and June 8, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9180), relating to trade in cotton, wool and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and New York Oct. 4 and 12, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 12, 1979.

Mexico
Treaty on extradition, with appendix. Signed at Mexico City May 4, 1978.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 30, 1979.

Morocco
Agreement regarding interpretation of Articles 21(2) and 25(1) of the convention of Aug. 1, 1977 for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Rabat Oct. 25, 1979. Enters into force upon entry into force of the convention of Aug. 1, 1977.

Norway
Extradition treaty. Signed at Oslo June 9, 1977.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 30, 1979.

Panama
Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. Signed at Panama Jan. 11, 1979.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 30, 1979.

Agreement relating to the library and museum in the Civil Affairs Building. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Sept. 24, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 24, 1979.
Interim agreement relating to continued use of lands and installations for purposes of air traffic control and related services, with related note. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.



Profile

People

Population: 15.5 million (1979 est.).
Density: 50 per sq. mi.
Religion: Sunni Moslem.
Literacy: 10%.
Life Expectancy: 40 years.

Geography

Area: 260,000 sq. mi. (673,397 sq. km.), compares with the size of Texas.
Capital: Kabul (pop. 603,969).

Economy

Agriculture: *Products*—wheat, cotton, fruit and nuts, karakul pelts, wool, mutton.
Industry: *Products*—textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, carpets, fertilizer, cement.
Natural Resources: Natural gas, oil, coal, copper, talc, barites, sulphur, lead, zinc, iron, salt, precious and semiprecious stones.

Trade: *Exports*—$340 million (1978): natural gas, fruit and nuts, karakul pelts, raw cotton, carpets, wool. *Partners*—U.S.S.R. (45%), U.S., U.K., India, Pakistan, Iran. *Imports*—$450 million (1978): capital goods, petroleum products, textiles, foodstuffs. *Partners*—U.S.S.R. (45%), U.S., Japan, India, U.K., F.R.G.
Economic Aid Received: Foreign aid was in the range of $200 million per year just before the April 1978 coup. This was two to three times the level of earlier in the decade. The leading donor has been the Soviet Union. Substantial aid has also been received traditionally from the U.S., the F.R.G., and multilateral agencies. During the Daoud period, large commitments were also received from Middle East oil states and China. More recently, much of the foreign aid has been suspended except for that received from the U.S.S.R.

(For more details on Afghanistan's geography, people, history, government, and economy, see p. 65.)

Security of the Western Alliance

Address before the Berlin Press Association in Berlin on December 10, 1979 (delivered by George S. Vest, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs).[1]

I want to begin by expressing Secretary Vance's keen regret that the pressure of events makes it impossible for him to be here tonight. The continuing situation in Iran has required that he make some urgent changes in his travel plans—a fact which he regrets and which he and I hope you will understand. He has asked, therefore, that I convey to you his greetings and that I stress to you this point: that every word I speak tonight should be accepted as his—and attributed to him.

An invitation to address the Berlin Press Association is itself an honor. Some lines of Goethe go this way: "He only earns his freedom and existence who daily conquers them anew."

Each day, the press corps of this city expresses anew the truth of those lines—by upholding the principles of a free and open press. You help us understand the profound changes taking place about us, and you help defend the right of citizens to participate in decisions which affect their lives and well-being.

This gathering affords an opportunity also to express, once again, the admiration that millions of Americans feel for Berlin and its people—and the abiding commitment of our nation to this city. President Carter, who remembers with great warmth his visit to Berlin last year, has asked that his personal greetings be conveyed to you, along with his assurance that the United States is steadfast in this commitment.

For 35 years, Berlin has been a symbol for free people everywhere. In the postwar period of tension and confrontation, Berlin became a stirring example of human determination to be free—to live under democratic institutions. It is this unyielding determination which helped creat he balance upon which Berlin's cur at stability is based. The clear demonstration that Berlin would not yield, that Berliners wished to remain part of the Western world, made possible the Quadripartite Agreement.

And in the years since the Quadripartite Agreement, Berlin has been an impressive symbol of the tangible fruits detente can yield.

For the United States, the freedom of Berlin—and protection of the benefits made possible by the Quadripartite Agreement—are central foreign policy objectives. We will use every means at our disposal to guarantee the safety and the freedom of this city.

Moreover, we are committed to further easing tensions in Berlin through the opportunities provided by the Quadripartite Agreement. Full realization of these opportunities will benefit both East and West. Strict observance and full implementation of all aspects of the Quadripartite Agreement will make such progress possible.

It is essential to maintain the delicate balance of interests which has developed in and around the city. There should be no temptation to use Berlin as a point of pressure in reaction to developments in other areas of East-West relations.

There should be no questioning the important ties between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Western sectors of Berlin, to which the United States attaches particular importance.

Perhaps most importantly, there should be no questioning of Four Power rights and responsibilities for Berlin as a whole. These remain the basis for the stable situation which has developed in this city. The United States is determined to maintain Four Power rights and responsibilities for Berlin as a whole. We expect the agreement, and the practices and procedures which have arisen from it, to be strictly honored.

There is yet another reason to welcome this forum, for it affords us the opportunity to discuss an issue of vital concern to the people of Berlin and to us all—the security of our Western alliance.

Berliners know, better than most, that true security—what John F. Kennedy called "the survival and success of liberty"—cannot be bought with arms alone. The security of the West depends ultimately upon the vitality and the appeal of free political systems, upon the health of our economies, upon the ability of the Western democracies to cooperate with one another. Our goal is not only to defend ourselves, it is to build and maintain a way of life worth defending.

Nonetheless—as Berliners also know—it would be folly to neglect the military aspects of security. Indeed, one of the stern lessons of the past three decades is that we make detente possible through strength, not weakness. In a perfect world this would not be true; in the real world it is inescapable.

So let us focus tonight on the issue of military security—in both its defense and arms control aspects.

The subject is especially timely now, for the NATO allies are reaching, at this moment, a number of decisions—decisions which will shape the security of Europe in the 1980s and deeply influence relations between East and West. Such decisions, as you know, will be the chief concern of the NATO ministers when they meet in Brussels later this week.

One of these decisions involves a fundamental question which confronts NATO members and, indeed, all of the West. How should the alliance respond to the Soviet Union's unprecedented buildup of long-range theater nuclear forces targeted against Western Europe?

Deterrence and Arms Control

We will be answering that question in Brussels this week in a way which emphasizes two essential points.

- First, we stand ready to adjust force levels through concrete arms control negotiations. Our hope is that such negotiations will limit force levels on both sides. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations should understand that we have a genuine commitment to seek mutual arms limitations in strategic, theater nuclear, and conventional arms.
- NATO is determined, however—and this is the second essential point—to maintain secure deterrent forces across the entire nuclear and conventional spectrum. This the Soviets must also understand.

This dual policy—a policy of maintaining deterrence and of pursuing arms control—will be at the heart of NATO's strategy in the 1980s, for it is self-evident to us that adequate defenses and arms control must go hand-in-hand. Arms control agreements hold out the hope of affording greater security than arms competition with its high costs and built-in dangers. But

We will next demonstrate that the Court has jurisdiction over this dispute and the authority to indicate the provisional measures requested by the United States. Finally, we shall explain why, on the basis of article 41 of the Court's Statute, an indication of interim measures is urgently needed and amply justified.

The international legal standards here are of ancient origin. They have evolved over centuries of state practice, and in recent years have been codified in a series of international agreements. It is on four of those agreements that the Government of the United States relies here.

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

Since the subject of this proceeding is focused largely on the status and immunities of diplomatic agents, I shall refer at the outset to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The purpose of that convention, to which both the United States and Iran are parties, was to codify a fundamental, firmly established rule of international law—that the immunity and inviolability of Embassies and diplomats must be absolutely respected and that in no circumstances may a state engage in the type of conduct that is involved here in this matter before this Court.

The first relevant provision of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is article 22, relating to the physical premises of an Embassy or mission. The words of article 22 are clear:

> "1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.
>
> 2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.
>
> 3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution."

As to the personnel of such a diplomatic mission, article 29 of the convention goes on to provide that every diplomatic agent "shall be inviolable" and that he shall be free from "any form of arrest and detention." The language is unqualified: It prohibits any form of arrest or detention, regardless of any grievance which the host state may suppose that it has against a particular diplomat. There is a remedy available against a diplomat who a state believes has engaged in improper conduct—to require him to leave the country. But the Vienna convention excludes any form of physical arrest or detention for the purpose of prosecution or for any other reason.

The convention reemphasizes the principle of diplomatic inviolability in several different ways. Article 29 requires the receiving state to prevent any attack upon the person, freedom, or dignity of a diplomatic agent. Article 31 requires that each such agent enjoy unqualified "immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State." There is no exception; no matter what the cause, the receiving state is precluded from allowing the criminal prosecution of a diplomatic agent. In the last few days, as we will explain later in our argument, this absolute immunity from criminal prosecution has taken on an overwhelming importance.

Article 37 of the convention extends the same absolute inviolability and absolute immunity from assault and from criminal trial to the administrative and technical staff of an Embassy. All but two of the more than 50 Americans currently being held hostage in Tehran are either diplomatic agents or Embassy administrative and technical staff, some of whom also perform consular functions.

Other immunities and privileges pertinent to this case are found in Articles 24, 25, 26, 27, 44, 45, and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Among these are the inviolability of the archives and documents of the mission, the right of diplomatic agents and staff to communicate freely for official purposes, and the right to depart from the receiving state at any time they wish.

Over the hundreds of years that these principles have been recognized and honored throughout the international community, there have been occasions when a particular state has felt dissatisfied or aggrieved by the conduct of a diplomatic agent of another state or his government; and Iran is claiming some such grievances now. For hundreds of years, however, states have uniformly recognized that the only lawful course open to them is to declare the diplomatic agent *persona non grata*. When a state declares a diplomatic agent *persona non grata*, his government must withdraw him or suffer the eventual termination of his diplomatic status.

These uniformly recognized principles have been codified in article 9 of the Vienna convention. Under that treaty, a receiving state can in effect expel an objectionable diplomat—but under no circumstances may a state imprison an emissary or put him on trial. In diplomatic history and practice there is no precedent or justification for the seizure of a diplomat, let alone an entire diplomatic mission. There is also no precedent or justification of the imprisonment and trial of such persons in an attempt to coerce capitulation to certain demands. It is difficult to think of a more obvious, more flagrant violation of international law.

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

Both Iran and the United States are also parties to the second international convention on which the United States relies in this proceeding—the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. This convention reflects many of the same principles I have just described. Under the consular convention every state party, including Iran, has an international legal obligation to protect the consular facilities and members of the consular posts of every other state party.

Of course, when personnel of a diplomatic mission are providing consular services, they are entitled to the full protection afforded by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The Convention on Consular relations also requires the receiving state to permit another state party's consular officers to communicate with and have access to their nationals. This right is manifestly violated when the consular officers are themselves held incommunicado by force.

New York Convention

Apart from these two Vienna Conventions, the United States and Iran also are parties to the New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. One of the essential premises of the New York convention is stated in its preamble. It is that crimes against such internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents, are "a serious threat to the maintenance of normal international relations" and "a matter of grave concern to the international community."

The convention defines a number of types of conduct as constituting crimes within its scope. Under article 2 it is a criminal act to participate as an accomplice in an attack on the person or liberty of an internationally protected person or in a violent attack on official premises. Under article 4 of the convention, every state party, including Iran, is required to prevent such crimes. Under article 7, every state party must take steps to see that those responsible for such crimes are prosecuted. The Government of Iran has

violated every one of these provisions in the plainest way.

All three of the treaties I have discussed were drafted by the U.N. International Law Commission. They were adopted by conferences of plenipotentiaries or by the U.N. General Assembly —and thus by the vast majority of the states of the world. They have been so widely ratified as to demonstrate that they reflect universally recognized rules of international law.

Bilateral Treaty of Amity

Finally, the United States relies in this case upon a bilateral treaty—the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran. This treaty is in a sense even broader than the three multilateral conventions to which I have previously referred. Under article II, paragraph 4, of the treaty of amity, each party has a legal obligation to insure that within its territory the nationals of the other party shall receive "the most constant protection and security."

In addition, article II provides that, if any U.S. national is in custody in Iran, Iran must in every respect accord him "reasonable and humane treatment." Under articles II and XIX any such national is entitled to communicate with his own government and avail himself of the services of his consular officials. Article XIII requires that the consular officers and employees themselves be accorded the privileges and immunities accorded by general international usage and that they be treated in a fashion no less favorable than similar officer and employees of any third country.

That completes my brief summary of the principles of international law that underlie the application of the United States. I could go on to discuss the provisions of Article 2, Paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, under which Iran and all other U.N. members are obligated to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. But the United States believes that the three multilateral conventions and the 1955 bilateral treaty provide as clear a legal predicate as can be rationally required for its request for an indication of provisional measures.

MR. OWEN

The Attorney General has summarized the treaty provisions which form the legal predicate for the United States' pending request for an indication of provisional measures—and I would like to open my portion of the argument by making one brief comment about those treaty provisions.

In my judgment, the most striking feature of the legal principles involved in this case is their clarity and simplicity. All of the substantive principles involved are well known and familiar, and they are clear and unambiguous. This is not a case involving complicated legal considerations or difficult questions of interpretation; the only question here is one of the application of the four treaties—and I suggest that the application of the treaties will become very clear indeed from a brief review of the facts—to which I now turn.

Like the legal principles involved, the facts are simple—and tragically so. I submit that a mere recitation of the events will demonstrate beyond any doubt whatever that the Government of Iran is today engaged, on a continuing basis, in gross and obvious violations of the international legal obligations which it owes to the United States and to the international community at large.

The immediate factual story began on November 4 of this year. On that day, in the course of a demonstration of several thousand people immediately outside the U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran, several hundred demonstrators broke away and commenced a physical assault on the Embassy. I will not burden you with the details of the 2-hour attack on the Embassy or the manner in which the attackers physically cut their way into the Embassy. But I should emphasize that throughout the attack, U.S. officials were in contact with the office of the Prime Minister of Iran and the Iranian Foreign Ministry—vigorously calling for security assistance—and yet the Government of Iran made absolutely no effort to prevent the seizure of the Embassy and its personnel.

Indeed, in the days and weeks that have followed the initial attack and the seizure of more than 50 American hostages, the chief of the Iranian Government and the members of his council have repeatedly praised and approved the conduct of the captors. Instead of honoring its legal obligations and seeking to prevent or remedy the violations of the rights of the United States, the Government of Iran has actually ratified those violations and made them its own.

Since this last point is important in fixing the responsibility of the Government of Iran, let me pause to emphasize that government's complicity in the conduct involved. In response to a question from the President of the Court, we have submitted to the Court a collection of public statements made by Iranian officials in the last few weeks, and I would like to refer to two or three of those statements. On November 4, the very day of the Embassy seizure by the so-called Iranian students, the Ayatollah Khomeini, then the *de facto* Chief of State, approved the students' action, and the next day, November 5, a number of Iranian officials did exactly the same.

On that day, November 5, the Ayatollah Khomeini publicly refused to call upon the students to withdraw; the commander of the Revolutionary Guard congratulated the students and pledged the Guard's full support for the action; the public prosecutor and the judiciary announced their support; and then the Foreign Minister of Iran declared: "The action of the students enjoys the endorsement and support of the Government." On November 18 the Ayatollah Khomeini declared "what our nation has done is to arrest a bunch of spies, who, according to the norms, should be investigated, tried, and treated in accordance with our own laws." He made clear at the same time that the hostages would be released only if the United States first met certain specified demands of the Iranian Government.

I ask the Court to bear in mind that these statements emanated from a government which is under a solemn and continuing legal duty to provide the most constant protection and security to U.S. personnel. Indeed, as documented in the materials we have submitted to the Court, two senior members of the Iranian Government have publicly acknowledged this legal duty, while at the same time approving its violation.

Continuing the story of the hostages, the fact is that since the time of their capture they have been subjected to a harrowing ordeal. Bound hand and foot and frequently blindfolded, they have been subjected to severe discomfort, complete isolation and threats, including repeated threats both by their captors and by the Iranian Government to the effect that, in certain cirumstances, they, the hostages, would be put on trial and even put to death. They have been paraded blindfolded before hostile crowds, denied mail and visitors, and essentially held incommunicado. Some time ago, it is true, 5 non-American captives and 13 American hostages were released, but more than 50 U.S. citizens continue to be held in these inhumane and dangerous circumstances. Moreover, recent reports suggest that some of the hostages may have been transferred from the Embassy compound to other places of confinement. We have no way of knowing the details of the conditions of their confinement or their treatment at any such new locations.

both the parties in proceedings before it and, in indicating provisional measures, has not infrequently done so with reference to both the parties; and whereas this does not, and cannot, mean that the Court is precluded from entertaining a request from a party merely by reason of the fact that measures which it requests are unilateral;

30. Whereas, accordingly, neither of the considerations put forward in the Iranian Government's letter of 9 December 1979 can be regarded as constituting grounds which should lead the Court to decline to entertain the United States request in the present case;

31. Whereas it follows that the Court has not found in the Iranian Government's letter of 9 December 1979 legal grounds which should lead it to conclude that it ought not to entertain the United States request;

32. Whereas the Court will accordingly now proceed to examine the request of the United States Government for the indication of provisional measures in the present case;

33. Whereas by the terms of Article 41 of the Statute the Court may indicate such measures only when it considers that circumstances so require in order to preserve the rights of either party;

34. Whereas the circumstances alleged by the United States Government which, in the submission of that Government, require the indication of provisional measures in the present case may be summarized as follows:

(i) On 4 November 1979, in the course of a demonstration outside the United States Embassy compound in Tehran, demonstrators attacked the Embassy premises; no Iranian security forces intervened or were sent to relieve the situation, despite repeated calls for help from the Embassy to the Iranian authorities. Ultimately the whole of the Embassy premises was invaded. The Embassy personnel, including consular and non-American staff, and visitors who were present in the Embassy at the time were seized. Shortly afterwards, according to the Unites States Government, its consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz, which had been attacked earlier in 1979, were also seized, without any action being taken to prevent it;

(ii) Since that time, the premises of the United States Embassy in Tehran, and of the consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz, have remained in the hands of the persons who seized them. These persons have ransacked the archives and documents both of the diplomatic mission and of its consular section. The Embassy personnel and other persons seized at the time of the attack have been held hostage with the exception of 13 persons released on 18 and 20 November 1979. Those holding the hostages have refused to release them, save on condition of the fulfilment by the United States of various demands regarded by it as unacceptable. The hostages are stated to have frequently been bound, blindfolded, and subjected to severe discomfort, complete isolation and threats that they would be put on trial or even put to death. The United States Government affirms that it has reason to believe that some of them may have been transferred to other places of confinement;

(iii) The Government of the United States considers that not merely has the Iranian Government failed to prevent the events described above, but also that there is clear evidence of its complicity in, and approval of, those events;

(iv) The persons held hostage in the premises of the United States Embassy in Tehran include, according to the information furnished to the Court by the Agent of the United States, at least 28 persons having the status, duly recognized by the Government of Iran, of "member of the diplomatic staff" within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961; at least 20 persons having the status, similarly recognized, of "members of the administrative and technical staff" within the meaning of that Convention; and two other persons of United States nationality not possessing either diplomatic or consular status. Of the persons with the status of member of the diplomatic staff, four are members of the Consular Section of the Embassy;

(v) In addition to the persons held hostage in the premises of the Tehran Embassy, the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Iran and two other United States diplomatic agents are detained in the premises of the Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in circumstances which the Government of the United States has not been able to make entirely clear, but which apparently involve restriction of their freedom of movement, and a threat to their inviolability as diplomats;

35. Whereas on the basis of the above circumstances alleged by the United States Government it claims in the Application that the Government of Iran has violated and is violating a number of the legal obligations imposed upon it by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between Iran and the United States of 1955, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973, the Charter of the United Nations, and customary international law;

36. Whereas the power of the court to indicate provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court has as its object to preserve the respective rights of the parties pending the decision of the Court, and presupposes that irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights which are the subject of dispute in judicial proceedings;

37. Whereas the rights which the United States of America submits as entitled to protection by the indication of provisional measures were specified in the request of 29 November 1979 as:

"the rights of its nationals to life, liberty, protection and security; the rights of inviolability, immunity and protection for its diplomatic and consular officials; and the rights of inviolability and protection for its diplomatic and consular premises";

and at the hearing of 10 December 1979 as:

"the right [of the United States] to maintain a working and effective embassy in Tehran, the right to have its diplomatic and consular personnel protected in their lives and persons from every form of interference and abuse, and the right to have its nationals protected and secure";

and whereas the measures requested by the United States for the protection of these rights are as set out in paragraphs 2 and 12 above,

38. Whereas there is no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of relations between States than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies, so that throughout history nations of all creeds and cultures have observed reciprocal obligations for that purpose; and whereas the obligations thus assumed notably those for assuring the personal safety of diplomats and their freedom from prosecution, are essential, unqualified, and inherent in their representative character and their diplomatic function;

39. Whereas the institution of diplomacy, with its concomitant privileges and immunities, has withstood the test of centuries and proved to be an instrument essential for effective co-operation in the international community, and for enabling States, irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems, to achieve mutual understanding and to resolve their differences by peaceful means;

40. Whereas the unimpeded conduct of consular relations, which have also been established between peoples since ancient times, is no less important in the context of present-day international law, in promoting the development of friendly relations among nations, and ensuring protection and assistance for aliens resident in the territories of other States; and whereas therefore the privileges and immunities of consular officers and consular employees, and the inviolability of consular premises and archives, are similarly principles deep-rooted in international law;

41. Whereas, while no State is under any obligation to maintain diplomatic or consular relations with another, yet it cannot fail to recognize the imperative obligations inherent therein, now codified in the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963, to which both Iran and the United States are parties;

42. Whereas continuance of the situation the subject of the present request exposes the human beings concerned to privation, hardship, anguish and even danger to life and health and thus to a serious possibility of irreparable harm;

43. Whereas in connection with the present request the Court cannot fail to take note of the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973, to which both Iran and the United States are parties;

44. Whereas in the light of the several considerations set out above, the Court finds that the circumstances require it to indicate provisional measures, as provided by Article 41 of the Statute of the Court, in order to preserve the rights claimed;

45. Whereas the decision given in the present proceedings in no way prejudges the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the merits of the case or any questions relating to the merits themselves, and leaves unaffected the right of the Government of Iran to submit arguments against such jurisdiction or in respect of such merits;

46. Whereas the Court will therefore now proceed to indicate the measures which it considers are required in the present case;

47. Accordingly,

THE COURT,
unanimously,

1. *Indicates*, pending its final decision in the proceedings instituted on 29 November 1979 by the United States of America against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the following provisional measures:

A. (i) The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran should immediately ensure that the premises of the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulates be restored to the possession of the United States authorities under their exclusive control, and should ensure their inviolability and effective protection as provided for by the treaties in force between the two States, and by general international law;

(ii) The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran should ensure the immediate release, without any exception, of all persons of United States nationality who are or have been held in the Embassy of the United States of America or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran, or have been held as hostages elsewhere, and afford full protection to all such persons, in accordance with the treaties in force between the two States, and with general international law;

(iii) The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran should, as from that moment, afford to all the diplomatic and consular personnel of the United States the full protection, privileges and immunities to which they are entitled under the treaties in force between the two States, and under general international law, including immunity from any form of criminal jurisdiction and freedom and facilities to leave the territory of Iran;

B. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran should not take any action and should ensure that no action is taken which may aggravate the tension between the two countries or render the existing dispute more difficult of solution;

2. *Decides* that, until the Court delivers its final judgment in the present case, it will keep the matters covered by this Order continuously under review.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fifteenth day of December, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-nine, in four copies, of which one will be placed in the archives at the Court, and the others transmitted respectively to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to the Government of the United States of America, and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council.

(Signed) Humphrey WALDOCK
President

(Signed) S. AQUARONE,
Registrar. ■

U.S. Seeks Sanctions Against Iran

**PRESIDENT CARTER,
DEC. 21, 1979[1]**

From the first day the American Embassy was invaded and our diplomatic staff was seized as hostages by Iran, we have pursued every legal channel available to us to secure their safe and prompt release. On at least four separate occasions the world community, through the U.N. Security Council and through the International Court of Justice, has expressed itself clearly and firmly in calling upon the Iranian Government to release the American hostages.

Yet Iran today still stands in arrogant defiance of the world community. It has shown contempt not only for international law but for the entire international structure for securing the peaceful resolution of differences among nations.

In an irresponsible attempt at blackmail, to which the United States will never yield, kidnappers and terrorists, supported by Iranian officials, continue to hold our people under inhumane conditions. With each day that passes, our concern grows for the health and for the well-being of the hostages. We have made clear from the very beginning that the United States prefers a peaceful solution, in preference to the other remedies which are available to us under international law. For a peaceful resolution to be achieved, it is now clear that concrete action must be taken by the international community.

Accordingly, I have decided to ask for an early meeting of the U.N. Security Council to impose international economic sanctions upon Iran, under title VII of the U.N. Charter. The Government of Iran must realize that it cannot flaunt with impunity the expressed will and law of the world community. The Security Council must act to enforce its demand that Iran release the hostages. The world community must support the legal machinery it has established so that the United Nations and the International Court of Justice will continue to be relevant in settling serious disputes which threaten peace among nations.

I can think of no more clear and compelling challenge to the international community than the one we face today. The lives of over 50 innocent people are at stake; the foundation of civilized diplomacy is at stake; the integrity of international law is at stake; the credibility of the United Nations is at stake. And at stake, ultimately, is the maintenance of peace in the region. As we call on the Security Council to act, on behalf of international law and on behalf of peace, we again call on the Government of Iran to end this crisis by releasing the hostages without delay.

And now, because our holy days approach—a time to think of peace—I would like to add a few special words for the American people, indeed the people of good will in all countries, including Iran, who share concern for 50 innocent human beings who hope, themselves, for peace and for the salvation of their lives.

Henry Longfellow wrote a Christmas carol in a time of crisis, the War Between the States, in 1864. Two verses of that carol particularly express my thoughts and prayers and, I'm sure, those of our nation in this time of challenge and of concern and of crisis. And I would like to quote from that poem:

> And in despair I bowed my head.
> 'There is no peace on earth,' I said.
> 'For hate is strong and mocks the song
> Of peace on earth, good will to men.'
> Then pealed the bells, more loud and deep.
> 'God is not dead, nor does He sleep.
> The wrong shall fail, the right prevail,
> With peace on earth, good will to men.' ■

[1] Made to reporters assembled in the White House Briefing Room (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 24, 1979).

NATO Issues Declaration on Iran

Declaration on Iran Issued by Ministers and Other Representatives Attending the NATO, Brussels, December 14, 1979:

The Foreign Ministers and representatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, meeting in Brussels on 13th December 1979, reviewed the grave situation created by the occupation of the Embassy of the United States of America in Tehran and

region have rarely been better. Indian policy has been key to this, and any description of South Asia must start with its largest member—India.

In the last years of Mrs. Gandhi's government, relations were restored between India and Pakistan and Ambassadors were again exchanged between India and China. Mrs. Gandhi made additional efforts to improve relations with India's smaller neighbors. Following up this welcome progress, the Janata government, which took office in 1977, made the good-neighbor policy a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Further improvements were made in Indo-Pakistan relations, and Indian and Pakistani leaders have met with each other on a number of occasions. This is not to say, however, that deep-seated suspicions do not remain. A relationship born in the turmoil of India's partition—and one which has led to three armed conflicts—cannot be changed overnight. But progress has been made, and we sincerely hope that further progress will come.

Similarly, India has improved its relations with Nepal and Bangladesh. It agreed to Nepalese requests for separate trade and transit agreements. India also agreed to a short-term division of Ganges Rivers waters with Bangladesh. India's actions created a greater sense of confidence on the part of its neighbors, who are often uneasy about the over-awing strength and size of the giant across the border.

Aside from being well-received by the smaller South Asian countries, India's good-neighbor policy has been good politics in India itself. This would seem to augur well for a continuation of the policy by any government which takes office in New Delhi after the January election. We would certainly hope so and will be doing what we can from the sidelines to cheer on the cause of stable and friendly relations.

Afghanistan

There is, of course, one major exception to the general improvement of relations among the states of South Asia. This is the uneasy relationship between Pakistan and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The situation in Afghanistan is a profoundly troubling one for the United States. I would like to review it for you.

Afghanistan is today the scene of continuing human suffering and what amounts to civil war. In April 1978 the People's Democratic Party came to power in Kabul in a violent coup. Since then the prospects for reform under the new government have been overshadowed by internal strife. The government is confronted by continuing rebel operations and occasional troop mutinies. Nonetheless, the new President, Hafizullah Amin, continues to demonstrate that he retains the loyalty of key military units and that he is determined to employ these well-armed forces to defend his regime.

There are in Afghanistan large numbers of Soviet military personnel, primarily engaged in technical and advisory roles with the Afghan Armed Forces. They appear to be taking an increased role in military decisions and operations. The prospect is for a prolonged period of continued fighting.

Important U.S. interests are affected by developments in Afghanistan. Our effort to encourage peace and stability in the region is clearly made more difficult by Afghanistan's internal unrest and the exodus of refugees from Afghanistan. These already number over 300,000, most of whom have fled to Pakistan. The reorientation in Afghanistan's foreign policy away from its traditional genuine nonalignment to an approach virtually indistinguishable from that of Cuba or the Soviet Union is one we regret.

Our interest in the welfare and economic development of the people of Afghanistan—one of the world's poorest nations—has been amply demonstrated by the fact that we have provided over $.5 billion of assistance in the past 30 years. In the present situation, economic development has largely come to a standstill, and our own aid program is being phased out in accordance with legislative requirements.

We are especially disturbed by the growing involvement of the Soviet Union in Afghan affairs. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, as neighbors, have always had close relations. Never before in recent times, however, have the Soviet military—and, apparently, the political—roles been as extensive. Direct interference in Afghanistan by any country, including the Soviet Union, would threaten the integrity of that nation and peace in the area and would be a matter of deep concern to the United States. We have repeatedly impressed on the Soviet Government the dangers of more direct involvement in the fighting in Afghanistan. We are continuing to monitor developments closely.

For its part, the U.S. Government seeks no special position in Afghanistan. We look for a relationship based on mutual respect and shared interests in regional stability, the independence and territorial integrity of all states in the area, and nonintervention. These are goals which I have already spelled out as among the guiding principles of our policy throughout South Asia. We have important differences with the Afghan Government, including our deep concern about the human rights situation in Afghanistan. Security concerns and the decline in our programs have required us to reduce our Embassy staff in Kabul and to withdraw dependents of U.S. Government personnel. Nevertheless, we have continued to express to the Government of Afghanistan our desire for normal and friendly relations. We consider that the initiative for such relations lies with them.

Pakistan

Pakistan's understandable uneasiness about developments in Afghanistan is heightened by its internal difficulties. The country continues under martial law, imposed in July 1977. Elections that were promised for November of this year were indefinitely postponed, and martial law has been indefinitely extended. We regret this decision and continue to hope that Pakistan will reform to elected civilian government as soon as possible.

Pakistan's political problems are heightened by its economic difficulties. Years of heavy budget deficits, mounting imports and inadequate exports have brought Pakistan to the brink of a crisis in its external finances. Moreover, to feed itself, Pakistan will require a sustained and substantial increase in agricultural productivity. To turn this situation around will require difficult economic policy decisions.

The United States traditionally has had a close relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan was a member of both South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Our two countries continue to be linked together by a 1959 agreement which pledges the two sides to consult in accordance with constitutional processes in the event of aggression from Communist powers. Although SEATO and CENTO no longer exist

and Pakistan has joined the nonaligned movement, we continue to value our ties with this country and remain pledged to support Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity. Pakistan's security is an important concern for us.

Our ability to provide Pakistan with the support we would wish to give it has been restricted by Pakistan's nuclear activities. Our legislation mandates a cutoff of most development and military assistance to countries which import certain sensitive nuclear equipment material and technology, including equipment used for uranium enrichment. The fact that Pakistan has been developing a uranium enrichment program which is inconsistent with its power generation or research needs has caused us deep concern. We have cut off further economic development assistance, valued at about $40 million annually, as well as terminated our modest military training program. This action, as I have said, was required under U.S. law.

We have expressed our concern to the Pakistanis about their nuclear activities and have urged them not to move forward to develop a nuclear explosives capability. We believe that the development of such a capability could aggravate rather than relieve their security concerns and could be a major source of instability in the South Asian region.

As you all know, our Embassy in Islamabad was overrun by a mob and destroyed by fire 10 days ago. Four members of our staff died tragically in that fire—two American servicemen and two Pakistani employees. There are legitimate questions about the time it took for the Pakistanis to clear the compound. The Pakistani Government has established a commission of inquiry to look into this. But in contrast to the Iranian regime, the Government of Pakistan acknowledged its responsibility for the protection of our diplomatic mission. President Zia has expressed his regret to us about the incident and has offered to rebuild our chancery in Islamabad.

Relations With India

Differences over nuclear issues have also influenced U.S. relations with India, whose 1974 nuclear explosion was a key element in generating renewed concern in this country and elsewhere about the danger of the spread of nuclear technology which could be used for military purposes. U.S. concern about nuclear proliferation eventually resulted in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.

This act has had an important bearing on our relations with India. It provides that after March 1980, nuclear supplies may not be exported by the United States to any country which has not accepted International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards over all its peaceful nuclear facilities. India has refused to accept such safeguards.

The provisions of the act affect the continued supply of enriched uranium fuel to the twin reactors at Tarapur, north of Bombay. These reactors, which supply some 15% of the power requirement of western India, were built in the 1960s with American economic assistance. A bilateral agreement calls for U.S. supply of enriched uranium for the lifetime of the reactors. India, in exchange, is obligated to purchase all Tarapur fuel from the United States and to accept certain safeguards and other controls over the fuel and the waste material produced from it.

This knotty problem has received considerable attention in India. It has at times tended to obscure the fact that relations between the United States and India are otherwise good and probably better than they have been since the early 1960s.

The improvement in our relations with India dates back to the last years of Mrs. Gandhi's government. You will recall that a few years before that, in 1971, our relations had sunk to a low with the famous, so-called American tilt toward Pakistan in the Bangladesh war and the dispatch of the aircraft carrier *Enterprise* to the Indian Ocean. By the mid-1970s, both governments had come to recognize that a more mature relationship was called for. The Desai government moved further in this direction. It made "genuine nonalignment" a watchword. While it maintained good relations with the Soviet Union, it also sought better ties with the United States.

The United States and India often stress our shared commitment to human rights and the democratic process. But our relationship with India goes far beyond the realm of political philosophy. Perhaps nothing better symbolizes the diversity of ties between the two countries and the concrete ways in which that cooperation is manifested than the Indo-U.S. Joint Commission and the work carried on through its four subcommissions—economics and commerce, agriculture, science and technology, and education and culture.

We hope that through the work of these commissions, through our expanding trade (now approaching $2 billion annually), through the establishment of a modest economic assistance program, through exchanges of scholars and students, and, perhaps most important, by a willingness on the part of the two countries to engage as equals in a wide range of candid consultations on bilateral and multilateral issues, the ups and downs which have so frequently characterized Indo-U.S. relations in the past will be avoided. We recognize that we have much in common. We also recognize that there are issues where we disagree. Our aim has been to expand the former and to isolate and discuss the latter. We think we have made considerable progress.

We hope that this will continue. India now faces general elections, scheduled for January, taking place in an established institutional framework. We are confident that whatever government comes to power, our good relations with India will continue. We can also hope, as I have said earlier, that India will continue to strengthen and improve relations with its neighbors. In the final analysis, it is this aspect of Indian foreign relations that may be the most important from our own point of view.

Let me turn now to four smaller countries of the area.

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka (or as it was formerly known, Ceylon), like most of the countries of South Asia, has faced two major problems since it won independence in 1948: the creation of an economy sufficient to raise the standards of living and meet the aspirations of its people and the nurturing of a sense of nationality and unity among peoples of diverse ethnic, religious, and linguistic communities. Sri Lanka has tried to meet these challenges within a democratic system and remains one of the few functioning multiparty democracies in the Third World.

Since the government headed by J.R. Jayewardene came to office in the last national elections in mid-1977, Sri Lanka has dramatically changed its former economic policies. While not abandoning the general Socialist orientation that has characterized Sri Lanka

General Assembly Acts on Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Following are texts of Security Council Resolution 462 adopted by consensus on January 9, 1980, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Donald F. McHenry's statement in the General Assembly on January 12, and the General Assembly resolution adopted January 14.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 462, JAN. 9, 1980

The Security Council,

Having considered the item on the agenda of its 2185th meeting, as contained in documents S/Agenda 2185,

Taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its Permanent Members at the 2190th meeting of the Security Council has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Decides to call an emergency Special Session of the General Assembly to examine the question contained in Document S/Agenda/2185.

AMBASSADOR McHENRY, JAN. 12, 1980[1]

This emergency session marks only the sixth time that the General Assembly has been specifically convoked under the "uniting for peace" procedure to discharge the peacekeeping functions of the United Nations when the Security Council was prevented from doing so. On each of those occasions, the precarious peace guarded by this Organization was undermined by a crisis that challenged principles underlying the U.N. Charter. The infrequency with which the Security Council has used this extraordinary procedure attests to the world's collective judgment that it be invoked sparingly and only in grave circumstances.

Today we are faced with a challenge to the principles of the charter as grave as any that necessitated our meeting during previous crises. We need no long oration, no extensive remarks to remind us why we are gathered here.

Afghanistan, a member of the United Nations, has been invaded by the Soviet Union, another member. It was invaded in violation of the Soviet Union's obligation not to use force against the territorial integrity and political independence of another state—an obligation imposed on the Soviets by both the U.N. Charter and a bilateral treaty between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.

Afghanistan, a nonaligned sovereign state, has been occupied by Soviet troops in violation of the international legal principle that no state may intervene by force in the internal affairs of another. Afghanistan has had its government toppled and replaced by a regime chosen by the Soviet Union, in violation of every nation's right to self-determination by its people.

When I addressed the Security Council during its debate on this matter, I chronicled the brutal series of events in Afghanistan. Every member here knows how the Soviet Union airlifted tens of thousands of troops into the territory of its neighbor and took over the Afghan capital of Kabul. Every member knows that after Soviet troops surrounded the presidential palace in Kabul, the President of Afghanistan was summarily executed, and a puppet leader from abroad was installed in his place. Every member knows that the Soviet Union then undertook widespread military operations to subjugate Afghanistan and its people. Every member of the United Nations also knows that the invasion of Afghanistan poses a serious threat to other countries, both in southwest Asia, where the current level of tension and instability is already high, but also elsewhere in the world. It poses a particular danger to Afghanistan's neighbors.

The Soviet Union and its allies, including the Foreign Minister representing the Soviet-installed regime now in power in Kabul, have asserted, both here and in the Security Council, that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was prompted by armed intervention into that country by other foreign powers—including, as they tell it, the United States. They have asserted that all the world is well aware that Afghanistan has been the target of so-called imperialist aggression aimed at overthrowing the "popular democratic regime" that governs there.

But all the world knows no such thing. These allegations are an obvious attempt to divert attention from the central issues. The Soviet allegations are nothing more than a transgressor's attempt to mask its misdeeds. No one can or should believe them.

We are particularly insulted by the transparent falsity of the Soviet claim that its troops entered Afghanistan at the repeated invitation of its "popular democratic regime." As so many of my fellow delegates have pointed out during this debate, no reasonable man could possibly believe that the Government of President Amin issued such a deadly invitation. Amin's Soviet-appointed successor was not even in office at the time Soviet troops first entered Afghanistan.

The truth of the matter is that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to quell determined opposition by the Afghan people to their own government. The Soviet Union replaced one leader in Afghanistan with another to its own liking. It is sheer hypocrisy for the Soviets to claim that their presence was necessary to prevent the overthrow of a "popular democratic regime" by so-called imperialist forces.

Neither the U.N. Charter nor any bilateral treaty affords the Soviet Union, or any country, the right to take military action in another country because it disagrees with the policies or performance of the existing government. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan flouts international law, breaches world peace, and threatens regional and global security.

The universal outcry against the subjugation of a nonaligned state by its great power neighbor proves that the world will not condone military intervention without legal or moral justification by one state into another. The strong responses to this act of aggression by many countries, including my own, demonstrate to the Soviet Union that it cannot ignore international law without suffering serious consequences. The United States and other nations are considering other unilateral and multilateral measures to further demonstrate to the Soviet Union of the magnitude of its error, including withdrawal from cultural exchanges, trade missions, and even the 1980 Summer Olympic Games.

But unilateral action on the part of individual states is most effective when it is taken in concert with collective action that expresses the will of the world community.

The Security Council considered the threat to the peace raised by the question of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at length. The vast majority of its members voted to call for the withdrawal of the invasion force in Afghanistan. But the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution and stymied the Council's attempt to discharge its peacekeeping function under the charter.

Therefore, the nations of the world have turned to the General Assembly to denounce this dangerous breach of the peace and security.

It is imperative that we, the member states of the United Nations, express in clear and forceful terms that we will never condone lawless interference with the right of a sovereign people and the lawless invasion of its territory.

It is imperative that we demand the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, so that the people of that country can be free to set their own course in the world and to choose their own leaders.

It is imperative that we demonstrate we cannot be duped into ignoring our responsibility to defend the principles of the charter by tortured explanations that insult our intelligence.

And, above all, it is imperative that we view this incident for what it really is. The Soviet Union insists that this General Assembly debate has been prompted by American and Chinese pettifogging; that it is being used as an excuse to renew the cold war; and that denunciation of its invasion by the members of the General Assembly will amount to an abandonment of the principles of nonalignment embraced by many nations represented here.

But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is no cold war squabble. It is an act that the rest of the world cannot afford to ignore. It demonstrates that the Soviet Union has no real commitment to the principles of territorial integrity, to self-determination, to nonalignment, when those principles conflict with its perception of its interests.

For this body to remain silent in the face of open aggression would be for the members of the United Nations to condone a violation of the only principles that small nations can invoke to protect themselves from self-aggrandizement by larger and more powerful states. It is not the United States whose freedom is most threatened by Soviet indifference to the charter; the small and nonaligned countries, like Afghanistan, are most imperiled.

So we cannot remain mute. We must speak out. We must stand united in support of the principles of freedom, in support of independence, and in support of the principles of self-determination.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION A/RES/ES-6/2, JAN. 14, 1980

The General Assembly,

Taking note of Security Council Resolution 462 (1980) of 9 January 1980, calling for an emergency Special Session of the General Assembly to examine the question contained in document S/Agenda/2185,

Gravely concerned at the recent developments in Afghanistan and their implications for international peace and security,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all peoples to determine their own future and to choose their own form of government free from outside interference,

Mindful of the obligations of all States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recognizing the urgent need for immediate termination of foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan so as to enable its people to determine their own destiny without outside interference or coercion,

Noting with profound concern the large outflow of refugees from Afghanistan,

Recalling its resolutions on the strengthening of international security, on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty and on the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing its deep concern at the dangerous escalation of tension, intensification of rivalry and increased recourse to military intervention and interference in the internal affairs of States, which are detrimental to the interests of all nations, particularly the non-aligned countries,

Mindful of the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the responsibility of the General Assembly under the relevant provisions of the Charter and of Assembly Resolution 377A(V) of 3 November 1950,

1. Reaffirms that respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State is a fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations, any violation of which on any pretext whatsoever is contrary to its aims and purposes;

2. Strongly deplores the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan, which is inconsistent with that principle;

3. Appeals to all States to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Arghanistan and to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of that country;

4. Calls for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to enable its people to determine their own form of government and choose their economic, political and social systems free from outside intervention, subversion or coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;

5. Urges all Parties concerned to assist in bringing about, speedily and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the Afghan refugees to their homes;

6. Appeals to all States and national and international organizations to extend humanitarian relief assistance with a view to alleviating the hardship of the Afghan refugees in coordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to keep Member States and the Security Council promptly and concurrently informed on the progress towards the implementation of the present resolution;

8. Calls upon the Security Council to consider ways and means which could assist in the implementation of this resolution.

VOTE ON RESOLUTION, JAN. 14, 1980

Of the 152 members of the United Nations, 140 participated in the special session vote on General Assembly Resolution A/RES/ES-6/2 on January 14 as follows:

For (104)
Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republi , Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kampuchea, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri

and provoke an economic crisis greater than that of the Great Depression 50 years ago, with a fundamental change in the way we live.

Twin threats to the flow of oil—from regional instability and now potentially from the Soviet Union—require that we firmly defend our vital interests when threatened.

In the past year, we have begun to increase our capacity to project military power into the Persian Gulf region, and are engaged in explorations of increased use of military facilities in the area. We have increased our naval presence in the Indian Ocean. We have been working with countries in the region on shared security concerns. Our rapid deployment forces, as described earlier, could be used in support of friendly governments in the Gulf and Southwest Asian region, as well as in other areas.

South Asia. The overwhelming challenge in this region will be dealing with the new situation posed by Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. We must help the regional states develop a capability to withstand Soviet pressures in a strengthened framework for cooperation in the region. We want to cooperate with all the states of the region in this regard—with India and Pakistan, with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal.

In this new situation, we are proposing to the Congress a military and economic assistance program to enable Pakistan to buttress its defenses. This is a matter of the most urgent concern, and I strongly urge the earliest possible approval by the House and Senate. We are also working closely with other friends of Pakistan to increase the resources available for Pakistan's development and security.

We are also pursuing the possibility of gaining access to military facilities in the region in time of trouble. We are prepared to work closely with our friends in the region, on a cooperative basis, to do whatever is required to ensure that aggressors would bear heavy costs so that further aggression is deterred.

A high priority for us in the region is to manage our nuclear concerns with India and Pakistan in ways that are compatible with our global and regional priorities. The changed security situation in South Asia arising from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan calls for legislative action to allow renewed assistance to Pakistan. But this in no way diminishes our commitment to work to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, in Pakistan or elsewhere.

Steady growth of our economic assistance is also essential if the countries of South Asia are to achieve growth and true stability.

Africa

A peaceful transition to majority rule in Southern Africa continues to be a major goal of the United States. We gave our fullest support to the successful British drive to reach an agreement among all parties in Rhodesia. The process of implementation will not be easy, but the path is now open to a peaceful outcome. With our European allies, Canada and the African states directly concerned we also are making progress toward independence and majority rule for Namibia. The momentum resulting from successful resolution of the Rhodesian conflict should aid in these initiatives.

Congressional support for the Executive Branch decision to maintain sanctions on Rhodesia until the parties reached agreement on a ceasefire and an impartial elections process had begun was instrumental in creating the conditions necessary for agreement. Now that the United States, European trading partners and the surrounding African states have lifted sanctions, the process of economic reconstruction in Rhodesia—soon to be Zimbabwe—can begin.

With the creation of an independent Zimbabwe after many years of fighting, we will be prepared to cooperate in a coherent multi-donor development plan for the poor nations in the Southern Africa region.

Our active support for self-determination and racial equality in Southern Africa has enabled the United States to develop a continuing and effective dialogue with governments throughout the continent. As Africa grows more important to us for economic, political and strategic reasons, we will be strengthening our ties of mutual interest with Africans. We will continue to participate in their first priority—economic development—and to help Africans resolve their political problems and maintain stability in their continent.

Whether in the Horn or in other areas of the continent, we will also provide to friendly nations security assistance when needed for defense of their borders.

North Africa

In 1979 the United States moved to help a long-standing friend by strengthening our arms supply relationship with Morocco. In assisting Morocco to deal with attacks inside its internationally recognized frontiers, we seek conditions of greater security and confidence in which a political settlement of the Western Sahara conflict can be effectively pursued. Though not itself a mediator, the United States in the months ahead will encourage the countries in the area to resolve their differences peacefully in order that the vast economic potential of North Africa can be exploited for the well-being of the people living there.

Latin America

Since my inauguration, I have worked hard to forge a new, collaborative relationship with the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean—one resting on a firm commitment to human rights, democratization, economic development and non-intervention. The events of 1979—even the turbulence in Central America and the Caribbean—presented us with opportunities to move toward these goals.

There was encouraging progress in the area of human rights and democratization in the Western Hemisphere this past year. The inauguration of a new democracy in Ecuador, and the strong effort by the Andean countries to preserve democracy in Bolivia were positive steps.

During 1979, I met with the President of Mexico twice to discuss the opportunities and difficult issues before our two countries. We have taken worthwhile steps, including an agreement on natural gas and on trade.

On October 1, Vice President Mondale and many leaders from Latin America traveled to Panama to celebrate the coming into force of the Panama Canal Treaties. The transition to a new relationship and a new structure to manage the Canal was smooth and effective because of the contributions and the mutual respect between Panamanians and Americans.

The Vice President also traveled to Brazil and Venezuela. The Secretary of State met with leaders in Quito at the inauguration of the new democratic President of Ecuador and in La Paz at the OAS General Assembly. These meetings have helped us to develop further the close consultative ties which are so important to a free and balanced community of nations in the hemisphere.

Also, in 1979, the United States moved to a much closer economic and

political relationship with the increasingly significant Andean Pact countries. A memorandum of understanding on economic relations was signed in Washington in November.

Central America and the Caribbean region are undergoing a period of rapid social and political change. There is a threat that intervention by Cuba may thwart the desire of the people of the region for progress within a democratic framework and we have been working closely with the governments in the region to try to aid in the developmental process of the region and are prepared to assist those threatened by outside intervention.

The Caribbean Group, which is coordinated by the World Bank and which we helped establish, has now become an important factor for development in the region, adding $260 million in concessionary resources to the region. We have increased our aid to the Caribbean, reprogrammed loans, and are seeking prompt Congressional action on a supplemental of $80 million for Nicuaragua and Central America.

My Science Advisor, Dr. Frank Press, led a large delegation of scientists and educators to Barbados, Peru, Venezuela and Brazil to forge new and fruitful ties between our countries in important areas of science and technology.

THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY

A growing defense effort and a vigorous foreign policy rest upon a strong economy here in the United States. And the strength of our own economy depends upon our ability to lead and compete in the international marketplace.

Energy

An essential lesson to be drawn from Iran is that there are compelling foreign policy as well as domestic economic reasons for lessening our dependence on foreign oil.

In response to a series of United States proposals, the industrial countries adopted in 1979 a cooperative energy strategy for the 1980s. Its main elements are collective restraint on oil imports; intensified efforts to conserve oil and boost production of conventional substitutes for oil; and collaborative research, development and commercialization of new fuel technologies.

At the Tokyo Economic Summit in June, the heads of government of the seven major industrial democracies agreed that they must take responsibility for curbing oil demand. By the end of the year, 20 industrialized nations, members of the International Energy Association, had agreed not only to enforce equitably allocated ceilings on their oil imports, but to create a system for quickly adjusting the ceilings to changes in world oil supply. Completion of the detailed agreements to execute the global oil demand-allocation process is at the head of the international energy agenda for 1980.

At the 1980 Economic Summit in Venice, I intend to propose further joint action to smooth the transition from oil to more abundant fuels and to slow the growth in oil prices.

In support of the international oil strategy, the Administration and the United States coal industry are launching joint marketing efforts to make this country a major exporter of steam coal. With assurance of reliable United States coal supply at competitive prices, many of the electric power plants to be built in the 1980s and 1990s can be coal-fired rather than oil-burning. Coal exports will help us pay for our declining but costly oil imports.

A new source of natural gas supply for the United States—Mexico—was opened through the conclusion of government-to-government negotiations. Through close cooperation with our northern neighbor, Canada, the Administration cleared the way for expanding the flow of Canadian natural gas to the United States and for private development of the Alaskan gas pipeline across Canada to the lower 48 states.

We continue to believe that nuclear power will play an essential role in meeting the energy needs of many nations, but with effective safeguards against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

International Monetary Policy

We are moving forcefully to establish the fundamental economic conditions for a strong dollar. In 1979 the balance of payments was in approximate balance for the first time in three years, despite substantially higher oil import costs. Our anti-inflationary economic policies and strong energy program should provide a basis for further improvement. Of course the outcome depends in part also upon responsible pricing behavior by OPEC and other oil producers.

We support the efforts under way to strengthen the international monetary system. I urge the Congress to enact promptly legislation permitting the United States to increase its quota in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as part of the general expansion of Fund resources. We welcome the measures being taken by the IMF to improve its ability to promote sound economic and exchange rate policies in all member countries. We also welcome the study of the possible establishment of a "substitution account" to strengthen the international monetary system by promoting the role of the Special Drawing Right as the principal reserve asset in the system.

We have long recognized that in an era of interdependence, our own security and prosperity depend upon a larger common effort with friends and allies throughout the world.

Trade

Under the direction of my Special Trade Representative, we brought to a successful conclusion the multilateral trade negotiations, the most ambitious set of negotiations to reduce barriers to international trade in a decade. The resulting "MTN" agreements, covering a broad spectrum of trade issues, were concluded and ratified by overwhelming majorities of the United States Congress. These binding commitments, signed by all the major trading nations, provide the framework for a new era in international trading relations with them and with the developing nations. This makes clear my resolve and that of the American people to resist the dangers of protectionism.

The reorganization of the Federal government trade agencies which I directed will assure more effective and prompt governmental action to exploit the export opportunities afforded by the MTN. The plan, approved by Congress this fall, establishes a strong, authoritative voice in the Executive Office of the President to provide coherence and leadership to United States trade policy, negotiations, and the implementation of the MTN trade codes. The reorganization establishes the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and strengthens the Commerce Department.

When these facts are held up against the standards of international law to which the Attorney General earlier referred, including the principles that every diplomatic agent must be kept inviolate from any form of arrest or detention and from any attack upon his person, freedom, or dignity, I suggest that it is not really possible to imagine any clearer violations of the four applicable treaties than the violations presented in this case. On this score, I might also add, there is true unanimity among international legal scholars. Since early November there has been an outpouring of pronouncements from leading international legal scholars throughout the world, and all have unanimously condemned the Iranian treatment of the American nationals in Tehran.

In addition, the same view has received the public support of numerous well-known organizations of jurists, including various societies of international law, the International Law Association, and the International Commission of Jurists. Without exception, the scholars and learned societies have condemned the Iranian hostage-taking as the purest kind of violation of international law. To cite just a single example, the retired President of this Court stated in a recent interview as follows:

> . . . the conduct of the Iranian authorities in this matter constitutes the most flagrant violation of the norms of international law honoring the privileges and immunity of diplomatic missions and their officials.

He went on to say that history will record Iran's actions as "the most complete list of infractions" against these universally recognized norms of international law.

I know of no dissent. Moreover, we are not speaking in the past tense. The violations are going forward and continuing as I stand here this afternoon. With each passing day—indeed with each passing hour—the rights of the United States and the rights of its citizens in Tehran are being assaulted in a manner which is totally inconsistent with the rule of law. That ongoing and continuing violation of plainly established rights is the essence of the problem before the Court this afternoon.

Jurisdiction of the Court

Having reviewed the substantive elements, legal and factual, of the dispute with Iran which the United States has brought before this Court, I would like now to turn to the question of the Court's jurisdiction over the dispute. As I understand the teachings of the prior decisions of the Court with respect to the indication of provisional measures, it is not necessary for a state requesting such measures to establish conclusively that the Court has jurisdiction. The urgency of the situations which call for provisional measures is such that an effort to reach final and conclusive determinations with respect to jurisdiction could well defeat the purpose of Article 41 of the Court's statute. For these reasons, as I understand it, the Court follows the principle that if the Party requesting interim protective measures makes a *prima facie* showing that the Court has jurisdiction over the dispute, that showing provides a sufficient jurisdictional predicate for the Court to act affirmatively on the request.

In this case, I respectfully submit, the United States can make more than a *prima facie* showing. Indeed, I think I can demonstrate that the Court has jurisdiction over the present dispute beyond any doubt at all.

In this connection let me refer to the jurisdictional provisions of the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Article I of the Protocol provides unequivocally:

> Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.

Needless to say, the United States is a party to a dispute with Iran. It has repeatedly called upon the Government of Iran to release the hostages pursuant to its international legal obligations, and Iran has repeatedly refused. Since both states are parties to the protocol, and since one of them (the United States) has presented an application to the Court, article I confers mandatory jurisdiction upon the Court.

It is true that articles II and III of the protocol go on to provide that the parties to the dispute may agree on other methods of settling the dispute, namely by arbitration or conciliation. That is to say, the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court under article I is unqualified, but under articles II and III the parties may mutually agree on arbitration or conciliation instead. I want to emphasize, however, that the settlement procedures contemplated by articles II and III are purely optional. In the English version of the protocol this is indicated not only by the permissive word "may" as it appears in articles II and III, but also by the preamble to the protocol, which indicates explicitly the intention that the Court shall have jurisdiction "unless" arbitration or conciliation have been agreed upon by the parties. Moreover, I am informed that the same conclusion flows from the equally authoritative texts of the protocol in French, Spanish, Russian, and Chinese.

And, finally, the same conclusion—the conclusion that the Court has jurisdiction if no such optional agreement on arbitration or conciliation has been reached—is confirmed by two articles by well-known scholars, both of which appear in a volume whose English title is *A Collection of Studies on International Law, In Honor of Paul Guggenheim*, published in 1968. May I refer the Court respectfully to pages 634 and 695 of that volume, at which Herbert Briggs and Paul Ruegger emphasize that under treaty provisions of this kind the Court's jurisdiction is obligatory where the parties have not in fact resorted to other means of settlement.

The Court will not be surprised to hear from me that no agreement on other means of settlement has been reached in this case. In response to questions propounded by the President, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Mr. Newsom, has provided the Court with a factual account of the efforts made by the United States to open negotiations with the Iranian authorities, and the total rejection of all such overtures by the Government of Iran. Specifically, in early November, after the seizure of the hostages, when the U.S. Government dispatched a distinguished emissary, a former U.S. Attorney General [Ramsey Clark], to visit Iran to discuss the hostage-taking with the Government of Iran, that government refused even to let him enter the country. He stayed in Istanbul for several days attempting assiduously to open discussions, but eventually he returned home without having been able to meet any representative of the Government of Iran.

Moreover, as Mr. Newsom has stated, subsequent efforts by the United States to negotiate have been equally unsuccessful. In fact, every one of the United States' repeated efforts to open direct communications between the two parties has been rebuffed by Iran which, incidentally, has even refused to attend the relevant meetings of the U.N. Security Council. Under such circumstances the United States respectfully submits that, even if articles II and III of the protocol required a prior attempt to arbitrate or conciliate as a condition on this Court's jurisdiction—and we do not believe that they do—that requirement would have been obviated by this Iranian conduct. I should add that exactly the same is true with respect to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations whose jurisdictional provisions are identical to

those of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Turning to the elements of the dispute which arise under the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran, the jurisdiction of the Court is again, I submit, crystal clear. Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the treaty provides in its entirety as follows, and I quote:

> Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific means.

Again, in view of the fact that the repeated efforts of the United States to deal with the dispute by diplomacy have been consistently rebuffed by the Government of Iran, it seems indisputable that under the treaty of amity, this case is properly before this Court.

A final jurisdictional issue arises under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. With respect to that convention, the jurisdictional showing that we can make is admittedly less compelling than the showing we have made with respect to the other three treaties. In contrast with the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and on Consular Relations, article 13 of the convention on internationally protected persons might be read as requiring a 6-months' effort by the parties to arbitrate the dispute as a prerequisite to the Court's jurisdiction.

It is the position of my government, however, that where, as in this case, one of the parties has closed down the Embassy of the other and has flatly refused even to open communications, either through the other's special emissary or in any other fashion, the arbitration requirement is rendered inoperable. It is our position, therefore, that we have made out a *prima facie* showing of jurisdiction, even under the internationally protected persons convention. Moreover, even if no such showing had been made, all of the major claims presented in the Application of the United States are solidly based, I submit, upon the other three treaties—as to which, in our view, the Court's jurisdiction appears not merely *prima facie*, but beyond dispute.

At this point, in response to a question raised by the President of the Court, I should make one final comment on the Court's jurisdiction. As the Court is aware, the Security Council of the United Nations has addressed the present dispute, and in Resolution No. 457, adopted 6 days ago, the Council called upon the Government of Iran to bring about the immediate release of the hostages. In such circumstances it might conceivably be suggested that this Court should not exercise jurisdiction over the same dispute.

I respectfully submit that any such suggestion would be untenable. It is, of course, an impressive fact that the 15 countries represented in the Security Council—15 countries of very diverse views and philosophies—have voted unanimously, 15 to nothing, in favor of the resolution to which I have referred. The fact remains, however, that the Security Council is a political organ which has responsibility for seeking solutions to international problems through political means. By contrast, this Court is a judicial body with the responsibility to employ judicial methods in order to resolve those problems which lie within its jurisdiction. There is absolutely nothing in the U.N. Charter or in this Court's Statute to suggest that action by the Security Council excludes action by the Court, even if the two actions might in some respects be parallel.

By contrast, Article 12 of the U.N. Charter provides that, while the Security Council is exercising its functions respecting a dispute, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation on that dispute; but the charter places no corresponding restriction on the Court. As Rosenne has observed at page 87 of his treatise, *The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice*, the fact that one of the political organs of the United Nations is dealing with a particular dispute does not militate against the Court's taking action on those aspects of the same dispute which fall within its jurisdiction.

To sum up on this point, the United States has brought to the Court a dispute which plainly falls within the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, and I respectfully submit that, if we can satisfy the Court that an indication of provisional measures is justified and needed in a manner consistent with Article 41 of the Court's Statute, the Court will have a duty to indicate such measures, quite without regard to any parallel action which may have been taken by the Security Council of the United Nations. As to whether the actions of the Security Council affect the need for provisional measures, I will have more to say a little later in my argument, but first I would like to explain the specific reasons which underlie our request for such an indication of such measures.

Nature of Interim Measures

On this subject I start from the premise that an essential purpose of such provisional measures is to preserve the rights of the parties pending the final decision of the Court. Putting the matter in other terms, it is familiar jurisprudence that the Court may look to see whether any injury which may be done to one party or the other during the pendency of the case will be, on the one hand, an injury which can be remedied through the Court's final decision or, on the other hand, whether during the pendency of the case one party will be subject to an injury which is actually irreparable.

An injury of the former kind may or may not justify an indication of provisional measures, but where an irreparable injury threatens or is actually being inflicted during the pendency of the case, there is clear justification—and indeed an urgent need—for interim protective measures. As the Court observed in the *Fisheries Jurisdiction* cases, the *Nuclear Test* cases, and the *Aegean Sea* cases, Article 41 of the Court's Statute, and I quote, "presupposes that irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights which are the subject of dispute in judicial proceedings".

Applying this standard of irreparable injury to the present case, I submit that the United States is clearly entitled to interim measures of protection. The simple fact is that the United States' rights of the highest dignity and importance are being currently and irreparably violated by the Government of Iran. Specifically, the international agreements upon which we base our claim have conferred upon the United States the right to maintain a working and effective embassy in Tehran, the right to have its diplomatic and consular personnel protected in their lives and persons from every form of interference and abuse, and the right to have its nationals protected and secure.

As I indicated earlier, with each passing hour those rights are being destroyed, and the injury, once incurred, is plainly and completely irreparable. The trauma of being held hostage day after day in conditions of danger cannot be erased; the weeks of interruption of diplomatic functions cannot be repaired. If the hostages are physically harmed, this Court's decision on the merits cannot possibly heal them. Given the nature of the rights involved, an ultimate award of monetary damages simply could not make good the injuries currently being sustained as this case awaits the Court's judgment.

the holding of members of its staff as hostages in flagrant violation of international law and human rights.

They reaffirmed that their countries fully respect the independence of other states and recognise the right of all peoples to chart their own political, economic and social course. They have no desire to intervene in Iran's internal affairs.

They emphasised that any taking of hostages, for any motive whatsoever, is totally unacceptable and must be firmly opposed by the international community as a whole.

The Governments of the above-mentioned countries urgently call upon the Iranian authorities immediately to release unharmed all the United States Embassy staff members in Tehran and to allow them to return to their country. ■

Iranian Diplomatic Personnel in U.S.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DEC. 12, 1979[1]

The Department of State has informed the Charge of the Iranian Embassy that the staffing level of the Embassy should be reduced to 15 persons. The Charge was also informed that the Iranian Consulates General in New York, San Francisco, Chicago, and Houston are expected to reduce their personnel to five at each post.

These steps have been taken in view of the continued illegal detention of American personnel and holding of the American Embassy compound in Tehran, as well as U.S. Government property in Tabriz and Shiraz.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DEC. 29, 1979[2]

I want to clarify the situation with respect to the staffs of the Iranian Embassy and four Consulates.

On December 12, the Iranians were asked to reduce their staff with diplomatic status to 35 and to give us a list of those remaining within 5 days. Our list on December 12 showed a total of 218 individuals in that category at those Iranian posts. We noted at the time that we believed our list might not be up-to-date as the Iranian Embassy had not been reporting regularly on the departure of its personnel.

We have since learned that of the total of 218, 152 have been removed from the rolls of the Iranian Embassy and Consulates. Many of these were old regime personnel who have either departed or been given permission to remain. That leaves a total of 66 persons to be accounted for.

Thirty-five of those persons are eligible to remain in the United States under the maximum levels we established on December 12. The Iranian Embassy is revising the list of those eligible to remain that they originally provided us, and we expect that list Monday. The remaining 31 persons of the 66, plus an additional 17 military officers (who have been reported to us by the Department of Defense as liaison personnel), are required to depart or regularize their status with Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The Iranian Embassy has been directed that these persons not immediately departing should be in touch with INS at once.

INS is getting in touch directly with each Iranian removed from the list—the 152 persons associated with the previous regime who were removed from the Embassy rolls plus the 31 terminated diplomatic personnel and the 17 terminated military personnel. These persons will be instructed to make arrangements for their departure or to regularize their status in the United States.

We have requested INS to provide continuing reports on the status on Iranian Embassy and Consulate employees including departure information. ■

[1] Made available to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston.

[2] Made available to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

FMS Credits for Israel

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, DEC. 31, 1979[1]

The President met with Israeli Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman on December 28, 1979. Subsequently, the President has decided to request the Congress to increase by $200 million the foreign military sales (FMS) credits previously authorized for Israel in the special legislation in support of the peace treaty.

The decision was based on consideration of such factors as inflation and Israel's balance-of-payments deficit and takes into account the fact that the Israeli Government has instituted since November extremely tough austerity measures designed to overcome these economic problems.

The decision, taken at a time when the President is determined to hold down Federal expenditures, reflects our sympathy and concern for Israel's security and well-being.

Presently, U.S. FMS credits for Israel total $2.2 billion, in addition to a grant of $800 million, to be disbursed over a period of approximately 3 years. ■

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 31, 1979.

Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25% discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 9230. 13 pp. $1. (Cat. No. S9.10:9230.)

Exhibition of Art Treasures. Agreement with Egypt, modifying the agreement of October 28, 1975. TIAS 9236. 4 pp. 75¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:9236.)

Economic Cooperation. Agreed minutes with Iran. TIAS 9238. 27 pp. $1.50. (Cat. No. S9.10:9238.)

Technical Cooperation in Audit Administration and Training. Agreement with Saudi Arabia. TIAS 9246. 10 pp. $1. (Cat. No. S9.10:9246.)

Pedagogique Nationale d'Education Technique. Agreement with Lebanon. TIAS 9280. 9 pp. $1. (Cat. No. S9.10:9280.)

Technical Cooperation in Supply Management Development. Agreement with Saudi Arabia. TIAS 9281. 10 pp. $1. (Cat. No. S9.10:9281.)

Collecting and Conserving Water Supplies from Surface Runoff. Agreement with the United Arab Emirates, amending and extending the agreement of July 10, 1976. TIAS 9288. 9 pp. $1. (Cat. No. S9.10:9288.) ■

American Hostages in Iran

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE, DEC. 5, 1979[1]

Over the past several weeks, we have been hearing a drumfire of propaganda out of Tehran, some of it from people calling themselves students, some of it from the government-controlled radio and television in Iran, and some of it from various officials or people in authority. The message is very clear. It says over and over that the world and the American people should ignore the hostages, forget about the innocent people bound hand and foot, overlook the continued outrage to law and standards of human behavior. We are told to forget all that and focus on the hatred of one man. We are not going to forget, and the American people are not going to get their priorities confused.

How are our hostages being treated? The facts are there for all to see, and the simple fact is that 50 human beings are being held under inhuman conditions, contrary to all civilized standards, in order to prove a political point. They are not permitted regular visitors. They are isolated and not allowed to speak, except to their captors. As far as we know, the hostages have not been allowed to receive mail or messages. There has never been a systematic accounting of the numbers and welfare of the hostages.

The so-called students have not permitted any outside observers even to see these people for 10 days. They are refusing to let international organizations, such as the Red Cross, into the compound. They refuse visits by religious organizations. They refuse representatives of neutral states. Even prisoners of war are guaranteed certain standards of human treatment. But these standards are being dragged in the dirt every day by a group of kidnapers, with the acquiescence of the government.

We are hearing daily propaganda about the alleged crimes of our people in Tehran, most of whom volunteered to serve their country at a difficult and dangerous time. We are not and will not respond to that propaganda.

I would note that one of those being held as a so-called spy in Tehran is, in fact, a private American citizen who simply happened to be visiting the Embassy on business at the time of the attack on November 4. It was many days before we even learned, indirectly, that he was being held. That man, like the rest, has now been held for 31 days—tied up, denied contact with his family, denied exercise, denied access even to the comfort of religion.

We hear a great deal about the crimes of the Shah, but that is not the issue. The issue which disturbs the American people is that 50 of our fellow citizens are being abused, in violation of international law. These are our brothers and sisters.

Yesterday, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution which called—as the first most important priority, as it should—for the release of the American hostages. That is the issue. It is the only issue, and we are not going to forget they must be set free.

PRESIDENT CARTER, DEC. 7, 1979[2]

[Inaudible] in the last 30 days has been not only the support and understanding and patience of the American people and the strength of the hostages' families, but also the superb work of the State Department and all of you, who I know have put in many extra hours, prayers, and extra commitments to help protect the lives and the safety of our hostages.

The most important single message that I can give to you is this: As far as I am concerned, as far as the State Department is concerned, as far as our nation is concerned, there is one issue and that is the early and the safe release of the American hostages from their captors in Tehran. And it's important for us to realize that from the very first hour of the captivity of our hostages by a mob—who is indistinguishable from the government itself—that has been our purpose. And we have tried to restrain every other nation and the United Nations and the people in our own country from confusing the issues.

At this time, I am not interested in trying to resolve whether or not the Shah was a good or bad leader or the history of—[applause]—or the history of Iran. I'm not trying to interfere in the Government of Iran or the inclination of the people there, and we do not want to confuse the issue by injecting these extraneous questions or debates into the present situation. When that does happen, in my opinion, it delays the day when we will see the American hostages come home.

I am not going to take any military action that would cause bloodshed or arouse the unstable captors of our hostages to attack them or to punish them. We're going to be very moderate, very cautious, guided and supported and advised by Secretary Vance. Our purpose is to get the hostages home and get them safe. That's my total commitment, and I know you join with me as full partners in this effort.

Just one other comment. I'm not trying to be presumptuous in speaking for them, but there's no doubt in my mind that every hostage and every person who loves those hostages, not just the families, but 220 million American people, thank you—working with Secretary Vance and all those in this Department—for the superb work that you have done in insuring, so far, the safety in which I am confident and which I pray every moment of my life will be successful in getting our hostages home where they belong.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, DEC. 13, 1979[3]

We have read reports from Iran today that international observers will be allowed to see our people who are being held hostage.

I want to emphasize that for any such visit to the hostages to accomplish a humanitarian objective and to be responsive to international opinion and to acceptable standards of behavior, it is important that those who see the hostages be allowed to see all of them, to talk with them, and to report to the families of the hostages and to the world on the condition of each hostage. Any observers allowed on the Embassy compound should be qualified, internationally recognized, impartial, neutral observers and should include a qualified medical doctor. Visits by these observers should occur regularly and frequently until the hostages are released. If this occurs, we would consider it a step forward.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, DEC. 18, 1979[4]

There continue to be confusing and sometimes conflicting reports that American citizens being illegally held as hostages might be placed before some type of public trial or tribunal. As we made clear on November 20, such an action would be a further provocation to the United States and to the world

for decades, the government has encouraged the domestic private sector, welcomed foreign investment, and accelerated a major economic development program designed to bring irrigation to hundreds of thousands of presently unproductive acres. Sri Lanka has been very successful in enlisting foreign support for this development effort, including the United States, and the response of the economy to the new economic policies has been impressive. From a GNP growth of under 3% for most of the 1970s, Sri Lanka achieved a real growth rate of over 8% in 1978.

Despite this economic success, there remain unresolved tensions between the majority ethnic group, the Sinhalese who are Buddhist, and the minority Tamils who are Hindu and Christian. Underlying the tension is a small group of Tamil terrorists bent on achieving a separate nation for Tamils through violence. While Sri Lanka has a population of only 15 million, the course of events over the next few years may have a significance beyond the shores of the island nation. What is at stake is whether a nation can maintain its commitment to democracy and human rights and meet the economic expectations of its people, while at the same time resolving the competing and conflicting claims of its majority and minority peoples. While the problems are centuries old, Sri Lanka's traditions and the moderation and accommodating spirit of its government augur well for the future.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh, in the eastern part of the region, is one of the world's most impoverished and overpopulated countries. Following its creation, Bangladesh faced a number of major economic, political, and administrative problems. In recent years there has been a modest but broad-based improvement in the quality of public administration, the economy, and public order. Ziaur Rahman, who took power in 1975, was elected president in June 1978. This February parliament elections gave his Bangladesh Nationalist Party a majority.

During the past year, there has been continued progress in fulfilling commitments to restore political freedom and to promote economic development. The number of political prisoners has been further reduced. The February 1979 parliamentary election was a step forward in Bangladesh's political evolution. Martial law was withdrawn, restrictions on press freedom were relaxed, and some long-banned newspapers resumed publication. On Wednesday of this week, Ziaur completed the dismantlement of the emergency/martial law regime which had been in place nearly 4 years, ending the state of emergency and announcing the release of 730 political prisoners. Ziaur's actions are worthy of commendation.

Bangladesh states that its foreign policy is one of "friendship toward all" and genuine nonalignment. Relations with the United States are excellent and probably as good as they have ever been since that nation's birth. Our interests in Bangladesh reflect our desire for stability and a humanitarian interest in improving the lot of Bangladesh's desperately poor majority. We welcome Bangladesh's position as a moderate in multilateral forums such as the United Nations and the nonaligned movement.

Nepal

The Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal is also being buffeted by the winds of change. Disturbances which broke out this spring led the King to call for a referendum to determine whether the country should continue with and slightly modify its present system of no political parties and indirectly chosen representatives—or whether it should move to a multiparty system. The King's decision was widely hailed in Nepal and abroad as a bold and imaginative step which paves the way to genuine popular participation in a continuing monarchical system. It has been followed by a burst of political activity, facilitated by lifting of restrictions on politicians and the press. The referendum is expected to be held in the spring.

Nepal's primary relations are with its two giant neighbors—India and China. Our relations with it are good. We are grateful for Nepal's consistently moderate stance on international political and economic issues in the nonaligned movement, the United Nations, and other international forums.

Our humanitarian interest in Nepal as one of the poorest of the world's countries has prompted a substantial American economic assistance program there. This has contributed to the strength of our bilateral relationship.

Maldives

I would like to mention one other country with which until recently we had very little contact—the Republic of Maldives. Maldives is a new country—it gained its independence only in 1965—and it is comprised of nearly 2,000 islands stretching over 600 miles through the Indian Ocean. During the last 2 years we have sought to develop and strengthen our ties with this nation.

Like the rest of the South Asian nations, Maldives is nonaligned. Its first national priority is economic development. To date, we have not been able to provide any direct economic assistance, but international development institutions to which we are a contributor, such as the U.N. Development Program, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank, are involved in promoting human development in this fascinating country. We value our relationship with Maldives and hope we will be able to develop it further in the years ahead.

Conclusion

In much of this talk I have spoken of South Asia as if it were a discrete part of the world, somehow isolated from events to its east and west, and protected by the Himalayas in the north and the Indian Ocean to the south. Of course it is not. The links between South Asia and other areas of the greater region of which it is a part are important and becoming ever stronger.

You will recall that very early in my remarks, I said that the way the United States historically has looked at South Asia reflects in many ways the way we have looked at the world as a whole. As a global power, with global responsibilities, we cannot make South Asia policy in a vacuum. We cannot deal with all developments there as if they were somehow isolated from events elsewhere. Furthermore, because of the growing links between the South Asian nations and the countries to their east and west, the countries of the subcontinent themselves recognize that their security and well-being increasingly are affected by events occurring outside their own region. And we also seek to make them aware that many of their actions carry great implications for our global interests and, indeed, for the world as a whole. ■

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DEC. 26, 1979[1]

On December 25–26 there was a large-scale Soviet airlift into Kabul International Airport, perhaps involving over 150 flights. The aircraft include both large transports (AN–22s) and smaller transports (AN–12s). Several hundred Soviet troops have been seen at the Kabul airport and various kinds of field equipment have been flown in. I cannot give you an estimate of numbers.

The Soviet military buildup north of the Afghan border is continuing, and we now have indications that there are the equivalent of five divisions in Soviet areas adjacent to Afghanistan. It appears that the Soviets are crossing a new threshold in their military deployments into Afghanistan. We believe that members of the international community should condemn such blatant military interference into the internal affairs of an independent sovereign state. We are making our views known directly to the Soviets. ■

[1] Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

Background on Afghanistan

Geography

Afghanistan is a landlocked country whose strategic location has had a major influence on its history. It borders on the U.S.S.R., Iran, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China.

From southwest to northeast the country is divided by the towering—up to 25,000 feet (7,620 m.) above sea level—Hindu Kush and Pamir mountain ranges. Mountains and arid desert country are interspersed by small valleys made fertile by irrigation from snow-fed mountain streams.

Afghanistan's climate is typical of the higher regions of central Asia—cold in the winter and hot and dry in the summer. Another characteristic of the climate is the range of temperature change within short periods, from season to season, and from place to place. For example, in summer at Kabul (6,000 ft.; 1,829 m.), the temperature may be 60°F (16°C) at sunrise and by noon reach 100°F (38°C). Kabul's mean temperature in January is 32°F (0°C). In the plains of Jalalabad (1,800 ft.; 549 m.), summer temperatures can reach 115°F (46°C).

Precipitation is scanty—rarely exceeding 15 inches (38 cm.) annually, most of which occurs from October to April.

People

Afghanistan's ethnically and linguistically mixed population reflects its location astride trade and invasion routes that lead from central Asia into the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent. Pushtun (Pathan), Tajik, Uzbek, Turkoman, and Hazara groups constitute the bulk of the Afghan population, with small groups of other peoples represented. The dominant ethnic group—the Pushtun—comprises about half of the total population. Afghan Persian (Dari) and Pushtu are the principal languages spoken, although Turki is also used in the north.

The principal cities of Afghanistan are the capital, Kabul, in the east; Kandahar, southwest of Kabul; Herat, near the Iranian border in the northwest; and Mazar-e-Sharif, near the Soviet border in the north. Other cities with industrial bases are growing.

Afghanistan is a Moslem country, which is now governed by a Marxist regime. Religion has traditionally pervaded all aspects of life, and it is now a prime factor underlying the countrywide revolt against the government, which is perceived as Communist and atheist. Except for a rather small urban population in the principal cities, people are divided into clan and tribal groups and follow centuries-old customs and religious practices in the conduct of their affairs.

History

Afghanistan, often called the crossroads of central Asia, has had a turbulent history and has suffered many invasions. In 328 B.C., Alexander the Great entered present-day Afghanistan and, after crossing the Helmand River and the Hindu Kush, captured ancient Bactria (present-day Balkh). His rule was followed by domination by Scythians, White Huns, and Turks. In 652 A.D., Afghanistan fell to conquering Arabs, who brought with them a new religion, Islam.

Arab rule gave way to Persian rule, which continued until 998, when Mahmud of Ghazni (of Turkish extraction) assumed control. Mahmud established Ghazni as a great capital and cultural center, from which he repeatedly invaded India to spread the Moslem faith. Mahmud's dynasty was short-lived, however, and Afghanistan was ruled by various princes until the invasion of Ghengis Kahn in the early 13th century, which resulted in the destruction of Herat, Ghazni, and Balkh.

Late in the 14th century, Afghanistan was again devastated—this time by the invasion of Tamerlane, who made it part of his huge Asian empire. In the early 16th century, Afghanistan came under the rule of Babar, who founded the Moghul dynasty in India and who is buried at Kabul, his favorite city.

Afghanistan was founded as an independent kingdom by Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747. Ahmad Shah consolidated various chieftainships, petty principalities, and provinces into one country. From then until 1973, when the monarchy was overthrown and a republic was established, the monarchs were members of the Durrani tribe, although after 1818 they were members of a different clan.

European Influence. During the 19th century, as British power in India expanded and Russia moved into central Asia in its push to the east, the history of Afghanistan was significantly influenced for the first time by European countries. British efforts to secure a stronger position in order to counter Russian influence in Persia (Iran) and central Asia led to the first Anglo-Afghan war, from 1838 to 1842.

British anxiety over Russian advances in central Asia and Afghan dealings with Russia led to the second Anglo-Afghan war (1878–80), which brought the Amir Abdur Rahman to the throne. This ruler agreed to British control of Afghan foreign affairs.

World War I. During World War I, Afghanistan remained neutral despite German intrigue to have the Afghans foment trouble along the borders of India. Meanwhile, nationalism was developing in the area. Amanullah, who succeeded to the throne in 1919 following the assassination of his father, sought to terminate British control of Afghanistan's foreign affairs. This resulted in the third Anglo-Afghan war, which lasted only a few months. Some initial Afghan successes persuaded the

Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and Zaire.

Against (18)
Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Hungary, Laos, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Vietnam, and Yemen (Aden).

Abstain (18)
Algeria, Benin, Burundi, Congo, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Madagascar, Mali, Nicaragua, Sao Tome and Principe, Syria, Uganda, Yemen (Sana), and Zambia.

Absent (12)
Bhutan, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Dominica, Libya, Romania, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, South Africa, and Sudan. ■

[1] USUN press release 5.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy
Agreement for the transfer of enriched uranium for a research reactor in Indonesia, with annex and exchange of notes. Signed at New Delhi Dec. 7, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1979.
Signatures: Indonesia, IAEA, and U.S., Dec. 7, 1979.

Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: St. Lucia, Nov. 20, 1979.

Biological Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 8062.
Accession deposited: Sao Tome and Principe, Aug. 24, 1979.

Conservation
Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 8249.
Ratifications deposited: Italy, Oct. 2, 1979;[1] Guatemala, Nov. 7, 1979; Tanzania, Nov. 29, 1979.
Accession deposited: Liechtenstein, Nov. 30, 1979.

Copyright
Universal copyright convention, as revised, with two protocols annexed thereto. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.
Ratification deposited: Italy, Oct. 25, 1979.[2]

Cotton
Articles of agreement of International Cotton Institute. Done at Washington Jan. 17, 1966. Entered into force Feb. 23, 1966. TIAS 5964.
Notification of withdrawal deposited: Iran, Nov. 23, 1979; effective Dec. 31, 1979.

Cultural Property
Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export, and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris Nov. 14, 1970, at the 16th session of the UNESCO General Conference. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1972.[3]
Ratification deposited: Cyprus, Oct. 19, 1979.

Environmental Modification
Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 5, 1978.[3]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 13, 1979.

Fisheries
Convention on future multilateral cooperation in the northwest Atlantic fisheries. Done at Ottawa Oct. 24, 1978. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1979.[3]
Ratification deposited: Portugal, May 25, 1979.

Human Rights
International covenant on civil and political rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.[3]
Ratification deposited: El Salvador, Nov. 30, 1979.

International covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.[3]
Ratification deposited: El Salvador, Nov. 30, 1979.

Judicial Procedure
Convention abolishing the requirement of legalisation for foreign public documents, with annex. Done at The Hague Oct. 5, 1961. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1965.[3]
Instrument of accession signed by the President: Dec. 27, 1979.

Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 14, 1975.[4]
Acceptance deposited: United Kingdom, Dec. 5, 1979.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 17, 1977.[4]
Acceptances deposited: Kuwait, Nov. 27, 1979; United Kingdom, Dec. 5, 1979.

International convention on standards of training, certification, and watchkeeping for seafarers, 1978. Done at London July 7, 1978. Enters into force 12 months after the date on which not less than 25 states, the combined merchant fleets of which constitute not less than 50% of the gross tonnage of the world's merchant shipping of ships of 100 gross register tons or more, have either signed it without reservation as to ratification, acceptance, or approval or deposited the requisite instruments.
Signatures: Belgium, Dec. 7, 1978;[5] China, June 13, 1979;[5] Denmark, June 4, 1979; [1,5] Federal Republic of Germany, Mar. 26, 1979; Liberia, Mar. 21, 1979;[5] Poland, Dec. 1, 1978;[5] U.K., Dec. 1, 1978;[5] U.S., Jan. 25, 1979;[5] U.S.S.R., Oct. 9, 1979; Yugoslavia, Mar. 23, 1979.[5]

International convention on maritime search and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done at Hamburg Apr. 27, 1979. Enters into force 12 months after the date on which 15 states have either signed without reservation as to ratification, acceptance, or approval or deposited the requisite instruments.
Signatures: Federal Republic of Germany,[6] U.S.,[6] Nov. 6, 1979; Switzerland, Nov. 14, 1979.[6]

Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. Done at Moscow Aug. 5, 1963. Entered into force Oct. 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
Accession deposited: Cape Verde, Oct. 24, 1979.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Accession deposited: Cape Verde, Oct. 24, 1979.

Patents—Microorganisms
Budapest treaty on the international recognition of the deposit of microorganisms for the purposes of patent procedure, with regulations. Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977.[4]
Ratification deposited: U.S., Sept. 24, 1979.

Patents—Plant Varieties
International convention for the protection of new varieties of plants of Dec. 2, 1961, as revised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978.[4]
Signatures: Canada, Oct. 31, 1979; Ireland, Sept. 27, 1979; Japan, Oct. 17, 1979; Mexico, New Zealand, July 25, 1979; Sweden, Dec. 6, 1978.

Postal
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, with Final Protocol. Done at Vienna, July 10, 1964. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.
Ratification deposited: Lebanon, Oct. 5, 1979.

Additional protocol to the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with Final Protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964. Done at Tokyo Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for Article V of the Additional Protocol which entered into force Jan. 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.
Ratification deposited: Lebanon, Oct. 5, 1979.
Accession deposited: Albania, Sept. 28, 1979.

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.
Ratifications deposited: Colombia, July 26, 1979; Lebanon, Oct. 5, 1979; San Marino, Oct. 26, 1979.
Accession deposited: Albania, Sept. 28, 1979.

Money orders and postal travelers' checks agreement, with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8232.
Ratifications deposited: Colombia, July 26, 1979; Lebanon, Oct. 5, 1979; San Marino, Oct. 26, 1979.

Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York, Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.[3]
Accession deposited: El Salvador, Nov. 30, 1979.

Satellite Communications System
Operating agreement on the international maritime satellite organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979.
Signature: Argentina, Oct. 2, 1979.

Convention on the international maritime satellite organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979.
Signatures: Algeria,[7] July 15, 1979; China,[7] Portugal,[7] July 13, 1979.
Ratifications deposited: Belgium, July 14, 1979; Brazil, Italy,[8] July 10, 1979; Finland, July 12, 1979; Greece, July 13, 1979; Poland, July 3, 1979.
Accession deposited: Argentina, Oct. 2, 1979.

Seabed Disarmament
Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Feb. 11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337.
Accessions deposited: Cape Verde, Oct. 24, 1979; Sao Tome and Principe, Aug. 24, 1979.

Space
Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Mar. 29, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1972; for the U.S., Oct. 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.
Accession deposited: Liechtenstein, Dec. 26, 1979.

Sugar
International sugar agreement, 1977, with annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978.
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 13, 1979.
Ratification deposited: U.S., Jan. 2, 1980.

Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with annexes and protocol. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos Oct. 25, 1973. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1975; for the U.S., Apr. 7, 1976. TIAS 8572.
Ratifications deposited: Costa Rica, Sept. 10, 1979; Ivory Coast, People's Democractic Republic of Yemen, Sept. 25, 1979.

Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for the planning of the broadcasting-satellite service in frequency bands 11.7–12.2 GHz (in regions 2 and 3) and 11.7–12.5 GHz (in region 1), with annexes. Done at Geneva Feb. 13, 1977. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1979.[3]
Approval deposited: Argentina, Oct. 1, 1979.

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), as revised, relating to the aeronautical mobile (R) service, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva Mar. 5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1979, except for the frequency allotment plan for the aeronautical mobile (R) service which shall come into force on Feb. 1, 1983.[3]
Approval deposited: U.S.S.R., Sept. 24, 1979.

Terrorism
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532.
Accession deposited: Barbados, Oct. 26, 1979.

International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly Dec. 19, 1979. Enters into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the 22d instrument of ratification or accession.

Trade
Fourth certification of changes to schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Apr. 20, 1979. Entered into force Apr. 20, 1979.

Protocol of provisional application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Oct. 30, 1947. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1948. TIAS 1700.
De facto application: St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Oct. 27, 1979.

Whaling
Protocol to the international convention for the regulation of whaling (TIAS 1849). Done at Washington Nov. 19, 1956. Entered into force May 4, 1959. TIAS 4228.
Adherence deposited: Peru, Dec. 28, 1979.

BILATERAL

Association of South-East Asian Nations
Agreement concerning cooperation in economic development, education, culture, and narcotics. Signed at Denpasar and Kuala Lumpur July 2 and Oct. 24, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1979.

Commission of the Cartagena Agreement (Andean Group)
Memorandum of understanding on science and technology cooperation. Signed at Washington Nov. 21, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 21, 1979.

Memorandum of understanding concerning trade, financing, science and technology, development of industry, agriculture, and infrastructure. Signed at Washington Nov. 21, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 21, 1979.

Cuba
Agreement extending the provisional application of the maritime boundary agreement of Dec. 16, 1977. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Dec. 27 and 28, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 28, 1979.

Finland
Extradition treaty. Signed at Helsinki June 11, 1976.[4]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 13, 1979.

Sugar

In 1979, Congress ratified the International Sugar Agreement, thus fulfilling a major commitment of this Administration. The agreement is an important element in our international commodity policy with far-reaching implications for our relations with developing countries, particularly sugar producers in Latin America. This agreement and other measures my Administration has taken already have helped to stabilize sugar prices and bring high domestic prices into line with those prevailing in the world marketplace. Producers and consumers alike will benefit from a more stable market for this essential commodity. We need prompt enactment of implementing legislation for this agreement.

Tin

At year's end, Congress approved stockpile disposal legislation which will permit the General Services Administration to sell 30,000 metric tons of tin from our strategic stockpile and contribute up to 5,000 metric tons to the International Tin Organization's (ITO) buffer stock. This fulfills a United States pledge made during the Conference on International Economic Cooperation and represents a major step forward in our relations with producing countries in the developing world. We will consult with other members of the ITO to ensure that our tin disposals do not disrupt markets and take into account the needs of both producers and consumers.

Common Fund

The United States joined members of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, both developed and developing nations, in negotiating an agreement on the framework of a Common Fund to help international commodity agreements stabilize the prices of raw materials. Negotiations are now underway on the final articles of agreement of the Fund.

The United States also participated in successful negotiations of an international rubber agreement.

Economic Cooperation With Developing Nations

Our relations with the developing nations are of central importance to the United States. The fabric of our relations with these countries has both political and economic dimensions, as we witnessed in recent weeks when nations of the Third World took the lead in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Our ability to work together with developing nations toward goals we have in common—their political independence, the resolution of regional tensions, and our growing ties of trade for example—require us to maintain the policy of active engagement with the developing world that we have pursued over the past three years.

The foreign assistance legislation which I will be submitting to you for FY 81 provides the authority and the funds to carry on a cooperative relationship with a large number of developing nations. Prompt Congressional action on this legislation is essential in order to meet our treaty and base rights agreements, continue our peace efforts in the Middle East, provide economic and development support to countries in need, promote progress on North-South issues, protect Western interests, and counter Soviet influence.

We will also be asking Congress to enable us to honor our international agreements for multilateral assistance by authorizing and appropriating funds for the International Financial Institutions.

Finally, the Administration and the Congress agreed in 1979 on fundamental changes in the way the United States government is organized to conduct economic and technical relations with the developing nations. I submitted and the Congress approved a plan to consolidate in a small policy-coordination body, the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA), responsibility for direct United States development assistance, for guidance to United States representatives in multilateral development agencies, and for presenting our long-term development interests in Federal government policy bodies dealing with trade and other economic relations with developing nations. I also submitted, and the House approved in the 1979 session of Congress, a plan to establish the Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation (ISTC), a constituent element of the IDCA group of agencies. Once approved, the ISTC will carry out research as well as support research by foreign scientists on technological means of reducing poverty in developing nations.

Food—The War on Hunger

One of the main economic problems facing developing countries is lagging food production. We must help these countries meet this problem—not only so that their peoples will be free from the threat of continuing hunger, but also so that their societies will be strong enough to resist external pressure. I have directed that United States bilateral and multilateral aid be geared increasingly to this goal, as recommended by our Hunger Commission, chaired by Sol Linowitz; we are urging other donor countries to join in more effective efforts to this end.

Good progress has been made since the Tokyo Economic Summit called for increased effort on this front. The World Bank is giving this problem top priority, as are some other donor countries. The resources of the consultative Group on International Agricultural Research will be doubled over a five-year period. The work of our own Institute of Scientific and Technological Cooperation will further strengthen the search for relevant new agricultural technologies.

The goal of freeing the world from hunger by the year 2000 should command the full support of all countries.

THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF FOREIGN POLICY

Human Rights

The ultimate aim of our foreign policy must be to preserve freedom for ourselves and to expand freedom for others. This is a matter both of national principle and of national interest. For we believe that free and open societies are not only better able to meet the rising expectations of their people; they are also better able to accommodate often conflicting internal pressures before popular frustrations explode in violent and radical directions.

We do not seek to impose our system or institutions on others. Rather, we seek to support, in practical and concrete ways, the efforts of other nations to build their own institutions in ways that will meet the irrepressible human drive for freedom and justice.

Human rights policy commands the strong support of our citizens, and of the Congress. The world climate increasingly favors human rights progress.

Despite new turbulence and conflict, the past year featured some encouraging positive developments. We cannot and should not claim credit for them. But it is clear that we are part of a growing movement. During 1979, we saw:

- The further strengthening of democratic practices in Spain and Portugal, with free elections in both countries;

• The disappearance of several of the world's most repressive regimes;

• The freeing of political prisoners in Asia, Africa, and Latin America;

• A return to democratic rule in several Latin American countries and widespread progress in reducing human rights violations in the region;

• The growing strength of international human rights institutions. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights held its first meeting. Preparations began for another conference to review compliance with the Helsinki accords, to be held in Madrid this November. The OAU took long strides toward establishing a human rights commission for Africa. UN bodies became increasingly active in their human rights efforts.

The United States is still not a party to the key human rights treaties that establish world standards and implementing machinery. In early 1978, I sent for Senate approval four such treaties, the American Convention on Human Rights, the Convention on Racial Discrimination, and the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights. Hearings were held in 1979. No single action by this country would do more to advance the cause of human rights than Senate approval of these instruments and a fifth human rights treaty sent to Congress previously, the Genocide Convention. I urge the earliest possible Senate action.

Humanitarian Aid

The mass exodus of refugees from Vietnam reached a crescendo in summer 1979 with over 65,000 people a month fleeing repression and economic privation. Most fled by boat, and many were lost at sea. In July, at a special UN meeting on refugees, Vice President Mondale presented a major United States program to rescue and help support and resettle the new refugee population. I doubled to 14,000 a month the number of Indochinese refugees the United States, in accord with our finest traditions, would absorb over the year ahead.

The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in late 1978 gravely jeopardized the supply of food for the already decimated and brutalized Khmer people. In October, I announced that the United States would pay one-third of the costs of the international relief program mounted jointly by UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Leaders of thirty-five church and voluntary agencies, with White House encouragement, are engaged in their own large fund-raising program for refugees.

In early November, Mrs. Carter visited refugees on the Thai-Cambodian border and reported back to me, the United States voluntary agencies, and the American people. In response, our efforts to avert a mass famine were accelerated.

The obstacles remain daunting—continued warfare and aggression by Vietnam, non-distribution by the Phnom Penh authorities of much of the UNICEF-ICRC aid, movement of up to 900,000 hungry Khmer to and across the Thai border where they can be fed and helped.

But Americans will continue their efforts both public and private to avert the famine that looms. New help for our efforts will come from the National Committee formed in early 1980 by leading citizens to help in mobilizing and supporting the sustained effort essential to achieve this humanitarian goal.

An essential lesson to be drawn from Iran is that there are compelling foreign policy as well as domestic economic reasons for lessening our dependence on foreign oil.

As the year began, we are also considering new means of helping, through our contribution to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and in other ways, the mounting Afghan refugee population in Pakistan and other desperate refugee situations such as Somalia.

It cannot be ignored that the destructive and aggressive policies of the Soviet Union have added immeasurably to the suffering in these three tragic situations.

I have asked the heads of the appropriate departments of the Executive Branch to play an active role in the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy to formulate a new approach to deal with sensitivity with the difficult subject of people arriving on our shores from Latin America.

My meeting with Pope John Paul II during his historic and unprecedented visit to the United States helped raise the world's consciousness in connection with pressing problems of famine, homelessness, and human rights. Our talks spurred positive action in many of these areas, notably Indochina, and set the stage for further action in 1980.

THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Together with our friends and allies, we are striving to build a world in which peoples with diverse interests can live freely and prosper. But all that humankind has achieved to date, all that we are seeking to accomplish, and human existence itself can be undone in an instant—in the catastrophe of a nuclear war.

Thus one of the central objectives of my Administration has been to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons to those nations which do not have them, and their further development by the existing nuclear powers—notably the Soviet Union and the United States.

Non-Proliferation

I entered office committed to assert American leadership in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons—which could create fundamental new instabilities in critical regions of the world, and threaten the security of the United States. This should not and cannot be done unilaterally. The cooperation of other suppliers of nuclear technology and materials is needed. This issue must not become a North-South confrontation.

We have been proceeding on a number of fronts:

• We have been seeking to encourage nations to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or to accept full-scope international safeguards. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act calls for such safeguards in connection with United States nuclear exports.

• The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) has demonstrated that suppliers and recipients can work together. Its results will be published in a month. While differences remain, it will provide a broader international basis for national decisions which must balance energy needs with non-proliferation concerns.

• Finally, we are working to encourage regional cooperation and restraint. Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which will contribute to the lessening of nuclear dangers for our

That being so, I would direct the Court's attention to an early and similar case decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice. In that case, entitled *The Case Concerning the Denunciation of the Treaty of November 2, 1865, Between China and Belgium*, interim measures were requested in order to provide for the protection and security of nationals and property, the performance of consular functions and freedom from arrest and criminal penalties except in accordance with law. In indicating the requested protective measures, the President of the Court emphasized that the injury expected to occur during the pendency of the case "could not be made good by the payment of an indemnity or by compensation or restitution in some other material form." In that case, given the threat of irreparable injury, interim measures were indicated, and we seek the same relief here.

Moreover, I should emphasize that the threat of future irreparable injury is growing. The situation in Tehran is volatile in the extreme, and the danger for the hostages can sharply increase at any moment. The current chief of the Iranian state himself has spoken of the possible destruction of the hostages—the ultimate in irreparable injury. In this connection it should be recalled that in recent months over 600 Iranian nationals have actually been executed after peremptory trials by revolutionary councils. The defendants in those trials were denied the right to counsel, the right to present defensive evidence, the right to appeal—indeed, the right to any legal process at all—and the penalty was death.

Against that background, the often repeated threats to put the American hostages on trial for alleged crimes creates an ominous and an unacceptable threat not only for the hostages and for the United States but for the entire international community. In the words of the Secretary General of the United Nations, "The present crisis poses a serious threat to international peace and security," a threat which may well be alleviated if this Court promptly indicates the interim measures requested by the United States.

I would like now to turn to an alternative standard under which the United States in our submission is now entitled to the requested relief. As the Court is aware, in many legal systems it is recognized that interim relief of the kind requested here is appropriate in order to preserve the status quo *pendente lite*—and it is the position of the United States that this principle also cries out for immediate judicial action in this case.

On this point, however, I do not wish to be misunderstood. Obviously I am not asking the Court to maintain the status quo as created by the Government of Iran over the past days and weeks. Obviously the status quo which we seek to preserve —or, more correctly, to which we seek to return—is the status quo *ante*, the situation immediately prior to the Iranian seizure of the Embassy and the hostages.

There is, I submit, clear authority for such relief, as noted in Dumbauld's treatise, *Interim Measures in International Controversies*. Referring to the general principle of enforcing or sanctioning the status quo through indications of interim measures—and citing cases and authorities—Judge Dumbauld states as follows (and I quote from page 187 of his treatise):

> It should be noted that the status quo thus sanctioned is not that at the time of the judgment, or at the date suit is brought, but the last uncontested status prior to the controversy.

T controversy which we have brought before the Court arose with the seizure of the Embassy and the hostages in Tehran on November 4, 1979, and I submit that the situation cries out for interim measures calling upon Iran to release the hostages and the Embassy and thus return to the status quo as of November 3, 1979.

In order to test the validity of this conclusion, I should like to pose for the Court a simple hypothetical case. Let us assume that on November 4, 1979, instead of allowing the Embassy and the hostages to be seized, the Revolutionary Council of Iran had announced that, unless certain demands were met by the United States by—let us say—December 10, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran would then be attacked and its personnel taken hostage.

If in that situation the Government of the United States had brought its case to this Court and requested an indication of provisional measures calling upon Iran to desist from its threat, I suggest that the Court would have acted affirmatively on that request. In that situation, I submit, the Court would have called upon Iran to leave the American diplomatic staff in Tehran free and inviolable and immune from prosecution—and I want to emphasize that that, in essence, is exactly the basic provisional measure we are requesting from the Court now.

In other words, we would have been entitled, in our view, to such a provisional measure if Iran had not yet violated its international legal obligations to the United States, and, in our view, that necessarily means that we are entitled to the same protective measures now—now that Iran has actually embarked upon a profound and continuing violation of our rights. To hold otherwise at this time—to withhold such protective measures—would be to allow Iran to benefit from actually using force instead of merely threatening to do so.

For the foregoing reasons, we believe that we are clearly entitled, as a matter of law and logic, to the protective measures which we are seeking, and we submit that humanitarian considerations require no less.

Possible Obstacles to the U.S. Request

At this point I would like to turn to the question of whether there are any possible legal obstacles to our request. We have considered that question with care, and we, at least, have concluded that there are none.

On this subject I would refer at the outset to the telegraphic message which has just been received by the Court from the Government of Iran and reference to which was made by the President at the opening of the hearing. Since that message constitutes Iran's only response to the United States' request for provisional measures, I should like to reply thereto on behalf of my government.

I think it is significant that the opening paragraph of the Iranian statement expresses great respect for this Court and its achievements in resolving legal conflicts between states. It is our hope and expectation that this respect will lead the Government of Iran to honor in full whatever action the Court may take in response to the pending U.S. request.

The main theme of the telegraphic statement of the Government of Iran is that the question of the American hostages in Tehran is only one of several problems or disputes that now exist as between the two governments. It is alleged in general terms that in various ways the Government of the United States has behaved improperly toward Iran in past years and that in this larger context the problem of the American hostages in Tehran is only a marginal and secondary problem.

There are, I suggest, two short answers to this proposition. First of all, Iran's view of its treatment of the American hostages as a *secondary* problem is not shared by the Secretary General of the United Nations or the Security Council of the United Nations. They have unanimously characterized the hostages' captivity as a major threat to international peace. Secondly, to the extent that

there are *other* disputes between Iran and the United States, Iran has made absolutely no effort to bring any such matters before the Court. The fact is that the *only* dispute which *has* been brought before the Court is the dispute relating to the taking of the American hostages, and, we submit, with the greatest respect, that that is the only dispute with which the Court can now deal. The Government of Iran asserts that the Court should not take cognizance of the dispute relating to the hostages, but for the reasons I have previously indicated, that is simply incorrect as a matter of law. The hostage question clearly lies within the Court's jurisdiction and, we submit, is properly presented for your decision now.

Paragraph 4 of Iran's statement of yesterday goes on to suggest—albeit somewhat indirectly—that the United States is now improperly seeking part or all of the relief which it seeks on the merits. In fact, if the Court compares our request for interim measures with the form of judgment that we are seeking, it will find that the two pleadings request different forms of relief—except in one respect. The only respect in which our request and our application overlap is that both pleadings ask in effect for an order calling for the immediate release of the hostages and their safe departure from Iran.

I submit, however, that this convergence of the two requests results merely from an excess of caution on the part of the United States. Frankly, we are hopeful that this Court will indicate measures calling for immediate release of the hostages and that Iran, consistent with its asserted respect for this Court, will comply long before it becomes necessary for the Court to write its final judgment. It is our hope and expectation, therefore, that the request for a judgment requiring release of the hostages will have become moot long before the Court acts on our application for such a judgment.

In a very real sense, therefore, our request for release of the hostages, being one of the very greatest urgency, should have appeared only in our pending request for an indication of provisional measures—and should not have been included in our application for judgment. Nevertheless, not wishing to presume as to how the Court will rule as a result of today's hearing, we took the conservative course of including a similar request in our application. I earnestly submit, however, that such conservatism on our part does not in any way militate against our request for an indication of interim measures; the need for such relief is urgent in the extreme.

This brings me to the final point made in yesterday's statement by the Government of Iran. It is there suggested that if provisional measures are indicated by the Court, they cannot properly be made unilateral—the implication being that the Court could not properly call for the release of the hostages by Iran without calling for some equivalent action by the United States.

That suggestion is simply, I submit, incorrect. Article 41 of the Court's Statute authorizes the Court, where circumstances so require, to indicate "any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of *either* party." I submit that clearly contemplates that where one of two parties is unilaterally causing irreparable injury to the other, a unilateral provisional measure is entirely appropriate. As I shall indicate in a moment, the United States would have no objection if the Court were to include, in an indication of provisional measures, the conventional provisions calling upon both parties to avoid aggravation of the dispute and preserve their rights—but we nevertheless assert an urgent need for unilateral action by Iran to release the hostages.

Having provided that response to the recent statement of the Government of Iran, I should now like to return to the question of whether there are any legal obstacles which might militate against our pending request. In this respect we have considered with care the possibility that the Court's 1976 decision in the *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf* case might be viewed as contrary authority against our request, having in mind the recent action of the U.N. Security Council. I respectfully submit, however, that the facts and law of the *Aegean Sea* case are so distinguishable that, far from militating against an indication of provisional measures in this case, they actually support the present position of the United States.

In the Aegean Sea dispute between Greece and Turkey, both parties participated in the Security Council debates on the dispute. Both parties agreed in the Security Council that a solution to the dispute could be achieved only through direct negotiations between the parties. After the Council called upon both parties to negotiate, both parties expressly agreed that they would do so. Moreover, in the *Aegean Sea* case the question whether violations of international law were occurring was open to legal question, and the jurisdiction of the Court was also in doubt.

In that situation, when Greece requested that this Court indicate provisional measures calling upon Turkey to refrain from certain exploratory activities on the disputed Continental Shelf, the Court assumed that both states would honor their undertakings to negotiate and that aggravation of the dispute would thereby be avoided. Most importantly, the Court was not persuaded that the activities of which Greece complained were actually threatening irreparable injury. For those reasons, as we read that case, the Court concluded that an indication of provisional measures was unnecessary.

The contrast with the present case, I submit, is very clear indeed. In the present case the Court plainly has jurisdiction; the authorities of Iran have refused to send a representative to take part in the proceedings of the Security Council; they have rejected the Council's resolution as "an American plot"; they have refused to communicate with the U.S. Government in any way at all; their violations of international law are clear; by threatening trials, they are continuing to aggravate the dispute; and truly irreparable injury is proceeding day by day. In the present case the need for protective measures, I submit, could not be more imperative.

If there were any doubt about the distinctions between the *Aegean Sea* case and the present one, I think it is laid to rest by the terms of the resolution of the Security Council in this case and the debate which attended its adoption. Resolution 457, to which the President of the Court has earlier referred, in its first operative paragraph, "Urgently calls on the Government of Iran to release immediately the personnel of the Embassy of the United States of America being held in Tehran, to provide them protection and to allow them to leave the country." The second operative paragraph "Further calls on the Governments of Iran and of the United States of America to take steps to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them to their mutual satisfaction in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations." That is to say, the resolution calls upon the parties to take steps directed not to the release of these hostages, but to "the remaining issues" between the two states. Those remaining issues, however, are not before this Court, and the Court can take no responsibility for them. Under its Statute the Court's function "is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it . . ." and that is a judicial function which has not been, and, of course, could not be, undertaken by the Security Council.

community. The gravity of the situation created by the illegal and irresponsible holding of the hostages would be compounded by any such public exploitation of American citizens. The authorities in Iran would bear full responsibility for any ensuing consequences.

As also stated on November 20, the United States is seeking a peaceful solution through every available channel. This is far preferable to the other remedies available to the United States.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DEC. 25, 1979[5]

The State Department believes there are 50 U.S. hostages being held in the American Embassy in Tehran. We have, on previous occasions, requested a list from the Iranian authorities of all the persons being held in the Embassy. We have not yet received such a list. This discrepancy illustrates the importance of our getting such a list and receiving confirmation from the Iranian authorities that all the hostages are safe. We are continuing to seek such a list from the Iranian authorities through the channels available to us.

PRESIDENT CARTER, DEC. 28, 1979[6]

Secretary of State Vance will proceed to the United Nations tomorrow to press the world's case against Iran, in order to obtain the speediest possible release of American hostages, in accordance with the demands which have already been made earlier by the U.N. Security Council and the International Court of Justice.

The United States reserves the right to protect our citizens and our vital interests in whatever way we consider appropriate in keeping with principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. But our clear preference is now, and has been from the beginning of this crisis, for a quick and a peaceful solution of this problem through concerted international action.

We must never lose sight of our basic goals in this crisis—the safety of our fellow citizens and the protection of the long-term interests of the United States. A thoughtful and determined policy, which makes clear that Iran will continue to pay an increasingly higher price for the illegal detention of our people, is the best policy to achieve those goals, and it is the policy that I will continue to pursue.

Another serious development, which has caused increased concern about peace and stability in the same region of the world, is the recent Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, which has now resulted in the overthrow of the established government and the execution of the President of that country. Such gross interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan is in blatant violation of accepted international rules of behavior.

This is the third occasion since World War II that the Soviet Union has moved militarily to assert control over one of its neighbors, and this is the first such venture into a Moslem country by the Soviet Union since the Soviet occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan in the 1940s.

The Soviet action is a major matter of concern to the entire international community. Soviet efforts to justify this action on the basis of the U.N. Charter are a perversion of the United Nations that should be rejected immediately by all its members.

I have discussed this serious matter personally today with several other heads of government, all of whom agree that the Soviet action is a grave threat to peace. I will be sending the Deputy Secretary of State [Warren Christopher] to Europe this weekend to meet with representatives of several other nations to discuss how the world community might respond to this unwarranted Soviet behavior. Soviet military action beyond its own borders gives rise to the most fundamental questions pertaining to international stability, and such close and extensive consultation between ourselves and with our allies are urgently needed.

Q. Do we have the votes in the U.N. Security Council, and do we have the Russians' promise they won't veto our resolution?

A. I expect we will see adequate support in the U.N. Security Council for our position.

Q. Have you gotten in touch with Brezhnev?

A. I have sent him a message. ■

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[1] Remarks made to reporters assembled in the White House Briefing Room (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 10, 1979).

[2] Remarks made to State Department employees in the lobby at the State Department (text from Weekly Compilation of Dec. 10). Prior to the remarks, the President and Secretary Vance met with the families of the hostages.

[3] Made by White House press secretary Jody Powell (text from Weekly Compilation of Dec. 17).

[4] Made by White House press secretary Jody Powell (text from Weekly Compilation of Dec. 24).

[5] Made available to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III in reply to questions about the discrepancy between the numbers of hostages believed to be in the Embassy in Tehran and the number of hostages reported to have been seen by visiting American clergymen.

[6] Remarks made to reporters in the White House Briefing Room (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 31).

Iran Chronology, December 1979

December 1

Iranian students announce they have identified CIA agents among the hostages.

December 2

President Carter gives deposed Shah temporary sanctuary at Lackland Air Force Base hospital in San Antonio, Texas.

Egypt renews asylum offer for deposed Shah.

December 3

United States reports no success in finding a permanent haven abroad for deposed Shah.

U.N. Security Council drafts third appeal to Iran to release hostages.

December 4

Security Council unanimously adopts resolution "urgently" demanding the immediate release of hostages.

In an investigation of the deposed Shah's finances, Iranian officials allegedly uncover $1 billion in identifiable funds misappropriated by the Shah.

Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh says hostages will be tried as spies and judged by the students holding them captive.

December 5

Deposed Shah rules out Egypt, Panama, South Africa, and the Bahamas as possible places of refuge.

December 8

Nephew of deposed Shah is slain in Paris.

December 9

Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh announces that Iran intends to proceed with an investigation into alleged U.S. wrongdoings in Iranian affairs.

Ghotbzadeh assures Secretary General Waldheim of hostages' safety and states that they can be visited by a neutral observer.

Soviet Union warns United States that any military action in Iran could have "grave consequences."

December 10

In The Hague, Attorney General Civiletti appeals to the International Court of Justice to take "the quickest possible action" to insure release of hostages.

Carter Administration charges Japan with undercutting U.S. efforts to use economic pressure against Iran.

December 11

A Federal district judge rules the order issued by Attorney General Civiletti on November 13 unconstitutional.

In a private session, the International Court of Justice begins consideration of U.S. suit against Iran.

December 12

United States orders expulsion of Iranian diplomats in retaliation for continued detention of hostages.

Carter Administration asks appeals court to allow continued deportation of Iranian students, arguing that the program was a key foreign policy measure in efforts to secure release of hostages.

December 13

Khomeini approves Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh's plan for an "international investigative team" to look into "aggressor policies" of the United States in Iran. He also approves Ghotbzadeh's suggestion that an international team visit the hostages.

New Iranian delegate to the United Nations, Mansour Farhang, is scheduled to arrive in New York.

Central Bank in Iran accuses the Shah and his associates of forging documents, diverting nationalized land into private holdings, and illegally taking over a company as part of a plot to embezzle hundreds of millions of dollars.

United States welcomes Iran's decision to allow outside observers to check on condition of hostages.

Three hostages are permitted to make telephone calls to their families.

Central Bank in Iran estimates that Iran's economy shrunk by 12% in 1979.

Foreign Ministers and other representatives attending the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels issue a declaration condemning the holding of U.S. hostages in Tehran. They reaffirm that while they have no desire to intervene in Iran's internal affairs and ". . .fully respect the independence of other states, recognizing the right of all peoples to chart their own political, economic, and social course, any taking of hostages, for any motive whatsoever, is totally unacceptable and must be firmly opposed by the international community as a whole." They urgently call upon Iranian authorities to release unharmed all hostages and allow them to return to their country.

December 15

International Court of Justice orders Iran to immediately release all hostages and tells Iran to return the Embassy in Tehran and consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz to U.S. control.

Deposed Shah leaves United States for residence in Panama.

After learning of the Shah's departure for Panama, Iranian militants holding the U.S. Embassy announce that trial for the 50 hostages would "definitely begin."

Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh says that hostages will be visited by delegation of Christian clergy before Christmas to see that "none have been harmed." He also states, while appearing on ABC–TV's "Issues and Answers" that "no trial will go on."

December 16

In a proclamation, President Carter designates December 18 as National Unity Day and, to demonstrate support for the hostages, calls upon all citizens and organizations to observe that day by prominently displaying the American flag.

December 17

Khomeini says that the militants occupying the U.S. Embassy are expressing the people's will and not setting a separate foreign policy.

December 18

Carter Administration reports it is seriously considering "nonviolent" military action if hostages are put on trial.

December 19

United States agrees to a request by Secretary General Waldheim to delay moves to seek economic sanctions against Iran.

December 21

President Carter decides to ask Security Council to impose economic sanctions against Iran.

Khomeini orders arrangements be made for clergymen to visit U.S. Embassy in Tehran to hold Christmas services for hostages.

December 22

United States warns Soviet Union that any attempt by Soviets to block the Security Council from imposing economic sanctions against Iran would be regarded as unfriendly action.

Iran ignores Carter Administration call for economic sanctions by United Nations. Iranian Economic Minister, Bani-Sadr, states they were already prepared for such action and have taken precautionary measures.

December 23

Secretary Vance revokes passport of former CIA employee, Philip Agee, who proposed resolving the Iranian situation by exchanging CIA files on Iran for release of hostages.

December 24

Three American clergymen hold Christmas services in U.S. Embassy compound for hostages.

Soviet Government indicates disapproval of U.S. efforts to have Security Council impose economic sanctions against Iran.

United States announces its intent to seek wide-ranging rather than limited sanctions against Iran.

Japan rebuffs a plea by Iranian ambassador to remain neutral in international effort to obtain release of hostages.

December 25

Four clergymen meet 43 hostages in Iran creating a discrepancy in the total number of hostages held.

Soviet Union rebuffs appeal by Ambassador Thomas J. Watson, Jr., that it promise not to veto a move for Security Council sanctions against Iran.

U.S. Congressman George Hansen embarks on a second trip to Iran.

December 26

United States asks Iran for explanation on the discrepancy in the number of hostages being held.

December 27

Federal appeals court rules that the Carter Administration had the right to conduct special immigration checks of Iranian students in the United States and to begin deportation proceedings against any who were here illegally or who did not report to officials as ordered.

Three clergymen return from visit with hostages.

Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh abandons attempts to find a way out of the impasse over the hostages through an international tribune and calls for their trial on charges of spying.

December 29

Secretary Vance visits the United Nations to press world's case against Iran in order to obtain release of hostages in accordance with demands already made by the Security Council and the International Court of Justice.

December 31

Secretary General Waldheim leaves for Iran in an effort to negotiate the release of hostages.

Security Council votes 11 to 0 to give Iran one week to release hostages. ■

war-weary British to give Afghanistan the freedom to conduct its external affairs. This event, celebrated on May 27, is considered to be its independence day, even though Afghanistan was never actually colonized by the British.

Reform and Reaction. After the third Anglo-Afghan war, King Amanullah set about making changes in his country. Moving from its traditional isolation, Afghanistan entered into diplomatic relations with the principal nations of the world. In 1927 the King made an extensive tour of Europe, an experience which fired him with a desire to modernize Afghanistan. His modernization efforts, which included abolishing the traditional Moslem veil for women, alienated many tribal and religious leaders. This development, together with the depletion of the national treasury and the deterioration of his army, made him easy prey for Bacha-i-Saqao, a brigand who captured Kabul and declared himself King early in 1929. Nadir Khan defeated Bacha-i-Saqao on October 10, 1929, with Pushtun tribal support and was declared King, returning the crown to the Durrani tribe.

His son, Mohammad Zahir Shah, succeeded to the throne on November 8, 1933, after the assassination of Nadir Shah by a fanatical follower of the previous dynasty. Nadir Shah's brothers were Prime Ministers through 1952, and Zahir Shah's cousins, Sardar Mohammad Daoud and Sardar Mohammad Naim, were Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister from 1953 until March 1963.

With the 1964 Constitution as the vehicle, Zahir introduced a program of social and political reforms under a more liberal parliamentary rule. In practice, the so-called experiment in democracy produced few lasting reforms, and frequent executive-legislative deadlocks delayed or blocked vital legislation. Under this more relaxed rule, which allowed political expression but which did not provide for a legalized political party system, the country's moderate reformers were increasingly overshadowed by extremists of both the left and right. A 2-year drought in 1971–72 worsened economic conditions. Amid charges of corruption and malfeasance, the monarchy was removed from power by a virtually bloodless military coup d'etat, led by former Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud, on July 17, 1973. The 1964 Constitution was abrogated, and Afghanistan was declared a republic with Daoud as its first President and Prime Minister.

Recent Events. Five years after coming to power, President Daoud was, in turn, overthrown by a Marxist coup in April 1978. Daoud and many members of his family were killed at this time. The coup was carried out by the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, a coalition of the Marxist Khalq and Parcham parties. It succeeded because of previous effective recruitment of a large number of young military officers.

Opposition to the Marxist government developed almost immediately and subsequently grew into a countrywide insurgency. Differences between the leaders also surfaced very early and resulted in the exile of the Parcham group and numerous purges and imprisonments. Approximately 1½ years after coming to power, the in-party factionalism erupted in a showdown between the two top leaders—Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin—resulting in the death of Taraki and the assumption of power by Amin in September 1979. Three months later, Amin was overthrown in a bloody coup engineered by the Soviets and was replaced by Abarak Karmal, leader of the Parcham group which had been exiled in the summer of 1978.

After the April 1978 coup had brought a Marxist government to power in Afghanistan, the Soviets moved quickly to take advantage of the new situation and to consolidate their ties with the Taraki government. In December 1978, they signed a new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Afghanistan. Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan grew significantly and, as the insurgency against the government developed, Soviet military equipment and advisers became critical to the survival of the regime. Beginning in the spring of 1979, Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan began to escalate dramatically until it culminated in December 1979 with the current Soviet invasion which installed the new government.

Government

Since April 1978 Afghanistan has been ruled by a Marxist regime. The government calls itself a republic. The highest body is the Revolutionary Council headed by a President. There is a Council of Ministers headed by a Prime Minister. Basic power is vested in the Politburo of the ruling party, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan headed by a Secretary General. The new leader, Babrak Karmal, holds all three leadership positions—President, Prime Minister, and Secretary General of the party—as did his predecessor, Hafizullah Amin.

Economy

The turmoil which has engulfed Afghanistan during the past year owing to an insurgency, which escalated steadily throughout the year until it had spread throughout the entire country, has totally disrupted the basic economic system. Therefore, it is impossible to provide any reliable current economic statistics. The last statistics available are for 1978 when the gross national product was in the range of $3–4 billion and the per capita income was about $250. ■

U.S. Asks Security Council To Impose Sanctions Against Iran

**SECRETARY VANCE,
DEC. 29, 1979[1]**

We meet tonight at a moment when the principles upon which this great international body rests are being sharply challenged in Iran.

More than 8 weeks have passed since our Embassy was seized and our people and those from other nations were taken hostage in Tehran. On three separate occasions, this Council has unanimously expressed the will of the international community that the hostages be released immediately.

From the outset, the Secretary General, with the full cooperation of the United States, has labored unceasingly for a peaceful solution. The President of the General Assembly has twice urged Iran to release the hostages. The International Court of Justice has spoken, clearly and unanimously. Governments and world leaders, of varying political and religious faiths, have appealed for the release of our people. And the U.S. Government has, with determination, persistence, and patience, pursued every peaceful channel available to us.

The response of those who perpetuate this crisis—the terrorists who have invaded our Embassy and the Government of Iran which supports them—has been defiance and contempt. They have placed themselves beyond the world's law and beyond the moral imperatives that are common to the world's cultures and religions.

At the heart of this matter are 50 men and women—still captive, still isolated, still subjected to the most severe strains. The World Court, in its unanimous decision, expressed concern that continuation of these conditions of imprisonment ". . . exposes the human beings concerned to privation, hardship, anguish and even danger to life and health and thus to a serious possibility of irreparable harm. . . ." Claims that the hostages are well ring hollow, for the international community has been denied either consistent or comprehensive access to them.

But let us be clear: It is not only 50 American men and women who are held hostage in Iran, it is the international community.

This is far more than a conflict between the United States and Iran. Iran has placed itself in conflict with the structure of law and with the machinery of peace all of us have painstakingly built.

The time has come for the world community to act, firmly and collectively, to uphold international law and preserve international peace. We must give practical meaning to the principles and purposes of our charter.

As long as Iran remains indifferent to the voices of reason and mercy that have been raised from every corner of the world, as long as it refuses to recognize the common rules of international behavior, it must accept the consequences of its deliberate actions.

On November 25 the Secretary General, acting under article 99 of the charter, took the extraordinary step of requesting an urgent meeting of the Council to deal with this crisis, stating that "the present crisis poses a serious threat to international peace and security." The Council's resolution of December 4, adopted unanimously, expressed the Council's deep concern at the dangerous level of tension and spoke of possible grave consequences for international peace and security.

These statements, along with the many statements of concern by member states, make clear the judgment of the international community that Iran's act of taking and holding hostages represents a violation of the law of nations and threatens international peace and security. If Iran continues to hold the hostages, after the Council and the world community have unanimously called for their release, action against Iran under chapter VII of the charter is not only justified but required to promote a peaceful solution to this crisis.

It is, therefore, incumbent upon all of us as members of this Council to take the steps necessary to insure that the Council's earlier unanimous decision is implemented. My government, therefore, seeks a resolution which would condemn Iran's failure to comply with earlier actions of the Security Council and of the International Court calling for the immediate release of all the hostages. The resolution would further provide for two additional steps: first, request the Secretary General to intensify his good offices' efforts, noting his readiness to go personally to Tehran and to report back to the Council by a specified date; second, decide that, if the hostages have not been released when the Council meets again at the early specified date, the Council will at that time adopt specific sanctions under article 41 of the charter.

We believe that the continued solidarity of the international community will serve to demonstrate that an early resolution of the problem is to the benefit of all, including the people and leaders of Iran. The prolongation of this crisis is in no one's interest.

We are not unmindful of the grievances of the Iranian people. We respect Iran's sovereignty and independence and the right of the Iranian people to decide their own form of government. As we have repeatedly emphasized, once the hostages are released unharmed, we are prepared, in accordance with the U.N. Charter, to seek a resolution of the issues between us. With the hostages' release, the way will be clear for Iran to present its grievances in any appropriate forum.

The United States, however, cannot respond to claims of injustice while our citizens are held in unjust captivity, in violation of the resolutions and orders of the world's primary peacekeeping institutions. As a great American President, Abraham Lincoln—a man of deep compassion and understanding—once declared: "There is no grievance that is a fit object of redress by mob law."

Our patience and forbearance have been severely tested in these past weeks. They are not unlimited. We have made clear from the beginning that we prefer a peaceful solution to the other remedies that are available to us under international law. It is in the interest of such a peaceful solution that today we call upon this body to act.

Let us act now to preserve the web of mutual obligation which binds us together and shields us from chaos and from disorder. For there can be no evasion of this central point: If the international community fails to act when its law is flouted and its authority defied, we not only diminish the possibility for peace in this crisis, we belittle this institution of peace, itself.

Effective action by the Security Council can breathe new life into the provisions of the charter and the deci-

France
Protocol relating to the isotopic enrichment of uranium by chemical exchange. Signed at Washington Sept. 4, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 31, 1979.

Federal Republic of Germany
Treaty concerning extradition, with protocol. Signed at Bonn June 20, 1978.[4]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 20, 1979.

Guyana
General agreement for economic, technical, and related assistance. Signed at Georgetown Nov. 8, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 8, 1979.

India
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036, 9578), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 26 and Nov. 6, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 6, 1979.

Indonesia
Memorandum of understanding on the multilateral trade negotiations. Signed at Jakarta Nov. 29, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 29, 1979.

Italy
Memorandum of understanding concerning energy cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Rome Oct. 17, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 17, 1979.

Japan
Treaty on extradition, with exchange of notes. Signed at Tokyo Mar. 3, 1978.[4]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 13, 1979.

Macao
Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 3, 1975, as amended and extended (TIAS 8027, 9472), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Oct. 17, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 17, 1979.

Mexico
Treaty on extradition, with appendix. Signed at Mexico City May 4, 1978.[4]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 13, 1979.

Nigeria
Agreement extending the agreement of Apr. 20, 1976 (TIAS 8243), concerning procedures for mutual assistance in the administration of justice in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation and its subsidiaries and affiliates. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Mar. 8 and 26, 1979. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1979.

Norway
Extradition treaty. Signed at Oslo June 9, 1977.[4]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 13, 1979.

Pakistan
Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 4 and 9, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9050, 9551), relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Nov. 13 and 16, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 16, 1979.

Panama
Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. Signed at Panama Jan. 11, 1979.[4]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 17, 1979.

Saudi Arabia
Project agreement for technical cooperation in educational programs for meteorology, hydrology, arid land studies, and environmental protection, with annexes. Signed at Riyadh Nov. 25, 1979. Enters into force after deposit by the Government of Saudi Arabia of the sum described in article IX.

Agreement amending and extending the technical cooperation agreement of Feb. 13, 1975. Signed at Riyadh Nov. 25, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 25, 1979.

Singapore
Agreement amending the agreement of Sept. 21 and 22, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9214), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Sept. 12 and Oct. 16, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 16, 1979.

Spain
Agreement regarding claims arising from CRISEX. Signed at Madrid Nov. 13, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 13, 1979.

Switzerland
Agreement on research participation and technical exchange in the U.S. heavy section steel technology program and the Swiss research program in fracture mechanics, with appendices. Signed at Washington and Wurenlingen June 15 and July 9, 1979. Entered into force July 9, 1979.

Agreement on research participation and technical exchange in the U.S. loss of fluid test program and the Swiss emergency core cooling systems-reflood program, with appendices. Signed at Washington and Wurenlingen June 15 and July 9, 1979. Entered into force July 9, 1979.

Thailand
Agreement relating to air transport services, and annex. Signed at Bangkok Feb. 26, 1947. Entered into force Feb. 26, 1947. TIAS 1607.
Terminated: Dec. 7, 1979.

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of Feb. 26, 1947 (TIAS 1607). Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok Mar. 3, 1970. Entered into force Mar. 3, 1970. TIAS 6837.
Terminated: Dec. 7, 1979.

Air transport agreement, with annexes. Signed at Bangkok Dec. 7, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1979.

Turkey
Treaty on extradition and mutual assistance in criminal matters. Signed at Ankara June 7, 1979.[4]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 13, 1979.

Treaty on the enforcement of penal judgments. Signed at Ankara June 7, 1979.[4]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 13, 1979.

Agreement concerning the grant of defense articles and services under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara Aug. 15 and 31, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 31, 1979.

Agreement relating to a loan and grant to support and promote the financial stability and economic recovery of Turkey. Signed at Ankara Nov. 1, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 1, 1979.

United Kingdom
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates of deceased persons and on gifts. Signed at London Oct. 19, 1978. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1979.
Proclaimed by the President: Dec. 6, 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of July 3, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4078, 4267, 6659, 6861, 8014), for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. Signed at Washington Dec. 5, 1979. Enters into force on the date on which each government shall have received from the other government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Agreement concerning the turnover of the airfield at Grand Turk Auxiliary Air Base to the Government of the Turks and Caicos Islands and its use by the U.S. Government. Effected by exchange of notes at

Washington Dec. 12, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 12, 1979.

Agreement concerning United States defense areas in the Turks and Caicos Islands, with annex, memorandum of understanding and aide memoire. Signed at Washington Dec. 12, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 12, 1979: effective Jan. 1, 1979.

Yugoslavia
Agreement on the establishment of a U.S. information center in Titograd in accordance with the terms of the memorandum of understanding of June 14, 1961. Signed at Belgrade June 25, 1979. Enters into force upon its acceptance by authorized parties of both countries in accordance with their national laws.

Taiwan
Mutual defense treaty. Signed at Washington Dec. 2, 1954. Entered into force Mar. 3, 1955. TIAS 3178.
Terminated: Jan. 1, 1980. ■

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[1] With reservation.
[2] With a statement.
[3] Not in force for the U.S.
[4] Not in force.
[5] Subject to ratification, approval, acceptance.
[6] Subject to ratification.
[7] Not subject to ratification.
[8] With declaration.

December 1979

Events pertaining to Iran can be found on page 56.

December 2
American Embassy in Tripoli, Libya, is attacked by demonstrators.
In Portugal's parliamentary election, the Democratic Alliance wins 128 seats in the 250 seat Parliament. Francisco Sa Carneiro is named Prime Minister.

December 4
Secretary Vance transmits the seventh semiannual report on implementation of Helsinki Final Act covering the period June 1 through November 30, 1979, to Congressman Dante Fascell, Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

December 5
United States temporarily suspends normal operations of Tripoli Embassy.

December 6
Ambassador Sol Linowitz departs on his first official visit to Egypt and Israel, as the President's special representative, to review work of the negotiations to date, December 6–13.

December 7
U.N. Cuban mission is bombed.

December 8
Britain appoints Lord Soames as British Governor to Rhodesia.

December 9
Secretary Vance departs for Europe for meeting with the NATO Council and leaders of U.S. major allies, December 9–14.

December 10
Shin Hyon Hwack is named Prime Minister of South Korea.

December 11
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Parliament renounces rebellion against Britain clearing the way for the British to resume control. The territory resumes use of its colonial name, Southern Rhodesia.
In a vote of 82 to 62, Irish Parliament elects Charles Haughey as new Prime Minister of Ireland.
Special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers is held in Brussels, Dec. 11–12.

December 12
Rhodesia returns to legality under British Crown. British economic sanctions are lifted.

December 13
Semiannual ministerial session of the North Atlantic is held in Brussels, Dec. 13–14.

December 15
Britain declares formal end to Rhodesia conference without cease-fire agreement.

December 16
British Prime Minister Thatcher arrives in the U.S. for official visit December 16–18.

December 17
Leaders of Patriotic Front guerrilla alliance, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, agree to a British cease-fire plan aimed at ending the 7-year Rhodesian civil war.

December 21
Parties to the 7-year Rhodesian civil war, Robert Mugabe, Joshua Nkomo, and Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa, sign Lancaster House agreement.
U.N. Security Council votes to lift 13-year economic embargo against Rhodesia.
Choi Kyu Hah takes office as South Korea's fourth President.

December 22
Prime Minister Pol Pot, leader of the Cambodian forces, is replaced by Khieu Samphan. Pot is Secretary General of the Communist Party and Commander in Chief of Democratic Kampuchean Armed Forces.

December 24–25
Over 150 flights, part of a large-scale Soviet airlift, land at Kabul Airport in Afghanistan.

December 26
United States announces reductions in Embassy staff and other official missions in El Salvador because of concern for the safety and welfare of U.S. Government employees and their dependents.

December 27
Afghan President Hafizullah Amin is ousted from power and killed, along with members of his family, in a coup supported by Soviet troops. He is replaced by Babrak Karmal, a former Deputy Prime Minister who had been living in exile in Eastern Europe.
Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, Portugal's first female Prime Minister, resigns.

December 29
Gabon President Bongo is re-elected to a second 7-year term.

December 31
Togo President Eyadema is re-elected to a new 7-year term. ■

Department of State

November 30–December 28

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†314	12/3	Habib: address at the Miami Conference on the Caribbean, Nov. 28.
*315	11/30	Richard Cavins Matheron sworn in as Ambassador to Swaziland (biographic data).
*316	12/3	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, Jan. 4.
*317	12/5	Victor H. Palmieri appointed U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs (biographic data).
*318	12/4	Conference on U.S. foreign policy in Africa, Detroit, Dec. 13.
*319	12/7	Fine Arts Committee meeting, Jan. 18.
*320	12/7	Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Advisory Committee, Jan. 8.

Latin American neighbors has not yet been ratified by the United States Senate.

Working together with Congress, I remain committed to vigorous pursuit of our non-proliferation objectives.

Limitations on Strategic Arms

The most prominent of our nuclear arms control efforts is, of course, SALT II.

The signing of the Treaty brought to an end painstaking negotiations carried out under three administrations of both parties.

- SALT II is in our mutual interest; it is neither an American favor to the Soviet Union nor a Soviet favor to the United States.
- Ratification of the SALT II Treaty would represent a major step forward in restraining the continued growth of Soviet strategic forces.

Because SALT II reduces superpower competition in its most dangerous manifestation, this Treaty is the single most important bilateral accord of the decade:

- SALT II will permit us better to maintain strategic equivalence in nuclear weapons and devote our defense increases more heavily to our highest priority needs for conventional force improvements;
- Without it, the Soviets can add more power to their forces and better conceal from us what they are doing;
- Without SALT II, and the beginning of SALT III, deeper cuts would take many more years to achieve;
- Without SALT II, our efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons will be more difficult.

I believe that the Senate will ratify SALT II because the Treaty is, in its simplest terms, in the interest of our Nation's security.

But I do not believe it advisable at this time to bring up the Treaty for consideration on the Senate floor. The Congress and the Executive Branch must first deal with the pressing matters arising from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION

As we enter the decade of the 1980s, we face challenges both at home and abroad which will test our qualities as a people—our toughness and willingness to sacrifice for larger goals, our courage and our vision.

For this Nation to remain secure, for this country to prosper, we must rise above narrow interests. The dangers of disunity are self-evident in a world of major power confrontation. The rewards of a new national consensus and sense of purpose are equally clear.

We have new support in the world for our purposes of national independence and individual human dignity. We have a new will at home to do what is required to keep us the strongest nation on earth.

We must move together into this decade with the strength which comes from realization of the dangers before us and from the confidence that together we can overcome them.

JIMMY CARTER ■

[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980.

and the families and friends of victims of human rights abuses including the disappeared. Often as important, but sometimes more difficult to manage, are contacts with government agencies responsible for the judicial system, the management of detention centers, and the general administration of justice.

In countries where disappearances have been commonplace, we have registered our disapproval of this phenomenon in the strongest possible terms, emphasizing as well the damage it does to our bilateral relationship and the negative effects it may have on all aspects of our relationship including the assistance we provide.

We talk on two levels; one on the principles concerned the problem itself, clearly and specifically, and we make formal and informal representations about the disappeared on our own initiative and at the behest of the families and friends of the disappeared. Members of the Congress, private citizens, and human rights organizations. We present representation lists containing the names of the disappeared.

The sad reality is that even when a repressive government reaches a stage of willingness to look for certain of the disappeared, or when an individual official is disposed to be helpful in such a search, it is often unable to determine the whereabouts of an individual who may have been picked up by security agencies operating without the knowledge of other agencies or operatives acting independently without the knowledge of their superiors.

In some instances, during the early stages, our representations are disparaged. We are told that the disappearances, while unfortunate, are the unavoidable byproduct of the "war" against subversion or terrorism. We are asked why we are interested at all since the disappeared are not U.S. citizens but terrorists and criminals. It is suggested to us, and not obliquely, that we have no business meddling in another nation's internal affairs. As we enter the third year of this policy, however, these efforts to escape discussion of the issue have by and large been abandoned.

Needless to say, we reject categorically such self-serving and fundamentally erroneous distortions of the international human rights obligations of all countries. We are prepared to demonstrate, and indeed have demonstrated, our concern on this issue in a tangible way using the variety of foreign policy instruments provided by law and policy to the conduct of our foreign affairs.

U.S. Support for U.N. Resolution 33/173

There is much the United States can and does do bilaterally in our efforts to attenuate and eventually eliminate this problem. Our efforts are enhanced when other states join in our representations and express concerns similar to our own.

At times world public opinion may seem ephemeral, but no country—no matter how unenlightened or repressive its regime—enjoys being the target of international scorn and obloquy. In nations where disappearances occur, we have joined with like-minded friends and allies to urge an end to this dreadful human rights violation. We work closely with other free nations to foster our international human rights objectives. There still is no more appropriate forum for such cooperation than the United Nations.

On December 20, 1978, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 33/173, on disappeared persons. Its genesis can be found in a growing awareness that in various parts of the world, enforced or involuntary disappearances of persons, as a result of excesses by law enforcement or security authorities, unhappily had become a common phenomenon. The resolution called upon governments to search for missing persons, hold law enforcement and security authorities fully accountable for disappearances, and to cooperate with other governments in locating or accounting for persons who disappear. The resolution also requested the U.N. Human Rights Commission to consider the question of the disappeared. It urged the U.N. Secretary General to use his good offices in disappearance cases and to draw the concerns expressed in the resolution to the attention of governments with a view toward disinterested humanitarian action.

The United States strongly supported this resolution, and is working to insure that it is implemented in the spirit which animated its adoption. In late August of 1979 in Geneva, the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities discussed the human rights of detained persons with special emphasis on the disappeared. The outcome of this discussion was a resolution adopted by the subcommission on September 5.

The subcommission considers that the resolution in question places not merely a legal but also a moral obligation, based on the principles of elementary humanity which inspire the international community on all those participating in U.N. activities. Nations are asked to take account at every appropriate opportunity of disappearances brought to their knowledge and to combine their efforts to try to locate the missing and dissappeared persons.

The subcommission also proposes for Human Rights Commission approval the creation of a group of experts who would be given all the information available for locating disappeared and missing persons in various regions of the world and who would make necessary contacts with government and families concerned.

The subcommission also transmitted to the U.N. Secretary General several lists of missing persons with a view toward his exercising the good offices role urged in the General Assembly resolution of last December.

Finally, the subcommission suggests that if the disappearance phenomenon continues, its extreme gravity would justify some form of emergency remedy based on the notion of *habeas corpus* designed to induce governments to search for the disappeared.

What is striking about the subcommission's actions is that we are witnessing the beginning of the forging of machinery and procedures within the U.N. system to handle the disappearance phenomenon. The U.N. Human Rights Commission will consider the subcommission's recommendations at its meeting in Geneva in early 1980. I promise you the United States will do all it can to insure constructive action on the subcommission's proposals.

Let me conclude by reiterating my appreciation for the opportunity to appear before your committee, my admiration for the tremendous international public service this forum provides, and my assurances that this Administration remains totally committed to finding ways to mitigate and eliminate the egregious violation of human rights that "disappearances" represent. ■

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

In short, there is a clear division of responsibilities here and that division was clearly recognized during the proceedings in the Security Council. At that time U.S. Ambassador [to the United Nations] Donald McHenry stated as follows:

> The United States wishes to place on the record that the adoption of this resolution by the Security Council clearly is not intended to displace peaceful efforts in other organs of the United Nations. Neither the United States nor any other member intends that the adoption of this resolution should have any prejudicial impact whatever on the request of the United States for the indication of provisional measures of protection by the International Court of Justice.

Before making that statement Ambassador McHenry and his colleagues informed Council members that the United States would speak in this vein during the debates about this pending case before the Court, and all of the members so consulted were in agreement with the statement. Moreover, after the statement was made, no member of the Council disagreed with the stated intention to the effect that the Council's action should not impede the United States' pending request before this Court. Thus all 15 members of the Security Council evidently agree that the Court is free to act affirmatively on the pending request of the United States if it is inclined to do so.

Requested Measures

Let me conclude my argument in favor of interim protective measures by reciting exactly what measures are being requested. The Government of the United States respectfully requests that the Court, pending final judgment in this case, indicate forthwith the following:

First, that the Government of Iran immediately release all hostages of U.S. nationality and facilitate the prompt and safe departure from Iran of these persons and all other U.S. officials in dignified and humane circumstances.

Second, that the Government of Iran immediately clear the premises of the U.S. Embassy, Chancery, and Consulate in Tehran of all persons whose presence is not authorized by the U.S. Government and restore the premises to U.S. control.

Third, that the Government of Iran insure that all persons attached to the U.S. Embassy and Consulate should be accorded, and protected in, full freedom of movement necessary to carry out their diplomatic and consular functions. That is to say, to the extent that the United States should choose, and Iran should agree, to the continued presence of U.S. diplomatic personnel in Tehran, they must be permitted to carry out their functions in accordance with their privileges and immunities.

Fourth, that the Government of Iran not place on trial any person attached to the Embassy and Consulate of the United States—and refrain from any action to implement any such trial.

Now, in connection with this fourth request, I should like to draw the Court's attention to recent reports that Iran may intend to continue the captivity of these hostages so that they may appear before some sort of international commission. Whatever the purpose of the continued detention, of course, it remains totally unlawful. Accordingly, in light of these recent reports, with the Court's permission, the United States wishes now to amend its fourth request for interim measures to add: that the Government of Iran must not detain or permit the detention of these persons in connection with any proceedings, whether of an "international commission" or otherwise, and that they not be forced to participate in any such proceeding.

Finally, the fifth request of the United States is that the Government of Iran insure that no action is taken which might prejudice the rights of the United States in respect of the carrying out of any decision which the Court may render on the merits, and in particular neither take, nor permit, action that would threaten the lives, safety, or well-being of the hostages.

This recitation of the provisional measures requested by the United States makes clear, we believe, that we are seeking an indication which is relatively specific as to the measures to be taken. We recognize that in some cases it may be appropriate simply to indicate, in general terms, that each party should take no action to aggravate the dispute or prejudice the rights of the other party in respect of the carrying out of the Court's decision on the merits. As I indicated earlier, the United States has no objection to the inclusion of such general provisions, subject, of course, to the usual specification that such measures will apply on the basis of reciprocal observance. I earnestly submit, however, that, in the circumstances of this particular case, any provisional measures indicated by the Court should be specific as to the release of the hostages, the clearing of the Embassy, and the inadmissibility of putting the hostages on trial, or bringing them before any international commission. Every effort should be made to insure that the Court's message will be clearly understood in Iran, thus maximising the chance that it will be effective.

There is ample precedent, I submit, for the specificity of our request. In the *Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.* case, the Court, in indicating provisional measures, included not only the usual language about avoiding prejudice to the rights of the parties and aggravation of the dispute; it also included particularized measures as to the method by which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company should be managed during the pendency of the litigation. Similarly, as another example, in the *Fisheries Jurisdiction* case, the Court indicated very specific provisional measures as to the enforcement of fisheries regulations and even permissible annual catches of fish. I respectfully submit that, if such specific measures were appropriate in the context of these commercial cases, they are the more appropriate in a case which involves the lives and liberties of some 50 human beings and in which, because of divergences in culture and language, misunderstandings as to meaning may arise unless any provisional measures indicated by the Court are as specific and hence as clear as possible. The specific measures indicated in the case between Belgium and China which I have earlier discussed are illustrative of what is required; the measures there indicated are not unlike those sought here.

Conclusion

In concluding my argument this afternoon, I would respectfully—most respectfully—urge that the Court rule on the request of the United States with the maximum possible expedition. We have taken the liberty of reviewing the timing of the Court's actions on requests for provisional measures in years past, and we have found that in one case, the Court indicated provisional measures 13 days after the request was filed; in another case the Court ruled on the request in 9 days; and in a third case, the Court acted in only 6 days. Today is the 11th day since the pending U.S. request was filed, and we recognize, of course, that the Court will need some amount of additional time to deliberate and to act.

Nevertheless, we respectfully request that the Court act with the maximum possible speed—because we are dealing here, again, not with commercial interests, but with the lives and liberties of persons who have now been under close confinement and imminent peril for more than 5 weeks. The danger for these 50 or more lives increases as each day goes by. It is critically important to my government to achieve the immediate re-

lease of these individuals, and I suggest that it is no less important to the world community and to the rule of law.

Mr. President, distinguished and learned Members of the Court, we believe that this case presents the Court with the most dramatic opportunity it has ever had to affirm the rule of law among nations and thus to fulfill the world community's expectation that the Court will act vigorously in the interests of international law and international peace. The current situation in Tehran demands an immediate, forceful, and explicit declaration by the Court, calling upon Iran to conform to the basic rules of international intercourse and human rights. Only in that manner, I respectfully suggest, can the Court discharge its high responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations.

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I respectfully request that the Court indicate provisional measures calling upon the Government of Iran to bring about the immediate release of the U.S. nationals now held captive in Iran and the transfer of control of the American Embassy in Tehran to the Government of the United States.

TEXT OF COURT ORDER

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1979
15 DECEMBER 1979

CASE CONCERNING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF IN TEHRAN
(United States of America v. *Iran)*
REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES

ORDER

Present: President Sir Humphrey WALDOCK; *Vice-President* ELIAS; *Judges* FORSTER, GROS, LACHS, MOROZOV, NAGENDRA SINGH, RUDA, MOSLER, TARAZI, ODA, AGO, EL-ERIAN, SETTE-CAMARA, BAXTER; *Registrar* AQUARONE.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,

After deliberation,

Having regard to Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute of the Court,

Having regard to Articles 73 and 74 of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the Application by the United States of America filed in the Registry of the Court on 29 November 1979, instituting proceedings against the Islamic Republic of Iran in respect of a dispute concerning the situation in the United States Embassy in Tehran and the seizure and holding as hostages of members of the United States diplomatic and consular staff in Iran;

Makes the following Order:

1. Whereas in the above-mentioned Application the United States Government invokes jurisdictional provisions in certain treaties as bases for the Court's jurisdiction in the present case; whereas it further recounts a sequence of events, beginning on 4 November 1979 in and around the United States Embassy in Tehran and involving the invasion of the Embassy premises, the seizure of United States diplomatic and consular staff and their continued detention; and whereas, on the basis of the facts there alleged, it requests the Court to adjudge and declare:

"(a) That the Government of Iran, in tolerating, encouraging, and failing to prevent and punish the conduct described in the preceding Statement of Facts [in the Application], violated its international legal obligations to the United States as provided by

- Articles 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 37 and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
- Articles 28, 31, 33, 34, 36 and 40 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
- Articles 4 and 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, and
- Articles II(4), XIII, XVIII and XIX of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, and
- Articles 2(3), 2(4) and 33 of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) That pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations, the Government of Iran is under a particular obligation immediately to secure the release of all United States nationals currently being detained within the premises of the United States Embassy in Tehran and to assure that all such persons and all other United States nationals in Tehran are allowed to leave Iran safely;

(c) That the Government of Iran shall pay to the United States, in its own right and in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, reparation for the foregoing violations of Iran's international legal obligations to the United States, in a sum to be determined by the Court; and

(d) That the Government of Iran submit to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution those persons responsible for the crimes committed against the premises and staff of the United States Embassy and against the premises of its Consulates";

2. Having regard to the request dated 29 November 1979 and filed in the Registry the same day, whereby the Government of the United States of America, relying on Article 41 of the Statute and Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court, asks the Court urgently to indicate, pending the final decision in the case brought before it by the above-mentioned Application of the same date, the following provisional measures:

"(a) That the Government of Iran immediately release all hostages of United States nationality and facilitate the prompt and safe departure from Iran of these persons and all other United States officials in dignified and humane circumstances.

(b) That the Government of Iran immediately clear the premises of the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulate of all persons whose presence is not authorized by the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Iran, and restore the premises to United States control.

(c) That the Government of Iran ensure that all persons attached to the United States Embassy and Consulate should be accorded, and protected in, full freedom within the Embassy and Chancery premises, and the freedom of movement within Iran necessary to carry out their diplomatic and consular functions.

(d) That the Government of Iran not place on trial any person attached to the Embassy and Consulate of the United States and refrain from any action to implement any such trial.

(e) That the Government of Iran ensure that no action is taken which might prejudice the rights of the United States in respect of the carrying out of any decision which the Court may render on the merits, and in particular neither take nor permit action that would threaten the lives, safety, or well-being of the hostages";

3. Whereas, on the day on which the Application and request for indication of provisional measures were received in the Registry, the Government of Iran was notified by telegram of the filing of the Application and request, and of the particular measures requested, and copies of both documents were transmitted by express airmail to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran;

4. Whereas, pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute and Article 42 of the Rules of Court, copies of the Application were transmitted to Members of the United Nations and to other States entitled to appear before the Court;

5. Whereas on 6 December 1979 the Registrar addressed the notification provided for in Article 63 of the Statute of the Court to the States, other than the parties to the case, which were listed in the relevant documents of the United Nations Secretariat as parties to the following conventions, invoked in the Application:

(i) the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, and the accompanying Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes;

(ii) the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, and the accompanying Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes;

(iii) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973;

6. Whereas on 30 November 1979, pending the meeting of the Court, the President, in exercise of the power conferred on him by Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, addressed a telegram to each of the two governments concerned calling attention to the fact that the matter was now *sub judice* before the Court and to the need to act in such a way as would enable any Order the Court might make in the present proceedings to have its

U.S. Defense Policy

by President Carter

Remarks to members of the Business Council in the East Room of the White House on December 12, 1979.[1]

It's indeed a pleasure for me to be with you again. This afternoon I would like to make a very important statement to you, following which the Chairman and I will walk down the hall, and I'd like to greet each one of you individually, as has been my custom in the past when we've been together. And then we'll have a chance for a few questions that you might want to put to me concerning energy or inflation or legislation before the Congress or Iran or other matters of interest to you.

But my first concern, and the first concern of every President who has ever lived in this house, is and must be the security of our nation. This security rests on many kinds of strength—on arms and also on arms control, on military power and on economic vitality and the quality of life of our own people, on modern weapons, and also on reliable energy supplies. The well-being of our friends and our allies is also of great importance to us. Our security is tied to human rights and to social justice which prevails among the people who live on Earth and to the institutions of international force and peace and order, which we ourselves have helped to build.

We all hope and work and pray that we will see a world in which the weapons of war are no longer necessary, but now we must deal with the hard facts, with the world as it is. In the dangerous and uncertain world of today, the keystone of our national security is still military strength—strength that is clearly recognized by Americans, by our allies, and by any potential adversary.

Twice in this century, each time in the aftermath of a global war, we were tempted in this country by isolationism. The first time, we succumbed to that temptation, withdrawing from our global responsibilities, and you know what the result was. A generation later the world was again engulfed by war. But after the Second World War, we built a national consensus, based on our own moral and political values, around the concept of an active role for America in preserving peace and security for ourselves and for others.

Despite all the changes that have swept across this world in the last 30 years, that basic consensus has endured. We've learned the mistake of military intervention in the internal affairs of another country when our own American security was not directly involved. But we must understand that not every instance of the firm application of the power of the United States is a potential Vietnam. The consensus for national strength and international involvement, already shaken and threatened, survived that divisive and tragic war.

Recent events in Iran have been a vivid reminder of the need for a strong and united America, a nation which is supported by its allies and which need not bluff or posture in the quiet exercise of our strength and in our continued commitment to international law and the preservation of peace. Today, regardless of other disagreements among ourselves, we are united in the belief that we must have a strong defense and that military weakness would inevitably make war more likely.

So, the issue we face is not whether we should be strong; the issue is how we will be strong. What will be our defense responsibilities for the 1980s and beyond? What challenges must we confront in meeting those responsibilities? What defense programs do we need, and how much will be spent to meet them? How can we correlate most successfully our military readiness and our arms control efforts? To begin with, our defense program must be tailored to match our responsibilities.

European and Pacific Alliances

In Europe our military forces have provided the foundation for one of the longest periods of peace and prosperity that continent has ever enjoyed. Our strength, both conventional and nuclear, helps to maintain peace while our allies work together and build together through the European Community and also nurture their historical ties to the countries of Eastern Europe. Our mutual commitments within the Atlantic alliance are vital to us all, and those commitments are permanent and unshakable.

American military strength provides the framework within which our mature friendships with Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand all contribute to stability in the Pacific basin and throughout the world.

The prospects for peace in the Middle East have been enhanced by a strong America and by confidence in us among our friends in Egypt and in Israel. We are determined to continue the progress which has been made in the Middle East.

We must and we will continue to meet these and our other responsibilities. But there are reasons for concern about our ability to sustain our beneficial and our peaceful influence throughout the world—real reasons for concern.

Defense Spending

For nearly 20 years now, the Soviet Union has been increasing its real defense spending by 3% or 4% each year, 3% or 4% compounded annually. In contrast, our own defense spending has declined in real terms every year from 1968 through 1976. This is creating a real challenge to American leadership and to our influence in the world.

We will almost certainly face other challenges, less direct, though no less serious. The 1980s are very likely to bring continued turbulence and upheaval, as we've experienced in the 1970s. Problems of energy price and energy supply will continue to strain the economy of the developed world and will put even more severe pressures on the developing nations. Political instability, which is already serious enough, may even intensify as the newer nations struggle to cope with these problems, which are serious enough for us.

As in the past, when the winds of change threaten to arouse storms of conflict, we must be prepared to join our friends and our allies in resisting threats to stability and to peace.

The steady buildup by the Soviets and their growing inclination to rely on military power to exploit turbulent situations call for calm, deliberate, and sustained American response.

Through the mid-1970s, the United States relied on the defense strategy and also on force structures devised during the early 1960s, a time when we enjoyed strategic nuclear superiority and a tactical nuclear monopoly, when Soviet seapower was limited and the Soviet military presence outside Eastern Europe almost nonexistent. All that had changed by the time I took office as President.

Beginning in 1976 and continuing in my own Administration, we've set out to counterbalance the growth in Soviet military power by launching new efforts that draw on our own considerable strengths. During each of the last 4 years, there has been a moderate increase in real defense spending. In Europe we've taken steps, as you know, to reverse a decade of relative decline in the military strength of the Atlantic alliance.

When I first began to meet with Atlantic alliance leaders almost 3 years ago, I found them very troubled by the state of our military strength in the Atlantic alliance. I promised to raise our own level of defense spending, in real terms, by some 3% per year, and our NATO allies responded by making the same pledge. With American leadership, NATO also took the crucial step of adopting a bold, Long-Term Defense Program, which will extend over 15 years. That program is helping us to increase our capacity to deter or to defeat any surprise attack that may be launched against our European allies and, therefore, against ourselves.

Theater Nuclear Forces

We are also taking steps to redress the balance in other theater nuclear forces. This action, as you know, we've been pursuing in the last few days.

In the early 1960s, the United States removed its medium-range missiles from Europe. We could do this then because there was overwhelming U.S. strategic superiority. But the Soviet Union did not show similar restraint. The accelerating development of their relatively long-range, mobile, multiwarhead SS–20 missile is a major escalation in theater nuclear armaments. With the advent of rough strategic parity, this new missile creates a potentially dangerous weakness in NATO's ability to deter aggression. In the SALT II negotiations, we carefully protected our freedom to correct this weakness.

Just a few hours ago, I was informed that the NATO alliance resolved to strengthen its theater nuclear weapons to offset actual Soviet deployments. The agreement reached this afternoon in Europe was a unanimous agreement very encouraging to all of us. Now, on the basis of strength, we can negotiate with the Warsaw Pact to reduce nuclear weapons and also to reduce, we hope, conventional weapons throughout the European theater.

Strategic Forces

In the area of intercontinental or strategic forces, we also face adverse trends that must be corrected. Improved Soviet air defenses now threaten to make our strategic bombers vulnerable. The cruise missile will be our solution to that problem. Production of the first generation of air-launched cruise missiles will begin next year.

In addition, our land-based Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) are becoming increasingly vulnerable because of the improved accuracy of the Soviet Union's multiwarhead missiles. That's why we decided last spring to produce the MX missile. The relatively small number of MX missiles to be deployed will have mobility and a large number of shelters and will be far less vulnerable than our present fixed-shelter Minutemen.

Further, in response to any first strike against us, the MX will have the capability to attack a wide variety of Soviet military targets. The MX missile, deployed as I've just described, will not undermine stability, but it will deter attack and encourage negotiations on further nuclear arms limits. In addition, by increasing the difficulty of any contemplated Soviet strike, it will contribute to the survivability of our own strategic bombers and submarines. Even with SALT II, America needs the MX to maintain the strategic nuclear balance.

We are also modernizing our strategic submarine force. The first new Trident submarine has already been launched, and the first of our new Trident missiles, with a range of more than 4,000 miles, have already been put to sea.

Thus, each leg of our strategic triad is being modernized—cruise missiles for our bombers, the MX for our intercontinental missiles, and Trident for our undersea deterrent. Nor will we neglect our conventional forces, though here we must rely heavily on the parallel efforts of our allies, in Asia as well as in Europe. They must bear their proportional share of the increased costs of a common defense.

Conventional Forces

I'm determined to keep our naval forces more powerful than those of any other nation on Earth. Our shipbuilding program will sustain a 550-ship Navy in the 1990s,and we will continue to build the most capable ships afloat. Seapower is indispensable to our global strategy, in peace and also in war.

And finally, we are moving rapidly to counterbalance the growing ability of the Soviet Union, directly or through surrogates, to use its military power in Third World regions, and we must be prepared to deal with hostile actions against our own citizens or our vital interests from others as well. For this purpose, we need not only stronger forces but better means for rapid deployment of the forces that we already have.

Our 1981 defense budget and our 5-year defense program will meet this need in two different ways. The first will be a new fleet of maritime prepositioning ships that will carry the heavy equipment and the supplies for three Marine brigades that can be stationed in forward areas where U.S. forces may be needed. With their supplies already near the scene of action, the troops themselves can then be moved in by air very rapidly. The second innovation will be a new fleet of large cargo aircraft to carry Army tanks and other equipment over intercontinental distances. Having rapid deployment forces does not necessarily mean that we will use them. We intend for their existence to deter the very developments that would otherwise invoke their use.

We must always remember that no matter how capable or advanced our weapons systems, our military security

sions of this Council. It can remind all of us, now and in the future, of our solemn obligation to heed the judgments of this body and to preserve its central place in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Let us move together, in a manner that is clear and convincing, to demonstrate that the rule of law has meaning and that our machinery of peace has practical relevance. Let us protect, as we must, the basic process that permits nations to maintain civilized relations with one another.

Through the decision we urge on this Council, we together can hasten the day when this ordeal is resolved. And through our demonstrated commitment to the purposes of our charter, we will strengthen both the principles and the institutions that serve world peace and protect us all.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 461, DEC. 31, 1979

The Security Council,

Recalling its Resolution 457 (1979) of 4 December 1979,

Recalling also the appeal made by the President of the Security Council on 9 November 1979 (S/13616), which was reiterated on 27 November 1979 (S/13652),

Gravely concerned over the increasing tension between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America caused by the seizure and prolonged detention of persons of United States nationality who are being held as hostages in Iran in violation of international law, and which could have grave consequences for international peace and security,

Taking note of the letters from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran dated 13 November 1979 (S/13626) and 1 December 1979 (S/13671) relating to the grievances and statements of his Government on the situation,

Recalling also the letter dated 25 September 1979 from the Secretary-General (S/13646) stating that, in his opinion, the present crisis between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America poses a serious threat to international peace and security,

Taking into account the order of the International Court of Justice of 15 December 1979 calling on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure the immediate release, without any exception, of all persons of United States nationality, who are being held as hostages in Iran (S/13697) and also calling on the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure that no action is taken by them which will aggravate the tension between the two countries,

Further taking into account the report of the Secretary-General of 22 December 1979 on developments of the situation (S/13704),

Mindful of the obligation of States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered,

Conscious of the responsibility of States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

1. Reaffirms its Resolution 457 (1979) in all its aspects;

2. Deplores the continued detention of the hostages contrary to Security Council Resolution 457 (1979) and the order of the International Court of Justice of 15 December 1979 (S/13697);

3. Urgently calls, once again, on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to release immediately all persons of United States nationality being held as hostages in Iran, to provide them protection and to allow them to leave the country;

4. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to lend his good offices and to intensify his efforts with a view to assisting the Council to achieve the objectives called for in this resolution, and in this connexion takes note of his readiness to go personally to Iran;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on his good offices efforts before the Council meets again;

6. Decides to meet on 7 January 1980 in order to review the situation and in the event of non-compliance with this Resolution, to adopt effective measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter of the United Nations.

VOTE ON RESOLUTION 461, DEC. 31, 1979

For (11)
Bolivia, China, France, Gabon, Jamaica, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, U.K., U.S., Zambia.

Abstain (4)
Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Kuwait, U.S.S.R.

AMBASSADOR McHENRY, JAN. 13, 1980[2]

For the third time in the last 6 weeks, this Council meets to consider a dangerous violation of the principle of diplomatic inviolability—one that, in the words of the Secretary General, poses a serious threat to international peace and security.

After 70 days, the 50 personnel at the American Embassy, who were taken hostage by a lawless mob in Tehran, are still prisoners. We have yet to have a statement of opposition to their imprisonment from the Iranian authorities.

Those few outsiders who have seen the hostages briefly, during carefully orchestrated visits, report that the hostages are isolated, psychologically abused, and afforded an inadequate diet, despite assurances to the contrary. Some have suffered the humiliation of forced participation in propaganda broadcasts. Neutral observers are not permitted to visit them regularly to assess their condition or to minister to their needs. Even the Secretary General of the United Nations, the emissary of the world community, was barred from seeing the hostages.

The past 2 months have been marked by repeated calls for the release of the hostages from nearly every member of the international community. The Secretary General and many members of this Organization have devoted tireless efforts to promote a peaceful resolution of the present crisis. The broad international support we have received in our efforts to secure the release of the hostages has given encouragement to the American people in this difficult and trying period. On their behalf, I thank all who have worked so hard.

It might be useful to recall the measured steps which have brought us to the current situation.

On two separate occasions during November, the President of the Security Council, expressing the will of the members of the Council, appealed to Iran to release the hostages. But the hostages were not freed.

On December 4 of last year, this Council, by unanimous vote, urgently called on the Government of Iran to release immediately the personnel of the American Embassy who were being

held in Tehran, to provide them with protection, and to allow them to leave Iran. Still the hostages were not freed.

On December 15, the International Court of Justice gave the authority of the world's highest tribunal on international legal matters to the position set forth in the Council's resolution. The Court noted that ". . . there is no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of relations between States than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies. . . ." The Court ordered the Government of Iran to release the hostages immediately and to restore possession of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran to American authorities. Still the hostages were not freed.

On December 31, this Council, without dissent, adopted resolution 461, in which it deplored the continued detention of the hostages as contrary to the order of the International Court and its own prior resolution and urgently called once again on the Government of Iran to release immediately all U.S. nationals being held as hostages. In that resolution, the Council decided that it would adopt effective measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the U.N. Charter in the event that Iran did not comply with its mandate. And still the hostages have not been freed.

Five times the world community, acting through the duly constituted organs of the United Nations, has pleaded with the Government and people of Iran to conform to the precepts of international law and release the hostages. Five times our collective plea has fallen on deaf ears.

The International Court and the court of world opinion have demanded that Iran release the hostages in accordance with both the accepted norms of international behavior and its treaty obligations. Yet Iran continues to imprison diplomatic personnel as part of a campaign of terrorism and political blackmail by elements in Iran who have the support of Iranian authorities.

Resolution 461 is a decision of the Security Council adopted under chapter VII of the charter. The operative language of that resolution, including the Council's decision to adopt effective measures under articles 39 and 41 of the charter in the event of noncompliance with the resolution, continues in full force. Under article 25 and article 2, paragraph 2, of the charter, all members of the United Nations are obliged to accept that decision and to carry out its mandate.

Clearly Iran has not complied with the resolution and freed the hostages. The time has, therefore, come for the Security Council to adopt the effective measures against Iran under Articles 39 and 41 of the U.N. Charter that are required by paragraph 7 of resolution 461.

The members of the Council have before them the measures that my government proposes. Admittedly, they should not be taken lightly. But after 2 months of restraint by the American people and the world community, during which we have explored every possible avenue for a solution, we have failed to secure the release of the hostages and to restore the rule of international law.

Our deliberations this weekend exemplify the patience and good faith with which we have sought to resolve this crisis. The Council was originally scheduled to vote on these measures last Friday, January 11. In the hours before the meeting, various suggestions and reports from voices purporting to speak for Iran led some to believe progress toward release of the hostages was possible. They believed further clarification of Iran's position was necessary before proceeding to vote on sanctions.

Reluctantly the United States agreed to delay the vote—not because we saw any evidence of movement toward a solution but because we were, and are, prepared to explore every proposal that holds any realistic prospect of securing the release of the hostages. The Secretary General then sent an urgent message to Tehran, seeking clarification of the unwritten proposal which some thought they had heard Friday afternoon.

Last night the Secretary General received a letter, but the letter did not respond to the Secretary General's message. The letter does not mention the existence of the hostages or acknowledge the world's concern and responsibility for them. Even the most dexterous among us have had difficulty finding a clue in the letter that could encourage responsible governments to delay the vote on sanctions any longer.

The most that can be said for the letter is that, for the first time since last November, when Mr. Bani-Sadr resigned as Foreign Minister, Iran has sent a written message to the United Nations. Even so, Iran has now explicitly refused to abide by any pronouncements from the United Nations with which it does not agree—including, obviously, the demand for the immediate release of the hostages contained in resolution 461.

We delayed Friday's vote in order to explore any possible hope represented by Friday's suggestions and by this letter. To have gone ahead without doing so would have been irresponsible. But our efforts at clarification have come to a frustrating end. It would be even more irresponsible for us to delay any longer in discharging our obligations under Resolution 461 and the charter. Clearly the time to take effective measures has come.

When Secretary of State Vance addressed this Council on December 29, he said that: "As long as Iran remains indifferent to the voices of reason and mercy that have been raised from every corner of the world, as long as it refuses to recognize the common rules of international behavior, it must accept the consequences of its deliberate actions." The sanctions we propose will serve to demonstrate that Iran's continued defiance of international law will result in its increased isolation from the world community.

While the proposed sanctions constitute a meaningful and significant expression of the world's condemnation, they are yet a temperate response to Iranian intemperance. To adopt measures less stringent than those proposed in the resolution before the Council would be tantamount to adopting no measures at all. And to adopt no measures at all would both violate the binding mandate of paragraph 6 of resolution 461 and constitute an abdication of our obligation to search for peaceful

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Article 39 of the U.N. Charter

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 41 of the U.N. Charter

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

321	12/10	Vance: address at the Berlin Press Association (delivered by Assistant Secretary George Vest).
*322	12/12	Gerald B. Helman sworn in as Ambassador to the U.S. Mission to the European Office of the U.N. (biographic data).
*323	12/12	Itinerary of British Prime Minister Thatcher's visit to the U.S. Dec. 16–18.
*324	12/12	International and U.S. efforts to aid Kampuchean famine.
*325	12/13	U.S. Organization for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), study group 1, Jan. 10.
326	12/19	Communique of Special Meeting of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers, Dec. 12.
*327	12/19	CCIR study group 2, Jan. 23.
*328	12/19	CCIR study group 4, Jan. 16.
*329	12/20	Nancy Rawls sworn in as Ambassador to the Ivory Coast (biographic data).
*330	12/26	Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Advisory Committee.
*331	12/21	Vance: statement on the release of Peace Corps Volunteer Deborah Laff.
*332	12/28	Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, study group on International Child Abduction, Jan. 19.
*333	12/28	U.S. Organization for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), study group A, Jan. 23 and 24. ■

† Held for a later issue.
* Not printed in the BULLETIN.

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World Court Rules on American Hostages

Following are introductory remarks by the President of the International Court of Justice, Sir Humphrey Waldock, and the oral argument to the Court by the United States, on December 10, 1979, and the order of interim measures of protection issued by the Court on December 15, 1979, in the case United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran.

The oral argument was presented to the Court at The Hague by U.S. Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti and the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, Roberts B. Owen. The U.S. Government was represented by Roberts B. Owen, as Agent; Benjamin R. Civiletti and Stephen M. Schwebel, Deputy Legal Adviser of the State Department, as Counsel; and David H. Small, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the State Department, as Adviser. Mr. Civiletti was assisted by Jack Goldklang, Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Counsel of the Justice Department, and by Robert Smith, Special Assistant to the Attorney General.

Texts of the U.S. application to the Court instituting proceedings against Iran, its request for interim measures of protection, and a letter from Secretary of State Vance to the President of the Court were printed in the Department of State Bulletin *of January 1980, p. 37.*

PRESIDENT WALDOCK

The Court meets to consider the request for the indication of provisional measures, under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court, and Articles 73 and 74 of the Rules of Court, made by the Government of the United States of America, in the case concerning *United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran* brought by the United States of America against Iran.

The case was brought before the Court by an application filed in the Registry of the Court on 29 November 1979. In that application the U.S. Government claims to found the jurisdiction of the Court on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and Article I of the Optional Protocol thereto concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes; the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 and Article I of the Optional Protocol thereto concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes; Article XXI, paragraph 2, of a Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of 1955 between the United States of America and Iran; and Article 13, paragraph 1, of the Convention of 1973 on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents.

The United States then alleges a sequence of events beginning on 4 November 1979 in and around the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, involving invasion of the Embassy premises and the seizure and detention of U.S. diplomatic and consular staff. On the basis of these allegations, it formulates a number of legal claims and asks the Court to adjudge and declare that the Government of Iran, in tolerating, encouraging, and failing to prevent and punish the conduct described in the application, violated its international legal obligations to the United States under the provisions of a number of international treaties and conventions; that the Government of Iran is under a particular obligation immediately to secure the release of all U.S. nationals currently being detained and to assure that they are allowed to leave Iran safely; that the Government of Iran should pay reparation for the alleged violations of Iran's international legal obligations; and that the Government of Iran should submit to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution the persons responsible for the crimes committed against the premises and staff of the U.S. Embassy and Consulates.

On 29 November 1979, the day on which the application itself was filed, the United States of America submitted the present request for the indication of provisional measures. I now ask the Registrar to read from that request the statement of the measures which the United States asks the Court to indicate.

THE REGISTRAR

The Government of the United States of America requests that pending final judgment in this suit the Court indicate forthwith the following:

(i) that the Government of Iran immediately release all hostages of United States nationality and facilitate the prompt and safe departure from Iran of these persons and all other United States officials in dignified and humane circumstances;

(ii) that the Government of Iran immediately clear the premises of the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulate of all persons whose presence is not authorized by the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Iran, and restore the premises to United States control;

(iii) that the Government of Iran ensure that all persons attached to the United States Embassy and Consulate should be accorded, and protected in, full freedom within the Embassy and Chancery premises, and the freedom of movement within Iran necessary to carry out their diplomatic and consular functions;

(iv) that the Government of Iran not place on trial any person attached to the Embassy and Consulate of the United States and refrain from any action to implement any such trial;

(v) that the Government of Iran ensure that no action is taken which might prejudice the rights of the United States in respect of the carrying out of any decision which the Court may render on the merits, and in particular neither take nor permit action that would threaten the lives, safety, or well-being of the hostages.

. . . .

PRESIDENT WALDOCK

The Government of Iran has not appointed an Agent. On the other hand, by a letter telegraphed to the President and received in the Registry in the late evening of yesterday, 9 December 1979, the Government of Iran has informed the Court of its view that on various grounds the Court cannot and should not take cognizance of the case submitted to it by the U.S. Government, or indicate the provisional measures formulated in the Request. A copy of that letter was communicated immediately to the Agent of the United States of America. I shall therefore ask the Registrar now to read the text of that letter.

THE REGISTRAR

[*Translation from French*]

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the telegrams concerning the meeting of the International Court of Justice on 10 December 1979, at the request of the Government of the United States of America, and to submit to you below the position of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in this respect.

1. First of all, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran wishes to express its respect for the International Court of Justice, and for its distinguished members, for what they have achieved in the quest for just and equitable solutions to legal conflicts between States. However, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran considers that the Court cannot and should not take cognizance of the

case which the Government of the United States of America has submitted to it, and in a most significant fashion, a case confined to what is called the question of the "hostages of the American Embassy in Tehran".

2. For this question only represents a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem, one such that it cannot be studied separately, and which involves, *inter alia*, more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, the shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict with all international and humanitarian norms.

3. The problem involved in the conflict between Iran and the United States is thus not one of the interpretation and the application of the treaties upon which the American Application is based, but results from an overall situation containing much more fundamental and more complex elements. Consequently, the Court cannot examine the American Application divorced from its proper context, namely the whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States over the last 25 years. This dossier includes, *inter alia*, all the crimes perpetrated in Iran by the American Government, in particular the *coup d'état* of 1953 stirred up and carried out by the CIA, the overthrow of the lawful national government of Dr. Mossadegh, the restoration of the Shah and of his regime which was under the control of American interests, and all the social, economic, cultural, and political consequences of the direct interventions in our internal affairs, as well as grave, flagrant and continuous violations of all international norms, committed by the United States in Iran.

4. With regard to the request for provisional measures, as formulated by the United States, it in fact implies that the Court should have passed judgment on the actual substance of the case submitted to it, which the Court cannot do without breach of the norms governing its jurisdiction. Furthermore, since provisional measures are by definition intended to protect the interests of the parties, they cannot be unilateral, as they are in the request submitted by the American Government.

In conclusion, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran respectfully draws the attention of the Court to the deep-rootedness and the essential character of the Islamic revolution of Iran, a revolution of a whole oppressed nation against its oppressors and their masters; any examination of the numerous repercussions thereof is essentially and directly a matter within the national sovereignty of Iran.

I have the honour, etc.

Tehran, 9 December 1979

• • • •

MR. OWEN

I have the honor to appear before the Court today as Agent of the United States of America in support of the request of the United States for provisional measures of protection against the Government of Iran. Mr. President, in view of the extraordinary nature of the matter which is to be argued before the Court this afternoon, the President of the United States has requested the Attorney General of the United States to appear before the Court as Counsel in support of our request for provisional measures. With the Court's permission, therefore, I would like at this time to introduce to the Court the Attorney General, Mr. Benajmin R. Civiletti, who will commence the presentation on behalf of the United States.

MR. CIVILETTI

I appear today as Attorney General of the United States and advocate in support of its request for provisional measures of protection from illegal acts of the Government of Iran. I feel privileged to appear on behalf of my government. I should also say that the United States is grateful to the Court for providing a hearing at this time.

If I may be permitted a personal introduction. I have spent my working life as a trial lawyer in the United States. I have been an advocate both for the government and for those who oppose the government, in both civil and criminal suits. Anyone who has been a trial advocate in any country would approach this Court with respect and awe. In a real sense this Court represents the highest legal aspiration of civilized man.

Yet I find myself addressing this Court with awe but with restrained anger. More than 50 of my countrymen are held prisoners, in peril of their lives and suffering even as I speak. This imprisonment and this suffering are illegal and inhuman. It takes no advocate to bring this cause to you. The facts are known worldwide, and every citizen of the world—trained in the law or not—knows the conduct to be criminal.

I come to this Court, my government comes to this Court, not so that yet another body will reiterate the fact that what we are witnessing in Iran is illegal. The United States comes here so that this tribunal may demonstrate that international law may not be tossed aside, that the international fabric of civility may not be rent with impunity.

My government asks this Court to take the most vigorous and most speedy action it can not to settle a minor boundary dispute with regard to a small boundary, not to give to one national treasury from another, but to save lives and set human beings free. This is what people everywhere—not just monarchs and presidents, not just lawyers and jurists—expect of what a judge in my nation called the "omnipresence" that we know to be the law.

If I come to you with anger, I also come to you with urgency. We who speak the sober language of jurisprudence say the United States is seeking the "indication of provisional measures." What we are asking this Court for is the quickest possible action to end a barbaric captivity and to save human lives.

For the first time in modern diplomatic history, a state has not only acquiesced in, but participated in and is seeking political advantage from the illegal seizure and imprisonment of the diplomatic personnel of another state. It even threatens to put these diplomatic personnel on trial. If our international institutions, including this Court, should even appear to condone or tolerate the flagrant violations of customary international law, state practice, and explicit treaty commitments that are involved here, the result will be a serious blow not only to the safety of the American diplomatic persons now in captivity in Tehran, but to the rule of law within the international community.

To allow the illegal detention and trial of U.S. diplomatic personnel and other citizens to go forward during the pendency of this case would be to encourage other governments and individuals to believe that they may, with impunity, seize any Embassy and any diplomatic agent, or indeed any other hostage, anywhere in the world. Such conduct cannot be tolerated; every civilized government recognizes that. We therefore submit that this Court has a clear obligation to take every action to bring this conduct to an immediate end.

We shall this afternoon discuss the simple, clear issues presented in the following order. I shall review the applicable basic principles of international law which bind both Iran and the United States, not only under customary international law but also under four treaties to which both states are parties. These treaties are directly in point. Mr. Owen will then briefly summarize the facts to demonstrate to the Court that the Government of Iran has committed, is committing—and is proposing to commit—clear, flagrant violations of these principles of international law.

appropriate effects; and whereas by those telegrams the two governments were, in addition, informed that the Court would hold public hearings at an early date at which they might present their observations on the request for provisional measures, and that the projected date for such hearings was 10 December 1979, this date being later confirmed by further telegrams of 3 December 1979;

7. Whereas, in preparation for the hearings, the President put certain preliminary questions to the Agent of the United States Government by a telegram of 4 December 1979, a copy of which was communicated on the same date to the Government of Iran; whereas, in response to those questions the United States Agent on 7 December 1979 submitted to the Court a declaration by Mr. David D. Newsom, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, together with certain documents appended thereto; and whereas copies of that letter and the declaration and documents accompanying it were immediately transmitted to the Government of Iran;

8. Whereas on 9 December 1979 a letter, dated the same day and transmitted by telegram, was received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, which reads as follows: *[Translation from French]*

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the telegrams concerning the meeting of the International Court of Justice on 10 December 1979, at the request of the Government of the United States of America, and to submit to you below the position of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in this respect.

1. First of all, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran wishes to express its respect for the International Court of Justice, and for its distinguished members, for what they have achieved in the quest for just and equitable solutions to legal conflicts between States. However, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran considers that the Court cannot and should not take cognizance of the case which the Government of the United States of America has submitted to it, and in a most significant fashion, a case confined to what is called the question of the "hostages of the American Embassy in Tehran".

2. For this question only represents a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem, one such that it cannot be studied separately, and which involves, *inter alia*, more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, the shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict with all international and humanitarian norms.

3. The problem involved in the conflict between Iran and the United States is thus not one of the interpretation and the application of the treaties upon which the American Application is based, but results from an overall situation containing much more fundamental and more complex elements. Consequently, the Court cannot examine the American Application divorced from its proper context, namely the whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States over the last 25 years. This dossier includes, *inter alia*, all the crimes perpetrated in Iran by the American Government, in particular the *coup d'état* of 1953 stirred up and carried out by the CIA, the overthrow of the lawful national government of Dr. Mossadegh, the restoration of the Shah and of his régime which was under the control of American interests, and all the social, economic, cultural, and political consequences of the direct interventions in our internal affairs, as well as grave, flagrant and continuous violations of all international norms, committed by the United States in Iran.

4. With regard to the request for provisional measures, as formulated by the United States, it in fact implies that the Court should have passed judgment on the actual substance of the case submitted to it, which the Court cannot do without breach of the norms governing its jurisdiction. Furthermore, since provisional measures are by definition intended to protect the interests of the parties, they cannot be unilateral, as they are in the request submitted by the American Government.

In conclusion, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran respectfully draws the attention of the Court to the deep-rootedness and the essential character of the Islamic revolution of Iran, a revolution of a whole oppressed nation against its oppressors and their masters; any examination of the numerous repercussions thereof is a matter essentially and directly within the national sovereignty of Iran.

9. Whereas both the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Iran have been afforded an opportunity of presenting their observations on the request for the indication of provisional measures;

10. Whereas at the public hearing held on 10 December 1979 there were present in Court the Agent, counsel and adviser of the United States of America;

11. Having heard the oral observations on the request for provisional measures on behalf of the United States of America presented by the Honorable Roberts B. Owen, Agent, and the Honorable Benjamin R. Civiletti, Attorney-General of the United States, as counsel, and taking note of the replies given on behalf of that Government to further questions put at the conclusion of the hearing by the President of the Court and by two Members of the Court;

12. Having taken note that the final submissions of the United States of America filed in the Registry on 12 December 1979, following the hearing of 10 December 1979, were to the effect that the Government of the United States requests that the Court, pending final judgment in this case, indicate forthwith the following measures:

"First, that the Government of Iran immediately release all hostages of United States nationality and facilitate the prompt and safe departure from Iran of these persons and all other United States officials in dignified and humane circumstances.

Second, that the Government of Iran immediately clear the premises of the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulate in Tehran of all persons whose presence is not authorized by the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Iran, and restore the premises to United States control.

Third, that the Government of Iran ensure that, to the extent that the United States should choose, and Iran should agree, to the continued presence of United States diplomatic and consular personnel in Iran, all persons attached to the United States Embassy and Consulates should be accorded, and protected in, full freedom of movement, as well as the privileges and immunities to which they are entitled, necessary to carry out their diplomatic and consular functions.

Fourth, that the Government of Iran not place on trial any person attached to the Embassy and Consulates of the United States and refrain from any action to implement any such trial; and that the Government of Iran not detain or permit the detention of any such person in connection with any proceedings, whether of an 'international commission' or otherwise, and that any such person not be required to participate in any such proceeding.

Fifth, that the Government of Iran ensure that no action is taken which might prejudice the rights of the United States in respect of carrying out of any decision which the Court may render on the merits, and, in particular, neither take, nor permit, action that would threaten the lives, safety, or well-being of the hostages";

13. Noting that the Government of Iran was not represented at the hearing; and whereas the non-appearance of one of the States concerned cannot by itself constitute an obstacle to the indication of provisional measures;

14. Whereas the treaty provisions on which, in its Application and oral observations, the United States Government claims to found the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the present case are the following:

(i) the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, and Article 1 of its accompanying Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes;

(ii) the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, and Article 1 of its accompanying Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes;

(iii) Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of 1955 between the United States of America and Iran; and

(iv) Article 13, paragraph 1, of the Convention of 1973 on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents;

15. Whereas on the request for provisional measures in the present case the Court ought to indicate such measures only if the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear, *prima facie*, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded;

16. Whereas, so far as concerns the rights claimed by the United States of America with regard to the personnel and premises of its Embassy and Consulates in Iran, Article I of each of the two Protocols which accompany the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 on, respectively, Diplomatic and Consular Relations provides expressly that:

"Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol";

whereas the United Nations publication *Multilateral Treaties in respect of which the Secretary-General Performs Depositary Functions* lists both Iran and the United States as parties to each of the two Conventions, as also to each of their Protocols concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes, and in all cases without any reservation to the instrument in question;

17. Whereas, while it is true that Articles II and III of the above-mentioned Protocols provide for the possibility for the parties to agree, under certain conditions, to resort not to the International Court of Justice but to an arbitral tribunal or to a conciliation procedure, no such agreement was reached by the parties; and whereas the terms of Article I of the Optional Protocols provide in the clearest manner for the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in respect of any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of the above-mentioned Vienna Conventions;

18. Whereas, accordingly, it is manifest from the information before the Court and from the terms of Article I of each of the two Protocols that the provisions of these Articles furnish a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded with regard to the claims of the United States under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963;

19. Whereas, so far as concerns the rights claimed by the United States with regard to two of its nationals who, according to the declaration by Mr. David D. Newsom referred to in paragraph 7 above, are not personnel either of its diplomatic or of its consular mission, it appears from the statements of the United States Government that these two private individuals were seized and are detained as hostages within the premises of the United States Embassy or Consulate in Tehran; whereas it follows that the seizure and detention of these individuals also fall within the scope of the applicable provisions of the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 relating to the inviolability of the premises of Embassies and Consulates; whereas, furthermore, the seizure and detention of these individuals in the circumstances alleged by the United States clearly fall also within the scope of the provisions of Article 5 of the Vienna Convention of 1963 expressly providing that consular functions include the functions of protecting, assisting and safeguarding the interests of nationals; and whereas the purpose of these functions is precisely to enable the sending State, through its consulates, to ensure that its nationals are accorded the treatment due to them under the general rules of international law as aliens within the territory of the foreign State;

20. Whereas, accordingly, it is likewise manifest that Article I of the Protocols concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes which accompany the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 furnishes a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded with regard to the claims of the United States in respect of the two private individuals in question;

21. Whereas, therefore, the Court does not find it necessary for present purposes to enter into the question whether a basis for the exercise of its powers under Article 41 of the Statute might also be found under Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of 1955, and Article 13, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973.

22. Whereas, on the other hand, in the above-mentioned letter of 9 December 1979 the Government of Iran maintains that the Court cannot and should not take cognizance of the present case, for the reason that the question of the hostages forms only "a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem" involving the activities of the United States in Iran over a period of more than 25 years; and whereas it further maintains that any examination of the numerous repercussions of the Islamic revolution of Iran is essentially and directly a matter within the national sovereignty of Iran;

23. Whereas, however important, and however connected with the present case, the iniquities attributed to the United States Government by the Government of Iran in that letter may appear to be to the latter Government, the seizure of the United States Embassy and Consulates and the detention of internationally protected persons as hostages cannot, in the view of the Court, be regarded as something "secondary" or "marginal", having regard to the importance of the legal principles involved; whereas the Court notes in this regard that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has indeed referred to these occurrences as "a grave situation" posing "a serious threat to international peace and security" and that the Security Council in resolution 457 (1979) expressed itself as deeply concerned at the dangerous level of tension between the two States, which could have grave consequences for international peace and security;

24. Whereas, moreover, if the Iranian Government considers the alleged activities of the United States in Iran legally to have a close connection with the subject-matter of the United States Application, it remains open to that Government under the Court's Statute and Rules to present its own arguments to the Court regarding those activities either by way of defence in a Counter-Memorial or by way of a counter-claim filed under Article 80 of the Rules of Court; whereas, therefore, by not appearing in the present proceedings, the Government of Iran, by its own choice, deprives itself of the opportunity of developing its own arguments before the Court and of itself filing a request for the indication of provisional measures; and whereas no provision of the Statute or Rules contemplates that the Court should decline to take cognizance of one aspect of a dispute merely because that dispute has other aspects, however important;

25. Whereas it is no doubt true that the Islamic revolution of Iran is a matter "essentially and directly within the national sovereignty of Iran"; whereas however a dispute which concerns diplomatic and consular premises and the detention of internationally protected persons, and involves the interpretation or application of multilateral conventions codifying the international law governing diplomatic and consular relations, is one which by its very nature falls within international jurisdiction;

26. Whereas accordingly the two considerations advanced by the Government of Iran in its letter of 9 December 1979 cannot, in the view of the Court, be accepted as constituting any obstacle to the Court's taking cognizance of the case brought before it by the United States Application of 29 November 1979.

27. Whereas in that same letter of 9 December 1979 the Government of Iran also puts forward two considerations on the basis of which it contends that the Court ought not, in any event, to accede to the United States request for provisional measures in the present case;

28. Whereas, in the first place, it maintains that the request for provisional measures, as formulated by the United States, "in fact implies that the Court should have passed judgment on the actual substance of the case submitted to it"; whereas it is true that in the *Factory at Chorzów* case the Permanent Court of International Justice declined to indicate interim measures of protection on the ground that the request in that case was "designed to obtain an interim judgment in favour of a part of the claim" (*Order of 21 November 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 12*, at p. 10); whereas, however, the circumstances of that case were entirely different from those of the present one, and the request there sought to obtain from the Court a final judgment on part of a claim for a sum of money; whereas, moreover, a request for provisional measures must by its very nature relate to the substance of the case since, as Article 41 expressly states, their object is to preserve the respective rights of either party; and whereas in the present case the purpose of the United States request appears to be not to obtain a judgment, interim or final, on the merits of its claims but to preserve the substance of the rights which it claims *pendente lite;*

29. Whereas, in the second place, the Government of Iran takes the position that "since provisional measures are by definition intended to protect the interests of the parties they cannot be unilateral"; whereas, however, the hypothesis on which this proposition is based does not accord with the terms of Article 41 of the Statute which refer explicitly to "any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of *either* party"; whereas the whole concept of an indication of provisional measures, as Article 73 of the Rules recognizes, implies a request from one of the parties for measures to preserve its own rights against action by the other party calculated to prejudice those rights *pendente lite;* whereas it follows that a request for provisional measures is by its nature unilateral; and whereas the Government of Iran has not appeared before the Court in order to request the indication of provisional measures; whereas, however, the Court, as it has recognized in Article 75 of its Rules, must at all times be alert to protect the rights of

depends on the abilities, the training, and the dedication of the people who serve in our Armed Forces. I'm determined to recruit and to retain, under any foreseeable circumstances, an ample level of such skilled and experienced military personnel.

To sum up, the United States is taking strong action: first, to improve all aspects of our strategic forces, thus assuring our deterrent to nuclear war; second, to upgrade our forces in NATO and in the Pacific, as part of a common effort with our allies; third, to modernize our naval forces and keep them the best in the world; fourth, to strengthen our rapid deployment capabilities to meet our responsibilities outside NATO; and fifth, to maintain an effective force of highly trained military personnel.

Defense Budget

We must sustain these commitments in order to maintain peace and security in the 1980s. To insure that we press forward vigorously, I will submit for fiscal year 1981 a budget to increase funding authority for defense to more than $157 billion, a real growth of more than 5% over my request for fiscal year 1980. Just as in 1979 and in 1980, requested outlays for defense during fiscal year 1981 will grow by more than 3% in real terms, over the preceding year. We will sustain this effort.

My 5-year defense program provides a real funding increase that will average more than 4½% each year. I intend to carry out this program. With careful and efficient management, we should be able to do so within the budget increases I propose. If inflation increases or exceeds the projected rates that we now expect, I intend to adjust the defense budget as needed, just as has been done in 1980 fiscal year.

Much of this program which I've outlined to you will take 5 years or more to reach fruition. The imbalances it will correct have been caused by more than a decade of disparity. This cannot be remedied overnight, so we must be willing to see this program through. To insure that we do so, I'm setting a growth rate for defense that will be tolerable for our country over the long haul.

The most wasteful and self-defeating thing that we could do would be to start this necessary program, then alter it or cut it back after a year or two when such an action might become politically attractive. The defense program that I'm proposing for the next 5 years will require some sacrifice—but sacrifice that we can well afford. It will not increase at all the percentage of our gross national product devoted to defense, which will remain steady at almost exactly 5% per year.

We must have a long-range, balanced approach to the allocation of Federal expenditures. We will continue to meet such crucial needs, of course, as jobs and housing and education and health, but we must realize that a prerequisite to the enjoyment of such progress is to assure peace for our nation. So in asking congressional support for our defense efforts, I'm asking for consistent support, steadfast support—not just for 1980 or 1981 but until these commitments have been fulfilled.

Sustained American strength is the only possible basis for the wider, truly reciprocal detente which we seek with the Soviet Union. Only through strength can we create global political conditions hospitable to worldwide economic and political progress and to controlling both conventional and nuclear weapons.

SALT

As the strongest, most advanced country on Earth, we have a special obligation to seek security through arms control as well as through military power. So, I welcome the debate by the Senate in its consideration of the SALT II Treaty. It will enable us to build a clearer understanding that these efforts in both arms control and in defense are vital to our security and they are mutually compatible, one with another.

There are several reasons why SALT II will strengthen the military aspect of our national security.

First, we can better maintain strategic equivalence in nuclear weapons with SALT II. Without it, the Soviet Union can add more to the power of their own forces, widen any advantage that they may achieve in the early 1980s, and conceal from us what they are doing. For us, maintaining parity with these uncontrollable Soviet activities would add to our costs in time, money, and also uncertainty about our own safety.

Second, we can better maintain the combat efficiency and readiness of our non-nuclear forces with SALT II than we can without it. Whatever the level of the defense budget, more of it will have to go into strategic weapons, atomic weapons, if SALT II is not ratified.

Third, we can better strengthen the unity, resolve, and capability of the NATO alliance with SALT II than we can without it. That's why the heads of other NATO countries have urged strongly its ratification.

Fourth, we can better continue the SALT process, which has now been going on for more than 30 years—the process of negotiating further reductions in the world's nuclear arsenals, with SALT II than without it. Without SALT II and all its limits, its rules, and definitions in place, any agreement in SALT III would, at the very best, take many more years to achieve.

And **finally,** we can better control the proliferation of nuclear weapons among currently non-nuclear nations with SALT II than without it. This could be one of the most important factors involved in our pending decision on the SALT Treaty.

All of these issues are extremely important and they are intimately interrelated. A strong defense is a matter of simple common sense; so is SALT II.

I will do my utmost as President to keep America strong and to keep our nation secure, but this cannot be done without sustained effort and without some sacrifice, which our nation can certainly afford.

The best investment in defense is in weapons that will never have to be used and in soldiers who will never have to die. But the peace we enjoy is the fruit of our strength and our will to use this strength if we need to. As a great nation devoted to peace, we must and we will continue to build that American strength. ■

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[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 17, 1979.

Review of U.S. Policy in the 1980s

by Howard B. Schaffer

Address before the Foreign Policy Conference for Asian-Americans at Hunter College in New York City on December 1, 1979. Mr. Schaffer is Country Director for India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

During its now 203-year history, the United States has had a relationship with the countries of South Asia that differs in many ways from our involvement with the rest of Asia. China clippers and Yankee traders did not plough the waters of the Indian Ocean as they did those of the Pacific. We never involved ourselves directly in the political affairs of South Asia—there was no "Open Door" policy, no forced opening to the west, no colonial relationships. We fought no wars in the region. Until recently, South Asia was not a source of immigrant skills for our own economic development. Even our missionaries did not find South Asia as fruitful a ground as other regions.

Of course, we all remember that the beginning of our own history goes back to South Asia—Columbus was looking for a new route to India and found a new world instead. But the subcontinent was exactly half a world away from us. Throughout most of our history, this region of the world was dominated by one colonial power, thereby closing off the possibility for the development of closer ties between the United States and the nations of South Asia.

It was not until 1947 and the dawn of independence in South Asia that the United States began to search for its role in the region, to seek to define a relationship where none really had existed before.

But in the postwar world, America was a very different kind of country with global responsibilities. The way we looked at South Asia reflected in many ways the way we looked at the world as a whole. And just as our perception of the world has changed during the past three decades, so has the nature of our relationship with the countries of South Asia.

In the 1950s we tended to look at the nations of the region, as we did countries elsewhere, through the prism of the cold war, looking at any gain for our adversaries as a loss for us

In the 1960s our emphasis was on economic development. We were determined to do everything we could to promote the human development of the region and to enable it to serve as an alternative to the developmental models offered by the Communist world.

In the 1970s a number of developments in the region caused us to reassess our interests there. Many of our critics borrowed a phrase coined by one of our former American ambassadors to India and said that we were pursuing a policy of benign neglect. I do not believe this is true. But nevertheless, in the wake of Vietnam and our own reexamination of American interests and involvement around the world, it was inevitable that we should ask ourselves what kind of a relationship we should have with the nations of the subcontinent.

Principles of U.S. Policy

Today, as we face the beginning of the decade of the 1980s, I think we have a clear idea of what our policy should be. I would like to review with you some of the major principles that will govern our policy toward South Asia during the coming decade.

- The United States seeks equally good relations with all the nations of South Asia. We recognize as a fact of life that no matter what measuring stick one uses—GNP, population, military strength, political and economic influence—India is the most important power in the region. But our desire to pursue equally good relations with all of the countries in the region means that there will be no "tilt" in U.S. policy toward any country.
- We respect the nonalignment of the South Asian nations and expect others to do the same. Today, for the first time, all of the nations of the area are members of the nonaligned movement. Nonalignment in the true sense of the word is acceptable to us. We want to see a South Asia that is free of great power involvement and competition, a South Asia that is able to work out its own problems without fear of external manipulation or exploitation. For our part, we do not wish to dominate the region or any part of it, and we do not wish to see an external power play such a role. In this connection, we cannot help but look with great concern at the increased Soviet role in Afghanistan and the specter of external involvement in the region that this portends.
- We want to see a South Asia that continues along the path of economic development, that increasingly meets its own food needs, that betters the conditions for human development, and that seeks to alleviate chronic unemployment and underemployment.
- We want to see South Asian nations develop strong internal institutions, where the strength of the governments derive from the consent of the governed, and where the relationships between the governments and the people lead to internal stability and not instability.
- We want to see a South Asia where the nations of the region continue to improve their relations with each other, where they begin to look to the future and not to the past, and where they seek areas of cooperation based on their common heritage and interests.
- We want to see a South Asia that remains free of the peril of nuclear proliferation, not only because of our general desire for a halt to the spread of nuclear weapons but for the very real and specific dangers this would present to the stability and security of the region.

In pursuing these goals, we will help where we can, bearing in mind the wishes of the people of the region. But we must recognize that in the final analysis, it is the people of the region themselves—and especially their governments—who bear the responsibility for creating in reality what the people of South Asia have sought for generations—a just society, free from want and free from fear.

With this outline of our policy interests in South Asia as a backdrop, I would now like to describe a number of developments in the individual countries of the region, and relate them to those overall policy interests.

India

I believe we can take some satisfaction with the present state of affairs in South Asia, with the exception of the tragic situation in Afghanistan. Relations among most of the countries of the

resolutions to international disputes and uphold the fundamental principles of international law.

Some have urged that we not pursue sanctions because they may not result in the immediate release of the hostages, and may even harden Iranian intransigence.

We hope that sanctions will strengthen the voices of those in Iran who argue that the holding of diplomatic hostages is wrong and will result in Iran's increased isolation from the international community.

Failure to impose sanctions will confirm the belief of those in Iran who feel that they can act with impunity. The effect of our failure will, thus, be measured in a lessening of this Council's ability to deal effectively with international crises.

Others have urged that the Council set aside the question of sanctions in order to focus the world's attention on Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

That Soviet aggression in Afghanistan does not reduce our concern over the situation in Iran. On the contrary, it should heighten Iran's concern for its future as an independent nation. It should bring Iranians to a realization that they must rebuild their country quickly and prepare to defend their borders. It should make Iran aware of the danger posed by its isolation from the rest of the world community.

Once sanctions have been imposed, the key to ending this crisis and restoring its status as a fully participating member of the international community will lie with Iran. It has only to free the hostages and provide them with safe conduct until they can leave for home, and the sanctions will automatically expire. Iran can even avoid imposition of the sanctions altogether by releasing the hostages before the members of the United Nations complete the process of taking the necessary steps under their constitutions and laws to implement sanctions. Nothing will prejudice Iran's right to seek redress of its grievances, whether against the United States or its former rulers, in an appropriate international forum.

I remind the Council that this is not a bilateral quarrel but a confrontation between Iran and the entire international community. The continued viability of cherished and heretofore universally observed principles of international law is at stake. As the distinguished delegate from Nigeria, who served so ably on this Council during prior debates, said last month, diplomatic immunities and inviolability are so much a part of international law and custom that all nations that rely on and respect law have an obligation to defend them.

The members of this Council must now do what we can do, in the words of Secretary Vance, ". . . demonstrate that the rule of law has meaning and that our machinery of peace has practical relevance."

We must do what we can under the charter to defuse this most serious threat to peace and world order. That is the object and purpose of the collective security system. We must show Iran that the world is determined to see the hostages freed.

DRAFT RESOLUTION, JAN. 13, 1980

The Security Council,

Recalling its Resolutions 457 (1979) of 4 December 1979, and 461 (1979) of 31 December 1979,

Recalling also the appeal made by the President of the Security Council on 9 November 1979 (S/13616) which was reiterated on 27 November 1979 (S/13652),

Having taken note of the letters dated 13 November 1979 and 1 December 1979 concerning the grievances and views of Iran (S/13626 and S/13671, respectively),

Having taken into account the order of the International Court of Justice of 15 December 1979 calling on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure the immediate release, without any exception, of all persons of United States nationality, who are being held as hostages in Iran (S/13697) and also calling on the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure that no action is taken by them which will aggravate the tension between the two countries,

Further recalling the letter dated 25 November 1979 from the Secretary-General (S/13646) stating that, in his opinion, the present crisis between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America poses a serious threat to international peace and security,

Bearing in mind that adoption by the General Assembly by consensus on 17 December 1979 of a convention against the taking of hostages,

Mindful of the obligation of States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered and, to that end, to respect the decision of the Security Council,

Conscious of the responsibility of States to refrain in their international relations from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Affirming that the safe release and departure from Iran of all those being held hostage is an essential first step in resolving peacefully the issues between Iran and the United States and the other States Members of the international community,

Reiterating that once the hostages have been safely released, the Government of Iran and the United States of America should take steps to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them to their mutual satisfaction in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Further taking into account the report of the Secretary-General of 6 January 1980 (S/13730) made pursuant to Resolutions 457 (1979) of 4 December 1979 and 461 (1979) of 31 December 1979,

Bearing in mind that the continued detention of the hostages constitutes a continuing threat to international peace and security,

Acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Urgently calls, once again, on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to release immediately all persons of United States nationality being held as hostages in Iran, to provide them protection and to allow them to leave the country;

2. Decides that, until such time as the hostages are released and have safely departed from Iran, all States Members of the United Nations:

(a) Shall prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories, whether or not originating in their territories, to or destined for Iranian governmental entities in Iran or any other person or body in Iran, or to or destined for any other person or body for the purposes of any enterprise carried on in Iran, of all items, commodities, or products, except food, medicine, and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes;

(b) Shall prevent the shipment by vessel, aircraft, railway, or other land transport of their registration or owned by or under charter to their nationals, or the carriage whether or not in bond by land transport facilities across their territories of any of the items, commodities, and products covered by subparagraph (a) which are consigned to or destined for Iranian governmental entities or any person or body in Iran, or to any enterprise carried on in Iran;

(c) Shall not make available to the Iranian authorities or to any person in Iran or to any enterprise controlled by any Iranian governmental entity any new credits or

loans; shall not, with respect to such persons or enterprises, make available any new deposit facilities or allow substantial increases in existing non-dollar deposits or allow more favourable terms of payment than customarily used in international commercial transactions; and shall act in a businesslike manner in exercising any rights when payments due on existing credits or loans are not made on time and shall require any persons or entities within their jurisidction to do likewise;

(d) Shall prevent the shipment from their territories on vessels or aircraft registered in Iran of products and commodities covered by subparagraph (a) above;

(e) Shall reduce to a minimum the personnel of Iranian diplomatic missions accredited to them;

(f) Shall prevent their nationals, or firms located in their territories, from engaging in new service contracts in support of industrial projects in Iran, other than those concerned with medical care;

(g) Shall prevent their nationals or any person or body in their territories from engaging in any activity which evades or has the purpose of evading any of the decisions set out in this resolution;

3. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall give effect forthwith to the decisions set out in operative paragraph 2 of this resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of this resolution;

4. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to carry out these decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter;

5. Urges, having regard to the principles stated in Article 2 of the Charter, States not members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution;

6. Calls upon all other United Nations bodies and the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations and their Members to conform their relations with Iran to the terms of this resolution;

7. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations, and in particular those with primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, to assist effectively in the implementation of the measures called for by the present resolution;

8. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations or of the Specialized Agencies to report to the Secretary-General by 1 February 1980 on measures taken to implement the present resolution;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted not later than 1 March 1980.

VOTE ON DRAFT RESOLUTION, JAN. 13, 1980

For (10)
France, Jamaica, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Tunisia, U.K., U.S., Zambia.

Against (2)
German Democratic Republic, U.S.S.R.

Abstain (2)
Bangladesh, Mexico.

Not Participating (1)
China.

AMBASSADOR McHENRY, JAN. 13, 1980[3]

The Security Council has now completed its effort to discharge the legally binding obligation imposed on it by the passage of resolution 461/79 and to adopt effective measures against Iran under Articles 39 and 41 of the U.N. Charter. It has been prevented from doing so by the negative vote of the Soviet Union. Written by Lewis Carroll as pages out of Alice in Wonderland, the light becomes darkness. The victim becomes the criminal. Commitment to international law becomes a defense of anarchy. How extraordinary to hear from a nation that has just sent its armies and gauleiters into Afghanistan to describe our efforts to seek the freedom of 50 of our citizens held hostage by armed terrorists as interference in "the internal affairs" of Iran.

The Soviet vote is a cynical and irresponsible exercise of its veto power. The motive behind it is transparent. The Soviets hope that, by blocking sanctions, they can divert attention from their subjugation of Afghanistan and curry favor with the Government and people of Iran, who are among those most directly affected by the Afghan invasion.

But the Soviets hope in vain. The nations of the world, viewing this veto in tandem with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, cannot fail to note that Soviet tributes to the primacy of international law are purely rhetorical and that Soviet policy only conforms to international norms on a selective and self-serving basis.

And in Iran, even though chaos seems to reign, it should be apparent that the Soviet veto is an act of political expediency designed to buy Iranian silence on Afghanistan and Soviet advantage in the region.

By resolution 461, the Council undertook a binding obligation to adopt effective measures under article 25 of the charter; all member states are obliged to respect the provisions of resolution 461. A Soviet veto now attempts to block the membership from fulfilling that obligation.

The question then arises: what a member, bound by resolution 461, and acting in good faith, pursuant to its obligations under article 2, paragraph 2 of the charter, should do to implement it.

Most obviously, Iran remains bound immediately to release the hostages pursuant to resolution 461. But in addition to that paramount obligation, the membership of the United Nations at large remains obliged to review the situation and the event of Iran's noncompliance with it—an event which has come to pass—to take effective measures consistent with the charter to carry out that resolution.

My government has already instituted measures designed to exert economic pressure on Iran, as envisaged in the vetoed resolution. These measures will be applied firmly and vigorously until the hostages have been released. We urge all other members of the United Nations to join with us in the application of meaningful measures against the continued holding of the hostages in defiance of international law. Only thus will we demonstrate to Iran that their lawless actions are viewed with disfavor by all nations. The United States will, of course, welcome and cooperate with the continued good offices of the Secretary General and all members of the world community in seeking a solution to the present crisis. We sincerely hope that, despite the Soviet veto, our efforts will lead to the return of the hostages and the return to the rule of law in international affairs. ■

[1] USUN press release 155.
[2] USUN press release 6.
[3] USUN press release 7.

GEOGRAPHY

The continent of Africa covers 11,635,000 square miles—nearly one-fifth of the world's total land surface—an area which could contain all of the United States, Western Europe, and India. It is the second largest landmass in the world. Some of its countries, such as Sudan, Zaire, and Mali, approach one-third the size of the continental United States. The African Continent stretches 5,000 miles from north to south and 4,600 miles from east to west. Its 18,900-mile coastline looks out upon the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Of this vast continent, the region known as sub-Saharan Africa, of course, does not touch the Mediterranean and contains 2,322,625 fewer square miles than the rest of the continental landmass. Despite close ties between countries of north Africa and those of the Near East, there are some historic, economic, and cultural reasons to consider the continent more than a geographical entity.

In addition to the continent itself, a number of islands are also included under the rubric "Africa." With the exception of the Canary Islands and Reunion, all others are identified with sub-Saharan Africa. These include Madagascar, Cape Verde, Comoros, Seychelles, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Mauritius. The islands of Zanzibar and Pemba are now part of the United Republic of Tanzania.

Topography

Approximately four-fifths of the African Continent lie in the tropical latitudes. Its vast surface consists of a series of level or slightly undulating plateaus which fall away from a central area of high, cliff-like formations to low-lying coastal zones which average only 20 miles in width. The plateaus are 1,000 feet or higher, rising to 2,000 or 3,000 feet in southern and eastern Africa and to 5,000 feet in some areas.

Massive geologic changes in the plateaus have produced corrugations which are among the most conspicuous features of the African landscape: the Great Rift Valley of east Africa, one of the deepest fractures in the Earth's crust; Mt. Kilimanjaro, 19,565 feet and Mt. Kenya 17,058 feet above sea level in east Africa; and the volcanic peak of Mt. Cameroon in west Africa, 13,353 feet above sea level. These changes also produced Lake Chad in central Africa; the lakes of East Africa, including Africa's largest, Lake Victoria; and the continent's four major rivers: the Nile (4,000 miles long), the Zaire (3,000), the Niger (2,600), and the Zambezi (1,650). These rivers are, for the most part, broad and sluggish and have occasional rough cataracts and spectacular falls, such as Victoria.

In addition to its peaks and mountain ranges—the Atlas Mountains of the northwest, the highland belt of Ethiopia and eastern Africa, and the Drakensberg of South Africa—the continent contains the Sahara and Kalahari deserts, regions of heavy rainfall and lush forest vegetation, and, between desert and rain forest, grasslands (known as savannas), and savanna woodlands. Desert makes up nearly one-half of Africa's total area, while 40% contains the partly forested grasslands and 10% dense forests and thickets.

Climate

Since it lies astride the Equator, most of Africa has either a tropical or subtropical climate. Temperate climates are found, however, in the north close to the Mediterranean, along the southern and southwestern areas of the Cape of Good Hope, and on the higher parts of the inland plateaus. Air temperatures vary from hot in most parts of the continent to cold in the deserts (at night), on the plateaus, and in the mountains, where some peaks are permanently snowcapped.

Africa is divided into distinct climatic belts, allowing for the exceptions already noted. In one belt, which is bounded by the 5° line on each side of the Equator, there is a year-long hot and rainy climate, with some areas receiving as much as 100 inches of rain annually. From 5° to 15° on each side of the Equator the climate is warm, with heavy rainfall during the season when the sun is high. Deserts prevail in areas 15° to 30° from the Equator, areas where temperatures vary from very hot to very cold. Accumulated rainfall in these areas is less than 10 inches annually, and sometimes no measurable rainfall occurs for years. More than 30° from the Equator there are mild, rainy winters and warm, dry summers.

Africa's varied climate has not only affected vegetation, river conditions, and the incidence of disease, it has also helped determine patterns of settlement. Africans gravitated toward fertile lands, water, and areas suitable for grazing. Europeans, when they arrived, tended to settle near the coasts on the cool eastern and southern plateaus and the temperate regions of northern and southern Africa. Modern cities, having mostly evolved out of bastions of colonial administration and trade, dot the landscape of the continent.

African Highlights

Total area: 11,635,000 square miles (of which sub-Saharan Africa is 9,312,375 square miles)

Valleys: Great Rift Valley of East Africa – one of the deepest fractures in the Earth's crust

Mountains: Mt. Kilimanjaro, 19,565 feet, and Mt. Kenya, 17,058 feet, above sea level

Lakes: Lake Victoria—Africa's largest lake with 26,828 square miles (compare with Lake Superior, North America's largest lake, 31,700 square miles)

Rivers: the Nile (4,000 miles long), Zaire (3,000 miles), Niger (2,600 miles), and Zambezi (1,650 miles)

Deserts: the Sahara and Kalahari—all deserts comprise about 50% of the continent's total area

Partly forested grasslands: 40% of Africa's total area

Dense forests and thickets: 10% of total area

Climate: mainly tropical or subtropical

Population: estimated at more than 400 million

Population growth rate: 2.9%

Independence: since 1945, 45 nations gained independence

HISTORY

Credence to the theory of man's African origin has been provided by the research and diggings of renowned anthropologists in eastern, southern, and western Africa. Remains of a forerunner of modern man—Australopithecus—and other creatures with hominoid characteristics, such as Homo erectus and Homo habilis, have been unearthed in various parts of the continent. Some are thought to be over 2½ million years old.

Further evidence of the evolution of primitive people throughout the Paleolithic (unpolished Stone Age—1 million-16,000 years B.C.) has been discovered, including remains of Neanderthal man dating back to around 40,000 B.C. Traces of his continued development down through the Mesolithic, Neolithic (polished Stone Age), Bronze, and Iron Ages have been found in several regions of Africa.

Some scholars believe that primitive African people expanded to neighboring continents midway through the Paleothithic Age. Meanwhile, in Africa they were dividing into three main races—Negroid, Bushmanoid, and Pygmoid. Near the end of the Paleolithic period Caucasoid people from the Mediterranean region moved into northeast Africa. Somewhat later, a fifth racial group, the Mongoloid, touched the coast and islands of east Africa.

Of the indigenous Africans, the Negroid became dominant, learning first to hunt and forage, later to domesticate animals, and finally to develop agricultural communities. In a millenium before and a millenium after Christ, descendants (known by linguistic classification as Niger-Congo or Nigritic) expanded to control much of the southern half of Africa. A major subgroup, speaking the Bantu language, spearheaded migration to the east and south, overrunning and nearly eliminating the Pygmoid and Bushmanoid peoples in the process.

Meanwhile, additional Caucasoid groups, during several centuries B.C. and A.D., were moving into north and northeast Africa, in some instances replacing earlier Caucasoids or in other cases pushing back Niger-Congo (Nigritic) groups. During the 7th to 10th centuries, Bedouins spread Islamic influence across north Africa, while from the 10th to the 18th century other Moslems continued to settle in east Africa from the Horn southward to Zimbabwe.

As groups spread and then consolidated, sophisticated societies developed. Artifacts, dating to the 10th century, attest to the organization of their civilizations. Starting with Kush (Ethiopian plateau—1st to 3rd centuries), "Sudanic" kingdoms developed for over 1,000 years—ancient Ghana, Kamen, Mali, Songhai, the Hausa states. The kingdoms of the Congo—Kongo, Lunda, and



Kingdoms and Empires
1450 B.C. - A.D. 1800

3629 2-80 STATE(RGE)

© National Geographic Society, 1980.

Penetration of Islam

Moslems predominate

Moslems form significant minority

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

social services from reaching isolated rural people and prevent food from reaching markets and food deficit areas. There is a lack of research and extension services. Inadequate attention is focused on the role of women, who are the main agricultural workers, both in production and marketing. Poor rainfall and soil conditions exist in many parts of the continent. Inappropriate domestic policies in many countries hold down the price of agricultural goods in order to provide, in effect, subsidies to the politically more important urban populations. There are other factors including lack of farmer credit and lack of adequate fertilizer.

Desertification and Deforestration

Fifty-two percent of Africa's land is desert or is threatened by desertification. This compares with 4% in Asia and 1% in Latin America. In part this results from climatic changes and other natural phenonema, such as in the Sahel and sections of Ethiopia and Kenya. However, part of the tragedy is manmade. Since the beginning of this century 100 million hectares have been taken out of forests and put to other uses. When many trees are stripped off the land so quickly, it leads to lower water tables, erosion, and floods. Wood becomes more scarce, thus firewood becomes difficult to obtain, a hardship for rural people who depend on it as their main source of local energy.

Energy

Despite oil production in some parts of Africa, many developing countries suffer from energy shortages. They are squeezed between increasing requirements and skyrocketing energy prices. Increased petroleum costs have sharply raised the price of fertilizer which is vital to African rural economy. They have also slowed African industrialization, made it expensive to pump water, and costly to transport goods to markets. Hydroelectric dams, such as the Volta, Inga, and Aswan dams, have helped somewhat but so far cannot meet the demands, in part because power lines are not available or practical.

Trade

In addition to the export of minerals, Africans rely on the sale of primary natural products (agricultural, timber, etc.) for their national incomes. Because many depend on a single export product, they are vulnerable to world price fluctuations cited earlier. Current increases in oil prices, of course, greatly benefit Nigeria, Angola, Zaire, and Gabon at the moment, and potentially Congo and Madagascar in the future.

With certain exceptions, African nations trade relatively little with each other. In fact, the African infrastructure of transportation and communications, inherited from colonial days, links capitals more directly to Western Europe than to one another, thus limiting commercial cooperation among African states. The low volume of inter-African trade also results from the fact that African nations export a relatively limited range of products, many of which are mutually competitive. A few promising regional projects now cut across former colonial borders and are designed to reduce dependence on consumer goods and manufactured products imported from outside the region.

Employment

Important to some African countries with large populations is the effort to increase employment in industry. Labor intensive industries are critical because African exports depend very heavily at the present time on commodities. Mineral extraction, processing, and exportation provide many jobs and are a major source of revenue for a number of countries. Unfortunately, fluctuations in world mineral prices often benefit the rich (gold from South Africa) and sometimes hurt the poor, for example, when Zambia and Zaire suffered a few years ago from a temporary decline in copper prices.



Health

Health is a serious problem. Although Africa's primary need in this field is preventive medicine, many of the medical facilities provided during the colonial period—hospitals and urban dispensaries—were designed for curative purposes. Africa, nevertheless, has long been an important center for the study of tropical medicine, including parasitic diseases. The great epidemics which once took such a toll of African life are being controlled and in some cases eliminated.

Much, however, needs to be done. Life expectancy averages 43 years, compared with 53 years in the entire developing world and 71 years in the United States. Infant and child mortality remains particularly high. The ratio of medical personnel to population in Africa is very low; water supply and sanitation facilities remain widely inadequate.

Education

Africa is also wrestling with monumental problems in education. Illiteracy is estimated at an average 80% across the continent. Costs are staggering—some countries devote more than one-third of their budgets to education in an effort to increase instruction at all levels and to meet increases in population. There is also the desire to modify the European educational models inherited from the colonial period by adding courses which reflect African traditions, culture, and history.

Most countries are endeavoring to expand their vocational and technical schools. They are also attempting to provide better teacher training facilities to staff secondary schools which still often depend on non-African teachers. In these efforts, they face a dilemma—knowing that better educated citizens will facilitate nation-building but at the same time finding that national economies are often unable to fully absorb secondary school and college graduates.

African universities and secondary schools have their share of student unrest. Part of the unrest is directed toward student grievances, such as housing and student desire for more participation in school administration and choice of curriculum. Another part reflects grievances concerned with national, political, and economic problems.

Population Growth

Population and urbanization growth rates are the highest in the world—2.9% and 11% respectively. Furthermore, growth rates appear to be accelerating. Efforts to control population increases, which impact adversely on already poor societies, are inhibited by religious resistance and traditional African belief in the importance of the large extended family.

Development

In attempting to arrest its economic decline and counter such adverse indicators as stagnant food production, growing populations, and declining per capita income, Africa must have foreign assistance. Even in countries such as Nigeria, which has benefited from higher oil prices and large oil exports, there are extensive pockets of poverty. Many developed countries have responded through both bilateral and multilateral programs to African needs, although seldom at levels which satisfy the impoverished or produce dramatic improvements in national economies.

While total official development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa has increased modestly each year, in effect the amounts have barely kept even with inflation, particularly in some countries

COUNTRY		LAND		PEOPLE										
				Population				Culture			Education		Labor Force	
Familiar Name Official Name *(Earlier Name)*[2]	**Capital**	**Total Sq. Mi.**	**% in Agriculture**	**Total (mil)**	**Growth Rate (%)**	**Density per Sq. Mi.**	**Life Expectancy (yrs.)**	**Ethnic Groups (%)**	**Religion (%)**	**Language**	**Literacy (%)**	**Primary Students (% of age group[3])**	**% in Agr.**	**% in Industry, Service, & Commerce**
Madagascar Democratic Republic of Madagascar *(Malagasy Republic)*	Antananarivo	228,000	na	9.1	2.6	37	44	18 Malagasy Groups Comoran French Orientals	Christian animist	Malagasy French	40.0	80.0	90.0	Ind 2.0
Malawi Republic of Malawi *(Nyasaland Protectorate)*	Lilongwe	45,747	30.0	5.9	2.9	129	42	Chewas Njanja Lomwe Yao	Traditional Christian Moslem	Chichewa English	25.0	61.0	90.0	Ind 10.0
Mali Republic of Mali *(French Soudan)*	Bamako	464,873	na	6.5	2.7	5.1	38	Mandé 50.0 Peul 17.0 Voltaic 12.0 Other 21.0	Moslem 90.0 Traditional 9.0 Christian 1.0	French Bambara	5.0	15.0	80.0	Ind 1.0 S. :v 19.0
Mauritania Islamic Republic of Mauritania *(Mauritania)*	Nouakchott	419,229	na	1.42	2.1	3	39	Arab-Berber 33.0 Arab-Berber Negroid 33.0 Negroid 33.0	Moslem	Hasanya-Arabic French Toucouleur	12.0	16.0	88.0	na
Mauritius Mauritius	Port Louis	720	60.0	.9	1.3	1,238	66	Indo-Mauritian 67.0 Creoles 28.0 Sino-Mauritian 3.0 Franco-Mauritian 2.0	Hindu Moslem Catholic Protestant	English French Creole Hindi	61.0	na	28.9	28.0
Mozambique People's Republic of Mozambique *(Mozambique)*	Maputo	303,769	30.0	9.6–10.4	2.2	29	44	Makua Tsonga Other Bantu Europeans	animist 65.0 Christian 22.0 Moslem 11.0 Other 20.0	Portuguese, Local English	20.0	52.0	80.0	Ind 5.0
Namibia *(South West Africa —former name)*	Windhoek	318,261	30.0	.92	4.1	2.9	na	Africans 88.0 Mixed-European 12.0	Christian 50.0 animist	Afrikaans English German Local	Wh* 80.0 NWh 28.0		60.0	Ind 4.0
Niger Republic of Niger *(Niger)*	Niamey	490,000	na	5-6	2.8	8.1	39	Hausa 50.0 Djerma 23.0 Fulani 15.0 Taureg 12.0	Moslem animist Christian	French Hausa Djerma	6.0	17.0	90.0	na
Nigeria Federal Republic of Nigeria *(Nigeria)*	Lagos	357,000	40.0	79.8	2.5	224	41	Hausa-Fulani Ibo Yoruba	Moslem 47.0 Christian 34.0 animist 19.0	English Hausa Ibo Yoruba	25.0	49.0	75.0	10.0
Rwanda Republic of Rwanda	Kigali	10,169	39.0	4.2	2.17	400	44	Hutu 89.0 Tutsi 10.0 Twa 1.0	animist Christian Moslem	French Kinyar-Wanda	25.0	37.0	95.0	Ind 5.0

* Wh = white; NWh = nonwhite

ECONOMY												GOVERNMENT			COUNTRY[5]
Gross Domestic Product			Distribution of GDP			Trade									
						Imports		Exports			U.S. Econ. Assistance FY 1979 ($ mil)				
Annual ($ bil.)	Growth Rate (%)	Per Capita ($US)	% From Agr.	% From Ind.	% From Serv.	Total ($ mil)	From U.S. ($ mil)	Total ($ mil)	To U.S. ($ mil)	Leading Exports		Type	Date Independence	Chief of State and/or Head of Govt.	
1.74	1.0	208	29.0	20.0	51.0	282	6	278	59	Coffee Cloves Vanilla	2.1	Republic	6/29/60	Pres—Cdr. D. Ratsiraka	**Madgascar**
1.08	6.4	183	45.0	22.0	33.0	344.3	4.3	183	10.7	Tobacco Tea Ground Nuts Sugar	3.5	Republic	7/6/64	Pres—Dr. H. K. Banda	**Malawi**
.94	5.0	140	38.0	17.0	45.0	211	3.5	84	na	Meat Cotton Fish Peanuts	17.4	Republic	9/22/60	Pres—B. Gen. M. Traore	**Mali**
.52	−.60	376	35.0	37.0	28.0	283	na	161	na	Iron Gypsum Fish	7.1	Military Republic	11/28/60	Pres.— ' t. Col. Ould Haidala	**Mauritania**
.45	10.0	680	na	na	na	306	15.40	310	15.60	Sugar Tea Tobacco	3.3	Parl. Dem. Under Const. Monarch	3/12/68	Chief of State— Queen Elizabeth PM—Sir S. Ramgoolam	**Mauritius**
1.6	0.0	170	45.0	15	40.0	635	20	150	39	Cashew Cotton Veg. Oil Tea	13.7	People's Republic	6/25/75	Pres—S. M. Machel	**Mozambique**
1.2-1.4	0.0	Wh* 6,800 NWh 816	na	na		265	10	530	5	Copper Uranium Diamonds Cattle	0	Interna-tional Territory	Pending	South Africa—Illegal Administrator	**Namibia**
.711	8.0	142	47.0	24	29.0	317.9	na	307.7	na	Uranium Livestock Cowpeas	9.6	Republic	8/3/60	Pres—Col. Seyni Kountché	**Niger**
42.7	2.9	522.6	23.0	50	27.0	12,452	985	10,347	3,981	Petroleum Cocoa Tin Coal	0	Federal Repub-lic	10/1/60	Pres—Alhaji Shehu Shagari	**Nigeria**
.62	5-6.0	106	52.0	22	26.0	105.4	na	106	na	Coffee Cassiterite Tea Pyrethrum	0	Republic	7/1/62	Pres—Maj. Gen. J. Habyarimana	**Rwanda**

*Wh= white; NWh= nonwhite

Interview for NBC News

Following is an interview President Carter held in the Oval Office with John Chancellor of NBC News on January 7, 1980, portions of which were broadcast during the week.[1]

Q. I was wondering about aid—military aid—to Pakistan.

A. Yes. This is a commitment that I am ready to make. We have already assured President Zia, who's the leader of Pakistan, directly with a telephone communication from me the day—very shortly after the invasion, and since then through emissaries, that we're willing to join other nations in giving necessary protection to Pakistan and meet their legitimate defensive military needs. This is not a threat to India, an adjacent country, but it's an ability for Pakistan to repel invasion if it should occur and particularly to let Pakistan be known as a strong nation able to protect itself, so that a possible invasion will be prevented.

Q. Have there been any specific communications within the last 18 hours on this between yourself and General Zia or the two governments involved?

A. Through diplomatic emissaries, yes; not directly between me and Zia.

Q. Are you able to expand on that, about the amount of aid or how it would be delivered or what it would be?

A. No. There are three factors that have to be considered. One is the degree to which other nations will join in with us in providing economic and military aid; secondly, the amount of aid and the specific form of it that the Pakistanis would like to have; and thirdly, of course, I'll have to go to the Congress to get authorization to provide the American portion of the aid that's decided to be given to Pakistan.

Q. Can you tell us what other countries might also be supplying aid to Pakistan?

A. I think it would be better to let them speak for themselves.

Q. Would they be Western, industrialized countries?

A. Yes, mostly, and also some of the Mideast countries perhaps, which have the wealth and the ability to help to finance part of the aid.

Q. So you're really putting together a package of aid for Pakistan.

A. Yes. Some people call it a consortium. I don't want to predict at this point what other nations might do, because the evolution of this so-called consortium is still in the embryonic stage, but we want to accommodate Pakistan's needs. And obviously, with our complete absence, some of the regional countries are obviously consulting with one another and will help themselves individually.

Q. Somalia, Oman, and Kenya have offered us the use of naval and air facilities. Will the United States accept any of those offers?

A. Yes, we're considering the use of some of those facilities. We don't have any definite agreement yet, but that's the kind of thing that I think is important to our Nation to prepare for the long-range meeting of any threat to the peace in the Mideast-Persian Gulf-northern Indian Ocean area.

Q. As a journalist it sometimes seems to me as though the Soviet Union, which will become a net importer of petroleum during the 1980s, is really going for the Persian Gulf. They're trying to control that part of the world. Is that your view?

A. I think that's one of the factors that we believe is extant. No one can know what the Soviets' plans might be, but I think we've got to be prepared for that eventuality, and the best way to prepare for it is to prevent its occurrence. The arousing of world opinion to recognize the threat that the Soviets project to that area of the world is an important first step, particularly the marshaling of common condemnation of the Soviets for what they've already done. The strengthening of countries in the area that might be threatened, so that they can repel any potential invasion, is another very important element. And I think the third thing is to make sure that our own country realizes that we've got a long-range commitment to be made and that the responsibility and the sacrifice economically to prepare for it must be shared by all of us.

One of the important elements involved in the question you asked is the Soviets' need to produce more of their oil and gas. High technology is an element of that. And the punitive aspects of a partial trade embargo against the Soviet Union for those very valuable items is a cautionary message to the Soviet Union that I think they are perfectly able to read and must read.

Q. Could I ask you about Iran, and where we stand now in terms of the hostages?

A. We've always had a few basic principles to guide me since I've been involved in meeting this absolutely illegal and abhorrent act. One is to protect the long-range interests of our country; secondly, to protect the lives and the well-being of the hostages; third, to seek their release; fourth, to avoid bloodshed if possible, but still to protect our interests if necessary; and lastly, to make sure that a strong majority of the nations of the world understand that Iran is a criminal actor in this process and that we are the aggrieved party, and to keep world support for our position.

We've had four votes in the U.N. Security Council. We've not had a negative vote yet; we've only had four abstentions. When we took our case to the International Court of Justice, the vote was 15 to nothing in favor of our position.

And I think that Iran must realize—there are some responsible people in Iran—and the world must realize that Iran is at this moment involved in a criminal act, a terrorist act. And it's not a matter of negotiating on a diplomatic basis between two nations. This is a matter of condemning Iran for international terrorism and for kidnaping. And I think those purposes that I've described are and will be our basic principles until those hostages are home safe.

Q. If some Americans are put on trial in "show trials," what would your reaction be to that?

A. I would rather not give specifics, but we are prepared to take action that would be quite serious in its consequences for Iran.

Q. And I can't draw any further details on that out of you today?

A. No, I don't think it would be good to go into details. ■

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[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 14, 1980.

Hostages in Iran, Invasion of Afghanistan

Following are remarks by the President made at a White House briefing for Members of Congress on January 8, 1980.[1]

Tonight I'd like to take a few minutes to explain to you two basic and serious problems that we've now been addressing—one of them since the 4th of November, the other one, just Christmas Eve.

Hostages in Iran

I don't recall in history a time, at least in modern history, when our nation was at peace that it was so deeply concerned as it has been the last 2 months since American hostages were kidnaped in our own Embassy in Tehran on November 4. I need not go into the details on that incident, because you're thoroughly familiar with them. But I will outline very quickly the basic principles that have guided me the last 2 months, and then at the end of my brief comments, I'll be glad to have questions from any of you.

This has not been a good 2 months. It's been a time of strain and trial. It's been a time of intimate negotiations with many foreign leaders, trying to accomplish the basic goals that we have followed since the beginning of this confrontation with the terrorists or kidnapers in Tehran.

Our first commitment has been to protect the interests of our Nation, the long-run, long-range interests; secondly, to do what we can to insure the lives and the safety of the American hostages—our 50 fellow countrymen; third, to secure through diplomatic means, using every possible channel, their release—unharmed, if God be willing; fourth, to avoid bloodshed, which would very likely lead to the death of our hostages; and fifth and most difficult, to maintain support for the American position by the vast majority of nations on Earth.

This has not been an easy last task, because historically in the United Nations and other international fora, our country has not been a favorite, because we are powerful and a superpower and because there is a jealousy and animosity at times and distrust toward us.

We've now had four votes in the Security Council, as you know. We've not yet experienced a negative vote. On the last vote to set a deadline for the imposition of sanctions and to call for the Secretary General's trip to Iran, there were four abstentions—the Soviet Union and their puppet, Czechoslovakia, and two small Moslem nations, Bangladesh and Kuwait. The other 11 nations voted to send the Secretary General to Iran for a last effort to negotiate the release of the hostages, at the end of which time the Security Council would come back and take action on possible economic sanctions.

In the International Court of Justice, the vote was 15 to 0—a unanimous vote.

So far then, we have accomplished all the goals that we set for ourselves except the release of the hostages, and we are still exploring every possible avenue for that release.

The most difficult part of the Iranian question is that there's no government entity with whom we can communicate or negotiate or register a complaint or a request. When the Secretary General went over to Iran, he came back and reported the same thing that we had already known, and that is that the most powerful single political entity in Iran consists of the international terrorists or the kidnapers who are holding our hostages. Whenever there has been a showdown concerning the hostages between Khomeini or the Revolutionary Council versus the terrorists, the terrorists have always prevailed.

We don't know what will happen in the future, but I think you possibly recognize that this small group of people—who may originally have comprised some students, but who are not students and should not be referred to as students—have achieved, with the holding of American hostages, a great and significant political influence in Iran. They don't necessarily have as one of their prime interests the integrity of Iran as a nation or the well-being of the Iranian people or even the security of the country within which they live. And so there is no legitimate political bargaining leverage that can be exerted on them, and there is no entity there with whom one can negotiate.

They know that the consequences to Iran will be quite severe if our hostages are injured or killed, and I think only the presence of a very strong military force in the Arabian Sea has deterred them so far from taking action that would have been even more abhorrent to the rest of the world. That problem persists. It's an ever-present consideration of mine and yours. And I'm determined that this country will not forget for a moment those hostages. And the last hostage there is just as important to me as the first one.

Our country is remarkably unified. I've had strong support, which I deeply appreciate, and the American people have been surprisingly patient, which, as you know, is not a characteristic of Americans. But I think most people who've studied the situation, who've looked at the map, who've seen where the Embassy is located within Tehran, can see that a strike force or a military action that might be oriented toward the release of the hostages would almost certainly end in failure and almost certainly end in the death of the hostages.

They are being held in small groups—two or perhaps three in a group—with heavily armed militants constantly guarding them and the hostages constantly being tied, with their hands bound at all times.

We'll continue to persist. Our next step will be in the United Nations to have sanctions imposed against Iran. I cannot predict to you that the imposition of those sanctions—if we get the nine requisite votes—will cause an early release of the hostages. We pray that something will happen and that eventually Iran will recognize that the threat to them is not from the United States but even more vividly from the Soviet Union, which has, on Christmas Eve, invaded Afghanistan.

Invasion of Afghanistan

In my own opinion, shared by many of the world's leaders with whom I have discussed this matter, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War. It's a sharp escalation in the aggressive history of the Soviet Union.

Obviously, we all were shocked and deplored publicly and officially the Soviet action in Hungary and then later, in 1968, in Czechoslovakia. Those were two countries which, since the Second World War, were basically subservient to the Soviet Union; they were

Department of State
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

AFRICA / 1

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

Dogon cliff dwellings (Museum of African Art, Eliot Elisofon Archives)

Bushong—somewhat similar in government and organization to the "Sudanic" states, appear to have been founded in the 14th century. The city-states of the Guinea Coast—Ife, Benin, Yoruba—date at least to the 15th century. These states were highly organized and engaged in long-distance trade in salt, gold, cattle, horses, and ivory.

Early in the 15th century Portuguese navigators undertook voyages of exploration that initiated a gradual buildup of African trade relations with Europe and the Americas, leading eventually to Christian missionary contact with Africa. During the 16th and 17th centuries the Dutch, British, French, Spanish, and Arabs increased their trade with Africa. Slaves became an important commodity, although this trade had existed for centuries before with various Arab countries. No reliable figures exist as to the extent of the slave trade, but estimates range from 10 to 30 million people sold into slavery. At that time, a fringe of trading posts and maritime stations was established on the Atlantic and Indian Ocean coasts, but the interior of the continent remained unknown to most non-Africans.

Colonial Period

The 18th and early 19th centuries saw extensive European exploration, religious proselytizing, and ultimate colonialization of much of Africa. Missionaries, traders, and adventurers penetrated into the heart of the continent. These were the years of Mungo Park, Savorgnan de Brazza, Rene Caille, H.M. Stanley, Sir Richard Burton, and David Livingstone. They were followed later, especially after 1880, by government officials extending inland their colonial domains.

Once the main dimensions of Africa's inner geography and resources were revealed, a scramble for colonial territory took place. Although until 1879 only a small part of the African Continent was under foreign rule, by 1900 all but two of the present 47 countries (45 independent states) of sub-Saharan Africa were subject to European control. These exceptions were Liberia, settled by freed American slaves in the 1820s, and the ancient Empire of Ethiopia. The remainder of Africa had been claimed and placed under one form of control or another by France, Great Britain, Portugal, Belgium, Spain, Germany, and Italy. For the next half-century, Europeans themselves settled in various areas of the continent, traded, extracted minerals, and established governments reflecting the different policies and institutions of the colonial metropoles.

Independence

Many factors helped to create a climate in which most of the European-ruled colonies in Africa eventually became independent: the growth of African nationalist movements; the participation of Africans in World Wars I and II; the Atlantic Charter of 1941 proclaiming the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they would live; and changing interests and ideas in Europe regarding the efficacy of empire, including its economic implications.

With the exception of South Africa, which had become an independent union with dominion status within the British Commonwealth in 1910, and the Sudan (separated from Egypt in 1956), the wave of actual independence did not begin until 1957. Led by Nkrumah of the Gold Coast, Kenyatta of Kenya, and Sekou Toure of Guinea, a host of sub-Saharan countries in rapid succession broke ties with their colonial rulers. Thus, since 1957, 41 nations have joined the four already independent (Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan, South Africa) with two more (Zimbabwe and Namibia) poised on the threshold of independence.

Africa's political evolution during the past two decades has been tumultuous, with nearly two-thirds of the countries undergoing nonconstitutional changes in leadership and forms of government. Dozens of coups have toppled not only early leaders and rulers but sometimes series of their successors.

While more than half of the nations have come under the control of military leaders or committees, some—Nigeria, Upper Volta, and Ghana—have now completed the cycle and returned to civilian-constitutional rule. Some leaders who assumed dictatorial powers—Idi Amin of Uganda, Bokassa of the Central African Empire, and Macias in Equatorial Guinea—have been ousted

by more moderate forces. Despite political trauma in many areas, there have been islands of relative tranquility with stable leadership elsewhere on the continent—Tanzania (Nyerere), Zambia (Kaunda), The Gambia (Jawara), Botswana (Seretse Khama), Ivory Coast (Houphouet-Boigny), Senegal (Senghor), and Kenya, where Moi succeeded Kenyatta in an orderly constitutional process.

Secession attempts have threatened national entities. Eritrea has been trying to break free from Ethiopia since shortly after formal absorption into Ethiopia in 1962. Katanga (now Shaba) tried unsuccessfully to secede from Zaire (then the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in 1960 and Biafara from Nigeria in 1967.

Not only have there been internal disturbances in many African countries but disputes and sometimes open warfare have broken out between states. For example, Somalia and Ethiopia have been fighting intermittently over possession of the Ogaden region for years. Shabans, operating out of Angola, have made incursions into Zaire in both 1977 and 1978. Until recently, Mauritania first sided with, but then opposed, Morocco in its dispute with the Polisario over the fate of the Western Sahara (former Spanish Sahara). Chad asserts that Libya has annexed a portion of its northern territory.

African nations, acting through the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and various ad hoc groups, have endeavored to mediate some of these international disputes. While they have had moderate success in a few instances, the continental unity advocated by Nkrumah of Ghana in the pan-African movement of the early independence years has failed to provide the degree of cohesion envisioned by many Africans.

Another source of turmoil is found in the "wars of liberation" being waged in southern Africa. Although in various stages of resolution or escalation, they primarily involve the future of Zimbabwe, Namibia, and ultimately South Africa.



with extremely high rates. Currently 52% of aid is provided bilaterally, 34% multilaterally, and 14% from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—where statistics combine bilateral and multilateral aid. It should also be recognized that large bilateral donors, such as France, the United States, and West Germany, are also major contributors to international development organizations.

International donors have endeavored to focus their assistance on the major problem areas cited earlier. The World Bank, the United States, and other developed countries have concentrated on the improvement of rural agriculture extension services, building road networks, increasing fertilizer production, and adapting modern technology to Africa's needs. The World Health Organization (WHO) is coordinating numerous medical and health projects, including major immunization programs in which the United States takes a leading role. A plan is being developed for a U.N. Decade on Drinking Water and Sanitation plus Transport and Communications. Many countries, with the United States as a leader, have mounted Sahelian recovery and relief programs, with the aggregate total approximately $1 billion per year. A U.N. Desertification Conference was held in Nairobi in 1977 as an initial step in organizing efforts to deal with the long-range problems of arid land. Periodic follow-up meetings have been held subsequently.

In regard to Africa's energy needs, the heads of major industrialized countries at the 1978 Bonn economic summit agreed to intensify efforts to deal with energy problems in the developing world by devoting more bilateral aid to them and encouraging the World Bank, which already does much in this area, to provide still more to ameliorate shortages in the developing world. Since employment in industry depends on highly volatile commodity prices, major consumers and producers have negotiated three important international commodity agreements involving cocoa, coffee, and sugar.

Despite the foregoing efforts, international organizations and donor countries must concentrate even more effort on helping Africans deal with the two factors which most seriously im-



Sub-Saharan Africa: Selected Development Indicators (median values)

	Low Income Developing Countries		Middle Income Developing Countries	
	Africa	Other	Africa	Other
Income per person, 1976 ($U.S.)	145	155	390	990
Share of agriculture in GDP, 1976 (%)	41	47	28	18
Share of population in urban areas, 1975 (%)	11	18	24	47
Share of manufactures in exports, 1975 (%)	5	14	5	24
Life expectancy at birth, 1975	41	45	44	61
Total fertility rate, 1975	6.3	6.2	6.5	5.8
Percentage of primary school-age children attending school, 1975	53	51	79	103
Adult literacy rate, 1974	23	22	15	72

SOURCE: World Bank—Development Indicators, World Bank Development Report, 1978

Total Official Development Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa[1]
(Commitments in $ millions)

DONOR GROUPS	1974		1975		1976		1977		1978 Estimate	
TOTAL	**4,612**	**100%**	**4,585**	**100%**	**5,054**	**100%**	**6,275**	**100%**	**6,695**	**100%**
BILATERAL (FREE WORLD AND COMMUNIST)	**2,529**	**55**	**3,731**	**60**	**2,575**	**51**	**3,277**	**52**	**3,485**	**52**
MULTILATERAL	**1,179**	**25**	**1,383**	**30**	**1,656**	**33**	**1,998**	**32**	**2,260**	**34**
European Communities (EDF)[2]	305	7	176	4	515	10	772	12	850	13
International Organizations	874	19	1,207	26	1,141	23	1,226	20	1,410[3]	21
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL[4]	**904**	**20**	**471**	**10**	**823**	**16**	**1,000**est.	**16**	**950**	**14**
United States[5]	**270**	**6**	**294**	**6**	**353**[6]	**7**	**371**	**6**	**470**	**7**
AID	131	3	160	4	203	4	219	4	330	5
P.L. 480	117	3	108	2	117[6]	2	124	2	119[3]	2
Peace Corps	22	neg.	26	neg.	33[6]	1	28	neg.	21	neg.
Exim Bank (nonadditive)	(84)	(2)	(125)	(121)	(98)[6]	(2)	(49)	(—)	(—)	(—)
Other Free World	**4,008**	**87**	**4,058**	**89**	**4,572**	**90**	**5,785**	**92**	**6,105**	**91**
Europe (17 countries)	**2,027**	**44**	**2,188**	**48**	**2,413**	**48**	**3,157**	**50**	**3,320**	**50**
France	562	12	715[7]	16	617	12	597	10	620	9
United Kingdom	170	4	198	4	233	5	154	2	155	2
West Germany	344	7	393	9	313	6	398	6	415	6
Other (12 countries)	646	14	706	15	735	15	1,236	20	1,280	20
European Communities	305	7	176	4	515	10	772	12	850	13
Non-Europe	**1,107**	**24**	**663**	**15**	**1,018**	**20**	**1,402**	**22**	**1,375**	**20**
Canada	203	4	192	4	195	4	402	6	425	6
Oil Producers (9 OPEC countries)	904	20	471	11	823	16	1,000	16	950	14
International Organizations	**874**	**19**	**1,207**	**26**	**1,141**	**22**	**1,226**	**20**	**1,410**	**21**
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (loans)	394	9	594	13	494	10	505	8	584[3]	9
International Development Association (loans)	364	8	373	8	419	9	373	6	429[3]	6
International Financial Corporation (loans)	3	neg.	2	neg.	27	1	26	neg.	32[3]	neg.
U.N. programs (grants)[8]	73	1	83	2	70	1	88	2	193[3]	3
African Development Bank	40	1	155	3	131	1	234	4	172	3
Communist (8 donors)	**334**	**7**	**233**	**5**	**129**	**3**	**119**	**2**	**120**	**2**
U.S.S.R.	17	neg.	73	2	26	1	21	neg.	—	—
China	237	5	150	3	57	1	10	neg.	—	—
East Europe	80	2	10	neg.	46	1	88	2	—	—

[1]Official development assistance is defined as gross commitments of grants and concessional loans for development purposes and excludes other official flows consisting mainly of export credits. Exceptions made in this table are the inclusion of nonconcessional loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Financial Corporation (IFC), and African Development Bank (ADB). An unknown portion of U.S.S.R. and Eastern European aid to Africa is also nonconcessional.

Table comprises all independent sub-Saharan African countries including former and current recipients of assistance from the Agency for International Development (AID).

Data are by calendar year. Exceptions are IBRD, International Development Association, IFC, and ADB loans and U.S. assistance which are by U.S. fiscal year for the reason explained under footnote 5.

[2]European Communities' assistance consists of the European Development Fund (EDF) grants and soft loans and part of the Communities' budget (food aid, emergency relief, and some technical assistance), both of which are financed by the nine members (Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom).

[3]Actual figure.

[4]Of which bilateral assistance amounted to $443 million in 1974 and $438 million in 1975. Only combined data available for 1976. Oil producers of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) comprise Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. Multilateral organizations are Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Special Arab Fund of Africa, Technical Assistance Fund for Africa, and Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa.

[5]Although calendar-year data are reported and used by the donor community, U.S. fiscal-year data are used here for assistance from international organizations and from the United States to avoid confusion regarding the figures prepared for congressional committees which are provided on a fiscal-year basis. They are published for the Congress in AID's *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations.*

[6]15 months, i.e., FY 1976 plus transitional quarter.

[7]Recent changes in donor aid levels partly reflect fluctuations in exchange rates.

[8]U.N. data are not available on a commitments or expenditures basis. Nor are they comparable since definitions change frequently. (For explanation see notes in *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations.*) Data for the U.N. specialized agencies have not been available since FY 1969.

SOURCE: Agency for International Development, revised 1978

COUNTRY		LAND		PEOPLE										
				Population				Culture			Education		Labor Force	
Familiar Name Official Name *(Earlier Name)*[2]	Capital	Total Sq. Mi.	% in Agriculture	Total (mil)	Growth Rate (%)	Density per Sq. Mi.	Life Expectancy (yrs.)	Ethnic Groups (%)	Religion (%)	Language	Literacy (%)	Primary Students (% of age group[3])	% in Agr.	% in Industry, Service, & Commerce
São Tomé and Príncipe Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe	Sáo Tomé	372	na	.08	2.0	215	na	Mixed-Portuguese-African 80.0 African 20.0	Christian 80.0 Other 20.0	Portuguese	5-10.0	na	62.0	Ind 7.0 Other 31.0
Senegal Republic of Senegal *(Senegal)*	Dakar	76,000	na	5.38	2.6	71	44	Wolof 36.0 Fulani 17.5 Sere 16.5 Other 30.0	Moslem 75.0 Christian 5.0 animist 20.0	French Wolof Pulaar Local	5-10	53	70	Ind 10.0 Gov & Serv 20.0
Seychelles Republic of Seychelles *(Seychelles Colony)*	Victoria	171	na	.06	2.6	360	60	Seychellois Creole	Catholic 91.0 Other 9.0	English French	60	na	17	Ind 55.0
Sierra Leone Republic of Sierra Leone *(Sierra Leone)*	Freetown	27.925	30	3.22	2.4	115	44	Temne Mende	animist 70.0 Moslem 25.0 Christian 5.0	English Krio	10	35	75	Ind 15.0
Somalia Somali Democratic Republic *(British Somaliland and Italian Somalia)*	Mogadishu	246,155	13	3.2	2.3	13	41	Somali 98.8 Arab Asian 1.2	Moslem 99.0	Somali Arabic English Italian	20	58	60	Ind 3.0
South Africa Republic of South Africa *(Union of South Africa)*	Pretoria	472,359	na	27.39	2.5	53	61	African 69.0 White 20.0 Colored 10.7 Asian .03	Traditional Christian	English Afrikaans Zulu Xhosa	Wh* 100 NWh 35	89	31	na
Sudan Democratic Republic of the Sudan *(Anglo-Egyptian Sudan)*	Khartoum	967,500	20	16.8	2.5	17	50	Arab-African Nilotic-African	Moslem 70.0 Indigenous beliefs 25.0 Christian 5.0	Arabic English Local	28	32	86	Ind 6.0
Swaziland Kingdom of Swaziland *(Swaziland)*	Mbabane	6,704	8	.49	3.0	74	43	Swazi Zulu White 3.0	Christian animist	English SiSwati Zulu	36	na	85	Ind 5.0
Tanzania United Republic of Tanzania *(Tanganyika and Zanzibar)*	Dar Es Salaam	365,608	na	17.4	2.7	48	45	Over 130 Groups	Christian 35.0 Moslem 35.0 animist 30.0	Swahili English	63	57	90	Ind 2.0 Com 10.0

*Wh= white; NWh= nonwhite

ECONOMY												GOVERNMENT			COUNTRY[5]
Gross Domestic Product			Distribution of GDP			Trade					U.S. Econ. Assist-ance FY 1979 ($ mil)				
						Imports		Exports							
Annual ($ bil.)	Growth Rate (%)	Per Capita ($US)	% From Agr.	% From Ind.	% From Serv.	Total ($ mil)	From U.S. ($ mil)	Total ($ mil)	To U.S. ($ mil)	Leading Exports		Type	Date Inde-pen-dence	Chief of State and/or Head of Govt.	
.019		160	na	na	na	6.9	na	6.5	na	Cocoa Copra Palm	0.1	Republic	7/12/75	Pres—M. Pinto Da Costa	**São Tomé and Príncipe**
1.80	2.30	333	28	24	48	713	na	426	na	Peanuts Phosphate Fish	18.1	Republic	4/4/60	Pres—L. S. Senghor	**Senegal**
.63	6.5	1,146	na	na	na	53	na	13	na	Copra Cinnamon	0.5	Republic	6/29/76	Pres—F. R. Rene	**Seychelles**
.55	2.40	176	32	23	45	173	na	151.10	60.40	Minerals Agricultural	5.9	Republic	4/27/61	Pres— S. P. Stevens	**Sierra Leone**
.22	na	70	31	8	61	175	na	55	na	Livestock Fruit Hides	26.2	Indepen-dent Republic	7/1/60	Pres—M. Gen Siad Barre	**Somalia**
45.71	14.3	9,136** 3,836 2,857 2,056	9	23	68	9,279	1,079	8,549	2,259	Gold Ore Uranium Diamonds Wool Sugar	0	Republic	5/31/10	Pres—M. Viljoen PM—P.W. Botha	**South Africa**
7.5	3.0	386	41	16	43	1,075	100	525	22	Cotton Gum Arabic Peanuts	42.8	Republic	1/1/56	Pres— Gen. G. M. Numayri	**Sudan**
.22	9.80	440	na	na	na	151	na	152	na	Sugar Wood Iron Asbestos	6.2	Monarchy	9/6/68	King— Sobhuza II PM—M. Gen Dlamini	**Swaziland**
3	5.90	180	45	16	39	784	na	574	na	Coffee Cotton Sisal Spices	22.9	Republic	Tan 1961 Zan 1963 Union 1964	Pres—J. Nyerere	**Tanzania**

**9,136 (White), 3,836 (Asian), 2,857 (Colored), 2,056 (African)

not independent nations in control of their own affairs. There was an uprising, as you know, and the Soviets brutally stamped the uprising out within those two countries.

This, however, was a sovereign nation, a nonaligned nation, a deeply religious nation, and the Soviets invaded it brutally.

We were informed, other leaders throughout the world were informed, by Soviet Ambassadors and direct messages from Moscow, that the Soviets went into the nation to protect it from some third force that might be threatening Afghanistan. When questioned about where was the third threatening force from, the Soviets have never been able to give a reasonable answer. They claim that they were invited in by the government to protect Afghanistan. As you know, the leader of Afghanistan, President Amin, who was supposed to have invited them in, was immediately assassinated as soon as the Soviets obtained control over Kabul, the capital city, and several of the members of the President's family were also killed.

We are the other superpower on Earth, and it became my responsibility, representing our great nation, to take action that would prevent the Soviets from this invasion with impunity. The Soviets had to suffer the consequences. In my judgment our own Nation's security was directly threatened. There is no doubt that the Soviets' move into Afghanistan, if done without adverse consequences, would have resulted in the temptation to move again and again until they reached warm water ports or until they acquired control over a major portion of the world's oil supplies.

I talked to the President of Pakistan immediately after this Afghanistan invasion and also talked to many other of the world's leaders and sent them direct messages. The action that we could take was confined to three opportunities. One is to take military action, which I did not consider appropriate. Our country has no desire, nor could we have effectively implemented military action, to drive the Soviet forces from Afghanistan—which left me with two other options, which I chose to exercise. One is political action, and the other one is economic action.

Politically, we joined with 50 other nations to take to the Security Council two propositions: one, to condemn the Soviet Union for the invasion and, therefore, the threat to world peace; and secondly, to call upon the Soviets to withdraw their troops. The vote was cast after the debates were concluded. The only nations voting against these two propositions were East Germany—again, a Soviet puppet nation—and the Soviets themselves. The permanent members, as you know, have a veto right. And now a move is underway, which I think will be realized, to take this case to the General Assembly for further condemnation of the Soviet Union.

It's difficult to understand why the Soviets took this action. I think they probably underestimated the adverse reaction from around the world. I've talked to many other leaders, our allies and those representing nations that might be further threatened, and they all believe that we took the right action. It was not done for political reasons; it was not done to implement some foreign policy. It was done in the interest of our national security.

We did take economic action, which I think was properly balanced. It was carefully considered. We will try to impose this action on the Soviet Union in a way that will have a minimal adverse effect on our own country, where the sacrifices will be shared as equitably as you and I together can possibly devise and at the same time let the Soviets realize the consequences of their invasion.

We will not permit the Soviets to fish in American waters within 200 miles of our land area. They have a very large fishing fleet, involving hundreds of thousands of tons of fish harvested. They will not have those permits renewed.

We will not send high technology equipment to the Soviet Union or any equipment that might have a security benefit to the Soviet Union. This will include drilling equipment, for instance, used for the exploration and production of oil and natural gas.

We will restrict severely normal commerce with the Soviet Union, which is highly advantageous to them. And of course, I have interrupted the delivery of grain, which the Soviets had ordered, above and beyond the 8 million tons which our Nation is bound by a 5-year agreement to have delivered to the Soviet Union.

We have taken steps to make sure that the farmers are protected from the adverse consequences of this interruption of grain shipments to a maximum degree possible. It will be a costly proposition. I understood this when I took the action. And my estimate is, based on a fairly thorough but somewhat rapid analysis, that this year the extra cost to purchase this grain and to change the price levels of corn and wheat and to pay the extra storage charges will amount to about $2 billion. That's in fiscal year 1980. In fiscal year 1981 there will be an additional cost of about $800 million.

It may be that as the season progresses and we have more experience in substituting for the Soviet Union as the purchaser of this grain, that there will be an additional $200–300 million spent in 1980. If this should take place, then that would reduce by the same amount, roughly, expenditures in 1981 fiscal year. So, the total cost will be in the neighborhood of $2.8 billion. This cost will not fall on the farmers except to the extent that they are taxpayers like every other American. This will be shared by all those in this country who pay taxes to the Federal Government.

This grain will not be permitted to go back on the market in such a way as to depress agricultural prices. And in a few minutes I'll let one of the representatives here of the Agriculture Department, Jim Williams, outline to you the details. And I have a sheet prepared, for handing out to all of you—the exact loan prices for wheat and corn and the other prices for the redemption of corn and wheat from storage.

The last point I want to make is this: It's very important that we understand that our allies are working very closely with us. I talked to several of them before we took this action. All of them agreed that it should be taken. We've got the maximum practical assurance from them that they will not substitute their sale of goods, including grain, for our own. There are three major nations that ordinarily have grain to export—Argentina, Canada, and Australia. Argentina does not have adequate grain to make any significant difference.

I talked to President Giscard d'Estaing today, who represents West Europe. They do have substantial quantities of grain ordinarily on hand, particularly barley. They will not substitute their grain for ours that's being withheld from the Soviet Union.

We anticipate that this withholding of grain to the Soviet Union will not force them to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. We understood this from the beginning. We don't think that economic pressure or even condemna-

tion by the United Nations of the Soviet Union will cause them to withdraw their troops. But we hope that we have laid down a marker and let them know that they will indeed suffer, now and in the future, from this unwarranted invasion of a formerly independent, nonaligned country.

I need the support of the American people. I believe that it's a matter of patriotism, and I believe that it's a matter of protecting our nation's security. I anticipate that we'll get good response from the Congress in the minimal legislation that might be required to carry out these programs. Almost all of it can be done by administrative action under the rights given by the Congress, through legislation, to the Secretary of Agriculture and to me.

There are just a couple of other things that perhaps should be mentioned, but I think I'll wait on them till a little later.

We want to pursue a long-range analysis and a schedule of actions to strengthen American interests and presence and influence in this troubled area of the world, in southwest Asia. You know about some of these from news reports that have already been issued.

And we will take action, with the Congress' help, to strengthen Pakistan. Our desire is to do this through a consortium of nations; that's also the desire of Pakistan. I talked since lunch with President Zia of that country. I've talked to him before about this matter.

And other nations in the region which might be threatened by the Soviets, from Afghanistan, will also know that we and many other nations on Earth are committed to their adequate defense capability, so that the Soviets will be discouraged from further expansionism in the area.

Because of the Iranian question, we have greatly built up our naval forces in the northern China Sea or in the Arabian Sea. Those will be maintained at a higher level than they have been in the past. And as you know, there has been a marshaling of worldwide public opinion, not only in the condemnation of the Iranian terrorists who hold our hostages but also against the Soviet Union for their unprecedented invasion of Afghanistan in this recent few weeks. ■

[1]Opening and closing paragraphs omitted; text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 14, 1980.

Meeting the Challenge in Southwest Asia

Statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee on February 1, 1980.[1]

We meet at a time when new challenges abroad underscore the importance of active American leadership in the world—a leadership based both on strength and on diplomatic skill. For these are times which test both our wisdom and our will.

Our requirements are underscored by the particular challenges we face in the southwest Asia and Persian Gulf region, where Iranian militants hold American diplomats prisoner—and where Soviet troops seek to suppress the people of a sovereign nation.

Let me begin my testimony by taking a few moments to describe the elements of our strategy in this troubled area. Obviously, one region does not define our total agenda. It does, however, provide a compelling demonstration of the imposing diplomatic tasks that lie ahead.

Resisting Soviet Aggression

In its invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, for the first time since World War II, has used its own armed forces beyond the Warsaw Pact sphere to impose its authority directly over a Third World country. The Soviets' precise motives in attacking Afghanistan may remain unclear. But there is no lack of clarity about the fact of their aggression.

The Soviet action requires an American response that is firm, sustained, and effective. Our object is to impose a cost on Soviet actions in Afghanistan and, more broadly, to make it clear that such aggression anywhere will encounter firm resistance. We seek also to strengthen our position in the region in ways that protect our interests, reassure our friends, and recognize local realities.

The President acted promptly after the invasion to limit the transfer of high technology, grain sales, and other commercial contracts; to restrict Soviet access to our fisheries; and to suspend various U.S.-Soviet exchanges. It is also our firm view that we should not make the same mistake that we made in 1936, when we participated in an Olympics which were used to glorify a host whose policies were threatening the peace.

We are working with our allies, and with other nations, as they develop their own measures in opposition to aggression.

The Soviet Union stands condemned by the entire world community. The U.N. General Assembly vote of condemnation, 104 nations to 18, was a telling rebuke to the Soviet Union and especially to their notion, pressed last summer in Havana, that developing countries and the Soviet Union have a "natural alliance."

The President is also taking action to deter further aggression in the area. We have assured Pakistan of our support. And the Soviet Union is on notice that any attempt to control the vital Persian Gulf region will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

To strengthen our ability to respond swiftly and effectively to military needs in the region should they arise, we have increased our force presence in the Indian Ocean. We have held positive initial discussions with a number of nations in the area concerning U.S. access to air and port facilities. And we are accelerating our plans for the rapid deployment force. These steps to enhance the mobility of our military forces are an essential part of the overall defense modernization program in which we are engaged.

Strengthening Regional Security

Enhancing the security of that region must also be a cooperative undertaking. As the President said in the State of the Union: " . . . we are prepared to work with other countries in the region to share a cooperative security framework that respects differing values and political beliefs, yet which enhances the independence, security, and prosperity of all."

This effort to build a more secure community of independent nations in the region will require a sustained, long-term commitment. Let me briefly

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Cover Photo:

Mangbetu woman, Zaire
(Museum of African Art,
Eliot Elisofon Archives)

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The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.

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HODDING CARTER III
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor

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Children in Sudan (AID photo by Kay Chernush)

PEOPLE

The population of Africa is presently estimated at more than 400 million persons, with 85% living in sub-Saharan Africa. However, because of the vastness of the continent, density is less than half that of the United States, running at about 30 persons per square mile. This figure is steadily increasing, nonetheless, with an estimated annual increase of 2.9%. Should current trends continue, the continent's population might conceivably reach as high as 800 million by the year 2000, a subject of growing concern to the governments of some of the highly populated countries.

People are dispersed unevenly throughout the continent. Vast stretches of deserts and mountains are virtually uninhabited. As indicated earlier, good climate, fertile land, navigable rivers, safe ports, and historical demographic movements have created several areas with population density running as high as 500 persons per square mile. South of the Sahara, the most populated areas are:

- The lands bordering the Gulf of Guinea in west Africa, particularly Nigeria and the southern parts of Ghana, Benin, and Togo;
- The Nile Valley in northern Sudan;
- The east Africa highlands, particularly the plateaus of Ethiopia and eastern Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania; and
- The eastern and southern coasts and interior High Veld of South Africa.

Ninety percent of the African people have dwelt for decades as small groups in rural areas but many have been moving in recent years to urban centers. Increased employment opportunities, drought in some regions, and the universal lure of the "big city" are creating burgeoning metropolises which begin to rank with some of the world's largest and busiest. Among those with more than a million inhabitants are: Kinshasa (Zaire), Lagos and Ibadan (Nigeria), Johannesburg and Cape Town (South Africa), Abidjan (Ivory Coast), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), and Accra (Ghana).

Jeans and batiks (Museum of African Art, Eliot Elisofon Archives)

Tremendous diversity exists among the people of sub-Saharan Africa. This diversity stems from a variety of causes—the infusion of elements from outside the African Continent, the melding of a portion of these people with original African stock, migration to new areas in search of better livelihood, rivalries which produced factions and subdivisions, tendencies to organize into small, close-knit groups for protection and mutual support. This process, which has continued for many millenia, has produced more than 800 ethnic divisions.

Scholars have attempted to classify the people of Africa in a variety of ways. Anthropologists identify by racial strain. Some scholars use linguistic categories, and others work with listings of ethnic or "tribal" groups. From names alone, it is often difficult to determine the interrelationship among race, language, and group or tribe. Therefore, in the outline of African history, references were made to the five anthropological strains of the continent. A section follows on linguistic classification, which endeavors to link origin with major linguistic groups. Finally, a third section carries the progression on to more familiar ethnic, enthnolinguistic, or tribal names.

African Language Groups



The approximate distribution of the main native language groups of Africa is shown on the map. Although the number of different languages is very high (perhaps more than 800), all native languages derive from four basic stocks. These stocks are represented by the shaded and unshaded portions of the map. Key letters indicate divisions of the main stocks and are placed in localities where interrelated languages are spoken. European and European colonial languages, which often serve as a common language between language groups, are not included in this presentation. The dotted line at E shows the area where Ancient Egyptian was spoken, but the present language is Arabic. Certain other distributions, too minute to be shown on the map, include complex variations in the Sudanic languages; pockets of Fulani in the Atlantic subgroup of Niger - Congo (L) found as far east as Lake Chad; and Bantu (R) encroachments on the territory of the Click - speakers.

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Languages

The complexity of African society is graphically demonstrated by the number of languages found on the continent. Of more than 1,000 languages and dialects, fewer than 10 are spoken by over a million persons. Most are used by groups numbering less than 100,000 people.

Of the numerous linguistic authorities, the classifications of Prof. Joseph Greenberg represent something of a contemporary consensus. His listing of categories and a map showing the general geographic location of groups is reproduced here. In the brief textual amplification which follows, references are also made to alternate names used by another eminent scholar, Prof. George Murdock.

The largest language family is the Niger-Congo and Kordofian (Nigritic-

Public health instructor, Sudan (AID photo by Kay Chernush)

pede African development—a lack of infrastructure and a shortage of skilled and semiskilled workers.

It should not be inferred that all African developing countries are dependent on foreign aid in all, or even selected, areas of their economies. Some have been particularly successful in certain sectors (Guinea in bauxite export and Nigeria in petroleum production). Others, which initially devoted large portions of their resources to increasing manufacturing (Kenya and Ivory Coast) are now able to devote greater support again to agricultural production. As indicated earlier, many countries are investing heavily in education and the training of Africans to replace the expensive, imported European manpower which still provides technicians and management for some sectors of African business and government.

MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS

United Nations

Sub-Saharan African nations, individually and collectively, play important roles in the international and regional organizations of which they are members. They regard the United Nations as a major forum for asserting their views and as a convenient arena for advancing foreign policy objectives. Each country, large or small, has one vote in the General Assembly and all 45 independent sub-Saharan states are U.N. members. Therefore, they have nearly one-third of the Assembly's 152 votes, and their often coordinated position on many issues is significant and often crucial. The African members have been particularly concerned about issues involving colonial powers, subjugated peoples, and human rights issues. They have been prime movers in General Assembly and Security Council resolutions dealing with southern African problems. They have been, however, more reluctant to take controversial positions involving other independent black regimes.

Just as African nations participate actively in the United Nations, affiliated organizations and other international bodies have been deeply involved in the development of Africa. Among these are the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), its International Development Association (IDA), and its International Finance Corporation (IFC); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the U.N.'s World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Children's Fund (UNICEF), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Many of these bodies participate in the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), which has given or plans to give $789,175,000, or one-fourth of its world total of allotments (approximately $3.5 billion), to sub-Saharan Africa in the period 1977–81.

Economic Commission for Africa

The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) is a U.N. regional body in which all independent African states, except South Africa, are represented. It was established in 1958 for the promotion and planning of African economic and social development through cooperative and regional action. The ECA carries on extensive research and has acted as a catalyst in the creation of the African Development Institute and the African Development Bank. It maintains and endeavors to strengthen economic ties with other countries of the world. The headquarters of the ECA's Secretariat is located at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Organization of African Unity

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is the most prestigious and encompassing organization on the African Continent. Founded in May 1963, it includes all independent African states except the white-ruled Republic of South Africa. Headquartered in Addis Ababa, it has both political and economic responsibilities. With no coercive powers over its members, OAU resolutions are advisory rather than binding, although individual OAU states typically have been extremely reluctant to depart from OAU positions adopted by resolution. A primary OAU function is to obtain an African consensus on questions of interest at the United Nations, where the OAU maintains a permanent office.

The preamble of the OAU Charter reaffirms the principles of the United Nations and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also pledges to support the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples and to foster African political and economic development. The signatories agree to coordinate and harmonize their general policies in order to promote African progress and unity, to defend sovereignty and territorial integrity, to eradicate colonialism from Africa, and to promote international cooperation. Signatories adhere to the principle of noninterference in one another's affairs, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the condemnation of political assassination or subversive activity against neighboring states, the liberation of remaining dependent areas, and the nonalignment of national blocs.

The work of the OAU is carried on through four "principal institutions"—the Assembly of Heads of State and Government; the Council of (Foreign)

Ministers; the General Secretariat; and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration. A number of specialized and ad hoc commissions deal with a wide variety of activities of common interest and attempt to instill a spirit of cooperation among member states.

Annual OAU "summits" endeavor to deal with current crises, often involving African interstate relations. Debates are sometimes acrimonious and avoid facing up to the tough issues and differences which divide nations. The OAU, however, over the years has endeavored to assist in such issues as the early mercenary problems in Zaire, the Biafran rebellion, disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia, the transition to independence in Angola, the status of the Western Sahara, liberation issues of southern Africa, and, recently, human rights in other areas of Africa.

African Development Bank

The purpose of the African Development Bank, which was established in 1964 and now has a membership of 48 independent African nations (including those of North Africa), is to contribute to the economic and social development of its members, both individually and collectively. The Bank finances investment projects and development programs, placing special emphasis on multinational projects. The Bank has an authorized capitalization of $1 billion, of which approximately 35% has now been deposited by subscribers. It is expected that the United States and others will soon become members, helping to increase the Bank's capital to $6.3 billion by 1984. The United States will be the largest single donor, with 17% of nonregional members' capital contributions.

Lome Convention

The Lome Convention, establishing overall cooperation between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group, was signed in Lome, Togo, in February 1975. The Lome II Convention, signed in November 1979, succeeds it. The new 5-year accord provides ACP countries with trade preferences, economic assistance, and industrial cooperation. In addition, the Lome Convention has financed efforts to maintain stable export earnings for certain commodities of less developed countries in an experimental attempt known as the STABEX program.

ACP Group

The African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group was originally convened to negotiate the Lome Convention with the EEC. Founded as a permanent group in July 1975, the ACP group endeavors to insure that the ACP/EEC Convention is properly implemented. It also tries to develop closer trade, economic, and cultural relations among the ACP states and to promote effective regional and interregional cooperation between its members. ACP headquarters is in Brussels.

Economic Community of West African States

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has 16 members, including nearly all the Francophone, Anglophone, and Lusophone countries of the West African region reaching from Mauritania to Nigeria. Its objective is to create a common market in which internal trade barriers will be eliminated. The community also promotes free movement of people, services and capital, harmonization of agricultural policies, joint development of economic and industrial policies, and elimination of disparities in levels of development. Community headquarters is in Lagos, Nigeria.

Inter-African Coffee Organization

The Inter-African Coffee Organization (IACO), which has 15 members, was formed in 1960. Its objective is to adopt and adhere to a united policy on the marketing of coffee. The organization facilitates contracts among member countries, international organizations, and coffee buyers. Its headquarters is at Abidjan, Ivory Coast.

West African Rice Development Association

The West African Rice Development Association (WARDA) has 14 members. Its purpose is to work cooperatively in the research, growing, and marketing of rice. It lobbies for increased quotas on the world market. WARDA's headquarters is in Monrovia, Liberia.

Table on Multilateral Organizations can be found on page 28.

Basic Data on Sub-Saharan Africa

Data presented in the following tables have been assembled by the Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, to illustrate the diversity and complexity of sub-Saharan Africa. Profiles include selected information on the governments, people, geography, and economy of 47 political entities south of the Sahara. Not listed are the countries of North Africa, which do not come under the purview of the African Bureau. Data vary in accuracy and recency, depending on method of collection, as well as economic and political considerations. Culled from a variety of sources, the data should not be regarded as definitive or finite and should not be used for accurate country comparisons. They are intended to provide a few basic facts for each country and an order of magnitude by which to gauge demographic changes and economic development.

COUNTRY		LAND		PEOPLE										
				Population				Culture			Education		Labor Force	
Familiar Name Official Name *(Earlier Name)*[2]	Capital	Total Sq. Mi.	% in Agriculture	Total (mil)	Growth Rate (%)	Density per Sq. Mi.	Life Expectancy (yrs.)	Ethnic Groups (%)	Religion (%)	Language	Literacy (%)	Primary Students (% of age group[3])	% in Agr.	% in Industry, Service, & Commerce
Togo Republic of Togo *(French Togoland)*	Lome	21,853	96	2.3	2.7	93	40	Ewe Mina Kabyé	animist 60.0 Christian 20.0 Moslem 20.0	French Local	10	50	78.0	22.0
Uganda Republic of Uganda *(Uganda)*	Kampala	91,076	30	13.2	3.5	145	50	Bantu Nilotic Sudanic	Christian 50.0 Moslem 10.0 animist 40.0	English Swahili Luganda	25	53	90.0	Ind 4.0
Upper Volta Republic of Upper Volta *(Upper Volta)*	Ouagadougou	106,000	na	6.5	2.2	125	38	Voltaic Mande Fulani	animist Moslem Christian	French Local	5-10	14	95.0	5.0
Zaire Republic of Zaire *(Belgian Congo)*	Kinshasa	905,063	2	27	3	30	44	Bantu 80 other groups	Christian 50.0 Syncretic sects 50.0	French Lingala Other	20	90	79.0	na
Zambia Republic of Zambia *(Northern Rhodesia)* *(Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland)*	Lusaka	290,724	na	5.4	3.2	11	47	Bantu groups	animist Christian	English 70 local	20	96	57.0	43.0
Zimbabwe *(Zimbabwe Rhodesia)* *(Southern Rhodesia)*	Salisbury	150,333	40.0	7.2	3.5	45	52	African 96.0 White 3.0 Other 1.0	Syncretic 52.0 Christian 24.0 animist 24.0	English Shona Ndebele	Wh* 100 NWh 30	99	64.0	Ind 9.0

*Wh = white; NWh = nonwhite

[1] Statistics are drawn from the latest, most reliable data available from a variety of sources, particularly Department of State *Background Notes* which are periodically updated. Therefore, except where indicated, no specific year can be designated for each category of statistics. Furthermore, current figures do not exist in many cases and some data are based on U.S. Government estimates.

[2] The earlier name listing is included to identify for readers unfamiliar with Africa earlier names by which some of the countries have been known. In some cases these names date to pre-independence and in other instances relate to previous post-independence regimes. No political significance should be attached to

ECONOMY											U.S. Econ. Assistance FY 1979 ($ mil)	GOVERNMENT			COUNTRY[5]
Gross Domestic Product			Distribution of GDP			Trade									
						Imports		Exports							
Annual ($ bil.)	Growth Rate (%)	Per Capita ($US)	% From Agr.	% From Ind.	% From Serv.	Total ($ mil)	From U.S. ($ mil)	Total ($ mil)	To U.S. ($ mil)	Leading Exports		Type	Date Independence	Chief of State and/or Head of Govt.	
.525	5-8.0	233	25	21	54	162	na	127.5	na	Phosphates Cocoa Coffee	3.1	Republic	4/27/60	Pres—Gen. G. Eyadema	**Togo**
2.80	0	240	55	8	37	364	3.4	334	77	Coffee Tea Cotton Copper	5.1	Republic	10/9/62	Pres—G. Binaisa	**Uganda**
.70	3.1	103	34	19	47	237	na	89	na	Livestock Peanuts Shea Butter Cotton	17.0	Republic	8/5/60	Pres—A. S. Lamizana	**Upper Volta**
4.10	−1.0	150	16	30.0	54	623	114 +Canada	1,576	197.7 +Canada	Copper Cobalt Diamonds Coffee	40.3	Republic, with strong pres. authority	6/30/60	Pres—Lt. Gen. Mobutu Sese Seko	**Zaire**
1.25	.50	228	14	41	45	680	44 4	811	115.7	Copper Cobalt Emeralds Zinc	31.7	Republic	10/24/64	Pres—Dr. K. Kaunda	**Zambia**
3.3	−4.0	Wh* 8,800 NWh 816	16.0	40	44	na	na	na	na	Tobacco Chrome Textiles Grain	0	Future under negotiation	Pending		**Zimbabwe**

*Wh = white; NWh = nonwhite

selections, which are based largely on historical perceptions.

[3]The resulting percentages, or "Gross Primary Enrollment Ratio,", for countries with universal primary education may exceed 100% since some pupils may be above or below the accepted primary school age—6 to 11 years.

[4]na= not available

[5]The Bureau of African Affairs has a peripheral interest in the following geographical entities: Western Sahara, British Indian Ocean Territory.

discuss five critical elements of this effort.

First, we are working to improve local capabilities for self-defense and enhance the political and economic stability of the area.

This objective is advanced through our economic and security assistance program, including those in Israel and Egypt. And to address the immediate danger to Pakistan, we will be requesting an exception to existing legislative restrictions so that we can join with others in responding swiftly to Pakistan's security needs. This does not signal a lessening of our commitment to nonproliferation, and we have so indicated to the Pakistanis. It does signal our determination to help a country that faces the threat of Soviet combat forces and combat operations on its border.

Second, the goal of regional security will be served if local disputes can be resolved. Resolution of such disputes can strengthen the security of the states in the region, bring a greater measure of stability to the area, and lessen the chances for conflict which the Soviets could exploit.

Recent events have underlined our interest and that of all parties in the region in an Arab-Israeli peace. It is in Israel's and Egypt's strategic interest, as well as in ours, to carry forward the Camp David accords. A secure peace between Israel and its neighbors would enhance the security of Israel and permit the Arab states to concentrate more fully on domestic needs and the Soviet threat.

For similar reasons, we must be diligent in our support for efforts to resolve the differences between India and Pakistan and to avoid a nuclear rivalry on the subcontinent. We are also encouraging cooperation among the nations of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula.

In a highly significant show of cohesion this week, the Foreign Ministers of 35 Islamic countries united in a forceful denunciation of the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan and called for the use of "all possible means" to bring about a withdrawal.

Third, it is important that we seek improved relations with nations throughout the area, wherever there is a basis of shared interests.

As we seek to help Pakistan meet its legitimate defense requirements, we retain a strong interest in cooperation with India. Clark Clifford's [President Carter's personal emissary to India] mission is a measure of the high priority we attach to U.S.-Indian relations.

With respect to Iran, as the President said: "We cannot and will not relax our concern for the hostages." To do so would be to fail our responsibilities to fellow citizens and to countenance a flagrant disregard for international law and for elemental standards of decency. Therefore, this matter will remain uppermost in our relations with Iran and at the top of our foreign policy agenda. We will pursue every channel to achieve the safe return of our people.

But the Soviet action should give Iran added reason to be responsive. As the Soviet threat has increased, the leaders of Iran have added reason to bring about the prompt and unconditional release of the hostages, as mandated by both the International Court of Justice and the U.N. General Assembly.

Fourth, we are coordinating our efforts with others outside the region who share our interests there.

We have already made clear that our assistance to Pakistan will be an integral part of a broad international effort. We have been engaged in active consultations with our European allies, Japan, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and others to this end. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan presents a threat not only to American interests in the region; it is a threat to the interests of our allies as well. We are asking our allies not that they support an American response; we are asking that they follow our lead in a coordinated response to serve our common interests.

Fifth, we need to demonstrate American and Western understanding of Islam. Our difference with Iran, for example, is in no sense a confrontation with the Islamic faith or Islamic traditions. On the other hand, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan represents an attempt to crush an Islamic resistance and to impose external rule over all of an Islamic nation.

We must pursue such policies on a sustained basis. They will require not only our strength and our resources but also diplomatic skill. And, to a considerable degree, their impact will depend upon our actions in other areas as well.

It is all the more critical now that we reduce our reliance on foreign oil. The strength of our international position is grounded in the strength of our economy and thus upon our ability to construct a secure energy future. We must invest our efforts here with still greater urgency—to substitute our own conservation for a greater share of imported oil and to build a greater capacity to fulfill our own energy needs.

And we must persist in foreign policy directions that have been charted and which remain fundamentally sound. As we build our strength to meet the challenges of the times, we must not lose sight of the strengths we gain through steadiness in our diplomacy.

The Soviet assault against Afghanistan requires the new steps we are taking in our foreign policies. Our relations with the Soviet Union must convey the clear message that the response to aggression will be firm and sustained. For our hopes for better relations and for peace will depend on the choices they make in coming years.

But let us also be clear that the longer term goals we are pursuing are essential if we are to continue building America's military, economic, and political strength in the coming decade.

- We will continue to build America's military strength and to strengthen our alliances. The reinstatement of registration for the draft will further demonstrate our resolve.
- We will continue, out of hardheaded self-interest, to support effective, verifiable limits on the accumulation and spread of nuclear weapons. The SALT II Treaty remains strongly in our security interest. Without it, by 1985 the Soviets could have several thousand more warheads and several hundred more systems to deliver them than is possible under the treaty. Without it, our ability to observe Soviet strategic forces—and thus evaluate Soviet capabilities—would be impaired. Our predictions of future Soviet strategic forces will be less certain and thus our defense planning more difficult. And the opportunity for further limits in the future will be clouded. For these reasons, we remain committed to ratification of the treaty.
- We will continue the process of normalization of relations with China.
- We will continue to pursue an active diplomacy, as in the Middle East and southern Africa, to seek peaceful solutions to regional disputes. A just peace is always its own justification.

National Security Goals

by President Carter

Excerpts from an address before the annual convention of the American Legion in Washington, D.C., on February 19, 1980.[1]

• • • •

We remain the world's most powerful force, and the American people and the Congress are now united with me in keeping the United States second to none in military strength. I have to tell you that this degree of common commitment has not always existed. During the last 12 years, for instance, the Congress has cut the Presidents' defense budget by more than $50 billion—an average reduction below what the Presidents have proposed of more than $4 billion per year.

Recently this pattern has changed, and we now have obvious and growing support throughout this country for a strong national defense. This new unity and this new determination must be sustained; not just for a few months, but so long as the serious challenges confront the United States of America, we must be united and determined to have a strong country. I'm very thankful that most Americans agree with you and me that in order to insure an America at peace, we must and we will have that strong America.

Promoting Peace

We are determined also to see the blessings of peace shared with other people around the world. At Camp David and during my personal mission to the Mideast, we promoted peace between Egypt and Israel. In just a few days, a milestone will be passed in history when full diplomatic recognition is consummated with the exchange of Ambassadors between those two countries that have been at war four times in the last 30 years. Now work must continue toward that comprehensive peace that is so vital to the security of the United States and to stability in the Middle East.

After 4 years of negotiation also, we concluded the historic Panama Canal treaties, which will protect American interests, which will stabilize a potentially volatile situation, which will assure continued responsible operation of the canal, which will enable us to protect the canal—now and in the far distant future, during the 21st century—and strengthen our influence in a strategic area of the world and of this hemisphere.

We have also negotiated a sound strategic arms limitation treaty, SALT II, which has great advantages for our country. It will enhance world stability and peace.

SALT II will continue the process of arms control which was begun by President Eisenhower and which has been continued by every President since his time. It will help to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the other nations on Earth. It will force substantial reduction in the present numbers of Soviet missile launchers and provides no similar requirement that missile launchers of the United States be reduced. It will enhance the ability that we have to monitor the Soviet nuclear forces. It will prevent an expensive and a dangerous nuclear arms race, an arms race that would be counterproductive both for ourselves and for the Soviet Union, and would require funding, very high levels of funding which are needed to improve the American conventional forces.

SALT II is not a panacea. It is a supplement and not a substitute for a strong defense. SALT II is not based on trust. It can be verified by our own national technical means. I will consult very closely with the Congress when the time comes again to move toward ratification of the treaty.

During these past 3 years we've joined with our Atlantic allies to strengthen NATO, both its spirit and also its military capability. There's a new sense of cooperation and resolve and a greater confidence that we together can deter aggression.

Another successful foreign policy initiative has great strategic significance. We have normalized relations with China while retaining our trade and friendship with the people of Taiwan. We now have a great opportunity to expand this new relationship to bring mutual advantages to both countries and to improve the prospects for a stable and a peaceful Asia. This is the first time I recall in history when our nation has been friends with both Japan and China at the same time.

And, as you well know, our nation's commitment to democracy, to human rights, to self-determination, and to economic stability and development has greatly improved our relations with the countries of the Third World.

New Challenges

These achievements have all been gratifying to you and to me, yet today we face new and serious challenges. At this very moment, 53 Americans are being held hostage in Iran. The long and continuous efforts to insure the safe release of our people have now reached a particularly sensitive and intense stage. My task is to protect the interests and the principles of our nation while we negotiate for the release of the Americans who are being held as innocent prisoners.

I deeply appreciate the firmness, patience, the unity, and the will shown by almost all Americans during these days of crisis. I cannot and I will not rest until every single American is home, safe, and free.

Also at this very moment, some 100,000 Soviet troops, heavily armed, seek to subjugate a proud and a once independent nation, a nation that presented no challenge to Soviet security and wanted only to retain their freedom. This Soviet invasion of Afghanistan poses a threat to the independence of countries throughout southwest Asia and to the economic lifeblood of many nations, oil. It has altered the careful balance of forces in a vital and a volatile area of the world.

That's why I did not hesitate to answer Soviet aggression with strong economic sanctions, including restrictions on grain shipments and sales of high technology to the Soviet Union. That's why we joined with more than 100 other nations in the United Nations to condemn this aggression and to demand withdrawal of the Soviet invasion forces from Afghanistan. And that is why I have given notice that the United States will not attend the Moscow Olympics, unless the Soviet invasion forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan before February 20. That deadline is tomorrow, and it will not be changed.

And finally, I have served notice in my State of the Union address, and I would like to quote the words: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

And as I also stated clearly to the Congress: While protecting the constitutional rights of Americans and avoiding the abuses of the past, we must remove all impediments to an effective intelligence capability for our nation.

At this time, I am strengthening our own military presence in the Persian Gulf region, and we are encouraging other na-

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SPECIAL (See Center Section)

President Carter's address before the American Legion Convention, February 19, 1980
President Carter's News Conference, February 13, 1980



Murdock) of which the Bantu sublanguage group is the most important. Members of this family, of course, are descendants of the earliest people who remained on the continent and who occupy much of sub-Saharan Africa. The Afroasiatic (Hamitic-Murdock) including Semitic-, Berber-, and Cushitic-speaking people, stem from the early Caucasoids and are found primarily in north and northeast Africa. The Sudanic can be found in a region stretching along the lower Nile and westward through the area known as the Sahel.

One of the smallest, but purest strains involve the Click (Khoisan-Murdock) family, known as such by the characteristic clicking sound made by its speakers. Bushmen and Hottentots of southwestern Africa belong to this family. There are some languages, such as Swahili and Hausa, which act as *lingua francae* between widely divergent groups, especially in regard to trade. In addition to indigenous languages, English, French, Portuguese, and Arabic are used widely throughout Africa for official and commercial purposes.

Ethnolinguistic Groups

Finally the diversity of ethnic groupings, which reflect original racial strains and bear names sometimes, but by no means always, similar to the languages they speak, is illustrated on the ethnolinguistic map. This includes a portion of the names of well-known ethnic-linguistic or tribal groups. Their inclusion does not necessarily reflect their relative importance, nor is their location on the map, along with relation to national borders, politically definitive.

Scattered throughout the continent are approximately 5 million people of predominantly European descent, more than half of whom are concentrated in southern Africa. There are also nearly 1 million Asians and a sprinkling of other races on the continent.

Religion

Religion plays a significant role in the life of most Africans. There are as many variations of indigenous religious practice as there are languages and ethnic groups. However, for the majority of beliefs which have developed within Africa's own culture, there are two or three common denominators. One involves faith in a Supreme Being who created all things, who gave the world its order and infused it with ongoing energy. Another is the conviction that the universe is a unity of being, without separation of physical and spiritual elements.

African religious beliefs also attribute conscious life to nature and natural objects, one of the reasons that the term "animist" (a Latin derivative) has been commonly used as a generic term to cover many traditional religions. In fact it inadequately describes the range and depth of the religious faith which characterizes sub-Saharan Africa. The 7th century sweep of Islam did convert to the Moslem faith many sub-Saharan Africans living in and sometimes below the Sahel and in certain regions of east Africa. Christian missionaries also brought their denominational doctrines to sub-Saharan Africa.

Culture

The cultural richness of Africa is manifested in four major forms: art, music, dance, and literature. All interpret in unique ways the traditional African values—religious beliefs; veneration of the deceased; respect for nature; and the importance of childbearing, the family, the community, and its leaders. The arts express reverence for the past, and when used during the rites of passage—i.e., puberty, marriage, death—teach social roles and responsibilities, as well as aiding in the assimilation of traditional beliefs.

Thanks to energetic art collectors, from early colonial explorers to modern curators and tourists, sculpture has become best known outside the continent as examples of traditional cultural expression. Most of those recently acquired are in wood, but museums do hold fascinating collections of terra cotta Nok statues from the 2d and 3d centuries B.C., as well as Benin and Ife bronzes several thousand years old. Other forms of traditional art include rock paintings, decorative metalwork, basketry, and jewelry.

Traditional dances reveal much of African lore and legend, philosophy, and belief. They may celebrate glories and triumphs of the past, mark contemporary events and rites of passage, or make supplication for a good harvest or the security of the community. Folk dances vary markedly throughout the continent, from those of the Zulu warriors to the Dogon masked societies. However, most involve group, rather than individual, effort with participants massed in circles or lines.

Drums are most often identified with African music. However, Africans for thousands of years have played wind, string, as well as other percussion instruments, obtaining subtle and complex expressions from relatively simple devices. While much of the music has served as accompaniment for dancing, soloists and ensembles perform for many other occasions. The rhythmic patterns of African music are reflected outside the continent, notably in American jazz.

Until the 18th century, most African literature was in the oral tradition, being handed on from generation to generation by word of mouth. Experts estimate that in sub-Saharan Africa one can find over 250,000 myths, legends, and folk tales. Written literature appeared first in areas which reflect Arabic influence, Hausa in west Africa and Swahili in the east. In the past 80 years published works have burgeoned, including such landmarks as Leopold Senghor's "Negritude" poetry, H.I.E. Dhlomo's *Valley of the Thousand Hills*, Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*, and Thomas Mofolo's *Chaka*.

AFRICAN GROUPS

In the tribes of traditional Africa every person—man or woman—had a role assigned to him by the society. He learned the ways of the society and the tasks expected of him. If the particular tribe had a relatively complex structure, he might belong to groups other than family groups within the society, such as age-sets, military wings, secret societies, artisans' guilds, etc. But he would be assigned to these groups just as surely as he would be a member of a given family. Almost no choice would be open to him. He could never openly organize to change the society because the justification of all authority was based on doing things the way they had always been done. This does not mean there was no change, but change was not planned. It came about because of natural disaster or invasion. Men did not organize in groups to bring about change. Rather the groups that existed were there to perform certain traditional functions in ritualistic ways.

As tribesmen migrated to the urban centers under the colonial regime, they often moved away from the direct control of their traditional rulers—because the distance was great, because sometimes the European administration encouraged this, and because they found new rewards and new values in the new urban ways. In general, this decline in allegiance to the traditional rulers was regarded by the African urban migrant as a liberation from the restrictions that had been imposed upon him by ancient custom.

This change in attitude, however, had important consequences for him. The tribal structure had offered him two kinds of security: social and psychological. In the tribe he was always assured of enough to eat, insofar as the whole tribe had enough to eat. He had assured work. When he grew old, the tribe would provide for him. This was his social security. Furthermore, he learned a single set of rules of behavior. He knew what was expected of him and what he could expect of others. He knew that when he was married or his children were born or a member of his family died, the tribe would participate in an appropriate ceremony to mark the occasion. This was his psychological security.

In the towns he tended to lose this kind of security. Often far from home, sometimes separated from his immediate family, he could not count on always having food or employment. In moments of crisis or ceremony—death, birth, marriage, coming-of-age—he might have neither money nor companions with which to mark the occasion. Furthermore, the ways of the city were bewildering. He was not sure what was expected of him or what he might reasonably ask others to do. He was torn between traditional ways and some of the new ideas he learned in the city. He looked around for ways and means to replace the sense of social and psychological security he had lost by leaving his rural, tribal area. To the extent that the government could not provide this security, because of lack of money or personnel or popular acceptance, the migrant to the towns began to create new groups, voluntary associations, which might help to meet these needs. The very idea of a voluntary association was a new one, for it implied that individuals would group together in their own interests for limited purposes to change the social situation in some way. These were more the instruments of change than the instruments of tradition.

Text from Colliers Encyclopedia, Vol. I, 1974, p. 22 (© Macmillan Educational Corporation, 1974).

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA[1]

COUNTRY		LAND		PEOPLE										
				Population				Culture			Education		Labor Force	
Familiar Name Official Name *(Earlier Name)*[2]	**Capital**	**Total Sq. Mi.**	**% in Agriculture**	**Total (mil)**	**Growth Rate (%)**	**Density per Sq. Mi.**	**Life Expectancy (yrs.)**	**Ethnic Groups (%)**	**Religion (%)**	**Language**	**Literacy (%)**	**Primary Students (% of age group[3])**	**% in Agr.**	**% in Industry, Service, & Commerce**
Angola Peoples' Republic of Angola *(Angola)*	Luanda	481,351	22	6.35	2.0	17	38	Ovimbundu 38.0 Kimbundu 23.0 Bakongo 13.0	animist 84.0 Catholic 12.0	Portuguese Local	20	79.0	75.0	Ind. 10 Serv. 10
Benin The People's Republic of Benin *(Dahomey)*	Porto Novo	43,483	18	3.4	2.8	78	40	Fons Adjas Baribas Yoruba	animist 65.0 Christian 15.0 Moslem 13.0	French Local	20	43.0	60.0	Ind. 2 Serv. & Com. 38
Botswana Republic of Botswana *(Bechuanaland)*	Gaborone	220,000	5	.72	3.0	3	55	Batswana and others 99.0 White 1.0	animist 85.0 Christian 15.0	English Setswana	30	na[4]	75.0	25
Burundi Republic of Burundi	Bujumbura	10,747	na	3.9	2.2	362	41	Hutu 85.0 Tutsi 14.0 Twa 1.0	Christian 60.0 animist Moslem	Kirundi French	10	23.0	92.0	Ind 1
Cameroon United Republic of Cameroon *(French and British Cameroons)*	Yaoundé	183,568	35	8.16	2.0	42	41	200 Groups	Moslem Christian animist	English French Local	65	111.0	80.0	Ind 15
Cape Verde Republic of Cape Verde *(Cape Verde Islands)*	Praia	1,557	na	.33	2.8	211	50	Creole 71.0 African 28.0 European 1.0	Catholic 65.0 animist 35.0	Portuguese Crioulo	26	na	na	na
Central African Republic Central African Republic *(Central African Empire; Ubangi-Shari)*	Bangui	247,000	10	2.2	2.3	7	41	Baya-Mandjia Banda M'Baka	Protestant 40.0 Catholic 28.0 animist 24.0 Moslem 8.0	French Sangho	18	79.0	87.0	na
Chad Republic of Chad	N'Djamena	496,000	50	4.2	2.1	8	39	Sudanic Nilotic Arabic Saharan	Moslem Christian animist	French Chadian Arabic	7	37.0	90.0	Ind 4
Comoros Comoros Federal Islamic Republic *(Comoro Islands)*	Moroni	863	na	.37	3.7	117	49	Antalote Cafre Makao Other	Shirazi-Moslem 86.0 Catholic 14.0	Shaafi-Islam Malagasy French	15	50.0	87.0	Govt. 3
Congo People's Republic of the Congo *(French Congo)*	Brazzaville	132,000	1	1.78	2.4	9	44	Bakongo Bateke M'Bochi Sangha	animist 48.0 Christian 47.0 Moslem 5.0	French Lingala Kikongo	90	90.0	70.0	na
Djibouti The Republic of Djibouti *(French Territory of Afars and Issas)*	Djibouti	9,000	na	.25	na	27	na	Somalis (Issas) Afars	Moslem	French Somali Afar Arabic	10	na	na	na

See footnotes at end of table.

ECONOMY												GOVERNMENT			COUNTRY[5]
Gross Domestic Product			Distribution of GDP			Trade									
						Imports		Exports			U.S. Econ. Assistance FY 1979 ($ mil)				
Annual ($ bil.)	Growth Rate (%)	Per Capita ($US)	% From Agr.	% From Ind.	% From Serv.	Total ($ mil)	From U.S. ($ mil)	Total ($ mil)	To U.S. ($ mil)	Leading Exports		Type	Date Independence	Chief of State and/or Head of Govt.	
1.83	6.5	492	29	27	44	541	na	672	na	Oil Coffee Diamonds Iron	1.1	People's Republic	11/11/75	Pres—José E. Dos Santos	**Angola**
.54	3.0	170	39	20	41	226	13	144	na	Palm Products Cotton Peanuts	1.0	Military (Revolutionary Republic)	8/1/60	Pres—Col. M. Kérékou	**Benin**
.23	35.0	480	na	na	na	207	na	170	na	Diamonds Copper Nickel Beef	16.0	Republic Parl. Dem.	9/30/66	Pres—Sir S. Khama	**Botswana**
.50	2.7	128	64	15	21	61.40	na	97.50	na	Coffee Tea	2.0	Republic	7/1/62	Pres—Col. J. B. Bagaza	**Burundi**
2.60	14.20	328	33	20	47	608	48	530	14	Cocoa Coffee Timber Aluminum	10.6	Independent Republic	1/1/60	Pres—A. Ahidjo	**Cameroon**
.07	0	179	na	na	na	32.3	1.8	na	na	Fish Bananas Salt	5.7	Republic	7/5/75	Pres—A. Pereira	**Cape Verde**
.39	4.0	177	37	23	40	78.8	na	80.10	na	Diamonds Cotton Timber Coffee	0.2	Republic	8/13/60	Pres—David Dacko	**Central African Republic**
.29	2.0	120	52	14	34	126	3	98	0	Cotton Livestock	7.0	National Union Transitional Govt.	8/11/60	Pres—Oueddei Goukouni	**Chad**
.05	1.0	153	na	na	na	13	na	9	1.35	Perfume Oils Copra	0	Republic	7/6/75	Pres—Ahmed Abdallah	**Comoros**
.89	2.6	500	15.0	43	42.0	238.9	na	235.4	na	Wood Sugar Tobacco	0.9	People's Republic	8/15/60	Pres—D. Sassou-Nguesso	**Congo**
.06	na	360	na	na	na	74	na	na	20	Hides Cattle Coffee	1.4	Republic	6/27/77	Pres—H.G. Aptidon	**Djibouti**

Selected African Multilateral Organizations

	No. of African Countries[1]	Headquarters
Economic Communities and Other Multisectoral Organizations		
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP) (Lome Convention between EC and ACP)	35	Brussels, Belgium
Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC)	4	Bangui, CAR
Council of the Entente States	5	Abidjan, Ivory Coast
Customs Union Between Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa	4	None
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	16	Lagos, Nigeria
Great Lakes States Economic Community (CEPGL)	4	Rotates
Lake Chad Basin Commission (CBLT)	4	N'Djamena, Chad
Organization for the Development of the Senegal River (OMVS)	3	Dakar, Senegal
Organization of African Unity (OAU)	All independent African states except South Africa	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
River Niger Commission (CFN)	9	Niamey, Niger
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)	All	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
West African Economic Community (CEAO)	7	Ouagadougou, Upper Volta
Specific Purpose Organizations		
African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC)	33	Dakar, Senegal
Cocoa Producers Alliance	7	Lagos, Nigeria
Desert Locust Control Organization for East Africa (DLCOEA)	7	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Inter-African Coffee Organization (IACO)	15	Not designated
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)	4	Vienna, Austria
Permanent Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS)	8	Ouagadougou, Upper Volta
West African Rice Development Association (WARDA)	14	Monrovia, Liberia
Banking, Finance		
African Development Bank (ADB)	37	Abidjan, Ivory Coast
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA)	7	Khartoum, Sudan
Bank of Central African States (BEAC)	5	Yaounde, Cameroon
West African Monetary Union (UMOA)	6	No permanent headquarters
West African Development Bank (BOAD)	6	Lome, Togo
Education and Research		
African Training and Research Center in Administration and Development (CAFRAD)	20	Tangier, Morocco
Association of African Universities (AAU)	32	Accra, Ghana
Pan-African Institute for Development (PAID)	32	Geneva, Switzerland
Organization of Coordination and Cooperation for the Fight Against the Major Endemic Diseases—West Africa (OCCGE)	8	Bobo-Dioulasso, Upper Volta

[1] Numbers are not always limited to sub-Saharan countries, for example, ACP and OPEC include North African and other countries.

Copies of the complete discussion paper, Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States, *may be purchased for $2.50 from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (a 25% discount is allowed when ordering 100 or more discussion papers mailed to the same address).*

"Meet the Press" Interview

President Carter was interviewed on NBC's "Meet the Press" on January 20, 1980, by David Broder, The Washington Post; *Carl T. Rowan,* Chicago Sun-Times; *and Judy Woodruff and Bill Monroe of NBC News.*[1]

Q. Assuming the Soviets do not pull out of Afghanistan any time soon, do you favor the United States participating in the Moscow Olympics? And if not, what are the alternatives?

A. No. Neither I nor the American people would support the sending of an American team to Moscow with Soviet invasion troops in Afghanistan. I've sent a message today to the U.S. Olympic Committee spelling out my own position, that unless the Soviets withdraw their troops within a month from Afghanistan that the Olympic games be moved from Moscow to an alternate site, or multiple sites or postponed or cancelled. If the Soviets do not withdraw their troops immediately from Afghanistan within a month, I would not support the sending of an American team to the Olympics.

It's very important for the world to realize how serious a threat the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan is. I do not want to inject politics into the Olympics, and I would personally favor the establishment of a permanent Olympic site for both the summer and the winter games. In my opinion, the most appropriate permanent site for the summer games would be Greece. This will be my own position, and I have asked the U.S. Olympic Committee to take this position to the International Olympic Committee, and I would hope that as many nations as possible would support this basic position. One hundred and four nations voted against the Soviet invasion and called for their immediate withdrawal from Afghanistan in the United Nations, and I would hope as many of those as possible would support the position I've just outlined to you.

Q. If a substantial number of nations does not support the U.S. position, would not that just put the United States in an isolated position, without doing much damage to the Soviet Union?

A. Regardless of what other nations might do, I would not favor the sending of an American Olympic team to Moscow while the Soviet invasion troops are in Afghanistan.

Q. You spoke earlier of a serious threat to peace. Just how serious is this situation? Are we potentially on the verge of conflict with the Soviet Union?

A. As I said earlier, this in my opinion is the most serious threat to world peace since the Second World War. It's an unprecedented act on the part of the Soviet Union. It's the first time they have attacked, themselves, a nation that was not already under their domination, that is, a part of the Warsaw Pact neighborhood. They have used surrogate forces, the Cubans, to participate in other countries, like Angola or Ethiopia.

This is a threat to a vital area of the world. It's a threat to an area of the world where the interests of our country and those interests of our allies are deeply embedded. More than two-thirds of the total exportable oil that supplies the rest of the world comes from the Persian Gulf region in southwest Asia.

My own assessment is that there have been times in the years gone by that we have had intense competition with the Soviet Union and also an effort for accommodation with the Soviet Union, for consulting with them and working with them toward peace. This is an action initiated by the Soviets, and I am still committed to peace, but peace through strength and through letting the Soviets know in a clear and certain way, by action of our own country and other nations, that they cannot invade an innocent country with impunity; they must suffer the consequences.

Q. In that connection, your critics say that the Soviets are moving because they've seen weakness on your part. They don't believe you or the American people will fight. If they move into Pakistan or into Iran, will you use military force?

A. We've not been weak. We've been firm and resolved and consistent and clear in our policy since I've been in the White House. We've had a steady increase in our commitment to the strength of our national defense, as measured by budget levels and also measured by the tone and actions that I have taken and the Congress has taken. We've strengthened our alliances with NATO, both in the buildup of fighting capability and also lately in the theater nuclear force response to the Soviet threat with atomic weapons.

We've also let it be clear that we favor the resolution of intense differences that have destabilized the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region. The most notable advance has been the peace treaty signed between Israel and Egypt and we have reconfirmed our commitment to Pakistan of 1959. We are committed to consult with Pakistan and to take whatever action is necessary, under the constitutional guidelines that I have to follow as President of our country, to protect the security of Pakistan, involving military force if necessary.

In addition to that, we're increasing and will maintain an increased level of naval forces in the northern Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf region and we are now exploring with some intensity the establishment of facilities for the servicing of our air and naval forces in the northern Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf region. These actions have been initiated ever since I've been in office. They are consistent and clear and we are concentrating on them now with an increased level of commitment because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Q. The timing of this appearance the day before the Iowa caucuses suggests a political motive. Why did you accept this appearance when you have refused to appear anyplace where your challengers could confront you directly?

A. In a time of crisis for our country I believe it's very important for the President not to assume in a public way the role of a partisan campaigner in a political contest. Our country is in a state of crisis, and this has been a consistent policy that I have maintained since the Iranians captured and held hostage Americans in Tehran. I do not consider this to be a campaign forum, "Meet the Press," and I'm not here as a partisan candidate.

As you well know, we have been presenting my views very clearly to the American people in multiple ways, my own appearances before the press, my briefing of groups in the White House, the sending of surrogates for me to Iowa.

tions to form a cooperative security framework, which can enhance their independence and help to preserve regional peace.

To underscore our resolve and our readiness, I've stepped up our overall defense effort and proposed registration for draft-age Americans. I have made it clear that there is no need at this time to reimpose the draft, but registration is a necessary precaution which will expedite mobilization if it should be required in the future.

• • • •

It is important that everyone understands that every action that I have taken is peaceful and is designed to preserve peace. Because we seek peace, we have pursued and will pursue every opportunity to ease tensions. Because we seek peace, we have been cautious and restrained. Because we seek peace, we must leave no room for doubt among our allies and no room for miscalculation among our potential adversaries.

It is obvious that the Soviet leaders did miscalculate in Afghanistan. They underestimated the courage and the tenacity of freedom fighters in that country, and they did not anticipate the world's quick and forceful response to their aggression. They are now paying a high price in the number of casualties in Afghanistan, in our own actions, in the actions of our allies, and in the condemnation of virtually the entire Muslim and Third World community in the United Nations and in the individual and collective statements and actions.

There is no way for you or me to know the future plans of the Soviet leaders. We cannot be certain if or when they will withdraw their forces, if they seek colonial domination only in Afghanistan or if they seek other conquests as well. No President of the United States can afford to gamble our peace and security upon wishful thinking about the present or the future intentions of the Soviet Union. But we do know that our intentions must be crystal clear. We will stand firm against aggression, and we will not accept business as usual with the Soviet Union while the invasion continues.

Our firmness is not a prelude to combat nor is it a return to the cold war. It is simply prudence—to reduce the chances for a misjudgment that could be fatal to peace. It's a reaffirmation of a longstanding commitment and a sustained response to a strategic challenge.

Our measured reaction to this aggression, fortunately, comes at a time when our military strength is unequaled and growing, in keeping with the commitment that I made to you in 1976.

A dangerous decline in defense spending has been reversed. From 1969 to 1976, real defense outlays—that is, constant dollars spent—declined every year. In constant dollars, defense spending dropped by one-third in those 8 years before I became President. President Ford began to reverse this pattern, but only since 1977 have outlays for defense been increased every year. Our 5-year defense program through 1985 will continue this trend.

I would like to reemphasize that from the very start, my Administration, in cooperation with the Congress, has been engaged in a substantial and carefully planned strengthening of our military forces. In December of last year—well before the Soviet invasion—the Secretary of Defense presented to the Congress the broad outlines of my plans for defense spending not only in 1981 but for the next 5 years. And last month I submitted officially the strong budget proposal itself.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has made everyone more aware of the importance of a strong defense capability. But since the process of strengthening our military forces has been underway for several years, the recent developments in southwest Asia do not now require any major redesign of next year's defense budget. Of course we will continue to review our requirements and make any necessary adjustments to meet changing circumstances.

I consider the increase in the defense budget for fiscal year 1981 to be necessary to assure our national security. It's a carefully measured amount, and it in no way signals a new or transient "boom" in defense spending. It is estimated quite accurately that the Soviet Union spends 13% of their gross national income or gross national product on defense. The percentage of our own gross national product represented by defense expenditures for 1981 is about 5%. And that share will hardly vary at all if the present projections of our defense expenditures are carried out in 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985—about 5% of our GNP. The impact of the additional expenditure on the inflation rate will be negligible.

These expenditures for defense are clearly within the capability of our American economy. And moreover, we are spending our money well.

• We are strengthening our strategic "triad" that deters the Soviet nuclear threat.

• I accelerated development of cruise missiles, which begin production this year. Because of their small size and the large numbers, cruise missiles will be far more effective than the B–1 bomber for penetrating Soviet air defenses now or those they can project in the future.

• We have initiated a new MX missile system and finally resolved schedule and contract problems that had stalled the Trident submarine program for so long. The first Trident was launched last year, and six more are under construction.

Because we have emphasized a stronger NATO, which had languished, as you know, during the Vietnam war, we now have commitments from our NATO partners for an annual 3% real growth in their own defense budgets. We have begun joint developments of new weapons, we have enhanced our ability for a rapid deployment of ground and air forces in Europe in a crisis, and have spurred modernization of NATO theater nuclear weapons to meet a threatening buildup of formidable Soviet nuclear missiles in that region of the world.

Our NATO allies keep about 3 million troops on active duty. Added to our 2 million, we can and we will maintain a powerful and effective force for the defense of Western Europe. You can depend on that because it is vital to our own nation's defense

I have also emphasized since I have been in office the general modernizing of the conventional forces of our country, to respond to military threats not only in Europe but in other vital areas of the world.

• We are re-equipping our ground forces. We have already expanded the number of tanks and infantry battalions. We are modernizing our Navy with an additional aircraft carrier, new guided-missile ships, Harpoon cruise missiles, and new and more modern and effective attack submarines. We have now underway the first full-scale modernization of tactical air forces since the 1960s.

• We are capable today of responding to a threat of peace—to a threat to peace in almost any part of the world. Our naval task force now in the Persian Gulf region testifies to our mobility and our strength, and we are building a rapid deployment force which can carry stronger defense forces—much stronger defense forces—to any vital area.

• To achieve that goal, we have already begun development of a new fleet of large transport planes and a force of maritime prepositioning ships with

enough supplies and heavy equipment for three Marine brigades.

The sum of all these defense efforts is a clear message: We have not abdicated—and we will not abdicate—the responsibility of the United States to help maintain a peaceful world.

Commitment to Peace

Our commitment to world peace is twofold: We and our allies must be able to meet any military challenge, and we must be strong and principled as we seek to resolve disputes and to reduce tensions. Preventing nuclear war is a preeminent task, to repeat what I said earlier. That is why the last three U.S. Presidents have negotiated the strategic arms limitation treaties—and I will not abandon this effort to control nuclear weapons. In fact, the immediate crisis underscores the importance of mutual constraints on nuclear weapons. Because it serves our security interests, I remain committed to the ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

Last month I said in my State of the Union address that we must face the world as it is. We must be honest with ourselves, and we must be honest with others. That is why 3 years ago I determined to reverse the declining effectiveness of our military forces. And that is why I have worked so hard to fight inflation as we develop a national energy policy. We are dangerously dependent on imported oil, and there is no cheap way out.

Let me quote from the American Legion's own energy policy statement: "Our national security, as well as our economic security, cannot exist without energy independence. . . ."

I thank you again for your hard work and your effective efforts to face facts and to help build a secure future for our country. We cannot spend or regulate our way out of every national problem. Nor can we abolish inflation by decree. That is the truth. Above all, whether it is registration of young people, increased military strength for ourselves and our allies, or increased energy conservation and production, we cannot have peace and security without a willingness to sacrifice. That is the most important truth of all.

With your help and with the support of the American people, I propose to carry on the struggle for a strong nation, for a just society, and for a peaceful world.

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[1]Text from White House press release of Feb. 19, 1980.

President Carter's News Conference, February 13 (Excerpts)

Since the day our Embassy was seized in Tehran, we have had two goals: one, the safety and release of the Americans being held hostage, and the other is the protection of our national interest in this critical area of the world. Since that first day, we have pursued every possibility to achieve these goals. No stone has been left unturned in the search for a solution.

Over the past several weeks, our efforts and our activities have become particularly delicate and intense. Recently there have been some positive signs, although experience has taught us to guard against excessive optimism.

Since mid-November, we and the Iranian officials have been discussing with Secretary General Waldheim of the United Nations his proposal to send a commission of inquiry to Tehran. We would support steps by the United Nations that would lead to the release of the hostages if the steps are consistent with our goals and our essential international principles. An appropriate commission with a carefully defined purpose would be a step toward resolution of this crisis.

I know that you and the American people will understand that I cannot afford at this delicate time to discuss or to comment further upon any specific efforts that may be underway or any proposals that may be useful in ending this crisis.

Q. Do you think it was proper for the United States to restore the Shah to the throne in 1953 against the popular will within Iran?

A. That's ancient history, and I don't think it's appropriate or helpful for me to go into the propriety of something that happened 30 years ago.

• • • •

Q. If the crisis in Afghanistan is real and as serious as you have said it is—if it is, does the United States have the military capacity to cope with it, short of using a nuclear weapon?

A. The crisis is a great one, precipitated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for several reasons. First of all, this is a crucial area of the world—to us, to our allies, and to other nations. Two-thirds of all the oil exported in the entire world come from the Persian Gulf region. Secondly, it's a highly volatile, rapidly changing, unstable part of the world. Third, the Soviets have been indulging in a steady military buildup over a number of years, which has caused us concern and to which we have reacted since I've been in this office. Fourth, the Soviets—a major departure from anything they've done since the Second World War—have now exhibited a willingness to use their military forces beyond their own borders, in a massive invasion of Afghanistan.

The reaction that I have taken to these steps are appropriate and, I believe and hope, adequate. We must convince the Soviet Union, through peaceful means, *peaceful* means, that they cannot invade an innocent country with impunity, and they must suffer the consequences of their action.

Everything we've done has been to contribute to stability, moderation, consistency, persistence, and peace. We have taken actions on our own, and we have asked our allies and others to join in with us in the condemnation of the Soviet Union and the demand that the Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan and to convince them that any further adventurism on their part would cause grave consequences to the Soviet Union.

In my judgment our forces are adequate. We cannot afford to let the Soviets choose either the terrain or the tactics to be used by any other country—a nation that might be invaded, their neighbors, our allies, or ourselves—if they should persist in their aggressive action. Those judgments would have to be made at the time. But I believe they're adequate.

• • • •

Q. In Afghanistan again, what kind of regime would be acceptable to you? The Russians have said that if they withdraw, they would leave—I think have left the indication that they would leave a puppet regime. Would you insist on a neutralist regime, or what ideas have you on it?

A. What we would like to have, first of all, is a Soviet withdrawal and a commitment, that might be verified and carried out, that the Soviets would not invade another country or use their military forces beyond their borders again to destabilize the peace. We would like to have a neutral country. If there had to be a transition phase during which a neutral and responsible government might be established ac-

Sub-Saharan Africa



Information in this article is intended to provide background for study and discussion; it is not designed to be read as a formal statement of U.S. policy, except where the material is specifically described as such. The article summarizes currently available information and raises relevant questions (some of which admittedly may be unanswerable) as an aid to public discussion of important issues in U.S. foreign policy. All material in this article is in the public domain except where copyright is indicated.

Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States—Part 1

Above: *Tyi Wara* (antelope) headress, Mali
(photo by John Klekas)

Once called the "dark Continent," Africa, in recent years, has become a vital part of this nation's foreign policy. The following discussion paper, compiled by former Ambassador G. Edward Clark, deals with the sub-Saharan nations and their relations with the United States.

The paper is presented as a two-part series with Part 1 focusing on geography, history, the people and their culture, and economic and political conditions. Part 2, to be published in the April BULLETIN, *will examine the role the United States has played in postcolonial African development.*

INTRODUCTION

Sub-Saharan Africa is not only the direct ancestral home of millions of Americans but, according to some anthropologists, perhaps the cradle of mankind—the birthplace of Homo sapiens. Long enshrouded in primeval mist, it has revealed its grandeur and its myriad cultures slowly to the rest of the world. Ancient Egypt and Carthage, followed later by Islamic traders, missionaries, and European colonial powers, ultimately sensed, discovered, and began to exploit the latent potential of the continent's human and natural resources.

Only within the past three decades, however, has the majority of Africa resumed independence through the creation of nation-states and undertaken significant roles in the community of nations. Now African states are in themselves, singly and as a bloc, powers to be reckoned with. It behooves Americans to know this continent—its potential, its strength, its problems—because the future of the United States is inextricably linked to the destiny of Africa.

Sub-Saharan Africa is indeed a majestic mosaic, stretching from the sands of the Sahara to the Cape of Good Hope, lifting from rain forests of the Congo to the snows of Mt. Kilimanjaro. It is a melange of some 1,000 ethnic groups, hundreds of religious sects, and 47 separate countries, 45 of which are fully independent. Africa is an ever-emerging drama of changing leaders, changing names, and changing alliances. But it is far more. For the United States it represents:

- Individual and collective political power;
- A source of essential natural resources;
- An area involving important human rights concerns;
- A potential site for great power confrontation;
- Significant strategic locations; and
- Ever-present hunger for humanitarian and developmental assistance.

For those who already know, understand, and admire Africa and its people, this document is designed to provide some updating of information, views, and data. For those who are not familiar with the continent, it is intended to serve as a basis for understanding the significance and importance of our relations with this vital region of the world.

Although the broad generic term "Africa" is frequently used throughout this publication and some data pertain to the entire continent, attention actually is focused on sub-Saharan Africa and the off-shore island states, which in fact contain the majority of countries and most of the continent's population. Within the Department of State, responsibility for the conduct of relations with this area is delegated to the Bureau of African Affairs. The Department of State conducts relations with North Africa through its Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.



"Despite the impact of modernization in urban areas, traditional loyalties remain strong. . . ."

Left: Africa Hall in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, meetingplace of the Organization of African Unity and U.N. Economic Commission for Africa

Above: Mushenge village chief, Zaire (Museum of African Art, Eliot Elisofon Archives)

POLITICAL PROCESSES

Political institutions and processes vary greatly in sub-Saharan Africa. There are highly centralized forms of governments, constitutional monarchies, military oligarchies and autocracies, as well as parliamentary systems. The latter, in turn, include numerous variations—presidential and collective executives, unicameral and bicameral houses, fully elected and partly appointed legislatures. Universal suffrage is found in most countries, although in some of southern Africa voting rights are racially restricted.

Some of these differences are due in part to the administrative and political institutions imposed upon the Africans during the European colonial period. The various forms of government also reflect different historical and social backgrounds. Ethiopia's former constitutional monarchy, for example, was deeply rooted in the country's centuries-old royal history. Nigeria's newly inaugurated American-style federalism on the other hand, represents an attempt to maintain unity in one of Africa's largest states by accommodating the social, cultural, and historical differences which exist among the country's several ethnic groups.

Africa's Niger-Congo (Nigritic) groupings are characterized by strongly developed traditional structures, which in some cases cut across political boundaries superimposed on areas by colonial powers with little or no regard for linguistic or cultural distribution. Despite the impact of modernization in urban areas, traditional loyalties remain strong and, therefore, the development of national consciousness in Africa is an exceptionally complicated task.

Most independent African nations have endeavored in a variety of ways and with varying degrees of success to make government both effective and responsive to the will of the people, to provide some means for citizen participation in government, and to establish country-wide arenas in which potentially divisive forces—such as ethnic and regional interests—can contest peacefully.

Supplementing and at times superseding the role of government institutions in working toward these goals in many African countries is a ruling political party. Usually the outgrowth of the country's earlier nationalist movement, these parties have continued after independence their efforts to achieve national mobilization and the resolution of differences within the populace. Consequently, much of the political activity which normally occurs within government institutions in most Western nations occurs "outside the government"—within the ruling party—in many African countries. Thus political confrontation, bargaining, and decisionmaking frequently take place more often within the party organization than within the formal structure of government.

Although many of these political parties before independence could boast unified bodies of support, they now experience pressures toward fragmentation. Opposition has frequently been based on ethnic-linguistic and regional rather than national loyalties. This strains national political unity, leading in some cases to the breakaway movements or strong centralized governments cited earlier. The postindependence era has also seen the rise of new competing factions based on age, economic, and other interests.

It is probable that the African states will continue to experience change in government form and process as they experiment in an effort to find the best political mechanism for their particular needs.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

Sharp contrasts are found in the economies of the 45 independent, and 2 nearly independent, countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Some, like Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Zaire, Zambia, and South Africa have large reserves of minerals. Today, from its known reserves, Africa produces 95% of the world's diamonds, 87% of its cobalt, 65% of its gold, 54% of its chrome, and a steadily increasing proportion of its petroleum. A few, like Ivory Coast and Kenya, have successfully developed agricultural exports. On the other hand, others, such as Chad, Mali, and Upper Volta in the Sahel, are doubly disadvantaged by poor resources and landlocked locations which create high transport costs. These contrasting circumstances are further accentuated by varied colonial and cultural heritages and postcolonial philosophies of economic development.

Generally speaking, however, most of Africa suffers from poverty and extreme underdevelopment. The continent, in fact, contains two-thirds of the world's least economically developed countries. Economic growth rates of 2% and other indicators are discouraging, portending further economic and human crises, as well as possible resultant political unrest.

The major sectors of concern affecting African development involve agriculture, transport, health, desertification and deforestation, energy, industrial employment, trade, education, and population growth.

Agriculture

Agricultural prospects are discouraging. Per capita food production is now declining by 1.4% annually, compared with Asia's 3.4% increase each year. A deficit of 23 million tons of food grains in Africa is forecast by 1990 unless production can be significantly increased. This deficit would be 14 times greater than 1975 shortages. Average daily per capita nutritional intake for Africa is 1,950 calories and 55 protein grams, the lowest in the developing world and declining. Wholly inadequate transportation systems prevent agricultural and



Pumping water in Malawi (USICA photo by Richard Saunders)

COUNTRY		LAND		PEOPLE										
				Population				Culture			Education		Labor Force	
Familiar Name Official Name *(Earlier Name)*[2]	**Capital**	**Total Sq. Mi.**	**% in Agriculture**	**Total (mil)**	**Growth Rate (%)**	**Density per Sq. Mi.**	**Life Expectancy (yrs.)**	**Ethnic Groups (%)**	**Religion (%)**	**Language**	**Literacy (%)**	**Primary Students (% of age group[3])**	**% in Agr.**	**% in Industry, Service, & Commerce**
Equatorial Guinea Republic of Equatorial Guinea *(Equatorial Guinea and Spanish Guinea)*	Malabo	10,820	85-90	.31	1.7	29	na	Fang 75.0 Benges Combes Other 25.0	Catholic 60.0 Protestant animist	Spanish	20	na	95.0	Ind .2
Ethiopia Ethiopia *(Empire of Ethiopia)*	Addis Ababa	455,000	53	30.0	2.5	62	38	Amhara 25.0 Galla 40.0 Tigre 12.0 Other 23.0	Ethiopian Orthodox Christian 40.0 Moslem 45.0 animist 15.0	Amharic Tigrinya Gallinya Arabic	7	23.0	86.0	Ind 10
Gabon Gabonese Republic *(Gabon)*	Libreville	102,317	1 Forest-75	.58	1.7	5.4	na	Fang Eshira Bapounou Bateke	Christian 46.0 Moslem animist	French	20.0	na	70.0	Ind. 30
Gambia (The) Republic of the Gambia *(Gambia)*	Banjul	4,003	55	.56	2.08	139	na	Mandingo 40.0 Fula 13.0 Wolof 12.0 Other 35.0	Moslem 85.0 animist Christian	English Mandinka Wolof	10.0	na	85.0	na
Ghana Republic of Ghana *(Gold Coast)*	Accra	92,100	70	10.6	3.2	115	48	Akan Ewe Ga	animist 45.0 Christian 43.0 Moslem 12.0	English Akan, Ewe, Ga	30.0	60.0	60.0	Ind 10
Guinea People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea *(French Guinea)*	Conakry	246,048	na	4.5	2.5	18	41	Foulah Malinke Soussous	Moslem 75.0 animist 24.0 Christian 1.0	French Local	10.0	17.0	84.0	Ind & Com 9
Guinea-Bissau Republic of Guinea-Bissau *(Portuguese Guinea)*	Bissau	14,000	na	.92	3.0	65	35	Balanta Fulani Manjaca	animist Moslem Christian	Portu-guese Crioulo	12.0	na	90.0	5.0
Ivory Coast Republic of The Ivory Coast *(Ivory Coast)*	Abidjan	124,500	na	7.3	4.2	58	44	60 Groups	animist 63.0 Moslem 25.0 Christian 12.0	French Local	20.0	62.0	75.0	25.0
Kenya Republic of Kenya *(Kenya)*	Nairobi	224,900	10-15.0	15.8	4.0	70	53	Kikuyu 20.0 Luo 14.0 Luhya 14.0 Other 52.0	animist 38.0 Protestant 37.0 Catholic 22.0 Moslem 3.0	English Swahili Local	25.0	109.0	21.0	Ind 23.0
Lesotho Kingdom of Lesotho *(Basutoland)*	Maseru	11,716	na	1.2	2.1	102	46	Sotho 85.0 Nguni 14.0 White 1.0	Christian 70.0 animist 30.0	English Sesotho Xhosa Zulu	59.0	65.0	90.0	Ind 2.0 Serv 2.0 Govt 4.0
Liberia Republic of Liberia *(Liberia)*	Monrovia	43,000	na	1.73	3.3	40	46	American Descendents 20 Niger-Congo Groups	Tribal 75.0 Moslem 15.0 Christian 10.0	English, Local	24.0	40.0	76.0	9.0

ECONOMY												GOVERNMENT			COUNTRY[5]
Gross Domestic Product			Distribution of GDP			Trade					U.S. Econ. Assist-ance FY 1979 ($ mil)				
						Imports		Exports							
Annual ($ bil.)	Growth Rate (%)	Per Capita ($US)	% From Agr.	% From Ind.	% From Serv.	Total ($ mil)	From U.S. ($ mil)	Total ($ mil)	To U.S. ($ mil)	Leading Exports		Type	Date Inde-pen-dence	Chief of State and/or Head of Govt.	
.07	.20	240	na	na	na	20	na	2.2	na	Cocoa Coffee Wood Bananas	0	Republic	10/12/68	Pres—Lt. Col. Obiang Nguema Mbazogo	**Equatorial Guinea**
2.6	4.0	103	50.0	15	35.0	520	27	306	95	Coffee Pulses Hides Meat	9.0	Provi-sional Military	Since Ancient Times	Chief of State—Mengistu Haile-Mariam	**Ethiopia**
2.2	10.0	4,012	na	na	na	800	25.9	1,449	187	Petroleum Wood Manganese Uranium	0	Republic	8/17/60	Pres—El Hadj Omar Bongo	**Gabon**
.17	4.5	280	na	na	na	84.2	1.44	42	.8	Peanuts Palm Fish Hides	4.9	Republic	2/18/65	Pres—Sir A. D. Jawara	**Gambia**
7.95	2.9	380	49.0	25	26.0	842	134	804	153	Cocoa Minerals Wood	22.3	Republic	3/6/57	Pres—Hilla Limann	**Ghana**
1.0	3.0	140	43.0	33	24	206	na	272	na	Bauxite Alumina Fruit Coffee	8.5	Republic	10/2/58	Pres—Sekou Touré	**Guinea**
.15	na	120	na	na	na	35	na	12	0	Peanuts Palm Products Fish	2.3	Republic	9/24/73	Pres—Luis Cabral	**Guinea-Bissau**
6	9.10	821	25.0	20.0	55.0	1,300	97	1,600	171	Coffee Cocoa	0	Republic	8/7/60	Pres—F. Houphouët-Boigny	**Ivory Coast**
5.5	5.7	337	30.0	23.0	47.0	1,800	na	1,100	na	Coffee Tea Meat Cement	28.0	Republic	12/12/63	Pres—D. T. arap Moi	**Kenya**
.24	4.0	120	38.0	8.0	54.0	206	na	16.80	na	Wool Mohair Cattle Diamonds	12.2	Constitu-tional Monarchy	10/4/66	King—Moshoeshoe II PM—Dr. L. Jonathan	**Lesotho**
.82	4.0	450	29.0	37.0	34.0	463.5	na	447.4	na	Iron Rubber Timber Diamonds	9.8	Republic	1847	Pres—W. R. Tolbert, Jr.	**Liberia**

I think my positions and the actions that I've taken have been very clear, and my appearance on this show is an opportunity to give you, for instance, a chance to ask me questions about issues that are important to the American people.

Q. A colleague of mine printed this question 3 weeks ago, at the time that you cancelled out of the Iowa debate, as an example of what you might have been asked, and I'd like to ask it.

A. Fine.

Q. With all due respect, we still have 5.8% unemployment. Inflation has risen from 4.8% to 13%. We still don't have a viable energy policy. Russian troops are in Cuba and Afghanistan. The dollar is falling. Gold is rising. And the hostages, after 78 days, are still in Tehran. Just what have you done, sir, to deserve renomination?

A. Well, since I've been in the White House, I've done everything possible to strengthen our own nation, not only militarily but economically and politically, and I think morally and ethically as well. We have strengthened our alliances with our allies, which has been pointed out already on this program. We have dealt not only with peace for our country but peace for others, working with the British and Rhodesia, working with the Egyptians and Israelis in the Middle East.

We've tried to expand American friendships among other nations on Earth, notably being successful in retaining our friendship with the people of Taiwan, opening up a new and friendly relationship with the recognizition [sic] of a fourth of the world's total population in China. We've had, I think, a great improvement in our own nation's relationships with countries as expressed by recent U.N. votes.

Domestically, I've dealt with the nation's crises and problems as best I could, working with a Congress that sometimes acts too slowly. Since the first day I've been in office, we've been addressing the most serious threat to our nation domestically and that is inflation, tied very closely with energy.

Energy is the single most important factor in the increase in the inflation rate since I've been in office. Just in the last 12 months OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] has increased energy prices by 80%. As a matter of fact, all the increase, for practical purposes, of the inflation rate since I've been in office has been directly attributable to increase in OPEC oil prices.

When I was elected the prime threat to our country was extremely high unemployment. We've added a net increase of 9 million jobs, and we've cut the unemployment rate down by 25%. This has been a very good move toward the strengthening of our nation's economy. We've cut down our balance of trade deficit. We have seen a very clear increase in net income for Americans above inflation, above taxes paid of about 7½%. Corporate profits have gone up about 50%. And I think our nation is much more unified and I believe in addition to that, there's a greater respect for the integrity and the truthfulness of the government of our country. So we've made some progress.

I might say that I don't claim to know all the answers. They are not easy questions to address. They are not easy problems to solve. But our country is united. We are struggling with these very difficult and complicated questions. And I think that they need to be pursued further, hopefully in a second term for myself.

Q. You said in an interview recently that the invasion of Afghanistan had changed your opinions of the Russians more drastically than anything else since you had been in office. Why did it take almost 3 years for you to discover the true intentions of the Soviet leadership?

A. I've never doubted the long-range policy or the long-range ambitions of the Soviet Union. The fact that we have consistently strengthened our own nation's defense after 15 years of a decrease in commitment to our nation's defense vis-a-vis the Soviets is one indication of that. All of the actions that I described earlier, the strengthening of NATO, the movement into the northern Indian Ocean, the search for peace in the Mideast, and so forth were directly because of the ultimate threat by the Soviet Union to world peace.

But it is obvious that the Soviets' actual invasion of a previously nonaligned country, an independent, freedom-loving country, a deeply religious country with their own massive troops is a radical departure from the policy or actions that the Soviets have pursued since the Second World War. It is a direct threat because Afghanistan, formerly a buffer state between the Soviet Union and Iran and the world's oil supplies and the Hormuz Straits and the Persian Gulf, has now become kind of an arrow aiming at those crucial strategic regions of the world. So this is a major departure by the Soviet Union from their previous actions. Their long-range policies have been well understood by me then and still are.

Q. And yet your Administration didn't take any steps to offset the huge increases in the number of Cuban troops in Africa in recent years. Soviet combat troops are still in Cuba today, despite your statement last fall that their presence was not acceptable. In light of this failure to counter Soviet aggression earlier, do you accept any responsibility at all for the Soviet calculation that they could move into Afghanistan with impunity?

A. The Soviets have seriously misjudged our own nation's strength and resolve and unity and determination and the condemnation that has accrued to them by the world community because of their invasion of Afghanistan. As you know, Cuban troops went into Angola long before I became President, and the Soviet brigade, about 2,000 to 2,500 troops, has been in Cuba since the early 1960s. There has obviously been a buildup in the Soviet adventurism in the horn of Africa, in Ethiopia. These moves were of great concern to us.

But the point that I would like to make clear is that we have always had a very complicated relationship with the Soviet Union based on cooperation when we could together move toward a peaceful resolution of the world's problems like the negotiation of the SALT Treaty and competition with the Soviet Union when our interests were at cross purposes in any region of the world. I think our strength has been clearly demonstrated. The resolve of our nation has been clearly demonstrated. The support of our allies has been clearly demonstrated, and, indeed, the support of the world in the condemnation of the Soviets' recent invasion has also been clearly demonstrated.

Times change and circumstances change. Our country has been one that does commit itself to the preservation of peace, but peace through strength, not weakness. That has been our policy. That will still be our policy.

Q. Is there any specific new hope for ending the hostage crisis with Iran?

A. I can't predict the early end of that situation. The concern that I feel about the hostages today is just as great as it was a month ago or 2 months ago. Our policy on the Iranian capturing of our hostages has been clear and consistent. It's an abhorrent violation of every moral and ethical standard and international

law. It's a criminal act, a group of terrorists, kidnappers seizing innocent victims and holding them for attempted blackmail in an unprecedented way, supported and encouraged by government officials themselves.

Our response has been clear, to protect, first of all, the short term and long-range interests of our country; secondly, to protect the safety and the lives of the hostages themselves; third, to pursue every possible avenue of the early and safe release of our hostages; fourth, to avoid bloodshed if possible because I have felt from the very beginning that the initiation of a military action or the causing of bloodshed would undoubtedly result in the death of the hostages; and fifth, and perhaps most difficult of all, is to arouse and to sustain the strong support by the vast majority of nations on Earth for our position as an aggrieved nation and the condemnation of the world for Iran for this direct violation of international law. It's an abhorrent act.

I don't know when the hostages will be released, but we will maintain our intense interests in it. We will maintain our commitment to every possible avenue to carry out the policies I've just described to you, and we will maintain as best we can the full support of the rest of the world and that concerted pressure from many sources, including the recent sanctions that we have initiated against Iran, I believe and I hope and I pray will result in the safe release of our hostages. I can't predict exactly when.

Q. How do you answer criticism that your Administration bungled the admission of the Shah to this country chiefly by not providing guaranteed protection to the American Embassy in Iran after American diplomats had warned that there might be this kind of trouble, and there had been, in fact, a seizure of the Embassy a few months previously?

A. I don't have any apology at all for letting the Shah come here as an extremely sick person—

Q. What about protection of the Embassy?

A. —for treatment. The Embassy had been attacked in the past. Embassies around the world are often subjected to attacks. In every instance the Iranian officials had joined with our own people to protect the Embassy of the United States. Following the seizure of the Embassy earlier in the year we had carried out a substantial program for the strengthening of the Embassy's defenses.

After the Shah came here to the United States for treatment and we notified the Iranian officials of that fact, we were again assured by the Iranian Prime Minister and the Iranian Foreign Minister that the Embassy would be protected. It was, indeed, protected for about 10 days, following which the Ayatollah Khomeini made a very aggressive and abusive speech and when it was attacked by militant terrorists, the Iranians, the Iranian Government, withdrew their protection for the Embassy.

It was an unpredictable kind of thing. This has never been done, so far as I know, in modern history, to have a government support a terrorist act of this kind, the kidnapping of hostages and the holding of them for attempted blackmail. But there was no stone unturned in our attempt to maintain relations with Iran, which is in our interest, and at the same time to protect our people.

Q. Some of our allies are now saying that Iran already is in chaos and that if the United States puts the economic screws on, that country could fall apart and make it easy for the Soviet Union to pick up the pieces. Are you listening to this or are you still going to put the screws on Iran?

A. That's been a constant concern of mine. What we want is a unified Iran, not fragmented. We want a stable and independent Iran, and we want a secure Iran. But we cannot accept the abhorrent act, supported by the Iranian officials, of the terrorists holding Americans hostage. We have decided to take action against Iran, with the presence of our naval forces, to prevent injury to our hostages; and secondly, to impose, with an increasing degree of severity, sanctions against Iran that would encourage them to release the hostages.

There has been obviously a new element introduced into the Iranian hostage crisis in recent weeks with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. My belief is that many of the responsible officials in Iran now see that this major threat to Iran's security, and the peace of Iran, is becoming paramount, and that there will be an additional effort on their part to secure the release of the hostages and remove the isolation of Iran from the rest of the civilized world.

But I think our actions have been well considered. We have taken every element of caution about the possibility which you describe. And in my judgment, the best thing for Iran to do now is to release the hostages, to seek redress of their alleged grievances in the international fora and the courts of the individual nations, and to begin to strengthen themselves against the possible threat by the Soviets now addressed toward them in Afghanistan.

Q. In view of what you just said, are you prepared to accept a delay or postponement of the imposition of the economic sanctions against Iran?

A. No. Those sanctions will be pursued by ourselves, unilaterally, and joined in by as many of our allies as will agree. We have had very acceptable support by our allies in this imposition of sanctions against Iran, and we've had overwhelming support in the International Court of Justice and in the United Nations from many nations who've observed this situation. So I will not postpone the imposition of sanctions.

Q. In 1976 you castigated the Republicans for what you described as a "misery index" of some 13%. That misery index is now up to 19%. What do you think about it now?

A. Obviously, when a nation is in a state of crisis—a deep obsession and concern with the holding of innocent Americans and an acknowledged threat to world peace by a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; with high inflation brought about by, in my opinion, unwarranted increases in the price of oil—this preys on the minds of Americans. We are taking action, as I've described, on this program and previously to alleviate these concerns, and I believe that the unity of America has been paramount. I believe the future will hold a better prospect for the alleviation of those tensions. ■

[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980.

ceptable to the Afghanistan people, then perhaps some peacekeeping force espoused by the United Nations, maybe comprised of Muslim military troops or otherwise, could be used during that transition phase.

But the prime consideration that I have is to make sure that the Soviets know that their invasion is not acceptable, to marshal as much support from other nations of the world as possible, and to prevent any further threat to the peace and the cause of war. I think through strength we can maintain peace. But we've got to be resolute, we've got to be consistent, and our actions have got to be in a tone of long-range, predictable action clearly understood by the Soviet Union.

Q. You call for an increase of about 5% in military defense spending. Some Members of Congress have suggested that that might be too small, given the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Would you support a plan by Congress to go as far as doubling the current 5% increase in military spending?

A. Ever since the first year I've been President, we've had a substantial and steady increase in spending for defense, because I recognized that we had some defects in our defense capability when I became President. I might add, in complete accuracy, that President Ford had initiated this buildup shortly before he went out of office. It's one I've continued.

In my opinion, the military budget that we have presented to the Congress in recent weeks is the appropriate level of expenditures. It's very carefully matched to how rapidly we can purchase and develop weapons and accurately matched to the ultimate goals of deployment of our troops, the mobility of our troops, and the interrelationship with our allies.

I'm not saying that there would be no fine tuning or some modification to the budget that wouldn't be acceptable to me, but I would resist very strongly any effort—as has been proposed just recently—to cut the defense budget below what I proposed.

. . . .

Q. You have said that the Soviets have to be made to pay a price for invading Afghanistan, and your counsel has said that our boycott of the Olympics is not intended to be punitive. How do you explain the seeming difference between these two positions?

A. We have no desire to use the Olympics to punish, except the Soviets attach a major degree of importance to the holding of the Olympics in the Soviet Union. In their own propaganda material, they claim that the willingness of the International Olympic Committee to let the games be held in Moscow is an endorsement of the foreign policy and the peace-loving nature of the Soviet Union.

To me it's unconscionable for any nation to send athletes to the capital of a nation under the aegis of the Olympics when that nation—that host nation—is actively involved in the invasion of and the subjugation of innocent people. And so, for that reason, I don't believe that we are at all obligated to send our athletes to Moscow.

And I would like to repeat, if the Soviet Union does not withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by the 20th of this month, then neither I nor the American people nor the Congress will support the sending of an Olympic team to Moscow this summer.

. . . .

Q. If the Soviets, by any chance, should remove their troops from Afghanistan between February 20 and May 24, when the Olympic committees have to give their decisions, is there any possibility you might change your mind and then support sending the American team to Moscow?

A. I don't see any possibility of that.

. . . .

Q. As you know, the French have not agreed to go to a foreign ministers conference in Rome later this month. The West Germans have not agreed to the Olympic boycott, and there's been some dissatisfaction, I understand, with your Administration's reaction to the Japanese. Have you been entirely satisfied with the Japanese, the French, and the West German reactions to your call for punishment and sanctions against the Soviet Union?

A. In general, I have been well pleased, yes. There's a remarkable degree of unanimity among all our major allies about the seriousness of the Soviet threat into Afghanistan and the actions that must be taken to counter that threat and prevent further aggression by the Soviet Union.

There are nuances of difference. The countries are different; they have different perspectives; they have different forms of government. Some are coalition governments where the prime minister has a different party represented in his foreign ministry and so forth. We do have times when we get aggravated and displeased, for instance, with the French. There are times when the French get aggravated and displeased by us.

The recent disagreement on exactly the time and the composition and the secrecy to be maintained by the foreign ministers meeting was unfortunate. My understanding of it was derived from a telephone conversation with [West German] Chancellor Schmidt after he met several days with [French] President Giscard d'Estaing. My understanding was that the date and the place had been arranged by them and that I was conforming to their request. That was not the same understanding that the French had. We did not communicate adequately. But that's just a minor difference compared to the major agreements on which we base present and future policy among us allies.

. . . .

Q. You once said that you weren't sure whether American troops should ever be used to defend Yugoslavia. Marshal Tito is sick. In light of Afghanistan, do you still feel that way?

A. We have had close discussions with the Yugoslavian leaders, including Marshal Tito when he was here not too long ago. The overall message that they give to us, which I accept as accurate, is that Yugoslavia is a strong, fiercely independent, courageous, well-equipped nation that can defend itself. If we are called upon to give any kind of aid to the Yugoslavian people in the future, we would seriously consider it and do what, in our opinion, would be best for them and for us.

I've had frequent conversations recently with other major European leaders about the need to strengthen our ties with Yugoslavia and to protect them as a nonaligned country, without being dominated or threatened successfully by the Soviet Union. We'll take whatever action is necessary to carry out those goals, but commensurate with actual need and commensurate with specific requests from Yugoslavia itself. ■

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 18, 1980.

But now these efforts have an even greater worth.

• We will maintain a policy of positive engagement with the developing world, to assist their development and help them defend their independence. This is deeply in our interest as well as theirs.

• And we will continue to press the process of democratization and human rights. For as President Carter noted in his State of the Union address:

> In repressive regimes, popular frustrations often have no outlet except through violence. But when peoples and their governments can approach their problems together—through open, democratic methods—the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and enduring. That is why our support for human rights in other countries is in our own national interest as well as part of our own national character.

Supporting the Foreign Service

Against this policy background, let me comment briefly on the safety and well-being of the people on whom we depend to conduct the foreign affairs of this Nation.

Since the days of Benjamin Franklin and the Committee of Correspondence, our diplomats have risked their lives in the service of our country. At no time since World War II has such service been more dangerous and difficult than at present. Recent events have illustrated the point all too clearly. Foreign Service has often become hazardous, frontline duty as evidenced by actions against our people in Tehran, Islamabad, Kabul, Tripoli, Managua, and San Salvador.

At many other posts, persons serving abroad have to work and live under conditions of physical danger and stress. More and more employees endure long periods of separation from their families because of deteriorating conditions of overseas service and, more recently, because of widespread evacuations of their dependents.

Despite these most trying circumstances the Foreign Service has performed with singular dedication and high competence.

During times such as these, the members of the Foreign Service deserve the best conditions of service and support we can reasonably provide. To this end, the budget submissions before you have been formulated, and certain revisions may be needed, to provide enhanced support for our people in several respects.

• Our foreign buildings operations, which have always had the strong backing of this committee and the Congress, have been modified to provide greater emphasis than before on better staff housing and safer working space in dangerous, disagreeable, and high-cost locations.

• Our FY 1981 request presently contains $25 million for post security against potential terrorist attacks and better safeguards against fire. In light of the increased danger of hostile mob actions, we are seeking authorization to submit in the near future an FY 1980 supplemental request designed to provide better protection in such circumstances.

• The Administration will soon reach a final decision on a new single Foreign Service pay plan. The Administration will then be requesting additional FY 1981 sums, as covered in the allowances for contingencies section of the Federal budget, to provide Foreign Service employees pay comparable to their Civil Service counterparts. This was recommended by a congressionally mandated expert pay study completed last June and is required by the Pay Comparability Act of 1971.

• Our evacuation costs reached a record high last year and may do so again this year. Thus there is an unavoidable deficit in the FY 1979 emergencies account, along with an anticipated shortfall this year, for which we are seeking supplemental funds.

• For the worst hardship posts we are also including funds in our FY 1981 request to permit annual rest and recuperation trips to the United States for the first time, as authorized by Congress.

• We are requesting funds and positions in the FY 1981 submission to strengthen our basic reporting and analytical capabilities at key posts and related critical hard-language training skills.

• And finally, we are seeking final congressional support this year for a new Foreign Service Act to replace the present obsolete 1946 charter. The authorizing committees are now marking up the bill. This measure will provide a modern, simplified, and supportive personnel structure. The understanding and subsequent support of the Appropriations Committee will be essential.

In concluding, let me emphasize one point: If we are to meet the requirements of leadership in a troubled world, we have to back our policies with our resources.

That basic truth is widely recognized in connection with our defenses. We must be prepared to invest considerably greater sums in the years ahead.

The same rule applies in connection with our foreign economic and military assistance. Minimal commitments will not overcome massive requirements.

The rule holds just as firmly when it comes to supporting the people we depend upon to design and conduct the foreign policy of the United States.

I am confident that they will continue to justify your backing and support in the critical times ahead. ■

[1] Press release 30 of Feb. 4, 1980. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

"New York Times" Interview

Following are excerpts from Secretary Vance's interview with Bernard Gwertzman on January 15, 1980, and published in The New York Times *on January 16.*

Q. About a year ago, you were saying that if we got a strategic arms agreement, this might lead to better relations with the Soviet Union, and I wondered if you might reflect on what went wrong.

A. I had hoped that if we were able to get SALT II negotiated and signed and ratified that this would provide a basis for a more stable relationship, without the peaks and valleys that we have experienced in the more than 3 years we have been here.

However, the situation which we have just seen take place in Afghanistan has obviously had a very major negative impact on our relations. The Soviet Union clearly crossed a threshold in its action.

revising the list to eliminate items for which controls are not warranted.

I have acted in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States under the authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979. I transmit herewith my report pursuant to Sections 6(e) and 7(g)(3) of the Act.

I have recognized that other countries are major exporters of agricultural commodities. At my direction, United States officials promptly began consultations with other major agricultural exporters to seek their cooperation in restricting exports in harmony with our actions. These consultations and negotiations have been fruitful and will continue. We have also consulted with U.S. farm organizations and trading companies, and these consultations have contributed valuable information concerning the domestic impact of these export restrictions, their adverse impact on the Soviet Union, and the availability of identified items from foreign sources. I have considered the possibility that some of the agricultural commodities involved might be obtained by the Soviet Union from other countries. I have also assessed the threat to our national security and foreign policy posed by the Soviet aggression and the consequences of a failure to take prompt and decisive action. I have determined pursuant to Section 4(c) of the Act that the absence of such controls would prove detrimental to the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States.

Pursuant to Section 6(d) of the Act, I have determined that although reasonable efforts have been made to achieve the purposes of these controls through alternative means, available alternatives would not comparably advance the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States.

I have also directed that the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate officials, review and revise our policy with respect to the export of high technology and other strategic items to the Soviet Union. This review is to proceed with the utmost urgency. Effective January 11, 1980 the Department of Commerce suspended all outstanding licenses and authorizations for exports to the Soviet Union and announced that it has suspended the issuance of new licenses and authorizations. The review I have directed will also consider what our policy should be on future applications for licenses, whether existing special licenses should be amended or revoked, and whether validated licenses should be required for any other exports currently permitted to the Soviet Union under general license. The Secretary of Commerce announced on January 11, 1980 his denial on national security grounds of eight license applications for export of high technology items to the Soviet Union.

When the review and revision of our policy on high technology and other strategic items is completed, I will submit a further report to the Congress concerning any additional controls that may be imposed.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

Restrictions on Agricultural Commodity Exports to the USSR: Report to the Congress Pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979

Acting pursuant to a Presidential directive issued on January 7, 1980 under the authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979, the Department of Commerce has issued rules effective p.m. January 7, 1980, restricting the export of identified agricultural commodities and products to the Soviet Union. (45 Fed. Reg. 1883, Jan. 9, 1980). This is the Report required by Sections 6(e) and 7(g) (3) of the Act with respect to the imposition of these export controls.

These Restrictions Further Significantly U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy Interests

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the installation of a puppet government is an extraordinary and grave act of aggression which threatens vital U.S. security and foreign policy interests. This invasion is an extremely serious threat to peace.

- It places the Soviets within aircraft striking range of the vital oil resources of the Persian Gulf;
- It threatens a strategically located country, Pakistan;
- It poses the prospect of increased Soviet pressure on Iran and on other nations of the Middle East;
- Above all, it is the first Soviet invasion of a previously independent and unoccupied nation since World War II.

These extraordinary circumstances demand prompt and forceful response by the United States. We must show the Soviet Union that it cannot expect to continue to do business as usual with the United States while it is invading and occupying an independent nation. Accordingly restrictions have been placed on agricultural exports to the USSR. These exports make a substantial contribution to Soviet strength. U.S. security interests are affected when that strength is devoted to the military invasion of previously independent nations. Curtailment of these exports is a critical element in our efforts to demonstrate to the USSR in tangible ways that it cannot engage in armed aggression with impunity and without cost to itself.

As President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, I find that the exports being curtailed by this action make a significant contribution to the military potential of the Soviet Union that is detrimental to the national security of the United States.

Probability of Success. The restrictions can reasonably be expected to bring home to the Soviet leaders that they cannot act as they have in Afghanistan without paying a significant price. The controls are expected to have a significant impact on the Soviet economy. They will impress upon the Soviet people the consequences of their government's actions. Absent substitutes from other sources, the restrictions will mean the loss of up to half of projected grain imports for FY 1980. Combined with the 48 million ton short-fall from planned 1979 production, the effect will be a major reduction in the availability of livestock feed, the slaughter of livestock that cannot be fed, and in due course a significant reduction in USSR meat production below planned levels. Moreover, contacts with the governments of other major grain supplier countries indicate that there will be substantial cooperation in limiting the Soviet Union's ability to replace the curtailed U.S. shipments with imports from other sources.

Compatibility with Foreign Policy. The controls are essential to achieve U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives and are compatible with overall U.S. policy toward the USSR, for the reasons given above.

Foreign Reaction. Many countries have expressed support for these actions by the United States, and United States officials are urgently consulting with other suppliers to seek complementary actions.

Economic Impact of Controls. The most significant effect of the control on U.S. exports relates to the 17 million tons of grain previously authorized for the Soviet Union, valued at about $2.3 billion. In FY 1978 U.S. exports of all agricultural commodities to the USSR were $1.9 billion, and in FY 1979 $2.2 billion. These exports constituted 6.8% of total U.S. agricultural exports in FY 1978 and 6.9% in FY 1979. Grain exports accounted for about 80% of the value of U.S. agricultural exports to the USSR in FY 1979. Soybeans accounted for another 15%. The U.S. provided 65.1% of Soviet grain imports in FY 1978 and 77.8% in FY 1979.

Total Soviet grain utilization is estimated at 231 million metric tons from July, 1978 to June, 1979, and—before imposition of these restrictions—was projected to be 228 million tons for July, 1979 to June, 1980. U.S. grain exports (11.1 million tons) accounted for 4.8% of the 1978/1979 Soviet use. Before these restrictions, U.S. exports were projected to provide 11.2% (25.5 million tons) of the Soviets' projected 1979/1980 utilization (228 million tons).

The United States is the world's largest exporter of wheat and corn and will remain so even after the suspension of most agricultural commodity exports to the Soviet Union. The United States has been undertaking consultations with other governments to reduce the possibility that other suppliers would take advantage of U.S. action to build up their own competitive position at U.S. expense. Because the export restriction has been imposed on agricultural commodities destined to the USSR in response to a Soviet act of aggression and on the basis of fundamental U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, it is unlikely that such action will diminish the overall reputation of the United States as a reliable supplier.

With respect to foreign availability of wheat and corn, the United States is the major supplier of these commodities in world trade. At this time, it appears that additional supplies available in the world market are limited. With respect to soybeans and soybean products, there is substantially greater foreign availability. The availability of these commodities to the Soviet Union will depend therefore, in part, upon the cooperation of foreign suppliers.

In the absence of offsetting domestic policies the restriction on agricultural exports to the USSR would have an economic impact primarily on grain farmers, on firms and employees in the grain sector, on certain rail and barge lines, and on communities in grain producing areas.

Absent offsetting action, it is estimated that the restrictions on the export of agricultural commodities to the Soviet Union would reduce 1980 farm income by approximately $3.0 billion.

The Secretary of Agriculture has been directed to take a number of actions, using authorities already available under current law, to ensure that the suspension of exports to the USSR will not fall unfairly on farmers and on grain marketing systems. To assure that it does not, he has taken the following actions:

To prevent immediate market congestion

The Department of Agriculture:

- has requested that future trading in wheat and corn be suspended for the market days, January 7 and January 8;
- has announced that it will purchase up to 4 million tons (150 million bushels) of wheat, including the assumption of the contractual obligations on up to 3.7 million tons (135 million bushels) that will not be shipped to the Soviet Union;
- is preparing to assume the contractual obligation on up to 10.0 million tons (395 million bushels) of corn.

None of these grain purchases will be resold on the domestic market until it can be done without adversely affecting market prices. All contractual assumptions will be made at prices that will protect against losses, but will not guarantee profits.

To fully offset the intermediate term impacts of the suspension of sales to the USSR

The Department of Agriculture has taken action to:

- increase the wheat loan price to $2.50 a bushel;
- increase the corn loan price to $2.10 a bushel, with comparable increases in loan prices for the other feed grains;
- increase the reserve release price to $3.75 a bushel for wheat—representing 150 percent of the new loan price;
- increase the reserve call price to $4.63 a bushel for wheat—representing 185 percent of the new loan price;
- increase the reserve release price to $2.63 a bushel for corn—representing 125 percent of the new loan price;
- increase the reserve call price to $3.05 a bushel for corn—representing 145 percent of the new loan;
- make comparable increases in reserve release and call prices for the other feed grains;
- waive first-year interest costs for the next 13 million tons of corn (corn only) entering the reserve;
- increase reserve storage payments from 25 to 26½ cents a bushel for all reserve commodities except oats, which is increased from 19 to 20 cents a bushel.

To facilitate long-term supply and demand adjustments

The Department of Agriculture is not evaluating:

- increased commercial grain exports, and increased food donations under P.L. 480 where appropriate;
- increased production of fuel alcohols from grain and other agricultural commodities;
- acreage diversion programs.

These steps are intended to offset the reduction in farm income and, assuming a suspension through 1980, will limit the reduction in value of agricultural exports to approximately $2.0 to $2.25 billion (instead of $3 billion). It is anticipated that these actions will result in increased budgetary costs of $2.5 to $3.0 billion during FY 1980 and 1981. Most of the increase in budget outlays will be associated with removal of wheat and corn from the market and, therefore, the budget impact will be lessened when these commodities move back into the market and loans are repaid or sales proceeds are obtained.

Enforcement

No unusual problem is anticipated in enforcing the control on United States direct sales of agricultural products. With respect to reexports from third countries to the USSR, the fungible nature of the commodities makes it somewhat difficult to control their ultimate destination. The Department of Commerce and other agencies will watch this situation closely and will take enforcement action in case of violations.

Foreign Policy Consequences of Not Imposing Controls

If this and other measures which have immediate and practical effect had not been imposed, United States reactions to Soviet aggression would have been limited largely to words. Vigorous and far-reaching action was required to confirm to the Soviets that they cannot with impunity engage in acts of aggression that threaten the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States.

UNDER SECRETARY COOPER, JAN. 22, 1980[3]

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify before your committee at oversight hearings on the President's suspension of shipments of agricultural products and high technology items to the Soviet Union. I would like to start with a brief description of the events in Afghanistan which led us to take these economic measures. I will comment on their role in U.S. relations with the U.S.S.R., our allies, and other countries, and, in that context, respond to the questions in your letter of invitation.

Events in Afghanistan

Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, nonaligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan. Fifty thousand heavily armed Soviet troops originally crossed the border and are now dispersed throughout Afghanistan. More Soviet troops are arriving in Afghanistan daily, with some 80,000 there now. They, and the Afghan troops under their control, are attacking Afghan tribesmen.

This invasion violates the rules of international conduct and jeopardizes peace beyond the borders of Afghanistan. It heightens the threat of further Soviet expansion into neighboring countries in southwest Asia. A Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan. Such an aggressive military policy, if it goes unanswered, threatens other countries on the periphery of the Soviet Union, including Europe and the Persian Gulf. It en-

OPIC-sponsored petroleum projects reached commercial production in Ghana.

In addition, the Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation (ISTC) will play a major part in our bilateral energy program. It will have principal responsibility for long-term research and development, for evaluating the applicability to developing countries of different energy technologies, and for fostering the ability of the developing countries to do research and development in energy-related areas.

Population and Health

Progress in all major fields—agriculture, energy, industry, and health—is threatened by rapid population growth. If present trends continue, the world's population would only stabilize in 2090—at 10 billion compared with today's 4.3 billion. The implications not only for development but also for peace and security throughout the world are obvious.

Moreover, high fertility strains the health of both mothers and children, through the effects of close birth-spacing and through septic abortion, particularly in countries lacking family planning services.

The United States can and should do more to encourage family planning. The proposed FY 1981 budget reflects this need, particularly through increased support for private voluntary organizations working in the field. As emphasized at the U.N. World Population Conference and the U.N. International Women's Year Conference, all couples should have not only the right to plan their families but also the safe, effective, and affordable means to do so, as couples in developed countries have had for years. Family planning assistance is being requested by the governments of most people in the Third World, from countries of many faiths and cultures. IDCA is, therefore, directing a study of assistance needs in this area and of the strengths of other donors, notably the World Bank and the United Nations, as well as the opportunities for increased U.S. efforts.

Equally important, we will develop policies and programs that help make small families a more attractive option, particularly by improving opportunities for women so that they are less dependent socially and economically on large families.

Poor health also hampers development, particularly through its effects on productivity and on learning ability. The principal threats to health in the Third World are malnutrition, common infections, and, of course, high birth rates. IDCA is working to improve health by supporting primary care, safer water and better sanitation, disease control (especially for malaria), and health planning. In conjunction with the U.N. system and the World Bank, we are expanding through AID—and, through ISTC, will be expanding even further—recent efforts to bring U.S. scientific skill to bear on health problems of the Third World, focusing particularly on primary care.

COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT BUDGET

The most important initial task of IDCA has been to work with the President in establishing a coordinated, comprehensive budget for the total U.S. development assistance effort.

The President's budget request for the full range of development assistance and development-related programs in FY 1981 is $8.3 billion. This includes $6.4 billion for bilateral programs, $1.7 billion for multilateral development banks, and $244 million for contributions to the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS).

I am convinced that this comprehensive budget is well balanced and makes maximum use of the unique advantages of the various donor mechanisms. IDCA conducted an intense review of the program budgets as they were developed to assure consistency and to assure appropriate emphasis.

The budget reflects the priorities I have already mentioned. It also provides positive incentives for countries with good records in human rights and equitable economic growth and seeks greater use of private voluntary organizations.

Two other features of the FY 1981 budget are worthy of note.

First, we are proposing a change in the budgetary treatment of callable capital subscriptions to the multilateral development banks. Although these banks are not within the jurisdiction of this committee, the callable capital point is important in terms of the full impact of the development assistance budget. This year we are not seeking budget authority for this type of capital. As a result there is a substantial lowering in the amount of our request. Callable capital accounts for about 90% of our total subscriptions to bank capital. It is not paid in to the banks; it serves only as a guarantee for bank borrowings from private capital markets and could only be called to meet obligations on those borrowings. It is highly unlikely that it will ever be called. More than $11 billion is already available in case of a call, $5.7 billion in appropriated funds and another $5.7 billion through authority for public debt transactions.

None of these funds has ever been spent, and we do not think it is necessary or desirable to seek further appropriations of funds for this particular purpose. In recognition of these factors, the Administration proposes enactment of program limitations, rather than budget authority, for control of callable capital. For 1981, the budget authority for the multilateral development banks is, therefore, $1.1 billion less than the previous system would have shown.

Second, the Administration is requesting a separate $50 million emergency special requirement fund for the economic support fund. This will allow rapid and flexible responses to changing international situations without disrupting planned programs elsewhere and without relying on supplemental requests. Allocations from the emergency fund would be done with congressional consultation.

At this point, let me summarize the major program accounts.

Bilateral Programs

AID—Development Assistance. The AID development assistance request of $1.882 billion will allow AID to provide substantial increases for a number of countries that have performed well in human rights and economic development and also to undertake almost $80 million in energy programs (compared with about $30 million in FY 1980).

The emphasis in AID development assistance programs is on meeting basic human needs in poor countries. In carrying out this emphasis, AID specializes in areas where U.S. experience, technology, and carefully programed resources can multiply the effectiveness of others and make use of our comparative advantages. It has a strong tradi-

tion of leadership in innovative approaches to development, many of which are now supported by large investments from the banks. Country programs are at the heart of AID's efforts—programs that emphasize not only AID's programmatic strengths but also respond to this nation's concern for support of institutions that encourage popular participation and equitable development.

Food for Peace. The request for PL 480 program levels totals slightly over $1.6 billion; in addition a budget amendment will be submitted shortly to increase this amount by $100 million to make use of some of the grain diverted from sales to the Soviet Union. Based on December estimates of 1981 seasonal average prices, this should allow for a program of about 6.4 million tons.

Food aid is provided primarily for humanitarian and development purposes to poor countries. Concessional sales under titles I and III, which are basically resource transfer mechanisms, share some of the attributes of both the multilateral aid and the AID programs in encouraging sound economic policies. For example, where appropriate, title I programs are used in support of changes recommended by the IMF and the multilateral development banks. Title III multilateral year programs require developing countries to undertake additional development efforts, particularly in the field of agriculture and rural development. Food donated under title II is used by U.S. voluntary agencies and the multilateral World Food Program in various ways to benefit the needy, including increasingly large amounts for refugee feeding.

The food program has become more development-oriented in recent years under both congressional and administrative direction. IDCA is working to further that trend and to insure that it complements our other developmental efforts.

We urge speedy enactment of the food security reserve legislation now pending before the Congress. It provides for a reserve of up to 4 million tons of wheat, a large part of which would consist of wheat that had been destined for the Soviet Union. The wheat reserve would be used in times of scarcity to provide for emergency food needs in developing countries even when our food production is relatively low, and without disrupting the U.S. market.

Overseas Private Investment Corporation. No budget authority is requested for OPIC because, as a self-sustaining U.S. Government corporation, it does not require annual appropriations to fund its programs.

OPIC offers political risk insurance for private U.S. investments in developing countries, guarantees loans by U.S. business in these countries, and, in some cases, invests its own funds. OPIC has carried out its mandate well. OPIC's basic authorities expire in FY 1982. As we approach the time for reauthorization, IDCA and OPIC will need to consider whether OPIC's programs can be made more effective in achieving U.S. development and export objectives.

Economic Support Fund. For FY 1981, the President is requesting $2.1 billion for the economic support fund, including peacekeeping operations. This also includes the proposed $50 million emergency special requirement fund. Such a fund is important for avoiding disruptive emergency reprograming at times when changing situations require unanticipated use of economic support funds.

The economic support fund provides economic assistance to countries where U.S. foreign policy interests can be served by bolstering economies that have been affected by political or economic crises. It can finance balance-of-payment assistance through cash transfers or commodity import programs and large infrastructure projects, as well as programs of more immediate benefit to the poor.

The Secretary of State allocates economic support funds among countries based on foreign policy considerations. AID manages the economic support fund projects, taking into account economic development criteria.

Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation. The President is requesting budget authority of $95 million for the proposed ISTC in FY 1981. Of this amount, $57 million is for the continuation of projects to be transferred from AID.

ISTC was authorized by Congress as a component of IDCA in the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979. Since funds for ISTC have not yet been appropriated, ISTC has not begun operations.

Currently, a very small fraction of the world's research and development is focused on the problems of the poor countries. Through ISTC, we will be able to channel much more research effort into the same areas upon which we are placing priority emphasis throughout our developmental efforts. Furthermore, the program will be structured to emphasize research in the developing countries themselves, thus fostering their self-help capabilities.

To help in the fight against hunger, ISTC will lead a sustained research effort in the developing countries on the crops, the soils, the actual farming conditions of poor farmers who do not have access to irrigation or the money to buy commercial fertilizers used in the high-yielding rice and wheat varieties.

In the energy sector, ISTC will support centers in selected developing countries which improve and adapt technologies that are not yet ready for practice, doing the work under actual conditions. These centers will serve as central points of information, problem-solving, and training.

Health is a third area in which ISTC will play a leading role. A tiny percentage of the world's health research effort is spent on diseases that ravage the poor of the world. As a result, we labor in our assistance efforts with inadequate vaccines, health equipment unsuited for the conditions of developing countries, and, most of all, lack of knowledge on the causes (and thereby on potential low-cost prevention) of these diseases. ISTC will manage a program that links U.S. health science to training and experimentation by researchers in their own countries to help address these problems.

Other donor nations have recognized the importance of this type of help and have restructured their foreign assistance programs to give special focus to science and technology. Canada's International Development Research Centre, separately organized from the Canadian bilateral program, has been exceptionally successful in strengthening the local problem-solving capability of Third World scientists and practitioners. Sweden, West Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, and Austria have all set up similar institutions. ISTC will be able to work closely with these organizations, as well as with the new U.N. Fund for Science and Technology for Development.

The principal things that distinguish the ISTC from any other activities supported by the United States

States might provide to strengthen Pakistan's defensive capabilities along its border with Afghanistan. Following an assessment of these talks, we intend to have further detailed discussions with other potential equipment suppliers and sources of financing in an effort to coordinate an overall effective response.

During the Islamabad discussions, we reiterated our deep concerns about Pakistan's nuclear activities. We have made clear to the Pakistanis our view that a nuclear explosion in the present unsettled international environment in South Asia would be especially dangerous and even more unwise than before. We have stated what we consider to be a fact—that a Pakistani nuclear test would drastically alter our relationship and put at serious risk our further cooperation.

Throughout these discussions we stressed our view that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan posed a challenge to the entire region and that we hoped an appropriate regional response would be forthcoming. Since the visit of the President's special emissary Clark Clifford to New Delhi nearly coincided with our own, we were able to underline in both capitals our support for continued good relations between India and Pakistan. ■

[1]The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Assistance to the Caribbean, Central America

Following are President Carter's message to the Congress of November 9, 1979, and a statement by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 7.

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, NOV. 9, 1979[1]

Many of our neighbors in Central America and the Caribbean are in crisis—crisis marked by economic problems, terrorism, and popular frustration. The resolution of these problems in ways that will preserve the independence and security of these countries, while expanding democracy and supporting human rights, is very much in the national interest of the United States.

Prompt and effective U.S. assistance is vital.

- Nicaragua's economy has been crushed by bitter and prolonged strife. We have been asked to help, and we are doing so. But more is needed to restore public confidence, private initiatives, and popular well-being.
- The Governments in El Salvador and Honduras have pledged democracy and moderation. These and other Central American countries are embarked on accelerated development efforts of direct benefit to the poor. Assistance in these efforts is essential in creating the conditions under which democratic institutions can grow and thrive.
- The countries of the Eastern Caribbean are young and struggling democracies. They need help now for nation-building and for economic development.

I am therefore today proposing action to expand our support for development and security in Central America and the Caribbean. This will augment our existing development and security assistance programs in these regions, which in turn complement the contributions of several other governments and international agencies.

I have directed that, subject to normal congressional notification procedures, funds be reprogrammed for use in Central America and the Caribbean. These include:

- $5 million from the fiscal year 1980 Economic Support Funds for development projects in Central American countries other than Nicaragua.
- $10 million from fiscal year 1979 and fiscal year 1980 development assistance funds for public works and high employment impact projects in the Caribbean. These projects are an important part of our fiscal year 1979–80 contributions of $66.9 million budgeted for the Caribbean Development Group, chaired by the World Bank.

We are also reprogramming Food for Peace funds to increase food assistance in the area, especially in Nicaragua. We will also likely be reprogramming $5 to $10 million in Foreign Military Sales credits and International Military Education and Training funds for the Caribbean, and similar amounts for such programs in Central America. We are still working out the final details of these proposed reprogrammings and will fully inform the appropriate congressional committees of our proposed actions.

Reprogramming, however, is not enough. The enclosed bill would provide $80 million in flexible Economic Support funding, $75 million to assist in the reconstruction of the Nicaraguan economy and $5 million for early-impact development projects in other Central American countries.

I strongly urge rapid congressional action on this bill.

Such action will demonstrate that the United States can be relied upon to support democratic aspirations, the rebuilding of broken economies, and the security of our friends in this nearby region. Our additional funds for Central American development should substantially augment existing programs. Furthermore, we hope that other nations and international institutions will increase their efforts to accelerate the social and economic development of Central America.

With your help we can make clear where we stand.

JIMMY CARTER

DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER, DEC. 7, 1979[2]

The President's proposals to help strengthen democracy and support development in Central America and the Caribbean will address growing problems in a part of the world that is of major importance to the United States. We believe these programs are essential to an effective and credible U.S. response to changes in the region.

Most of the new appropriations we have proposed would assist Nicaraguan reconstruction. But these constitute only part of a major effort in the region. I would, therefore, like to begin by considering the broader issues and their implications for our national interests.

Middle America



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Q. What prompted the Soviet action?

A. There are all kinds of theories. They run from the Soviets' attempting to place themselves in a position where they can exert increasing influence in Central and South Asia—where they are closer to the Indian Ocean and could have as a long-range objective pushing through to the Indian Ocean—to the thesis that they found the situation deteriorating in Afghanistan and they decided to move in, to a concern about what an independent and nationalistic Afghanistan with a strong religious base would mean for the Moslems in the Soviet Union.

But I don't think it does any good to try, at this point, to psychoanalyze which of these was the reason—or what combination of them. The plain fact is that the Soviet Union committed aggression in a naked way by moving their forces in vast numbers into a neighboring country; in short, it invaded that country. The consequence of that is that there must be a sharp and firm response.

The Soviets must recognize that they are going to have to pay a cost as long as their troops stay in Afghanistan. In addition, they are going to have to realize that this kind of action is going to be met by a firm and protracted response so that such adventures will not happen in the future.

Q. Do you think the United States contributed to the Soviet action by not being decisive enough in its own signals to Moscow?

A. The United States has expressed its convictions on important issues to the Soviet Union in strong terms and I don't buy the proposition that the Soviet Union didn't understand our views on key issues. I think they took a conscious, calculated decision in invading Afghanistan, and they are going to have to pay the price for it.

Q. Do you feel personally misled by the Russians?

A. No. I have always believed that there are both competitive and complementary interests involved in our relationship. I have felt that even though there were competitive aspects in the relationship, we should try to see whether we could find a convergence of interests in areas such as arms control, which hopefully could lead to an easing of tensions.

Obviously, the action which was taken in Afghanistan by them has dealt a blow to our bilateral relations. That is too bad, but we live in the real world, and we have to respond to it in a clear and firm way, and we have done so.

Q. Can you discuss the speech or doctrine that the President is preparing to deal with the situation?

A. In light of what happened in Afghanistan, we are reviewing the s' ation and consideration is being given to a speech which would state our foreign policy in broad terms and also specifically, as it relates to southwest Asia. We are considering the possibility of a statement on building a strengthened framework for regional cooperation in the area.

Q. Would this be similar to the Eisenhower doctrine, which offered American protection for countries in the Middle East threatened by communism?

A. I don't want to comment on specifics which may develop from the current review, but there are certain elements in our strategy that are already obvious.

The Soviets must recognize that they are going to have to pay a cost as long as their troops stay in Afghanistan.

There is the fact of the increased presence of American forces in the Indian Ocean area. There is the fact that we have always stated that we would increase assistance to nations which are threatened. And there is the fact that we will press in negotiations for regional peace, such as the Arab-Israeli negotiations. These are some of the points that are involved in considering the framework for regional cooperation.

Q. An American team recently went to Kenya, Somalia, and Oman to discuss further use of military facilities there. What has been the reaction from those countries?

A. Reactions arising from our preliminary discussions have been positive. By the way, we are not talking of huge U.S. bases but the use of facilities that exist in various countries which would be available to the United States in connection with the increased presence which the United States has there and would intend to keep there for the foreseeable future.

Q. Like more port calls and logistics?

A. Yes.

Q. Rather than stationing combat troops?

A. Yes.

Q. As someone who has been interested in sports your whole life, do you have any personal feelings about American participation in the Moscow summer Olympics?

A. Yes. I look back to the 1936 games, when I was in college, and I think in hindsight that it was a mistake for us to attend the 1936 Olympics. Obviously, that affects my thinking about the current situation.

Q. In other words, you oppose American participation if the current situation prevails in Afghanistan?

A. That is my view.

Q. At what point do you have to make a decision? Obviously, you can't wait until July 18.

A. It would have to be made in the fairly near future.

Q. By the end of this month?

A. I would say by mid-February.

Q. Can the government compel Americans not to take part?

A. If the government expressed its views, I believe that our citizens would follow that view.

Q. Does the President feel the same way as you do on the Olympics?

A. My guess is he does.

Q. The other day, Mr. Brezhnev again said that the Soviet troops would be withdrawn after their mission was completed. Do you think they will?

A. If they did, that would be a good thing. I don't believe that is going to happen in the near future, but I would like to be proven wrong.

Q. You don't think the United States has overreacted in its actions and rhetoric?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Is there any disagreement within the Administration on what to do?

A. There is no disagreement.

Q. On the question of further arms control talks, there has been some confusion. What are your instructions?

A. Our policy, insofar as arms control issues are concerned, is that we should continue to pursue those under discussion with one or two exceptions. This is because the pursuit of these negotiations is in our national interest and, indeed, becomes even more important at a time of high tension or crisis than in more normal times. It is in the interest of the United States and of regional stability and peace as well.

So we will be pursuing various arms control initiatives which are going forward. One exception is that of the Indian Ocean, where the action in Afghanistan cut the legs from under the basis for such negotiations. In other areas such as nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, our objectives remain the same, and we should also continue to pursue limits on conventional arms transfers with the understanding that when our friends are placed in jeopardy by actions or threats that are directed against them, we will help them and provide them with military assistance. We will continue to pursue that policy.

Q. On Iran, how frustrating has it been for you as a negotiator?

A. It is a very frustrating problem because there is no interlocutor with whom one can talk who has the authority to pursue a discussion.

For example, you begin to talk to somebody. It appears that maybe some progress is being made. Then the interlocutor is removed from the scene, and somebody else is put in his place. We may begin to make progress again in the discussions. Then either that interlocutor is removed from the scene or he is overruled, so that there is no one that you can really talk to and have any confidence that something is going to come out of the discussion.

Obviously, this is a terribly frustrating experience, especially when the safety of 50 Americans is involved, and concern about their well-being is something that one carries every hour of the day and night.

I often wake up at night and wonder if there is some avenue we are not pursuing that we ought to be pursuing. I get up and try to think out the issues, think a new suggestion through. This is someting that all of us do because this is uppermost in our minds.

Q. How many secret channels have you tried?

A. Let's say more than 10.

Q. Were there some secret trips you took?

A. Yes. Early in the crisis, when we were first involved in negotiations in the hope that we could find a rapid solution for the problem, I made three secret trips to New York. We thought they held some promise and that is why they were handled in such a sensitive way. It was being handled through the United Nations.

Q. Is that when the package proposal first surfaced—the idea of, in return for freeing the hostages, the Iranians could have their grievances aired at the United Nations?

A. Yes.

Q. What will happen next? Are we in for a protracted siege?

A. I can't say that I see at this point any encouraging prospect for a quick solution. I wish I could say otherwise. But I would be misleading you if I indicated that I did see a quick solution.

Q. Is the United States pushing itself as a result of Afghanistan into a relationship with China that might hold risks for the future?

A. I think that the Chinese will follow what they believe to be the correct course of action from their standpoint. We will follow what we believe to be correct. There may be a degree of parallelism on steps that should be taken in connection with Afghanistan. But that does not mean that there is any military alliance or such relationship between the United States and China.

Q. Might not the Chinese draw the impression we would support them in another war on Vietnam or somewhere else?

A. There is certainly no basis for that. They are going to follow what they believe to be in their national interests. We will do the same. There will be differences of views, as in the Security Council the other night when they did not participate in the sanctions vote against Iran.

Q. How important is a solution of the Palestinian issue to the kind of regional cooperation you have talked about?

A. It is clear that the solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute is a key issue that is necessary for the achievement of peace and stability in the region. Therefore, one of the most important matters that we and others have to devote our attention to is an effort to try and bring about a satisfactory resolution of the Palestinian problem. We must continue to pursue the autonomy talks and try to make progress in them by the target date, which the parties set for themselves, at the end of May.

Q. Summing up, do you think we're in another cold war?

A. Obviously, the bilateral relationship has received a severe blow as a result of what happened in Afghanistan, but I think it is too early at this point to say what the long-range outcome is going to be.

This will depend upon the actions which Moscow now takes and what their actions will be in respect to the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. Therefore, it is premature to predict the long-term future.

What is not premature is to make sure that the steps that we take and that others take are clear and firm and strong so that the Soviets understand clearly the action which they took is going to require them to pay a continuing price as long as their troops remain in Afghanistan and that aggression will be resisted.

Q. Are you still planning to leave office at the end of this term?

A. I haven't changed my mind. ■

dangers the security of all nations, including, of course, the United States and our allies and friends.

There has been overwhelming opposition in the United Nations to the Soviet invasion. Our allies and most of the Third World have called for Soviet withdrawal, in the Security Council and General Assembly. But expressions of concern, even vast U.N. General Assembly majorities, would not alone convey to the Soviets our resolve to resist their aggression, especially if we treated our economic relations with the U.S.S.R. as untouchable. Unambiguous action by the United States was necessary.

U.S. Response

On January 4th, the President announced a series of measures in response to the Soviet invasion. We have asked the Senate to defer consideration of SALT II. We have sharply curtailed U.S. grain exports and Soviet fishing privileges. We will delay new consular facilities and defer most cultural and scientific exchanges. Since the President's speech, we have reduced Aeroflot landings in the United States. We have suspended shipments of goods under validated export licenses and all new licensing pending a review of our policy. Other major aspects of our bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union are also under intensive review, and additional measures may be announced.

We plan to increase direct and indirect support for threatened countries in southwest Asia. We have announced that we will maintain an increased level of forces in the Indian Ocean. We are taking other steps to permit us to project military power more effectively in the region.

All of these actions are designed to demonstrate to the U.S.S.R. in a tangible way that it cannot engage in aggression with impunity. The restrictions on grain exports—our largest commodity exports to the Soviet Union—most clearly illustrate our resolve to the Soviets and to other countries.

The costs to the Soviet Union will be heavy. The U.S.S.R. is dependent upon grain imports for growth in its standard of living. After an initial reduction in livestock herds, an embargo will mean reduced per capita meat consumption in a country that normally does not provide adequate supplies. If we and other countries find it necessary to continue to restrict Soviet agricultural imports, the U.S.S.R. will have to revise its hopes for improving basic living standards. We will pay a price ourselves for imposing these restrictions.

Foreign trade is always mutually beneficial, and we cannot penalize the Soviet Union in this area without to some extent hurting ourselves. But we have the mechanisms in place to insure that the price is kept to a minimum and is borne equitably.

Multilateral Support

The grain export controls have received multilateral support. On January 12, we convened a meeting of representatives of the major grain exporting countries, including Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the European Community (EC). This group generally agreed that its governments would not replace directly or indirectly the grains denied by U.S. measures.

Those countries with destination controls will impose them. Canada will refrain from grain sales in excess of normal traditional levels. Australia will not replace wheat taken off the market by U.S. action. The EC has taken administrative measures to reduce sharply grain and poultry exports to the U.S.S.R. Argentina will not use government measures to take commercial advantage of U.S. action but has indicated it will not seek to alter natural market demand. All, including Argentina, agreed to set up a group to monitor grain flows on a continuing basis to achieve "our common purposes." We are following up with the Argentine Government to increase their cooperation.

We are also seeking parallel and supportive action for our other measures. A few days ago Deputy Secretary Christopher and I returned from intensive exploratory consultations with our European allies—including discussion in NATO; with the member countries of the European Economic Community; and additional talks in Bonn, London, Rome, and Paris. Philip Habib [Special Adviser to the Secretary of State] has just concluded similar consultations in Tokyo.

Our allies share our view that the Soviet invasion is a sharp and threatening deviation from Soviet policy in recent years. They agree that we must demonstrate to the Soviets that their conduct will involve heavy costs for the U.S.S.R. Their capabilities for responding to the Soviet threat differ, but I am encouraged by their desire to maintain a strong, united front under the current circumstances.

Controls on Agricultural Exports

We are particularly mindful of the provisions of the new Export Administration Act of 1979 and of this subcommittee's major contribution to that legislation over the past year. You have or will soon have before you the President's report of his decision to impose controls on agricultural exports to the Soviet Union. I would simply like to mention some of the major themes of the 1979 act which are reflected in two of the questions in your invitation and in the President's actions.

- A wide range of political and economic measures has been under consideration from the beginning of the Afghan crisis, not just export controls.
- We raised the issue of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan with increasing urgency as the Soviet military buildup proceeded, culminating with a Presidential message to President Brezhnev. No satisfactory reply was received.
- The Administration consulted congressional leaders promptly, as soon as it became clear that controls on grain exports and other actions would be necessary.
- We have given, and continue to give, high priority to obtaining the cooperation of other governments and to limiting the availability of substitutes from foreign sources.
- The grain controls have been—and any new controls we may need to add for technology exports will be—measured against the specific criteria contained in the 1979 act.

Except for agricultural products, we have not added new controls or increased the number of export items for which validated licenses are required. The suspension of shipments of licensed goods is a temporary measure, expected to last 4–6 weeks, while we review our licensing policy and adopt any changes that seem appropriate under the new circumstances. We look for-

ward to receiving your views and the views of your committee concerning appropriate revisions in our licensing policy.

In conducting our review in the light of the Soviet invasion, we must bear in mind that the concepts of foreign policy and national security—a central objective of our foreign policy—are inextricably intertwined. We must reevaluate which exports actually make a significant contribution to Soviet military potential which would be detrimental to our security. We will also consider other items which should be controlled in order to help deter Soviet aggression.

Let me conclude by affirming that we continue to hope that the Soviets will see the need for restraint in their policies. We have called for them to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan in accordance with the U.N. resolutions. We must deter them from further threats to Pakistan, Iran, the Persian Gulf, and elsewhere. Neither we nor the rest of the world can tolerate a policy of Soviet expansionism. The more quickly we can bring this message to the attention of the Kremlin through firm measures, the better our chances that it will be heeded before greater damage is done.

The 1980s have begun with little optimism for U.S.-Soviet relations. Yet only rarely in the past 25 years have we seen such worldwide condemnation of Soviet aggression as we now see. Only rarely have we seen NATO as ready as it now is to strengthen its defenses and to act in concert. If we had not taken strong actions, if we had maintained a posture of business-as-usual beyond our diplomatic protests, I have little doubt that the condemnation by other countries and their willingness to work together to deter aggression elsewhere would dissipate in a cloud of uncertainty surrounding U.S. leadership and U.S. determination to resist Soviet aggression. ■

[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 14, 1980.

[2]Text from Weekly Compilation of Jan. 28.

[3]The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Customs Valuation Agreement

LETTER TO HOUSE SPEAKER O'NEILL AND SENATE PRESIDENT MONDALE, JAN. 16, 1980[1]

During 1979 we achieved a remarkable series of improvements in the international rules for the conduct of trade, domestic legislation governing trade policy, and the organization of the Executive branch trade policy agencies. These successes were the result of a cooperative effort between the Congress and the Executive which must be continued if we are going to conduct successfully our international economic policy.

At the end of the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations last year, we had not yet completed negotiations with a significant number of developing countries on the Customs Valuation Agreement. Despite this fact, we decided to submit the Customs Valuation Agreement to the Congress together with the other nontariff barrier codes for approval. Negotiations with developing countries have continued, however, and have reached a point such that I can now notify the Congress of my intention to enter into a supplementary agreement on customs valuation.

The new agreement would make a minor amendment to the Customs Valuation Agreement already approved by the Congress. This amendment would eliminate one of the four tests under the Agreement by which related parties can establish a transaction value for customs purposes, i.e., the use of the transaction value from unrelated parties' sales of identical goods from third countries (Article 1.2(b)(iv)). This amendment will have little impact on the Customs Valuation Agreement but will greatly facilitate acceptance of that Agreement by a significant number of developing countries. All the developed country signatories to the Agreement support the amendment.

In accordance with the Trade Act of 1974 procedures for approval and implementation of trade agreements, the United States Trade Representative and other appropriate agencies will consult with Congressional committees about the agreement for the next 90 calendar days. After the agreement has been signed it will be submitted for Congressional approval together with proposed implementing legislation and a statement of administrative action necessary or appropriate to implement the agreement in the United States. The agreement will not take effect with respect to the United States, and will not have domestic legal force, unless the Congress approves it and enacts the appropriate implementing legislation.

Congressional approval of the amendment to the Customs Valuation Agreement will help us obtain broader support for the Tokyo Round agreements by developing countries. This result will advance our national interest and enhance the prosperity of our people. I look forward to working together in this continuing effort.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER ■

[1]Text of identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Walter F. Mondale, President of the Senate (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 21, 1980).

Allies Support U.S. Embargo

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JAN. 10, 1980[1]

The United States is pleased by the positive reaction on the part of our European allies to the President's decision cancelling the sale of 17 million metric tons of grain to the Soviet Union in the wake of their invasion of Afghanistan. The President has received assurances from the leaders of major West European nations that their governments support this important measure. They will take appropriate steps to assure that the Soviet shortfalls resulting from the cancellation of U.S. sales will not be made up through exports of their own grain supplies.

At the same time, we are in urgent consultation with the other major grain exporting nations. Both Australia and Canada have already confirmed that they, too, will support the U.S. action and not make up the Soviet grain deficit. As a result of these consultations, which are continuing, the Soviet Union will be unable to purchase sufficient grain from other countries to meet the major shortfall caused by the President's decision.

The United States feels that the strong allied backing in this area demonstrates Western solidarity in the face of a direct Soviet threat to international security and will make clear to the Soviets that they cannot undertake aggression with impunity. The President believes that we have laid down a marker and let the Soviet Union know that they will, indeed, suffer now and in the future from their unwarranted invasion of a formerly independent nonaligned country. ■

[1]Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

in the development field (including the U.N. fund, which is described elsewhere in my statement) are:

- Its program will be built around key subject areas in which scientific and technological investigation can produce results that are broadly applicable throughout the developing world;
- It will work extensively with the scientific and technological institutions and skilled individuals in developing countries, linked along lines of common interests with counterparts in the United States, to enhance capability within the selected key areas; and
- It will monitor the results of scientific and technical research in the United States for new applications to the problems of developing countries.

Peace Corps. For FY 1981, $118.8 million is requested for the Peace Corps. This unique organization continues to be extremely successful. By working directly at the village level, the Peace Corps volunteers often enhance the development prospects of the countries where they serve. The Peace Corps also provides support to the domestic development service programs of Third World nations and to multilateral volunteer programs.

Inter-American Foundation. In FY 1981, the Administration is requesting $17 million. The foundation is an independent government corporation that has focused on small-scale development in Latin America and the Caribbean. It has successfully worked with local private organizations that normally would not have direct access to U.S. development assistance programs.

Multilateral Development Banks

The President is requesting a total of $1.7 billion for the World Bank group and the regional development banks. As discussed previously, this incorporates a proposed change in the budgetary treatment of callable capital subscriptions.

The largest request is for budget authority of $1.1 billion for the first of three installments for our share in the sixth replenishment for the International Development Association (IDA). IDA is the "soft loan window" of the World Bank, making only concessional loans and only to the poorest countries. It is the major source of this type of assistance. The Administration thus places a very high priority on providing our full share of resources for the replenishment of IDA.

I also want to highlight the request for $18 million for the first portion of our subscription to the capital of African Development Bank (ADB). This will be the first U.S. subscription to the ADB. It constitutes an important sign of our commitment to growth and development in the African continent.

The multilateral development banks are the largest source of financial development assistance. They receive subscriptions and contributions from many donor countries in addition to the United States, and they mobilize substantial amounts of private capital in markets throughout the world. As a result, they can support large-scale infrastructure projects in critical sectors, and they can help in instances where U.S. bilateral assistance is small or entirely absent. They also provide assistance to middle income countries with whom the United States does not have a bilateral assistance program.

These countries continue to need substantial amounts of external financing for development purposes and many of them are important to the United States for foreign policy and national security reasons. The banks, as a consequence of their size and multilateral character, are also an important force in coordinating donor activity and in encouraging recipient governments to implement appropriate policy measures for fostering equitable growth.

In recent years the banks have moved increasingly toward our policies of supporting development in rural areas in poor countries. IDCA is actively working on furthering those policies within the banks and on establishing specific mechanisms to assure that banks' projects and U.S. bilateral projects are coordinated for maximum effectiveness.

International Organizations and Programs

The President is requesting $244 million for U.S. voluntary contributions to U.N. programs and to the OAS. The largest of these requests is for $140 million for the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), which plays a key role in coordinating multilateral and bilateral assistance at the country level. Also included are requests for $40 million for UNICEF, $17.5 million for technical cooperation programs of the OAS, and $15 million for the new U.N. Interim Fund for Science and Technology for Development.

The new science and technology fund, which will be managed by the UNDP, is an initiative growing out of the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development which took place last summer in Vienna. The fund's multilateral character will permit it to take an active role in areas where bilateral efforts are necessarily limited.

In contrast to the problem-oriented approach of the ISTC, the fund, as a U.N. program, will devote the major part of its resources to meeting the specific requests from member countries and regional groups. The fund will primarily undertake institution-building activities which would complement the basic needs focus of AID and the problem-oriented research approach of ISTC. The fund will, for example, help developing countries through technical assistance, training, and policy advice to build up basic scientific competence. Increased scientific capabilities will in turn enable these countries to participate in and benefit from the programs of ISTC and other agencies.

The fund is planned to be in existence for a 2-year period, with a target for total resources of $250 million. A second U.S. contribution in FY 1982 will be considered as the program becomes more detailed and the intentions of other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and OPIC donors become clearer.

CONCLUSION

The President's reorganization of the foreign assistance programs will assure a well-coordinated, government-wide approach to U.S. development assistance goals. Three bilateral assistance organizations—AID, OPIC, and the proposed ISTC—are components of IDCA. U.S. participation in the developmentally oriented U.N. voluntary programs falls under the new agency's direction, and responsibility for U.S. participation in the multilateral development banks is shared by the IDCA and the Department of Treasury. Thus, IDCA is in a unique overview position to both observe and influence overall U.S. programs.

The comprehensive foreign assistance program I have outlined is, I believe, well-reasoned and well-balanced. It reflects our nation's compassion for the millions of our fellow human beings who face staggering burdens in simply obtaining the most basic of human needs. It also reflects the need to make the most efficient use of our development assistance dollars.

More than ever, it is essential that we efficiently marshall our foreign assistance so that we are identified in the international community with a strong commitment to economic progress and human decency. The Administration's program for FY 1981 meets that objective. ■

[1]The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the Committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Nobel Laureate Sakharov Exiled

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JAN. 23, 1980[1]

The decision by Soviet authorities to deprive Nobel laureate Andrei Sakharov of his honors and to send him into exile arouses worldwide indignation. This denial of basic freedoms is a direct violation of the Helsinki accords and a blow to the aspirations of all mankind to establish respect for human rights. The American people join with free men and women everywhere in condemning this act.

We must, at the same time, ask why the Soviet Union has chosen this moment to persecute this great man. What has he done in the past few months that is in any way different from what he was doing for the past 20 years? Why the need to silence him now? Is it because of the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan?

Just as we have welcomed Solzhenitsyn, Brodsky, Rostropovich, and thousands of others who have fled Soviet oppression, so we would welcome Dr. Sakharov. It is part of our proud and sacred heritage.

The arrest of Dr. Sakharov is a scar on their system that the Soviet leaders cannot erase by hurling abuse at him and seeking to mask the truth. His voice may be silenced in exile, but the truths he has spoken serve as a monument to his courage and an inspiration to man's enduring quest for dignity and freedom. ■

[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980.

Human Rights Reports

On February 4, 1980, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee released *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979*. This report on human rights conditions in 1,954 countries was submitted to the Congress by the Department of State in compliance with Sections 116(d)(1) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

The 1979 report includes 39 countries that were not covered in previous reports. The expanded coverage is the result of a 1979 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which directs that the reports include, in addition to recipients of U.S. economic or security assistance, all foreign countries which are U.N. members. In addition to those countries which fall into the statutory categories, three additional countries, which may be of interest to Members of the Congress, are included (North Korea, Southern Rhodesia, and Taiwan).

The report draws on information furnished by U.S. missions abroad, congressional studies, nongovernmental organizations, and human rights bodies of international organizations. For most countries reported on, conditions are described up to the end of 1979. In the case of a few countries, significant developments occurring during the first month of 1980 are also included.

The organization of this report follows three basic categories. After an introduction, the description of conditions in each country is divided into three sections which correspond to three categories of human rights. A fourth section describes the government's attitude toward outside investigations of internal human rights conditions. In addition, statistical tables are provided, where relevant, listing the amounts of U.S. bilateral assistance and multilateral development assistance for fiscal years 1977, 1978, and 1979.

Copies of this 854-page report may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for $8.00 each. Remittance, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany order. ■

Interests, Policy, and Challenges

With few exceptions, our neighbors in Central America and the Caribbean face grave endemic problems that are aggravated by adverse international economic conditions. In recent months there have been violence and coups in both Central America and in the English-speaking Caribbean. Unemployment, poverty, and population growth are placing severe strains on local institutions. The global energy crisis and worldwide inflation compound the difficulty of planning and financing long-range development efforts.

As President Carter said in transmitting this supplemental request, helping our neighbors deal with these severe problems in ways that will preserve their independence and security is very much in the national interest of the United States.

We desire for our neighbors in Central America and the Caribbean what we desire for our own people: strong, independent democracies that respect human rights; equitable economic development; and security against hostile outside forces.

To promote these goals, we have supported the gradual development of open, pluralistic political systems that respect human rights. Our motives reflect practical as well as idealistic considerations, for the flexibility, responsiveness, and resilience of democracy are the surest guarantees against radicalism and disruption.

We have promoted regional cooperation to deal with common economic problems. In the Caribbean we have supported a successful multilateral effort under the World Bank to increase both the effectiveness and the level of foreign assistance. In Central America, we are examining ways to revivify the Common Market and its institutions.

In light, however, of the traumatic events of the past year, we must do more to support moderate solutions to the region's pressing needs.

After a bitter, prolonged, and destructive struggle, the people of Nicaragua today face a massive rebuilding on a scale that is unprecedented in this hemisphere. Because the ultimate character of Nicaragua's new government will heavily influence prospects in other nations of the region, we must, for our own sake, participate in Nicaragua's reconstruction.

Honduras is in the midst of a promising development process that includes elections. But its strategic location and poverty make it vulnerable to radical influence.

El Salvador has a new government pledged to open the political system, to pursue urgently needed economic reforms, and to respect human rights. But it faces bitter opposition from both the radical left and the reactionary right.

While Guatemala is stronger, particularly economically, it too has development problems, as well as human rights problems.

Recent events have underscored the fragility of the newly independent democracies of the tiny eastern Caribbean island states. Their leaders, many of a younger generation educated in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada are impatient to build societies responsive to the needs of their peoples. But some of them appear to be willing to discard the regional heritage of parliamentary democracy. The coup d'état in Grenada last March exemplifies this disturbing trend.

Finally, Cuba stands ready to exploit regional tensions, straining still further the often fragile political balance that exists in its smaller neighbors in both the Caribbean and Central America.

These conditions are accelerating change in the region and provoking widespread instability and uncertainty. The fundamental problem we share with our neighbors is not that of defending stability in the face of revolution; it is to build a more stable, equitable, and pluralistic order. That is the challenge of Nicaragua, and it is the challenge throughout the region.

Our Overall Response

The challenges facing the countries of Central America and the Caribbean are too complex and deep-rooted to be resolved quickly, even with large-scale outside assistance.

By supporting the reconstruction of Nicaragua, however, we can demonstrate our genuine concern for the future of that country, and we can help to revitalize the country's private sector, whose contributions are so important both to development and to democracy. By increasing our support for sound development throughout Central America and the Caribbean, we can help provide hope and direction even in the face of turmoil. And by responding to legitimate security concerns, we can help free attention and resources to deal with economic development in an atmosphere of peace. The President's proposals will enable us to do this by increasing direct U.S. assistance.

In Central America, our development assistance and PL 480 food aid totals have averaged $80–90 million over the past several years, providing a stimulus to regional integration as well as an important contribution to individual countries.

In the Caribbean, development assistance and PL 480 programs have nearly doubled since FY 1976, to over $130 million in FY 1979. This increase will have a growing impact in coming months as actual disbursements begin to catch up with obligations. It has already contributed to the regional impetus of the World Bank-led Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development, which includes 30 recipients and donors, including Venezuela, Brazil, and Japan, as well as European countries.

The serious situation now facing Central America and the Caribbean has led us to consider additional resources through reprograming of funds in the proposed FY 1980 budget. These reprogramings would include:

- $5 million in economic support for El Salvador. These funds would be used for high-impact programs to improve the barrios surrounding San Salvador and five other major cities and to provide jobs for the people who live there. We are also considering the possibility of diverting funds for similar projects in Guatemala if conditions there improve soon;
- $10 million in development assistance for the eastern Caribbean; $7.6 million of this already has been reprogramed from FY 1979 funds. These funds are to finance labor-intensive construction and repair of schools, roads, water and sanitation systems, and markets;
- Substantially increased development assistance funds for Honduras and El Salvador;
- $15–20 million in PL 480 for FY 1980—$10 million in title I and $4–5 million in title II—to meet essential needs for Nicaragua; and
- $10–20 million in foreign military sales (FMS) funds and international military education and training (IMET) for the Caribbean and Central America. The funds will be used for a number of purposes including the replacement by the Dominican Republic of equipment

lost during the 1979 hurricanes; training in Panama and the United States; sale of basic equipment and Coast Guard training to eastern Caribbean nations; and, in Central America—especially in Honduras and El Salvador—transportation, communication, medical, and other equipment, plus training for professional development.

Supplemental Request

Although these reprogramings will address many urgent needs, some of the most pressing requirements can be met only through economic support funding. However, as you know, substantial reprograming of economic support funds is not possible. We are, therefore, seeking new authorizations totaling $80 million; $75 million in economic support funding will be used to assist in the reconstruction of the Nicaraguan economy, especially its private sector.

Our supplemental request for Nicaragua includes:

- A $70 million loan to provide foreign exchange resources that Nicaragua needs to maintain supplies of critical imports—60% of these imports would go to the private sector—which will include agricultural, industrial, medical, and transportation items that the U.S. has traditionally sold Nicaragua, thus helping to reconfirm our historically close trading ties; and
- $5 million in grants for technical assistance to help support agricultural institutions, expand activities by private and voluntary organizations, and strengthen educational exchange programs.

These activities are carefully designed to provide direct support for the private sector, through credit for small- and medium-size businessmen and farmers and home repair and reconstruction. All together, we estimate that these funds will generate the equivalent of more than 30,000 year-round jobs.

Nicaragua's economy has been crushed by the long and destructive civil war that finally ended in July. The speed and nature of its recovery will be a key factor in determining Nicaragua's future.

There has been a substantial global response to Nicaragua's needs. Roughly $270 million in bilateral credits and grants have been pledged by other countries to aid in reconstruction. International financial institutions have made extraordinary efforts. The Inter-American Development Bank, for example, has moved rapidly to provide $95.5 million in recovery assistance and to reformulate another $86 million of its existing portfolio.

The new government has efficiently used the resources that have been provided. Even so, critical needs remain. They include restoring private sector productive capacity in both agriculture and industry; reconstructing public transportation, housing, schools, health facilities, and infrastructure; and providing employment opportunities.

In the absence of U.S. assistance, our mission in Nicaragua has projected that the unfinanced balance-of-payments deficit over the 2-year rehabilitation period would be $400 million. Approximately $100 million may be covered by new projects under consideration by other donors, leaving an unfinanced gap of $300 million.

The political situation remains in flux. The Nicaraguan Government today operates collegially and pragmatically. Many views are represented. Some of the Sandinista leadership wants to lead Nicaragua toward a Marxist model. Others want to restructure their country in an independent, pluralist fashion. The Catholic Church, private entrepreneurs, and other key groups in Nicaragua are all actively participating in reconstruction.

We are pleased by the reestablishment of an open press and the respect being shown for legal processes in general. We are concerned, however, by the large numbers of former National Guard members still held prisoner and by the delays in bringing them to trial. We hope the Nicaraguan Government's invitation to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission is an indication that this situation will soon be resolved.

Our own policy is to support the development of an independent and pluralist Nicaragua working with its neighbors in a framework of regional cooperation. We understand and support what has emerged as the driving consensus among Nicaraguans today—to build a new Nicaragua that, through popular participation, is capable of meeting basic human needs.

Through mutual cooperation, mutual respect, and nonintervention, we are strengthening our contacts with the government and with the many groups on which a healthy pluralist society depends—the church, labor, the media, and the private sector. We are encouraging Nicaragua and its neighbors to ease the tensions that have existed and to promote a new era of regional cooperation and economic integration.

The United States has helped Nicaragua generously with emergency relief. These new programs would enable us to continue to play a role in meeting the far greater challenge of Nicaragua's reconstruction.

Nicaragua's relations with other nations will be shaped by the responsiveness of those nations to Nicaragua's immediate problems. Cuba has provided teachers, doctors, technicians, and military advisers. Other countries—Mexico, Germany, the Andean Pact, Spain—have contributed people and money. We can do no less.

In addition to the $75 million in supplemental funds for Nicaragua, we are seeking $5 million in economic support funding for high impact urban and rural development projects in Honduras and possibly Guatemala.

Honduras has made an impressive commitment to social development and democracy. Its common frontier with Nicaragua and a longstanding boundary dispute with El Salvador make it central to the peace of the region.

The additional funds requested for this strategically located country would be used to support high-impact development projects in small towns and rural areas, including roads, water and sanitation systems, and local slaughter houses. This assistance will demonstrate our willingness to support a Central American government with a good human rights record and a proven commitment to equitable development.

In closing, I want to reiterate our judgment that these requests are vital to U.S. interests in Central America and the Caribbean. By helping to meet new, urgent requirements, we will make our presence felt on the side of both development and democracy. ■

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[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 12, 1979.

[2] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Department of State bulletin

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

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FY 1981 Foreign Assistance Programs

Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 5, 1980.[1]

When I appeared before you a year ago on behalf of our foreign assistance programs, I said that the United States cannot have a foreign policy of active leadership in the world if we are unwilling to put out resources behind our words. Today, in the face of new challenges in southwest Asia and other regions of the world, that fact is all the more evident.

The President, with the clear support of the Congress and the American people, has responded firmly and thoughtfully to the challenges posed by terrorism in Iran and aggression against Afghanistan. In both cases, we are showing that acts which violate international law, threaten our interests, or abuse our citizens will meet a determined response from a strong and unified America.

Afghanistan and Iran are immediate challenges which require immediate responses. But they also are manifestations of more profound and sustained challenges which we must meet through sustained and determined policies of our own. And buttressing those policies must be strong foreign assistance programs of the kind we are proposing.

Diplomacy and Foreign Aid

In Third World countries throughout Latin America, Africa, and Asia, more and more people are insisting not only that their nations preserve their independence from foreign domination but also that they themselves have a greater say in the economic and political decisions of their governments. When these demands are long denied, popular frustrations can explode in violent and radical directions. By helping poorer nations and people in need to build a better future, we are both strengthening the world economy and enhancing the political stability which comes with economic, social, and political justice.

Beyond the challenge of constructively addressing change within developing nations, we must respond as well to threats they may face from beyond their borders. A policy which failed to provide for the legitimate security needs of our friends would be more than short-sighted. It would be dangerous. For it would increase the danger of conflicts—and international confrontations—that can be avoided if local security balances are preserved.

We can expect that the Soviet Union will continue to take advantage of conflict—both within developing nations and between them. As we pursue policies that help developing nations preserve their independence and meet the real needs of their people, we are addressing today the conditions of poverty and tension that will produce, if left unattended, the crises of tomorrow.

In short, a policy which addresses in their own terms the genuine needs and priorities of Third World nations is a policy which also has the effect of helping us compete effectively with the Soviets in the Third World. Through sustained support for economic and institutional development in the Third World, we also strengthen the global basis for resistance to outside domination.

In an immediate context, we are also well served by the vivid contrast between our approach to the developing world and that of the Soviet Union.

- We are seeking to address human needs.
- We are prepared to work within a world of diversity, with nations of varying economic and political systems, as long as they are prepared to work with us toward goals we share.
- Our efforts are structured to support the independence and self-sufficiency of developing nations.

The Afghanistan invasion is a vivid demonstration for all the world to see that the Soviet Union disregards such principles and practices. This fact—and this contrast—has not been lost on the nations of the world.

I began my testimony with this brief discussion of the importance of our foreign assistance to our diplomacy, since together we must make certain that our diplomacy is strong and equal to the challenges of our times. And again, I emphasize that we cannot lead in the world without adequate resources.

We all must also recognize the full range of compelling reasons for effective foreign assistance programs.

The human dimension of the issue is clear. We cannot rest well when we know that hunger is the bitter companion of hundreds of millions of human beings; when we know that many millions more lack such essentials as shelter, health, and training. The continuation of that suffering is an affront to the conscience of men and women everywhere.

And our humanitarian commitment is reinforced by the recognition of other ways in which our aid serves our interests as well as the interests of developing nations.

The countries of the Third World are increasingly involved in our daily lives. They supply the major proportion of such critical raw materials as rubber, manganese, and tin. And they are the fastest growing markets for our exports.

The cooperation of developing countries is also essential to the solution of global problems that affect us all. No nation, acting alone, can halt the spread of nuclear weapons or cure the pollution of air and water or overcome the tension between spiraling global population growth and finite resources. There can only be international answers—or there will be no real answer—to these and other pressing global challenges.

For these reasons, the proposition is inescapable that peace and prosperity for ourselves, now and for the future, are directly related to the strength of our relations with the developing nations and the political and economic paths they choose to pursue. That is not to say that our interests and those of developing nations inevitably are the same. They often are not. But we can negotiate most effectively and constructively on specific and practical issues between us in an atmosphere of mutual respect and shared concerns.

I believe we have demonstrated over the past several years that our clear commitment to work toward justice and economic progress abroad does strengthen our ties in the developing world. Despite setbacks and heightened causes of tension in some areas, our

relationships with the nations of Africa, Latin America, and Asia are, in general, better today than they have been in some time. And the practical results have served our interests.

• We have made concrete progress with developing nations on international economic issues—on the common fund, on trade and investment relations, and on strengthening international economic institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

• Progress toward peace, justice, and independence in Rhodesia has been due not only to the skill of British diplomacy and the wisdom of the parties to the conflict; it would not have been possible without the constructive role played by the African governments in the region and our ability to work with them.

• Resolving our dispute with Panama on the future of the canal has strengthened the security of the canal and strengthened the basis for constructive relations throughout the hemisphere.

• And, with regard to the situations in Iran and Afghanistan, our ability to pursue our diplomatic goals at the United Nations and elsewhere has been enhanced by our improved relations with the nations of the Third World.

The foreign assistance legislation before you is, quite simply, a request for the resources and the flexibility necessary to sustain this active and practical approach to the developing world.

The requests before you are austere in view of the challenges with which we must deal. They have been prepared with careful regard for their budgetary impact. As is always the case, we will keep these levels and their allocation under continuing review to assure that the resources we are requesting are adequate to the task. For we cannot serve our nation's interests without the resources necessary for sustained and effective American leadership in the world.

Major Programs

Before turning to some of our specific programs, let me address some of the broader aspects of our fiscal year 1981 request.

The **first** point is the importance of the overall levels we are proposing.

For FY 1981, we are requesting $2.96 billion in budgetary authority to fund security assistance programs totaling $4.9 billion, including both military assistance and economic support funds. When the Soviets are expanding their capability to intervene militarily around the world, it is clear that we cannot reduce our own determination to help others defend themselves and strengthen their economies.

We have proposed a modest increase from $1.7 billion to almost $2 billion in bilateral development assistance. There is ample programmatic justification for this increase.

We are also proposing $1.9 billion for the international financial institutions and such U.N. bodies as UNICEF and the U.N. Development Program. These multilateral efforts increasingly reflect priorities similar to ours. In many cases, they also complement our bilateral assistance efforts by supporting large-scale infrastructure projects, such as irrigation and transportation and other sectors where U.S. bilateral assistance is limited. The size and multinational character of these organizations enables them to take the lead in coordinating donor activity and in encouraging recipient governments to implement policy measures needed to foster equitable economic development. It should be noted that this year we have reduced the size of our request by not seeking budget authority for callable capital subscriptions to the multilateral development banks. None of these funds have ever been spent. We do not believe it necessary or desirable to seek appropriations of funds for this purpose.

In connection with the FY 1981 requests I have just mentioned, although it is not within the direct purview of this committee, let me note that the FY 1980 foreign assistance appropriations bill has yet to be reported out of the Senate-House conference committee. In the meantime, we are operating under a continuing resolution which provides for drastically reduced spending levels for several important programs. This situation, if it continues, will severely impair the effectiveness of our assistance efforts, both economic and military, bilateral and multilateral. It is urgent that a FY 1980 appropriations bill be agreed upon by the conference committee and speedily enacted by the Congress.

Our proposed PL 480 Food for Peace program for FY 1981 will help meet critical food needs in over 60 countries. For FY 1981 we are requesting a $1.6 billion Food for Peace program. These funds will provide an estimated 6 million metric tons of agricultural commodities. In addition, we will request through a budget amendment an addition of $100 million to make use of some of the grain which would have been available to the Soviet Union. In the distribution of our Food for Peace, priority is directed to feeding hungry people, particularly refugees in Kampuchea, southern Africa, and Somalia, and to helping reduce balance-of-payments problems in Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nicaragua, the Sudan, and other countries experiencing economic difficulties.

Let me emphasize that the sum of the parts of these economic assistance programs has an independent worth of its own. It conveys the vital message that while our emphasis on security measures is necessarily growing, our commitment to help meet economic and human needs remains just as strong.

Second, let me emphasize that the Soviet action in Afghanistan warrants particular attention to our programs for the Middle East and southwest Asian region. We must demonstrate to those who rely upon us—and to the Soviets as well—that our commitment to the economic progress and military security of the states in the region is strong and dependable.

We have agreed to continue our discussion with Pakistani officials about Pakistan's military and economic requirements. We have made it clear that we do not intend to go beyond the level of assistance we have already discussed for FY 1980 and FY 1981. We will also continue our consultations with other governments on their plans for assistance to Pakistan. Pending these further discussions, we will defer our request to the Congress for assistance to Pakistan at this time.

Third, the President is requesting a sum of $50 million in unprogramed economic support funds. This proposal will help us to meet emergency situations where relatively small amounts of aid, readily available, can promote immediate and pressing foreign policy interests.

The requirement for a fund of this nature has been clear for some time. In the past year we have had to come to the Congress with a number of requests for supplementals or budget amendments to deal with urgent and un-

U.S. Favors Transfer of Summer Olympics

by Secretary Vance

Remarks before the 82d session of the opening of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in Lake Placid, New York, on February 9, 1980.[1]

On behalf of President Carter, and as an honorary Vice President of the U.S. Olympic Committee, it is an honor to welcome this distinguished committee to the United States and to Lake Placid and to welcome athletes from around the world to the 1980 Winter Olympics.

As we meet here tonight, the world faces a serious threat to peace which raises an issue of fundamental importance to the Olympic movement.

From their beginnings in ancient Greece, the Olympics have symbolized some of humanity's noblest principles. Foremost among these is peace. The modern games reflect this principle in the opening ceremonies, when doves are released to symbolize peace.

The ancient games were held in the city-state of Elis. They marked a "truce of the gods." During this truce, open warfare against or by the host city-state was forbidden.

In the view of my government, it would be a violation of this fundamental Olympic principle to conduct or attend Olympic Games in a nation which is currently engaging in an aggressive war and has refused to comply with the world community's demand to halt its aggression and withdraw its forces.

Let us be clear about the fundamental issue we face. This is not a question of whether a national team should be barred from competing on political grounds. We welcome every team this committee has invited to these winter games.

The question we now confront is entirely different. It is whether the games should be held in a country which is itself committing a serious breach of international peace. It is our conviction that to do so would be wholly inconsistent with the meaning of the Olympics.

It is impossible to separate this decision from its political consequences. To hold the Olympics in any nation that is warring on another is to lend the Olympic mantle to that nation's actions.

We already see the nation selected as host of the summer games describing its selection as recognition of "the correctness of [its] foreign political course" and its "enormous services . . . in the struggle for peace."

The inescapable fact is that the struggles of nations and peoples to preserve their independence—to preserve peace now and for the future—will be contradicted and diminished if the Olympics are held in a nation whose continuing aggression has been condemned by an overwhelming majority of the U.N. General Assembly.

Responsibility for this matter should not be shifted to the athletes. That would only force them to carry a burden which properly belongs to the leaders of the Olympic movement. None of us wants our athletes to suffer. But neither should we let them be exploited.

Beyond the effects of this decision on efforts for international peace, we should be concerned about its consequences for the Olympic movement.

The United States deeply values the Olympic Games and the principles on which they rest. We are immensely proud of our own athletes and those of other nations who have trained long and hard. We do not want to see the Olympic movement damaged.

But if the basic principles of the Olympics are ignored, the future of the games themselves will be placed in jeopardy.

Throughout the world, there is broad and growing opposition, among governments and people, to going forward with the games as planned, as if nothing has happened. To do so would imperil the broad popular interest and support upon which this and future Olympics depend.

The preferable course would be to transfer the games from Moscow to another site or multiple sites this summer. Clearly there are practical difficulties, but they could be overcome. There is also precedent for cancelling the games. Or it would be possible, with a simple change of rules, to postpone the games for a year or more.

Let me make my government's position clear: We will oppose the participation of an American team in any Olympic Games in the capital of an invading nation. This position is firm. It reflects the deep convictions of the U.S. Congress and the American people.

To avoid such problems in the future, we support the establishment of permanent homes for the Summer and Winter Olympics.

I know that this distinguished body will carefully weigh the issues now before you. By upholding the principles of the Olympics when they are under challenge, we will preserve the meaning of the Olympics for years to come. ■

[1]Press release 36.

Summer Olympics in Moscow

Following are President Carter's letter of January 20, 1980, to Robert Kane, President of the U.S. Olympic Committee, and Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher's statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on January 28.

PRESIDENT'S LETTER
JAN. 20, 1980[1]

As President of this nation and as Honorary President of the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), I write to advise you of my views concerning the Games of the XXII Olympiad scheduled to be held in Moscow this Summer.

I regard the Soviet invasion and the attempted suppression of Afghanistan as a serious violation of international law and an extremely serious threat to world peace. This invasion also endangers neighboring independent countries and access to a major part of the world's oil supplies. It therefore threatens our own national security, as well as the security of the region and the entire world.

We must make clear to the Soviet Union that it cannot trample upon an independent nation and at the same time do business as usual with the rest of the world. We must make clear that it will pay a heavy economic and political cost for such aggressions. That is why I have taken the severe economic measures announced on January 4, and why other free nations are supporting these measures. That is why the United Nations General Assembly, by an overwhelming vote of 104 to 18, con-

demned the invasion and urged the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops.

I want to reaffirm my own personal commitment to the principles and purposes of the Olympic movement. I believe in the desirability of keeping Government policy out of the Olympics, but deeper issues are at stake.

In the Soviet Union international sports competition is itself an aspect of Soviet government policy, as is the decision to invade Afghanistan. The head of the Moscow Olympic Organizing Committee is a high Soviet Government official.

The Soviet Government attaches enormous political importance to the holding of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow, and if the Olympics are not held in Moscow because of Soviet military aggression in Afghanistan, this powerful signal of world outrage cannot be hidden from the Soviet people, and will reverberate around the globe. Perhaps it will deter future aggression.

I therefore urge the USOC, in cooperation with other National Olympic Committees, to advise the International Olympic Committee (IOC) that if Soviet troops do not fully withdraw from Afghanistan within the next month, Moscow will become an unsuitable site for a festival meant to celebrate peace and good will. Should the Soviet Union fail to withdraw its troops within the time prescribed above, I urge the USOC to propose that the Games either be transferred to another site such as Montreal or to multiple sites, or be cancelled for this year. If the International Olympic Committee rejects such a USOC proposal, I urge the USOC and the Olympic Committees of other like-minded nations not to participate in the Moscow Games. In this event, if suitable arrangements can be made, I urge that such nations conduct alternative games of their own this summer at some other appropriate site or sites. The United States Government is prepared to lend its full support to any and all such efforts.

I know from your letter to me and your meeting with Secretary Vance and Lloyd Cutler of your deep concern for the men and women throughout the world who have trained tirelessly in the hopes of participating in the 1980 Olympic Games. I share your concern. I would support the participation of athletes from the entire world at Summer Olympic Games or other games this summer outside the Soviet Union, just as I welcome athletes from the entire world to Lake Placid, for the Winter Olympic Games.

I have the deepest admiration and respect for Olympic athletes and their pursuit of excellence. No one understands better than they the meaning of sacrifice to achieve worthy goals. There is no goal of greater importance than the goal at stake here—the security of our nation and the peace of the world.

I also urge that the IOC take a further step to eliminate future political competition among nations to serve as hosts for the Olympic Games. I call upon all nations to join in supporting a permanent site for the Summer Olympics in Greece, and to seek an appropriate permanent site for the Winter Olympics.

The course I am urging is necessary to help secure the peace of the world at this critical time. The most important task of world leaders, public and private, is to deter aggression and prevent war. Aggression destroys the international amity and goodwill that the Olympic movement attempts to foster. If our response to aggression is to continue with international sports as usual in the capital of the aggressor, our other steps to deter aggression are undermined.

The spirit and the very future of the Games depend upon courageous and resolute action at this time. I call for your support and your help in rallying the support of the other Olympic Committees throughout the world.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER JAN. 28, 1980[2]

I appreciate this opportunity to meet with you to discuss the Administration's views on U.S. participation in the Summer Olympic Games in Moscow.

In his State of the Union address, President Carter emphasized that " . . . with Soviet invading forces in Afghanistan, neither the American people nor I will support sending an Olympic team to Moscow."

This weekend in Colorado the U.S. Olympic Committee agreed to ask the International Olympic Committee, when it meets in Lake Placid in early February, to transfer, postpone, or cancel the Summer Games. We are encouraged by this decision and by the support and understanding shown by the U.S. Olympic Committee.

We have carefully examined the two resolutions introduced on January 22 by Senators Muskie and Pryor (S.R. 333 and 334) and are in general agreement with them. Our preference at this time, however, would be Senate adoption of a third resolution—the one passed overwhelmingly by the House last week (H. Con. Res. 249).

This morning I would like to review with you, briefly, some of the factors which led the Administration to take such a strong stand on the Olympics and the reasons we would welcome the committee's early passage of a concurrent resolution.

In late December the Soviets launched a massive invasion of Afghanistan. They played an instrumental role in the execution of that country's head of state. More than 80,000 Soviet troops are now occupying Afghanistan, seeking to crush the resistance offered by Afghan nationalists fighting for their freedom.

In our considered judgment, this invasion presents a serious threat to world peace and, in particular, to the security of the nations in the region surrounding Afghanistan.

In his State of the Union address, the President outlined a full range of responses to this threat. I would like to confine myself chiefly to the question of the Olympics.

The essence of the President's decision is clear and simple: Unless all Soviet troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan within the next month, the U.S. Government will not support participation by U.S. athletes in the Summer Olympics in Moscow.

Our consultations with other governments prove that many strongly share our concerns. We are much encouraged by the decision this weekend of the West German Olympic Committee to support transfer, postponement, or cancellation of the Summer Games. Other governments around the world have also adopted a position paralleling that of President Carter, and we expect many more governments to join in this effort in the days ahead.

We are still exploring a number of alternative ways of dealing with the games: transferring them to another site—or sites—or cancelling them entirely—as was done in 1916, 1940, and 1944. In this latter case, the international community could decide to hold some other form of international competition, this year or next.

The President has also suggested that, in the future, a permanent home for the Summer Olympics might be established in Greece. A suitable site for the Winter Games could be sought as well.

We expect that the U.S. Olympic Committee will discuss all these possibilities with the International Olympic Committee at their February 9 meeting. A firm and united expression from the U.S. Congress before that meeting would help to convey the strength and depth of U.S. sentiment on this crucial question.

I would like to stress that we are deeply conscious of the long, hard, even painful years of practice our athletes

Soviets Veto Sanctions Against Iran

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JAN. 14, 1980[1]

Like the presence of Soviet tanks in the streets of Kabul, the Soviet veto of the U.N. Security Council resolution on Iran exposes, for all the people of the world to see, the Soviet Union's disregard for international law and the world's machinery of peace.

Their veto is an act of political cynicism. It offends the conscience of all who honor freedom and who seek to strengthen the grip of law over lawlessness, of peace over strife—in this crisis and for the future.

The facts are clear. On December 31, the Security Council adopted a binding resolution on Iran.[2] That resolution, as had a prior resolution which the Soviet Union approved, called on Iran to release the hostages. It requested that Secretary General Waldheim continue to use his good offices to secure their release. It committed the Security Council to review the situation again on January 7 and, if the Iranians had not yet complied, to adopt effective measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the U.N. Charter. These are the articles of the U.N. Charter that provide for mandatory sanctions.

The Secretary General then went to Tehran. He reported to the Council on January 7 that the progress he sought had not been made; that the Iranians refused to release the hostages. It, therefore, became incumbent on the Security Council to act.

Twice the United States, despite extreme skepticism, agreed to a delay of this action so that any indication of a good-faith effort to resolve this crisis could be explored. As has so often been the case in the past, those explorations proved fruitless.

The necessary majority of the members of the U.N. Security Council voted to impose specific sanctions on Iran in accordance with the provisions of the charter and the previous decision of the Council. The Soviet Union has thwarted that effort with their veto.

Let us be clear about what the Soviet Union is saying to the world by its two vetoes in the past week and by its other actions: The Soviet Union has opposed this effort of the international community, including the United States, to resolve the crisis in Iran through peaceful means. Meanwhile, it is seeking to crush the independence of Afghanistan through military force.

The Soviet Union can veto the Security Couincil's resolution on Afghanistan—but they cannot veto the imprint their aggression has left on world opinion.

The Soviet Union can keep the Security Council from acting now on Iran—but they cannot block the determination of members of the international community that terrorism and lawlessness must be dealt with firmly.

Over the next several days, we will be working with other nations which uphold the principles of the United Nations and which seek a peaceful end to the crisis in Iran, to carry out our obligations under the Security Council resolution of December 31 and to implement the sanctions. At the President's direction, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher is now in Europe to discuss our actions with our European allies. We will also be in immediate contact with other nations.

The terrorists holding the American hostages cannot take comfort from this veto, because in reality it is aimed at advancing Soviet designs in Iran. The veto does nothing to lessen the world community's condemnation of their acts, nor does it lessen Iran's isolation from the world. In spite of the veto, we are confident that nations will act to maintain the rule of law. ■

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 21, 1980.

[2] For text of Resolution 461, see BULLETIN of Feb. 1980, p. 68.

U.S. Files Brief With ICJ in Iran Hostage Case

On January 15, 1980, the United States filed its Memorial on the merits with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the *Case Concerning the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran*. The Memorial was filed in accordance with the Court's order of December 24, 1979, which gives Iran until February 18, 1980, to file its Counter-Memorial.

In the Memorial, the United States requests the Court to declare that Iran has violated its international obligations to the United States and to order Iran to conform to its legal obligations. The United States also requests the Court to hold that the United States is entitled to reparations for Iran's violations of international law, in a sum to be determined after the full extent of injury suffered by the United States and its nationals is known.

In particular, the United States alleges that Iran has violated:

- Articles 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 37, 44, and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;
- Articles 5, 27, 28, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, and 72 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations;
- Article II(4), XIII, XVIII, and XIX of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran; and
- Articles 2, 4, and 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents.

The specific measures the Court is asked to order are:

- That Iran immediately restore the U.S. Embassy, Chancery, and Consulates to the exclusive control of the United States and insure protection and inviolability of those properties according to treaties between the United States and Iran and general international law;
- That Iran immediately release all U.S. hostages and grant them full protection, privileges, and immunities to which they are entitled under treaties in force and general international law,

including immunity from criminal jurisdiction and freedom and facilities to leave Iran;

- That none of the hostages be forced to appear at any "trial," "grand jury," or "international commission;"
- That those responsible for crimes against the personnel and premises of the United States be prosecuted or extradited to the United States; and
- That the United States is entitled to reparation in its own right and in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals held hostage.

Many of these measures were already specified by the Court in its order of December 15, 1979, directing Iran to release the hostages. The December 15 order was an interim order entered to preserve the rights of the United States while the case is pending. In the Memorial filed January 15, the United States requests that a final judgment be entered in favor of the United States on all issues in the case. ■

Press release 11 of Jan. 15, 1980.

Iran Chronology, January 1980

January 1

U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim arrives in Tehran to seek negotiations for release of the hostages.

January 2

A spokesman for the Iranian militants asserts that Secretary General Waldheim would not be allowed access to the hostages.

January 3

Secretary General Waldheim meets with Iran's policymaking Revolutionary Council but fails to meet with Khomeini.

U.S. begins search for 9,000 Iranian students who failed to report to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

January 4

Militants order Iranian Foreign Ministry to hand over U.S. Charge L. Bruce Laingen, to be interrogated about documents that were found in the Embassy files.

January 8

U.S. wins approval from other major industrial countries on new financial sanctions against Iran and plans to include the measure in a forthcoming U.N. resolution.

January 11

U.S. submits draft resolution calling for economic sanctions against Iran to the U.N. Security Council.

January 12

Security Council delays debate on U.S. bid for sanctions against Iran because of a last minute message from Iranian authorities to Secretary General Waldheim proposing to release the hostages in return for the formation of an international tribunal that would hear Iran's grievances.

Iran formally asks Panama to arrest the deposed Shah for extradition to Iran.

January 13

Security Council votes 13 to 2 (Soviet Union and East Germany) on a draft resolution calling for economic sanctions against Iran.

January 14

Iran's ruling Revolutionary Council announces that all journalists working for U.S. news organizations would be expelled from Iran.

Iranian Government warns U.N. members that the economic boycott envisioned by the U.S. would jeopardize their relations with Iran. The Iranian Foreign Ministry also informs U.N. authorities that any Security Council decision that was contrary to Iran's interests would be considered invalid.

January 15

Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, Iran's Economic and Finance Minister, leads in the Iranian Presidential campaign.

U.S. files its Memorial with the World Court on the merits of the U.S.-Iran hostage case. The Memorial was filed in accordance with the Court's order of December 24, 1979, which gives Iran until February 18, 1980, to file its Counter-Memorial.

January 19

Alleged plotters of a coup against Iran's Revolutionary Government are arrested in Tabriz.

January 22

Because of the Afghanistan crisis, the Carter Administration makes a policy decision to offer future economic and military cooperation to Iran if the hostages are released unharmed.

January 23

Khomeini is hospitalized in Tehran for treatment of a heart ailment.

January 25

Bani-Sadr wins in Iran's first Presidential election. Of the 4 million votes counted, he receives 75.7%. However, the Revolutionary Council remains supreme until Bani-Sadr's government can be approved by a General Assembly to be elected about the end of February.

January 27

Bani-Sadr states that the major responsibility for ending the crisis over the hostages lays with the U.S. He states that "when America decides to put aside its policy of expansionism and violating the sovereignty of other countries, then it will be adopting correct policies for the solution of the crisis."

January 28

Canada announces it is temporarily closing its Embassy in Iran.

A Federal judge orders the Carter Administration to return the passport of Philip Agee, the former CIA official who, in December, proposed resolving the Iranian situation by exchanging CIA files on Iran for release of the hostages.

Secretary General Waldheim plans a series of new moves aimed at speeding the release of hostages among which includes a tentatively selected five-member commission to inquire into Iran's grievances against the U.S. and the deposed Shah.

January 29

With the help of the CIA and the Canadian Embassy, six U.S. Embassy employees, who had been secretly hiding in the Canadian Embassy in Tehran, escape from Iran posing as Canadian diplomats and carrying Canadian passports with forged Iranian visas.

January 30

Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh states that the escape of the Americans aided by the Canadians could worsen conditions for the 50 hostages. He also condemns the act as a violation of "international law."

January 31

Iranian militants announce that they would refuse to obey any order by President-elect Bani-Sadr to hand over their hostages to a third party. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica
The Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington Dec. 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 1961. TIAS 4780. Accession deposited: Uruguay, Jan. 11, 1980.[1]

Atomic Energy
Fourth supply agreement for the transfer of enriched uranium for a research reactor in Yugoslavia, with annex and exchange of notes. Signed at Vienna Jan. 16, 1980. Enters into force on the date upon which the amendment to the project agreement of Oct. 4, 1961 between the International Atomic Energy Agency and Yugoslavia enters into force.

Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Monaco, Jan. 4, 1980.

Containers
International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037.
Accession deposited: Argentina, Sept. 11, 1979.

Cultural Relations
Protocol revising the convention of Nov. 22, 1928 (TIAS 6548) relating to international expositions, with appendix and annex. Done at Paris, Nov. 30, 1972.[2]
Ratification deposited: Italy, Nov. 20, 1979.

Customs
Customs convention on the international transport of goods under cover of TIR carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20, 1978.[3]
Accession deposited: Norway, Jan. 11, 1980.

Education
Convention on the recognition of studies, diplomas, and degrees concerning higher education in the states belonging to the Europe region. Done at Paris Dec. 21, 1979. Enters into force 1 month after the fifth instrument of ratification has been deposited.
Signature: U.S. Dec. 21, 1979.

Finance
Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into force Nov. 30, 1977. TIAS 8765.
Accessions deposited: China, Maldives, Jan. 15, 1980.

Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Adopted at Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951.[3]
Accession deposited: Barbados, Jan. 14, 1980.

Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 14, 1975.[2]
Acceptances deposited. Argentina, Dec. 31, 1979;
Cuba, Dec. 27, 1979; Dominica, Dec. 18, 1979; Israel, Dec. 31, 1979; Peru, Jan. 21, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 17, 1977.[2]
Acceptances deposited: Dominica, Dec. 18, 1979; Israel, Dec. 31, 1979; Peru, Jan. 21, 1980; Poland, Jan. 2, 1980; Sri Lanka, Jan. 16, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Adopted at London Nov. 15, 1979. Enters into force 12 months after acceptance by two-thirds of the members of the Organization, other than associate members, except for those which, before the amendments come into force, make a declaration that they do not accept them.
Acceptance deposited: Finland, Jan. 14, 1980.

Patents
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978; except for chapter II. Chapter II entered into force Mar. 29, 1978.[4] TIAS 8733.
Accession deposited: Australia, Dec. 31, 1979.

Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention, with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos Oct. 25, 1973. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1975; for the U.S. Apr. 7, 1976. TIAS 8572.
Accession deposited: Honduras, Oct. 11, 1979.

Trade
Agreement on technical barriers to trade. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.
Acceptances deposited: Chile,[5] Oct. 25, 1979; Argentina,[6] Austria,[6] Belgium,[6] Canada, European Economic Community, Finland,[6] France, Federal Republic of Germany,[7] Ireland, Italy, Japan,[8] Luxembourg, Netherlands,[9,10] New Zealand, Switzerland, U.K.,[9,11] U.S., Dec. 17, 1979; Sweden, Dec. 20, 1979; Denmark, Dec. 21, 1979;[12] Brazil, Norway, Dec. 28, 1979.

International dairy arrangement. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.
Acceptances deposited: Argentina,[6] Austria,[6] European Economic Community,[1] Finland,[6] Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, U.S., Dec. 17, 1979; South Africa, Dec. 18, 1979; Sweden, Dec. 20, 1979; Bulgaria, Dec. 26, 1979; Norway, Dec. 28, 1979.

Arrangement regarding bovine meat. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.
Acceptances deposited: Argentina,[6] Austria,[6] Canada, European Economic Community, Finland,[6] Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, U.K.,[13] U.S., Dec. 17, 1979; South Africa, Dec. 18, 1979; Sweden, Dec. 20, 1979; Bulgaria, Dec. 26, 1979; Brazil, Norway, Dec. 28, 1979.

Agreement on trade in civil aircraft. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.
Acceptances deposited: Belgium,[6] European Economic Community, France, Federal Republic of Germany,[7] Ireland, Italy,[6] Japan,[8] Luxembourg, Netherlands,[9,10] Switzerland,[6] U.K.,[9,14] Dec. 17, 1979; Canada,[15] Sweden, U.S., Dec. 20, 1979; Denmark,[12] Dec. 21, 1979; Norway, Dec. 28, 1979.

Agreement on implementation of article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 1700). (Customs valuation) Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Enters into force Jan. 1, 1981, for the governments which have accepted or acceded to it by that date.

Agreement on government procurement. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Enters into force Jan. 1, 1981 for those governments which have accepted or acceded to it by that date.

Agreement on import licensing procedures. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980 for the governments which have accepted or acceded to it by that date.

Agreement on implementation of article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (antidumping code). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980, for those governments which have accepted or acceded to it by that date.

Agreement on interpretation and application of articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (subsidies and countervailing duties). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980 for those governments which have accepted or acceded to it by that date.

Geneva (1979) protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 30, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.

U.N. Industrial Development Organization
Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Enters into force when at least 80 states that have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval notify the depositary that they have agreed, after consultation among themselves, that the constitution shall enter into force.
Signatures: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Senegal, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen (Aden), Yugoslavia, Apr. 8, 1979; Austria, Oct. 3, 1979; Bangladesh, Jan. 2, 1980; Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, U.K., Venezuela, Zambia, Oct. 5, 1979; Benin, Dec. 4, 1979; China, Sept. 6, 1979; Congo, Dec. 18, 1979; Cuba, Oct. 2, 1979; Finland, Sept. 28, 1979; Gabon, Jan. 8, 1980; Guinea, Nov. 29, 1979; India, Nov. 16, 1979; Indonesia, Sept. 28, 1979; Japan, Jan. 18, 1980; Madagascar, Dec. 13, 1979; Mexico, Nov. 12, 1979; Nicaragua, Jan. 16, 1980; Niger, Apr. 9, 1979; Norway, Sept. 28, 1979; Pakistan, Oct. 22, 1979; Panama, Aug. 17, 1979; Philippines, Oct. 12, 1979; Portugal, Sept. 10, 1979; Rwanda, Aug. 28, 1979; Sierra Leone, Aug. 29, 1979; Spain, Jan. 21, 1980; Sri Lanka, Oct. 31, 1979; Sudan, June 27, 1979; Swaziland, Jan. 14, 1980; Sweden, Sept. 28, 1979; Switzerland, Sept. 19, 1979; U.S., Jan. 17, 1980; Upper Volta, Nov. 16, 1979, Yemen (Sana), July 19, 1979; Zaire, Jan. 21, 1980.
Ratifications deposited: India, Mexico, Jan. 21, 1980; Madagascar, Jan. 18, 1980; Pakistan, Oct. 29, 1979.

Wheat
Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Norway, Jan. 28, 1980.

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Spain, Jan. 9, 1980.

BILATERAL

Bolivia
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of May 31, 1978 (TIAS 9581). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz Dec. 6, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 6, 1979.

Bulgaria
Joint statement on the development of cooperation in agriculture, with annex. Signed at Washington Nov. 26, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 26, 1979.

Canada
Agreement for a cooperative vessel traffic management system for the Juan de Fuca region, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa Dec. 19, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 19, 1979.

Denmark and the Faroe Islands
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the U.S., with annexes and agreed minute. Signed at Washington Sept. 5, 1979.
Entered into force: Jan. 18, 1980.

Egypt
Project grant agreement relating to technical assistance for the improvement of the Egyptian telecommunications system, with annex. Signed at Cairo Dec. 30, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 30, 1979.

European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)
Arrangement in the field of nuclear safety research, with addenda. Signed at Washington Mar. 19, 1979. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1979.

Hungary
Agreement on tariff matters, with annexes and exchange of letters. Signed at Budapest Nov. 18, 1978.
Entered into force: Jan. 1, 1980.

Indonesia
Agreement for cooperation in scientific research and technological development, with exchange of letters. Signed at Washington Dec. 11, 1978.
Entered into force: Oct. 5, 1979.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Agreement amending the agreement of May 11, 1959, as amended and extended (TIAS 4291, 7852), for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy, with annex. Signed at Vienna Jan. 14, 1980. Enters into force on the date on which the Agency receives from the U.S. written notification that it has complied with all requirements for such entry into force.

Israel
First amendment to the agreement of Nov. 15, 1979 relating to cash assistance to Israel during FY 1980 to support the economic and political stability of Israel. Signed Dec. 12, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 12, 1979.

Agreement for cooperation in the field of health. Signed at Washington Jan. 29, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 29, 1980.

Japan
Agreement on educational exchange programs. Signed at Tokyo Feb. 15, 1979. Entered into force: Dec. 24, 1979.

Agreement for financing an educational exchange program, with memorandum. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Jan. 11, 1958, as amended Dec. 2, 1960, and Aug. 23, 1963. Entered into force Jan. 11, 1958. (TIAS 3982, 4635, 5422)
Terminated: Dec. 24, 1979.

Republic of Korea
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Seoul and Washington Dec. 27, 1979, and Jan. 14, 1980. Enters into force on the date mutually agreed upon by the Administrations.

Macao
Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of letters at Hong Kong and Macao Nov. 29 and Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 18, 1979; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Mexico
Treaty on extradition, with appendix. Signed at Mexico City May 4, 1978.
Instruments of ratification exchanged: Jan. 25, 1980.
Entered into force: Jan. 25, 1980.

Agreement relating to salary supplements to personnel dedicated to opium poppy eradication and narcotics interdiction. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico Dec. 3, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 3, 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of June 2, 1977, as amended (TIAS 8952, 9251), relating to additional cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico Dec. 5, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 5, 1979.

Department of State bulletin

Volume 80 / Number 2037 / April 1980

Cover:

Mangbetu woman, Zaire
(Museum of African Art, Eliot Elisofon Archives)

Secretary Vance

Victor Palmieri

President Carter

David D. Newsom

The DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.

CYRUS R. VANCE
Secretary of State

HODDING CARTER III
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor

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foreseeable aid requirements ranging from Southeast Asia to Central America. Obviously I cannot promise that this amount of unprogramed funds will eliminate the need for future supplementals. But it can give us a greater degree of flexibility and can help us to respond promptly where crisis conditions threaten our interests. It will be used only after providing Congress written notification of our intended use of the fund, in accordance with standard reprograming procedures.

Fourth, our national interest in the international system, including the United Nations and the affiliated institutions, has become ever more clear in the recent past. In turn, our own support for these agencies is especially important now.

The United Nations has been an important forum for the pursuit of our goals in both the Iran and Afghanistan crises. The recent votes in the Security Council and the General Assembly attest to the widespread support for our objectives on these two issues. Beyond that, the U.N. Development Program and other technical assistance agencies, together with the international financial institutions, serve most of the same long-term goals as our own bilateral aid programs—the goals of sustained human progress and a stable world order. And the multilateral development banks are a particularly effective and efficient way of achieving these aims: The combined effect of contributions from other donors and the use of callable capital to support borrowing in private markets mean that U.S. expenditures on the World Bank, for example, are multiplied many times over in actual Bank lending.

For these reasons I hope the Congress will resist any effort to treat our contributions to these agencies as vehicles for punishing or rewarding recipient countries.

I have emphasized that our economic assistance programs have political, as well as economic and humanitarian, importance. In times of challenge to our interests, our incentive to support global development is redoubled. But we should never forget that economic development is not an abstraction; it is a process through which many millions of human beings find first the hope and then the reality of adequate food, decent health care, and the new opportunities which education and training can bring. Economic development is one of the great moral challenges of our times.

Security Assistance

Let me add a few words about our security assistance programs.

These programs are essential instruments for promoting both our own security and that of our friends and allies. In addition they are a vital part of our policies toward the Third World. In recent years they have proved their worth in many ways.

They have strengthened our relations with Israel and Egypt, and strengthened those nations, as they have negotiated toward peace. They have afforded material support to friendly nations in Southeast Asia whose security has been threatened by Vietnamese actions. They have helped us strengthen NATO's southern flank, maintain peace and stability in Korea, and assist Latin American and African nations as they meet their security needs.

As in the past, our FY 1981 security assistance request includes five programs.

• Recent events have clearly demonstrated the importance of our foreign military sales (FMS) financing program. FMS provides credits and loan guarantees which assist foreign governments in purchasing needed defense articles, services, and training. This approach has made possible our gradual transition away from grant military aid. For FY 1981 we are requesting a total program of $2.6 billion, requiring budget authority of only $714 million. Some 59% is allocated for Israel and Egypt and will make a critical contribution to our effort to achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace.

• Under the military assistance program (MAP), we are requesting funding for only Portugal, Spain, and the Philippines. In each of those countries we have important military bases serving mutual security interests. The $105 million requested for FY 1981 will fund those three programs, management expenses, and delivery of previously funded MAP material.

• The economic support fund, for which we are requesting $2.1 billion, provides needed economic aid to countries of particular political and security interest to the United States. Again, Israel and Egypt are the primary recipients. In addition, the economic support fund will be used to help improve the prospects for reconstruction and peaceful growth in Central America, southern Africa, and other troubled areas. Let me stress in this context the great urgency we attach to the pending FY 1980 supplemental request for Nicaragua, in addition to the proposed $25 million in economic support funds for 1981.

• The peacekeeping operations program provides funds for the Sinai Field Support Mission, as well as for U.S. contributions to multilateral peacekeeping efforts in Cyprus. This program for 1981 will cost $25 million and will help reduce the risk of war in these troubled parts of the world.

• Finally, the international military education and training program (IMET) is a cost-effective element of our security assistance. For FY 1981 we are proposing IMET programs of $32.5 million to train personnel from 61 countries. We consider this program of major importance, despite the relatively small sums involved. In addition to strengthening local defense capabilities, IMET improves the basis for U.S. security cooperation with developing countries, particularly in the case of small nations where we have no other military ties. In the process, IMET directly supports our efforts to advance the cause of human rights, as it exposes military officers in other countries to the role of our own armed forces in a democratic nation. I believe it has been a factor in the heartening moves toward democracy of a number of Latin American nations in recent years. I hope IMET will have your special attention.

In conclusion let me emphasize a central point. Far from suggesting a change in direction, events in Iran and Afghanistan have underscored the absolute necessity of a sustained American commitment in the developing world. In both cases, important challenges are being answered with resolve. I believe the American people are united in this resolve.

This unity and this resolve must not be applied only to our immediate response to these particular challenges. We are also dealing with long-term,

broader issues which require our holding to long-term strategies—in both defense and development—that are fundamentally sound.

To build and protect the kind of world in which freedom is nurtured, our persistence over time—measured largely by the resources we apply—will be decisive.

That is why I believe that the FY 1981 foreign assistance legislation before you is of particular importance to our nation. ■

[1] Press release 32. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Poison Gas Use in Indochina

by Evelyn Colbert

Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on December 12, 1979. Ms. Colbert is Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. [1]

Many members of the Hmong (Meo) hilltribes minority arriving in Thailand as refugees from Laos have reported chemical attacks by Lao-Vietnamese forces in Laos. In some cases, they have stated that they were the actual victims of such attacks. These attacks, directed against both civilian and military targets, are reported to have occurred from 1974 to as recently as May 1979. As we have already heard, we do not have absolute proof of these charges; however, the result of U.S. Government investigations support the conclusion that some chemical agent or agents were being used in Laos during the period in question, as part of the Lao Government's effort to bring the Hmong under its control.

Hmong Resistance

The years of enmity between the Hmong and the lowland Lao and Vietnamese have left bitterness on both sides. During the Indochina wars, one faction of the Hmong worked with the Lao and Vietnamese Communists. However, the majority of the Hmong supported French and later American efforts to forestall a Vietnamese Communist victory in Laos. With their unmatched skills as guerrilla fighters, the Hmong played an important military role for both the United States and France.

When the Communists came to power in Vientiane in 1975, a few Hmong settled under Lao-Vietnamese control semivoluntarily. However, many of the Hmong who had been allied with the French and the United States continued their guerrilla resistance in remote upland areas, threatening land communications and attacking isolated Lao and Vietnamese units. Other Hmong retreated deeper into the mountains of northern Laos or fled to Thailand.

Those who continued their resistance did so without any U.S. assistance, then or now, drawing instead largely upon cached weapons and ammunition and inspired by their perennial fears of control by the dominant lowland Lao and the Vietnamese. Most Hmong have seen their actions as defensive and that of the Vietnamese and Lao Government forces as an attempt to eradicate Hmong tribes, at least those who are former followers of General Vang Pao and their families in Phu Bia and Phu Ma Thao.

Lao-Vietnamese Resettlement Campaign

The Lao Government, with strong Vietnamese assistance, is waging a military campaign against the 300,000 Hmong. This campaign is aimed ultimately at resettling them, primarily in the lowlands and plains where they can be more easily controlled. The government contends that such resettlement is essential to its security. It fears foreign support of the Hmong insurgency if the Hmong are left in remote areas. It is also the Lao Government's policy to put an end to the Hmong traditional practice of slash and burn agriculture which results each year in the destruction of valuable timber—one of Laos' few natural resources.

The practical effect of this campaign has been to create great hardship for many Hmong, resulting in the flight to Thailand of approximately one-fifth of the Laos Hmong population. Beginning in 1974, and gradually increasing in frequency in 1976 and 1977, there were reports of use of poison gas by Lao and Vietnamese troops against insurgent Hmong tribes. All of the reports on this subject referred to air delivery of a chemical agent—or agents—causing illness or death. Descriptions given by refugees of color and other characteristics of the agents and the symptoms of the illnesses caused vary widely. Several reports told of repeated chemical attacks on Hmong villages under control of the Lao Government.

I should emphasize that as we have heard, it has been very difficult to obtain physical evidence of poison gas. Some of the symptoms described could possibly result from materials other than lethal poison gas, e.g., defoliants, riot control agents, phosphorous shells, etc. The physical evidence of most toxic agents normally dissipates very

have undergone to prepare for the Summer Olympics. That is why we are actively exploring with other governments possible alternatives to holding the games in Moscow.

But, at the same time, we cannot forget that more profound issues are at stake here. We must convince the Soviets that we are willing and able to respond to their aggression, whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere. If we permit sports to go forward as usual, after we have said there will be no business as usual, we will be sending out a contradictory signal, and one which could call into question the firmness of our resolve.

The Soviets clearly attach tremendous political importance to the games. Their propaganda, the way in which they have gone about Olympic preparations, their transparent hope of using the games as a showcase of the alleged successes of a totalitarian system, leave no doubt that they see in these Olympics a political device. We cannot give our support or blessing to a cynical effort by the U.S.S.R. to masquerade as a peaceloving country while at the same time Soviet troops are occupying and oppressing Afghanistan.

Our view of this matter is reinforced by the recent arrest and exile of Andrei Sakharov, world famous physicist, human rights advocate, and Nobel laureate. Who, in the face of this outrageous act, can believe the Soviets intend to host the Olympics as a celebration of the human spirit?

Facing such bleak realities, we cannot afford to remain passive. Our stand on the Olympic Games is one step which may help convince Moscow that it cannot invade its neighbors and oppress its own citizens with impunity.

We look forward to working closely with the committee to develop policies which will uphold our own principles and will deter the Soviets from aggressive, repressive actions in the future. ■

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980.

[2] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Technology Transfers to the U.S.S.R.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, JAN. 8, 1980[1]

Subject: Policy on Technology Transfers to the USSR

I direct that you, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate officials, review and revise our policy with respect to the export of high technology and other strategic items to the Soviet Union. Pending review, no validated export licenses for shipment of goods or technical data to the Soviet Union are to be approved. This review is to reassess what exports will make a significant contribution to the military potential of the Soviet Union and therefore prove detrimental to the security of the United States in light of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

In addition, I direct that you immediately review those transactions for which validated licenses have already been issued but export has not occurred to determine whether any such licenses should be suspended or revoked in light of the changed national security circumstances.

Finally, I direct that you, in consultation with the Secretary of State and other appropriate officials, determine whether certain transactions now under general license requirements should be subject to validated license requirements.

JIMMY CARTER

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE, JAN. 8, 1980[1]

Subject: Policy on Technology Transfers to the USSR

I have directed the Secretary of Commerce to review and revise our policy with respect to the export of high technology and other strategic items to the Soviet Union. This review is to reassess what exports will make a significant contribution to the military potential of the Soviet Union and therefore prove detrimental to the security of the United States in light of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Our COCOM [Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy] partners should be consulted on this review, which will reexamine precedents established in the past for COCOM exceptions, in order to secure their cooperation. These consultations should make clear that the basis for review and revision is the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan which has changed the nature of the potential danger to our common military security.

JIMMY CARTER ■

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 14, 1980.

Hermitage Exhibit Canceled

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JAN. 22, 1980[1]

The U.S. Government has decided that in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it cannot recommend that an exhibition in this country of art objects from the Hermitage Museum, in Leningrad, would be in our national interest. This decision has been conveyed to the sponsors of the exhibition.

What this means is that the government will not grant the objects immunity from judicial seizure under Public Law 89–259. This law provides that objects imported for temporary cultural display cannot be seized as part of a legal proceeding, that is, the waiver would. Without a finding that exhibition is in the national interest, this immunity cannot be granted.

In the past, the Soviet Union has chosen not to permit objects into the United States for cultural purposes without the granting of this immunity. The exhibition was originally scheduled for Washington, Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Detroit, sponsored by Control Data Corporation. I would note that a lot of countries do send exhibits here without a waiver. ■

[1] Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

FY 1981 Development Assistance Programs

by Thomas Ehrlich

Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 5, 1980. Mr. Ehrlich is Director of the U.S. International Development Cooperation Agency.[1]

I am pleased to present the first testimony of the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA) before this committee. IDCA owes much to the House Foreign Affairs Committee for its existence. My objective today is to present an overview of all the development assistance programs proposed by the President for the coming year. To evaluate the individual programs, they should be viewed in the context of our entire development assistance effort.

The testimony is in two parts. The first describes our overall development assistance plans, indicates the range of our development assistance goals, and describes activities in some of the priority areas within that range. The second briefly explains the budget request for each of the separate programs and indicates how they relate to one another.

Many now recognize the importance of developing countries to the United States and that assisting development is in the U.S. interest for humanitarian, economic, political, and strategic reasons. But it is also essential to step back and to see these objectives as part of a coherent effort to achieve an overriding goal—a world at peace in which we can overcome poverty.

President Carter, in his State of the Union address, stated that: "Peace—a peace that preserves freedom—remains America's first goal." A world at peace in which nations respect each other's national independence, in which each nation expands the participation of its people in its political process, in which each nation respects the human rights of its citizens, in which each nation strives to meet the economic aspirations of its people equitably—that is a world in which our own people and institutions can flourish.

We have learned that dictatorships which consistently fail to meet the economic and political aspirations of their people raise the risk of internal strife. Frustrated and enraged people, mired in poverty and oppressed by a few, breed terror, revolution, and chaos. They do not produce nations that can resist subversion. Nor can such nations strengthen their national independence. They are prey to destabilizing influences from within and without. They raise the temptations of intervention for their neighbors and more distant major powers. Often those temptations threaten the peace we seek.

A world of nations striving to meet the aspirations of their people through the use of representative institutions and caring about the human rights of their citizens does not guarantee peace and freedom but certainly is a necessary precondition.

Those who fight for peace are also required to struggle against poverty.

American interests in Africa, Asia, and Latin America—dramatized by the threat to our security that currently confronts us—are diverse and significant. How we resolve the many challenges brought to us by the developing world in the 1980s will have a tremendous impact on the course of our own nation's development during the rest of this century.

The central feature of the developing world is *change*—social, economic, and political change that results from an up-swelling of nationalistic or religious feeling, from a desire to bring their nations to parity with developed countries, or from the economic injustice that is far too pervasive within the developing world.

In the midst of an interdependent world economy marked by much prosperity, hundreds of millions of people remain without adequate food, shelter, and health care. We must forge an American response to the twin problems of growing interdependence and world poverty. If America meets this challenge, our own economy and society will be strengthened by the growth and adaptation that our response will require.

Each of the facets of our interdependent relationship with the Third World involves important domestic interests. There are those in this and other industrial countries who would take a protective stance in reaction to the growth in economic contacts between the developed and developing worlds. But our country can profit and grow as a result of, not in spite of, the political and economic development of the Third World. We need the courage and sense of purpose to do so.

In that context, I emphasize that our FY 1981 development assistance budget is an important statement in relation to the current world turmoil. At a time when the world is watching all our actions, and reactions, the President's request says that the United States seeks to strengthen our relations with the nations of the Third World. Those relations will be strengthened in other ways as well: in international organizations, the United Nations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The United States will continue to cooperate and negotiate on issues of significance to both developed and developing nations. As IDCA responds to its mandate in the field of development assistance, it will also play its part with other agencies in setting policies toward the overall U.S. relations with the developing nations and toward international negotiations with them.

I have just returned from a 2-week visit to Africa. Throughout that trip I heard time after time—directly and indirectly—two quite different concerns that have arisen in the wake of the recent events in Iran and Afghanistan.

On the one hand, some Africans suggested the United States might simply turn inward and minimize its relations with developing countries. Those who expressed this fear were concerned that isolation from the Third World might be the apparent lesson of Iran to the United States—we could expect only grief, not gratitude, from our efforts to help the nations of the Third World, and we would be best off

IAEA Conference Held in India

by Gerard C. Smith

Statement at the 23d general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in New Delhi on December 4, 1979. Ambassador Smith is Special Representative of the President for Nonproliferation Matters.

It is indeed an honor to appear here today. I would first like to congratulate you, Dr. Sethna [Homi N. Sethna, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of India], on your election as President. You have long been one of the most admired and respected individuals associated with the work of the agency. Your election augurs well for the success of this conference.

I would also like to express our gratitude to the Government of India for all its efforts in hosting this conference.

The President of the United States has asked me to convey the following message:

On behalf of the American people, I would like to send my best wishes to the participants in the IAEA's 23d general conference.

Nuclear power can be critical in the urgent efforts we must make—individually and jointly—to reduce our dependence on dwindling and sometimes insecure fossil fuel supplies. Our extensive cooperative and supply relationships with other countries are major elements in expanding the utilization of nuclear power.

Our ability to derive its full benefits will depend upon greater public confidence that this important energy source is being developed and managed in a safe and effective manner. Misuse of the technology will gravely affect the security of all nations, and it is vital that we intensify our joint efforts to halt the spread of nuclear explosives.

Difficult challenges often provide great opportunities. By working together I believe we can fulfill the promise of the atom for a better and more peaceful world.

The United States recognizes the central role that the IAEA is playing in these endeavors. We intend to continue providing strong support for the programs of the agency.

It is my hope and the hope of the American people that as we enter the 1980s we can renew our efforts to pursue nuclear development in a harmonious and rewarding fashion.

Nuclear power is needed by many countries, including my own. The United States recognizes this need; we will meet our commitment to peaceful nuclear cooperation. At the same time, we must do a far better job in meeting the challenges facing the nuclear power industry, including public concern about safety, waste disposal, proliferation, and supply assurance.

Challenges Facing the Nuclear Industry

We are committed to improving reactor safety. Reactor operators must be more highly trained; regulatory agencies, properly organized; we need more effective and timely response capabilities in emergencies. Three-Mile Island demonstrated shortcomings; it did not negate nuclear energy as a safe, reliable, and economic source of energy. It should make us better able to assure the safe operation of nuclear facilities. The United States will continue to share with the IAEA and its member states the results of its investigation of Three-Mile Island.

Radioactive waste disposal is as much a social and institutional question as a technological one. We should intensify our joint efforts to demonstrate and convince our citizens of the feasibility of waste disposal in different geologic media.

We need to deal more effectively with the disposition of spent fuel. INFCE and other examinations should give us greater confidence in this respect. There is more than one option from which to choose. Protracted retrievable storage of spent fuel produced by most current type reactors is safe and economically competitive with reprocessing. There is growing agreement that reprocessing is not essential for waste management.

There is growing apprehension that additional nations may acquire nuclear explosives. We must insure that this does not occur, since it could have a seriously prejudicial impact on international nuclear commerce, as well as on international security and stability.

The United States recognizes the urgent need to maintain confidence in nuclear supply arrangements with nations meeting nonproliferation conditions. We realize that there should be greater certainty in the issuing of export licenses and predictability in the exercise of national controls. To these ends we are prepared to work closely with others and intend to implement our law in ways that provide for such certainty. Consumer states also bear a responsibility; their use or misuse of technology can have an important effect on the actions of suppliers.

There is need for adequate uranium mining, production, and enrichment to sustain reactor needs. The United States is prepared to help others to identify and develop their natural uranium resources. With necessary exploration and investment, we believe that the uranium industry should not experience excessive difficulty in meeting needs at least until the end of the century. It appears that one conclusion of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) is that there will be sufficient enrichment capacity to meet probable demands, at least through the 1990s. This is encouraging.

The long-term growth of nuclear power will also eventually require more advanced reactor systems. Since fuel utilization improvements can be achieved in thermal reactors, nuclear power could proceed in a once-through mode for a considerable time. Plutonium recycle appears to us as unnecessary, marginally economic at best, and imprudent at this time from a nonproliferation standpoint.

Although some nations are proceeding with breeder research and development (which requires reprocessing), we believe there are compelling economic and nonproliferation reasons for limiting the number of reprocessing plants to a few large-scale facilities and gearing reprocessing capacity to near-term plutonium demand for research and development on advanced reactors.

As such reprocessing takes place, it will become highly important to assure that the resultant plutonium is subject to rigorous international controls.

If the breeder proves to be economic as it is developed and demonstrated, it is likely to be so only in those countries having advanced infrastructures and suitable grid sizes. This does not mean that breeders should be limited to some countries and denied to others. And, there will be time before selecting a particular advanced technology to look at various options and to modernize international nonproliferation arrangements.

U.S. Support for IAEA

The IAEA has long served as a focal point for nuclear cooperation. We believe it will prove important in meeting the challenges I have described.

We strongly support the Director General's proposal to intensify the IAEA's efforts on nuclear safety.

We will continue to support the IAEA's vital safeguards program which is so critical to nonproliferation efforts. This year the United States has contributed $5.1 million to this program; we call upon others to augment their support for it. We believe that nations should also design nuclear facilities for effective application of safeguards.

Additional nations are adhering to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and we hope that full-scope safeguards will become a norm for international nuclear trade.

We congratulate the IAEA for its role in the conclusion of the Convention on Physical Protection. The convention should help discourage diversion by terrorists or other subnational groups.

The agency's technical assistance activities help developing nations to take advantage of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Subject to appropriations by Congress, we will increase our voluntary 1980 contribution over the 1979 level. We also plan to implement our special program of technical assistance outlined at the recent U.N. session on disarmament. We believe our record of cooperation in accordance with Article IV of the NPT has been consistently good. We continue to look for new ways to be even more responsive to the needs of the developing countries. We endorse the agency's study on spent fuel and are actively joining in its examination of whether an international plutonium regime can reinforce existing nonproliferation measures.

We appreciate the Secretariat's contribution to insure the usefulness of INFCE. We expect the IAEA to have an important role in INFCE follow-on. Since INFCE apparently will not foreshadow major technical fixes, we should press for institutional measures to provide both greater supply and nonproliferation assurance. Indeed such an evolution is contemplated by U.S. law and policy.

To sum up, the United States hopes to preserve and increase the essential role of nuclear power, but this will require greater public, governmental, and commercial confidence, as well as international cooperation.

With INFCE's conclusion, we need to resolve remaining differences and, building on past achievements, move toward a more assured nonproliferation framework.

Misuse of technology and equipment could severely damage prospects for nuclear power. This would be tragic, especially given the need of many countries to draw on this great source of power to enhance their energy security.

I began by underscoring our dependence on the development of nuclear energy. I would end on a note of optimism—that by dint of cooperation and discipline this great source of energy can be ours. ■

Munitions Sales to Saudi Arabia

by Lucy Wilson Benson

Statement before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on December 12, 1979. Mrs. Benson is Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.[1]

It is a pleasure to be here today to meet with the members of the subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I have a brief statement to make concerning the proposed sale of $120 million of F–5 munitions to Saudi Arabia.

In brief, this proposed sale includes Sidewinder missiles, Maverick missiles, laser guided bombs, and cluster bomb units. All of these munitions are already in the Saudi inventory. The proposed sale would, thus, complement an earlier sale made pursuant to congressional notification.

The Saudi F–5 fleet is an integral part of Saudi Arabia's overall defense posture, a posture designed to provide defensive coverage of a very large, resource-rich land area with limited manpower. The F–5 version we have supplied to Saudi Arabia is a workhorse aircraft which must fulfill a variety of defensive missions. Its major weapons systems are the Sidewinder, Maverick, laser-guided bombs, and cluster bomb units. Obviously the usefulness of these systems, and thus of a significant portion of the Saudi Air Force, is tied to the availability of munitions such as those proposed in the sale we are discussing today.

Saudi Arabia initially requested these munitions in 1976, to phase with deliveries of the aircraft and the associated training programs. After discussions with the Congress at that time, the United States agreed to provide some, though not all, of the quantities requested. We also told the Saudis then that we would undertake to supply additional munitions at a later date. When we gave that assurance, we clearly conveyed to the Saudis that any further sales would also be subject to our congressional notification procedures. Nonetheless the assurance was given, both because we felt that additional quantities would be justified and because the original sale of the weapons system themselves only made sense if it included—as it did—a corresponding willingness to supply the necessary munitions.

The Saudis have expressed to us on numerous occasions over the past 3 years their concern that we follow through on this earlier commitment and provide adequate numbers of those munitions for both reserve stocks and for training purposes. Their growing concern must, I think, be viewed in light of the major importance to U.S. national interests of the quality of our overall relations with Saudi Arabia.

I know that members of the committee are aware of Saudi Arabia's key role in both regional and world affairs and of the importance of the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship.

Saudi Arabia remains the world's largest exporter of crude oil. It currently provides 21% of American oil imports. Saudi decisions on oil production and price have enormous impact on the world economy, and our own. For example, the Saudi decision last June to increase daily production temporarily from 8.5 to 9.5 million barrels greatly eased pressures of supply and price. Saudi Arabia agreed to continue this higher level of production through the final quarter of this year in response to continued supply and price pressure.

Saudi Arabia has become an important factor in international finance, in support for the U.S. dollar, and in world development lending.

Agreement amending the agreement of May 22, 1978, (TIAS 9248) concerning an illicit crop detection system to be used in curbing the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico Dec. 6, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 6, 1979.

Poland
Agreement amending the agreement of Nov. 8, 1976, (TIAS 8407) relating to the acceptance of airworthiness certifications. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Jan. 28, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 28, 1980.

Saudi Arabia
Project agreement for technical cooperation in educational programs for meteorology, hydrology, arid land studies, and environmental protection, with annexes. Signed at Riyadh Nov. 25, 1979. Entered into force: Jan. 23, 1980.

Spain
Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters, with patent addendum. Signed at Madrid Nov. 5, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 5, 1979.

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid Dec. 11 and 20, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 20, 1979.

Sudan
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with annexes and agreed minutes. Signed at Khartoum Dec. 22, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 22, 1979.

Grant agreement for commodity imports. Signed at Khartoum Dec. 31, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 31, 1979.

Switzerland
Administrative agreement for the implementation of the agreement on social security of July 18, 1979. Signed at Bern Dec. 20, 1979. Enters into force on the date of entry into force of the July 18, 1979 agreement.

Turkey
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Ankara Dec. 11, 1979. Enters into force upon receipt by Turkey of written notice that domestic U.S. laws and regulations covering debt rescheduling concerning this agreement have been complied with.

United Kingdom
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in earth sciences and environmental studies. Signed at Reston and London Sept. 21 and 26, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 26, 1979.

Venezuela
Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation. Signed at Caracas Jan. 11, 1980. Enters into force on the date on which the parties notify each other that they have complied with the constitutional and statutory requirements necessary for its entry into force.

Yugoslavia
Agreement on the establishment of a U.S. information center in Titograd in accordance with the terms of the memorandum of understanding of June 14, 1961. Signed at Belgrade June 25, 1979.
Entered into force: Dec. 6, 1979.

Zambia
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Aug. 4, 1978, with minutes of negotiation. Signed at Lusaka Dec. 21, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 21, 1979. ■

[1] With declaration.
[2] Not in force.
[3] Not in force for the U.S.
[4] Chapter II not in force for the U.S.
[5] Ad referendum.
[6] Subject to ratification.
[7] Applicable to Berlin (West).
[8] Subject to completion of constitutional procedures.
[9] Subject to approval.
[10] Provisionally applicable to the Kingdom in Europe.
[11] In respect of its metropolitan territory and the territories for which it has international responsibility except for Antigua, Bermuda, Brunei, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, Sovereign Base Areas (Cyprus), Virgin Islands.
[12] Not applicable to the Faroe Islands.
[13] In respect of Belize.
[14] In respect of its metropolitan territory and the territories for which it has international responsibility except for Antigua, Belize, Bermuda, Brunei, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, Sovereign Base Areas (Cyprus), Virgin Islands.
[15] With reservation.

January 1980

Events pertaining to Iran can be found on page 61.

January 2
U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Ambassador Victor Palmieri, leaves on a 2-week trip to Southeast Asia for a first-hand look at Kampuchean relief efforts and refugee assistance programs throughout the region. He will visit Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Japan.

January 3
India's seventh national parliamentary elections are held.

Fifty-two nations call for an urgent meeting of the Security Council "to consider the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security."

January 4
President Carter cuts off sale of high technology equipment and grain and limits fishing privileges in U.S. waters to the Soviet Union in response to its aggression in Afghanistan.

U.N. Security Council meets to consider the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

January 5
Mauritanian President Mohammed Mahmoud Ould Louly is dismissed by the ruling military committee. Prime Minister Mohammed Khouna Ould Haidalla takes over his post and will also serve as head of the ruling military committee.

Secretary of Defense Brown arrives in Beijing for an 8-day visit, the first to China by a senior Pentagon official since the Communists came to power in 1949.

January 7
U.N. Security Council votes on a draft resolution calling for the "immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan."

January 9
Security Council adopts Resolution 462 by consensus to call an emergency Special Session of the General Assembly to deal with the Afghanistan situation. The vote was 12 to 2 (U.S.S.R. and East Germany) with one abstention (Zambia).

January 10

U.S.-Turkey announce successfully completed negotiations on an agreement for cooperation on defense and economy and three supplementary agreements detailing cooperation in the areas of defense support, defense industry, and installations.

January 13

U.S. offers Pakistan a tentative 2-year economic and military aid package worth about $400 million to help meet the threat posed by Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

Soviet Union Aeroflot office in New York is bombed.

January 14

U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution condemning "armed intervention" in Afghanistan and calling for the "immediate, unconditional, and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan." The vote was 104 to 18, with 18 absentions and 12 absentees.

Spanish Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez meets with President Carter.

Deputy Secretary Christopher visits Western Europe Jan. 14–16.

January 15

Egyptian Vice President Hosni Mobarak visits U.S. Jan. 15–19.

January 17

U.S. journalists, accused of biased reporting and interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs, are ordered out of the country.

January 19

Afghanistan Government expels journalists with U.S. passports after having kept them under house arrest for 2 days.

January 21

West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher visits the U.S. Jan. 21–22.

January 22

Roy Jenkins, President of the European Commission, arrives in Washington for a 3-day visit Jan. 22–24.

U.S. decides that in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the exhibition of art objects from the Hermitage Museum in Leningrad would not be in U.S. national interests.

Dr. Andrei D. Sakharov, Soviet dissident leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, is arrested by the Soviet Government and exiled to the city of Gorky, 250 miles east of Moscow.

January 23

President Carter delivers his "State of the Union" address.

Prime Minister Cossiga of Italy arrives in the U.S. on an official visit Jan. 23–26.

January 24

House votes 386 to 12 to support President Carter's request that the U.S. press for the transfer, cancellation, or boycott of the Moscow Summer Olympic Games.

In a House vote of 294 to 88 and a Senate vote of 74 to 8, China is approved most-favored-nation trade status.

U.S. announces it is willing to sell military equipment to China, excluding weapons.

Ambassador Linowitz, U.S. special envoy to the Middle East, visits Europe and the Middle East Jan. 24–Feb. 4. He meets in London with King Hussein of Jordan and British officials Jan. 25–26.

January 26

Under Secretary for Political Affairs Newsom visits Romania Jan. 26–28.

January 28

Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approves a resolution calling for the relocation, postponement, or cancellation of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympic Games.

European Parliament President Simone Veil visits the U.S. Jan. 28–31.

January 29

At a conference in Pakistan, Islamic Foreign Ministers from 35 Moslem countries adopt a resolution condemning the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan as a "flagrant violation" of international law.

Senate adopts a resolution 88 to 4 calling for the U.S. to boycott the Moscow Summer Olympics unless the games are postponed, canceled, or moved, regardless of whether Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan.

January 30

Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser visits the U.S. Jan. 30–Feb. 1.

January 31

Newly appointed Ambassadors to the U.S. Simon Sabimbona (Burundi) and Herbert Richard Wright Brewer (Liberia) present their credentials to President Carter.

Department of State

January 1–29

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*1	1/4	Status of U.S. contribution to international efforts for Khmer relief.
*2	1/9	William G. Bowdler sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (biographic data).
*3	1/9	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on radio communications, Jan. 17.
*4	1/9	U.S. Organization for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), study group D, Jan. 31.
*5	1/9	Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, bankruptcy study group, Feb. 1.
*6	1/9	SCC, SOLAS, working group on standards of training and watchkeeping, Jan. 23.
*7	1/9	SCC, SOLAS, working group on safety of fishing vessels, Jan. 23.
*8	1/9	SCC, SOLAS, working group on subdivision and stability, Jan. 23.
†9	1/15	U.S. Secretariat for the World Conference of the U.N. Decade for Women, 1980.
10	1/15	Vance: interview on "Today" show, New York, Jan. 11.
11	1/15	U.S. files brief with World Court in Tehran hostage case.
*12	1/16	U.S., Indonesia establish textile visa system, Oct. 1 and 15, 1979.
*13	1/16	U.S., Macau sign textile agreement, Nov. 29 and Dec. 18.
*14	1/17	SCC, SOLAS, working group on safety of navigation, Feb. 20.
*15	1/17	Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea, Feb. 7 (closed), Feb. 8 (open and closed).
*16	1/22	Lyle Franklin Lane sworn

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rapidly. In addition, persons severely affected by toxic agents would be unable to survive the long journey to Thai refugee camps and this, in effect, has ruled out the possibility of physical examination.

Nevertheless, as we can see in the materials released today, we believe that the reports are numerous enough to warrant our attention and concern. In 1977 we had begun a dialogue with U.S. agencies and other governments as well as with Lao officials in which we sought to focus concern on the welfare of Hmong caught up in Lao-Vietnamese resettlement schemes. The chairman has already mentioned our diplomatic efforts in this regard. In early October 1978, we specifically raised our concern about the reports of gas use in Laos with the Lao charge d'affaires in Washington. Later in October Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] Richard Holbrooke, in Vientiane, reiterated to the Lao leaders our concern over Hmong human rights and other issues relating to them.

Still later in 1978, the State Department directed U.S. diplomatic missions in the area to seek further information on the possible use of poison gas against the Hmong.

In January 1979, the Department again informed the Lao Embassy of its concern about reports of poison gas use in Laos, coupling this with a similar demarche in Vientiane. The Lao denied the reports. At the same time we also notified the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of our concern.

In March the U.S. Representative to the 35th session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission [Jerome J. Shestack] expressed U.S. concern about the plight of the Hmong, specifically raising the issue of reported use of poison gas in Laos against this tribal minority.

In May a State Department representative went to refugee camps in Thailand to interview Hmong claiming to be eyewitnesses and/or victims of poison gas attacks in Laos. The State Department representative also visited Vientiane where he discussed the problem with various diplomatic missions and the senior U.N. representative in Laos. He raised the problem directly with the Lao Foreign Ministry, noting that he had been assigned to seek evidence of gas use from among Hmong refugees in Thailand. Working with another officer from the American Consulate in Udorn, Thailand, he completed a report in June based on over 20 interviews with Hmong who claimed to be eyewitnesses and or victims. The report concluded that based on these interviews, there was reason to believe that some chemical agent was being employed in Laos.

Also, during this mission, the two State Department representatives received from Hmong refugees two samples of material that the Hmong claimed to be poison gas residue collected at the sites of two attacks in Laos. We have already heard from the medical people about the difficulties here.

We have provided these reports and our conclusions from these investigations to the Lao Government to substantiate and underscore our concern. We have also made demarches to the Vietnamese and the Soviets and provided them with these June interview reports, urging that the Soviets use their influence with both Hanoi and Vientiane to raise the matter with their allies. The Vietnamese and the Lao have categorically rejected reports of the use of such gas. The Soviets have stood behind these assertions. We have also provided information developed in these reports to other governments, asking each to share with us any available information they may have. Thus far, none have come forward with additional evidence.

In late September of this year, an Army medical team was dispatched to Thailand to interview Hmong who claimed to have knowledge of gas attacks in Laos. The team interviewed over 40 eyewitnesses and produced a report which reinforced the findings of the June investigation and elaborated in greater detail the symptomology of the alleged victims. Dr. [Charles W.] Lewis has discussed his findings in detail. I can assure you that we will very strongly raise Dr. Lewis' findings with various governments in a manner similar to our demarches based on the June report.

As recently as October 1, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke met with Lao Acting Foreign Minister Khamphay Boupha in New York and expressed deep U.S. concern about reports that poison gas was being used in Laos. The Lao, as in the past, rejected the allegations.

As Chairman [Lester] Wolff has noted, we have received no reports of the use of poison gas in Laos later than May 1979, providing some hope that whatever may have been taking place before that time has since ceased. However, there have been a few reports recently from Khmer refugees and from Khmer resistance groups that Vietnamese forces seeking to consolidate control in Kampuchea are using lethal chemical agents.

In late 1978, we had noted isolated allegations by the Pol Pot government, at that time still in control of the country, that Vietnamese troops were using poison gas delivered by artillery fire in eastern Kampuchea. Following the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea, these allegations began to multiply as did refugee reports of apparent gas attacks that were in some instances lethal. While we obviously cannot accept Pol Pot allegations at face value, we are concerned by and investigating refugee reports.

We do not have the volume of reporting from Kampuchea at this time that we have seen from Laos. We are, however, monitoring developments related to reports of gas use in Kampuchea very closely. We note that in Kampuchea, Vietnamese forces and their allies face a guerrilla resistance, often based in rugged and relatively inaccessible terrain, much as they do in Laos. In our demarches to the Vietnamese and Soviets, we made it clear that our concern about these reports related to all of Indochina.

In sum, on the basis of very sketchy reports of gas use in Laos, over a year ago, we acted to expand our knowledge on the question. Operating on the basis that the mounting numbers of reports give them collective weight, and on our conviction that given their subject matter warranted our deep concern, we have also, for over a year, used diplomatic channels to draw them to the attention of those with influence in Hanoi and Vientiane. In the case of Laos, we expressed our concern well in advance of the availability of significant evidence. We note the absence of any gas reports by refugees from Laos in over 6 months. We will, of course, continue to monitor the situation very closely.

In Kampuchea, while we do not have the weight of refugee testimony that we have had in the case of Laos, the similarity of the terrain and the nature of the fighting suggests that Vietnamese might possibly choose to rely on lethal chemical agents, if they have not already begun to do so, as some reports indicate.

We will continue to scrutinize developments in Kampuchea and are prepared to use diplomatic and public pressure on the Vietnamese should we

develop additional information pointing to possible gas use in Kampuchea. ■

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

U.S.-China Discuss Sale of Military Technology

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JAN. 21, 1980

Technology transfer was one of the major topics of discussion during Secretary [of Defense Harold] Brown's recent visit to the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). During his discussion there, he indicated that the United States is prepared to sell to the Chinese civilian technology which we would not approve for sale to the Soviet Union. This position grew out of the visit of Vice President Mondale to China last August. While the discussions with the P.R.C. during Secretary Brown's visit focused primarily on the sale of civilian technology designed to assist China in its industrial and economic modernization, it was recognized that some of the technology could also be used for military purposes.

During his visit, Secretary Brown also indicated that the United States was prepared to consider, on a case-by-case basis, the sale of certain carefully selected items of support equipment also suitable for military use, e.g., trucks, communications gear, certain types of early-warning radar. At the same time, he made clear that the United States has not changed its position that it has no plans to sell arms or weapons systems to China.

No decision has been made as to what specific equipment might be sold to China, nor have the Chinese made specific requests. We are studying this issue carefully now, have informed Congress of our intent, and have held preliminary meetings with the Chinese during Secretary Brown's visit. ■

Suspension of Agricultural Exports to the U.S.S.R.

Following are the texts of President Carter's memorandums for the Secretaries of Commerce and Agriculture of January 7, 1980; the President's letter to Speaker of the House of Representatives Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., and President of the Senate Walter F. Mondale and his report on restrictions on agricultural commodity exports to the U.S.S.R. pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979 of January 21; and a statement by Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Richard N. Cooper before the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on January 22.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, JAN. 7, 1980[1]

I hereby direct that you, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture and other appropriate officials, take immediate action under the Export Administration Act to terminate shipments of agricultural commodities and products, including wheat and corn, to the Soviet Union. Export licenses should be granted, however, to the extent necessary to permit shipments to continue up to the 8,000,000 metric tons of wheat and corn per year covered by Article I of the 1975 Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Supply of Grain. I am taking this action in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. I have determined in accordance with the Export Administration Act that the absence of controls would be detrimental to those interests and that alternative courses of action would not comparably advance them.

JIMMY CARTER

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, JAN. 7, 1980[1]

I have today directed the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with you and other appropriate officials, to take immediate action under the Export Administration Act to terminate shipments of agricultural commodities and products, including wheat and corn, to the Soviet Union. The Secretary of Commerce shall, however, grant export licenses to the extent necessary to permit shipments to continue up to the 8,000,000 metric tons of wheat and corn per year covered by Article I of the 1975 Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Supply of Grain. I am taking this action in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.

I hereby direct that you take the necessary actions, through commodity purchases, and through the price support and grain reserve programs, to protect America's farmers from the impact of this unanticipated action. These steps are designed to remove supplies from the market in order to assure that price levels will not be unduly affected.

JIMMY CARTER

PRESIDENT'S LETTER, JAN. 21, 1980[2]

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the installation of a puppet government is an extremely serious threat to peace. It threatens vital U.S. security and foreign policy interests:

- It places the Soviets within aircraft striking range of the vital oil resources of the Persian Gulf;
- It threatens a strategically located country, Pakistan;
- It poses the prospect of increased Soviet pressure on Iran and on other nations in the Middle East;
- Above all, it shows that the Soviets will use force to take over a neighboring country.

The Soviet invasion requires a firm and vigorous response by the United States. We must make clear to the Soviet Union that it cannot trample on the independence of other states and at the same time carry on business as usual with the rest of the world.

I have therefore taken several measures. I have directed the Secretary of Commerce to restrict exports and reexports of identified agricultural commodities from the United States to the U.S.S.R., except for exports of wheat and corn authorized under Article I of the Agreement on the Supply of Grain of October 20, 1975. These restrictions became effective January 7, 1980 under regulations issued by the Department of Commerce. The restrictions were initially made applicable to a broadly described group of agricultural commodities and products as a means of quickly achieving the objective of stopping exports of any items which are significant in terms of the grounds on which I acted. The Department of Commerce is

to minimize our contacts in the hope of minimizing our losses. This possibility is of real concern to many in Moslem as well as non-Moslem nations.

The second possible shift in U.S. attitudes, equally feared by those in Africa with whom I spoke, would be in reaction to events in Afghanistan and our subsequent efforts to help Pakistan. Unless the Russians are coming, it is said by some, the United States will not provide significant help to developing nations.

It would be a grave error for the United States to follow either of these courses, or even to leave uncorrected a suspicion of our adherence to them. Our long-term political and economic well-being is far too enmeshed with the developing world to allow cynicism of that nature to be seen as the basis of our relations with them. On the contrary, Iran and Afghanistan present a prime opportunity to affirm U.S. support for developing countries. Failure to meet the challenge, however, would be more than just an opportunity missed; it could lead to serious trouble over time by creating unnecessary tension in our relations with the Third World.

President Carter underscored the significance of this opportunity in his State of the Union address 2 weeks ago. He declared that:

> We will continue to build our ties with developing nations, respecting and helping to strengthen their national independence, which they have struggled so hard to achieve. And we will continue to support the growth of democracy and the protection of human rights.

He continued by pointing out that:

> In repressive regimes, popular frustrations often have no outlet except through violence. But when peoples and their governments can approach their problems together—through open, democratic methods—the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and far more enduring.

Our development assistance plans constitute a national statement that we want to work as partners with developing nations throughout the world. The creation of IDCA—and the cohesion it will provide to the presentation of our development assistance programs—could not have come at a more important time. This year the Administration has prepared a development assistance budget that makes clear we will not abandon those who look to the United States to help them bring an end to starvation and who seek to meet the basic human needs of their people.

During our preparation of the FY 1981 budget, we paid particular attention to the relative advantages of different instruments for achieving different development goals. We compared the advantages of various bilateral programs and examined closely the ways in which U.S. bilateral aid can complement the activities of the multilateral programs to which we contribute.

This budget focuses on the priorities that Congress and the President have stressed as most important. In the bilateral requests, we are emphasizing several key sectors of development. These include agriculture, energy, health, and population. Our bilateral requests also give emphasis to countries that have demonstrated strong support for human rights and equitable economic development. Furthermore, we have strengthened our support for private voluntary organizations.

DEVELOPMENT THEMES

In shaping our development assistance program, we must be realistic in our expectations of what can be achieved.

We cannot expect foreign assistance to instantly buy us friendship among the developing nations.

Similarly, we cannot expect immediate, dramatic change. We alone cannot wipe out poverty or hunger. Yet change is occurring and will continue. The economic, political, and social forces that set development in motion are vast. Our task is to demonstrate a willingness to be involved, to help channel and accelerate the change to make it as productive and equitable as possible.

We must continue to aid the nations of the developing world. Unless we are willing to do so, and at the same time demonstrate sensitivity toward their national and cultural aspirations, we cannot expect them to respect our system and our values. The concrete accomplishments at each increment of our effort may seem small, but the results are cumulative and lasting.

In order to make sure our developmental goals are cast within a realistic framework and to be certain that our limited development resources are being used most efficiently, IDCA defined a set of priorities for our development activities in the immediate future. The range of these priorities shows that assistance is only one of the activities that affect developmental concerns. Just as important to development are our policies in areas such as trade, raw materials, and international finance, which do much to shape the nature of growth and development in the Third World.

In defining the full range of policy areas for our attention, we examined both intensity of need and IDCA's ability to make a constructive contribution to U.S. policy. The result was an agenda for U.S. development efforts that is realistic in scope and that addresses immediate, pressing problems.

In brief, this development policy agenda deals with particular areas within five broad categories of concern where we will be directing our attention.

- We will be guiding an accelerated attack on global poverty—addressing the needs for food security, population control, and health and emphasizing programs that recognize the role of women in development.
- We will stress areas in which the United States and developing nations have the greatest mutual economic interests—particularly energy development, debt management, trade, raw materials, and investment.
- We will focus on regions and countries of particular importance—especially the Caribbean basin, sub-Saharan Africa, and countries demonstrating strong concern for human rights and equitable development.
- We will be involved with designing a development strategy for the coming decade through participation in the U.N. Third Development Decade and through the negotiations at the global level in the United Nations and in other international agencies. We will also be addressing the needs of the future by fostering scientific research and development applicable to development needs and by adjusting the allocation of U.S. development resources as needs change.
- We will manage increased bilateral assistance with reduced staff size by use of the most effective techniques of assistance at different stages of development. We will also increase our development impact by improving coordination among bilateral and mul-

tilateral programs and coordination with nonassistance programs.

Within this range of policy themes, we have begun to give particular attention to several of the most pressing sectors in which we can also make the most impact. Three of these sectors are food security and agriculture, energy development, and population and health. Because of their importance, and because they provide sound examples of what the different bilateral and multilateral programs can achieve, it may be helpful to describe briefly some of the activities in those sectors.

Food Security and Agriculture

Helping to meet the crisis of world hunger is the President's most important development priority. Kampuchea has made human starvation a current focal point of the public attention. But Kampuchea represents only the most visible example of the horror that hundreds of millions of people around the world face every day.

Chronic starvation is rampant and growing. As stressed by the President's Commission on World Hunger, there is no more important way for us to demonstrate concern for the needs of people in the Third World than to work toward the eradication of hunger. And there are clearer areas than food and agriculture in which development must occur if we are to be able to work peaceably and productively with the developing nations.

Obviously the United States cannot expect to feed the world. Instead, we will have to marshall our efforts on three levels.

- Food production must be expanded in developing countries.
- The earnings of poor people must be increased so they can buy the food they need
- The United States must continue to transfer food to areas where it is needed.

We are pursuing these goals through both bilateral and multilateral institutions. The bilateral Agency for International Development (AID) program for agriculture, nutrition, and rural development has increased in emphasis considerably in recent years. The level of funding has grown from $474 million in 1977 to $729 million requested in FY 1981, over half AID's functional account budget. AID funds will continue to concentrate on institution-building; on the introduction of high-yielding and innovative technologies; and on services, commodities, and generally smaller scale infrastructure aimed specifically at the needs of small farmers and the rural poor.

A second major bilateral tool in this effort is the PL 480 Food for Peace program, which provides both food for needy people and generates resources to support development activities.

From 1977 to 1979 the World Bank group devoted more than $8 billion to projects in agriculture and rural development. About one-third of the Bank's concessional resources were used for these purposes in FY 1979. Within the sector, there has also been a greater emphasis by all the multilateral development banks on lending that assists small farmers, as distinct from larger infrastructure projects.

We are encouraging those banks and the relevant U.N. agencies—the Food and Agriculture Organization (the U.N.'s leading organization in this sector), the World Food Program, and the International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD)—to expand even further their agricultural development programs. IFAD is unique in that it is charged with the task of dealing specifically with the problems of the rural poor and also because a major share of its funds come from members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). We are monitoring IFAD's performance carefully with other members of that institution.

Energy

Energy is a sector in which our interests and those of developing countries are obviously linked. While we are struggling with the energy crisis, they are facing huge energy problems of their own, ranging from depletion of firewood and other traditional fuels to staggering—and growing—debt burdens brought about by their oil imports.

Clearly, we help ourselves by helping them develop energy resources of their own. Not only are we not competing for the same energy supplies, but their growing financial burdens are straining the international financial system.

In developing the FY 1981 budget, IDCA has placed high priority on energy. The budget addresses the most pressing energy needs of the developing countries: assessments of energy requirements and potential energy sources in particular countries, full development of conventional energy supplies, development and implementation of new and renewable energy sources, and expansion of traditional fuel supplies to reverse or contain worsening environmental degradation.

As in agriculture, a description of the various donor programs for energy shows the relative advantages of the different institutions. IDCA is working to insure that these energy assistance programs complement one another.

The multilateral development banks have the comparative advantage of being able to provide substantial amounts of capital for large projects. With strong U.S. support, the World Bank has now taken the lead in assisting developing countries to develop their own fossil fuel resources. The United States has also encouraged the development banks to become more involved in forestry and renewable energy. The World Bank is now beginning to include fuelwood as an integral part of rural development.

In our bilateral program, AID will undertake a wide range of energy projects in FY 1981, with particular focus on renewable energy and on institution-building for improved management of all energy resources. The emphasis in our bilateral program on renewable energy reflects a concern for the needs of the poor who increasingly will be unable to meet the rising cost of conventional fuels. In this regard, AID is working at the frontiers of the use of alternative technologies to provide energy from indigenous resources. The Peace Corps has been active in helping to carry out these efforts. In a joint project with AID, the Peace Corps has begun to survey rural energy use in more than 30 countries and has helped disseminate basic energy information at the village level.

Current bilateral activities also include an Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) program to encourage and assist private U.S. energy companies to explore and produce petroleum, natural gas, and other energy resources in energy-deficient developing countries. This began as a special program in 1977 and has increased in activity since then. In a major achievement this past year, one of the first

Saudi Arabia has been and continues to be a key working partner in our efforts to resolve a number of conflicts in the Middle East and Africa and has become a major contributor to the quest for stability in the region. As we proceed with our efforts to reach a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, we will need to broaden the base of Arab support for the negotiating process, and Saudi cooperation in this endeavor will be of significant importance.

For its part Saudi Arabia places great reliance on its security relationship with the United States. In a general sense it recognizes the inherent vulnerability of a large territorial area with a relatively sparse population. Add to that combination natural resources worth over $5 trillion at today's prices and you have what the Saudis recognize as a tempting target. The Saudis also recognize that there is little in history to suggest that resources such as theirs will go both unprotected and unmolested for very long.

In specific terms the Saudis view with great concern events in neighboring countries which symbolize to them, to a greater or lesser degree, an aggressive Soviet policy whose objective is expansion of Soviet influence over the long term. In recent years they have seen manifestations of this policy in South Yemen and Ethiopia to the south, in Iraq to the north, and in Afghanistan in the not too distant northeast. In Saudi defense planning, Iraq and South Yemen have been seen as the most direct threats. They each have sufficient resources available in either military hardware terms or in the capacity to organize subversion to justify Saudi concerns.

To counter these perceived threats, Saudi Arabia embarked some years ago on a phased, and we think coherent, program to expand its armed forces and to modernize its military equipment. This program takes full account of the country's size and of its inherent manpower limitations. It involves neither projection forces nor the capability for large-scale, modern offensive operations, nor in most cases the most advanced weaponry. "Defensive" is occasionally used as a term of art; in this case it is a precise description of the force structure and armament on which Saudi military expenditure is based. The large proportion of Saudi military expenditure devoted to construction of cantonments, ports, roads, and other facilities is consistent with the defensive mission of Saudi forces. The relatively heavy investment in air defense and the associated command and control systems is equally consistent with that mission, as are the limited armored forces, the coastal Navy, and the upgrading of the National Guard. And the F–5 program itself is also primarily defensive; its primary roles are to counter armored or mechanized attack, suppress relatively unsophisticated air cover for such operations, and attack support and staging areas.

Much of the requisite new equipment for the Saudi modernization program has been purchased from the United States, and Saudi Arabia sees American willingness to provide support, spare parts, and munitions as an integral element of our concern for their security needs.

It is worth noting that each of these factors bearing on our relationship with Saudi Arabia has evolved since we sold the initial quantity of F–5 munitions more than 3 years ago. Saudi policy with respect to oil production and pricing, investments, and support of the dollar is, if anything, more important today.

In the meantime, too, the situation in the Middle East has stabilized in one sense as a result of the Camp David accords, focusing even more attention on next steps in the peace process. At the same time, the situation in the gulf has become increasingly unstable, and the Saudis perceive a more immediate threat from Soviet-inspired and assisted regimes in the general area. Thus events in the period since we first assured the Saudis that we would provide additional quantities of F–5 munitions argue in favor of this sale.

The F–5 munitions proposal should be seen in this context. The Saudis believe that these munitions are needed if they are to adequately maintain the defense capabilities of the F–5 aircraft they have acquired from the United States. The Department of Defense has carefully examined this munitions sale and has concluded that the quantities we are proposing to sell Saudi Arabia are militarily justified and will be an important contribution to Saudi Arabia's defensive needs. The Department of State concurs in that view.

More important, we believe there are urgent and overriding policy reasons for approving the sale. The threat is real, and the munitions to be supplied would not have a significant impact on the balance of forces in the region. Saudi Arabia's past and potential contributions to our purposes in the Middle East and to our major national interests in the energy, financial, and security fields support our view that the sale should be made. ■

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Export of Fighter Aircraft

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JAN. 4, 1980[1]

The President has decided that in certain cases the sale to foreign countries of intermediate fighter aircraft developed or modified for export (FX) would be in the national interest and would be consistent with the objectives of the U.S. arms transfer policy. An intermediate fighter is defined as one whose cost and performance characteristics would generally lie between our current export fighter, the F–5E, and fighter aircraft now in production for U.S. forces, such as the F–16.

The availability of FX aircraft will contribute to our national security objectives by permitting the United States to respond positively to the security needs of our friends and allies when the F–5E is inadequate, and it will contribute to arms transfer restraint objectives by discouraging purchases of more sophisticated first-line aircraft from the United States and other suppliers. An interagency study of the FX concept found that, without an intermediate alternative, an increasing number of countries may turn to first-line aircraft to fill their fighter needs. The FX, with its capabilities tailored largely toward a defensive role, is thus consistent with the overriding arms control purpose of the President's arms transfer policy—to

provide countries with the weapons best suited to their legitimate self-defense purposes.

The U.S. Government will not provide funding for development of the aircraft, and aircraft companies will assume all financial and market risks. Interested companies can proceed, however, with the assurance that the U.S. Government will not disapprove the sale of an intermediate fighter on the grounds that it was developed or modified solely for export. We will continue, of course, to apply all other arms transfer policy criteria to any proposed sales on a case-by-case basis to insure consistency with our foreign policy, national security, and arms control interests. In addition, any FX sales to countries covered by the President's arms transfer ceiling will be accommodated within the annual ceiling. ■

[1] Made available to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

Security Relations With Pakistan

Following are the joint U.S.-Pakistan statement issued on February 3, 1980, at the conclusion of the visit to Islamabad by Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser, and Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, and a statement by Mr. Christopher before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 7.

JOINT STATEMENT, FEB. 3, 1980

President Zia-ul-Haq, Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi, and other Pakistan Government officials held talks with Dr. Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Mr. Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary, and their advisers on February 2 and 3.

There was a full exchange of views on global and strategic matters, on the situation in the region, and on the broad range of issues in the bilateral relations between the two nations.

The two nations agreed that the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan and the aggression against the Moslem people of that country is a flagrant violation of international covenants and norms and a serious threat to the peace and security of Pakistan, the region, and the world.

The United States reiterated that its commitment to Pakistan's independence and security pursuant to the 1959 agreement is firm and enduring. The Government of Pakistan reiterated its resolve, as stated in the 1959 agreement, that it is determined to resist aggression.

President Zia-ul-Haq expressed appreciation for the visit of Dr. Brzezinski and Mr. Christopher. The American side expressed warm appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to it by the Government of Pakistan.

Appropriate consultations between the two governments will continue.

DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER, FEB. 7, 1980[1]

In the period since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we have had the strong support of the Pakistan Government in shaping an effective political response both internationally and regionally. Much of what has been done in the United Nations and the Islamic conference to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union has depended heavily on Pakistani leadership along with our strong support. Quite clearly we share with Pakistan a common assessment of the Soviet threat both globally and in the region and are united in our determination to meet the Soviet challenge.

The 2 days of intensive discussions in Islamabad over last weekend built on our earlier talks with Pakistani Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi in Washington. They produced a large measure of agreement of the nature of the security relationship we seek to build between our two nations. The personal participation of President Zia throughout these discussions indicates, in our view, the importance which he attaches to the regional threat and to U.S.-Pakistani cooperation in meeting that threat.

Much of the discussion in Islamabad focused on the U.S. commitment to the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan as embodied in the 1959 agreement of cooperation. We again strongly reaffirmed our commitment to the 1959 agreement with Pakistan. The President's forthright statement of vital U.S. interests in the region in his State of the Union address seemed to have had a salutary effect in helping to remove doubts about the strength and durability of this commitment. We stated our willingness to ask the Congress to affirm this commitment explicitly when we seek legislation to permit resumption of assistance. The Pakistanis expressed satisfaction with this outcome.

We described our intention to propose to the Congress a legislative package which would affirm the 1959 agreement and authorize economic assistance and military credits notwithstanding other legislative provisions such as the Symington and Glenn amendments. We described our efforts to encourage other traditional donors to increase their levels of assistance substantially and indicated that we viewed our contribution to be part of a broad multilateral effort.

The Pakistanis asked that we defer presenting any legislation which would specify amounts of aid until we had a better assessment of Pakistan's overall economic and military needs and until we had a fuller appreciation of the global totals of increased assistance which might be forthcoming to meet these needs. We agreed to this request, while making clear that our offer of assistance continued to stand.

In the immediate period ahead, both we and the Pakistanis intend to continue discussions with those governments to which we are looking to provide additional assistance. Our discussions in Riyadh with Saudi officials were a very important first step in this regard, and we received assurances of strong, continued Saudi support. We will stay in close touch with the Pakistan Government as the multilateral consultations proceed. We have stressed to them the importance of not losing momentum and moving forward with our own projected assistance as soon as possible.

In the meantime, our military team has continued detailed discussions in Pakistan in an effort to determine the scope of Pakistan's existing military deficiencies and to identify specific types of equipment which the United

		in as Ambassador to Uruguay (biographic data).
*17	1/23	Itinerary of Italian Prime Minister Cossiga's visit to the U.S., Jan. 23–26.
†18	1/23	U.S. aid to refugees in Somalia.
*19	1/24	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, Feb. 22.
*20	1/25	U.S., Netherlands Antilles sign air transport agreement, Jan. 22.
*21	1/25	Vance: statement before the New York State Bar Association, New York.
*22	1/28	Status of U.S. contribution to international efforts for Khmer relief.
*23	1/29	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, Feb. 26.
*24	1/29	SCC, SOLAS working group on the handling of dangerous goods in ports, Mar. 4.
*25	1/29	William G. Bowdler sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (revised biographic data). ■

*Not printed in the BULLETIN.
†To be printed in a later issue.

GPO Sales

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

Clockwide from top:
Abidjan, Ivory Coast
Rubber tire plant, Tanzania (ICA photo by Richard Saunders)
Mosque, Niger (AID photo)

Fulani woman (Museum of African Art, Eliot Elisofon Archives)

Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States—Part 2

This is the second of a two-part discussion paper, compiled by former Ambassador G. Edward Clark. Part 1, which was printed in the March 1980 issue of the Department of State Bulletin, *focused on the geography, history, the people of Africa and their culture, and economic and political conditions. Part 2 examines the role the United States has played in postcolonial African development.*

Americans once thought of Africa as the "dark Continent"—mysterious, unknown, and remote. Without colonial interests or responsibilities the United States knew little of Africa and was content to permit European powers to govern and exploit. The United States did, however, share in exploitation through the slave trade. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, U.S. involvement began to increase slowly and more positively through the activities of missionaries, explorers, and commercial groups. Slavery and related problems began to be eliminated in the United States through the passage of interdiction laws by the 1780s, the Civil War, and passage of the 14th and 24th amendments. World War II changed many American perceptions and began to shift U.S. priorities and policies. Africa, the "sleeping giant," was beginning to wake, bringing the realization that the United States, along with the rest of the world, soon would have to take account of its potential power and its own goals and ambitions.

Having played a major role in drafting provisions of the U.N. Charter, which provided the philosophical base for the end of colonialism, the United States from that point onward has taken stands which reflect common interests and has endeavored to insure that the emerging countries are accorded the opportunities which the United States had in its postindependence years.

IMPORTANCE OF AFRICA TO THE UNITED STATES

While U.S.-Africa relations today are strongly influenced by humanitarian considerations, Africa is also important to the United States for the following pragmatic reasons.

- Africa has political clout. In addition to its own bloc of 45 (50 with North Africa) African nations, in concert with other nations of the Third World, constitute two-thirds of U.N. membership. They play an important, often decisive, role in most international fora, including U.N. specialized agencies and political-economic agreements of great importance to the United States, such as one now being negotiated on the law of the sea.
- Africa, as indicated earlier, is rich in increasingly important natural resources—oil, copper, bauxite, uranium, cobalt, gold, and diamonds. Its largely unharnessed rivers can provide hydroelectric power to increase industry and agricultural irrigation.
- The potential exists for greatly increased trade and economic cooperation. While the United States needs to buy African raw materials, Africa requires capital investment, new technology, and markets for a wider range of other products.
- The continent is strategically located; many countries possess safe ports, good airfields, and controlling positions in relation to major waterways, air corridors, and disputed territories.
- Continuing liberation struggles, political instability within countries, and friction between countries make portions of Africa a potential arena for large-power confrontation.
- North-South issues, highlighting the poverty of most Third World countries, if not resolved, could create increasing envy, hostility, and resentment toward the United States and other industrialized nations.
- Africa assumes particular significance for Americans of African descent, who are increasingly concerned about many of the problems of the continent.

U.S. POLICY

Elements of U.S. foreign policy involving Africa have shifted from time to time, depending on various Administrations, changing congressional attitudes, and shifting circumstances on the continent itself. To a degree, flexibility is desirable in order that U.S. actions can be responsive to changing conditions. Resulting moves, however, must not be merely reactive but must be integrated with long-term, worldwide goals. Somewhere between the inevitable variables and the need for consistency, there has emerged in the past two decades a broad outline of U.S. policy toward Africa, which contains the following ingredients.

Preservation of the independence of African states

Forces of African nationalism are vital components of African political, social, and economic development.

Strong African states act as a bulwark against outside intervention.

An interrelationship exists between political stability and economic development.

Pursuit of peaceful solutions to African conflicts

Armed conflict has a negative effect on the nation-building process.

Resort to arms drains funds from the development process and sets back

Information in this article is intended to provide background for study and discussion; it is not designed to be read as a formal statement of U.S. policy, except where the material is specifically described as such. The article summarizes currently available information and raises relevant questions (some of which admittedly may be unanswerable) as an aid to public discussion of important issues in U.S. foreign policy. All material in this article is in the public domain except where copyright is indicated.

ports from Nigeria, was over $6.5 billion in 1978.

• Economic progress in Africa will lead to expanded markets for U.S. products.

• Given the limitations on aid resource flows, the private sector holds the potential for providing the goods, technology, and capital necessary for economic progress.

Opportunities and hopeful signs, however, do exist for increasing U.S. commercial activities in the longer term. There is growing awareness in Africa of the need for workable economic policies, including the role of foreign investment. These involve and, in some cases, rely on U.S. investment. Governments are seeking to improve their investment climate. There are renewed efforts to promote regional economic cooperation. Total Western aid, while still too little to meet Africa's basic needs, offers direct opportunities to U.S. firms for sale of capital goods, supplies, and specialized services.

Industrialized countries have begun to respond to developing countries' demands for special trade and financing benefits. The U.S. generalized system of preferences, various commodity pricing arrangements, expanded IMF help, and the Lome II Convention can lead to higher and more stable export earnings and therefore enhance African countries' ability to pay for needed imports. U.S. Government financing institutions, such as the Eximbank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation, are attempting to do more in Africa. Additional funding for the African Development Bank and Fund and any major increase in the oil-producing countries' aid to Africa through OPEC or the Arab Development Bank will open more possibilities for U.S. trade and investment.

Additional effort, however, will be necessary to take advantage of the foregoing and other opportunities to promote further trade and investment in sub-Saharan Africa. There needs to be close cooperation between the U.S. Government and private sector. African governments can also take additional measures to create a favorable environment for enhanced foreign trade and investment ties.

U.S. Economic Aid to Africa
($ millions)

	1979	1980	1981
BILATERAL AID[1]			
Development Assistance	248	318[2]	393[4]
P.L.-480 (food aid)			
Title I (concessional sales)	83	87	118[4]
Title II (grants)	87	105[6]	105[6]
Economic Support Fund	53	100[3]	140[5]
Refugees	15	14	12
TOTAL	**486**	**624**	**768**
% Increase	(10)	(22)	(23)
MULTILATERAL AID[7]			
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	583	788[8]	788[8]
U.S. share	139	197	197[8]
International Development Association	619	794[8]	794[8]
U.S. share	188	238[10]	238[10]
African Development Fund	228[9]	280[9]	NA
U.S. share	21[10]	25[10]	NA
TOTAL	**1,430**	**1,862**	**NA**
Total U.S. share	348	460	NA

[1]The United States also provides assistance in the form of loans from the quasi-commercial U.S. Export-Import Bank totaling $157 million in 1977 and $551 million in 1978 (1979-81 figures not available).

[2]"Best guess" assuming passage of FY 1980 appropriation at current conference levels.

[3]"Best guess" assuming FY 1980 appropriation. Of this 60 is for southern Africa, 40 for Sudan.

[4]Congressional presentation level for FY 1981.

[5]Congressional presentation level for FY 1981 of which 90 for southern Africa, 50 for Sudan.

[6]For Title II, FY 1981 level is estimate based on FY 1980.

[7]Figures from Treasury Department. Imputed U.S. share is roughly 25% for IBRD, ranges from 37% (1977) to 30% (1979) for International Development Association and from 8% to 9% for African Development Fund.

[8]Based on averaging planning figure for FY 1979–83.

[9]Estimates for calendar years.

[10]Assumes U.S. share is 30%.

CONCLUSION

Since all U.S.-Africa policy goals are not simultaneously attainable or easily achieved, in the 1980s the United States will have to make some difficult choices, for example:

In endeavoring to help bring about sound development of African states, will the United States be willing to step up dramatically economic assistance? How best can such assistance be used?

What are legitimate defense needs of African states; where is the line between self-defense and partnership in superpower maneuvering?

What are the best ways to avoid East-West conflict in Africa—more economic assistance, investment, trade with the independent countries?

Is there a point where the idea of conflict avoidance may have to be subordinated to stop the exertion of political control through increased military assistance and advisers or even naked intervention in a strategic area?

How can we minimize the opportunities and gains of our global adversaries without interfering in the internal affairs of independent states?

In an effort to end racial injustice in southern Africa, is the United States doing all it can? What strategy is most likely to promote our objectives in that troubled region? How?

In encouraging respect for human rights elsewhere in Africa, can the United States do more in certain countries where they are still being violated (Zaire or Ethiopia)? Is the U.S. house well enough in order to give credibility to U.S. demarches?

How can the United States better promote trade and investment to the mutual advantage of itself and African countries?

Has the United States done its fair share in responding to calls for humanitarian assistance—for drought victims, for political refugees?

Copies of the complete discussion paper, Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States, *may be purchased for $2.50 from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (a 25% discount is allowed when ordering 100 or more discussion papers mailed to the same address).* ■

Background Notes on African Countries

Background Notes—a unique series of short, authoritative pamphlets on the countries of the world—are written by officers in the Department of State's geographical bureaus and edited and published by the Editorial Division of the Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs.

The 47 *Background Notes* on each country of sub-Saharan Africa includes information on the people, land, history, government, political conditions, economy, foreign relations, and U.S. policy. Included also are a profile, brief travel notes, maps, a list of principal government officials, and a reading list.

Background Notes may be purchased for 75¢ each from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (orders of 100 or more copies of the same *Notes* mailed to the same address are sold at a 25% discount). Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, in the form of a check or money order must accompany orders. ■



(AID photo)

fullest realization of the continent's human and economic potential. The FY 1981 budget before you is an important first step in the initiation of such a policy for the 1980s and 1990s.

MR. MOOSE

It is a pleasure to appear again before this committee which has done so much to promote an effective and enlightened policy toward Africa.

Recent events, especially in Rhodesia, offer convincing evidence that the basic direction of this Administration's policy toward Africa is sensible and sound. We are under no illusion that there are many problems that remain, both in southern Africa and elsewhere on the continent; however, we are convinced that in the long run, our national interest and the interests of African states are best served by our continued contributions to the growth of strong, economically viable nations in Africa.

Our efforts, therefore, will continue to be directed toward that end through our development assistance, through the economic support fund, through our security assistance, and through our contributions to international development lending institutions.

Aid alone, however, is not sufficient: There is an equal if not greater need for more U.S. trade and investment. Far more than is the case on other continents, Africa's economic strength will depend on transnational, regional cooperation. We hope to use our resources to encourage regional economic cooperation as well as development on a national basis.

At the moment, our diplomacy has the following major goals:

- To help consolidate the historic breakthrough achieved at Lancaster House;
- To carry forward our negotiations toward an internationally acceptable transition to majority rule in Namibia;
- To continue to promote the concept of human rights in Africa and, most specifically, in South Africa; this, of course, includes our efforts to assist refugees throughout Africa; and
- To assure that key African states remain willing to support us in our efforts to protect and promote a peaceful international political order.

Our economic and security assistance programs in Africa provide tangible resources without which policy must remain rhetoric. The proposed total for FY 1981 is $787 million. This includes $393 million in development assistance, $140 million in economic support funds, over $205 million in PL 480 food aid (including titles, I, II, and III and our contribution to the World Food Program but not emergency feeding programs), and over $49 million in military aid—$45.5 in foreign military sales (FMS) credits, and $3.7 for the international military educational and training (IMET) program.

Mrs. Butcher has described for you the objectives that we hope to achieve with $393 million in development assistance. I shall concentrate my remarks on our proposals for economic support funds, FMS, and IMET for FY 1981.

Economic Support Funds

Our economic support funds will provide the underpinning for our policy in two critical areas—the Sudan and southern Africa. For the Sudan the proposed level of $50 million is the same as that requested for FY 1980. For southern Africa we are requesting $90 million, an increase of $22 million over what we hope will be appropriated for FY 1980.

In the Sudan, President Nimeiri has been supportive of the search for peace in the Middle East and of our actions on both the Iranian and Afghan crises. He has demonstrated an equally courageous commitment to development in spite of the fact that the initial measures required, such as price stabilization, have exposed him to domestic political risk. Our $50 million in economic support fund assistance, which takes the form of financing commodity imports vital to development, will help the Sudan overcome one major development constraint—a severe and continuing balance-of-payments shortage. It is designed to complement and support our project and PL 480 assistance (including a title III food for development program) and to support the economic reforms suggested by the International Monetary Fund.

The remaining $90 million in economic support funds will be devoted to development in southern Africa. As you are all aware, the next few months may determine whether or not we are, in fact, entering a new era in this region. We currently face the twin challenges of fragile independence for Zimbabwe and economic reconstruction in the region. As you all know, residual hostilities and suspicions continue to threaten the momentum toward peace. Our support, both economic and political, will continue to be required even more in the future than it has been in the past.

The economic support fund program for southern Africa will support the peace in several ways.

- It will provide an immediate response to humanitarian needs generated by conflict and resettlement.
- It will stimulate development by easing immediate balance-of-payment constraints and facilitating the importation of essential commodities.
- It will foster an integrated, regional approach to rehabilitating and extending regional transportation links upon which sustained development in this area must depend.

In short, our aid will both respond to and reinforce the basic desire for economic progress, which can be achieved once peace and stability come to the region.

Three countries will be the direct bilateral recipients of southern Africa economic support funds. In Zambia the money will be used for programs aimed primarily at financing imports of commodities required for increasing food production and covering foreign exchange shortfalls. In Mozambique our assistance will support improved farm production and enhanced food distribution and storage capacity. In Botswana we will continue to support transportation, food production, and rural development projects.

We realize that aid to Mozambique is controversial. There are continuing signs that despite its Marxist ideology, the Mozambican regime is attempting to build a sound basis for economic progress and wants expanded economic contact with us. We believe that U.S. aid will encourage such pragmatism and enable Mozambique—which provides vital transport links between the sea and South Africa and four other states in the region—to play the constructive role that it *must* play in order to support the economic consequences of the peace. I should add that Mozambique made a significant contribution to the success of the negotiations at Lancaster House, particularly in their final stages, and since then the Government of Mozambique has cooperated with [British Governor] Lord Soames' administration in Salisbury.

As you can see, our economic support fund aid to southern Africa is developmental in its orientation.

In addition to the bilateral programs I have just described, we are proposing a regional program aimed at strengthening efforts toward closer economic coordination by the countries in southern Africa. Improvement of the transport system, as well as manpower training, are high priority sectors to which we intend to contribute. Beyond this, however, the economic support fund program is intended to support an explicitly political scenario—the peaceful reintegration of southern Africa. It also provides us with the flexibility that we need to deal with the unexpected. This brings me to my final subject, Zimbabwe.

At the time of the Lancaster House talks, the United States indicated that, subject to congressional approval, it would be prepared to cooperate in a multidonor effort to assist in the agricultural and economic development of an independent Zimbabwe within the framework of a wider development concept for southern Africa as a whole. Our planning in this effort is at a very preliminary stage. The regional activities I have just mentioned would provide solid benefits for Zimbabwe. Following discussions with the new government, expected to be formed in March, we will be in a better position to discuss in specific terms the needs of this new nation and our assistance alternatives.

Finally, let me mention the proposed worldwide special requirements fund of $50 million that the Administration is proposing for FY 1981. It is designed to enable the President to respond quickly to unforeseen situations —such as economic problems resulting from political upheavals, balance-of-payments crises, or natural disasters— occurring between budgetary cycles. While we cannot predict now to what uses such a fund will be put in Africa during FY 1981, I am sure the committee can appreciate how welcome such a fund would have been to us for use in countries such as Uganda and Equatorial Guinea in FY 1980 and how important it could be during the next fiscal year.

FMS and IMET

Let me begin my testimony on our proposed security assistance programs for FY 1981 by explaining briefly how we determine which countries should be proposed for an FMS program and the context in which our African programs operate.

A number of factors are weighed and balanced before we determine that the security of the United States and world peace would be promoted through our entering into an FMS relationship with a given country, whether it be in Africa or elsewhere. These factors include, but are not limited to:

- Our political and economic relationship with that country;
- The nature of the threat posed to its security;
- The nature of its defense supply relationships with other nations;
- A possible desire to facilitate U.S. access to a country's military facilities; and
- The priority of the country within the region and on a worldwide basis.

In the International Security Assistance Act of 1979 (Section 18, PL 96–92), the Congress expressed its opinion that the problems of sub-Saharan Africa are primarily those of economic development, that U.S. policy should assist in limiting military conflict in that region, and that the President should exercise restraint in selling or providing financing for defense articles and services to that continent.

To date, we have pursued a policy of arms restraint in Africa, and we have not wished to become involved in an arms race on that continent. We have done so despite the massive transfers of arms by Soviet bloc nations to Africa since 1975. While we continue to believe that it is in our—and Africa's—long-term interests to direct our primary efforts to fulfilling the basic economic and developmental needs of African nations, we realize that events elsewhere in the world, especially to the northeast of Africa, are having an impact upon the African Continent itself. We cannot ignore those events nor can we turn a deaf ear to requests from friendly African nations for the upgrading and/or expansion of their military establishments.

For FY 1981, we are proposing an FMS program totaling $45.5 million and IMET programs totaling $3.7 million.

In the time remaining, I would like to review briefly with you our major country programs. Before I do so, however, let me say a brief word about our IMET programs. For FY 1981, we are proposing IMET grants for 20 African nations. The value of these programs cannot be measured in dollar terms. Through IMET, we are able each year to bring to U.S. military schools African officers who often return to their countries to play leadership roles. The education they receive, the friendships they make, the impressions of the United States with which they return, all contribute to making this program one of our least costly but nevertheless most important.

For FY 1981, we are proposing an FMS program of $30 million and an IMET program of $746,000 for the **Sudan.**

As you are well aware, the Sudan, under the leadership of President Nimeiri, has played and continues to play a crucial role in inter-African affairs and as a bridge between Africa and the Middle East. President Nimeiri's support for the Camp David accords is a matter of record. Domestically, the Government of the Sudan has followed a policy of political reconciliation, an ambitious economic development program coupled with economic reforms and efforts to assist with a growing refugee population numbering over 350,000 persons.

$5 Million Pledged for Rhodesian Refugees

On January 23 the Department of State notified the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) that in response to its appeal of January 14, the United States would pledge a total of $5 million to that organization for use in the repatriation of the more than 200,000 Rhodesian refugees. The UNHCR, which is coordinating the refugee repatriation effort in cooperation with other international organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, expects to begin this operation later this month.

The return of refugees to Rhodesia was an integral part of the Lancaster House agreement on a settlement of the Rhodesian conflict. The United States fully supports the complete and successful implementation of that accord. It is our hope that our support of the return of refugees and their reestablishment in their nation will contribute to the ongoing process of reconciliation and peaceful change in Zimbabwe.

Unnumbered press release. ■

fulfilled. Instead power was transferred smoothly from one civilian leader to another in accordance with that country's constitutional processes.

Africa's political, economic, and social evolution is far from complete. The rapid pace at which change takes place today only complicates the evolutionary process. Modern communications expose every stumble along the way to world scrutiny. And we, who must adjust rapidly to change in our own lives, may, therefore, be holding the new nations of Africa to unrealistic standards.

The development of nation states is a slow and difficult process. It took centuries, not mere decades, for the nations of modern Europe to grow from their tribal beginnings to highly developed states. Our own country grew to maturity slowly and painfully. And along the way, the developed countries of today experienced most of the travails that Africa has recently faced—colonialism, revolution, ethnic and racial conflict, civil war, economic upheaval, natural disasters.

When judged against the standard of our own progress, we must recognize that the new nations of Africa have taken substantial strides toward national maturity in a very brief period.

This does not mean that more cannot be done. Africa can learn from the mistakes we made as we developed and industrialized, particularly the shortsightedness that caused us to deplete our resources with insufficient thought for conservation or the shortsightedness that caused us to foul our air and water with little concern for pollution. Above all, Africa must resist the temptation to view issues myopically and to endow any one principle, such as noninterference, with such importance that it cancels out concern for other principles, such as respect for human and political rights.

Transition in U.S. Policy

Just as Africa has come to a transition point, so the United States has reached a transition point in its policy toward Africa. Under President Carter, Africa is no longer what I called in 1975 the "unchallenged occupant of the bottom rung of American foreign policy priorities." Today, America attaches a new importance to Africa—partly in response to Africa's changing concerns and partly in response to our own.

Our increasing economic interdependence with the black African states underscores the importance of a viable and independent Africa to American interests. We are becoming more dependent on African resources and more aware of Africa's potential as a trading partner. Without regard to differences in economic systems, Africa is turning to us and to our traditional allies for the development assistance it so desperately needs.

I believe that Africans realize that the Communist countries to which some of them have turned for arms are not equipped to make a major contribution to African economic development. None of the nine non-African nations invited to participate in last summer's Southern African Development Conference was an Eastern European state. But we were there, along with most of the countries of Western Europe.

So development, the wave of the future in Africa, is a wave that the United States is uniquely qualified to ride. If we are willing to supply more and better development assistance to Africa, and to couple it with a commitment for additional investment and two-way trade by the private sector, Africa's increasing preoccupation with economic concerns can be a cornerstone on which to build a mutually beneficial long-term relationship with African nations.

It would be naive to imply that the involvement of the Soviet Union and some of its allies as suppliers of arms and troops to selected revolutionary movements and governments has not affected our view of Africa. So has Africa's proximity to the Middle East.

In the end, however, America's Africa policy cannot be based on the fallacy that Africa's importance to us stems from its position on East-West issues. Neither can it be based on a desire to protect the existence of resources or to acquire lucrative markets for American goods.

Instead, the United States should base its relations with Africa on our desire to promote and facilitate the same opportunity for African nations that our own country was given two centuries ago—the chance to develop themselves politically, the chance to develop themselves economically and socially, and to do so without outside interference so that they can run their own affairs and take their rightful places in the community of nations.

Even judged by traditional standards, American interests are well served by an Africa policy that respects and responds to Africa's legitimate desire to develop with international assistance, but without outside interference. If our interest is anticommunism, a policy of assistance without outside interference offers a better chance of preventing Communist gains in Africa, because it is geared to alleviate the intolerable conditions in which communism thrives best. If our interest is economic, a policy of assistance without interference is the only way we can cultivate the African resource base and uncover potential markets without imposing an unacceptable form of economic dependence on newly independent nations.

But most important, a policy of assistance without interference will send a signal to Africa and the rest of the developing world that the United States supports dynamic, positive change in congruence with the goals of the developing countries, not simply our own.

Africa stands on the threshold of new and tremendous challenges. America stands on the threshold of a new and promising relationship with Africa. We must now make a renewed commitment to work with Africa for our mutual benefit. It will take time; it will take patience; and it will take joint efforts to bear fruit. But by working together, I am confident that we can succeed.

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[1] USUN press release 145. ■

Southern Rhodesia Holds Elections

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, FEB. 27, 1980[1]

Today marks the beginning of a 3-day electoral period in Rhodesia. This step, together with the elections February 14, means that for the first time all the people of Rhodesia will have had a genuine opportunity to choose their leaders in an open election. The process, set in motion by the Lancaster House settlement, has accomplished a great deal. All the parties involved are to be commended.

In spite of the difficulties of the transitional period, a cease-fire was established and violence reduced. For the first time in years, the leaders of all the parties were present in Rhodesia and

have been engaged in the electoral campaign over the past weeks.

The holding of this election is a remarkable achievement, indeed. As we have stated previously, we are confident that the British are determined to conduct these elections as fairly as possible.

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT MAR. 2, 1980[2]

The British Government and the other parties to the Lancaster House agreement are to be congratulated on the successful completion of elections throughout Rhodesia. For the first time in the history of the territory, elections open to all parties have been held under an agreed, democratic constitution.

According to the interim report of the Commonwealth observer group, which recognized the difficulties under which the election was conducted, the election was "free and fair to the extent that it provided an adequate and acceptable means of determining the wishes of the people in a democratic manner." This corresponds with our own assessment that the results of the election will reflect the will of the people of Zimbabwe.

We urge the forces on all sides to exercise restraint during this historic moment. Any attempt to abort the political process would be condemned by the world community. We, therefore, urge the parties to the process in Zimbabwe, and all nations, to respect and support the electoral outcome.

We look forward to the successful implementation of independence for Zimbabwe and to working with the new government. We shall continue to assist in the return and resettlement of refugees. In keeping with our pledge at Lancaster House, we also intend to assist the people of Zimbabwe as they rebuild their nation after years of conflict.

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[1] Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

[2] Issued to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III; also issued as USUN press release 18 of Mar. 3, 1980. ■

Refugee Coordinator Reports on Situation in Thailand

Following are two news conferences by Ambassador Victor Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, in Bangkok on January 18, 1980, and at the Department of State on January 23.

JAN. 18, 1980

As you may know, it was only 2 weeks ago that my appointment by President Carter as U.S. Refugee Coordinator and Ambassador at Large was confirmed by the Senate. My purpose in coming immediately to Thailand was to make a first-hand assessment of relief operations here, to meet with officials of the Royal Thai Government and international agencies, and to review the U.S. refugee program.

I have had very productive discussions with the Prime Minister and a wide range of Thai, U.S., and international organization officials. I have also inspected a number of the refugee camps, including Loei and Nong Khai in the north and Sa Kaeo, Khao I Dang, and the large concentrations on the border.

What I have seen during the past several days has reinforced my impressions of the magnitude of the problem and the generous scope of Thailand's humanitarian response. I have been assured by the Thai Government that Thailand will continue to do what it can to assist the unfortunate peoples from Indochina in their plight.

For our part, the United States will continue to give Thailand the strongest possible support in all respects. The President, Mrs. Carter, and Members of Congress are dedicated to this effort, and I look forward to strengthening our efforts in my position as refugee coordinator.

Throughout my visit, I have been enormously impressed by the dedication and hard work by Thai, international, and voluntary organizations personnel. Their efforts are crucial and will continue to receive strong support from the American Government and people.

Considerable progress has clearly been made on the resettlement side for Hmong, Lao, Vietnamese, and earlier Khmer refugees. I am pleased to note that the accelerated U.S. acceptance rate has measurably reduced the numbers of these refugees. I can only hope that the Governments of Vietnam and Laos will ameliorate those practices which compel their citizens to flee.

The major problem facing Thailand and the international community is, of course, the very large numbers of Khmer now in Thailand or awaiting an uncertain fate on the border. In recent weeks, there have been significant improvements in the facilities for displaced Khmer in Sa Kaeo and Khao I Dang. Fighting among Khmer border leadership groups, however, is a disturbing development and has pushed thousands more Khmer to move to Khao I Dang. Thus that site requires rapid expansion to remain minimally adequate. I am hopeful that the situation can be stabilized and that Khmer refugees who want to can remain on the border, free from the threat of attack and sustained by the international relief effort. With all the problems they face, it is tragic that displaced Khmer are fighting each other. In the interim, we will do our best to help Thai and international authorities solve pressing problems, such as water shortages now and possible flooding in the rainy season.

With respect to the situation inside Kampuchea, we remain deeply concerned over the continuing privation of the Khmer population. Further delay in the distribution of relief supplies donated by the world community is inexcusable. Ample supplies of food and trucks are now available within Kampuchea. The failure to make any significant progress in distribution raises fundamental questions about the priorities of the Heng Samrin authorities and their Vietnamese and other supporters. Against this background, the international effort to feed Khmer civilians on the border will continue to play a vital role in sustaining the population of western Kampuchea.

In sum, a strong framework for Thai and international cooperation has been developed and substantial progress has been made in recent weeks. But the tragedy of Kampuchea and the Khmer people remains.

Q. What did the Thai Prime Minister ask your government to do for the refugees in Thailand?

A. The Prime Minister was assured of continuing U.S. support for the relief effort in Thailand, not only in terms of our contributions to the international

think I should say that we discussed essential elements of this Western overall concept and that we reached full agreement on these essential elements of such an overall concept. I think we should take very seriously what the Secretary of State said about the substance of the talks he had with the Federal Chancellor because the Chancellor gave a very detailed, thorough, and in-depth analysis of the situation—potential consequences flowing from this situation—and he also explained in detail his views as to how the present situation could be overcome.

So I think an exchange of the kind we had today which produced agreement on the assessment of individual elements is necessary as the basis for such a substantive concept, and, therefore, it is no wonder that we reached agreement on these essential elements today insofar as such agreement hadn't existed already earlier.

Secretary Vance. Let me simply add to that that I want to underscore what Herr Genscher has said. It was extremely important to have this in-depth discussion of those short-term and long-range substantive matters. And as Herr Genscher has said, there was agreement; and we are proceeding along the same track.

Q. Did you discuss the plan of the international guaranty for a neutral Afghanistan?

Secretary Vance. We have discussed the communique which was issued yesterday at the end of the [European Communities Foreign Ministers'] conference in Rome and the conclusions which were set forth in that communique. Let me say that we are in general agreement with the statements reflected in that communique.

Q. [Inaudible; concerned U.S. policy to "punish" the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan.]

Secretary Vance. What we have said on that is that as long as Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan that they must pay a cost which flows from the fact of this blatant invasion of a neighboring country. And at the same time they must realize that such action is unacceptable to the world community, as is reflected by the vote in the United Nations, which was overwhelming.

Q. Can you tell us what contribution West Germany will make to the implementation of this overall response policy?

Foreign Minister Genscher. I think it is well-known that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, within the framework of the alliance, faces its most essential task in helping to safeguard the balance here in the central district of the central area of the alliance. Another very important role of the Federal Republic is to contribute to a solution of the very difficult economic and financial problems besetting our ally Turkey. We are, furthermore, interested in making a contribution to improving relations and deepening cooperation with the gulf states and also to make a contribution to the economic development of Pakistan. These, I think, are essential contributions on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany to this overall concept.

[1] Press release 41 of Feb. 21, 1980. ■

European Parliament President's Visit

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JAN. 29, 1980[1]

The President met with European Parliament President Simone Veil January 29, 1980. Madame Veil, who presides over the first directly elected European Parliament, is heading a 23-member delegation to the United States.

Madame Veil discussed the evolution of the European Parliament (EP) and the enlarged prospects it enjoys for becoming a significant social and political force in Europe now that its members are elected by universal suffrage. She pointed to the recent EP resolution on Iran in support of international efforts to secure the release of American hostages in Tehran who continue to be held in defiance of all accepted norms of international law. In addition, she discussed the recent EP resolution which condemned Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and which urged EP member countries to reconsider the sending of their national teams to compete in the Moscow Olympics.

The President stressed his admiration for the strength and vigor with which the European Parliament is addressing major issues of the day, and he reiterated U.S. interest in maintaining close contacts with this evolving institution. In that connection, the President and Madame Veil agreed on the desirability of intensifying transatlantic cooperation in the fields of trade and energy, a development which would accord with the Parliament's growing interest in international affairs.

Madame Veil expressed her personal appreciation for the forcefulness of the President's State of the Union message and felt that a great number of Europeans felt as she did.

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 4, 1980. ■

Madame Veil and President Carter

(White House Photo by Jack Knightlinger)

Security Assistance for Greece, Turkey, Relations With Cyprus

by H. Allen Holmes

Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 13, 1980. Mr. Holmes is Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.[1]

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our relations with the countries of the eastern Mediterranean and the Administration's security assistance proposals for Greece and Turkey for FY 1981. At the outset, I should explain that, this year, the Administration's proposal for funds for Cyprus' displaced persons will be submitted separately from the security assistance package. It, more appropriately, will be part of the budget request for refugee programs.

The basic policy goals of the United States in the eastern Mediterranean remain constant. We seek to strengthen our important bilateral relations with Greece and Turkey, to strengthen NATO's vital southern flank, and to facilitate the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

Events in Iran and Afghanistan, added to the unresolved problems in the Middle East, have opened to question some earlier assumptions about Soviet behavior, thus deepening the already considerable instability in the area bordering on the eastern Mediterranean region. International tensions have increased. These developments underline the importance of fostering close, cooperative relations with Greece and Turkey and the necessity of helping them to maintain viable, pro-Western democratic systems. They lend great urgency to our efforts to assist these critically situated allies in acquiring the materiel and training needed to discharge effectively their NATO responsibilities.

In formulating our security assistance proposals, we have been guided by the statement of principles contained in Section 620C(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The formal certification to this effect, required by section 620C(d) of that act, will accompany the Administration's FY 1981 legislative proposal. Detailed explanations of the certification are contained in the country program documents, and I will attempt to highlight some of the main points in this statement.

Turkey

As a result of partial elections on October 15, a new Turkish Government, led by Suleyman Demirel, took office in November. It is the first minority government in the history of the Turkish Republic, depending on parliamentary votes from parties which have no seats in the Cabinet. This government faces severe problems at home. The economy is in disarray; terrorism takes a daily toll of lives, including the brutal slaying of four Americans in December; and the harshest winter in 30 years makes all other problems even more acute. The Turkish Government is moving vigorously to combat these problems. Our support in the defense and economic fields will help it in this task, as well as serve basic U.S. interests.

The past year has seen a continuation of the steady improvement in our bilateral relationship. We have made significant progress in our defense negotiations. Secretary Vance and his Turkish colleague, Foreign Minister Erkmen, agreed in December on an intensified effort to complete these negotiations expeditiously. In talks held in Ankara in early January, Under Secretary-designate [for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology Matthew] Nimetz reached agreement on the core documents of a new relationship of defense and economic cooperation.

Initialed on January 10, these documents are the foundation agreement and supplementary agreements on defense support, defense industrial cooperation, and installations. In order to facilitate the conclusion of the negotiations and the continued functioning of U.S.-utilized facilities, Turkish authorities extended until February 22 the interim measures under which we conduct our various operations at Turkish installations. Both sides are now striving to complete the remaining parts of the agreement by February 22.

This new agreement contains no specific U.S. pledge of funding but rather a best-efforts commitment that we shall seek to help meet Turkish needs in the security and economic fields. Our FY 1981 assistance request for Turkey is in line with both the magnitude of these needs and the spirit of the recently initialed agreement. We are mindful of strong congressional interests in these negotiations, and we are arranging to brief the relevant committees in detail on what has been accomplished to date.

On the international plane, the Turkish Government has been helpful to us with respect to the critical problems in southwest Asia. It has condemned forcefully the taking of American hostages and the violation of our Embassy in Tehran. It fully shares our grave concern over Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. Within NATO, Turkey has given strong support in meeting that challenge.

Cyprus continues to affect our bilateral relationship with Turkey. The Turkish Government has frequently affirmed its desire to reach a just and lasting settlement on the island through the intercommunal talks. We hope that U.N. Secretary General Waldheim will soon succeed in bringing the two communities back to the negotiating table. We believe that Turkey will support his efforts toward that end.

On the bilateral plane, the U.S. Senate completed action last year on two consular treaties—the prisoner transfer treaty and the agreement on extradition and judicial assistance. Shortly after taking office, the new Turkish Government submitted both treaties to its Parliament for ratification. They are now in committee.

On January 24 the Turkish Government announced a sweeping program of measures which amount to a radical reorientation of the Turkish economy. It devalued the Turkish lira by 48%; ceased subsidizing most state economic enterprises, thus raising the price of many basic goods; encouraged foreign investment and private sector activity; and made the state economic enterprises subject to market forces. Independent financial experts and friendly governments have long advocated reforms of this kind and magnitude. Initial foreign reaction has been overwhelmingly positive. Success of the program will depend on a large inflow of external resources to finance essential imports in the next few months. The United States will do its part, as in 1979. We are delighted that the Federal Republic of Germany has again undertaken to put together an international consortium for this purpose. Chancellor Schmidt has appointed Finance Minister Matthoefer to lead this effort.

Our FY 1981 request for Turkey addresses these realities. We propose a total security assistance program of $452 million, of which $250 million is

achievement of the goals of economic development.

Armed conflict acts as an invitation to continued and heightened foreign intervention.

nding racial injustice southern Africa

Africa is united on the need for ansition to majority rule; most nations favor a peaceful transition rocess.

U.S. interests—including trade, ccess to minerals, strategic concerns, ntinued political influence—are best rved by a peaceful transition to ajority rule in Africa.

oiding an East-West conflict Africa

East-West conflict would neutralize other U.S. goals for Africa.

Africans themselves do not wish to me embroiled in such conflicts nor allow their continent to be used by erpowers for their own purposes.

True nonalignment by African nas is compatible with U.S. interests.

port for Africa's legitimate nse needs

The United States is not willing to er an arms race in Africa. However, gnizing that certain African nations s legitimate defense needs, the ted States has limited military assance programs, including training, certain countries.

omoting respect for human rights

U.S. concern with this issue is not fined to Africa.

The United States believes that h respect is fundamental to the sucs of political and economic develop at.

P oting U.S. trade, aid, and in- ment

Most African leaders see develop t as absolute top priority.

The Western world is best able to pond to this urgent need.

A *sustained* U.S. response is ded.

The United States needs African rces.

Adherence to the foregoing principles has contributed to African achievement of some of its most important goals and a steady improvement in U.S.-African relations. Secretary Vance has credited this improvement to:

Our willingness to work with African nations in a spirit of cooperation and understanding;

Our active support for majority rule and racial equality in southern Africa;

Our serious efforts to deal with the many economic issues which are part of the North-South dialogue and which directly affect the lives of Africans; and

Our genuine interest in African problems on their own terms, and not only in the context of East-West relations.

Illustrative of American support are: the roles which the United States has played in conflict resolution efforts in southern Africa, the Horn, and Shaba Province of Zaire; support of African regional organizations (i.e., OAU) in their effort to deal with political and developmental problems; U.S. stands against dictatorial regimes in the former Central African Empire, Equatorial Guinea, and Uganda; increasing levels of U.S. assistance, bilateral and multilateral; responsiveness to emergency needs, such as the Sahel drought and refugee problems; and efforts to promote investment and trade through the Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and special missions.



Freighter *African Comet* in New York harbor (ICA photo)

POLICY ISSUES

African countries are making progress on many fronts, but they still face serious problems and occasionally suffer setbacks in their efforts to achieve national goals. In offering economic, political, and sometimes moral support, the United States shares many of the aspirations and concerns of African nations, which will be discussed in the following section.

The question of decolonialization, following years of strife in Zimbabwe and Namibia, has been a volatile one. Closely related, and to a degree involving these countries, is the issue of human rights, most systematically violated by the apartheid structure of South Africa but abused elsewhere on the continent as well. Efforts to rejuvenate national unity and institute reforms needed to satisy post-independence dreams of constitutional democracy and economic progress can be observed in Zaire and Nigeria. Equally pressing developmental needs are being tackled, for example, in the Sahel on a regional basis and in Nigeria, which is able to use its petroleum and mineral wealth. The presence of Soviet, Cuban, and other Communist troops and technicians in the Horn and other parts of Africa presents strategy concerns, not only for the Africans but for the West.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe has been the focus of international attention for many years and the scene of an expanding guerrilla war

since the early 1970s. A British colony since 1890, it is populated by about 220,000 whites and 7 million blacks. Its ruling white settlers instituted a sociopolitical system that severely limited black rights. In November 1965, Prime Minister Ian Smith announced a "unilateral declaration of independence" from the United Kingdom. The U.N. Security Council, with U.S. support, imposed economic sanctions on Rhodesia in 1966 and 1968 in an attempt to force the Smith regime to end its illegal rebellion and take steps toward majority rule.

In the early 1960s, Rhodesian nationalists formed two rival groups, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), which advocated majority rule. They ultimately turned to guerrilla warfare from bases in neighboring countries. Eventually a loose ZAPU-ZANU alliance, known as the Patriotic Front, was formed. Inside Rhodesia, other nationalist groups, including Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC), were formed.

On March 3, 1978, the Smith regime and three black nationalists, including Bishop Muzorewa, signed the Salisbury agreement, which provided for qualified majority rule under which whites would retain considerable power. The external nationalists denounced the settlement and did not participate in it. After elections in April 1979, Bishop Muzorewa was installed as the first black Prime Minister of "Zimbabwe Rhodesia." Following the election of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government in May 1979, the British undertook a new initiative which culminated in the Lancaster House settlement signed December 21, 1979, by all the interested parties and the British.

The parties agreed on:

- A new, democratic constitution that will institute majority rule while protecting minority rights;
- A short transition period during which Rhodesia would return to legality under an all-powerful British Governor;
- British-supervised elections; and
- A cease-fire.

The transition period, which saw a declining level of violence, climaxed in



A full city well provides security for Timbuktu, Mali (above right); the dry well spells disaster in the Sahel (below right).
(AID photos)

Afghanistan: America's Course

by Secretary Vance

Address before the Council of Foreign Relations in Chicago on March 3, 1980.[1]

The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations has a proud tradition as a forum where major world issues can be explored and discussed. For nearly 60 years, this organization has been a center of thought, education, and reasoned debate on America's course in the world.

I want to speak with you today about that course. For as much as at any time in recent years, it is essential that our people be clear about our nation's goals and about the actions we are prepared to take in their pursuit.

As long as Americans remain in captivity in Iran, their safe release is uppermost in all our minds. The situation is now at a delicate and difficult stage. It would not be proper for me to comment on that situation in detail today.

Let me simply say that our objective is to bring the present crisis to an early end. We expect the work of the U.N. commission of inquiry to contribute to that objective. Our hostages must be released and safely returned to the United States. At the same time, we hope for an independent and secure Iran and have no desire to interfere in its internal affairs.

Today, I want to speak with you about another serious challenge we face: Soviet aggression against Afghanistan and the actions we have taken in response. Specifically, I want to discuss the purposes that underlie our actions and how they relate to the long-term goals of American foreign policy.

Let me begin by underscoring what is at stake.

Because of our commitment to the principles of national independence, territorial integrity, and human rights, we cannot turn our backs when national boundaries are violated, when the independence of another nation is destroyed, when the popular will is suppressed through brute military force.

What is at stake first in Afghanistan is the freedom of a nation and of a people.

We are concerned as well with the broader threat that Soviet actions pose to the region of southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. We now depend upon this area of the world for roughly 25% of our annual imports of oil. Our allies and others—developing nations as well as industrial—are even more dependent on oil from this region. Approximately two-thirds of Western Europe's oil imports and three-fourths of Japan's come from the Persian Gulf. And we must remember that our own economic health is intimately tied to theirs.

Our stake in the region, however, goes beyond oil, beyond economics.

Peace and stability in the region are critical to the future of our friends there. The strength and skill we show in supporting their independence will demonstrate to them and to others the constancy of our purpose. This is important to the character of our alliances, to our ties to friendly nations in every region of the world, and to the future of our relations with the Soviet Union.

So it is entirely accurate to say that the vital interests of the United States—in fact, of much of the world—are involved in this region. An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be an assault on these vital interests. As the President has said: It ". . . will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

Not even the most penetrating analysis can determine with certainty Soviet intentions in the region—whether their motives in Afghanistan are limited or part of a larger strategy. The fact is that tens of thousands of Soviet troops are in Afghanistan. The fact is that Soviet actions have created a potential threat to the security of nations in the region and to the world's free access to vital resources and shipping routes.

To respond firmly to the potential threat is not to be apocalyptic; it is simply to be prudent. In such a situation, our own people, our allies—and the leaders of the Soviet Union—must understand not only what the United States is doing in this crisis, but why.

A few days ago, I went to Europe at the President's request to consult with a number of our allies about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We discussed our common interests and our common responsibilities. I explained how America's actions support five key objectives. Today I want to outline them briefly for you and for the larger audience beyond this room.

U.S. Objectives

Our first purpose is to impose a heavy price for this aggression—because of our abhorrence of what is being done to the Afghan people and to help deter similar actions elsewhere. The Soviet leadership must understand that the international reaction to aggression will be swift and firm.

The steps we have taken—on grain, on technology, on the Olympics, on fisheries, and in other areas—convey our determination in the clearest terms. These measures do not stand alone. For the Soviets are facing staunch, broadly based Afghan resistance. And they have been condemned by the overwhelming majority of nations in the world.

The measures we have taken involve sacrifice—for our farmers and our businessmen, our athletes, our scientists—indeed, for all of us. But the American people are prepared to make sacrifices for the peace we cherish.

The steps we have taken are also designed to move us toward our second goal: the withdrawal of all Soviet military forces from Afghanistan.

Let me affirm today that the sanctions we have undertaken in response to the Soviet invasion will remain in force until all Soviet troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan. Let me be equally clear that when those actions cease—when Soviet troops are fully withdrawn from Afghanistan—our intention is to remove the sanctions we have imposed since the invasion of that nation.

To encourage that withdrawal, we are also ready, as the President has said, to support efforts by the international community to restore a neutral, nonaligned Afghan Government that would be responsive to the wishes of the Afghan people. With the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the United States would be willing to join with Afghanistan's neighbors in a guarantee of Afghanistan's true neutrality and of noninterference in its internal

affairs. Such a political settlement would put an end to brutality and bloodshed in Afghanistan. It would threaten the interests of no nation; it would serve the interests of all.

But let me be frank. There are no signs at this time of a Soviet withdrawal. If anything, current signs point to the contrary, the Soviet buildup continues, and permanent facilities are being constructed.

This makes our third objective all the more important. While imposing penalties for aggression for as long as necessary, it is deeply in the interests of the United States and our allies to manage East-West relations in ways that preserve their essential framework.

Our relations with the Soviet Union have been and will be essentially competitive. Our fundamental values differ. Our interests frequently diverge. We will promote our interests and our values, and we will oppose aggression. But our competition must be bounded by restraint and by sensitivity to each other's vital interests. For such a relationship between the two superpowers is central to peace.

We seek no return of the cold war, of the indiscriminate confrontation of earlier times.

We will continue to pursue our national interests in balanced and verifiable arms control agreements—in the SALT process, on conventional and theater nuclear forces in Europe, on banning tests of nuclear weapons, and in other areas. Specifically, the offer to negotiate an agreement on limiting theater nuclear forces in Europe remains on the table. The Soviet Union should pursue it with us.

Our nation has benefited from the arms control agreements we have achieved. In 1963, we halted poisonous nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere. The SALT I Interim Agreement froze the number of offensive strategic missiles when the Soviets were building up in this area and we were not. The Antiballistic Missile Treaty headed off a potentially costly and destabilizing arms race in these defensive weapons.

The SALT II Treaty we have negotiated also serves America's security interests. It would restrain Soviet strategic programs through 1985. It would limit the future threats we will face and thus make our own defense planning more certain. It would preserve our ability to monitor Soviet strategic developments. And it would permit our own modernization efforts to proceed.

SALT II is not a carrot. It is not a stick. It stands on its own merits as an integral part of our national security policy. It is especially important during a time of increased tension between the two superpowers.

We remain deeply committed to ratification of the treaty. It is not in our interest to forego its security advantages. Nor is it in our interest, during a period of heightened tensions, to dismantle the framework of East-West relations that has been built over more than two decades.

To help preserve this framework, and because we adhere to international law, we are not abrogating formal agreements with the Soviet Union.

We are pursuing preparations for the next review Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to be held this year in Madrid. We will continue our policy of building stronger relations with the nations of Eastern Europe. And we remain prepared to build a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union when circumstances permit.

Our fourth objective is to work with the nations of southwest Asia and with others to strengthen the security, stability, and independence of the region.

We firmly believe that the nations of the region should control their own destinies. Most emphatically, we believe that the resources of the region belong to its nations and peoples. Their independence poses no threat to us. The threat would lie in the loss of their independence.

We are strengthening our ability to respond swiftly and effectively if our vital interests are assaulted. We have increased our naval presence in the Indian Ocean. We have held positive discussions with nations in the area on U.S. access to air and naval facilities.

Our own military preparedness, however, is only one element of our strategy in the region. Creating a framework for security cooperation in the region must, of its essence, be a cooperative undertaking.

This means that we will work with the nations of the region to help strengthen their ability to defend their independence and enhance their political and economic stability. It means that we will continue to work with others toward peaceful resolutions of the tensions between nations in the region—most importantly, between Israel and its Arab neighbors. And it means that we will work to improve our relations with nations throughout the area, wherever there is a basis of shared interests. The United States welcomes the growing vitality of the Islamic world and sees in it a creative contribution to a world based on diversity and self-reliance.

Our fifth goal must be to draw from these events a renewed commitment to building the basic military and economic strength of America.

Our nation has initiated the most comprehensive modernization of our defense forces in over a decade. We will proceed expeditiously with the programs underway—to modernize each leg of our strategic forces, to implement NATO's decision last December on our theater nuclear weapons in Europe, and to upgrade our conventional forces.

Afghanistan brings the importance of those long-term defense investments into sharp focus, and it gives new focus to the need to increase our military mobility.

These programs will require increased defense budgets this year and for the foreseeable future. We must be clear in our determination to meet the requirements of safety and security for our nation and our allies.

Events in southwest Asia must also strengthen our determination to forestall a future energy disaster. For, quite simply, that is what we could face.

We should need no reminder of the costs and risks of our energy dependence. It fuels our inflation. It strains the dollar. It drains our balance of payments. It increases our vulnerability.

The message is clear. Energy policy is central to our foreign policy. We cannot, over the long run, be independent, strong, and free and at the same time remain heavily dependent on foreign energy.

We have made some progress in the past few years. Our overall oil consumption was down in 1979. So was gasoline

. . . the sanctions we have undertaken in response to the Soviet invasion will remain in force until all Soviet troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan.

We believe strongly that it is in our national interest to support the Government of Sudan. Sudan is expected to use the FMS funds to finance a military modernization program. The Government of Sudan may wish to purchase engineering and air defense equipment and other equipment, such as armored vehicles and artillery for self-defense.

The proposed IMET program, which would provide some 50 officers with professional/technical training in U.S. military schools in FY 1981, complements the acquisition of U.S. weapons and provides training in the essentials of modern military management.

The stability and economic strength of **Zaire** are important to the United States and our Western allies. We cannot agree with those who would have us wash our hands of Zaire's problems. To do so, we believe, would not be in our national interest. Instead, our policy begins with the premise that Zaire's strategic location, as well as its deposits of strategic minerals, renders that country's welfare important to us. Zaire's economic problems remain acute, as do its problems related to political participation and military accountability. Our position is that, together with our allies and the international financial institutions, we shall continue to assist Zaire's efforts to correct these problems as long as sustained progress is also made by the Government of Zaire in these same areas.

Our security assistance program for Zaire has already proven valuable in both Shaba invasions, when U.S.-provided spare parts, petroleum products, rations, medical supplies, and C–130s were of considerable assistance to the Zairian Armed Forces. We continue to be receptive to the Government of Zaire's request for modest security assistance and, in cooperation with our allies, expect that this assistance will contribute to the creation of a more disciplined and mobile armed forces. For FY 1981 we are proposing FMS financing of $8 million, which we expect the Government of Zaire to use for the maintenance and support of previously supplied C–130 and Cessna aircraft, as well as U.S.-origin transport communications equipment. Zaire may also request financing to purchase ammunition and basic transport and communications equipment for those brigades currently being trained by the French and Belgians.

Our proposed $897,000 in IMET for Zaire includes command and staff college-level courses plus a broad program in basic and advanced military operations, logistics, and maintenance.

We are proposing a $1 million FMS program and a $50,000 IMET program for **Cameroon.** For a nation which has played a lead role in international fora as a moderate, and one which has made considerable progress in economic development, our modest security assistance is designed to help strengthen Cameroon's defense capabilities and help diversify its sources for defense purchases. We expect Cameroon to request use of these proposed funds to purchase jeeps, trucks, communications equipment, and spare parts. The proposed IMET program would provide training for four or five officers in engineering, logistics, and communications courses.

We are proposing a $1.2 million FMS program and a $249,000 IMET program for **Liberia,** whose small Armed Forces depend almost entirely on U.S. assistance for equipment and military training. For one of our oldest and closest friends in Africa, U.S. support is designed to contribute to the modernization of Liberia's Armed Forces. Our proposal is, indeed, a modest one. Liberia has supported the United States in many ways: through its moderate positions in international fo. a, through the responsible leadership exercised by President Tolbert at home and in the Organization of African Unity, and through the important communications facilities we maintain in Liberia. We expect the Liberian Government to request FMS training to purchase support vehicles, field and engineering equipment, and mortar and small arms ammunition. Some of these credits may also be used for military housing construction. The IMET program would provide training for officers in operations, maintenance, and supply courses in the United States or one military training team to train a unit of personnel in Liberia.

The $500,000 proposal FMS and the $30,000 IMET program are designed to improve **Botswana**'s ability to defend its neutrality and control its borders. The small defense force Botswana formed in 1977 for border patrols requires additional vehicles and equipment. A small but well-equipped border defense force can be important in helping secure Botswana's territory from those who would use it for infiltration purposes.

For FY 1981, we are proposing new FMS programs in four countries—Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, and Gabon. All are modest programs, and their total value is $4.8 million.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Africa's Refugees

by Frank E. Loy

Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 13, 1980. Ambassador Loy is Deputy U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.[1]

I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss assistance for African refugees. As you are well aware, refugee problems are of an immense magnitude in Africa. Yet they are often overshadowed by developments in other parts of the world. In the past, this subcommittee has played a key role in focusing attention on African refugee problems, as well as in generating congressional support for increased U.S. contributions for both bilateral and multilateral refugee assistance. I look forward to working with you to make sure that the United States does all it can do to strengthen international relief efforts in Africa.

This hearing is particularly timely because just 2 days ago Karl Beck, the officer responsible for Africa in the State Department's Office of Refugee Programs, returned from a 2-week trip to the Horn of Africa to assess current needs and the adequacy of existing international relief programs and contingency planning.

This hearing is also timely because recent developments in southern Africa and the Horn have forced the international community to reassess the need for outside refugee assistance in Africa. On January 14, 1980, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued a special appeal for Zimbabwean repatriation. In the next few days, we expect the U.N. Secretary General to issue a sizable appeal for assistance to Somalia.

To date, the Administration has requested a total of $95 million in food and nonfood aid for African refugees for FY 1980. The nonfood items are valued at $49.85 million. Of this, we already

have contributed $16.9 million to the regular African program of the UNHCR. This figure represents one-third of the UNHCR's announced 1980 budget for Africa of $50.3 million.

The urgency we attach to African refugee needs is reflected in the fact that we already have contributed all of our one-third contributions this early in the year. At the same time, we have committed $5 million of section 533 economic support funds to the UNHCR's appeal for Zimbabwean repatriation and have received assurance that our $5 million, together with the amounts contributed by other donors, will insure adequate funding for the current phase of that operation.

Meanwhile, we are aware that due to the situations in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa, the UNHCR at present is undertaking a substantial revision of his African budget, and we already have begun the contingency planning necessary to enable us to attempt to respond to the UNHCR's increased requests.

In 1980 we will also provide $5 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for its African programs. And we will support a combination of bilateral and multilateral programs aimed at care and maintenance, infrastructure development, and education and training to the value of $19.85 million.

In addition, our 1980 Food for Peace contributions for food aid to African refugees will total $22 million, at the current Food for Peace budget level. Food for Peace's pending supplemental request would provide an additional $22 million in title II foods for African refugee-related programs.

For 1981 the State Department is requesting $54 million for nonfood aid for African refugees. This includes $35 million for the UNHCR, $7 million for the ICRC, and $12 million for direct bilateral assistance. Since these figures originally were compiled last summer, we have received information about increased needs that makes it apparent that additional funding will be requested by the international agencies concerned. In addition to nonfood aid, the Administration will be requesting substantial amounts for food aid.

At this time, I will turn to an analysis of the African refugee problem as we see it.

AFRICAN REFUGEES

Country of Asylum	Number of Refugees	Principal Country of Origin	Comments
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia	9,100	Western Sahara	Access not allowed to determine accurate numbers.
Angola	61,000	Namibia Zaire	
Botswana	20,300	South Africa Namibia Zimbabwe Lesotho	Repatriation to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) should end substantial problem.
Burundi	50,000	Rwanda	Self-settled, some for as long as 20 years.
Cameroon	30,000	Equatorial Guinea	Political refugees becoming economic refugees.
Djibouti	20,000	Ethiopia (mostly Eritreans)	Urban refugee problem special; govt. encouraging resettlement in third country.
Ethiopia	10,900[1]	Sudan Somalia	
Gabon	60,000	Equatorial Guinea	Refugee status being withdrawn Mar. 1, 1980.
Kenya	6,500	Uganda Ethiopia	Numbers decreasing.
Lesotho	250	South Africa	
Mozambique	120,000	Zimbabwe	Repatriation should end problem.
Nigeria	370	Equatorial Guinea	Political refugees becoming economic refugees.
Rwanda	8,500	Burundi Uganda	Fairly well integrated.
Somalia	500,000[2]	Ethiopia	22 camps; great, long-term aid needed.
Sudan	330,000	Ethiopia Uganda Zaire	Additional assistance required.
Swaziland	3,700	South Africa Mozambique	
Uganda	112,400	Rwanda Zaire	
Tanzania	160,000	Rwanda Burundi Uganda	Many long-term; self-settled.
Zaire	653,000	Angola Rwanda Burundi	
Zambia	80,000	Zimbabwe Angola South Africa	Severe problem should be obviated by repatriation to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

[1] Does not include displaced persons, estimated to be as many as 1 million.
[2] Does not include 500,000–700,000 refugees outside camps.

community but also in terms of the commitment which President Carter has made for continuing resettlement of refugees from Thailand. We assured the Prime Minister that we remain deeply committed to those objectives which President Carter has announced and that we stand ready to support this government in what must be one of the great humanitarian efforts of any nation.

Q. Is it true that you promised Prime Minister Kriangsak that the United States will increase the intake of refugees from Thailand to 10,000 per month?

A. It is true that we confirmed to the Prime Minister the commitment that was made some time ago as follows: that we will continue direct resettlement of refugees from Thailand to the United States at the rate of 7,500 per month, and in addition, we will be seeking to move another 2,500 to the refugee processing center to be opened at the end of January in the Philippines.

Q. What long-term problems do you think Thailand will face with the continued presence of Khmer people within its boundaries? Do you see another Palestinian-type situation existing in Thailand in the future?

A. I can't foretell the future; I'm sure that's not a surprise to you. But what I can do is tell you that Thai and U.S. objectives are precisely the same—to see that the Khmer refugees attain their desire to be able to return to their homeland. It is significant that the bulk of the movement of the Khmer refugees has been to the border, where they remain under conditions that are very difficult, obviously in the hope of returning to their homeland. It remains to be seen what the future will bring. The objective of most people when they are forced to leave their homeland is to return to their homeland, and I believe that is true for the Khmer people who are now on the border or in the camps close to the border. I am hopeful that that is exactly the result that we can obtain for them in the future.

Q. Will the refugees who do not want to return to their homeland be considered for resettlement in the United States at this time or in the near future?

A. We have made a very strong commitment to share with Thailand the burden of the refugee problem. That commitment has involved doubling the resettlement of refugees from Thailand to the United States—from 7,000 to 14,000, including, of course, refugees from all of Indochina. This doubling involves roughly 7,500 from Thailand going directly to the United States and another 2,500 to the refugee processing center. The processing is now at a point where we can meet those commitments. Thousands of refugees who are qualified, in terms of the criteria used for resettlement, are now awaiting transit. The question of new arrivals in Thailand is really not one that we can confront in this next phase.

We have obligations to this government and to the refugees, who have been here awaiting resettlement for a long time, to see to it that they are treated fairly. That is to say, that we have a principle of first in, first out. Later, we will be in a position to determine whether newly arrived refugees who do not want to return home will be processed for resettlement. I'm sure that there will be some in the category that you suggest. But that is not a category that we can reach right now with as many Hmong and Lao as well as Vietnamese that the United States is accepting after long stays in the camps.

Q. Does that mean that the program is to resettle everyone from the old camps who is qualified or who wants to go before you think about turning to the new Khmer?

A. No. It means that we will do our best to balance our obligations and to meet some tests of fairness. At some point there will be people among the new arrivals who, for reasons of family unification or prior association with the U.S. Government, will have to be considered. I can't give you a categorical answer to a problem that has as many human priorities as this one. We will continue to do our best to deal with these kinds of issues in a way that is seen as fair and sensible, and I hope that we can deliver on that. Up to now I think we have.

Q. In your talks with all the people concerned with the situation on the Kampuchean border, were you able to obtain any guarantee from those who control the hundreds of thousands of Khmer in the border camps that the humanitarian aid will be carried freely for those people and free of charge for those people in the border camps and further inside western Kampuchea?

A. The question is, who is in control of these border camps or concentrations? They really are not camps in a literal sense. They are large concentrations of refugees who have gathered on the border because they are being fed through the efforts of the Thai Government, the international agencies, and the American Embassy in Bangkok. They are surviving.

The issue for us is really a simple issue: How can we get the most food to the most people? The border situation is very complicated and changes from day to day. The situation involves communal arrangements in internal organizational structures which are peculiar to the Khmer groups that are there.

I don't have any guarantees except this: The Thai Government has expressed great concern about stabilizing the situation on the border. The international agencies have made it clear that they will continue to provide the people on the border with food. Our objective will remain feeding as many people as possible, in effect flooding that zone with food so as much of it as possible gets into Kampuchea. One of the amazing things to me was to understand that a great deal of the food that is reaching the border is being taken into the Kampuchean countryside by bicycles, other conveyances, and on people's backs. This food is playing a major role in sustaining the population of western Kampuchea. With that in mind, I haven't sought guarantees because there's nobody to give them.

Q. The U.S. Government has made much of the fact that the food is not being properly distributed inside Kampuchea. What specific sources lead you or the government to believe that aid is not being properly distributed by the Heng Samrin and possibly Vietnamese authorities in Kampuchea?

A. I have spent the last two days touring some of the camps and one of the things that we did was to interview people in the camps. Some of those interviews were arranged in advance and for others I just moved through the camps and talked to people, asking them about conditions inside Kampuchea. I was seeking, of course, recent arrivals to the extent possible.

I was overcome by the stories of what is going on inside the country in terms of the plight of people who are traveling under conditions of very great danger and great privation, often in ex-

traordinarily weak condition, to reach the border. So I have a personal sense that there is no effective food distribution to a large part of the Khmer population.

Secondly, we have a great deal of evidence now from the international organizations, which are exhibiting increasing concern and impatience, that the bulk of the relief supplies that have been brought into Kampuchea are still in warehouses or at the harbor. There isn't really any substantial argument about that. It is true that some supplies have been distributed, mainly Russian corn. Our impression is that that corn has not reached significant portions of the population and, more importantly, that the supplies sent into Phnom Penh and to the harbor have remained in warehouses. The international officials have confirmed that.

Q. International aid officials who have been in Kampuchea say that the Vietnamese or the authorities in Kampuchea are doing the best they can, and logistical problems are to blame. Some statements from Washington imply that there's a willful obstruction of such distribution by the authorities in Kampuchea. On what does the U.S. Government base that assertion?

A. My role in this matter has one objective—to see that the maximum number of people are fed. All I know is that the officials confirmed to me that the bulk of the relief supplies remain in the warehouses. I don't have to know much more than that. I'm not even interested in the difference between incompetence and deliberate nondistribution. All I'm interested in is the result, and the result is great suffering. I will bring every effort I can to bear on that situation.

There has now been a period of several months for the Phnom Penh authorities to invite people to take on the logistical job, if they cannot accomplish it themselves. It's perfectly clear that if they cannot accomplish it, there are many people, willing, ready, and able, to distribute it for them. There are people ready, willing, and able to carry the supplies on their backs, so it isn't even a question of gasoline. Let's not worry about fine distinctions; the fact is that the food is not being distributed. I, for one, will not join the debate about whether it's delivered or not. It's in the warehouses. That's the significant fact, especially for people who are starving.

Q. When you say you will bring every effort you possibly can, every pressure to bear to relieve this situation, what exactly do you mean?

A. I'm talking about every effort I can bring to bear. Let's see what this might be. First of all, the United States is a major contributor to the international effort. I hope to use every influence I can to see that our contributions result in food that reaches the people. If at some point I decide, and my government agrees, that people are not receiving the benefit of the contributions, then I may well suggest changes in distribution practices.

I might add that I'm not the first to suggest this. The operations director of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Mr. Hocke, has said that he would give the authorities in Phnom Penh until January 15 to get their act together. I do not intend to be a long way behind Mr. Hocke, to the extent I have anything to do with the matter. And remember our relief operations there, as elsewhere, are not direct. They are channeled through the international agencies. I hope that we can be effective in getting food to people, not getting food to warehouses. I think there are probably other things that can be done. I think that we will use all the ingenuity and energy we can bring to bear to achieve the result that we are seeking, namely the relief of hunger.

Contributions for Khmer Relief (as of Feb. 22, 1980)

	ICRC	UNHCR	UNICEF	WFP	Donor Totals
Australia	$ 286,300[1]	$ 550,781	$ 876,200	$ 917,000	$ 2,630,281
Belgium		251,724			251,724
Canada	1,282,000		1,289,900		2,571,900
Cyprus		1,000			1,000
Denmark	470,000	375,940			845,940
Finland	52,600		52,600		105,200
France	1,000,000				1,000,000
Germany, West	555,600	5,177,203	1,555,500		7,288,300
Greece		5,000			5,000
Iceland	1,500		1,500		3,000
Ireland			106,900		106,900
Israel		55,000			55,000
Italy		120,482		400,000	520,482
Japan	2,272,700	10,000,000	316,500	500,000	13,089,200
Lebanon		4,644			4,644
Liechtenstein	500,000		500,000		1,000,000
Luxembourg	24,600				24,600
Malaysia		5,000			5,000
Netherlands	75,000	1,288,660	375,000	800,000	2,538,660
New Zealand	50,300		50,200		100,500
Norway	200,000	804,198	400,000	1,944,000	3,348,198
Philippines		5,000			5,000
Qatar		10,000			10,000
Singapore		5,000			5,000
Sweden	1,176,500		1,176,500	2,429,500	4,782,500
Switzerland	1,093,800	156,250	768,700	855,700	2,874,450
Taiwan	5,333,333[2]				5,333,333
U.K.				1,600,000	1,600,000
U.S.	5,999,400	15,095,000	11,492,600	30,357,600	62,944,600[3]
Totals	$20,373,633	$33,910,882	$18,962,100	$39,803,800	**$113,050,415**

[1] Includes $10,000 equivalent of a donation of 30 tons of rice.
[2] Represents dollar equivalent of a donation of 16,000 tons of rice.
[3] The remaining $2,680,000 of the total amount disbursed by the United States have been contributions in kind, airlift costs, and grants to various smaller voluntary agencies and organizations.

NOTE: On Feb. 21, 1980, the American National Red Cross donated $50[illegible],000 to the ICRC; the total ANRC contribution to ICRC currently is $1.5 million.

SOURCE: Kampuchea Working Group, Department of State.

foreign military sales (FMS) financing and $2 million is international military education and training (IMET). We also seek $200 million in economic support fund assistance to help Turkey with its critical balance-of-payments problems.

The $250 million FMS financing program will have a beneficial impact on Turkey's ability to maintain equipment now in its inventory. It will also make a limited contribution to Turkey's program for reaching its NATO-approved goals of force modernization. Other allies, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, are also making bilateral efforts to enhance Turkish defense capabilities. Turkey has, however, a massive need for support equipment and spare parts.

IMET is an extremely valuable program. It provides needed training, and it enhances contacts and communication between Turkish and American military personnel. This dialogue is essential in light of the disruption which occurred during the embargo period. Now, both sides are relearning old habits of cooperation. As a result, we are working toward a stronger NATO in which U.S. and Turkish forces play complementary roles and make more effective use of scarce resources.

Turkey's critical economic situation makes it vital for the United States and other friendly nations to support the January 24 economic reforms. Our assistance will provide some of the resources which Turkey needs to sustain this program and, over time, to regain its economic health. Realistically, this process will take much longer than a year. Our economic support fund proposal is not dramatically large, but it builds significantly on our FY 1980 assistance. More importantly, it gives Turkey further assurance of our undiminished political support for the success of its economic stabilization program. We would plan to provide this $200 million in economic support fund assistance on terms which reflect Turkey's stringent financial circumstances. Last year the Administration agreed with the congressional initiative to provide $75 million of the $198 million economic support fund as a grant.

The assistance measures which I have cited will help to strengthen a valued friend and ally. They, therefore, are intrinsically important to major U.S. and Western security interests. They will enhance the Turkish-American bilateral relationship and Turkey's ability to play a useful role in the alliance.

Greece

During the past year, our relations with Greece have deepened and matured as that increasingly developed country has more firmly established itself as an important member of the democratic West. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Karamanlis, Greece will be entering the European Communities (EC) on January 1, 1981. The treaty of accession now being ratified by member states was signed in Athens on May 28 in the presence of major European leaders, including the President of France and the Prime Ministers of Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Ireland. President Carter sent a message to Prime Minister Karamanlis warmly welcoming this demonstration of Greece's economic vitality and democratic strength and congratulating him on his wisdom and leadership in bringing Greece into the EC.

The Government of Greece recently proposed the establishment of a permanent home for the Summer Olympic Games in Greece. It has offered to the International Olympic Committee a site near ancient Olympia for this purpose. We consider this a worthwhile initiative, particularly in the present circumstances, and are prepared to support it in any way that would be helpful.

We continue to have an on-going and positive defense relationship with Greece. The facilities we utilize there operate with the full cooperation of Greek authorities. Sixth fleet ships make regular calls in Greek ports.

Greece is seeking to reintegrate its armed forces into the NATO military command structure, from which it withdrew in 1974. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen. [Bernard M.] Rogers, has assumed the alliance mandate to develop military arrangements satisfactory to Greece and the alliance for this purpose. As a member of NATO, we strongly support these efforts and have urged all parties to work with General Rogers. We will continue to do so.

The security assistance program we are proposing for Greece for FY 1981 would provide $180 million in FMS

17th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, JAN. 24, 1980[1]

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the following report on progress made during the past 60 days toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem, plus a copy of Secretary General Waldheim's comprehensive report to the Security Council on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period of June 1 through November 30, 1979.

Since my last report on Cyprus, dated November 21 [28], 1979, the intercommunal talks have regrettably remained recessed. Now that the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council have concluded their periodic reviews of the Cyprus question, I am hopeful that all parties will again focus their primary attention on resuming the intercommunal negotiations. Secretary General Waldheim, in his December 1, 1979, report on Cyprus, undertook to pursue his efforts to reconvene the talks as early as possible in the new year. I am encouraged to note that the Secretary General's representatives on Cyprus have begun consultations with both parties in an attempt to find common ground upon which the negotiations might resume. The United States will continue to support fully the Secretary General and his staff in their efforts to achieve an early resumption of serious negotiations.

On December 14, 1979, the Security Council unanimously passed a resolution extending the mandate on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to June 15, 1980. I am pleased that the other members of the Security Council share our view that UNFICYP is essential to the maintenance of a calm atmosphere conducive to the reconvening of the intercommunal talks.

The Cyprus dispute has been on the international agenda for decades. The historical complexity of this issue indicates that perseverance, patience, and political courage are required on both sides if a just and lasting settlement is to be achieved. We are committed to the vigorous pursuit of all promising avenues that might lead to that settlement, and will continue to consult closely with all parties to the Cyprus dispute, the United Nations, our European allies, and other nations legitimately concerned with bringing peace to this troubled island.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER ■

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[1] Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980).

financing and $1:5 million IMET, for a total of $181.5 million.

The proposed program will assist Greece in fulfilling its NATO obligations and help provide for Greece's self-defense. The program also is a continuing indication of U.S. support for a democratic Greece. It has been formulated with a view to maintaining the military balance among the countries of the region and to strengthening the southern flank of NATO at a time of particular concern. In sum, the program for Greece will be fully consistent with the principles set forth in Section 620C(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and will make an important contribution to the defense posture of a key ally.

Cyprus

With respect to Cyprus, we continue to believe that the most effective way to achieve a permanent and mutually satisfactory settlement is through direct negotiations between the two parties on the island.

Secretary General Waldheim succeeded in bringing the two sides together in June, 1979, but the talks were recessed when the parties were unable to agree on an agenda. Since then, the Secretary General and his staff have worked tirelessly to find common ground on which the two sides might return to the negotiating table. The United States has consistently supported the Secretary General and will continue to do so, for we believe that his efforts carry the most promise for resumption of the intercommunal talks.

At the same time, we continue to consult closely with all parties to the dispute, our European allies, and other states which have a legitimate role to play and which share our common goal. Last fall, Secretary Vance had comprehensive discussions with Cypriot President Kyprianou in New York during the U.N. General Assembly. Cypriot Foreign Minister Rolandis has just completed a visit to Washington where he discussed the Cyprus problem with the Secretary, Deputy Secretary Christopher, and Under Secretary-designate Nimetz.

The long history of the Cyprus problem demonstrates that peaceful progress has never been easy. We believe, however, that a solution is achievable, and we remain committed to finding a solution that will bring peace to this troubled island.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Spanish Prime Minister Meets With President Carter

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JAN. 14, 1980[1]

The President met today with Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez of Spain. The two leaders had a working lunch in the Cabinet Room, with senior officials of both governments participating.

The President and the Prime Minister noted with satisfaction the close relations between their two countries and discussed a number of international issues which are of particular concern to both. These included the crises in Iran and Afghanistan, the situation in the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean, and U.S.-Spanish cooperation in Western security matters.

The President, in congratulating the Prime Minister for his vigorous leadership in the evolution of Spanish democracy, expressed his appreciation and that of the entire American people for Spain's support on behalf of the international effort to secure release of American hostages held by Iran in defiance of universally accepted standards of decency and law. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the principle of the rule of law, vital to the whole world community, is at stake in this crisis. The President and the Prime Minister further agreed that they would use every effort to convince the Iranian authorities to release, unharmed, all the hostages.

The two leaders exchanged views on the Soviet armed invasion and occupancy of Afghanistan. They agreed that this Soviet action, in flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter, constitutes a most serious threat to international peace. In condemning Soviet aggression, the President and the Prime Minister agreed on the need to strengthen Western solidarity, as expressed in concrete measures, to impress upon the Soviet Union the consequences of its conduct.

During their discussion concerning other areas of interest to both governments, the President expressed admiration for the Prime Minister's insights based on Spanish contacts and historical experience in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. The President welcomed the constructive suggestions which the Prime Minister made regarding these parts of the world and agreed that it would be useful to intensify U.S.-Spanish consultations on ways in which both countries could work for peace and stability there. ■

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[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 21, 1980.

Prime Minister Suarez and President Carter (White House photo by Karl Schumacher)

ruary with Prime Minister Robert gabe's ZANU party winning a ority of 57 seats in the House of Asbly. Subsequently, Mr. Mugabe a number of steps which fostered a ate of reconciliation in Zimbabwe. date for Zimbabwe's independence pril 18, 1980.

The United States has fully suped the British throughout the Laner House negotiations and thereaf- The United States urged the vari- Rhodesian parties to make the essary compromises that were evenly required for a final settlement. United States assisted in the tish airlift to Salisbury of material d to monitor the cease-fire. Also, the ited States has pledged $5 million to U.N. High Commissioner for Refus for use in the effort to repatriate estimated 200,000 Rhodesian refus. In the near term, the United tes has indicated willingness to operate in a multidonor regional nsportation and economic developnt program for the region that will lude Zimbabwe and its neighbors.

mibia

Following World War I, South Africa was given a League of Nations mandate to administer the former German colony of South West Africa until it was ready to become independent. After World War II South Africa refused to place Namibia under U.N. trusteeship and instead continued to subject the black majority of its 900,000 residents to South African law, including apartheid and racial discrimination. In 1966 the U.N. General Assembly revoked South Africa's mandate and in 1971 the International Court of Justice stated in an advisory opinion that South Africa was obligated to withdraw its administrator from Namibia immediately.

Through the 1975 Turnhalle conference of representatives (acceptable to South Africa) from most elements of the territory's population, South Africa sought to engineer a unilateral internal settlement based on a weak federation of ethnic states. Since this plan was internationally unacceptable, the then five Western members of the U.N. Security Council, including the United States, began a unique cooperative effort in 1977 to find a way to implement Security Council Resolution 385, passed unanimously the previous year with the intent of insuring free and fair elections in Namibia under U.N. supervision and control.

The Western Five plan, endorsed by the Security Council, calls for the creation of a U.N. Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) with military and civilian components and withdrawal of South African forces before independence. South Africa accepted the plan but raised problems concerning its implementation and proceeded with its own election of a "constituent assembly" (later "national assembly") in December 1978.

The Western Five have continued in their efforts, however, and despite the election have slowly gained more South African acceptance of the Secretary General's proposal for implementing the plan. Recent acceptance by South Africa of the concept of a demilitarized zone between Angola and Namibia to help monitor adherence to the plan is taken as a hopeful indication of the republic's willingness to cooperate with the United Nations. Settlement efforts accelerated in early 1980 with the dispatch of a U.N. technical team to southern Africa. Near settlement of the Zimbabwe problem may also have a positive effect on South Africa's attitude.

However, a transitional period leading to elections could be tense and fraught with further controversy, both in the delicate relations between South Africa and the United Nations and among the various aspirants to political power. Failure of the present initiative would probably increase the bloodshed and the involvement of outside powers. Success here, on the other hand, especially coupled with success in Zimbabwe, could point the way toward amelioration of the most intransigent of southern Africa's problems—apartheid in South Africa itself.

Apartheid

From the establishment of a Consulate in Cape Town in 1799, through the era of British colonies and independent Boer republics, the Union of South Africa and finally the Republic of South Africa, the United States has maintained official relations with the various governing entities. Rich in resources and strategically located, South Africa has been an important trading partner and wartime ally. However, during the past several decades, and particularly since the Sharpesville riots of 1960, U.S.-South African relations have been adversely affected by the republic's racial policies, generically known as "apartheid" or "separate development." Rigidly codified and often brutally enforced, apartheid laws offend concepts of racial justice and human rights held not only by the United States but also by the independent nations of sub-Saharan Africa as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In order to demonstrate opposition to apartheid and support for nonviolent evolution toward racial justice, the United States has imposed restraints on its relations with South Africa. Among these are an embargo on arms sales, police weapons, and equipment and a ban on U.S. naval ship visits to South Africa. In the commercial field, the United States prohibits direct Export-Import Bank loans to finance U.S. sales and limits trade promotion activities.

The United States, like the rest of the international community, has refused to recognize South Africa's bestowal of so-called "independence" upon the Transkei and other homelands. The homelands policy—which purports to define all black South Africans as citizens of one of the homelands—is a fundamental element of the apartheid strategy. The United States has never provided economic or developmental assistance to South Africa.

The United States has endeavored to use its influence to encourage peaceful evolution through maintenance of contact with leaders of all racial groups, through encouragement of private American firms to improve pay and working conditions of their black employees, and through support of constructive measures in the United Nations and other international bodies. However, the effect of U.S. efforts and indeed those of other countries and the United Nations has been limited.

There are indications that elements of the present government in South Africa, recognizing that their system as presently constituted is not viable, may be willing to make minor modifications in the government's racial policies. Near settlement in Zimbabwe and progress regarding Namibia have encouraged exponents of change within the South African ruling establishment. However, minor concessions regarding "petty apartheid" fall far short of basic demands of the black majority of citizens and their international supporters for demonstrable progress toward the ultimate goal of full participation of all races in the political, economic, and social affairs of the country. The intensity of black demands and expectations is increasing, along with heightened racial

polarization and growing militancy. This issue is the major political concern of all of black Africa.

The fundamental dilemma facing the United States and other concerned observers is how to promote racial justice without external involvement and violence, while simultaneously maintaining effective relations with the government and maintaining credibility with the black leadership. Another important policy objective is securing South Africa's cooperation with U.S. and international nuclear nonproliferation goals.

Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa, which includes Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya, occupies a strategically important location on the Red Sea and Indian Ocean close to volatile areas of the Middle East. The region has become a subject of U.S. concern because deep-seated historic and ethnic rivalries have erupted in recent years into open conflict. The situation has been exacerbated by the involvement of Soviet and Cuban forces, the latter now numbering an estimated 15,000 troops. Two sectors are particularly worrisome.

Eritrean liberation forces, including both Moslem and Christian elements, have been waging an insurgency for over 16 years in an effort to bring self-determination to the Eritrean people. Supported by Arab states, the insurgents had succeeded by mid-1977 in liberating most of Eritrea from Ethiopian domination. Since then, Ethiopia has endeavored to reassert its control with only limited success despite massive Soviet military assistance.

Following the replacement of Emperor Haile Selassie by a new revolutionary Ethiopian government, Somalia commenced an effort to end Ethiopian rule over the Somali people of the Ogaden region in mid-1977. Regular Somali military units were withdrawn in 1978, but fighting within the territory has continued.

The United States remains deeply concerned about the overall future of the region, and recent developments have produced a curious reversal of American relations with the countries of the Horn. Relations have improved with Somalia, which a few years ago was pro-Soviet. They have deteriorated with Ethiopia, once a close ally and now increasingly involved with Cuba and

The Horn of Africa

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Russia, with which it has a close military relationship. The United States, in fact, has suspended developmental assistance and preferential trade treatment for Ethiopia (although continuing humanitarian assistance) because of the expropriation without compensation of U.S. property.

Consistent with general policy, the United States endeavors to support moves toward negotiated, peaceful settlement of problems in the Horn. Faced, however, with Soviet-Cuban encouragement of military actions and with the growing threats to security in broad northwest portions of the Indian Ocean, the United States is increasingly willing to consider requests for assistance in efforts to maintain security in the region.

Zaire

Just after the Congo obtained independence from Belgium in 1960, the army mutinied, political authority broke down, and the Governor of Katanga (now Shaba) declared his province an independent country. Now called Zaire, the republic has been involved in turmoil, internal and external, political and economic, ever since. Katanga was reintegrated in 1963, but rebellions occurred in Kwilu and Kivu Provinces in 1964–65 and former Katangans invaded Zaire from neighboring Angola, first with insurgent white mercenaries in 1967 and then on their own in 1977 and again in 1978. Political instability in Zaire can have repercussions well beyond its national boundaries due to its size, its mineral wealth, and the fact that it borders on nine other states.

Zaire has rich deposits of copper, cobalt, and diamonds; an extraordinary hydroelectric potential; navigable rivers; and much good agricultural land. Unfortunately, the economy has suffered severely from political instability, mismanagement, and corruption in high places. International debts are now far too large, and Zaire, with the help of the IMF, Belgium, France, the United States, and others, is trying to fight its way out of its economic morass.

Many critics blame Zaire's economic plight on President Mobutu's authoritarian style of government. The United States has strongly encouraged current Zairian attempts to work with the IMF to reorganize the country's financial sector and to live with the fiscal constraints of the Fund's economic stabilization program. The United States has also urged President Mobutu to halt human rights abuses and adopt changes in the political structure of the country that would allow for stability and improve the prospect for a peaceful transfer of authority at such time as government leadership passes to others.

U.S. assistance is designed to assist the needy people of Zaire as directly as possible and to reinforce economic and political reform. Some reform measures have been implemented and others announced. How well these will work in the long run remains to be seen, but there has been a start toward reestablishment of economic health and toward healing of some of the human, regional, and ethnic wounds that have plagued Zaire since its independence.

Sahel

The Sahel (meaning "desert's edge"), drought-stricken in the early 1970s and today suffering from continuing desertification, provides an encouraging example of donor countries and international organizations working together with affected countries in a coordinated effort to meet emergency and long-range development needs on a regional basis. The region includes those countries which lie along the southern edge of the Sahara Desert—Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Senegal, Upper Volta, The Gambia, plus the islands of Cape Verde.

The Sahel is populated by 30 million persons, whose livelihood depends largely on livestock and agriculture. Rainfall is scarce and erratic. In times

consumption. Under the President's leadership, we have taken important steps toward greater energy security. But, as the President has said, far more needs to be done. Gaining control over our energy future is an essential part of a prudent response to recent events in southwest Asia.

National Interests

Each of these objectives—to gain the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan, to deter further Soviet aggression, to manage sensibly U.S.-Soviet relations in a period of heightened tensions, to help strengthen the nations in the region, and to build America's strength—each serves the interests not only of America but of all nations which have a stake in world peace and stability. And they involve the efforts of others as well as ourselves.

As we move ahead together, our allies need to know that the United States will remain strong. And we will.

They need to know that we are committed to the common defense. We are, and we will remain so.

They need to know, at the same time, that the United States, for its part, would welcome a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union. And we would.

We are not asking our allies to dismantle the framework of East-West relations. We do ask that they take measures designed to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and to deter the Soviets from new adventures that will produce new crises.

Detente cannot be divorced from deterrence. To oppose aggression now is to promote peace in the future—to foster the conditions for progress in East-West relations. To assume that we can obtain the benefits of detente while ignoring the need for deterrence would be shortsighted and dangerous. I am convinced that we will not do so.

As we work with other nations, we also seek the understanding and support of the American people behind the objectives I have described.

America's strength lies not only in our weapons and our laboratories, our factories, and our farms; it is rooted in the determination and good sense of our people when they are united in a common purpose. For the shape of our future depends on our will and our wisdom: the will to respond to aggression with renewed national strength and the wisdom to find, in our response to immediate crisis, a new national unity behind our foreign policy for the future.

That leads me to my final point.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has had a definite impact on our foreign policy—on U.S.-Soviet relations and the common agenda with our allies. But it should not—it will not—turn us away from the fundamental goals our nation has been pursuing in the world. They remain deeply in our national interest.

Energy policy is central to our foreign policy. We cannot . . . be independent, strong, and free and at the same time remain heavily dependent on foreign energy.

- It is in our national interest to lend America's full support to the negotiation of peaceful solutions to regional tensions.

Festering regional disputes fuel local arms races that drain resources from pressing human needs. They present opportunities for foreign intervention and exploitation. And they can erupt into open conflicts that bring the threat of wider wars. Precisely because the world has become a more dangerous place in recent months, we will continue to work to defuse its dangers.

- It is in our national interest to continue to strengthen our traditional alliances, to open new relationships—as we have with China—and to stay on course in building cooperative relations with the developing world.

The best way to thwart Soviet interference in the Third World is to pursue our own affirmative policy there, one that addresses the real interests we share in the freedom of developing nations—freedom from the dominance of outside powers, from the bitterness of racial injustice, from the waste of regional conflict, from the burdens of poverty.

That strategy does not mean that we should hide our differences with developing countries. But we can work together most effectively on issues of critical importance to us when they know we share their goals of political independence and economic justice.

This approach builds on our strengths, for it is most often to the West that these nations first turn for assistance in meeting their economic and security concerns. And this approach is working. There are serious trouble spots. But the fact is that our relations with most of the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are stronger today than they have been in years.

- And finally, it is not only in our national character but deeply in our national interest to translate our dedication to freedom into practical support for human liberty in other nations.

Nations that respect the rights of their citizens, that are open to the expression and accommodation of conflicting views and interests, are in a stronger position to maintain their national balance and their national independence.

We are well aware that seething frustrations can explode into radicalism and violence which imperil America's interests. But it remains true that more often today, change is taking place peacefully, and it is leading toward human freedom.

It is in our interest to be part of that tide. And it is in our interest to defend human rights when they are threatened.

Indeed, a central issue raised for all the world by Soviet actions in Afghanistan is one of human rights: the right to determine one's own government; the right to religious liberty; the right to live in peace.

We will continue to strive not to impose our own institutions but to help others give expression in their own ways to the irrepressible human right to be free.

Ultimately, the purpose and the measure of our foreign policy are its impact on the lives of our people and others.

For over 200 years the United States has been on the side of freedom and progress. While we have known the world is a dangerous place, requiring our strength and our vigilance, we have also known that it need not be a hostile one. As the human condition is improved, as people everywhere find better and more secure lives, the world becomes a safer place for America.

It is this belief that has marked the American character throughout the life of our Republic. It remains our faith today.

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[1] Press release 52 of March 4, 1980. ■

Question-and-Answer Session Following Chicago Address

Q. You referred to your discussions with French President Giscard d'Estaing and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who later, after the invasion of Afghanistan, issued a strong statement bolstering alliance unity. Nevertheless, many analysts have commented on the frictions within the alliance in recent months. How unified are our European allies behind you on policy in the Middle East and southwest Asia?

A. First, let me say that what we are talking about is a set of common objectives, a set of common goals.

The principal purpose of my trip was to discuss with the leaders of the four nations which I visited both our assessment of the threat we faced and the short-term and the long-term goals as we saw them. In addition to that, we then discussed the question of what actions should be taken to achieve those objectives.

Insofar as the assessment of the threat was concerned and both the short-term and long-term goals, I found that there was a great degree of similarity—that we were, indeed, on the same track. When it came to the question of specific actions, there were differences of views on some of the items. I think that is to be understood—it is understandable to me. We will be continuing our consultations as we work together to implement these common goals and objectives, and we will be seeking to find both common actions and parallel actions which will lead to the achievement of the common goals.

I believe, contrary to much of what one hears from time to time, that there is unity among us.

Q. A number of the questions, predictably, deal with different aspects of the situation in Iran and Afghanistan. A number complain about why our allies allegedly haven't provided us with more support; a number ask about the Olympics. Will we, in fact, go through with the boycott? How comparable is the current situation to the Olympics in Nazi Germany in 1936? Are we hurting our athletes and ourselves more than we're hurting the Soviets?

A. Let me start with the latter and then you will have to remind me of what each of the others is. [Laughter]

Insofar as the Olympics is concerned, we have taken our decision on the Olympics, and we have said that we would not participate in Olympics which were being held in the capital of a nation which is invading another nation. That decision has been taken; that is our decision. That is the decision that we will follow.

Q. Among the critics of the Administration's strong response to the Afghan invasion have been Ronald Reagan and George Kennan. Kennan noted that from a geopolitical point of view, there is merit to the view which allegedly has been stated by Mr. Reagan, that it would make more sense to take a strong action against Cuba, 90 miles from our shores, than to seek to influence Soviet behavior 5,000 miles away in a country located on the Soviet border. What is your response?

A. My response is that the suggestion by Mr. Kennan is very difficult for me to understand. To suggest that we should blockade Cuba at this point, with all the dangers that that would carry with it—and we have memories of that back in 1962—does not, in my judgment, make sense at this time.

I think it is very clear that there is a danger to our vital national interests and to those of our allies posed by the action which has been taken in Afghanistan by the Soviets in sending tens of thousands of troops into that country, is not only violating all the precepts of the U.N. Charter, international law but also the human rights of the people of that country, and at the same time, posing a threat to the surrounding countries; and as I indicated earlier, a potential threat also to the vital interests which we all have in the flow of oil from that important region.

Therefore, it seems to me that is where we should concentrate our attention; and that view is shared by our allies.

Q. A number of questions from the audience follow up on your point about the need for a strong defense. People are concerned, specifically, about the problems with the volunteer military. Will the proposals for draft registration of young men and authority to register young women lead to conscription? And do you have views on what should be the limits on women in terms of service in combat units?

A. On the question of conscription of draft, I have very strong personal views. I've held them for a long while. They often don't agree with other people's views.

I think it was a mistake to do away with the draft and go to a volunteer army. I believe not only should there be a draft, but I believe there should be universal service and that everyone should have to serve their government. I do not believe that that service necessarily has to be military service, but they should give at least 1 year to some kind of service to their country.

Q. There is a question referring to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations survey a year ago when the majority of the respondents expressed great concern about the declining position of the United States in the world. When asked for the principal reason for this decline, the greatest number of respondents attributed the decline to the diminishing value of the U.S. dollar, not to growing Soviet military power. The question is, what has the Carter Administration done, or is it doing, to arrest the decline of the dollar?

A. One of the main things which the Administration must do in connection with the problem of the dollar is to take the necessary steps on the energy front, which I talked about. That is a key element of the actions which we must take there because that has a very major impact on what happens to the value of the dollar.

In addition to that, obviously, we must take steps here at home to curb inflation, and that, I think, is obviously the key domestic item at this point and the one to which this Administration and the Congress must address their attention now and in the months ahead.

Overview

The continent of Africa, which has a majority of the world's least developed countries, also has the greatest number of refugees. There are estimates of up to 4 million refugees and displaced persons in Africa. The UNHCR estimated that there were 2.24 million refugees in Africa in December 1979, of which upwards of 1.7 million are in need of substantial assistance.

The discrepancies in estimates are due to a variety of factors, including differences in the definition of refugee status, political and economic incentives felt by various African government to inflate or deflate figures reported, and the large number of African refugees who are "self-settling"; that is, who cross borders with livestock and other possessions to resettle among related ethnic groups in neighboring countries of first asylum, outside of organized refugee resettlement programs.

The exact numbers of refugees are less important than the impact of their rapid growth in recent years on host countries, many of which are engaged in struggles to assure the survival of their own peoples.

A significant aspect of the refugee problem in Africa is the extent to which the African nations share their scarce resources with refugees seeking asylum within the borders. In the past 2 weeks, we have surveyed U.S. embassies in Africa in an attempt to quantify the burden which African countries shoulder in caring for refugees. The almost universal response was that, although impossible to quantify, the refugee assistance given by African countries, in the context of their limited resources, is substantial and generous. In almost every instance, refugees receive land and access to whatever health and education facilities are available. Often, as well, refugees in Africa are given food, clothing, and shelter by the people and governments of their countries of asylum. Mr. Beck tells me, for example, that in Somalia, the government has deployed 1,500 of its own personnel to care for the refugees and that the relief effort has nearly depleted the Somali Government's own stocks of food and medicines.

The African governments and people extend this hospitality despite the negative effect which this generosity has on their own development programs. It is incumbent on donors, such as the United States, to take this fact into consideration when providing development assistance. African countries seriously affected by refugee problems, such as those in the Horn and in southern Africa, should not only receive direct refugee assistance but should be given special development assistance as well.

The magnitude of the refugee problem in Africa is awesome, not because of the sheer numbers alone but also because of the potential for political and economic havoc which the problem poses. Four of the six countries which are hosts to refugees in excess of 100,000 are numbered among the 25 least developed nations in the world. Also, civil strife and systematic oppression, which are the principal causes of refugee outflows, in turn heighten tensions among neighboring countries and reduce opportunities for political and economic cooperation that could improve the lives of all the people in any given region.

In addition to the factors that generate refugee problems in Africa like civil strife and oppression, several other factors contribute to the size of refugee populations and the duration of refugee problems in Africa.

- African governments have traditionally been hospitable to refugees from neighboring countries and have been reluctant to adopt a policy of forced repatriation.
- In many parts of Africa, people move with relative ease across national boundaries, yet remain among people of similar ethnic origin.
- Generalized poverty, often exacerbated by droughts and other natural catastrophes, discourage refugees from returning to their homelands.

Unfortunately, we cannot be optimistic about prospects for declining numbers of refugees in 1980 and 1981. In fact, we can expect major increases for the foreseeable future in areas where there are already large refugee populations. In the Horn of Africa, for instance, we do not anticipate the kind of political accommodation between the Ethiopian Government and the insurgents that would permit the return to Ethiopia of the million or so refugees who have fled to the Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia. The scope of the refugee problem in this area will probably remain massive for a long time to come.

ASSISTANCE TO AFRICAN REFUGEES

	1978	1979	1980	1981
U.S. Government (millions $)	$31.8	$60.2	$93.9[1]	54
UNHCR Budget (millions $)	27	45	60[2]	105[2]
U.S. Contribution to UNHCR (millions $)	6	16	20[3]	35[4]

[1] Contingent on approval of the PL 480 supplemental request pending in the Congress.
[2] Estimate.
[3] What is expected to be appropriated.
[4] Requested in the 1981 budget.

Somalia

In Somalia alone, refugees have been arriving in the camps at the rate of 1,700 a day during the last 3 months. The current camp population of about 500,000 could easily reach 1.1 million by the end of this year. And in addition to this camp population, another 500,000–700,000 refugees are reportedly subsisting outside camps in a fragile economy and ecology.

Consequently, there is a good possibility that the Somali host-country nationals themselves will require assistance, especially in light of indications from the Food and Agriculture Organization early warning system that near-drought conditions may devastate both the spring and fall crops this year.

In response to its growing refugee problem, the Somali Government issued a worldwide appeal for $71 million in October 1979. The U.S. Government has already agreed to provide food aid valued at $13.6 million and nonfood items valued at $3.8 million, including

shipping costs. The nonfood items include drugs and medical supplies, domestic utensils, clothing, blankets, tents, and tarpaulins, which are being transported to Somalia now by air and sea.

In light of recent increases in the Somali refugee populations, the U.N. relief agencies have reassessed the needs for outside assistance in Somalia. Secretary General Waldheim is expected to issue an appeal this week for $120 million in emergency assistance and an additional amount for long-term development support.

In anticipation of the U.N. appeal for the World Food Program, the Agency for International Development's (AID) Food for Peace office has included $15 million in additional food (including freight) for Somalia in a 1980 supplemental request. Unless this request is acted upon by the Congress in a timely fashion, however, it will not be possible to deliver the food early enough to avoid certain starvation. In addition, we will be seeking to reprogram funds for the UNHCR's programs in Somalia which, together with the $3.8 million that we have already committed, would bring our contribution immediately to the one-third level at which we traditionally have supported refugee assistance in Africa. However, because of the critical nature of the need in Somalia, we would continue to assess the situation in order to determine if further support should be given.

Zimbabwe

As the subcommittee is aware, the dimensions of the Zimbabwe refugee problem will only become clear in the weeks and months ahead. The agreements reached at Lancaster House concerning Zimbabwe-Rhodesia provide, *inter alia*, for the repatriation of Zimbabwean refugees, estimated to number as many as 250,000. The first phase of the repatriation effort is to be completed by February 22, in anticipation of the national elections February 27–29. The balance of the refugees, many of whom are children—including students whose education ought not be disrupted—will have been repatriated by July–August. Last month UNHCR mounted a $22 million appeal to fund the repatriation effort—$14 million for the first phase and $8 million for the second. The U.S. Government has contributed $5 million to this fund. We hope the Zimbabwe repatriation program will be followed by development programs proposed by the new majority government for implementation in 1981.

General Trends

Following these comments about geographic areas, let me make some general observations about refugee problems throughout Africa. First, we see the following trends: There is a widespread and deep interest in education among all Africans, including refugees; refugees face ever-increasing difficulty in seeking access to agricultural land; and consequently, a growing number of refugees are creating new problems in urban areas. The possible implications of these trends, if they continue, would seem to be:

- Higher costs in refugee programs;
- The desire for greater control of refugees and their camps by host governments;
- Possible backlash among the citizens of host countries and, therefore, greater reluctance to accept massive numbers of refugees by their governments; and
- A need for more research and training to assist in the greater Africanization of refugee programs and activities.

Second, refugee problems are not a new phenomenon in Africa, nor are they apt to be resolved soon. Some refugees in Africa today have been outside their countries of origin for more than 15 years. It would be unrealistic to expect that the many intricate political differences that have uprooted these people could be settled in the near future. Despite the plan to return some 250,000 refugees to Zimbabwe, we are not sure that refugee problems in southern Africa will be entirely solved.

Third, we believe that the U.S. Government, as the largest single supporter of international refugee assistance, has a responsibility to encourage international relief agencies to broaden their view of refugee problems in Africa to include both emergency relief and the longer term support necessary to help refugees become self-sufficient in the countries where they are now located. In the past, multilateral aid has been too little and too temporary in nature to deal with the magnitude of the problem. As a result, the international community has probably expended more in continued food and other subsistence relief than would have been necessary to insure that the refugees could take care of themselves.

Recently, the governments of Somalia and Sudan have expressed their intention to request additional assistance for development programs specifically aimed at the permanent settlement and economic and social integration of refugees within their countries. These requests present our government with unusual opportunities to assist in effecting the long-term solutions, which in many instances will be the only answer to the refugee problem. I am assured by the African Bureau of AID that they will accord high priority to such requests.

Fourth, the practical needs in Africa are thus quite different from refugee assistance in other areas of the world, such as Southeast Asia where the primary goal is to provide care and maintenance to refugees while they are awaiting offers of permanent resettlement elsewhere. We need to be realistic about the quantity and kind of assistance needed to meet the circumstances in each area. And at the same time, we need to be sensitive to wishes of host-country governments that refugees not be perceived as having a better standard of living and having greater opportunities than the indigenous inhabitants.

Finally, there is growing recognition of the need for durable solutions in Africa. The current refugee assistance plans of both Somalia and Sudan, the two countries with the largest numbers of refugees, have called for assistance for permanent settlement programs.

In closing, I wish to assure you that we are well aware of the feeling of many people in Africa, in our country, and elsewhere that too little assistance has been offered African refugees. We are in the process of reassessing African needs for outside assistance, and we welcome your thoughts on ways to strengthen our contributions to this critical humanitarian problem.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Q. You have mentioned the bicycle brigade two or three times and the people who are willing to carry the aid—mainly the food—deep inside Kampuchea. As a result of your talks, then, has agreement been reached with the international agencies and others concerned that the effort to get food to the people on the border and to those who could carry it into Kampuchea will be stepped up considerably?

A. That is a very ambitious goal. In little more than 3 months, the international agencies and the world community have succeeded in mounting an operation which is bringing food to something like a million Khmer. That is a remarkable effort. It is remarkable in a number of ways. There is still a war going on in Kampuchea, and whether or not aid can be stepped up may not be as important as the question of whether it can be maintained, whether we can keep those shipments going to the border, whether distribution can be made to the people there in sufficient amounts so that supplies can continue to be carried inside the country.

Maybe it can be stepped up, but my sense at the moment is that the priority is to stabilize the situation on the border, to keep the shipments going, to start focusing on some other problems that have to be solved to maintain the flow of food. For instance, one of those problems is the water supply. There is no more pressing problem now in the relief effort than the question of water supply. The food is now flowing in tremendous volume, and the organizations are competent to handle it. They are succeeding. The food management and distribution problems are being solved in a major way. The problem that is not being solved is the water supply, which is getting more difficult every day, which demands major attention, and which is now being given attention by the international agencies.

Q. Late last year in New York there was an international pledging session to aid the refugees in Kampuchea. Soon after that there was some suggestion that some countries weren't delivering on those pledges. Could you give us an idea what the situation is now? Is there adequate international funding to keep this effort going for the foreseeable future?

A. This situation is complicated because of the way in which many of the pledges were made. There are about 30 pledging nations. Many of them have pledged contributions in kind. This aid is now flowing in from all over the world. One of the major tasks that faces Sir Robert Jackson, the U.N. Secretary General's special representative for coordinating the relief effort in Thailand, will be to match the pledges with the contributions to date and to assess the need for the balance of the planning period. I would say, however, that to my knowledge the pledges are being kept. The agencies are spending more money than was planned, but the pledges are being kept. One of Sir Robert Jackson's goals will be to convene a donor conference in the near future to take a new look at the funding situation. But the response to this has been solid and responsible from the great majority of the pledging nations.

Q. You've referred several times to stabilizing the border, which, to put it at its kindest, is chaotic right now. What can be done to bring stability to the border, and what role will the United States be playing in any such effort?

A. The United States is not a direct player, as you know. The direct players consist of the Thai Government, the international organizations, and the voluntary agencies. We are represented through our Embassy, of course, in support of the Thai Government and as a major donor to the relief effort and in other ways. But ultimately the question of stability on the borders is beyond the control of the players I've mentioned. It will depend on whether the Khmer community, which is concentrated in such great numbers there, can settle the differences among the factional leaderships in a way that permits the international organizations to operate. That's not something that anyone that is operating in Thailand can do very much about. My hope will be that the Khmer leadership on the border will see the need to concert its activities and to make some sense in keeping a stable environment.

Q. Three months ago, Thai Government policy was to try to move people away from the border to camps inside Thailand where there would not be this security problem. Two weeks ago the Thai announced that they would no longer encourage people to leave the border. Given the events of the last few days, do you think it is possible to guarantee an acceptable level of security if those people remain on the border?

A. Security for the refugees? I don't think it's possible to talk about security guarantees when you have refugees from a country in which hostilities are being conducted. The reason you have refugees is because you have insecurity. We are going to continue to have deep concerns about the issue of security for the Khmer people, who cannot be organized by anybody in Thailand. That responsibility lies elsewhere. We're going to be doing our best, through the Thai Government and through the voluntary agencies, to feed people and to keep people alive in the hope that the conditions that have caused them such suffering and that have caused them to leave their homes will somehow, someday, soon I hope, change so that they can return. That's our objective.

JAN. 23, 1980

I spent two weeks in Southeast Asia, about half of it in Thailand and the other half in Malaysia and the Philippines, essentially asking two or three questions: What have we accomplished with respect to the Kampuchean relief effort? What are the prospects for that effort in Thailand and within Kampuchea? What is happening in relation to our resettlement program in countries of first asylum throughout Southeast Asia?

I also had the opportunity to talk about funding problems with governments there and about other issues connected with this tragic, massive, and increasingly difficult situation.

Let me summarize just very quickly what I bring home with me by way of conclusions. First, famine has been checked temporarily within Kampuchea. It has been checked for the most part by the massive feeding operations which have been organized on the border by international agencies—principally the U.N. agencies, by voluntary organizations, and, I might also add, by the efforts of the American Embassy in Bangkok, which may have sounded the earliest alarm about famine in Kampuchea.

We can say that the famine has been checked in the west by the efforts of the border-feeding operation, which has penetrated into Kampuchea to an amazing distance. We have reports from both travelers within Kampuchea and from debriefings of refugees who arrived at the border that food from the border is penetrating 200–300 kilometers inside Kampuchea by the bicycle brigade and by the bull carts. That has been a major effort; it's been a successful effort.

Secondly, the famine has been temporarily checked by the fact that the recent harvest has come in, and the authorities have, in the main, apparently allowed people to keep that harvest. And I think you have to give credit to the international organizations—the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNICEF—which are operating the relief program within Kampuchea, for affecting the psychology of the authorities in Phnom Penh—allowing distributions of Russian corn, allowing villagers and farmers to keep that recent harvest, which was a very short harvest.

Now the question: What's ahead? And that answer, I think, is quite grim. I think we are facing again the threat of a renewed famine in Kampuchea. We are very seriously concerned as to how the population can be sustained between March—when this current short harvest will be consumed entirely—and November-December, when the next main crops will be harvested.

There will be a short harvest on small irrigated acreage in the spring and in the early fall, but there is going to be a huge deficit. We are going to have a massive famine again in Kampuchea if we are not able to step up the relief effort very substantially in the next 60–90 days.

According to the international organizations, there is now some hope for improvement of distribution within Kampuchea. In particular, after persistent refusal UNICEF has recently received agreement from Hanoi to allow it to charter barges for food shipments up the Mekong. They have received approval for flights to provincial airports by chartered Laotian aircraft operating out of Phnom Penh. And the possibilities of an airlift to outlying regions and barging operations—particularly after the dry season—give us some hope. At least, they give the international organizations hope that the icejam that has been blocking distribution within Kampuchea may be thawing, if not breaking up.

The processing of refugees for the resettlement program is in good shape. The third country resettlement is working and working well. Many countries are cooperating. And the refugee processing center in Bataan, Philippines, which will be a major help in that system, is well under way and will be receiving refugees from countries of first asylum this week.

Q. Can you tell us something more about the distribution of food within Kampuchea that has been arriving at Kompong Som and at Phnom Penh? How has this food been distributed in recent weeks, or has it been distributed?

A. In the last 2–3 weeks, UNICEF officials advised that some improvements in the situation have occurred, namely the ones I've mentioned—the approvals from Hanoi for barge charters up the Mekong, the approvals for the flights of Laotian aircraft into provincial capitals out of Phnom Penh.

They also report that there is a steady improvement in the movement of supplies out of Kompong Som to Phnom Penh. We hope these supplies then get to the provinces and to the Khmer, although I want to state that under the conditions that obtain within the country, neither the international officials nor we have any way to monitor distribution. We are continuing to ask that those organizations fulfill the requirements of our law and that we get reports which verify distribution.

I want to say again that they have indicated there are improvements that they deem important. They also have emphasized to me what I've already told you—that the famine has been temporarily checked. Again in saying that, I want to make it very clear that we do not have information covering important sectors of the country—the northeast; the southwest where the Pol Pot forces hold up in the Cardamom Mountains, particularly pockets in the hills and outlying regions in the north; and in institutions where children, the sick, the aged, and marginal groups have undoubtedly been bypassed with food supplies and are still undoubtedly suffering.

So when I say the famine is temporarily checked, it's based on the reports that I've indicated but also on an important proviso that there are large areas of the country we haven't seen. We are reasonably certain that there are still large groups suffering and certain also that famine is coming unless these relief efforts can be stepped up in the months ahead.

Q. The problem of supplies piling up in warehouses in Phnom Penh—is that a political problem; is that a logistical problem; is it a problem that they just don't have enough know-how to achieve that or track it or whatever?

A. That is not a distinction one can easily make between political and logis-

Thai-Kampuchea Border Situation

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JAN. 26, 1980[1]

The United States is concerned about recent Vietnamese military reconnaissance operations along the Thai-Kampuchean border, increasingly harsh Vietnamese propaganda attacking border area relief operations, and recent intelligence reports which point to possible Vietnamese military attacks on refugee concentrations along the Thai-Kampuchean border.

Vietnamese military activity in this area poses a potential threat to the security of Thailand. Any expansion of this military activity would constitute a threat to the peace, security, and stability of the entire region.

We welcome the strong expressions of concern already issued by Japan, the European Community, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada about the safety of the noncombatants on the border. Utmost care must be taken to assure that these people can return to their homes in Kampuchea.

We urge that all concerned governments continue to support efforts of international organizations, both at the border and in Kampuchea.

We also call upon the Governments of Vietnam and the Soviet Union, which supports Vietnam's military activity in Kampuchea, to refrain from any action that would threaten Thailand's security and integrity or endanger the well-being and safety of the noncombatants in the refugee concentrations along the border. More broadly, we urge them to seek a peaceful solution there, entailing the end of hostilities, withdrawal of all foreign troops, and creation of a genuinely independent and representative Khmer government at peace with all its neighbors.

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[1]Made available to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III. ■

CSCE and East-West Relations

by Matthew Nimetz

Statement before the U.S. congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on January 24, 1980. Mr. Nimetz is Counselor of the Department of State, Under Secretary-designate for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.[1]

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Commission to exchange views on the Helsinki Final Act and the CSCE process and to report to you on our preparations for the CSCE review meeting in Madrid. We appreciate the creative role of Chairman Fascell and the members of the commission, and we value the close working relationship with your staff. We will benefit increasingly from this collaboration as our Madrid preparations intensify.

As we meet, the world has entered on a dangerous and unpredictable period. Soviet aggression in Afghanistan has called into question fundamental principles of international conduct—principles upon which East-West stability has rested since World War II and which are fundamental to the Helsinki agreement. Indeed, the first basket of the Final Act is a virtual catalogue of principles violated by the Soviet invasion:

- Principle one: sovereign equality of nations;
- Principle two: refraining from the threat or use of force;
- Principle three: inviolability of frontiers;
- Principle four: territorial integrity of states;
- Principle six: nonintervention in internal affairs;
- Principle eight: equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

Afghanistan is not a party to the Helsinki agreement, but we must ask ourselves whether the Soviet Union, which feels free to violate such basic principles of conduct in Afghanistan, is not undercutting the basic norms of international conduct, embodied in the U.N. Charter, in a manner that threatens the peace and security of all regions of the world, including Europe.

Moreover, the human rights situation in the Soviet Union continues to give cause for concern. We had hoped that the year leading up to the Madrid meeting would produce movement to resolve long-standing cases of human rights spokesmen and prisoners of conscience. There have been a few positive developments. For example, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union reached high levels last year, although the numbers of applicants for emigration and of refusals also increased. However, there are indications that the number of Jews allowed to emigrate may now be decreasing, and we will continue to monitor this situation closely in coming months.

Lately has come word of the deplorable action of Soviet authorities regarding Dr. Andrei Sakharov, whose enormous contribution to science and to the cause of human rights is celebrated around the world. The fate of this Nobel Prize winner must be a cause of deepest concern to all free men and women. It is ironic that the Soviets should choose to take this harsh and unjustifiable action on the eve of the CSCE Scientific Forum in Hamburg, which has as its fundamental goal the encouragement of scientific inquiry and cooperation.

This latest act of official repression adds to a list of recent incidents which was already depressingly long. Three important figures in the Soviet Union—a human rights activist, Tatyana Velikanova; a Russian Orthodox priest, Father Gleb Yakunin; and a Baltic nationalist, Antanas Terleckas—were arrested on the same day at the beginning of November. In December, Victor Nikipelov, a human rights activist who had been particularly concerned with Soviet psychiatric practices, was arrested.

Two Ukrainian human rights figures, Yuri Litvin and Oles Bernik, were taken into custody and quickly sentenced to substantial terms in prison and labor camps for "anti-Soviet propaganda." We are concerned for the fate of Igor Guberman, editor of an unofficial journal of the situation of Jews in the Soviet Union, who was arrested in September. It is also deeply troubling that figures in the Soviet Helsinki monitors group—men like Orlov, Shcharanski, Rudenko, Petkus, Gajaukas—remain in prison, where some of them have been for many years. In Czechoslovakia, members of Charter 77—Dienstbier, Benda, Havel, and others—have also been imprisoned.

Given this discouraging record, one must assess why it is in our interest to persevere in CSCE. We have made this assessment and conclude that there are important ways in which CSCE continues to serve our interests and the interests of human rights.

For one, it has set a standard by which the actions of all participating states will henceforth be judged. We should not underestimate the importance of this fact. CSCE has made the human rights practices of our fellow signatories an object of legitimate concern and protest, heightening our awareness of our obligation to speak out and insuring that abuses of fundamental human rights will no longer go unremarked and unchallenged. We can hope that the steady pressure of world opinion, focused by CSCE on repressive practices, will gradually affect the actions of governments—first in marginal cases but eventually perhaps in more fundamental ways.

We should also be aware that CSCE has helped to break down, however slightly, the bloc-to-bloc configuration of European politics which for years prevented us from establishing lines of communication to many countries of Eastern Europe. The Final Act is an agreement between 35 sovereign states, without regard to political or military alignment. It has become a palpable and growing element in European politics, one which promotes discussion over confrontation and provides new opportunities for the countries of Eastern Europe to establish, albeit tentatively, their separate identities as independent nations. We are encouraged by signs that the Eastern Europeans value their CSCE relationship with us and by the progress which has been made—in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), for example—in resolving family reunification and emigration issues. By helping put our relations with these countries on a more normal basis, CSCE is perhaps a harbinger of the future Europe we all hope to build.

CSCE has other benefits. It represents a definitive recognition of the fact that the United States plays a central role in the future of Europe and provides us with a forum which includes all the European states (except Albania), the United States, and Canada, where we can meet to discuss political, economic, and humanitarian issues of common concern. In the area of security, for example, CSCE has established a means of creating a regime of confidence-building measures which has

the long-term potential for enhancing warning time of surprise attack and helping to stabilize the security situation in Europe. In the area of economic and environmental cooperation, the Treaty on Trans-boundary Air Pollution signed last November is a good example of an agreement made possible by the existence of CSCE and the Helsinki process. We hope in the future to use this process to help us find systematic solutions to issues like family reunification which are of central concern to us.

Finally, CSCE serves to remind the free nations of the West of the principles and values which bind them together and, in the end, are the source of their collective strength.

As we look forward to the Madrid meeting, we are conscious that the atmosphere of East-West relations has been gravely damaged by recent events. Nevertheless, the goals we have set for ourselves remain valid:

- To encourage substantive progress in human rights performance by Eastern countries before, during, and after the Madrid meeting;
- To insure a thorough review of implementation, especially of the humanitarian and human rights elements in the Final Act;
- To promote U.S. security and economic goals;
- To maintain a balance among the various baskets of CSCE and to insure that all subjects receive full attention and exposure.

We are, however, realistic. What is possible at Madrid will depend to a large extent on actions taken by others. To insure a useful and productive meeting at Madrid, we need action to resolve outstanding human rights cases like those of the Helsinki monitors and Charter 77 and an end to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. For our part, we will continue to insist on a thorough review of implementation, not only at Madrid but in our consultations with other signatories prior to Madrid.

In conclusion, I would like to mention briefly how we plan to continue our preparations in coming months. We plan to continue the series of bilateral CSCE consultations we have had with Eastern European countries and with the neutral and nonaligned. Members of the commission's staff will participate in these meetings as they have in past consultations. We plan an extensive series of meetings in Washington and around the country with interested groups to discuss Madrid preparations. We hope to reach as many people as we can, and we intend to take their comments seriously. We will continue our multilateral consultations in NATO and our cooperation with the commission and its staff. Our purpose is to develop not only an effective policy but one which reflects the legitimate concerns and the long-term goals of the American people.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Italian Prime Minister Visits U.S.

Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga of Italy made an official visit to the United States January 23–26, 1980. While in Washington (January 23–25), he met with President Carter and other government officials. Following is the joint press statement issued on January 25.[1]

At President Carter's invitation, the President of the Council of Ministers of Italy, Francesco Cossiga, paid an official visit to Washington January 24–25. The Italian Prime Minister is also visiting the United States in his capacity as President of the Council of Ministers of the European Community for the current 6-month term. The President offered a dinner at the White House in honor of Prime Minister Cossiga and had two meetings with him.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the exceptionally close relations between the two countries and stressed the solidarity existing between them; they also discussed a number of major international issues of common concern. These included the crises in Iran and Afghanistan, the relations between East and West, the situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the continuing efforts by both the United States and Italy to strengthen the Atlantic alliance, the international economic situation, the development of the European Economic Community—of which Italy holds at the moment the presidency—and a broad range of bilateral activities designed to intensify U.S.-Italian cooperation in all fields.

The President expressed his appreciation and that of the entire American people for Italy's assistance and support in connection with the international effort to secure the release of the American hostages held by Iran in

Prime Minister Cossiga and President Carter (White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)

of drought rural and nomadic people lose their crops, pasture land, and, consequently, their herds. The immediate effects can be starvation and death for thousands. Equally serious, as fodder disappears, herdsmen must forage further southward, thus desolating new belts of land.

It was a cyclical drought which caused the major disaster in 1968–73, resulting in immense economic losses; the disruption of the precarious balance among man, animals, and environment; and starvation. With the United States among the leaders, many countries, international bodies, and private organizations mounted relief efforts which reduced the human tragedy but did not reach the underlying problems. Initially, assistance was offered largely on a bilateral terms to countries affected, and they themselves attempted relatively little regional coordination.

Out of the crisis in the early 1970s came two positive developments. Prior to that time, the Sahelian states, even though sharing the same ecological conditions, shaped their development plans in isolation from each other and individually sought assistance to finance them as well as emergency requirements. Donors also failed to coordinate with each other.

The drought, however, illustrated dramatically the regionality of the Sahelian ecological disaster and emphasized the need for regional planning and solutions. Thus these countries formed the Permanent Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) to devise a Sahel development program, through which today they work together in a regional framework while international donors pool resources, avoiding competition and duplication. The program is focused on rural populations and the deprived in small urban areas. Decisions regarding project selection are made jointly by recipients and donors.

The United States has often taken the lead and is a major participant in both emergency and long-range Sahelian problems. U.S. help to the Sahel is based on a mix of humanitarianism and an honest desire to help these countries make economic progress (all, except one, are classified by the United Nations as economically "least developed"). U.S. contributions for the past 4 years are: 1976—$39.5 million, 1977—$45.9 million, 1978—$80.1 million, and 1979—$77.3 million (all exclusive of food aid). This is the largest U.S. aid program in Africa.

Major West African Oilfields

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Nigeria

Nigeria merits special attention, not as a contentious issue, but because of its unique position in Africa and its importance to the United States.

As seen from previous references, Nigeria has had a turbulent history since becoming independent in 1960—threatened disintegration of the original federation, three coups placing a series of military governments in power, and the Biafran secession attempt in 1967. For most of this period the country was beset by severe economic problems, corruption, mismanagement, and political wrangling. However, the great increase in oil income during the mid-1970s and the return in an orderly manner to civilian government (under a federal system much like that of the United States) in late 1979 have dramatically improved the prospects and status of this major country.

Nigeria's population numbered at the most recent count 79.8 million persons, with estimates going over 80 million. Nigeria has a GDP of $42.7 billion with a rising per capita figure of $522. Nigeria plays a powerful role in the United Nations, other international bodies, and African councils. It strongly supports regional economic cooperation, helps coordinate African positions on many issues (such as apartheid), and helps mediate African disputes.

The United States is the major foreign market for Nigeria's crude oil. Nigeria ranks second only to Saudi Arabia as the most important supplier of petroleum to the United States which buys over 1 million barrels a day of the highly desirable, light, low sulphur "sweet crude." With Nigeria's oil wealth, it is no longer necessary for the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) to assist it with major development grants or loans, but Nigeria does seek from the U.S. managerial and technical expertise to help make efficient use of its resources, foreign investment, and transfer of technology.

Probably as many as 20,000 Nigerians were studying in the United States in 1979. American private investment, exceeding $335 million (book value—net private direct investment as of 1977), is welcomed by Nigeria as a source of managerial talent and training.

Despite its impressive economic progress and political strides, this vast and complex country still faces problems. Even with its oil profits (over $10 billion annually and steadily increasing) the Federal Government of Nigeria is saddled with debts from previous regimes and demands for improvement in education, health, and other sectors of its infrastructure. The average Nigerian is clamoring for a greater share of the country's new-found wealth. Renewed challenges to the solidarity of the country are coming from minority groups and once-prominent political figures. Controversy, perhaps normal, is developing between newly elected President Shagari and the equally new bicameral Federal Legislature.

Many other African nations are watching with interest Nigeria's bold experiment in democracy and economic development. So, indeed, is the United States, which not only relies on Nigerian resources but looks to it as a strong, responsible voice in world councils.

Human Rights

With attention focused for so long on human rights violations in southern Africa, much of the world and Africans themselves paid relatively little attention to flagrant excesses in various other parts of the continent. Serious problems did develop in a number of newly independent sub-Saharan countries. The United States has shared international concern over resulting violations of human rights but is now encouraged by evidence that many African states are taking steps to restore and protect the rights of their citizens. As mentioned earlier, a number of despots have fallen, several countries have returned to civilian rule, and others have strengthened their commitment to the rule of law.

The OAU has passed a resolution calling for the drafting of a charter on human rights in Africa. The United Nations is studying the feasibility of creating an African human rights regional commission. Seminars and conferences on human rights matters have been held in Dar es Salaam, Butare, Dakar, Freetown, Cape Town, Khartoum, Kinshasa, and Lubumbashi.

Where human rights problems continue to exist, the United States seeks to induce improvements through the following means:

- Government-to-government communications;
- Meetings with opposition political figures, exiled victims of human rights abuses, human rights advocates, lawyers, journalists, and a wide cross section of citizens;
- Reexamination of U.S. assistance relationships;
- Exercising votes in multinational development banks;
- Support of human rights programs in international organizations; and
- Distancing the U.S. Government from abusive practices.

Communism

Communism, as espoused and supported by foreign Communist powers, has been a disruptive and often destructive force in sub-Saharan Africa for the past two decades. Initially the philosophy had an ideological appeal for the leaders of newly independent states, many of whom adopted Socialist forms of government. Later, however, various Communist powers—notably the U.S.S.R., China, and recently Cuba—began to exploit these fertile philosophical grounds, lingering anticolonialism, continuing racial discrimination, and intractable economic problems with escalating offers of advice, military assistance, involvement, and, in a few instances, domination.

Today, Communist influence, exerted through the presence of military personnel and economic technicians, threatens the future of several countries and the stability of various regions. U.S. interests are jeopardized, and concern is growing that Africa might become the stage for big power confrontation.

At the same time it should be noted that most African states are determined to maintain their hard-earned independence, believing, as several African leaders have remarked, "Having rid ourselves of one form of colonialism, we do not intend to subject ourselves to another." While making gains in some countries (Angola, Ethiopia) the Soviets in particular have lost ground in others (Ghana, Guinea, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, and Equatorial Guinea).

According to the most reliable estimates, there were over 41,000 Communist military personnel in sub-Saharan Africa in 1978. Of these, the largest numbers were 35,500 Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia and 3,815 from the

Q. There are a number of questions about different aspects of energy problems and our international relationships dealing therewith. What are the chances that the International Energy Agency (IEA) may be made, in the reasonably near future, into an effective consumers' cartel or consumers' alliance to oppose the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries?

A. My judgment is that the International Energy Agency will continue to operate generally as it is at the present time, and that is that it will serve as a body which can be called into action at such time as prices rise above the trigger point, when it will then become necessary for them—namely the 20 nations that participate in the IEA—to share the burden which is being thrust upon them. I believe it will adhere to that form rather than taking a different form.

Q. Many are concerned about the effects of the grain embargo on food producers and processors. The London *Economist* has argued that U.S. farmers or taxpayers are more likely to be hurt, possibly, than the Soviet Union. What are the economic consequences in the United States and how much are we hurting the Soviet Government through this embargo?

A. On the latter question, I think that the grain embargo on 17 million tons that will not be shipped by the United States is having an effect and will have an effect on the Soviet Union. I believe it will also have an effect on some of the countries which are dependent upon the Soviet Union in this area, so that I think that the grain embargo, in its combined action and effect, will be meaningful.

It is an action which requires sacrifice, but, as I have said, others are going to have to sacrifice and are sacrificing. This is necessary if we are going to take the steps to demonstrate our firmness and our resolve in light of the situation which faces us, which is, indeed, a critical situation.

Q. The Vietnamese have been creating a good deal of havoc in Kampuchea and elsewhere in the region. There is also the poignant question covered in a *New York Times Magazine* article yesterday on children of American servicemen who were left behind in Vietnam. How likely is it that we will be establishing diplomatic r[illegible]ons with Vietnam in the near future, diplomatic relations of some kind? And how ominous is it that the Vietnamese Army will continue to make significant gains in that region?

A. I think that it is unlikely that we will be establishing relations with Vietnam in the near future. At the outset of the Carter Administration, we indicated that we would be prepared to move in that direction should there be reciprocity on the other side.

First, we were met with demands from the Vietnamese for "reparations," as they called them. We said, under no circumstances would that be done, and that was a block which remained in the way of any progress until they withdrew that. At about the time they withdrew it, however, they embarked upon the program of pushing out into the sea tens of thousands of refugees—the "boat people." At the same time that they were doing this, they were preparing themselves for the invasion of Kampuchea.

We told them at that time that as long as these two actions on their part continued that we could not make progress on normalization. There has been some progress made in the area of the boat people; there has been a moratorium for a period of time on the boat people being pushed out of Vietnam. But insofar as Kampuchea is concerned, Vietnamese troops remain in Kampuchea and have not been withdrawn and, therefore, this remains an obstacle.

In the long run, we would like to normalize relationships, but we have to deal with these pressing issues, and these kinds of issues must be removed before we can come to that point.

Q. In the view of some, there is a greater threat to world stability posed by the instability that might result in Eastern Europe through the death of President Tito. Is the Soviet Union likely to exploit any crisis situation that might develop after Tito's death and seek to reverse the world balance of power?

A. The leadership in Yugoslavia is able, strong, resolved; and we have confidence that in a post-Tito period, they can lead their nation with strength and wisdom.

Insofar as we are concerned, we fully support their staunch position with respect to the importance of their independence, their sovereignty, and their territorial integrity.

Insofar as our own relations are concerned, our relations with Yugoslavia are good—indeed, I think they are deep and strong. I do not believe that in the post-Tito period that there is danger to Yugoslavia. It is a good, strong leadership, and they will be able to lead their country well and wisely.

Press release 52A of Mar. 4, 1980. ■

$787 Million Request for Economic and Security Assistance

Statements by Goler T. Butcher, Assistant Administrator for Africa of the Agency for International Development (AID), and Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 7, 1980.[1]

MRS. BUTCHER

I welcome the opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss AID's economic assistance program for Africa. I acknowledge with appreciation the support of this committee for our program in Africa.

For FY 1981 the Africa Bureau is requesting a total of $533.1 million; this includes $140 million in economic support funds ($90 million for southern Africa and $50 million for Sudan).

This compares with recent AID levels for Africa of $219 million in FY 1977 (which included $54 million in security supporting assistance); $329.7 million in FY 1978 (which included $110.7 million in security supporting assistance); $317.2 million in FY 1979 (which included $53 million for economic support funds, and $15 million for African refugees); and a planned FY 1980 program of $455.7 million (including $118 million for economic support funds).

In addition in FY 1981 we are planning PL 480 programs totaling $205 million. This compares with $169 million in FY 1979 and $142 million in FY 1978. Title III programs have been started in Sudan and are being developed for Senegal in FY 1980 and Somalia in FY 1981. We will be preparing food for development programs in other countries either through title III or title II of section 206 during the year.

While our AID levels for Africa have been increasing steadily in recent years, inflation both in the United States and Africa, and the addition of new country programs have offset much of the apparent increase in resources for the Africa program. Relative to the severe problems Africa faces in the 1980s, available development resources are extremely limited.

Africa's development problems, often due to factors beyond the control of national states, are complex and in many cases worsening. These problems, however, can be solved. The sub-Saharan portion of the continent has the potential for self-sustaining economic development and for an important economic role in the international community. Its markets and exports may now be modest in global terms, but in the coming two decades Africa's contribution can be significant and critical to a rapidly growing world demand for vital minerals—for oil as well as for raw materials and food supplies—in addition to providing investment opportunities and new markets.

Untapped Potential

I would like to discuss further the significance of Africa's untapped potential.

With world food shortages projected to reach near 100 million tons by 1995, Africa possesses sufficient underutilized land and water resources to feed its growing population and eventually to be a net exporter of food. In many areas only 10% of the arable land is under cultivation and major irrigation resources go undeveloped.

In an increasingly energy deficient world, the greatest undeveloped hydroenergy capacity is in Africa. Today 80% of the population's energy needs are satisfied by wood burning, a factor which contributes significantly to desertification. Over time, combination efforts in reforestation, hydropower, and coal development can reduce the heavy economic vulnerability Africa faces from current reliance on cutting forests and costly imported energy and could release surplus energy for world consumption.

In the past, illiteracy and unusually difficult health conditions have limited the full utilization of Africa's significant human resources. Today, literacy is expanding significantly, and health conditions are improving. The peoples of Africa have developed great skill in locally adapted agricultural techniques. If supplemented by outside technology, productivity can be considerably enlarged.

Sub-Sahara Africa is, minerally speaking, the most unexplored of the world's accessible regions. There are known mineral resources yet to be exploited. There is great promise of new mineral wealth. The United States will become increasingly dependent on regular supplies of Africa's petroleum and is already importing other strategic minerals, such as vanadium, chrome, manganese, and uranium. The growing interdependence between Africa and the United States is only beginning to be felt.

The Third World, specifically Africa, was the fastest growing market for U.S. exports in the 1970s. We now sell more goods to the developing world than we do to Europe and Japan. One out of nine industrial jobs in the United States today is due to exports to the Third World. These trends, mutually beneficial to both Africa and the United States, can show continuous growth only if economic stagnation can be avoided and minimum acceptable levels of development progress sustained.

Key Problems

There are, however, serious and often alarming problems which, in aggregate, could severely inhibit Africa's potential for economic growth and social progress.

We have highlighted, in the Africa overview of the congressional presentation, the most serious of these trends and their implications. In this regard, we believe that we must take the necessary steps in succeeding years; first, to concentrate our efforts in the five most serious problem areas; second, to encourage much greater intra-African development cooperation; and third, to redouble our collaboration efforts with other Western and OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] donors and international organizations.

Regarding the key problems, we will in FY 1981 begin more systematically to harmonize resources from all the development assistance accounts, economic support funds, and PL 480 to have a greater impact on five core constraints in Africa.

The highest priority will be given to reversing the sub-Sahara's declining per capita food productivity. While overall food production has increased, it has fallen behind population growth. We will be working with international groups and other donors in coming months to reevaluate past strategies and, where appropriate, to propose new directions. We have highlighted in the overview some of the important actions that must be taken.

An employment strategy must be developed to create critically needed

Political and Economic Interests in Africa

Addresses by Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., Administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID), and Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, on December 13, 1979, in Detroit before a regional foreign policy conference on Africa cosponsored by the Department of State and the Economic Club of Detroit; more than 35 other organizations in the Detroit area—representing business, organized labor, and educational, ethnic, civic, and professional groups—also cooperated in the conference program.

MR. BENNET

We are about to enter the last two decades of the 20th century. Looking back, the last two decades have been tumultuous ones for sub-Sahara Africa.

Today there are 46 independent states; in 1955 there were only two. In the past two decades political, social, cultural, and economic changes of enormous magnitude have swept across the continent. Change came so fast that in the 1960s and early 1970s, U.S. policymakers found forces racing ahead of their ability to adjust to the unfolding of African nationalism and the breakdown of colonial empires. Although Africa had emerged as an important global factor in the early 1970s, U.S. policy still tended to view Africa as weak and economically and politically unimportant. U.S.-Africa trade was minute, and our economic assistance to Africa decidedly token—only 6% of our worldwide totals. U.S. policy held that Africans should find their own answers to worsening problems.

Since 1976 a more active and sensitive U.S.-Africa policy has emerged. In contrast to the 1960s and early 1970s when policy was largely a series of reactions to events, today we see the United States taking a positive and activist role in searching for peaceful solutions to conflicts that persist in several corners of Africa. Relations with most African states have improved markedly. U.S. economic assistance to Africa had risen to $443 million in FY 1979, a doubling of 1975 levels. This still represents only 9% of our total worldwide assistance. However, our fastest growing economic aid program today is in Africa.

As our own policy has been maturing, we have seen a maturing of African nationalism which permits closer cooperation. In the immediate postcolonial period, it was natural for African leaders to concentrate on the politics of independence, and we were sometimes viewed as adversaries-by-association with excolonial masters.

Now, however, African leaders must turn time and more attention to economic and social development. Their people are pressing hard for results. We are able to provide some of that help, and most African governments are becoming more expert as well at tapping foreign private investment in ways compatible with their own natural development goals.

Today African leaders are committed to economic and social development, to gaining political and economic equality among the nations of the world, to limiting, where possible, foreign or outside meddling in African affairs, and to ending once and for all minority rule where it stubbornly resists inevitable change. The United States today supports those goals.

. . . it costs more to move a bushel of grain 700 miles into the interior of any African country than it does to ship it 7,000 miles from New Orleans.

Moreover, we realize that the long-term success of U.S.-African policy depends on the not-too-distant realization of African development aspirations. This is where we confront the most difficult challenge to the United States' Africa policy of the 1980s and 1990s. Just when U.S. policy has caught up with Africa's vision of itself, serious and unmet development needs and economic deterioration portend new crises and instability.

Challenges Facing Africa

In 1978, the average per capita GNP growth for all non-oil-producing African states was near zero. There are indications that the situation in 1979 is worse. Africa is projected to fall much farther behind the rest of the developing world during the next 10 years.

Consider these trends, their potential aggregate impact on Africa, and the challenge they present for U.S. policy in the near future.

First, per capita food production in Africa is now declining by 1.4% annually. During the period 1960–79, there has been no significant shift from Africa's highly vulnerable and predominantly subsistence agriculture. Average per hectare production in Africa lags far behind other developing regions. The increased production that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s came through expanding the area under cultivation rather than through increased yield. International research groups now estimate a food grain deficit in Africa of 23 million tons in 1990. Nigeria *alone* will then have to import as much grain as India. Even assuming sufficient world supplies, balance-of-payments trends suggest that most African nations will have insufficient foreign exchange to finance the food imports they require.

Second, desertification, deforestation, and erosion are threatening the essential agriculture resource base of the majority of the continent's countries. LANDSAT satellite photos show that 52% of Africa's land is now desert or subject to serious desertification. The capacity to produce food and meet basic human needs could be permanently and irreversibly damaged if this land degradation continues.

Third, population and urbanization growth rates, at 2.65% and 9.5% respectively, are the highest in the world. We can anticipate accelerating movements of migrant workers and refugees that will further aggravate food shortages and unemployment, possibly leading to serious social conflict.

Fourth, despite substantial progress in eradicating selected communicable diseases, the majority of Africa's population still has no access to basic health services. The presence of some debilitating disease in most of the African adult population is a predominant factor in the low productivity of labor. Life expectancy averages 45 years in Africa compared with 53 years in the developing world overall and 72 years in the United States.

Fifth, the World Bank forecasts a real per capita growth of less than 1% in Africa during the 1980s.

Sixth, accelerating rates of inflation and deteriorating terms of trade, fueled largely by recent energy price

increases, will further undermine Africa's fragile economies. An estimated debt service burden in 1990 of 27.6% of export earnings, more than any other geographic region, will seriously reduce Africa's capacity to import food and required capital resources.

Seventh, transportation systems are poor, developed largely for extractive industries with little regard for internal needs and domestic populations. Africa ranks last of all the continents in transport systems. The limited capacity that does exist is so expensive that it discourages investment and raises prices. For instance, it costs more to move a bushel of grain 700 miles into the interior of any African country than it does to ship it 7,000 miles from New Orleans.

In summary, for 70% of the African countries, per capita growth was *lower* during the 1970s than in the previous decade. This group was, in other words, *underdeveloping*. Unless reversed, the trends I have cited could turn today's development plans into nothing more than tomorrow's short-term, crisis-oriented relief programs.

Importance of Development to U.S. Interests

With such serious economic problems in Africa, not to mention here at home, one might legitimately ask: Is there anything we can do to help, even if we want to? Is Africa's development really that important to U.S. interests? The answers are clearly yes, for several reasons.

First, with ever-increasing global interdependence during the 1980s and 1990s, the United States will become considerably *more* dependent on regular, dependable supplies of Africa's natural resources. The region, the most unexplored of the continents, holds great promise of mineral and petroleum wealth. Today more than 25% of our imported petroleum comes from sub-Sahara Africa, five times what we used to import from Iran.

Several of the poorest African countries are only now discovering or beginning to develop important deposits of the strategic minerals uranium, manganese, vanadium, cobalt, chrome, titanium, and bauxite. These are essential to us for the production of high-grade metals for jet engines, for aircraft, and for defense and nuclear energy uses, and the earnings they represent are just as essential to the future prosperity of Africa.

Second, despite the discouraging economic and environmental trends, Africa, with untapped major river basins and extensive land, does have the physical potential to produce surplus food grains late in this century, when global deficiencies are projected to reach new records. Africa has the potential for increasing annual production of food grains by 16 million tons from rain-fed agriculture and 9 million from irrigated land. This would represent a 47% increase over the approximately 55 million tons of cereal produced in 1979. In addition, from another energy standpoint, most of the world's undeveloped hydroelectric power is in Africa.

Third, we are seeing today important and encouraging political transitions in Africa. Nigeria and Ghana have recently moved from military to civilian rule. Upper Volta and Mali are moving in similar directions. A peaceful settlement in Zimbabwe may now be a reality. These transitions are encouraging to all who believe more strength lies in democracy than in totalitarianism. These changes should mean more human rights and more human energies liberated for the task of development. They also make it all the more imperative that the African people see some tangible benefits of development progress.

Fourth, we should not forget that it was the rapidly rising U.S. exports to the developing world that played a key role in pulling the U.S. economy out of the 1973 recession. Africa is potentially a very important part of that market, depending on the continent's growth and capacity to import.

Moreover, with one-third of the independent nations of the world being African, and all of them voting members of the United Nations, Africa plays a major role in the ongoing North-South dialogue that is vital to our future welfare as well as to Africa's.

But clear interests do not constitute a policy. A policy expressed in material terms is narrow, short-sighted, and too much like the colonialism and paternalism that held Africa back for years.

A U.S.-Africa policy for the 1980s and 1990s must offer much more. It must start out with a shared hope for the future of the continent which is painfully far behind the rest of the world in unlocking its enormous human and physical potential. It must concretely support African aspirations in the drive for racial justice and economic and social development. An affirmative U.S.-Africa policy for the 1980s and 1990s must state with clarity that we, the most developed of the world's nations, will not allow Africa's alarming economic and environmental decline to continue, because it portends a loss of human potential and political instability that are contrary to both U.S. and African interests.

Our country has the wealth and the know-how in both its public and private sectors to help Africa move forward.

Today more than 25% of our imported petroleum comes from sub-Sahara Africa, five times what we used to import from Iran.

We know it, the Africans know it, and the world knows it.

Some say African development will take many decades, because they are so far behind. I say we no longer have the luxury of such patience. As we look back at the turn of the century, the test of the realism and effectiveness of our Africa policy in the 1980s and 1990s will certainly be whether we had the capacity to craft, in full partnership with Africa and with other donors, comprehensive solutions that will reverse the decline in Africa's development progress.

With this in mind, what new initiatives can be undertaken? Ideas will emerge from your deliberations here today particularly in the individual workshops on "African Economic Prospects" and on "U.S. Strategic Interest and Africa's International Role." We look forward to studying the results of your deliberations.

There are some important areas in which African nations can help themselves substantially.

There is room in some countries for cautious decentralization and greater local initiative in the development process. A strong central authority may have been necessary in the first stage of nationbuilding but can become a dead end if a few ministries attempt to manage all aspects of the development process. The greatest single development resource in any country is the liberated energies of its people.

One factor that is particularly important in liberating these energies is seeing that farmers receive economic prices for their labor. We frequently see farm prices held down artificially in

tical problems, especially when operating from outside the country.

The private voluntary organizations, U.N. agencies and the ICRC operating in Phnom Penh feel strongly that the problems are what they would call "structural;" that is, the lack of administrative competence, the lack of communications, the lack of transportation, the lack of roads, and so forth.

Other observers feel that the problems go beyond that; that if it's possible to supply 200,000 Vietnamese troops, it ought to be possible to supply food to people. And those observers would ask why it has not been possible to move some of the more than 40,000 tons that have been delivered into the country before this date.

Again, the answer has been that supplies have been moved out of Kompong Som and out of Phnom Penh, but those supplies were there before the international relief effort supplies arrived; that the Phnom Penh authorities were pursuing the principle of "first in time, first in right," and so they distributed Russian corn rather than the UNICEF and ICRC supplies. There are, in short, a lot of explanations.

Another explanation is that, in fact, the U.N. supplies delivered through ICRC and UNICEF have made a major impact on the total hoarding psychology of a government that lacked any strategic reserve for the period to come. It has been obvious for a long time that the coming months would be the worst period of all because the agricultural production system is shattered. There are no substantial prospects for recovery in agricultural production before 1981. The last crop was perhaps 10–15% of normal. And so some have argued that the supplies delivered by international agencies have constituted a kind of strategic reserve for the lean times ahead.

Whatever the facts, the supplies haven't been distributed up to now. There is now evidence that some supplies are being moved out of Kompong Som and out of Phnom Penh. We hope, and the international agencies believe, that those supplies are reaching people and that increasing amounts will move out of this blockage in the weeks ahead.

Q. From your 2-week trip, which of these different explanations do you subscribe to? I mean what is your impression as to why the delays?

A. I would find it easy to subscribe to the theory that the delays are caused by different factors at different times. It would seem to me that there has been a clear lack of logistical competence, a clear lack of administrative structure, and a clear lack of determination to get the food to the people.

Q. How many international refugee relief workers are now in Kampuchea, and what is the status of the hundreds of trucks that have now been provided by various sides? And is the distribution going beyond the Phnom Penh area—is it now, in any sense, fanning out from Phnom Penh to the rest of the country?

A. Let me remind you that I did not go into Kampuchea; that I have sought to give you a balanced view of the situation as it was reported to me by UNICEF officials with whom we met in Bangkok, who had come from Phnom Penh, and by other officials and travelers—including refugees—who have been recently in Kampuchea. I do not speak from personal observation within the country.

There are about five or six UNICEF officials operating in Phnom Penh. They have no opportunity, with that small a complement, to monitor movements out of Phnom Penh. They are doing their best to get the goods from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh, where the basic transportation system of the country is centered.

Routes 5 and 6 around the Tonle Sap, the Great Lake, originate at that point, so there are very few officials there.

I might add a point concerning the threat of renewed famine as against the temporary improvements that we've been able to make through these relief efforts. One of the things that has not happened, and which represents a clear, political issue rather than a logistical issue, is the improvement in the medical situation. There has been no willingness to allow international medical assistance, with some very limited exceptions. That is a matter, I think, of great and increasing concern.

Q. Do they have the adequate trucks now to distribute the food, and are they allowing distribution outside of the Phnom Penh area?

A. I'm advised by the UNICEF officials that there are now 400–500 trucks within the country; however, not all of them are operational because there is a very limited training program underway for drivers. There are 50 trucks a day moving supplies from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh, which carry about 250 tons. A lot of those trucks are not yet in service along the principal supply routes from the major harbor to the major distribution points.

There are 800 tons a week going by train, as of most recent information, from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh. That would mean, according to UNICEF, that they have improved their capacity to move goods out of Kompong Som—we're talking about relief goods now, both the joint ICRC/UNICEF program and the voluntary agencies. They think they have the capacity now for about 11,000 tons per month.

The target is 30,000 tons per month moving into the country to meet the food needs of the Kampuchean population. The Phnom Penh port itself has a substantially greater relief capacity right now—about 20,000 tons per month. If they can keep those supplies moving and we can sustain the program of moving them into the country, they will gradually develop the capacity to make the logistical connections that are necessary to reach the people.

Q. I'm perplexed by several things here. Last October, when Father Hesburgh [Theodore M. Hesburgh, chairman of a White House meeting on refugees] put together a group to make an appeal and Dick Clark [Ambassador Palmieri's predecessor] was providing him with some of the data that he was using, we were told that a large proportion of the people who were still surviving in Kampuchea were going to die within the next few months unless the relief effort could get up to that level of 30,000 tons a month.

Now you seem to be suggesting that it has not gotten up to that level, and yet you talk about a famine being temporarily checked in Kampuchea. You also talk about the inability to get to some areas to really be sure of what is happening. You talk about the inability of the five or six UNICEF people in Phnom Penh to know exactly where the food is going once they've put it in the warehouses in Phnom Penh.

Were the worst fears of last October exaggerated, or is our hope now that not too many people are dying is exaggerated? There seems to be some inconsistency here in the picture we've been given in the past and the picture you're painting today, and I don't understand it.

A. It's not hard to understand. The thing that would be hard to understand is if it would be perfectly consistent. The information is itself difficult to ob-

tain and difficult to verify. There are no statistics; there are no communications to speak of within this country.

What we do know is that as of September, we had the prospects of a virtual holocaust within Kampuchea. As of January, some 4 months later, it is possible to say that there have been, undoubtedly, thousands and thousands of deaths by malnutrition and starvation during the past year within that country. On the other hand, the relief efforts I've mentioned have come up to speed particularly in the border operation. I think we can say that that border operation may have saved a million Khmer lives in the past several months, not only by directly feeding several hundred thousand people in the border concentrations and in the Khmer holding centers but also by providing food that was taken into western Kampuchea. So both things are true. There has been great suffering; there remains great malnutrition.

I hope I have not misled you by saying the famine conditions were temporarily checked. There remains very serious malnutrition. There undoubtedly remain pockets—and they may be very substantial—of people in outlying regions who are still starving.

When I say the famine has been temporarily checked, I am giving you the characterization of experts in UNICEF and ICRC, and Sir Robert Jackson, the new U.N. coordinator, who have used those terms.

I don't think that the information was at all exaggerated that you got a few months ago. I think that I'm not exaggerating now when I tell you what I have said about the threat of a new famine, and I'm not sure I see the inconsistency. This was, in fact, one of the fastest buildups of an international relief effort, comprising not only food on the borders but water trucked in—one of the biggest water supply operations that has ever been mounted. Indeed it's been so big, it has about ruined the roads in that part of the area of Thailand.

In medicine, we now have several hundred medical people on the Thai border. This medical operation has played the major role in changing that picture. What I'm trying to say is that by checking it, we have not removed the problem.

Q. Nobody knows for sure, but there are estimates that the population of Kampuchea is only 3 million. If you are feeding 1 million on the border and planned distribution within the country has only met one-third of its goal and, therefore, reaching another 1 million people, two-thirds of the population are being reached. Do the remaining 1 million constitute the pockets you're talking about?

A. I think you're going to have trouble making the numbers add because we have trouble making the numbers add. For one thing, as I mentioned, there have been shipments of Russian grains which have been distributed. Undoubtedly those shipments have played a role.

For another reason, there has been the recent November-December harvest which, while it won't last another month, has played an important role in checking the famine.

Another thing that goes to the question, and that is perhaps the grimmest consideration, is that those people who were strong enough to get to the border or who had friends or family who were strong enough to get to the border and get back to them have had a higher survival rate than other people within western Kampuchea.

We really don't know how many people have died there, so when I say the famine is temporarily checked, I certainly am not commenting on the mortality rate of the last few months from malnutrition within Kampuchea. I hope that's clear, that there could have been and undoubtedly was a very real human tragedy expressed in terms of lives lost. It may be that that tragedy still continues, just in terms of the permanent damage that's been done by malnutrition, to a whole generation of Khmer.

Q. About 6 weeks or 2 months ago, officials here were suggesting that some of this food might be going to the wrong people, that we had no way of knowing whether it was going to the Vietnamese Army. Do you have a better grip on that subject now? Is this still the fear of the Administration here?

A. Again, my sense would be that it would be strange if some part of it were not going in the wrong direction, because there is such a substantial effort being made to move food to the border in order to get that food moving into the country.

On the other hand, the international organizations assure us—and we have made the concern very plain to them—that they have no evidence of deliberate diversion. On the other hand, they would say just what I have said, that in the real world, there may well be diversions. There may also be limitations to what they have the ability to inspect. I told you that they don't have any monitoring facilities. But I conclude from the information given by the international authorities that the food that is going into this relief program and, in the main, is reaching the people for whom it is intended. I want to be very clear on that, because I think that is what has checked the famine.

Q. Is there any sign of any movement by Hanoi toward allowing the controlled departure of people as seemed to have been agreed in Geneva last July?

A. There have been continuing conversations on that point. I myself met with the Vietnamese charge d'affaires in Bangkok, along with U.S. Ambassador Abramowitz. We asked again for the response that we need to continue the discussions. That response consists of the information concerning the relationship of the people on their list to either our government through past employment or to relatives in the United States. With that information, we have offered to use their list and to proceed on the basis indicated earlier, namely, to interview people at the airport in Ho Chi Minh Ville and to take them out and to make the program work. The charge listened with courtesy and interest, and we await the response of his government with interest.

Q. How long do you think it would be before these refugee camps are ever emptied, if ever possible, and do you think the flow of refugees into the United States will be speeded up?

A. The answer to the second question is that the process is being speeded up, particularly with respect to those people who have been there longest. We have, I think, made a very important improvement in the processing in Thailand. We will be taking well over 7,000 people a month out of Thailand. The whole worldwide resettlement effort now, from a processing standpoint, is in high gear. It takes time to put a management system in place, but this one is now in place; it is now working both in respect of the operation of the camps, the transit processing, and, hopefully, the processing centers where we will be working on bringing orientation programs to the refugees before they depart for third countries.

defiance of the universally accepted standards of international law.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the principle of civilized behavior and rule of law is at stake. They believe that the continued detention, bent on blackmail, of American diplomatic personnel puts Iran in conflict not merely with the United States but with the entire world community. The President and the Prime Minister further agreed that all the hostages must be released unharmed. To this effect, they concur in the need for all appropriate means to convince the Iranian authorities to end the illegal captivity of U.S. citizens.

The two leaders discussed the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and agreed that this unacceptable violation of the sovereignty and independence of a previously nonaligned state, of international law, and of the U.N. Charter constitutes a grave threat to the peace not only of a vital region but of the entire world. They noted the international recognition of this threat—as expressed by a very large number of countries, including all the European Community states—in the U.N. General Assembly vote overwhelmingly condemning the Soviet action in Afghanistan. The two leaders firmly reiterated their demand that all Soviet troops be withdrawn from Afghanistan. The President and the Prime Minister expressed their determination to pursue, with like-minded nations, a series of coordinated actions to make very clear to the Soviet Union that it will not be allowed to commit such aggression with impunity.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and agreed to press forward on the Camp David accords and on the search for a comprehensive settlement, recognizing the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of each country of the area and their rights to live within established and secure borders and taking into account the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

The President and the Prime Minister also discussed Atlantic security issues and expressed their satisfaction with the recent NATO decision to modernize the alliance's long-range theatre nuclear forces, in conjunction with the offer to Warsaw Pact countries to negotiate a balanced reduction of such weapons. They noted and they agreed that efforts to control and verify strategic nuclear weapons in the interest of world peace should not be abandoned.

The President and the Prime Minister also reviewed the difficulties of the present economic situation and agreed to cooperate closely in the efforts to reach common solutions to cope with them. They discussed the plans for the Venice economic summit, which Italy will host in June, with particular emphasis on pursuing effective policies on macroeconomics, energy, trade and monetary questions, as well as new initiatives for developing the North-South dialogue to which both sides attribute great importance.

In emphasizing his solidarity with the Prime Minister and with the Italian people in the fight against terrorism, the President expressed admiration for the Prime Minister's leadership and his commitment to democratic tradition. He further expressed his appreciation for the efforts made by the Italian Government to cope with the difficult economic situation, in order to achieve a greater stability and solve the most pressing problem of our time, the shortage of energy, and assure the necessary rate of economic growth.

To further the close bilateral relationship between the United States and Italy and enhance democratic ties on both sides of the Atlantic, the two leaders agreed to intensify cooperation in a variety of fields. Concrete steps in support of such cooperation will encompass the visit of a high-level investment mission to Italy for the purpose of expanding American investment in southern Italy; increased bilateral collaboration in the fields of energy research and development; a comprehensive program in agriculture which will help make Italy more self-sufficient in meat production and enlarge U.S. feed grain exports; expanded cultural and educational exchange activity between Italy and the United States, including instructional television for the reciprocal teaching of each country's language; and the prevention of drug abuse.

The President told the Prime Minister he looked forward with particular pleasure to the visit he will be making to Rome in June and the continuation of his bilateral talks with the Italian leadership directly preceding the Venice economic summit. ■

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980, which also carries the texts of President Carter's and Prime Minister Cossiga's remarks made at the welcoming ceremony on Jan. 24 and their dinner toasts that evening.

U.S. Withdraws From Summer Olympics

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, FEB. 20, 1980[1]

On January 20, the President wrote to President Kane of the U.S. Olympic Committee to urge the committee to propose to the International Olympic Committee that the 1980 summer games in Moscow be transferred, postponed, or cancelled if Soviet forces were not fully withdrawn from Afghanistan within a month.[2] The President also urged that if these proposals were not adopted, the U.S. Committee should not send a team to the Moscow games. This position has been overwhelmingly supported by the U.S. Congress and the American people.

On February 12, the International Olympic Committee announced it would adhere to its plans to conduct the games in Moscow. On February 14, President Kane of the U.S. Olympic Committee issued a statement saying the U.S. Olympic Committee would, of course, accept any decision the President makes as to whether a team should be sent to Moscow.

A month has now expired, and Soviet forces have not even begun to withdraw from Afghanistan. The President has, therefore, advised the U.S. Olympic Committee that his decision remains unchanged and that we should not send a team to Moscow. The President thanked the committee for its earnest and patriotic efforts to present the case for transferring, postponing, or canceling the games and asked it to take prompt action to formalize its acceptance of his decision.

The U.S. Olympic Committee depends for its funds on the generosity of American citizens and American business. Even though no U.S. team is sent to Moscow, the committee carries on many other important and worthwhile activities to support athletic excellence in this country. The President urges all American citizens to continue their financial and moral support of the committee.

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 25, 1980.
[2] For text of the letter, see BULLETIN of Mar. 1980, p. 50. ■

Relations With Islamic Nations

by President Carter

Statement made at the beginning of his meeting in the White House with representatives of faculties in Islamic studies from Washington, D.C., area universities on February 7, 1980.[1]

The history of Islam is very long compared to that of the United States. Islam is celebrating the first year of its 15th century. As an independent nation, we have only just entered our third. But from the beginning, the United States has enjoyed close and valued ties with the Muslim world.

A Muslim state, Morocco, was the first to recognize our independence. Our kaleidoscopic population includes a vigorous Islamic community. Many scholars from the Muslim world pursue their studies here. Centers for Islamic and Middle Eastern studies—many of which you represent—have grown up in universities all over America.

I have been struck, personally and in my experience as President, by the human and moral values which Americans as a people share with Islam. We share, first and foremost, a deep faith in the one Supreme Being. We are all commanded by Him to faith, compassion, and justice. We have a common respect and reverence for law. Despite the strains of the modern age, we continue to place special importance on the family and the home. And we share a belief that hospitality is a virtue and that the host, whether a nation or an individual, should behave with generosity and honor toward guests.

On the basis of both values and interests, the natural relationship between Islam and the United States is one of friendship. I affirm that friendship, both as a reality and as a goal—just as I totally reject any attempt to make moral and spiritual beliefs a barrier to understanding, rather than the bridge they can and should be.

I am determined to strengthen, not weaken, the longstanding and valued bonds of friendship and cooperation between the United States and many Muslim nations. We will lend our support to any nation working for peace and justice and to resist external domination. We will continue our efforts to help resolve peaceably—and with justice—the international disputes, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, which affect the Muslim world.

It is with profound revulsion that the world now witnesses the rejection of these principles of understanding and respect on the part of the Soviet Union. Today, in a Muslim country, Russian troops are making war against a people whose dedication to independence is as fierce as their faith.

In a time of grave danger and upheaval, I want to reaffirm what I said a few weeks ago: We have the deepest respect and reverence for Islam and all who share the faith of Islam.

Of course there is indignation among Americans today over events in one Islamic country. I share that indignation. But I can assure you that this just anger will not be twisted into a false resentment against Islam or its faithful. I say that with confidence, because a respect for religious faith is so deeply ingrained in the character of the American people.

We continue to seek the closest possible political, economic, and cultural ties with the Islamic nations and with Muslims throughout the world. That has not changed, and it will not change.

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[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 11, 1980. ■

U.N. Commission of Inquiry Established

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, FEB. 20, 1980[1]

Secretary General Waldheim has announced the establishment of a commission of inquiry to go to Iran to hear Iran's grievances and to allow an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the United States. He has stated that the commission will speak with each of our people.

Both the United States and Iran have concurred in the establishment of the commission, as proposed by the Secretary General, in mutually acceptable, official responses to him.

In concurring, the United States has taken note of the Secretary General's statement that the commission will undertake a factfinding mission. It will not be a tribunal. The United States understands that the commission will hear the grievances of both sides and will report to the Secretary General.

The American people are deeply aggrieved that Iran, after guaranteeing the protection of our people, has taken them hostage and held them in intolerable conditions for 108 days. The United States has no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran, but it does insist on the prompt return of the 53 Americans now illegally held in Tehran.

The United States has also made clear its position that the meeting of the commission with our people must be consistent with international law and that the hostages must, under no circumstances, be subjected to interrogation. It is vital, however, for the commission to determine that they are all present and to assess their condition.

We hope that the commission will, as the Secretary General has said, achieve an early resolution of the crisis between our two countries, which requires the release of the hostages.

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[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 25, 1980. ■

Iran Chronology, February 1980

February 2

Iranian militants, fearing a political compromise between Iran and the U.S. to secure release of the hostages, call for mass demonstrations of solidarity.

February 3

Militants cancel march to prevent it from coinciding with the unofficial inaugural speech to be given by President-elect Bani-Sadr.

Bani-Sadr is interviewed on ABC-TV "Issues and Answers."

February 4

Khomeini formally installs Bani-Sadr as first President of the Iranian Republic.

Khomeini, for the first time, condemns Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and pledges "unconditional support" for Moslem insurgents.

February 6

U.S. delays imposing formal economic sanctions against Iran to avoid upsetting possible chances for settling the crisis.

Panama's Foreign Minister, Carlos Ozones, states that the deposed Shah could not leave Panama. Other officials say that the Shah will not be extradited.

The Revolutionary Council announces that the first round of parliamentary elec-

Sov Union and East Germany
[illegible]rily in seven countries.

[illegible]ommunist country technical ex-
pert were estimated at 37,225, of
who 18,615 were Cuban, 10,970
Chi se, and 7,640 from the Soviet
Unio and Eastern Europe, most of
who are more widely dispersed
thro hout the continent than military
per nel.

[illegible] the face of Communist initia-
[illegible] the United States has continued
to bu d relationships which appear to
serv overall the best interests of both
th rican nations and the West. The
[illegible] of this general approach (cited
ear r) is to promote:

[illegible]esolution of those African
prob ns which threaten the peace and
prov e opportunities for Communist
expl ation;

• Constructive participation of Af-
rica nations in international fora; and

• Peaceful economic development
of th se nations.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The United States endeavors to help
Afri n countries in their sometimes
su sful and sometimes frustrated
effor to deal with their difficult eco-
nom problems. In doing so, American
moti es are a mix of altruism and
prag atism. In either case they reflect
a hi degree of interdependence be-
tw Africa and America. U.S. action
are ased on the following consid-
e ns.

• Americans have a genuine hu-
man arian interest in helping African
co ies meet the basic needs of their
pe le—proper nutrition, good health,
av ability of proper water, and the
ab y to achieve a decent standard of
livi .

Achievement of African prosper-
it important because the United
stat relies increasingly on the de-
vel ng world as a market for its
exp ts.

The United States needs African
mine ls and raw materials.

• A good economic relationship
with Africa can provide the foundation
for good political relationship. It is
impo tant that the United States iden-
tif th the basic development aspira-
tion of Africans.

Communist Military Personnel in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1978[1]

Country	TOTAL	U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe[2]	Cuba[3]	China
Angola	20,300	1,300	19,000	—
Equatorial Guinea	290	40	150	100
Ethiopia	17,900	1,400	16,500	—
Guinea	330	100	200	30
Guinea-Bissau	205	65	140	—
Mali	195	180	—	15
Mozambique	1,130	230	800	100
Other	1,330	500	485	345
TOTAL	**41,580**	**3,815**	**37,275**	**590**

[1]Number of persons present for a period of 1 month or more during 1978. Rounded to the nearest 5.
[2]Mainly Soviets. Among Eastern Europeans, most are believed to be East Germans.
[3]Includes troops.

Communist Economic Technicians in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1978[1]

Country	TOTAL	U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe[2]	Cuba	China
Angola	9,510	1,400	8,500	10
Ethiopia	1,400	650	500	250
Gabon	75	10	—	65
Gambia	75	—	—	75
Ghana	175	95	—	80
Guinea	1,035	700	35	300
Guinea-Bissau	405	265	85	55
Kenya	30	25	—	5
Liberia	210	10	—	200
Madagascar	200	—	—	200
Mali	1,025	475	—	550
Mauritius	15	—	—	15
Mozambique	1,270	750	400	120
Niger	160	10	—	150
Nigeria	1,750	1,625	—	125
Rwanda	60	10	—	50
Sao Tome and Principe	260	20	140	100
Senegal	500	100	—	400
Sierra Leone	310	10	—	300
Somalia	3,050	50	—	3,000
Sudan	775	125	–	650
Tanzania	1,365	165	200	1,000
Zambia	5,645	125	20	5,500
Others	7,525	1,020	1,090	5,415
TOTAL	**37,225**	**7,640**	**18,615**	**10,970**

[1]Number of persons present for a period of 1 month or more during 1978. Rounded to nearest 5.
[2]More than half are Soviets; nearly 1,000 are believed to be East Germans.

The United States endeavors to help Africans achieve national and regional goals, while at the same time serving U.S. interests, through economic assistance, trade, and investment.

Foreign Assistance

The relatively small (about 10% of total donor assistance through bilateral and multilateral channels) development role of the United States in Africa through the 1970s has been helpful when combined with the cooperative efforts of the countries involved. For example:

- Efforts in institution building have helped African governments to expand their capacity to absorb both private and concessional resource flows. These institutions include research centers, universities, veterinary schools, secondary and vocational institutions, agriculture credit banks, etc.
- Infant mortality and longevity statistics have been improved by African countries when assisted by AID-financed hospitals, inoculation and immunization programs, rural health care systems, and health training.
- Essential capital infrastructure projects of African countries have been augmented by roads, bridges, schools, marketing centers, ports, and railways built with U.S. aid.
- Grain exports have been augmented and national nutrition improved in several countries through the cooperative development and dissemination of new hybrid cereals.
- The quality of livestock has been upgraded, often in joint projects.

Increasing emphasis in U.S. assistance has been directed in recent years at alleviating the most critical needs of the most poor. To this end, bilateral AID programs are designed to concentrate even more than in the past on these persistently serious problems:

- Declining per capita food production;
- Shortage of employment opportunities relative to rapidly growing populations;
- Lack of access to health and other basic services;
- Shortage of skilled manpower and training opportunities; and
- Desertification of the land and shortage of energy.

While many of the foregoing needs can be met on a national basis, other problems require regional cooperation for effective resolution. In some cases multicountry approaches are the most cost effective allocation of scarce resources, such as through the Concerted Action for Development in Africa. AID, therefore, is increasingly attempting to address critical problems, such as those of the Sahel and southern and eastern Africa, through regional programs.

There are other special programs, some of which involve AID but in other instances extend beyond or outside the agency. These include:

- Refugee assistance—Africa has an estimated 4 million refugees, the largest number in the world. There are 475,000 refugees in camps in Somalia as of January 1, 1980, with a possible 700,000 more being outside camps. There are also large numbers of refugees of other nationalities in southern Africa, in or near Zaire, and elsewhere. In addition to giving refugee assistance to host governments, the United States has made major contributions to programs administered by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.
- The Peace Corps has 2,000 volunteers in Africa performing a wide variety of humanitarian and developmental services on a unique person-to-person basis.
- Under circumstances when legitimate self-defense is the criterion, the United States has provided limited military assistance to a few countries. For FY 1980 the United States is considering providing $45.5 million in foreign military sales credits and $3.4 million for participation in the U.S. international military education and training program.
- From the accompanying table, it will be noted that U.S. economic assistance to Africa has been steadily rising, at rates averaging more than 20% per year. Bilateral assistance, not including military assistance or Peace Corps funding, will total over $600 million for 1980 and a projected $768 million for 1981. This does not include U.S. contributions through multilateral channels, which in 1978 totaled an estimated $305 million.

Trade and Investment

In 1978, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for a mere 3.7% of world trade, the same proportion as in 1969. U.S. trade with sub-Saharan Africa remains small, accounting in 1978 for only 2.3% of our exports and, with Nigerian oil, 5.4% of our imports.

Direct foreign investment is also small and stagnating. U.S. net direct investment in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) amounts to about $1.8 billion (mainly in oil and mineral extraction), which represents less than 5% of U.S. investments in South America.

Manufacturing activities are minimal, constituting only 9% of all exports, compared to the 43% average for other developing regions.

Unfortunately barriers inhibiting expansion of trade and investment exist on both sides of the Atlantic. In Africa, these include inadequate infrastructure, lack of economic diversification, shortage of economic institutions and expertise, deficient government investment policies, and frequent incidences of political instability. On the part of the United States, there is insufficient understanding among U.S. firms concerning opportunities and ways of doing business in Africa, as well as difficulties in competing successfully with Europeans and Asians in the African marketplace. Nevertheless, expansion of U.S. trade and investment involving sub-Saharan Africa is in the interest of both African countries and the United States for the following reasons.

- As intimated earlier, during the 1980s the United States will become even more dependent on Africa's natural resources. While large known reserves have been mentioned earlier, many regions, which have not yet been explored, hold promise of additional mineral and petroleum wealth.
- The U.S. trade deficit with sub-Saharan Africa, primarily due to oil im-

U.S. Trade With Sub-Saharan Africa, 1978
($ millions)

	Exports	Imports
Total Sub-Saharan trade of which:	3,371	9,965
South Africa	1,080	2,346
Nigeria	985	4,977
U.S. total worldwide trade	143,660	183,136
% of U.S. total worldwide trade	2.3	5.4

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade

jobs for rapidly growing populations. The modern sector labor force in Africa is enlarging by more than 9% annually, whereas jobs are increasing by less than 1%. Aside from job formation in rural sectors, we must increasingly encourage the U.S. private sector to assist.

We will work to substantially expand the public access of poor populations to improved health and family planning, basic agricultural services, safer water, sanitation, and improved rural transportation systems. These are imperative if progress is to be made in social and economic development.

We will seek broader methods of attacking the key absorptive capacity constraints in Africa, the shortage of skilled and trained human resources. Broader participation in the benefits of development will be sought through nonformal and agricultural education, vocational training, and professional-level training and greater participation of women in development.

We will increase support for energy programs—including afforestation, renewable energy technologies, and soil conservation—to begin to address the twin and interrelated problems of energy shortage and desertification. Fifty-two percent of Africa's land area today is desert or subject to desertification, far greater than any other developing region.

Even with our most efficient concentration on these core constraints, we are seeking more and more to facilitate new forms of intraregional development cooperation between African states. Since 1970 trade *between* African states has declined from 18% of all trade to 12%. At a recent colloquium on trade and investment opportunities in Africa, U.S. companies identified the phenomenon of small national markets in Africa as a major disincentive to U.S. private investment. Many of Africa's difficulties today stem from the colonial fragmentation of the continent.

Today, increasingly, there is recognition by donors and Africans of the need to institutionalize African subregional cooperation, resolve common problems, exploit common resources—such as river basins—engage in selective market integration, and participate in joint projects that address national priorities. We will increase our support to African efforts in economic and development cooperation.

For instance, in southern Africa the five front-line states are working together on a plan for a systematic process of cooperation, starting in transportation and later moving to other areas in agricultural research, food production, livestock diseases, and technical training. They have indicated their desire that Swaziland, Lesotho, Malawi, and eventually independent Zimbabwe and Namibia join in this important precedent. These fledgling steps initiated by the front-line states in pluralistic approaches to economic cooperation merit the strongest support.

In FY 1981, we are proposing new regional programs in transportation and technical education to support the southern African initiatives. These new regional programs will also provide us the means, if appropriate, to respond to assistance requirements of a new elected government in Zimbabwe within the framework of the priority regional development concerns.

We will continue to support similar region-specific forms of collaboration in the Lake Kivu crescent, among the Economic Community of West African States, and in East Africa.

As I turn to the issue of project evaluation and program impact, I would like to recall the development situation which confronted most African nations at independence.

Development Situation in the 1960s and 1970s

There were very few institutions of higher learning, virtually no agricultural research institutions working on food crops, and extremely limited major infrastructure and health care services. Disease was widespread, illiteracy pervasive, and the departure of colonial technicians left services and facilities unfunctioning in many countries, as few if any Africans had been prepared for higher level positions. These were beginnings not faced in most other developing regions.

In the 1960s, U.S. assistance to Africa was very limited and represented between 3% and 4% of total worldwide U.S. aid.

The primary objective of U.S. economic assistance in Africa through the 1960s and early 1970s was to help develop the manpower, limited infrastructure, and institutional bases for short-term national integration and eventual efforts of macroeconomic development. Progress toward achieving these objectives is indicated by the following accomplishments.

In Nigeria AID financed contract teams from a dozen U.S. universities cooperated with Nigeria to expand facilities to reshape the Nigerian education system. Teacher-training institutions were expanded or created. Comprehensive secondary schools were developed at Ayetoro and Port Harcourt offering, for the first time ever in Nigeria, vocational and commercial courses. A technical college was developed at Ibadan. Several faculties of agriculture were developed, as well as a school of veterinary medicine. Considerable effort was devoted to establishing and training the faculty for the University of Nigeria—now with approximately 7,000 students.

Vocational training institutions were established in Togo, Guinea, Zaire, Benin, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, and Niger by 1965.

By the early 1970s, AID had supported the establishment or expansion of the faculties of eight higher education and 26 subprofessional institutions in Africa (including teacher-training institutions). In the period 1960–70, AID assisted in building institutions—including 15,000 classrooms housing 800,000 students—in which agriculture, education, and veterinary medicine degrees have been granted to 3,000 students and certificates awarded to another 14,000 during the period and in which in-service training had been provided to more than 100,000 teachers and training in U.S. or third-country institutions of higher education was provided to 14,000 participants.

One hundred million people in West and central Africa have been vaccinated against smallpox. The disease was eliminated from the area. (Later, with U.S. assistance, the World Health Organization eliminated smallpox from Ethiopia and Somalia and, with the successful conclusion of these campaigns, eliminated it entirely from the face of the Earth.)

Twenty million children in West and central Africa have been protected from measles.

More than 5 million people in Ethiopia were protected from malaria, and new farm lands were opened in areas earlier affected by malaria.

In infrastructure in the decade of the 1960s, the Volta hydroelectric project and related projects added 500,000 kilowatts of electric power generation and added considerably to Ghana's industrial potential.

Throughout Africa road systems were extended by 8,500 miles. AID

participated with other donors in constructing the Trans-Cameroon Railway which has contributed substantially to Cameroon's impressive growth rates.

The programs started in the mid-1970s in response to the new directions mandate, the Sahelian drought, and the concern over the plight of the southern African states are still too new to determine the full magnitude of their impact. There has already been a discernible increase in food production in the Sahel.

U.S. Programs

AID together with numerous other donors has been deeply involved in this effort. In addition assistance to agriculture research has increased with the creation, in Africa, of the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture and the International Livestock Center for Africa. Applied research in cereal crops—rice, maize (corn), sorghum, and millet—has been expanded. Seed multiplication programs are being supported in every region of the continent.

In Kenya AID assisted in nearly tripling the numbers of Agriculture Finance Corporation loans made to small farmers in the period 1971–79 (from 10,000 to 30,000). In addition AID contributed significantly to the successful research efforts leading to the introduction and widespread utilization by small farmers of Kenyan hybrid maize which increased small-holder production by as much as 25% per hectare.

In Tanzania AID has assisted in institutionalizing the capability to train maternal child health aides to staff 2,600 rural dispensaries and 184 rural health centers throughout Tanzania. It is estimated that 70–80% of women of childbearing age are attending maternal child health clinics staffed by these trained aides.

Overall literacy rates in Africa have risen rapidly and health programs have been steadily lowering infant mortality and adult morbidity.

But our expectations of impact and success should be evaluated with an historical perspective. Our general assistance policies of the 1960s and even early 1970s held that the former colonial powers were primarily responsible for assisting Africa's development. Moreover, policies were accepted that concentrated U.S. assistance to Africa in only 10 of the now more than 46 countries. AID had virtually no bilateral programs in Francophone and southern Africa until the 1970s.

New U.S. Initiatives

The program for which we are requesting your support recognizes the role of AID as a catalytic though minor donor in Africa. In terms of overall assistance flows to Africa, AID will provide in FY 1981 approximately 8%. We believe, however, that our programs fall into the areas of the most critical priorities and where the United States has special capabilities. Our assistance, hopefully, can be the linchpin in rendering other donor assistance more effective. In this regard, we are participating in several new initiatives.

In December 1979 the concerted action program for Africa was announced. Through this process of concertation with the five major Western donors, in close collaboration with Africans, more concentrated resources can be brought to bear in major programs of a regional nature that might not get underway in a normal bilateral project approach.

In June of this year we will meet with other Development Assistance Committee donors, six OPEC nations, and with Africans to consider some key problem strategies in food production, energy, transportation, and employment. We will present to the OPEC funding sources a number of projects for cofinancing. We believe that mechanisms can be found to assist the OPEC funds in designing projects so that OPEC's low rates of disbursement to Africa can be consistent with their pledges.

In southern Africa, the southern African development analysis, sent to Congress in April 1979, was completed in close cooperation with Africans and other donors. As a result there are several projects that will be undertaken as multidonor programs. The major effort will be in transport rehabilitation, the critical short-term problem of the area.

Later this year we will be encouraging the organization of a "coming together" of donors and African states to completely reevaluate our collective approaches to food production, to see where and how the currently declining per capita food productivity trends can be reversed. No other economic problem in Africa has higher priority.

In Africa today we find a continent with the capability of sustaining its socioeconomic growth and contributing to U.S. and global needs. In Africa today we find a continent with the resources and markets increasingly needed by the United States and other Western countries. But this potential is shadowed by the fact that Africa today lies squarely in the path of the food, energy, and ecological crises projected for the world as a whole later in this century. Moreover, the indivisible link between U.S. political and economic interests and African development is now a demonstrable fact.

We must, therefore, redouble our efforts to participate with Africa in the

U.S. Aid to Refugees in Somalia

Two cargo planes carrying 166,000 pounds of medical supplies arrived Mogadishu, Somalia, on January 23, 1980. These shipments, worth about $313,000, are the first deliveries of nonfood aid for relief of refugees in Somalia. The U.S. Government has pledged $2.5 million in nonfood aid to meet refugee needs as determined by the Government of Somalia and the U.N. High Commission for Refugees. Future shipments, which will be coordinated by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, will include blankets, tents, cloth, used clothing, and kitchen utensils.

While the problem of refugees in the Horn of Africa is severe, it has received little publicity. There are more than 475,000 refugees in camps in Somalia, and there may be as many as 700,000 living outside the camps. A recent U.N. study estimates the number in camps will reach 600,000 by the end of this year. That could mean over a million refugees in a country whose normal population is estimated at 4 million. Most of the refugees are nomads or subsistence farmers fleeing the fighting in Ethiopia. Their plight has been aggravated by poor "short rains" this past autumn.

In addition to nonfood aid, the United States, through Food for Peace, is providing 13,400 metric tons of various food commodities worth about $3.7 million. These shipments should begin arriving in February. Requests for additional assistance are under consideration by the U.S. Government.

Press release 18 of Jan. 23, 1980. ■

an understandable but frankly self-defeating effort to protect consumer prices, particularly in politically volatile cities. The result is less food grown and sold, less income for farmers to reinvest, stronger incentives for urban migration, and mounting costs for food imports. The transition to a policy which pays farmers an incentive price for their product is always painful, but it's essential. We are prepared to work through these complex issues in close partnership with the African countries and in some cases help ease the way by judicious use of PL 480 food.

U.S. Initiatives

For our part, we in AID, along with our colleagues in the State Department, are undertaking the following initiatives designed to integrate a more comprehensive U.S. development effort into our overall Africa policy.

First, the establishment of the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA) presents a new opportunity for the United States to relate more coherently all of this country's various development instruments to Africa's most serious problems. These include development grants, food aid (PL 480), technical assistance, nongovernmental and voluntary organizations, Peace Corps, Export-Import Bank, trade policy, and private sector investment. We are acutely aware of the indispensable role private investment must play in Africa—in the creation of jobs, in overall growth, and in establishing a revenue base so that "basic human needs" is an affordable policy and not merely an empty passing slogan. Concessional funding must not only be increased but used creatively to expand the continent's absorptive capacity for private sector investment, both foreign and domestic.

Second, we are studying the U.S. general schedule of preferences and recently completed multilateral trade agreements to determine why most African countries have been unable to take advantage of the tariff concessions that are, in theory, allowed under these trade policy vehicles. From this we will see where and how U.S. trade policy can and should have greater benefits for African development.

Third, we will work in concert with other Western donors and international organizations to design more comprehensive problem-solving programs rather than piecemeal projects. The major programs needed in food production, environmental reclamation, energy, infrastructure, etc., can often, by their nature, be undertaken only as multidonor programs. Following on the Sahel experience, we will be considering more significant multidonor programs in the Lake Kivu area and in the southern African region. We will be meeting with OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] donors to identify ways and means for interested OPEC agencies to play a larger development role in Africa. In addition, we will be taking various steps to reinforce Western donor collaboration in Africa.

. . . U.S.-Africa policy . . . must state with clarity that we, the most developed of the world's nations, will not allow Africa's alarming economic and environmental decline to continue, because it portends a loss of human potential and political instability that are contrary to both U.S. and African interests.

Fourth, also following our Sahel experience, we will encourage more intra-African cooperation in the various subregions. Many of Africa's difficulties today stem from the fragmentation that occurred in the "divide-and-conquer" policies of the old colonial empires. Today all the Western donors and many of the African states recognize the political and economic payoffs of institutionalizing African subregional cooperation to resolve common problems, exploit common resources, such as river basins, and enter into selective kinds of market integration. Despite the unfortunate demise of the East African Community, the new Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), southern African efforts at economic cooperation, and other new efforts deserve our active support. Dormant or ineffective African regional organizations can be animated with new mandates, programs, and resources.

The economic progress of Africa may well depend on how effectively many small and fragmented African states can work together. The United States can have a catalytic impact on what may become an important new era of African cooperation.

Fifth, the question of increased financial resources is an essential part of any set of new initiatives. We hope to see at least some increases in our concessional aid levels for Africa in FY 1981 and beyond.

The United States will seek congressional authority to join the African Development Bank in FY 1981. For the first time, the African Development Bank is being opened to nonregional capital, and the bank's significance will take on renewed importance in the difficult times ahead. The United States will propose in FY 1981 a capital input of $360 million representing 17% of the bank's nonregional capital. The United States would then be the largest single nonregional member.

These are but a few of the initiatives this Administration will be undertaking to support U.S. policy interests and African development.

All of this will require the support and determination of the American people. I believe all Americans now fully understand that we are not alone on this planet. We are fully aware today of our interdependence with other people whose attitudes toward the United States can have a very direct bearing on our own well-being. We may wish it were not so, but we know it is so.

We have shown in recent weeks that we are capable of deliberateness, and forceful moderation, even when unconscionably provoked. In recent years, we have found our voice again as advocates of the human rights to which all people aspire. We have wealth and power. And I believe we do have the capacity and boldness to translate these assets into a program that will, indeed, make a difference to Africa.

AMBASSADOR McHENRY[1]

I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk to you today about U.S.-Africa policy. My topic, however, is something of a misnomer. For the United States has an "Africa policy" only in the same sense that is has a "European policy" or an "Asia policy." Most of our policies in Africa, as elsewhere in the world, are bilateral; they pertain to our relations

with each of the 52 individual independent African countries.

But certain concerns cut across national boundaries. Africans share common aspirations. They are working to resolve common problems, many of which can be met only by cooperative and regional effort.

For three decades, the dominant concern of Africa has been its emergence from colonialism. The United States played a major role in drafting the provisions of the U.N. Charter that provided the philosophical base for the end of colonialism. During the decades since, American interest in Africa has waxed and waned.

- We had not been a colonial power.
- We carried on little trade with the black African states.
- We looked to those countries which had been colonial powers to play the major role in developments following independence.

Too often, what passed for policy was a series of responses to particular incidents and disorders that punctuated those years.

Today, the long struggle to end colonialism and racial discrimination in Africa is drawing to a close. I do not mean to suggest that Africa has put this period entirely behind it. In Southern Rhodesia and Namibia, the right of the people to determine their own future and to govern themselves has remained elusive. And in South Africa, the full political participation of all its citizens remains but a distant dream. But even in these last outposts, there has been progress.

The complex negotiations aimed at a settlement in Southern Rhodesia have nearly reached their conclusion. Despite initial skepticism, only a few differences regarding the cease-fire remain. So optimistic is the United Kingdom that the British Government has taken the first steps in the transition process. A British Governor arrived in Southern Rhodesia earlier this week. Other steps in the transition process leading to elections are underway. It is unimaginable that the remaining differences on the cease-fire can be allowed to stand in the way of an agreement. Clearly, the interests of the parties in reaching agreement outweigh the differences that continue to exist.

What happens in Southern Rhodesia may very much affect the possibility of a peaceful settlement in Namibia. There, the United States, Canada, France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom have been engaged for over 2 years in frustrating negotiations with South Africa in the hope of reaching an accord that will permit Namibia to gain its independence without further bloodshed. A reasonable basis for settlement has been proposed and enjoys wide support. However, South Africa has objected to two important aspects of implementation. Our hope is that the remaining differences can be overcome through technical discussions during the next few weeks so that the bloodshed can end and the people of Namibia can get on with the process of governing themselves.

None of the nine non-African nations invited to participate in last summer's Southern African Development Conference was an Eastern European state. But we were there, along with most of the countries of Western Europe.

So while the elimination of the last vestiges of colonialism and racial discrimination remain a high priority, Africa has reached an important transition point. Its nations can increasingly focus their attention on other issues—issues that have important long-term consequences for life and for the quality of life.

Human Concerns

Not surprisingly, economic development and modernization head the list of these concerns. As Doug Bennet pointed out so graphically in his remarks this morning, economic conditions, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, have reached crisis proportions.

- Food production is declining while the population increases.
- Inflation and trade deficits soar as the cost of energy rises and the price of the industrial goods Africa must import follows suit.
- Transportation and communications systems remain inadequate. An African foreign minister seeking to travel from Nairobi to Dar es Salaam finds himself having first to go to Europe.
- And while the world focuses its attention on the enormous refugee problems in Southeast Asia, Africa has painfully and quietly borne the burden of an even larger and more permanent displacement of people.

Without inter-African cooperation and without large-scale world assistance, the outlook for growth and development is indeed grim.

But even in southern Africa, where the political problems of Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa continue to receive priority attention, plans are already in motion to confront the serious developmental problems that exist. At the Southern Africa Development Conference, which was held last July, the "front-line" states of southern Africa—looking forward to the early independence of their neighbors in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia—laid the groundwork for cooperation on a regional development scheme. Economic development was also a principal topic at last summer's meeting of the Commonwealth countries in Zambia.

African states are active proponents of readjustments in the world's economic, financial, and trading systems. Along with other developing countries, they seek to replace or adapt the economic systems that were developed before they came into being, so that what they call the "new international economic order" will take into account the unique problems they face in a world dominated by developed nations.

While economic concerns are pressing, they are not the only important questions with which the new African nations are coping. In Africa, as elsewhere, human rights issues have assumed a new importance. In the last year, the tragic and brutal regimes of Idi Amin, Bokassa, and Mascias have been driven from power. The need for collective condemnation of evils like those practiced by these despots has resulted in the adoption of a draft outline for the creation of a human rights commission.

Many African nations are acquiring a measure of political stability unheard of just 15 years ago. The Governments of Upper Volta, Mali, Ghana, and Nigeria recently reverted from military to civilian control after democratic elections. Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, patterned its new constitution after our own. In Kenya, the predictions that chaos would result after the death of Jomo Kenyatta have not been

On the first question, which is the $64 question or in this case a somewhat larger figure, the obvious answer is that we don't know when conditions in Indochina will return to a point at which people will no longer have the motivation to flee.

It is clear that that motivation is, in part, related to political repression, in part to military activity, and in part—and particularly in Kampuchea—to hunger. If you could tell me when those conditions will change, I can tell you when people will want to stay home. ■

Kampuchean Relief Disrupted

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, DEC. 6, 1979[1]

Starvation still threatens millions of Cambodian lives, despite a massive international relief effort. This sad reality is due to no failure of global concern. The international community has offered the means and has the will to allay the suffering of the Cambodian people.

Growing quantities of food and medical supplies are now reaching that country, but too often the relief cannot get through to those in need; instead, the flow of aid is deliberately blocked and obstructed by the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin authorities. Their Soviet allies have not brought any discernible influence to bear to alleviate the situation, while supporting Vietnam heavily.

- Relief supplies are piling up in Phnom Penh and other points of initial delivery because local and Vietnamese authorities continually change or delay agreed arrangements for distribution.
- Taxes and tariffs are collected on the delivery of relief supplies—in effect, imposing a surcharge on human survival.
- We continue to receive reports that relief supplies are diverted or stockpiled for the use of military forces and that what distribution does take place is skewed to favor officials and supporters of the Heng Samrin regime.
- There is even interference with the attempts of the Kampuchean people to feed themselves. For example, refugees have reported the mining of rice fields to prevent a harvest.

In the face of widespread human anguish, this delay and diversion of humanitarian efforts is unconscionable.

As many as 2 million Cambodians may have died under the brutal Pol Pot regime. Now, in the wake of a Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia, the long-suffering people of that country face a new wave of oppression, hunger, and disease.

To counter this mounting tragedy, we call upon responsible leaders in both Hanoi and Moscow to recognize and act upon the compelling humanitarian requirements of the Cambodian people—which they thus far have not done. We call on them to cooperate fully with the international community in opening all routes for supplies to enter Cambodia—which they thus far have not done. We call on them to take the steps necessary to speed the distribution of humanitarian aid to starving people throughout all parts of that country—which they thus far have not done. We call on them not to feed the flames of war, but use aircraft and airfields to ferry food to feed the people of Kampuchea.

[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 10, 1979. ■

Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25% discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

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Trade in Textiles. Agreements with Hong Kong, amending the agreement of August 8, 1977. TIAS 9291. 9 pp. $1. (Cat. No. S9.10:9291.)

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Non-Conventional Energy Development. Agreement with the Philippines. TIAS 9356. 21 pp. $1.25. (Cat. No. S9.10:9356.) ■

Secretary Visits Europe

Secretary Vance departed Washington on February 19, 1980, for visits to Bonn (February 19–20), Rome (February 20–21), Paris (February 21), and London (February 21–22); he returned to Washington on February 22. Following is the text of the news conference he and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher held in Bonn on February 20.[1]

Foreign Minister Genscher. We had, yesterday and today, talks lasting for several hours. We had a substantive discussion of the world situation, we have arrived at a common analysis, and we were in agreement on the need for an overall Western concept. And I believe that the visit of the Secretary of State not only to Bonn but also to Rome, to Paris, and to London is of very great importance.

We welcome this effort undertaken by the American Administration to consult with its European allies and, as you know, there has been a very intensive process of consultations over the last few weeks. These talks will be continued when the Chancellor goes to Washington in 2 weeks.

I am convinced that the Secretary of State will leave the Federal Republic of Germany certain and convinced that the Federal Republic will meet its obligations within the framework of the Western community and that we will contribute to the objective of safeguarding the balance both internationally—worldwide—as well as here in in Europe. The objective is, furthermore, to implement the resolutions adopted by the United Nations as regards Afghanistan. The objective is also that all possibilities for talks and contacts should be used and exploited to do all we can in order to avoid escalation, but rather to make a political solution of the pending problems possible, and to continue in this way the process of a realistic policy of detente.

Secretary Vance. I first want to express my deep thanks to Foreign Minister Genscher and to the Chancellor for spending many hours during my stay here in the discussion of the various topics which Minister Genscher has referred to. The discussions were extremely helpful to me.

As Foreign Minister Genscher indicated, our analysis of the situation is common. And we had a chance to discuss in depth the steps to be taken within the Western community in dealing with the difficult problems that face us.

I might say a particular word about our discussion at lunch today with Chancellor Schmidt. During those discussions we discussed in great depth substantive issues relating to not only the current situation but the long-term objectives. We did not devote our time to the tactical short-term problems; those have been covered, along with substantive matters, in my discussions with Foreign Minister Genscher and his colleagues. But it was extremely useful to have the chance to have an in-depth discussion of both the short- and the long-term substantive issues which I shall convey back to my President in preparation for the meetings which he will be having in the near future with Chancellor Schmidt.

Q. A lack of information and consultation on the part of the United States has been often deplored here in Europe. Has this matter been on your agenda, and is the U.S. Administration willing to improve in the near future the process of informing the Western allies?

Secretary Vance. The answer is yes, of course, we are willing to improve the methods of consultation. It is absolutely essential that we have the fullest consultation between ourselves and our allies and friends. We have talked about possible ways of improving the exchanges between us which I hope will prove fruitful. I believe that they will. It is crucial in times like these that we do have both a mechanism and a means for full and complete discussion at any time.

Q. Hodding Carter [State Department spokesman] told us this morning that the State Department had established two lists of countries supporting, or seeming to support, the U.S. boycott initiative on the Olympics. Twenty-five countries would make this position clear, 25 others would express private support. West Germany, Mr. Carter said, was not on either list. Were you able to gain any support during your visit here?

Secretary Vance. The question of the Olympics is a question which must be determined by each government after full consultations among not only its government officials but also with the members of its national olympic committee and after discussion within its domestic public. That is an issue for each country to decide for itself, and I am sure that that process will be followed in this country.

Q. [Inaudible; concerned Olympic boycott.]

Secretary Vance. We made our position very clear on this issue. We said that we would not attend the Olympics in the capital of any invading country. The Soviet Union has invaded Afghanistan; its troops remain in Afghanistan; we have suggested that the Olympics should be transferred or an alternate site found or that they be canceled. And we have said if this is not done that we will not attend.

Q. You said there was agreement on "the need for" a Western overall concept. When will you reach an agreement on the Western concept?

Foreign Minister Genscher. I

IOC Rejects U.S. Proposal on Summer Olympics

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, FEB. 12, 1980[1]

We regret the decision of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to conduct the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow, and rejecting the proposal of the U.S. Olympic Committee to transfer, postpone, or cancel the games.

Under these circumstances neither the President, the Congress, nor the American people can support the sending of the U.S. team to Moscow this summer. The President urges the U.S. Olympic Committee to reach a prompt decision against sending its team to the games. The United States is working with a number of other like-minded governments to take similar action and to consider the practicability of conducting other international games for the teams which do not go to Moscow.

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 18, 1980. ■

tions are to be held March 7 and that the new 270-member assembly will convene on April 1.

February 8

Khomeini confirms designation of Bani-Sadr as chairman of the Revolutionary Council.

Archbishop Capucci and Monsignor Nolan visit some of the hostages.

February 9

Militants claim they have a mandate from Khomeini to continue holding hostages.

February 10

A group of 49 Americans, invited by the militants and led by Norman Fouer, a professor at the University of Kansas, meets with militants for 4 hours but is not allowed to see the hostages.

February 11

On the first anniversary of Iran's Islamic revolution, Khomeini urges all oppressed peoples to rise and fight for their rights against superpowers, but also suggests possible future relations with the U.S.

Bani-Sadr announces a formula for release of hostages which calls for the U.S. to admit the "crimes" it had committed in Iran, recognize Iran's "right to obtain the extradition" of the deposed Shah, and resolve "never again to interfere" in Iran's affairs.

February 12

Ghotbzadeh suggests the organization of a commission of inquiry into the abuses of the Shah's regime would help resolve the hostage issue.

February 13

Bani-Sadr announces that Khomeini approves secret plan for release of the hostages.

President Carter approves of an international commission of inquiry into Iran's grievances.

February 14

Bani-Sadr states that hostages could be freed within 48 hours if President Carter agrees to conditions approved by Khomeini.

Secretary General Waldheim begins draft guidelines for a U.N. commission that would hear Iran's grievances and obtain release of the hostages.

February 15

In New York, a Federal judge orders all briefs to be filed in lawsuits against Iran be sealed because of the sensitive situation existing to gain release of the hostages.

Alireza Nobari, head of Iran's central bank, declares that to gain release of the hostages, the U.S. should release Iranian assets now officially frozen.

Progress in the Middle East Peace Negotiations

by Sol M. Linowitz

Address before the Foreign Policy Association in New York on January 17, 1980. Ambassador Linowitz is Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations.

Today I want to speak to you candidly and with unalloyed realism about a truly critical subject: the Middle East peace ne tiations—their objectives, their progress to date, and their prospects for the future.

Over the years, the world has needed no reminder that the Middle East is an area of uncertainty and instability. Yet in recent days the reminders have been multiplying. Events have conspired to underscore once again how volatile—and how vital—that region of the world is.

The unlawful detention of American hostages in Tehran, the revolutionary turmoil and instability of Iran, the naked aggression of the Soviets into Afghanistan—all these explosive bursts of crisis dramatically absorb our attention. These events pose a threat to the independence and capability of moderate governments throughout southwest Asia and the Middle East. We are asking these governments together with our European allies to join us in a major effort to prevent further Soviet encroachment and to guarantee regional security.

But this strategy cannot be fully effective if it fails to address one of the main causes of instability in the region—the Arab-Israeli problem. Recent developments thus make progress toward resolution of this conflict an objective of even more crucial importance to peace and stability and to U.S. interest in this vital area. They make it even more urgent that the current negotiations between Egypt and Israel succeed and that the United States use its good offices constructively and vigorously to help them succeed. To do so is both in the highest interest of the United

February 17

The five members of the inquiry commission announced by Secretary General Waldheim are: Adib Daoudy of Syria, a political adviser to President Hafez al-Assad; Louis-Edmond Pettiti of France, a judge on the European Court of Human Rights; Mohammed Bedjaoui, Algeria's envoy to the U.N.; Andres Aguilar Mawdsley, Venezuela's former Ambassador to the U.S.; and Harry W. Jayewardene, a lawyer from Sri Lanka who is active in civil rights causes.

February 18

Bani-Sadr orally approves inquiry commission but does not give a firm commitment on the timing of the release of the hostages. He later sends a formal message to Secretary General Waldheim accepting the commission.

February 20

At Iran's request, U.N. inquiry commission delays trip from Geneva to Tehran for 3 days.

Khomeini issues statement giving his support for the militants holding the hostages and their demand for the Shah's return.

February 21

U.N. inquiry commission uses its 3-day delay in Geneva to gather information on conditions in Iran during the deposed Shah's reign.

February 23

Commission arrives in Tehran, but Khomeini issues a statement saying that the fate of the hostages should be decided by the new parliament to be elected in March/April.

February 24

Militants endorse Khomeini's statement.

February 26

Revolutionary Council announces that some U.S. reporters, banned since mid-January, may be permitted to enter the country.

February 27

Secretary of the Revolutionary Council, Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, officially forecasts that the parliament which is to be elected will not be ready to discuss the hostage issue until 4 weeks after it convenes.

February 28

Visit to hostages by commission is still undecided. ■

States and in the interest of world peace.

Prospects for the Future

I am here as a negotiator, and negotiators are by nature optimists. The business of a negotiator, after all, is to try to fashion workable solutions from the most unpromising of raw materials. But I am also a realist, and it is as an optimistic realist or a realistic optimist that I want to put my basic thesis before you: It is my deep conviction that the prospects for achieving peace between the Arabs and the Israelis—a just, durable, and comprehensive peace—are better today than they have been at any time in the past 30 years.

That is a dramatic statement, and I want to suggest to you the reasons why I believe it is so.

First. For the first time in history Israel and the strongest of its Arab neighbors, Egypt, have pledged themselves to peace and have entered into a binding treaty solemnly committing themselves to that objective.

Second. That historic pledge of peace, which rightly brought the Nobel Peace Prize to President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, is holding; it is working; it is bearing tangible fruits that dramatize, for all parties in the region, the benefits of peaceful negotiation.

Most importantly, both Egypt and Israel are living up to their agreements. Both nations have demonstrated their determination to adhere to their commitments. Thus Israel has turned over to Egypt on schedule not only the major portion of the Sinai but also the Alma oilfields, in spite of the immense difficulties that the loss of this oil—at today's prices—has posed for the Israeli economy. By the same token, Egypt has proceeded diligently to normalize its relations with Israel, despite the fact that these steps have led to punitive political and economic actions by a number of other Arab nations. This normalization process will be highlighted by an exchange of ambassadors less than 6 weeks from now.

In addition, this dramatic progress in their relations has been accompanied by what President Carter has described as "an extraordinary change in attitude" by Israelis and Egyptians alike. The growing respect and understanding between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin—which I have witnessed firsthand—reflect the steadily evolving attitudes of their two peoples.

Third. Israel and Egypt, through a framework agreement reached at Camp David, have pledged themselves to a broader peace—a comprehensive peace among all parties in the region. I have detected no wavering on the part of either leader in that commitment. Both know that progress toward that goal is essential if their dreams for their nations and peoples are to be fulfilled.

Fourth. The Camp David summit was not a one-shot achievement; rather it launched an ongoing process—and the existing momentum of that process is itself a major contribution to peace. The Camp David accords recognized that no comprehensive peace is possible unless both Israel's security concerns and the Palestinians' legitimate political requirements are satisfied. The present negotiation process is realistically designed to reconcile both sets of concerns. The process will necessarily be slow and difficult; it will be strewn with obstacles and setbacks. But the overriding fact is that the process is realistic and that it can succeed.

Fifth. The United States, at the request of both Israel and Egypt, is involved as a full partner in the negotiations. As Camp David demonstrated, the United States can contribute in a major way to the peace process—not by imposing its will—but by acting as a catalyst, by helping the parties overcome difficult issues, and by assisting the parties to maintain the momentum toward peace. The role of the United States is not to force solutions or prescribe answers. Nor do we envisage our role as that of policeman of the region. But within the framework agreed to by Israel and Egypt, the United States is committed and determined, more than ever, to work with the parties and to help them in their negotiations.

On this matter of U.S. involvement in the present peace process, I would like to interject one observation: As I look back to the decision of President Carter to take the initiative at Camp David, and as I see today the positive results that have flowed from that initiative, I am struck by the comparison between our nation's major contribution to Middle East stability and the recent actions of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, and what those actions tell us about the Soviet interest in stability in that part of the world. For me, the actions of the two great powers stand now in particularly sharp and vivid contrast—and the contrast makes me deeply proud of my country.

Objectives

I recognize, of course, that even a multitude of reasons to be hopeful is no substitute for concrete plans and specific actions. So let me briefly review with you the objectives of the peace process launched at Camp David, and where we now stand.

It was, in my judgment, the genius of the principal negotiators at Camp David to understand that other efforts to achieve comprehensive peace had failed by grasping for too much, too soon. In fact, the issues in the Middle East are so complex, the emotions so deep, and the contending parties so numerous that the problems have always defied shortcuts or one-step solutions.

The wisdom of Camp David was to recognize this fact: to recognize that the best hope for peace lay in a phased process—one in which agreements attainable at one stage become building blocks for subsequent progress on more difficult issues. And thus, by abandoning the quest for comprehensive "breakthroughs," Camp David, paradoxically, became a dramatic breakthrough: by deciding to pursue peace in relatively modest steps, the parties at Camp David took a giant step.

This does not mean that the objectives they set forth at Camp David were modest ones, far from it.

- The first goal was to establish an atmosphere of trust and confidence—an atmosphere that would not only make relations more friendly and fruitful between Israel and Egypt, but one that would also impress other parties in the region with the possibilities of peace.
- The second objective was to put in place, after the achievement of peace between Israel and Egypt, a functioning self-governing process for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza. The intention here was, and is, to demonstrate, in a transitional period, that full autonomy for the Palestinians and security for Israel are compatible and to pave the way for later negotiations to determine a final status for the West Bank and Gaza.
- The third goal was, and is, the most ambitious: to build a comprehensive peace settlement in the region—the "just, durable, and comprehensive"

effect on the economies of both developed and developing countries and may cause serious strains in the international financial system. The respective delegations accordingly agreed that there is a serious need to pursue strong measures to reduce oil imports, bringing prices for domestic crude oil to world levels, and substantially greater efforts to use and develop alternative energy sources. They noted the degree of cooperation that had already been achieved within the International Energy Agency on these issues. It also considered the effect on the economies of the developing countries of the dramatic increases in the price of petroleum and agreed to continue to provide development assistance and to consult these countries in an effort to overcome this effect.

In reviewing the situation in Iran, the Council agreed that the seizure and holding of American personnel as hostages is a blatant violation of international law, diplomatic norms, and human rights. The Australian and New Zealand representatives reaffirmed their sympathy and support for the United States and the American hostages. The members of the Council emphasized the importance of the hostages speedy release.

In addition to the special problems arising from the crisis in Southwest Asia, Council members reviewed the conduct of the alliance since the 28th Council meeting and expressed themselves satisfied with the continued high degree of cooperation and consultation. They took note of the regular program of exchanges, exercises, and visits carried out by the armed services of the three allies and the contribution these have made to the readiness of the members to support one another in periods of military danger or natural disaster. In this regard, they were particularly gratified that a second exercise in the Sandgroper series will be carried out in the Indian Ocean off of Western Australia later this year. Satisfaction was also expressed with the success of the other exercises carried on over the past eight months in the various series established under the alliance.

The Council members concluded by agreeing that the 30th Meeting of the Council will be held in Wellington in 1981 at a date to be decided.

[1] Press release 45. ■

Australian Prime Minister's Visits

Prime Minister J. Malcolm Fraser of Australia visited Washington, D.C., January 30–February 1, 1979, for meetings with President Carter and other government officials. He returned again on February 7–8 to discuss with President Carter conversations he had held with European leaders. Following are a statement by White House press secretary Jody Powell on January 31 and the President's and Prime Minister's remarks to reporters on February 7.

WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, JAN. 31, 1980[1]

The President and the Prime Minister's discussion focused primarily upon the dangerous situation that has arisen as a result of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, its potential impact on other countries in southwest Asia, and the implications that it has for independent governments everywhere, whether large or small. There will be further discussions at the official level as a result of the subjects covered by the two leaders.

I might say that the discussions ranged over a fairly wide area, including the Third World, obviously the Indian Ocean and southwest Asia, the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] nations, energy—those were the primary areas. I think I can say—as Prime Minister Fraser, I believe, has already indicated—that the United States and Australia have a very similar view of the gravity of the situation in southwest Asia and of the steps which need to be taken to deal with it.

The President told the Prime Minister at the beginning of the meeting that it was—this is a quote—"reassuring to have friends like you in a time of trial and testing." The President also complimented the Prime Minister upon the role of Australia in helping to bring about the Lancaster House discussions which resulted in the agreements in Rhodesia.

Prime Minister Fraser and President Carter (White House photo by Karl Schumacher)

REMARKS TO REPORTERS, FEB. 7, 1980[2]

President Carter

We're delighted to welcome back to the White House Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser of Australia, who came here a few days ago to consult very closely with me on matters of common interest to our two countries, but particularly the late developing events centered around the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Following his visit here, Prime Minister Fraser went to London to meet with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom—Great Britain—then went to meet with the Chancellor of Germany, and then the President of France. Following those visits, the leaders of the European countries suggested that because his meetings were so fruitful with them that he might stop by to see me again to give me a report on the consultations in Europe. I'm deeply grateful that Prime Minister Fraser has been willing to do this. His report has, indeed, been helpful.

We are grateful also to Australia because of their courageous stand as an ally of ours in condemning the invasion that threatens the peace in southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf region; the fact that as a major exporter of grain, Australia immediately announced that

they would not replace the grain being withheld by our country from the Soviet Union. And I'm also very pleased at the close military, economic, and political alliance that exists among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.

There was a meeting of foreign ministers scheduled in this alliance in July. At the suggestion of Prime Minister Fraser, we have decided to move that meeting up until the last week in February so that we can expedite the common discussions among us about the situation in the Indian Ocean and the regions bordering that sea.

We have had a thorough discussion about the Olympics and what might be done concerning the Olympics if the Soviets do not quickly withdraw all their forces from Afghanistan, and Prime Minister Fraser has taken the lead in this discussion and consultation as well. It's with a great deal of pleasure that I welcome him back here, and I'd like to ask him as an honored guest to make a few comments to you.

Prime Minister Fraser

Thank you very much, Mr. President. I value very greatly, indeed, the discussions that we had a few days ago and also today. I had said at the outset of this round of discussions that I have undertaken that it's important for the development of Australia's own policy in the future to know as well as possible the mind of the President of the United States, the policies of this country, and also of principal countries in Europe.

We have no presumptuous view of the influence of 14 million Australians, but we are determined to play what part we can in a cause that is important for free peoples, wherever they may be. We're glad, indeed, and thankful that the United States has responded in recent days, that the President made and delivered the statement he did in the State of the Union message, which should surely give clear warnings to the Soviets about any further moves beyond Afghanistan, and the clear need that there clearly is to bring greater reassurance to the world by removing forces from Afghanistan.

There are times when all of us in independent nations have necessarily to depend on the United States for the kind of world in which we live. This is the world's greatest free power, the strongest country in the world. And in times of danger, in times of invasion—as there have been, the Soviets in Afghanistan—it is the United States that must set a lead. And the United States has done what is necessary in the preservation, as Australia believes, of world peace. And because we strongly believe that what the President has done is right, because we strongly believe that what the President has done is necessary, Australia has moved to support—in what ways we can—the actions of the United States, and we will continue to do so in a cause which is of such great importance for us all.

The United States has also taken a lead over the matter of the Olympics. And I was shown some days ago that small document that has been handed out by Soviet activists in Moscow giving their view of what the Olympics mean and how they're going to exploit it amongst their own people. The Soviets themselves have made it perfectly plain that they regard the Olympic Games being held in Moscow as a great social and political event, not at that moment speaking about a great sporting event which is what it was meant to be. And they've also made it perfectly plain, in their own writings and documents, that they would regard the rewarding of the games to Moscow as a mark of approval of Soviet foreign policy.

Now, against the background of their own statements and against the background of their invasion of Afghanistan, how can free peoples' representatives go to Moscow and, no matter what they themselves might say, allow the Soviets to say of them that their presence there is a mark of approval of Soviet foreign policy? Because that's plainly in the current circumstances what the Soviet Union would in fact be saying.

Mr. President, I welcome very much the discussions that we've been able to have; they've been extraordinarily useful to me. They have given me much, if it was needed, much greater confidence that the United States, together with allies in Europe, is determined to do what must be done to preserve all those things which the people of the United States and the people of Australia hold most dear.

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[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 4, 1980.
[2]Text from Weekly Compilation of Feb. 11, 1980. ■

U.S.-Kiribati Sign Friendship Treaty

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, JAN. 24, 1980[1]

I transmit herewith, for advice and consent of the Senate, the Treaty of Friendship between the United States of America and the Republic of Kiribati. The primary purpose of the Treaty is to settle on terms acceptable to both governments the conflicting claims to 14 islands in Kiribati (formerly the Gilbert Islands) in the South Pacific Ocean, and to establish a regime of cooperation, particularly regarding security arrangements and fisheries. The report of the Department of State is enclosed for the information of the Senate.

The Treaty and Agreed Minute meet the practical interests of both countries and will satisfy the desire of the Kiribati people that their sovereignty over 14 of the islands in their country be unencumbered by a conflicting claim of the United States.

The Treaty will protect United States interests by assuring non-discriminatory future access to Kiribati fishing grounds which supply fish to the canneries of American Samoa. The Treaty also promotes the interest of American Samoa by encouraging joint ventures using the facilities constructed by the United States on Canton Island.[1] As well, any military use of the islands by third parties is to be a subject of consultations with the United States, and third parties may not use United States-built facilities without United States agreement.

The Treaty will further United States foreign policy and security interests in promoting peace, security and development of the region. I recommend that the Senate give early consideration to the Treaty and give its advice and consent to ratification.

JIMMY CARTER

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[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980. ■

U.S. Contributions to the UNHCR

by Esther Coopersmith

Statement in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) of the U.N. General Assembly on November 14 and in the ad hoc Committee for the Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to the 1980 Programme of the UNHCR on November 16, 1979. Ms. Coopersmith is U.S. Representative to the 34th U.N. General Assembly.

NOV. 14, 1979[1]

Ever since the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was created in 1951, it has had to deal with the humanitarian problem of displaced peoples throughout the world. During and immediately following the Second World War, we witnessed the flood of refugees from war-torn Europe. The High Commissioner then faced the challenge of finding asylum for these tens of thousands of homeless people. It would be nice to say that the problem has been solved. But, as we meet here today, we find that once again the world confronts a refugee problem of monumental proportion.

We have all pondered the staggering figures on refugees, but numbers alone do not reveal the extent of human suffering which these people are experiencing. Our eyes have been focused on the human tragedy in Indochina. First, there were the boat people from Vietnam, and at this very moment, it is the famine-striken people of Kampuchea who are fleeing across the border into Thailand.

We have all been deeply moved and saddened by the human suffering that engulfs these people. Finding the means to help them poses a difficult task for the High Commissioner and the international community.

Having heard the report of the High Commissioner, I know I speak the sentiments of all countries in acknowledging his heroic response and the extraordinary work of his colleagues. We know he wants to do more, and we know that more has to be done.

May I take this opportunity to express my government's appreciation and gratitude to the Government and people of Thailand for their compassionate and generous response to the refugees who have streamed across their border seeking not only sanctuary but the most basic needs of staying alive.

U.S. Support to Kampuchea

Reflecting the personal concern of our President and the American people, Mrs. Rosalyn Carter visited the areas in Thailand where thousands of Kampuchean refugees are seeking shelter in overcrowded, unsanitary, and humiliating conditions. She found this experience to be emotionally wrenching, and one which she will never forget. We had hoped Mrs. Carter could have come to New York to address Committee III, but unfortunately circumstances did not allow her to do so. She has met with High Commissioner [Poul] Hartling and discussed her observations with Secretary General Waldheim. She will continue to give support and encouragement to the voluntary groups in our country which have already demonstrated their profound concern and which have been involved in this crisis since its very beginning.

My government has already authorized the High Commissioner to make immediate use of $4 million for Kampuchean refugees from our contribution to the UNHCR. We will immediately transport mobile equipment to provide water to refugee holding camps as well as send communication equipment in order to improve the coordination between the refugee camps and the support agencies in Bangkok. Moreover, the President has directed the Peace Corps to accelerate its support of the UNHCR programs.

African Refugees

While we acknowledge the tragic circumstances of the people of Kampuchea and the continuing plight of those fleeing Vietnam and Laos, we must not—we cannot—allow these tragedies to divert our attention from Africa where most of the world's refugees are now concentrated. Approximately 4 million people have been uprooted in that continent, and the High Commissioner in his report, as well as by his attendance at the Arusha conference last May, has made it clear that his office gives the highest priority to the African refugee problems. We must support the High Commissioner in this commitment. The United States will certainly do so. The United States has set for itself a goal of providing one-third of the costs of the High Commissioner's general program requirements in Africa as an expression of its concern.

International Contributions

The UNHCR's role is essential to the well-being of the millions of refugees throughout the world. That role needs to be enhanced and additional resources made available in order for the High Commissioner to meet this immense problem which affects us all. We must do more than merely provide substandard camps in which refugees are barely able to eke out an existence. For over the long term, refugees must be helped to regain productive and self-sufficient lives as quickly as possible.

An undue burden of coping with problems caused by the influx of refugees has fallen to developing countries, and it is these countries which will require additional resources if the refugee programs of the High Commissioner are to succeed. But the High Commissioner cannot accomplish a task of such magnitude alone. Therefore, we call upon the specialized agencies of the United Nations to give high priority to assisting those developing countries with large numbers of refugees.

My government believes that the work of the High Commissioner is the responsibility of all nations. As Ambassador [Deputy Permanent Representative, Per] Aasen of Norway noted yesterday only 87 countries have contributed to the general program for 1978. We do hope all countries will contribute and get involved with the work of the High Commissioner.

Conclusion

This is a most critical period for the UNHCR. The tasks before it are unprecedented, and its response must transcend traditional approaches to the problem. History shall look to these days and those immediately ahead to judge the wisdom, the imagination, and the innovation we apply to the refugee crises of today.

For our part, let me state clearly that my government—and in fact all the American people—will continue to respond to this humanitarian problem. Our commitment, which we hope is shared by all present in this room, is

found in the preamble of the U.N. Charter—". . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person. . . ."

NOV. 16, 1979[1]

U.S. Pledge

On behalf of the U.S. Government, I am pleased to announce our intention to pledge $48,350,000 as an initial contribution to the UNHCR 1980 general program. A pledge letter in that amount will be forwarded to you pending final action on our 1980 appropriation which is now pending in Congress.

We plan to provide the $48,350,000 pledge for the following purposes:

- $30 million, to the ongoing UNHCR program for the care and maintenance of Indochinese refugees for the first 9 months of 1980;
- $16.9 million as a contribution toward the UNHCR's general program for African refugees; and
- $1,450,000 toward UNHCR's general program requirements in other areas.

With regard to UNHCR's special operations, we are pleased to announce an increase of the U.S. contribution to the High Commissioner's program of support for Khmer refugees in Thailand for a total of $15 million. With this pledge, U.S. commitments in support of the High Commissioner's program needs for the care and maintenance of refugees in countries of first asylum total $63,350,000.

We have the capability to increase our support of UNHCR programs in 1980 as further needs and special programs are identified. The United States plans to contribute up to one-third of the High Commissioner's general program needs in Africa, 30% of the program in Southeast Asia, and an appropriate share in meeting other UNHCR program needs, taking into account, as in the past, the level of support by other member governments. We are encouraged by the response other governments have made this year to some of the most urgent program needs and are confident that they will continue to join us in providing strong support to the overall program in 1980.

Special Programs

I would like to mention two special programs which the UNHCR has in process. The first concern is refugee processing centers in Indonesia and the Philippines. Both these governments, to their great credit, have now reached agreement with the High Commissioner to construct processing centers to which refugees, now in countries of first asylum, can go after they have been accepted for resettlement and while they await movement to their destinations. We plan to support 30% of the cost of these centers and have already provided adequate funds for initiation of construction.

The second program I would like to mention is the idea, still in its developmental stage, of a fund to promote durable solutions for refugees. The October meeting of the UNHCR's executive committee named a working group to develop this concept further. We do not see this fund as a large new development bank but as a focus for devising and planning—in collaboration with development banks and specialized agencies—projects which will be useful to governments and people who are taking the important and humanitarian step of absorbing or, in some cases, reabsorbing refugees into their societies and economies. We sincerely hope such a concept can be developed and, if it is, will support it fully so that the fund will have a capability of not only devising appropriate projects but assisting the movement and reception of refugees going to new locations.

These two new programs can, in our view, give the UNHCR substantially added capabilities in providing protection, care, and resettlement of the growing numbers of refugees. We are prepared to give strong support for these programs and the overall activities of the UNHCR.

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[1] USUN Press release 120.
[2] USUN Press release 123 of Nov. 19, 1979. ■

Secretariat Formed for Women's Conference

The U.S. Department of State, expressing its commitment to the U.N. Decade for Women, established the U.S. Secretariat for the World Conference of the U.N. Decade for Women, 1980 on November 26, 1979. Earlier in the year, the Department inaugurated U.S. preparatory efforts for the world conference with a day-long meeting on September 12 attended by more than 800 American women. The early establishment of the U.S. Secretariat, a full 7 months before the world conference, will enable in-depth U.S. preparation for the middecade reappraisal.

The U.S. Secretariat will direct and coordinate U.S. preparations for the world conference which will be held in Copenhagen, Denmark, July 14–30, 1980. The conference has two major purposes.

First, conferees will assess worldwide progress toward achieving the goals outlined in the resolutions adopted at the 1975 International Women's Year Conference in Mexico City, including the World Plan of Action.

Second, participants will formulate specific action-oriented programs for regional development in the second half of the U.N. Decade for Women, 1980–1985.

The conference will focus on three subthemes of education, health, and employment, as well as other substantive topics including the effects of apartheid on women and the special plight of women as refugees.

The U.S. Secretariat will work in conjunction with various government agencies and departments in the preparation of U.S. position papers. The Secretariat, through extensive public outreach, will seek to obtain opinions and suggestions from American women on all aspects of the Copenhagen conference.

Vivian Lowery Derryck is the director of the U.S. Secretariat. Maureen Whalen is the deputy director.

Correspondence for the Secretariat may be addressed to: U.S. Secretariat for the World Conference on the UN Decade for Women, 1980, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Press release 9 of Jan. 15, 1980. ■

Turkey
Agreement concerning assistance to Turkey in stabilizing its economy. Signed at Ankara Jan. 28, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 28, 1980.

[1] Not in force.
[2] Not in force for the U.S.
[3] With declaration.
[4] Applicable to the territory of the French Republic, including Overseas Departments and Territories. ■

February 1980

Events pertaining to Iran can be found on page 47.

February 4
French Embassy in Tripoli, Libya, is attacked by demonstrators.

February 7
U.S. further reduces its personnel at the Embassy in Libya and continues suspension of normal Embassy operations as a security precaution following mob attack on the French mission.

February 9
Ambassador McHenry begins 2-week visit to the Middle East and North Africa.

February 12
State Department announces that if Israel establishes a settlement in the city of Hebron, it could have a damaging effect on the peace process and cause serious consequences for the autonomy negotiations.

February 13
President Carter holds news conference. During the conference he calls for a February 20 deadline for Soviets to withdraw troops from Afghanistan or the U.S. will not participate in the Summer Olympics.

February 14
U.N. Human Rights Commission adopts a resolution condemning Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The resolution was approved by a vote of 27 to 8, with 6 abstentions.
U.S. Olympic Committee accepts President Carter's decision that a U.S. team not participate in the Moscow Olympics.

February 15
Spanish King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia on a private visit to the U.S. make a courtesy call on President Carter.

February 17
Canada holds parliamentary elections.

February 18
Former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau wins in Canada's elections.
Israeli Embassy officially opens in Cairo.
U.S. formally resumes membership in the International Labor Organization.

February 19
Secretary Vance departs for Bonn for meetings with Foreign Minister Genscher of West Germany and other European allies Feb. 19–22 on coordinating policies in response to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.
Kenyan President Daniel T. arap Moi visits the U.S. Feb. 19–22.

February 20
State Department announces the following countries supporting the Moscow Olympics boycott: Great Britain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Bermuda, Chile, Haiti, Australia, Fiji, Japan, New Guinea, New Zealand, Malaysia, China, Djibouti, Kenya, Liberia, Sudan, Zaire, Bahrain, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Paraguay, Papua New Guinea, and Israel.

February 21
Egypt officially opens embassy in Tel Aviv.

February 22
Cambodian Prince Sihanouk arrives in Washington for private talks with U.S. officials.

February 26
Israel and Egypt formally exchange ambassadors.
Twenty-ninth ANZUS Council meeting is held in Washington Feb. 26–27.

February 27
Leftist guerrillas invade Dominican Republic Embassy in Bogota, Colombia seizing 45 diplomats, including U.S. Ambassador Diego C. Asencio.
Rhodesia begins second phase of parliamentary elections. ■

Department of State

February 4–29

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*26	2/4	U.S., Pakistan amend textile agreement, Nov. 30, 1979 and Jan. 17, 1980.
*27	2/4	U.S., Mexico amend textile agreement, Sept. 11 and Nov. 20, 1979.
*28	214	Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, Feb. 29.
*29	2/6	Fifth annual U.S.-Central American Conference on Trade and Investment, New Orleans, Feb. 27–29.
30	2/4	Vance: statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Feb. 1.
*31	2/5	Vance: statement on "Egypt Today" symposium.
32	2/5	Vance: statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
*33	2/7	U.S. Organization for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), study group A, Feb. 28.
*34	2/7	Vance: statement before Senate Appropriations Committee, Feb. 7.
*35	2/8	Ronald I. Spiers is appointed Director of Bureau of Intelligence and Research (biographic data).
36	2/11	Vance: statement before the International Olympic Committee, Lake Placid, Feb. 9.
*37	2/11	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on fire protection, Feb. 25.
*38	2/11	SCC, SOLAS, working group on standards of training and watchkeeping, Feb. 27.
*39	2/19	Itinerary of Kenyan President Daniel T. arap Moi's visit to the U.S. Feb. 19–22.
*40	2/21	Vance: statement following meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Ruffini, Rome, Feb. 20.
41	2/21	Vance, Genscher: news conference, Bonn, Feb. 20.
*42	2/21	SCC, SOLAS, working group on bulk chemicals, Mar. 13.
*43	2/25	U.S., Finland air transport agreement.
*44	2/25	U.S., Hong Kong amend textile agreement, Jan. 28 and Feb. 6.
45	2/27	Vance, Peacock, Talboys: news conference following ANZUS Council meeting.
†46	2/29	U.S.-Canada consultation on U.S. fuel conversion proposals.
*47	2/29	Assistant Secretary Derian to travel to South Asia and Hong Kong, Mar. 2–28.

*Not printed in the BULLETIN.
†To be printed in a later issue. ■



Seated from right to left: Roberts B. Owen, Legal Adviser of the Department of State; Stephen M. Schwebel, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State; Thomas J. Dunnigan, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., of the U.S. Embassy in The Hague; David Small, Assistant Legal Adviser and Ted L. Stein, Attorney-Adviser (both of the Department of State); and Hugh V. Simon, Jr., Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in The Hague. (International Court of Justice photo.)

For text of Mr. Owen's oral argument see page 36.

U.S. Actions Against Iran

Following are President Carter's announcement, Executive orders, memorandum for the Secretary of the Treasury, and a message to the Congress of April 7, 1980, and a Department of State press release of April 8.[1]

PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT, APRIL 7, 1980

Ever since Iranian terrorists imprisoned American Embassy personnel in Tehran early in November, these 50 men and women and their safety, their health, and their future have been our central concern. We've made every effort to obtain their release on honorable, peaceful, and humanitarian terms, but the Iranians have refused to release them or even to improve the inhumane conditions under which these Americans are being held captive.

The events of the last few days have revealed a new and significant dimension in this matter. The militants controlling the Embassy have stated they are willing to turn the hostages over to the Government of Iran, but the government has refused to take custody of the American hostages. This lays bare the full responsibility of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council for the continued illegal and outrageous holding of the innocent hostages. The Iranian Government can no longer escape full responsibility by hiding behind the militants at the Embassy. It must be made clear that the failure to release the hostages will involve increasingly heavy costs to Iran and to its interests.

I have today ordered the following steps.

First, the United States of America is breaking diplomatic relations with the Government of Iran. The Secretary of State has informed the Government of Iran that its Embassy and consulates in the United States are to be closed immediately. All Iranian diplomatic and consular officials have been declared *persona non grata* and must leave this country by midnight tomorrow.

Second, the Secretary of the Treasury will put into effect official sanctions prohibiting exports from the United States to Iran, in accordance with the sanctions approved by 10 members of the U.N. Security Council on January 13th, in the resolution which was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Although shipment of food and medicine were not included in the U.N. Security Council vote, it is expected that exports even of these items to Iran will be minimal or nonexistent.

Third, the Secretary of Treasury will make a formal inventory of the assets of the Iranian Government, which were frozen by my previous order, and also will make a census or an inventory of the outstanding claims of American citizens and corporations against the Government of Iran. This accounting of claims will aid in designing a program against Iran for the hostages, for the hostages' families, and other U.S. claimants. We are now preparing legislation, which will be introduced in the Congress, to facilitate processing and paying of these claims.

Fourth, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General will invalidate all visas issued to Iranian citizens for future entry into the United States, effective today. We will not reissue visas, nor will we issue new visas, except for compelling and proven humanitarian reasons or where the national interest of our own country requires. This directive will be interpreted very strictly.

In order to minimize injury to the hostages, the United States has acted at all times with exceptional patience and restraint in this crisis. We have supported Secretary General Waldheim's activities under the U.N. Security Council mandate to work for a peaceful solution. We will continue to consult with our allies and other friendly governments on the steps we are now taking and on additional measures which may be required.

I am committed to resolving this crisis. I am committed to the safe return of the American hostages and to the preservation of our national honor. The hostages and their families, indeed, all of us in America, have lived with the reality and the anguish of their captivity for 5 months. The steps I have ordered today are those that are necessary now. Other action may become necessary if these steps do not produce the prompt release of the hostages.

EXECUTIVE ORDERS, APRIL 7, 1980

Amendment of Delegation of Authority With Respect to Entry of Certain Aliens Into the United States

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1185), and Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1–101. *Amendment.*

Section 1–101 of Executive Order 12172 of November 26, 1979, is amended by deleting "holding nonimmigrant visas,".

1–102. *Effective Date.*

This order is effective immediately.

JIMMY CARTER

Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Iran

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, and Section 301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1631), in order to take steps additional to those set forth in Executive Order No. 12170 of November 14, 1979, to deal with the threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States referred to in that Order, and in furtherance of the objectives of United Nations Security Council Resolution 461 (1979) adopted on December 31, 1979, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1–101. The following are prohibited effective immediately, notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licenses granted before the date of this Order:

(a) The sale, supply or other transfer, by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any items, commodities or products, except food, medicine and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations of clothing intended to be used to relieve human suffering, from the United States, or from any foreign country, whether or not originating in the United States, either to or destined for Iran, an Iranian governmental entity in Iran, any other person or body in Iran or any other person or body for the purposes of any enterprise carried on in Iran.

(b) The shipment by vessel, aircraft, railway or other land transport of United States registration or owned by or under charter to any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across the

peace that has attracted, and eluded, so many people for so many years.

As I emphasized earlier, it is not my place as the President's personal representative, nor is it the role of the United States, to dictate how those objectives shall be pursued. But it does seem to me appropriate to observe that achieving those goals will require certain essential acts and attitudes.

To begin with, we regard it as essential that Israel's security be strictly insured, for if terrorism should flare up during the transitional period, as the fledgling self-governing authority for the Palestinians gets underway, the whole future of the peace process could be jeopardized in the conflagration.

tions on two aspects of such transitional arrangements: the machinery for electing a self-governing authority for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza and the powers and responsibilities to be exercised by such an authority.

At present we are making efforts on both fronts. But predictably, much more has been accomplished in reaching agreement on the machinery than on the difficult second question—the powers and responsibilities to be exercised by the self-governing authority.

Let me underscore one point about this: No one has ever defined "full autonomy" in circumstances like these and that is what we are trying to do.

try to find answers to such complex problems as what to do about security; about arrangements with respect to lands, including settlements; about arrangements regarding water rights; and about the status of East Jerusalem Arabs.

These are enormously difficult problems. But we must view them in the light of the progress already made, remembering that a little more than a year ago there were many who believed that peace between Egypt and Israel was also impossible.

A serious problem of concern to both Egypt and Israel is the continued refusal of the Palestinian Arabs and of most Arab nations to join in the peace process. Admittedly, the absence of the Palestinians from the peace table—as well as the absence of Jordan—is both a disappointment and an obstacle. However, it should not be considered insuperable at this time. Real progress can be made by the present participants. The most important thing is to devote our maximum energies to making concrete progress in these talks. By so doing we can show those who have not yet participated that it is in their interest to join the process.

Ultimately, for the achievement of the peace we seek, we will need the participation of other key parties. But if there is sufficient progress by the current participants, that very progress can persuade the other parties that peace is in their interest.

Next week I will be going back to the Middle East. On that trip, I plan to meet with the heads of government of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco, as well as with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin. I am no prophet, particularly when it comes to a region so filled with uncertainties. But I do approach the journey with the conviction that the facts as I know them and the progress thus far made justify an attitude of guarded optimism.

For I believe that if we continue on our course, with the commitment and determination of the parties, we may yet find our way; and it may yet be that the Middle East, where man first dreamed his dream of peace, can show the world—even at an anguished time such as this one—how to resolve issues and conflicts that have been smoldering for centuries. And how right and fitting it would be that this region of the world, which is the cradle of civilization, should be the one which teaches man the great lesson he has not yet learned: How to beat swords into plowshares and learn war no more. ■

It is my deep conviction that the prospects for achieving peace between the Arabs and the Israelis . . . are better today than they have been at any time in the past 30 years.

Second, and of equal importance, it is essential that the self-governing authority have real substance; and that it have an opportunity to build authentic democratic leadership.

Third, I think it is essential to build cooperative relationships between the self-governing authority and Israel and with Jordan if that nation will join the peace process.

And finally, I believe it important that all of us resist the temptation to make premature judgments or predictions about an eventual final settlement. Our immediate objective is to set up transitional mechanisms; let us do that, putting first things first, and dealing with today's problems today. After such transitional arrangements have been implemented, the parties will be in the best position to work together to achieve comprehensive peace.

For the fundamental point is that the present negotiations are not designed to achieve agreement on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. Rather, Israel and Egypt, with the United States as a partner, are seeking agreement on a 5-year transitional arrangement to replace the present Israeli military government and its civilian administration on the West Bank and Gaza.

Current Status

Where do these negotiations stand at present? The accords call for negotia-

The talks since late May, therefore, have necessarily gone through a series of exploratory exercises. The day-in and day-out work is meticulous and arduous; but this is the very essence of negotiations. Now we are beginning to grapple with arrangements for full autonomy and a new way of life for the inhabitants of these areas.

Someone once said that there is no problem, no matter how complicated, which, when looked at in the right way, does not become more complicated. In these negotiations, we are now trying to look at immensely complicated problems in the right way. The difficulties are, as Secretary Vance once observed, like "trying to untie a knot from the inside." But as I found on my trip several weeks ago to Cairo and Jerusalem, there is a readiness on both sides to accept the fact that negotiations must result in the creation of a self-governing authority that is both credible and viable. And this, in turn, means that the transitional government must be empowered to exercise real authority over the lives of the West Bank and Gaza inhabitants.

So both parties are focusing on the powers and responsibilities which should be transmitted to the transitional authority and on how to insure that they will provide both full autonomy for the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza and security for Israel. This means we must focus attention on the powers and responsibilities to be conveyed to the Palestinians and

Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria—FY 1981 Programs

by Morris Draper

Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 12, 1980. Mr. Draper is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.[1]

Last year, when we discussed programs for these three countries, I remarked that the region was experiencing a period of rapid growth, change, and evolution. In the year since then, the continuing revolution in Iran, fighting in southern Lebanon, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and shifts and realignments of forces in the region have posed new challenges to the conduct of our foreign policy.

The three countries with the programs we are addressing today—Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon—border Israel. A comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict will not be possible without the involvement of these three countries. The directions their policies will take over the period ahead will be of great interest to the United States.

These countries are geographically close but are dissimilar in character, in government, in their political forces, and in the individual relationships we have with them. Our assistance programs take into account their diversity as well as our major policy interests.

Underlying the specific objectives each country program addresses is a goal common to all three. This is to help maintain mutual trust and confidence, to strengthen their wishes for association with the West, to demonstrate our constancy and purposefulness in support of their independence, and to reinforce their commitments to find peace through negotiation and mediation rather than through confrontation and conflict.

The programs we have proposed for fiscal year 1981 reflect in both magnitude and focus our best judgment of how our interests can be protected and advanced at a time of greater demands upon our limited financial resources. The programs are critically important assets in our capacity to influence new trends and developments not only within these three countries but in a wider arena.

LEBANON

The program we are proposing for Lebanon this year reflects our deep belief that the United States must continue to give visible and tangible support for President [Ilyas] Sarkis' efforts to reconstruct his divided country and to develop strong national institutions. We are seeking $20 million in foreign military sales credits, $500,000 for military training, and $7 million in economic support funds.

Military Assistance

New outbursts of fighting in southern Lebanon yesterday and today demonstrate graphically the need to realize President Sarkis' hope to extend his government's authority throughout the country, stage by stage. An indispensable element in this effort is the rebuilding of the Lebanese armed forces, and this has been a centerpiece of our overall strategy in Lebanon for 3 years.

In 1977, Secretary Vance announced a 3-year, $100 million foreign military sales credit program to assist in recreating a united national army. The first tranche of $25 million, funded in FY 1977, permitted the purchase of basic weapons and equipment to equip two defense battalions, which have become the nucleus of what is a concessionally balanced security force. Further tranches of $42.5 million in FY 1979 and of $32.5 million in FY 1980 will close the original program announced in 1977 and have placed, in the pipeline, the bulk of the light mechanized infantry and support equipment necessary to reestablish a four-brigade core ground force.

In addition, from 1977 to the end of 1979, well over 100 Lebanese officers received military, professional, and management training in U.S. service schools. Credits for the Lebanese Army international military education and training program amounted to $40,000 in FY 1977, $550,000 in FY 1979, and $500,000 in FY 1980.

Good progress has been made. The new Lebanese Army has remained intact and effective despite periodic outbreaks of fighting. In the past year, army units have been deployed into both the southeastern suburbs of Beirut—replacing Syrian units there—and into areas of south Lebanon, where they work with U.N. peacekeeping forces.

And, most significantly, in terms of President Sarkis' goal of achieving a genuine national consensus, the Lebanese Parliament last spring passed an armed forces reorganization law designed to reinforce the concept of concessional balance and to meet objections from Muslims that the Lebanese Army was tilted concessionally. In coming months, the Lebanese Army may be deployed in additional areas, possibly including the cities of Tyre and Nabatiyyah in the south.

The Lebanese Army now enjoys growing popular support. It is undertaking more responsibilities. Its morale is good, and its recruitment and training programs are proceeding well. U.S. assistance has helped make this possible.

Economic Assistance

President Sarkis' recovery program is a balanced mix of security and economic measures. We have been helping the Lebanese in economic and relief areas since 1975, at the height of the civil conflict. Some $115 million in economic assistance has been provided during this period, of which approximately $55 million has been for emergency disaster relief.

We are requesting $7 million in economic support funds for FY 1981 which will assist small and highly visible projects for agriculture, vocational training, housing repair, social welfare, and potable water. Our geographic concentration will be in south Lebanon which has suffered greatly in the past 2 years and will be supportive of the extension of Lebanese governmental authority, as mandated by the U.N. Security Council resolution which also formed the peacekeeping force for that region.

We did not seek economic support funds for Lebanon in the past 2 years. Now that the earlier pipeline is beginning to empty, we want it to resume this next fiscal year at a modest but politically very important level and use it where relatively small contributions will have the broadest result and ease pressing needs. Our successful village resettlement activity in southern Lebanon is a good model for what we seek to achieve.

Our military and economic assistance programs for Lebanon show the Lebanese and their neighbors in the Middle East that we attach great importance to movement toward a broad

U.S. Military Presence in the Indian Ocean Area

by David D. Newsom

Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 7, 1980. Ambassador Newsom is Under Secretary for Political Affairs.[1]

It is a pleasure to provide you this brief overview of the political background to our military presence in the Indian Ocean area.

As the President said in his State of the Union message [January 21, 1980]: "Events in Iran and Afghanistan have dramatized for us the critical importance for American security and prosperity of the area running from the Middle East through the Persian Gulf to South Asia. This region provides two-thirds of the world's oil exports, supplying most of the energy needs of our allies in Europe and Japan. It has been a scene of almost constant conflict between nations, and of serious internal instability within many countries. And now one of its nations has been invaded by the Soviet Union."

The United States has, for more than three decades, had a modest military presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf area. In recent years this has been symbolized primarily by the ships of the Middle East force presence in the Persian Gulf and naval visits throughout the Indian Ocean area.

Our need for improved communications and logistic capabilities in the area as a whole was recognized a number of years ago with the decision, in cooperation with the British, to begin constructing an austere facility on Diego Garcia in 1972, which we subsequently expanded with congressional approval to a naval support facility in 1976. The revolution in Iran and the general concern over our citizens in the area and over the security of the region generally have led us to increase that presence over the last year by regular and extended Navy task forces, including carriers. Two such task forces are currently in the Indian Ocean.

The events in Afghanistan further reinforce the need for forces upon which we can call to protect our interests and to come to the assistance of friendly countries, if we have need to do so. The tensions and uncertainties in this region clearly call for U.S. capability and flexibility to make such deployments and to sustain them effectively.

This raises force and budgetary implications which are best addressed by the representatives of the Department of Defense but whose importance we would firmly support.

Our friends in the area are generally receptive to the presence of U.S. forces in the region as a whole. The question of the location of these forces, the establishment of bases, and the use of facilities on their territories, however, is politically sensitive. The public posture of most countries in the area is to prefer a neutral Indian Ocean without the presence of either U.S. or Soviet forces. Most nations, however, recognize the realities of the current world scene, and if Soviet forces are present in increased numbers and a more threatening posture, as they are, there is a clear desire for the presence of a U.S. capability as well.

While there is an awareness both in and outside the region of Soviet facilities in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Aden) and Ethiopia, these tend to get less attention politically than our own more modest installations, in part because of the very natural and necessary public discussions of our plans and requirements. Thus, however inaccurately, Diego Garcia is more of a political symbol in some countries than Aden.

Opposition to the presence of foreign forces, bases, and facilities in this area comes from a variety of sources. There is a strong influence in the Indian Ocean area of nonalignment, epitomized by the participation of virtually every nation around the Indian Ocean in the nonaligned movement.

In all countries there are images and political cliches about past colonialization and intervention which come to the fore when a Western country talks of securing facilities or establishing bases.

To some extent we tend to bring this on ourselves by speaking of intervention at times as if these lands and the resources of this area were ours. They belong to independent sovereign countries which feel that the first responsibility for their defense lies with them. They want our help and our presence but in the context of their own sovereignty.

Throughout the Arab portions of this area, there are all of the sentiments, emotions, and political tensions which grow out of the Arab-Israeli dispute and the presence of large numbers of Palestinian people. Inevitably cooperation of any sort with the United States risks political opposition in this context.

The events in Afghanistan have changed this picture, although the underlying reservations remain. There is a greater concern about Soviet intentions which undoubtedly makes our quest for support facilities easier. We still cannot ignore, however, the political realities which lie below the surface. Nor can we ignore the economic and social pressures and ferment which lead to political instability and to vulnerabilities in many of the countries of the region to outside pressures. Our economic and security assistance programs directed at the region are thus an indispensable component of a strategy of building stability and strengthening the ability of the countries of the region to defend themselves and insure their security against outside intervention or internal subversion.

As the committee is aware, we are discussing cooperation and facilities with several countries in the area. These requests are based on the reality that we cannot keep a permanent fleet presence in the area without access to shore facilities to aid in resupply and reconnaissance. We believe that we shall be able to obtain useful cooperative arrangements in the area.

We are aware of the interest of the committee also in the possible use of facilities in the Sinai. In our present planning for support of the Indian Ocean presence and in the absence of the completion of the arrangements for peace in the area, we have not made final conclusions about the desirability or feasibility of facilities in this region.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

South Asia—Old Problems, New Challenges

by Jane Coon

Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 11, 1980. Ms. Coon is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. [1]

I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee to discuss with you the complex diplomatic, political, and security situation in South Asia today. Never before has South Asia seemed more important, nor the challenges to our interests more real and direct. Old problems remain, but new developments require us to reexamine our policies in a fresh and creative fashion.

As we begin to adjust to the new situation created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it is even more important than ever that the Congress and the Administration share their respective assessments and consult closely on appropriate and effective ways to pursue long-term U.S. interests in the region.

You have described some of the apparent paradoxes in the policy choices facing us in South Asia. It is precisely because there are no obvious answers that we are here today. You and your committee have an interest and the experience of many years standing in the region. With the extensive travel of you and many of your colleagues in Asia, you bring to these problems both the insight of direct experience and the perspective of a legislator. I hope that together we can bring into sharper focus the issues before us, recognizing that our choices will not be easy.

U.S. Security Interests—The Soviet Impact

I would like to begin by talking about our security interests in South Asia and how we analyze them in light of recent developments. Inevitably, the Soviet move into Afghanistan affects the manner in which we address other aspects of our policies. I would then like to move on to some of the other issues you have raised—nuclear nonproliferation, conventional arms transfers, and human rights—and relate these to the security interests which are the principal theme of my statement.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has dramatically changed the security situation in South Asia and southwest Asia. In responding to this challenge, we are proceeding along several parallel tracks.

- You are all aware of the steps we have taken in our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union to make sure the Soviets pay a high cost for what they have done.
- Internationally, we have supported the strong condemnation passed by the U.N. General Assembly, and we note that the Islamic conference has taken even stronger exception to the Soviet action.
- We are working on appropriate followup actions in international forums, including support for an appropriate resolution in the U.N. Human Rights Commission.
- We are strengthening our defense capabilities in southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean.
- We have made available over $11 million in cash and kind for the relief of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, whose plight you know better than most people.
- Finally, we are encouraging what we hope will be an effective regional response to the Soviet invasion. This includes efforts to strengthen Pakistan's ability and will to defend itself. It also involves keeping in touch with the Government of India and supporting the efforts India is making to encourage Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

U.S.-Pakistani Cooperation

The country most directly affected, of course, is Pakistan. In the period since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we have been able to work on parallel lines with the Pakistan Government in shaping an effective political response both internationally and regionally.

The 2 days of intensive discussions in Islamabad earlier this month built on our earlier talks with Pakistan's Foreign Affairs Adviser, Agha Shahi, in Washington and produced a large measure of agreement on the nature of the threat and of the security relationship we seek to build between our two nations. The personal participation of President Zia throughout the discussions in Islamabad indicates, in our view, the importance which he attaches to the regional threat and to U.S.-Pakistani cooperation in meeting that threat.

During these talks, we again strongly reiterated our commitment to the 1959 agreement which addresses the threat of Soviet or Soviet-directed aggression against Pakistan. The President's forthright statement of vital U.S. interests in the region—in his State of the Union address—seemed to have had a salutary effect in helping to remove doubts about the strength and durability of this commitment.

We stated our willingness to ask the Congress to affirm this commitment explicitly when we seek legislation to permit resumption of assistance. The Pakistanis expressed satisfaction with this outcome and will not pursue their earlier request to turn it into a treaty.

We were unable to reach a similar degree of agreement on our proposed levels of assistance. We described our intention to propose to the Congress a package which would authorize $100 million of economic support funds and a like amount of foreign military sales credits for each of the fiscal years 1980 and 1981. We described our efforts to encourage other traditional donors to increase their levels of assistance substantially and indicated that we viewed our contribution as part of a broad multilateral effort.

The Pakistanis asked that we defer presenting any legislation which would specify amounts of aid until we had a better assessment of Pakistan's overall economic and military needs and until we had a fuller appreciation of the increased assistance which might be forthcoming from all quarters to meet these needs. We agreed to this request, while making clear that our offer of assistance continued to stand. We also explained in some detail the degree to which this delay complicates our ability to get a supplemental appropriation for Pakistan in the current fiscal year.

In the immediate period ahead, both we and the Pakistanis intend to continue discussions with those governments to which we are looking to provide additional assistance. Our discussions in Riyadh suggest that Saudi Arabia is keenly aware of the importance of strengthening Pakistan. We will stay in close touch with the Pakistan Government as multilateral consultations proceed.

In the meantime, our military team has had detailed discussions in Pakistan in an effort to determine the scope of Pakistan's existing military deficiencies and to identify specific types of equipment which the United States might

New and Renewable Energy Sources—1981 Conference

by Harry M. Montgomery, Jr.

Statement in Committee II (Economic and Financial) of the U.N. General Assembly on November 21, 1979. Mr. Montgomery is the U.S. Representative on that committee.[1]

The global energy problem affects all of us. Effective and cooperative actions by all nations—producer and consumer, developed and developing—are required to insure a smooth and orderly transition from primary reliance on oil and gas to increased use of other forms of energy to meet the world's needs. The accelerated development and implementation of new and renewable forms of energy can make an important contribution to this process.

The U.S. Government attaches great significance to the Conference on New and Renewable Energy that will be held in 1981. Secretary of State Vance emphasized, at both the 33d and 34th sessions of the U.N. General Assembly, our strong support for this conference. The Senate, in its resolution of April 10, 1979, reaffirmed the high priority my country accords to this meeting. We welcome the proposal that it should be held in Nairobi. This is especially fitting, given the particular importance to developing countries of the issues to be dealt with by the conference.

The United States is already expanding its programs to develop these new energy technologies with a view both to our needs and to those of developing countries.

Energy Programs

Our Department of Energy (DOE) already has a substantial program to develop and apply various new and renewable technologies. For our fiscal year 1980, its budget includes almost $800 million in direct funding. Now, responding to President Carter's program to assure our nation's energy needs, the Congress is considering a much enlarged program for development of alternate sources of energy—notably synthetic fuels and solar energy—which will make available tested technologies benefiting the world community.

Our Agency for International Development (AID), which provides bilateral assistance to developing countries, has established programs which will provide:

- Training and support for national energy institutions;
- Analysis of developing countries' energy needs, uses, and resources; and
- Support for experimental programs and projects to determine the applicability of selected new and renewable energy technologies.

Also, the DOE manages a program of comprehensive energy assessments in collaboration with developing countries and is involved in other cooperative energy activities in 11 developing countries.

Conference Objectives

Multilateral efforts also will be required to meet these global needs. We believe the U.N. Conference on New and Renewable Energy can accomplish a number of valuable objectives.

- First of all, it will demonstrate, concretely, the mutual interest of the developed and developing countries in cooperating in the development of new sources and improved methods of using energy.
- In recognition of the seriousness of the global energy situation and the need to conserve conventional fuels, the conference will highlight the urgency of bringing alternatives to oil and natural gas into use as rapidly as posssible.
- The conference can review the state-of-the-art of various technologies, produce an inventory of research in progress and planning, highlight areas in which further research is needed, evaluate the demonstration projects, and assess the economic viability of available technologies.
- It can commit all developed and developing countries to making alternative energy development a priority field of cooperation and investment, with special attention to meeting the needs of developing countries in the context of accelerating their overall development.
- The conference can seek to agree on a realistic goal for the global use of new and renewable sources by the year 2000 and evaluate the role that such sources can play in rural, industrial, and other applications.
- Finally, it could draw up a plan of action for intensified and coordinated efforts at the national, regional, and international levels.

Conference Preparations

A successful conference requires prompt and effective preparations. We must move with despatch to insure that the conference takes place in August 1981—as proposed in the draft resolution—only 20 months from now. Its subject matter is too important to permit the date to slip. And if the conference is to be successful, it will require major efforts in the intervening period by the Secretariat, by the various agencies of the U.N. system, and by member states.

We are pleased that the first meetings of the technical panels are underway, with much credit due to the intensive work of the Center on Natural Resources, Energy, and Transportation. We agree with others that the ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council] Committee on Natural Resources should be designated as the conference preparatory committee. To perform this role, it would, of course, have to be open to universal membership.

Many U.N. agencies and other multilateral organizations are currently engaged in relevant energy activities. We agree with the distinguished Secretary General [Mohamed Habib Gherab] of the conference that greater coordination will serve the interest of all. The energy conference coordinating committee and task force, created by the Director General [Kenneth Dadzie], are steps in the right direction. In addition, strengthened interagency machinery, including further analysis by the Committee for Program Coordination of the Energy Programs of the U.N. system, would be useful.

We regret that the conference budget submission for 1980–81 has not been prepared in time for careful review before this debate. We will review this document carefully.

We have much work ahead to produce the type of conference that will meet the expectations of all of us and thus contribute to solving the global energy problem. The United States will participate actively and constructively in the conference and in its preparations. We will do our part to make it a success.

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[1] USUN press release 127. ■

FY 1981 Foreign Assistance Program

by John A. Bushnell

Statement before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Commitee on February 7, 1980. Mr. Bushnell is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.[1]

The past year has been one of substantial change in Latin America. We welcome most of the changes. We are challenged ourselves to adjust our assistance programs, both economic and security, to the changes in the area.

Some changes have been traumatic and caused great suffering, as in Nicaragua and the process even now going on in El Salvador. Others have been less drastic although not less passionate, as in the return to democracy in Ecuador, the evolution of democracy in the Dominican Republic and St. Lucia through peaceful change rather than revolution, and the steady movement of Peru toward free and open elections. The Andean Pact gained new momentum and moved toward warmer relations with us. Significant improvements in human rights were made in many countries. The island states in the Caribbean continued to cut their colonial ties and are beginning to stand on their own feet—a few of them not too steadily.

The rise in oil prices has been beneficial to several hemisphere countries; to most, particularly the smaller countries of Central America and the Caribbean, it has been a severe blow. All of these changes require new perspectives and a U.S. response suited to the new reality.

MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

As you are aware, the absolute amount of military and bilateral development assistance for Latin America as a whole declined over the decade of the 1970s. The major thrust of our economic assistance in Latin America and the Caribbean is now multilateral. And we have moved away from close relationships with countries where the military hold the reins of power and have made little progress toward a return to democratic government.

Some of the dimensions of our changed role are less immediately evident. First, bilateral and multilateral assistance are not perfect substitutes one for the other. Secondly, the declines in our assistance have come about for several reasons, among them budgetary constraints, competing demands for limited resources, and a change in worldwide assistance policy to concentrate on the poorest countries.

These changes do not, however, signal any diminution in the importance of our relationship with Latin America. We have over 330 million neighbors south of our border, many of whom are desperately poor. The combined economies of the entire region produced some $460 billion in gross national product in 1978. In the same year, we produced over $2 trillion worth. It is easy to see why the countries of Latin America expect us to provide significant help in their development, either through direct assistance or by special consideration in trade matters. For them, the test of our interest is our willingness to help with their most pressing problems—economic development and security.

U.S. Interests

Our own interests in the countries of Latin America are strong. They are our closest neighbors. They are also important trading partners and friends which share many of our views about peace and stability in the world. They voted unanimously in the OAS [Organization of American States] to condemn the taking of hostages in Iran, and 25 countries in the region voted for the resolution condemning Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Increasingly, we need the cooperation of our southern neighbors to solve some of our own problems—such as drugs, illegal migration, and access to energy and raw materials.

Finally, we have reason for concern because their economies are not yet robust enough to provide a decent livelihood—and sometimes even sustenance—to all their people. A number of countries are in a crucial state of political change. We have a large stake in this change process. If these transitions preserve democracy, national independence, and pluralism—principles we believe are necessary for the development of a political system truly responsive to the needs of the people—the outcome will be governments that we can work with smoothly and effectively on the whole range of mutual problems.

Given the magnitude and importance of our interests in the region, the programs we are proposing are modest. Our total request for development assistance, security assistance, and PL 480 programs totals $450 million. This is but a fraction of our worldwide total of nearly $8 billion. Our development assistance in 1981 would be equal to only one-half of 1% of the combined output of the receiving countries. More than half of our proposed program for Latin America and the Caribbean—$275 million, of which only $111 million is in the form of grants—is for development assistance through AID [Agency for International Development]. Security assistance totals $91 million: $63 million for military sales credits and training—less than 2% of our worldwide military programs—and $28 million for economic support, compared with $2 billion for other areas.

Latin America is an area with countries at various levels of development. Let me differentiate this economic geography. The countries which receive our development assistance through AID have less than 20% of the region's population. They produce only 11% of its output. In South America, the four countries with which we have development assistance programs make up only 14% of the population of the continent and produce barely 7% of continental gross national product.

The point to underline here is that the largest countries with the largest populations and the largest economies—Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and to a lesser degree Chile and Colombia—look to the international financial institutions for development assistance and to the private sector for the bulk of their financing needs. It is only through the international financial institutions and our private sector that we help in their special development needs. There are still enormous undeveloped areas in these countries with large numbers of very poor and even hungry people. But the immense financing needs of these countries must be satisfied in the private financial markets. A single syndicated loan in Colombia—for $600 million, or Brazil, for $1.5 billion—exceeds international financial institutions' lending in that country by many times and dwarfs our entire assistance program for the hemisphere.

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United States of any of the items, commodities and products covered by paragraph (a) of this section which are consigned to or destined for Iran, an Iranian governmental entity or any person or body in Iran, or to any enterprise carried on in Iran.

(c) The shipment from the United States of any of the items, products and commodities covered by paragraph (a) of this section on vessels or aircraft registered in Iran.

(d) The following acts, when committed by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in connection with any transaction involving Iran, an Iranian governmental entity, an enterprise controlled by Iran or an Iranian governmental entity, or any person in Iran:

(i) Making available any new credits or loans;

(ii) Making available any new deposit facilities or allowing substantial increases in non-dollar deposits which exist as of the date of this Order;

(iii) Allowing more favorable terms of payment than are customarily used in international commercial transactions; or

(iv) Failing to act in a businesslike manner in exercising any rights when payments due on existing credits or loans are not made in a timely manner.

(e) The engaging by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in any service contract in support of an industrial project in Iran, except any such contract entered into prior to the date of this Order or concerned with medical care.

(f) The engaging by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in any transaction which evades or avoids, or has the purpose or effect of evading or avoiding, any of the prohibitions set forth in this section.

1–102. The prohibitions in section 1–101 above shall not apply to transactions by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States which is a non-banking association, corporation, or other organization organized and doing business under the laws of any foreign country.

1–103. The Secretary of the Treasury is delegated, and authorized to exercise, all functions vested in the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*) to carry out the purposes of this Order. The Secretary may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the Federal government.

1–104. The Secretary of the Treasury shall ensure that actions taken pursuant to this Order and Executive Order No. 12170 are accounted for as required by Section 401 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641).

1–105. This Order is effective immediately. In accord with Section 401 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641) and Section 204 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703), it shall be immediately transmitted to the Congress and published in the *Federal Register*.

JIMMY CARTER

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, APRIL 7, 1980

In connection with my decision today to close Iranian diplomatic facilities in the United States, I am directing that the Uniformed Division of the Secret Service provide any assistance necessary to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General in order to make my decision effective, including control of movement of persons and property into and out of Iranian diplomatic facilities in the District of Columbia.

JIMMY CARTER

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, APRIL 7, 1980

Pursuant to Section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703, I hereby report to the Congress that I have today exercised the authority granted by this Act to take certain trade, financial and other measures against Iran and its nationals.

1. On November 14, 1979, I took the step of blocking certain property or interests in property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran. At that time the United States Embassy in Tehran was occupied and American personnel were being held hostage there in flagrant violation of international law. In addition, Iran had threatened suddenly to withdraw its assets from United States banks, to refuse to accept payment in dollars for oil, and to repudiate obligations owed to the United States and to United States nationals. Iran's actions attacked the foundations of the international legal order as well as the stability of the world economy and the international monetary system.

2. The extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, which I determined existed on November 14, continues today. The United States has used every diplomatic and legal means available to it to end this extraordinary threat, but without avail. Iran has ignored or rebuffed a decision by the International Court of Justice, resolutions by the Security Council of the United Nations and efforts by the Secretary General of the United Nations and others to resolve the underlying problems.

3. In light of the above, it is necessary for me to order the following to be prohibited:

(a) The sale, supply or other transfer, by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any items, commodities or products, except food, medicine and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and donations of clothing intended to be used to relieve human suffering, from the United States or from any foreign country, whether or not originating in the United States, either to or destined for Iran, an Iranian governmental entity in Iran, any other person or body in Iran, or any other person or body for the purposes of any enterprise carried on in Iran.

(b) The shipment by vessel, aircraft, railway or other land transport of United States registration or owned by or under charter to any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across the United States of any of the items, commodities and products covered by subparagraph (a) of this paragraph which are consigned to or destined for Iran, an Iranian governmental entity or any person or body in Iran, or to any enterprise carried on in Iran.

(c) The shipment from the United States of any of the items, products and commodities covered by subparagraph (a) of this paragraph on vessels or aircraft registered in Iran.

(d) The following acts, when committed by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in connection with any transaction involving Iran, an Iranian governmental entity, an enterprise controlled by Iran or an Iranian governmental entity, or any person in Iran:

(i) Making available any new credits or loans;

(ii) Making available any new deposit facilities or allowing substantial increases in non-dollar deposits which exist as of the date of the Order;

(iii) Allowing more favorable terms of payment than are customarily used in international commercial transactions; or

(iv) Failing to act in a businesslike manner in exercising any rights when payments due on existing credits or loans are not made in a timely manner.

(e) The engaging by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in any service contract in support of an industrial project in Iran, except any such contract entered into prior to the date of the Order or concerned with medical care.

(f) The engaging by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in any transaction which evades or avoids, or has the purpose or effect of evading or avoiding, any of the prohibitions set forth above.

Attached is a copy of this Executive Order which I am transmitting pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1641(b).

4. The prohibitions in paragraph 3 above shall not apply to transactions by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States which is a non-banking association, corporation, or other organization organized and doing business under the laws of any foreign country.

5. The above measures are being taken in furtherance of the objectives of Resolution 461 adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on December 31, 1979, and would have been specifically mandated by the Security Council on January 13, 1980, but for a veto by the Soviet Union.

6. This action is taken with respect to Iran and its nationals for the reasons described in this report.

JIMMY CARTER

DEPARTMENT PRESS
RELEASE 8,
APR. 8, 1980

Visa Revocation for Iranian Officials

Effective immediately, all visas according diplomatic or official status to Iranians in the United States, other than those on U.N. business, are revoked.

The decision has been made pursuant to the authority conferred on the Secretary of State by Section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. It applies to Iranian officials and employees, including those accredited to the United States, and their immediate families, attendants, and servants. It does not apply to Iranians accredited to or employed by the United Nations or other international organizations in the United States.

This action is taken in connection with the termination of relations between the United States and Iran. The termination of relations is necessary because of the continuing failure of the Government of Iran to put an end to the unlawful detention of U.S. citizens in Tehran, Iran.

[1] Texts of White House items from White House press releases. ■

U.S. Course in a Changing World

Address and excerpts from question-and-answer session before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at the Washington Hilton Hotel in Washington, D.C. on April 10, 1980.[1]

As you may know, for the last 2 days I've been meeting with President Sadat of Egypt. I've been very eager to get him out of the country before he decides to enter the late Presidential primaries. [Laughter] I think I'd rather run against anyone in this country than he. Let me say at the beginning that our meetings these last 2 days have been very significant. President Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem initiated the process of peacekeeping which finally culminated in the Camp David accords. And through his efforts and those of Prime Minister Begin, with whom I will meet next week, we have already achieved one resulting miracle: a Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel.

Its terms are being honored meticulously by both sides. Now we are engaged in negotiating to insure peace and security for Israel and its neighbors and for full autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. We come to these current talks, in which we are already participating, encouraged that the full agreements carried out at Camp David, with a solemn commitment from all three nations, will also be fully honored, as has the treaty between Egypt and Israel.

President Sadat and I talked of many issues. I was not surprised to find him sharing my own thoughts and my own concerns and my own ideas about the course of international events. I would like to discuss with you today some of the most urgent imperatives of American foreign policy with special emphasis in one particular area of the world. It's important that we take a hard, clear look together not at some simple world, either of universal goodwill or of universal hostility, but the complex, changing, and sometimes dangerous world that really exists.

It's not one world but many. It's no longer a world that is structured and controlled by competition among colonial powers. It's a more complicated world, where national, religious, and ethnic assertions are fragmenting old boundaries and old alignments. It's a world of conflicting ideologies, of unequal wealth, and of uneven resources. It's a world in which the capacity for destructive violence is at once alarmingly dispersed to every single small terrorist band and awesomely concentrated in the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers. It's in just such a changing world—uncertain, suspicious, shifting, searching for balance—that we pursue peace and security, not only for ourselves in this great nation but for every human being on Earth.

We have so much youthful vitality that we sometimes forget that we are a mature nation in the best sense. We've been a democratic republic now for two centuries, and we are the strongest nation on Earth. But we live among challenges which are, every day, a test of our maturity and our will and the skill of the American people to deal with rapidly changing and unpredictable times.

In many languages and out of many unfamiliar cultures other peoples constantly ask America for a response to myriad—and often conflicting—concerns. Nations ask us for leadership, but at the same time they demand their own independence of action. They ask us for aid, but they reject any interference. They ask for understanding, yet they often decline to understand us in return. Some ask for protection but are wary of the obligations of alliance. Others ask for firmness and certainty, but at the same time they demand flexibility required by the pace of change and the subtlety of events. The world asks, with impatience, for all these things at once. They ask for them today, not tomorrow.

Iran

Nowhere do we face the challenges I've just described more directly than we do in Iran. No single situation so aggravates the American people, so tests our maturity, so tries our patience, so challenges our unity, as does the continued captivity of American hostages in the Tehran Embassy. No other single event seems so clearly to mirror the disorder of our times. This disregard for diplomatic propriety and for international law is a special threat to the small nation, the weak nation, the nation without economic or military or political power or influence. And

political consensus, social and economic reconstruction, and the strengthening of democratic and representative institutions. All our actions focus on achieving stability and security for the Lebanese. We support the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity of Lebanon and the cohesion of its peoples.

JORDAN

We are proposing a substantial program of security and economic assistance for Jordan in FY 1981. This consists of $50 million in foreign military sales credits and almost $1.1 million for military training. Confirming our intention announced some 3 years ago, we have phased out grant military assistance. In the economic field, we intend to concentrate our efforts exclusively on the Maqarin Dam project, which is critical to Jordan's future economic and social health. We are seeking $50 million in economic support funding for this purpose.

Jordanian Contributions

While substantial, the overall size of our programs reflects a continued downward trend, which was also evident last year. While Jordan's needs for outside help will remain large in scope, the country is prospering and the projects begun in past years with American assistance are making important contributions to future progress.

Jordan remains highly important to the United States. Its leadership, its stability, its continued social and economic development, and its ability to defend itself and resist outside direction have been integral elements of our broad policy interests in Jordan and in the region for decades. Our programs will build on a relationship which provides for broad U.S.-Jordanian cooperation in many fields as we pursue our own interests and as Jordan strengthens its national independence.

While both the United States and Jordan want to sustain the mutually beneficial and friendly cooperation they have developed over the years, we do not disguise our differences over the Middle East peace process. We bear in mind, however, that Jordan remains dedicated to achieving a comprehensive peace on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242. It will, we are sure, remain openminded and will seize opportunities which may later beckon.

King Hussein has also argued with Arab leaders that they should move from a totally negative posture regarding the Camp David process to the development of a positive and pragmatic alternative strategy. While no such reasonable alternative has yet been developed, by King Hussein or others, we believe that Hussein's basic advice warrants more interest among the region's leaders than the blind and inflexible opposition we hear elsewhere.

Security and Stability

A word about Jordan's interests in and concerns over security and stability in the broader Middle East region and southwest Asia may be useful. Jordan has been helpful over the years to its friends in the Gulf states. Over 1,800 of Jordan's best officers and noncommissioned officers are training security personnel and are providing advice in the peninsula states. More than 7,000 men from these states have passed through Jordanian training programs since 1970.

Jordan sent troops to help Oman resist outside attacks and has trained military personnel in North Yemen. Jordanian help has been responsible, discreet, and effective, and—indirectly—has thus served broader U.S. policy goals.

Our military assistance programs will contribute to the careful, phased modernization of Jordan's armed forces. Our military training programs will reinforce the orientation of Jordan's military establishment toward the West. Our economic assistance program will be an indispensable element in the construction and development of the Maqarin Dam project, designed to harness and exploit effectively the last major uncontrolled source of water in the lower Jordan River basin. In a water-scarce region, which suffered a major drought this year, it is imperative that this project be started soon.

We have examined the mix of our agreements, our disagreements, and our interests in and with Jordan. We have renewed our conviction that it is in our fundamental interest to remain credible and understanding to this important country. The basic message—that we are capable of working with our friends even when we have disagreement and that we have a long-term vision of the achievement of basic goals common to both our countries—is one that we want understood far beyond Jordan. Only on such a basis can we strengthen our structure of cooperation which can overcome the challenge of tomorrow.

SYRIA

The program of economic assistance we are proposing for Syria reflects an appreciation of our long-term regional interests and the desirability of a mature and constructive relationship with this important Arab country. It also takes into account a situation that is different from that I have just discussed in respect to Jordan.

Economic and Military Support

We are seeking for FY 1981 economic support funding of $5 million. This request is significantly below the levels approved in most of the fiscal years we have had a program in Syria. There are reasons for this decrease. On a technical level, it is difficult to justify further large requests for the Syrian program while substantial funds from previous fiscal years remain in the pipeline. We are continuing our joint efforts to resolve cooperatively the difficulties which have prevented the early use of these funds for the development and welfare of Syria and its people.

Members of this subcommittee may wonder why we are proposing any program at all this year when Syria has been so sharply critical of the United States and the Camp David approach to the Middle East negotiations. While we do not accept the criticisms made by Syria—or those offered by other states—we are prepared to believe that they are meant sincerely. We have made fully clear to Syria that we intend to proceed with the process on which we have embarked, believing that it is the only path that has been suggested that promises steady progress toward a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We have also made clear, at the same time, that we want Syria to keep the door ajar so that it can pass through it and rejoin the peace negotiations at a later time, and possibly under conditions that would appear more promising to Syrian policy interests.

Syria is an important state, with a vital strategic location, whose cooperation will be essential if lasting stability in the Arab-Israeli scene is to be achieved. Syria has influence going far beyond its borders. It has close relationships with many governments

which have sprung from revolutions, including that in Tehran. Syria is a key member of the nonaligned movement.

Syria has more influence on the future destiny of Lebanon and on the direction of Palestinian policies there than any other government. The Syrian military presence in Lebanon has been a major ingredient in preserving the uneasy stability that has been established there, and Syrian behavior there—on the whole—has been prudent and cautious, thus reducing the risk of wider conflict in the area.

Cultural Agreement

Finally, we have wanted to carry out the understandings reached when we signed a cultural agreement with Syria in 1978. Our proposed program for FY 1981 will preserve our interesting and mutually beneficial people-to-people exchange efforts and U.S. training undertakings. Together with the support provided by the U.S. International Communication Agency, our proposed program will train 83 Syrian participants. Since 1975 a total of 310 Syrian professionals in the fields of agriculture, rural development, health, education, nutrition, and human resources have received training in the United States.

Shifts in attitudes and unforeseen events occur with astonishing rapidity in the Middle East. It is essential that the United States retain and exercise means of influencing trends and reinforcing cooperative relationships which encourage nations to pursue independent policies, as free as possible of negative outside influences. We also want to show our interest in Syrian citizens and in their aspirations for a better life in a more peaceful world. Our modest program for Syria is intended as a major contribution toward achievement of these policy goals and toward the reinforcement of the underlying good will which has been part of our relationship for many years.

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[1]The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

ANZUS Council Meets

The 29th meeting of the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States pact) Council was held in Washington, D.C., February 26–27, 1980. Following are a joint news conference held on February 27 by Secretary Vance, Australian Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock and Minister for Defense D.J. Killen, and New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Brian Talboys and the text of the joint communique issued February 27.

JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, FEB. 27, 1980[1]

Secretary Vance. Let me just say a few words at the outset, if I might, please. This 29th meeting of the ANZUS Council has been, in my judgment, one of the most productive in the long history of our alliance. It was, as you know, a special meeting.

Under our customary schedule, we would have met this summer in Wellington. However, the new international situation in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan lent greater urgency to our annual ANZUS consultations. We are particularly grateful to New Zealand for agreeing to a change in time and place.

We have found ourselves in close agreement on the importance of demonstrating to the Soviet Union that it cannot profit from such blatant violations of international law. We agreed that the response to this new challenge should be firm and contain a combination of political, economic, and security measures. These we discussed in detail.

As was the case last year in Canberra, we also had a very useful discussion on the situation in Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and other matters of concern to the alliance.

Again, may I thank my good friends and colleagues, Brian Talboys, Andrew Peacock, and Jim Killen for their participation in this most important meeting.

Foreign Minister Talboys. This has been a very valuable meeting of the ANZUS Council. It certainly has been, by far, the most valuable meeting that I have attended, and I want to place on the record, I'm sure, our admiration for the way in which the Secretary of State has led the discussion and has provided an opportunity in a very free and open way to discuss the development attitudes, the development of policies that can be followed.

We in New Zealand have been part of ANZUS since its inception. We have, through the years, played our part within the limit of our capacities, and we will certainly continue to do that.

Foreign Minister Peacock. I would like to endorse what has been said. I also regard this as the most significant ANZUS Council meeting I have attended. Together with Brian, I think it's our fifth—we came in as Foreign Ministers at about the same time. They are unique meetings. They are extraordinarily valuable in the manner in which one can coordinate approaches to global and regional situations.

We happen to be meeting on this occasion at a most significant time following the invasion by the Soviet Union of Afghanistan. We've been able to indicate, through the communique, the areas covered. I think it is widely recognized that we do not see events occurring there in a simple return to the cold war. The requirements of international security today are far more complex than that, and the complexities must be discussed openly. And the sort of Council meeting we have provides a forum for just that. I was glad to participate and I speak on behalf of Jim Killen as well.

Q. On page 9 of your communique, with reference to the subject of Iran, you use the words "the hostages speedy release." It seems to be anything but speedy, and I wonder if you could define that word, what your expectations are.

Secretary Vance. It has been 100-plus days since the hostages were seized and held in Tehran. We have been, since that time, engaged in discussions through various intermediaries with the Government of Iran seeking the earliest possible release of the hostages.

We have left no stone unturned in trying to bring this about at the earliest possible moment. Unfortunately, we have not been able to do so yet. We have, however, I think, taken a step forward with the commission which has gone to Tehran. They are engaged at this point in the performance of the duties set forth under their terms of reference which have been described by the Secretary General. Their mission is

provide to strengthen Pakistan's defensive capabilities on the western frontier. We will be in touch with other potential equipment suppliers and sources of financing in an effort to collaborate with them and the Pakistanis on an overall effective response.

We are prepared to process certain cash military sales even in the absence of agreement on our assistance levels, though obviously, Pakistan's ability to pay for much new equipment will be severely constrained under present circumstances.

We hope and trust that our economic support and that of other donors will make it easier for the Pakistan Government to take measures to encourage internal stability. We are confident that a U.S. military sales relationship will help Pakistan improve its ability to defend itself against the increased threat from the northwest.

India

Our contacts with Mrs. [Indira] Gandhi's new government in India have also been significant.

As you know, former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford was in New Delhi January 30–31 as the President's special emissary. We believe that his mission was successful in registering U.S. desires to maintain good relations and close consultative ties with the new Indian Government.

The President's decision to send a senior adviser of Secretary Clifford's stature obviously gratified Mrs. Gandhi and her colleagues, and the talks he held were frank, amicable, and in our view highly beneficial.

Mr. Clifford was forthright in presenting U.S. positions on the Soviet invasion and our response to it. He made it clear to the Indians that the United States was interested in their concerns and opinions and that as the largest power in the region, they had an important role in dealing with the new situation.

He reiterated our belief that the efforts we have undertaken to help Pakistan meet the challenge on its northwest frontier should not adversely affect either our relations with India or Indo-Pakistan ties.

He expressed our hope that India and Pakistan could evolve a regional approach to the fundamentally changed situation which the whole region now faces, and stated that what we do to strengthen Pakistan's security should not impede such an approach. He welcomed the decision of the Indians and Pakistanis to hold high-level talks, which took place a few days later.

We came away from the Clifford talks convinced that while the Indians are dubious about our military supply relationship with Pakistan, they are quite concerned by the Soviet invasion. They share our desire that the Soviets pull out of Afghanistan. They find developments in Afghanistan a matter of concern both for their own sake and also because, in the Indian view, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan could lead to big-power confrontation in the South Asian region.

We hope that continuing a frank dialogue with India can lessen the danger that our differences in approach could adversely influence Indo-U.S. relations. Our offer to be more receptive to Indian interest in purchases of U.S. military equipment to meet their legitimate security requirements reflects the importance we attach to India's role and to Indo-U.S. relations under present circumstances.

Against this background, we will also pursue our other interests in the region which include nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, narcotics, and the discouragement of regional arms races. I believe that our security objectives and these other interests can be mutually supportive and that we must seek to achieve all of our goals.

Nuclear Proliferation

The problem of nuclear proliferation causes us intense concern. If and when we reach an understanding with the Pakistan Government about a U.S. aid

Assistance for Afghan Refugees

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT, JAN. 31, 1980[1]

President Carter announced on January 31, 1980, that the United States is making a new pledge of $5.3 million for immediate assistance to the growing number of Afghan refugees fleeing into Pakistan because of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. This latest U.S. contribution consists of $5 million in emergency refugee funds for the Afghan relief program of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and $300,000 in grant aid for voluntary agency efforts.

The $5 million contribution to the UNHCR will include an immediate cash contribution of $3 million, plus the shipment of $2 million more in relief supplies. As a first step the United States is shipping more than 40,000 heavy blankets to Pakistan. The cost, including airfreight, is more than $500,000.

This new U.S. pledge is in response to the worldwide appeal issued by the UNHCR for a total of $55 million ($25 million in food and $30 million in cash) to help care for a projected refugee population of 500,000 over the next year—a number which may well increase as more Afghan people flee their occupied land.

The United States has already made an initial contribution to the UNHCR, through the U.N. World Food Program, of more than 17,000 metric tons of food commodities, largely wheat, valued at $6.1 million. In addition, the United States will allocate a minimum of $10 million from the pending supplemental appropriation for PL 480 (Food for Peace), on which the President hopes the Congress will shortly complete action.

Together, these will provide more than $16 million for more than 50,000 tons of food, including wheat, vegetable oil, and dried milk. With today's new pledge, the U.S. contribution will total more than $21 million, nearly 40% of the U.N. appeal.

We are considering still other humanitarian steps we can take to help UNHCR and the Government of Pakistan care for these unfortunate Afghan people who have been forced to flee their homes and now suffer from cold and hunger because of the brutal Soviet invasion and occupation of their homeland. More help is needed, and we call on all other humanitarian-minded countries to join this effort.

The President's Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Victor H. Palmieri, also announced today that he is sending his deputy, Frank E. Loy, and two staff members of a factfinding mission to Pakistan for a firsthand look at relief operations. Dr. Marie Griffin of the Center for Disease Control will accompany them to survey the medical needs of the refugees. Loy and his delegation will report their findings to President Carter and Secretary of State Vance on their return in 2 weeks.

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 4, 1980. ■

relationship, we expect to propose to the Congress legislation which would suspend the strictures of our nonproliferation legislation—the Symington and Glenn amendments—because of the imperatives of our security interests.

We have made it clear to the Pakistan Government that this does not represent any lessening of concern on our part. We have plainly told them our view that a nuclear explosion in the present unsettled international environment in South Asia would be even more dangerous and unwise than before. We have stated what we consider to be a fact—that a Pakistani nuclear test would drastically alter our relationship and put at serious risk our further cooperation.

We intend to continue to pursue this matter with the Pakistan Government since we believe that concerns for Pakistani security and regional stability cannot be separated from the question of nuclear restraint within the region.

Both the nuclear question and our prospective military supply relationship are intimately bound up with our desire to avoid sparking an arms race, especially one between developing countries which need to spend their scarce resources on pressing development problems. Our military supply policy toward Pakistan will emphasize improving Pakistan's ability to defend its western frontier with Afghanistan and will not be directed against India.

Human Rights

Our interest in human rights, too, is closely bound up with our support for the region. We are convinced that equitable economic development which encompasses all regions of Pakistan and the creation of representative political institutions can make an important contribution to the stability of the country. Our recently released human rights report has highlighted some of the practices we are concerned about. We have made our views known to the Pakistan Government and hope that we will be able to establish an aid relationship which will help Pakistan to move in this direction.

Narcotics

In closing, let me say a brief word about narcotics. We are deeply concerned about the influx of narcotic substances from southwest Asia into the European and U.S. markets. We are encouraged by Pakistan's recent ban on opium production in the settled and merged areas of the Northwest Frontier Province and by the apparent reduction in this year's crop. Realistically, this problem is likely to be with us for some time, however, and we will continue to work closely with the Pakistan Government on enforcement and other aspects of narcotics control.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Security Council Vote on Israeli Settlements

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 465[1]

The Security Council,

Taking note of the reports of the Commission of the Security Council established by Resolution 446 (1979) to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, contained in documents S/13450 and Corr. 1 and S/13679,

Taking note also of letters from the Permanent Representative of Jordan (S/13891) and the Permanent Representative of Morocco, Chairman of the Islamic Group (S/13802),

Strongly deploring the refusal by Israel to cooperate with the Commission and regretting its formal rejection of Resolutions 446 (1979) and 452 (1979),

Affirming once more that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,

Deploring the decision of the Government of Israel to officially support Israeli settlement in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967,

Deeply concerned over the practices of the Israeli authorities in implementing this settlement policy in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, and its consequences on the local Arab and Palestinian population,

Taking into account the need to consider measures for the impartial protection of private and public land and property, and water resources,

Bearing in mind the specific status of Jerusalem and, in particular, the need for protection and preservation of the unique spiritual and religious dimension of the holy places in the city,

Drawing attention to the grave consequences which the settlement policy is bound to have on any attempt to reach a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

Recalling pertinent Security Council resolutions, specifically Resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971, as well as the consensus statement made by the President of the Security Council on 11 November 1976,

Having invited Mr. Fahd Qawasmeh, Mayor of Al-Khalil (Hebron), in the occupied territory, to supply it with information pursuant to rule 39 of the provisional procedure,

1. *Commends* the work done by the Commission in preparing the report contained in document S/13679;

2. *Accepts* the conclusions and recommendations contained in the above-mentioned report of the Commission;

3. *Calls upon* all Parties, particularly the Government of Israel, to cooperate with the Commission;

4. *Strongly deplores* the decision of Israel to prohibit the free travel of Mayor Fahd Qawasmeh in order to appear before the Security Council, and requests Israel to permit his free travel to the United Nations Headquarters for that purpose;

5. *Determines* that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have no legal validity and that Israel's policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

6. *Strongly deplores* the continuation and persistence of Israel in pursuing those policies and practices and calls upon the Government and people of Israel to rescind those measures, to dismantle the existing settlements and in particular to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;

7. *Calls upon* all States not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connection with settlements in the occupied territories;

8. *Requests* the Commission to continue to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, to investigate the reported serious depletion of natural resources, with a view to ensuring the protection of those important natural resources of the territories under occupation, and to keep under close scrutiny the implementation of the present resolution;

These relatively more developed countries play an ever growing role in the affairs of the region and in world affairs. Moreover, the AID reflows—principal and interest—from these countries where we no longer have assistance programs will amount to $130 million in FY 1981. This is more than enough to pay for the $111 million in grant assistance we intend to provide to their smaller neighbors. Furthermore, a large share of their imports come from the United States, and we are an immensely important market for them. They look to us to be responsive to their needs in keeping our markets accessible to their goods and thus permit a reasonable rate of growth for their economies. For every dollar they earn in our market, they spend a dollar here. Thus, growing trade increases efficiency and well-being in both countries.

Let me turn now to the areas and countries where we still do have programs.

South America

The economies of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru—plus Paraguay and Colombia where our economic aid is small—are beginning to gain some economic strength which enables them to utilize to varying degrees the private financial markets. Their long-term outlook is generally positive; we expect their economic policies will enhance their development and strengthen their economies while addressing the very real problems they still face. The development assistance programs we have worked out with them are carefully crafted to reach and benefit the poor and to assist in institution building. The security assistance programs we are asking you to approve for these important South American countries are largely symbolic, but they will strengthen existing bonds of friendship. It would be seriously misleading to suggest that such small programs will enable us to exercise significant influence on the direction or nature of Latin American military expenditures or military planning.

Some disbursements continue from earlier programs in countries where we have withdrawn our development and military assistance, either by request or because of problems with the current governments. There are, for example, still $7.8 million in AID loans to be disbursed in Colombia and $4.5 million for Chile, although no new loans have been signed since 1976. But these older programs are coming to an end; they do not reflect our current priorities.

In sum, the focus of our commitment in South America today is to reach the poor and build institutions through training, planning assistance, and expert advise and to remain in touch with their military establishments. These purposes are narrow and the size of our programs small compared to each country's output, as is appropriate under the changed circumstances in South America.

Central America and the Caribbean

The situations we face today are radically different. President Carter stated to the Congress last November in his request for a major supplemental appropriation that:

> Many of our neighbors in Central America and the Caribbean are in crises marked by economic problems, terrorism, and popular frustration. The resolution of these problems in ways that will preserve the independence and security of these countries, while expanding democracy and supporting human rights, is very much in the interest of the United States.

The perception of deepening crisis and the assessment that we have a major interest in helping is, if anything, stronger today than it was 3 months ago. The Administration is giving urgent attention to Central America and the Caribbean and is seeking to use all the resources at our disposal to the maximum. But it is clear that the problems of the area are long term and that resources that might have been adequate in other circumstances are inadequate today.

In the Caribbean, the 12 small island states—of which nine have become independent since 1960—face enormous problems with very limited resources. Their economies cannot provide adequate growth and improve the livelihoods of their people under the impact of oil price rises and other external shocks. Our development assistance, while only 1% of their combined GNPs, can have a noticeable impact in a few important sectors. In addition, the rapid reduction in the British role in the Caribbean requires us to open the door to cooperative security relationships with them. Our security assistance proposals, principally for military training, are modest. But they can have a significant impact in providing security for development. To do otherwise is to leave the field to Cuba, which is aggressively expanding its influence with its smaller Caribbean neighbors.

We place considerable emphasis on regional programs in the Caribbean because we believe regional cooperation is the best and quickest way to deal with their problems. We are concerned that, in the absence of efficient regional institutions, the sense of futility of the poor and unemployed spawned by economic stagnation could turn into a breeding ground for radicalism. We must be prompt to respond to the need to grow and develop into healthy, independent, and pluralistic societies.

In Central America, even more fundamental changes are taking place. Economic distortions—the foremost of which has been an exaggerated concentration of wealth and political power in too few hands—have bred inequities that have festered over a long period. Adverse international economic conditions now severely aggravate these endemic tensions. We are concerned that without resolution of the severest of the economic problems, the processes of change could in some cases produce traumas and slip into anarchy.

The assistance we plan to reprogram for Central America in 1980, the funds we seek in the supplemental, and the appropriations we seek for 1981 are in part a response to a lessening of repression. But increased assistance is needed to forestall the possibility that over the longer term events will lead to governments unrepresentative of the broad majority of the population and controlled by well-trained and disciplined groups unashamedly hostile to the United States. Whether in the end these groups are of the right or the left will matter little to the peoples whose aspirations they would frustrate.

With regard to security assistance, it is important that we act now to improve the carability of moderate governments to defend themselves and sustain evolutionary and peaceful progress. Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras will receive the largest increases in FMS [foreign military sales] credits and IMET [international military education and training]—albeit not large in absolute terms.

HUMAN RIGHTS

As you know, there are several important countries where we have reduced or stopped completely our support because of their performance in human rights. But the tide has turned.

Last year was one of substantial progress on both personal and political rights in Latin America. There was a marked overall decline in cases of violations of the integrity of the person, even in countries where abuses have been most serious. Fewer disappearances occurred in Argentina. Cases of

prolonged arbitrary detention were down in Chile. The Uruguayan armed forces adopted apparently effective internal measures to stop the use of torture. Cuba released about 3,900 political prisoners.

The institutionalization of human rights in the inter-American system continued apace with the establishment of the Human Rights Court and a landmark visit to Argentina by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. These improvements were driven by a series of changes within Latin America itself although influenced by U.S. policies.

The regionwide trend from military to civilian governments enhanced respect for human rights. In 1979 Ecuador and Bolivia installed civilian governments; Peru elected an assembly which adopted a new Constitution; Brazil maintained a steady course of liberalization; and the freely elected government in the Dominican Republic consolidated its position.

Indigenous human rights organizations grew in strength and boldness, challenging government policies in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Nicaragua.

Acrimonious OAS debates on human rights gave way to general agreement on principles and institutions. The ninth General Assembly of the OAS approved resolutions urging reforms in Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile and emphasized the need to deal with the problem of disappearances. The Inter-American Human Rights Court came into being under the San Jose Pact, and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission enhanced its role.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Let me now address more specifically the proposed development assistance program for Latin America. The acting AID Assistant Administrator will discuss the program with you in greater detail in a few days.

The broad strategy is, of course, to maintain the momentum for continued economic development. We seek to maintain economic growth while spreading the benefits of growth more equitably. U.S. bilateral economic and technical cooperation in Latin America is not currently designed primarily as a resource transfer program. Our primary roles are to transfer ideas and technical knowledge to build indigenous capacity—primarily through creating and strengthening institutions and to deal with newer global problems.

In accordance with congressional directives, we concentrate our program on addressing the basic human needs of the poorest sectors in the recipient countries. Often this means rural health and agriculture programs. But we also face the growing global problems which increasingly impact on us all—environmental pollution, energy development and conservation, and population growth. These are a necessary complement to a basic human needs strategy.

Turning to our specific requests, the total development and economic support assistance of $303 million requested for the region is modest. The poorest countries—Haiti, Honduras, Bolivia, Guyana, and El Salvador, with per capita incomes of less than $625—would receive $80 million, including $32 million of our grant assistance. Where we have programs in the so-called middle-income Latin countries, our focus is on the poorest people in these countries. As you are well aware, the poor bear the burden that lagging growth and economic stagnation produce. Even in the best of times, the economies of these countries are not yet robust enough to employ fully their human resources.

Assistance to Nicaragua will remain large in FY 1981, but a significant shift is planned in the type of assistance. For FY 1980, in our supplemental request, we have asked for $75 million of quick disbursing economic support funds. Fast disbursing support funds are needed quickly to help overcome the crises resulting from exhausted foreign exchange resources, damaged or destroyed inventories, late or lost agricultural plantings, and lack of credit. Development assistance levels for FY 1980 are minimal; for until the immediate problems are resolved, few new development projects can be put in place.

We are continuing with several development projects for which funds were committed in FY 1978 and earlier years. By FY 1981 we expect the worst of the economic crises will be over, and it will be time to begin new development assistance projects. Thus, Nicaragua again becomes a major recipient of AID development assistance in FY 1981. However, there will still be short-term problems in the balance of payments which will require help. Our economic support fund request for $25 million is intended to address both the balance-of-payments problem and the needs of the private sector for credit. By FY 1982, we expect to be able to return to a normal program of development assistance without economic support funding.

To complement official aid efforts and help meet the challenge we face in Latin America and the Caribbean, we are working with a number of voluntary organizations, such as the American Institute for Free Labor Development. This organization can respond quickly and flexibly to new situations. The labor movements it reinforces are generally a key element of pluralistic democracy and an important political as well as economic force. We want to help and encourage them to do more and have requested $8 million for FY 1981. Because of constraints and inflexibilities inherent in any government-to-government program, there is much that private organizations can do that the United States cannot.

Respect for human rights is central to our policy in Latin America. Our proposed increased assistance levels in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru are linked to their present progress on human rights. A modest increase in our level of assistance would acknowledge the demonstrated support and respect for human rights in these countries where we have made clear our strong support of the return to the democratic process. Moreover, the fledgling democratic governments need our support to help relieve the strong pressures for social development which the return to democracy promises, but which the economies of these countries are unable to support adequately.

We have tried to maintain the momentum of assistance to regional programs. We are convinced that regional and subregional cooperation and interdependence can be the key to accelerating development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Regional cooperation not only can achieve economies of scale but helps tear away the sometimes fierce suspicions and fear which isolation can cultivate.

The Latins themselves are coming to realize the benefits that can accrue from working in tandem rather than competitively or defensively. We have urged the development of institutions which foster these linkages, and we are pleased to see the growing strength of the concept of regional cooperation on a wide variety of issues.

We hope to have $34 million for the Caribbean regional program. Nowhere is the building of regional institutions and cooperation more important than in the ministates of the Caribbean. Our program for Central America at $3.7

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it also comprises a part of the competing pressures on a great and a powerful nation like ours.

This crisis calls on us to act with courage, and also with wisdom, that will both produce results and preserve life. I'm deeply proud of the steady strength that has been demonstrated in America in dealing with the irresponsible Iranian authorities who've been unwilling to act or unable to carry out their frequent, solemn commitments. The leaders of the Iranian Government lack the cohesion and resolve to bring order to their own chaotic land or to decide on a basis for ending this illegal detention of hostages which has created international crisis.

For long months, ours has been a restraint of strength, despite outrageous provocation. I do not regret that restraint, which was designed to protect American lives and to explore with Iranian Government officials and with U.N. officials and with mediators working with us a way to resolve this crisis peacefully. But it has become necessary, because Iran would not act in accordance with international law and with their own interests, for us to act again. The steps I've taken this week, to end diplomatic relations and to impose sanctions, are firm and substantive, and we hope that they will be persuasive.

America will continue the careful and considered exercise of its power. We will pursue every and, I repeat, every legal use of that power to bring our people home free and safe. But the hard, sad reality is that a small number of zealots engaged in a power struggle within Iran are using the innocent American hostages for their own advancement, with serious adverse consequences to all Iranian people.

In the interests of the people of Iran and of their possible future as a unified and peaceful nation living in freedom, it is imperative that the Iranian Government resolve this crisis. Every day that the crisis continues, Iran is further isolated from the rest of the world. Every day that the American Embassy remains a prison pushes Iran further into lawlessness, down and down the spiral of disorder.

With a return of rationality, international lawlessness need not be Iran's fate. Bankruptcy, political as well as moral, need not be Iran's future.

If interference from outside is a threat, the threat does not come from the United States.

The challenge in that area of the world—as in some others—comes from the intersection of two historic trends. One is the rising demand for development and for self-determination which is felt, and deeply felt, throughout what we call the Third World. The United States responds with sympathy to that demand. The other trend is Soviet expansionism, which we are determined to oppose.

In 1946, the United States stood firm against Soviet occupation of northern Iran, against Soviet-sponsored subversion in Greece, against Soviet demands on Turkey. Historically, American strength has been used to help the countries of the Persian Gulf area to protect their stability and to retain their own sovereignty.

The reality of the world today is that Moscow exploits unrest—not to address the discontent that underlies that unrest, not to overcome the inequalities that give rise to unrest, but to expand its own dominion and to satisfy its imperial objectives.

Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has revealed for the world the hypocrisy of its courtship of the Third World. It has shown that it will not be deterred by principle or decency or by international law or by world public opinion or by the opposition of freedom-loving and patriotic Afghanis. And it has made this known in a region which is at once politically volatile and economically crucial.

The subjugation of Afghanistan represents the first direct intrusion of Soviet Armed Forces beyond the borders of the Warsaw Pact nations since the Second World War. The explosiveness of this region, its great natural wealth and the Soviet willingness to use the armed forces which have been developed during the Kremlin's enormous military buildup during the last 15 years are what combine to make the invasion of Afghanistan so unsettling to the future of international peace.

In southwest Asia, unstable and uncontrollable forces are at work. The Soviets have, with their invasion, disturbed these forces of historic, religious, economic, and ethnic conflict that are beyond the control of the Soviets and that could lead to much more serious direct confrontation with other nations which have vital interests in this region.

Nor can the world turn away from the harsh truth that the occupation of Afghanistan is marked by appalling inhumanity. We must not forget, and our allies and other nations must not forget, that today, at this moment, every day, the Soviet Union is violating human standards of decency and violating human rights in the grossest kind of way. Hundreds of Afghan freedom fighters are dying every week, some in brutal mass executions. Entire villages are being wiped out. More than 800,000 people have fled the country. Terror tactics, including the use of chemical weapons, are the trademark of the ruthless attempt to crush Muslim resistance and to install a Soviet form of peace—a peace of brutal armed suppression.

Earlier this year, 103 other members of the United Nations joined us in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and demanding the immediate withdrawal of the invading forces. Soviet citizens have never been informed of this U.N. action. This unprecedented condemnation was significant but, because of the principle at stake, because of the nation's importance to Western security, because of the savagery of the Soviet assault which continues until now, and because of the Soviet Union's use of its own troops directly in such a conflict, it's imperative that we continue to meet the challenge of the invasion with calm and unshakeable resolution.

The measures that I've ordered are designed to enhance peace. They include the embargo on further grain sales, tightened controls on high technology trade, limitations of fishing in U.S. waters, strengthening of our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, intensification of our development of rapid deployment forces and our capacity to deploy them and to use them, and our offer to assist states in the region to maintain their own security. These are necessary steps on a course which we must and we will persist.

We cannot know with certainty the motivations of the Soviet move into Afghanistan—whether Afghanistan is the purpose or the prelude. Regardless of its motives, there can be no doubt that the Soviet invasion poses an increased threat to the independence of nations in the region and to the world's access to vital resources and to vital sea lanes.

But our interest in peace and stability in the region goes far beyond economies. We cannot wish away the fact that conflict and tension in the region could endanger the broader peace. And if the invasion of Afghanistan does indeed foreshadow a pattern of Soviet behavior, then for the coming years, Americans must accept the truth that we are in for challenging and very difficult times. In

this ever more interdependent world, to assume that aggression need be met only when it occurs at one's own doorstep is to tempt new adventures and to risk new and very serious miscalculations. Our course is clear. By responding firmly, we intend to halt aggression where it takes place and to deter it elsewhere.

Let me underline for you this most vital point in our policy. America and Americans are not motivated by relentless hostility, by a desire for indiscriminate confrontation or a return to the cold war. But for America simply to accept Soviet occupation and domination of Afghanistan as an accomplished fact would be a cynical signal to the world that could only encourage further aggression, further tension, and further danger to world peace. It's America's responsibility to register and register in concrete terms our condemnation of the Soviet invasion for as long as that invasion continues.

1980 Olympic Games

It is extremely important that we not, in any way, condone Soviet aggression. We must recall the experience of 1936, the year of the Berlin Olympic Games. They were used to inflate the prestige of an ambitious dictator, Adolf Hitler, to show Germany's totalitarian strength to the world in the sports arena as it was being used to cow the world on the banks of the Rhine.

The parallel with the site and timing of the 1980 Olympics is striking. Let me call your attention to one compelling similarity between the Nazi view of the 1936 Olympics as a propaganda victory and the official Soviet view of the 1980 Summer Games. I'd like to read to you a passage from this year's edition of the "Handbook for Party Militants" issued in Moscow for Soviet Party activists, and I quote:

> The ideological struggle between East and West is directly involved in the selection of the cities where the Olympic Games take place. The decision to award the honor of holding the Olympic Games to the capital of the world's first Socialist state is convincing testimony of the general recognition of the historic importance and correctness of the foreign policy course of our country and of the enormous service of the Soviet Union in the struggle for peace.

Let me repeat a part of that:

> The decision to award the honor of holding the Olympic Games to the capital of the world's first Socialist state is convincing testimony of the general recognition of the historic importance and correctness of the foreign policy course of our country, and of the enormous services of the Soviet Union in the struggle for peace.

A few weeks ago I met with American athletes in the White House. I explained the Soviet stake in the Olympics, and the moral and political reasons why the United States will not send a team to the Moscow games. I understand the sacrifice that has been asked from these men and women for the sake of the security of their country and their world. The Soviet leaders certainly understand it. But for our not sending a team to Moscow, this is far more than a symbolic gesture. It's a direct repudiation—in the phrase of their own propaganda handbook—of the "correctness" of their foreign policy.

Under Olympic principles, and this is very important, athletes represent their nations. Athletes who are not part of a national team cannot compete in the Olympics. The United States does not wish to be represented in a host country that is invading and subjugating another nation in direct violation of human decency and international law. If legal actions are necessary to enforce the decision not to send a team to Moscow, then I will take those legal actions.

All of these decisions do require sacrifice, and I've acted to assure that the burdens of those sacrifices are shared as equally as possible among all Americans. The American people have demonstrated that they are willing to bear their share of the burden, but it is also vital that the burden of sacrifice be shared among our allies and among other nations.

With a return of rationality, international lawlessness need not be Iran's fate. Bankruptcy, political as well as moral, need not be Iran's future.

East-West Relations

Neither we nor our allies want to destroy the framework of East-West relations that has yielded concrete benefits to so many people. But, ultimately, if we continue to seek the benefit of detente while ignoring the necessity for deterrence, we would lose the advantages of both.

It is essential that our intentions be absolutely clear. The measures we've taken against the Soviet Union since the invasion will remain in effect until there is total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Then, and only then, we would be prepared to join with Afghanistan and its neighbors in a guarantee of the true neutrality and noninterference in Afghanistan's internal affairs. We support the restoration of a neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan, with a government that would be responsive to the needs and the wishes of the people of that country.

Although the Soviets have talked about the withdrawal of their troops, they have actually shown no interest in such proposals. There are no signs at this time of a Soviet withdrawal. As a matter of fact, within this last week, we have proof that the Soviets are moving additional troop units across the border into Afghanistan. We must be prepared to hold our course and to impose the costs of aggression for as long as this is necessary.

We thus face what could be a protracted time of strain in East-West relations. To enhance stability as much as possible in this predictable and difficult period, we will continue to maintain a stable military balance, both through our own steady defense modernization, and through negotiated arms limits that are equitable and verifiable. This objective—a stable balance—is advanced by the SALT II Treaty. In a period of heightened tensions, it is all the more important that we have reliable constraints on the competition in strategic nuclear weapons. SALT is an integral part of our national security policy. I remain committed to the ratification of this treaty, and the United States intends to abide by its obligations under international law and to take no action inconsistent with its intent or purpose, so long as the Sovets act with similar restraint.

The U.S. Approach

The course we pursue, therefore, in this turbulent world is steady, firm, and fair.

It's the course of a strong, stable nation practicing mature restraint but insisting on justice—the policy we pursue in Iran.

It's the course of a resolute nation, hopeful of good relations but determined to deter aggression—the course we pursue in dealing with the Soviet Union.

It's the course of the peacemaker—the same role to which the United States is committed in the Middle East and, indeed, throughout the world.

It's the course of an understanding nation, sensitive to the tides of change and to the rights and the needs of all people—America's rightful approach, proper approach, to the revolutionary

two-fold: to hear the grievances of the Iranians and also to bring about a speedy release of the hostages, and thus end the crisis.

I cannot tell you when that is going to be, but all of us in the international community will continue to do everything we can to bring that about at the earliest possible date.

Q. On pages 3 and 4 of the communique, you talk about enhancing the effectiveness of the military activities in the Indian Ocean and additional measures for military cooperation. Specifically, would either Australia or New Zealand give access to further military facilities for the United States? Would either of them be prepared to join the U.S. idea of a rapid deployment force?

Foreign Minister Peacock. We are prepared to look at any of those matters. We've held preliminary consultations with the United States and other interested countries, or particularly the United States and New Zealand, on this matter.

The military activities by the ANZUS partners in the Indian Ocean of the kind that we've discussed are distinct from the traditional activities in the Pacific and in defense of their metropolitan territories. They, therefore, represent an extension of effort to cope with Soviet pressure and threats to security affecting an area that is strategically vital because of its oil resources.

The discussions will continue about the nature of further operational planning in response to the crisis, and that is well underway. The additional measures for military cooperation, therefore, in essence, are still being explored.

Q. In other words then, would Australia, with its carrier task force which is mentioned here, be willing to take part in a standing increase in the level of forces in the Indian Ocean, together with the United States?

Foreign Minister Peacock. This is what we are discussing, and it is on the assumption that it will be on the basis of an increased role.

Q. Can you quantify that?

Defense Minister Killen. Not at the moment. A political decision has been taken to enhance the role; but to express it in mathematical form or quantify it, as you suggest, no, that is a matter for determination or advice by the military representatives who will be meeting tomorrow, and of course, that will be ongoing.

Q. There have been certain eliptical signals in the past few days—both from President Brezhnev and from President Carter—that both the United States and the Soviet Union are at least prepared to try to resolve the issue in Afghanistan. I wonder if you would try to put it in less eliptical language for us. What is the United States prepared to do? What do you perceive the Soviet Union as being ready to do?

Secretary Vance. I think that the President really made it quite clear what we are prepared to do. The President has indicated that if there is a withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the establishment of a nonaligned and neutral Afghanistan, acceptable to the Afghan people, that under those circumstances, we would be prepared to enter into others in the region in the guaranteeing of the nonalignment and neutrality of that state.

Q. Your perceptions are of what you think the Soviets are prepared to do. It's possible to interpret President Brezhnev's speech as also being something of an olive branch. Do you see it that way?

Secretary Vance. I think it is hard to interpret exactly what is being said. I think it would be fruitless for me to speculate at this point. I think it is important to know what we are prepared to do at this point and to convey that very clearly to the Soviets, as we have done by what we have stated publicly.

Q. There is a reference in the communique to the tensions along the Thai-Kampuchean border. You say that ". . . the Council viewed with particular concern the possibility that the hostilities could spill over into Thailand."

Could you describe for us today, in view of the fact that several weeks ago the State Department was saying that a Vietnamese attack into the refugee areas in Thailand appeared imminent, what the nature of that threat is today? Does it still appear imminent?

Secretary Vance. The concern which we have had—which is shared by many others—is that the Vietnamese troops would cross over the border and engage in conflict with those who are in the region immediately around the border where the refugee camps are located, as well as a number of refugees who are moving back and forth across the border.

Such an incursion across the border could lead to a confrontation between Thai troops and the Vietnamese troops who would be coming across the border. This would, obviously, present a very dangerous situation—one which all of us hope very much can and will be prevented.

That is the concern which we were referring to—or I was referring to—in what I have said before and what is mentioned here in the communique.

Q. Is there anything imminent about such a threat?

Secretary Vance. With the large numbers of troops that exist on the Kampuchean border, obviously, that presents a continuing danger which remains as long as they are there. You know our position. It is that the Vietnamese troops should be withdrawn from Kampuchea.

Q. Since the issuance of the Secretary General's statement on the mandate for the commission, which you pointed out had a two-fold purpose, the Iranian authorities have publicly, at least, denied that it had more than the purpose of hearing their grievances. And, secondly, since then there have been statements by Iranian authorities, including the Ayatollah, suggesting that if the hostages are released—and it's just an "if"—it would not be any time before April, and now today it's suggested May.

The American people I think would like to know: Is this a misunderstanding by the United Nations and the United States of the role of the commission? Has there been any change in Iran? Or where do we stand on this?

Secretary Vance. Let me say that the understanding of the United Nations and ourselves has been clearly set forth by the Secretary General. He was asked what the mandate was after a question had been raised as to the nature of the mandate, and he confirmed it was as he had originally stated it.

Sometimes there are very difficult and delphic statements that come out of Tehran. Indeed, that happens very frequently, and it's often very difficult to tell what is being said, particularly in light of the fact that often statements are made and then retracted very quickly thereafter.

Q. In the communique you talk about the Olympics. Could both of you address the specific cities in your

countries which might be involved in the Olympics—when, which games might be played, and whether you have the facilities to handle them?

Foreign Minister Talboys. In New Zealand there is no suggestion that there should be games in New Zealand. What is being done at the present time is that consideration is being given by a number of people to alternative sites—maybe in North America, and Canada perhaps, in other parts of the world—and as soon as those sites are identified, I have no doubt that they will be announced.

Q. But you are definitely ruling out any games in Auckland or other parts of your country.

Foreign Minister Talboys. There has been no such suggestion made.

Foreign Minister Peacock. We've held preliminary consultations with the United States and with other countries about the transferring of the games from Moscow and there were further discussions.

Transfer of the Olympics to another site would, in our view, represent politically the most effective way of registering with the Soviets the intensity of international disapproval of their invasion of Afghanistan.

I would confirm with you that one city of Australia, Melbourne, is one of the cities that is being considered, though for climatic and other reasons it would be lower on the list.

Q. What activities, and is that the only city under consideration?

Foreign Minister Peacock. We held the Olympics in 1956 so there are thinner facilities available.

Q. You're saying it could be any of the activities then in any of the games?

Foreign Minister Peacock. I'm saying nothing more than what I just said.

Q. In view of the role played by the United States and New Zealand, both in first precipitating and then condemning the African Olympic boycott of 1976, as well as the apparent dissatisfaction by African leaders with what they consider lukewarm support from the United States and in particular with your other colleagues as well on issues relating to southern Africa—particularly Rhodesia—do you feel or can you say that the United States actually has the moral authority to ask Third World countries to boycott the Olympics in 1980 when the West is outraged?

Secretary Vance. I would draw a distinction between a dipute over whether a particular team could participate and the question of whether or not it is proper for a nation to host the Olympic Games when it is involved in a naked and brutal invasion of another country. Under Olympic tradition and law itself, that is contrary to the traditions of the Olympics, and it goes back to the very beginning of the Olympics. So I think there's a clear distinction between the two.

Q. But what do you say to the Africans who don't see it that way and who felt that they—

Secretary Vance. They'll have to make their own decisions.

Q. You consulted very closely with Secretary General Waldheim before those terms of reference were issued. Why, if the Iranians were in agreement that there was some linkage between the commission and the release of the hostages, was it not spelled out in those terms of reference? And if they weren't in agreement, why did you make the concession allowing the commission to be formed when you had said previously you wouldn't do that unless there was some linkage to the release of the hostages?

Secretary Vance. I think the terms of reference and the understanding with respect to those terms of reference were clear, remain clear, and I think they have been correctly reflected by what the Secretary General has said.

Q. You earlier seemed to allow the possibility that Australia would participate in the U.S. rapid deployment forces. Could you please spell that out?

Foreign Minister Peacock. I simply said that we have the whole totality—and the Defense Minister is here so he should really answer it—but this question of operational planning and response to any crisis is well underway.

I said I think that additional measures for military cooperation are being explored. That means if you are having an examination, you would look at all the options.

Q. You say on page 4 [of the communique] that: "Council members reiterated the importance of preventing the . . . spread of nuclear weapons . . ." What have you obtained from the United States by way of guarantees that if Pakistan is given a further supply of U.S. arms, it will prevent or will not be accompanied by the continued development of Pakistani nuclear weapons? What have we done to get guarantees from the new military regime in South Korea that our uranium being sold to South Korea will not be sold, continued for nuclear weapons, as distinct from the previous piece of paper signed by the previous regime? And what have we done to find out who exploded a nuclear weapon inside of South Africa, and what have we done to condemn it?

Foreign Minister Peacock. I wish we had 6 hours [laughter].

In regard to the first question, the communique speaks for itself. It says there that we "reiterated the importance of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, and expressed concern that development and spread of the capability to acquire nuclear weapons would further harm security and international stability."

Now that statement is not made *in vacuo*. It applies globally. And you can apply it wherever you will.

In regard to your second question—which I think related to South Korea—so far as the export of uranium is concerned, you are well aware that Australia will not export uranium other than on terms of a government-to-government agreement entered into under stringent safeguards that we have laid down. Indeed, the safeguards that are written into the agreement are probably more stringent, if I may say so, than any other country in the world. And the basis is to insure that the yellow cake so sold and transferred to the country—to the purchaser—is not to be used for military purposes. So that answers the South Korean Army.

So far as South Africa is concerned—or, indeed, anybody else who explodes weapons—I've indicated clearly in Australia our opposition to nuclear testing.

Q. Can you give us any idea if there is anything more concrete than the public statements currently coming from Washington and Moscow on this whole issue of the neutralization of Afghanistan? Are talks at any preliminary stage between the United States and the Soviet Union? Are the

9. *Requests* the Commission to report to the Security Council before 1 September 1980, and decides to convene at the earliest possible date thereafter in order to consider the report and the full implementation of the present resolution.

AMBASSADOR McHENRY, MAR. 1, 1980[2]

As always, the Middle East is subject to many trends and influences, some of them contradictory in nature. In the view of the United States, one of the positive trends in the area is the current series of negotiations for a comprehensive settlement which resulted from the historic breakthrough at Camp David a year and a half ago. A Peace Treaty has been signed, and large areas of occupied Arab territory have been evacuated by Israel. The parties have taken concrete steps in the cause of peace, even in the face of issues which touch their most vital national interests and on which there are, particularly in Israel, sharp but honest differences of view.

As significant as these developments are, we recognize that there can be no comprehensive peace in the Middle East until the Palestinian problem in all of its aspects is resolved. The ongoing negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza are admittedly difficult and even if successful will constitute only a first step. But progress is being made, and for the first time in 30 years, the core issues are being addressed seriously and with determination.

Everyone recognizes that the problem of Israeli settlements is one of the issues that must be dealt with. The position of the United States on the question of settlements is clear and is consistent. In particular, the United States has had the occasion to state its views both publicly and privately concerning the situation in Hebron.

We regard settlements in the occupied territories as illegal under international law, and we consider them to be an obstacle to the successful outcome to the current negotiations which are aimed at a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East.

We have supported the resolution before us. We have done so despite our reservations with regard to certain of the provisions of the resolution, which we consider to be recommendatory in character. We believe that the report of the settlements commission is generally fair-minded and objective, but we have a question concerning the commission's recommendation in paragraph 54 of its report as to the best means to deal with the settlements in the occupied territories. I should also add that we do not read the reference in operative paragraph 5 of the resolution to changes in the institutional structure of the occupied territories as in any way prejudicing the outcome of the autonomy negotiations.

The basic framework for all our efforts, including the Camp David accords, is Resolution 242 which calls for negotiations to resolve the many and difficult aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such negotiations are currently underway.

One of the issues which the negotiators will have to address is the matter of existing settlements. There are a number of factors of a practical character that make impractical the call in operative paragraph 6 of the resolution for the dismantling of existing settlements. Some projects are not so easily dismantled; moreover, whatever the future status of the occupied territories, there will be a need for housing, and there will be a need for related infrastructure for the inhabitants.

My delegation is pleased that the Council has spoken unanimously on this important issue. At the same time, we believe we must all recognize that the solution to the problem lies ultimately in a negotiating process. For our part, we are committed to the negotiations in which we are currently engaged as a full partner, and we are determined that they shall bring a comprehensive peace closer to reality. In the final analysis, all of us here will be judged by the contribution which we make to this objective.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, MAR. 3, 1980[3]

There were some questions raised over the weekend about our vote in the Security Council on Saturday. I want, therefore, to make the following points. There is no change in our basic policy on settlements or on Jerusalem. Our policy has been consistently stated over a number of months and remains unchanged. Our support for Israeli security and well-being also remains firm and unwavering.

This is a fundamental element in American foreign policy. We remain totally committed to the success of the negotiations under the Camp David frameworks. We believe they will provide the proper context for dealing with issues such as the Israeli settlements in occupied territory.

As we said yesterday and as Ambassador McHenry made clear in the Security Council, the United States is opposed to the inclusion of the phrase "dismantling of existing settlements" in the Security Council resolution which was passed on Saturday.

The issue of existing settlements in occupied territory will be dealt with in the negotiations now underway. We do not consider the call in this forum—i.e., in the Security Council—in that resolution for dismantling them to be either proper or practical.

As we have said, we believe all the outstanding issues should be dealt with through negotiation, and we are fully committed to the success of the current negotiations.

Finally, to repeat again what we have said before, we have made clear our opposition to any effort to change or amend U.N. Resolution 242 in any way.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, MAR. 3, 1980[4]

I want to make it clear that the vote of the United States in the Security Council of the United Nations does not represent a change in our position regarding the Israeli settlements in the occupied areas nor regarding the status of Jerusalem.

While our opposition to the establishment of the Israeli settlements is longstanding and well-known, we made strenuous efforts to eliminate the language with reference to the dismantling of settlements in the resolution. This call for dismantling was neither proper nor practical. We believe that the future disposition of existing settlements must be determined during the current autonomy negotiations.

As to Jerusalem, we strongly believe that Jerusalem should be undivided with free access to the holy places for all faiths and that its status should be determined in the negotiations for a comprehensive peace settlement.

The U.S. vote in the United Nations was approved with the understanding that all references to Jerusalem would be deleted. The failure to communicate this clearly resulted in a vote in favor of the resolution rather than abstention.

I want to reiterate in the most unequivocal of terms that in the autonomy negotiations and in other fora, the United States will neither support nor

accept any position that might jeopardize Israel's vital security interests. Our commitment to Israel's security and well-being remains unqualified and unshakable.

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[1] Adopted unanimously on Mar. 1, 1980.
[2] USUN press release 16 of Mar. 1, 1980.
[3] Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston.
[4] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Mar. 10, 1980. ■

U.S. to Rejoin ILO

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, FEB. 13, 1980[1]

Two years ago I directed that the United States withdraw from membership in the International Labor Organization (ILO), a specialized agency of the United Nations, because it had strayed too far from its fundamental principles and purposes. In particular, our withdrawal was an expression of our growing concern over a number of trends that weakened the ability of the ILO to carry out its basic mission. Those trends included the erosion of the independence of employer and worker delegates attending ILO conference the relative immunity of certain countries from criticism for violating workers' human rights, the growing disregard within the ILO of the principles of due process, and the introduction of extraneous political issues into ILO debates.

At the time of our withdrawal, I stated that we remained ready to return to the ILO whenever that organization demonstrated respect for its proper principles and procedures. It was my hope that other countries would come to realize that the ILO and other U.N. agencies can only be effective if they are not used for political propaganda purposes.

Since then, a majority of ILO members—governments, workers, and employers—have successfully joined together to return the ILO to its original purposes. Through their efforts, steps have been taken to strengthen the independence of employer and worker delegates, undertake investigations of human rights violations in a number of countries, including the Soviet Union, reinforce the principle of due process, and generally reduce the level of politicization in the ILO.

I have decided, therefore, that the United States should now rejoin the ILO and work with other members to insure that the true potential of this organization is realized. This decision has the support of American trade union and employer organizations—the AFL-CIO and the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce.

As a member of the ILO, and with the support of other countries, the United States will seek to insure that the ILO continues to serve the interests of the world's working men and women by promoting more and better jobs while protecting their human rights and dignity.

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[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 18, 1980. ■

Background on U.S. Reentry into ILO

***Foreign Relations Outline*[1]**

The International Labor Organization (ILO), created in 1919 as part of the League of Nations, was established to set international labor standards, improve working conditions, create employment, and promote human rights. In 1946 it became the first U.N. specialized agency.

Unique among international organizations, it operates on a tripartite principle. Representatives of workers, employers, and government all participate on an equal basis. It is now composed of 141 member states.

U.S. Withdrawal

In November 1977, the United States withdrew from membership in the ILO for several reasons, including the erosion of the tripartite principle, the ILO's selective concern for human rights, its growing disregard for due process, and the increasing politicization of the organization. At that time, President Carter said that: "The United States remains ready to return whenever the ILO is again true to its proper principles and procedures."

Decision to Rejoin

Following the withdrawal, the President established a Cabinet-level committee to monitor developments and advise him on ILO matters. Reflecting the ILO's tripartite structure, AFL-CIO, U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, and U.S. Government representatives all had an equal voice on the committee. In early February 1980, the committee recommended unanimously to the President that the United States rejoin the ILO. The President accepted this recommendation, and the United States rejoined the organization on February 18.

Progress at the ILO

Although the ILO has not fully resolved all the issues that led to U.S. withdrawal, it has made significant progress on each.

Tripartism. The ILO has passed several resolutions strengthening its tripartite decisionmaking system. For example, a new ILO general conference secret ballot procedure, vigorously resisted by the U.S.S.R., permits employer and worker delegates to vote their consciences on sensitive issues without fear of government recrimination.

Human Rights. The ILO is applying its human rights machinery to Eastern Europe. In November 1978, the ILO governing body censured Czechoslovakia for illegally firing dissidents from their jobs, and it is currently examining worker complaints against the U.S.S.R. and Poland for violating trade union rights.

Due Process. In 1978 the general conference defeated an Arab resolution seeking to extend a 1974 resolution that condemned Israel without any investigation of the facts. A new mechanism to eliminate resolutions representing such violations of due process was negotiated by Western and Third World governments.

Politicization. ILO meetings have been far less politicized, and there has been a major turnaround on Middle East issues. When Arab representatives walked out during the speech of the Egyptian Labor Minister in the 1979 conference, only Communist delegates joined the walkout. The ILO also sent two missions to investigate working conditions of Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories. The mission reports were well balanced and accepted by both Arabs and Israelis at the 1978 and 1979 general conferences. As a result, no political resolutions were offered on this subject.

million and the Andean region—only slightly less—are very modest indeed but, nevertheless, are important as an incentive to the development of regional projects.

Let me conclude my comments on economic assistance by noting how important it is for us to have a means to respond quickly to unexpected political changes, such as in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The contingency economic support fund which the President has requested is just such an instrument which embodies primarily through its disbursement characteristics the flexibility we need to meet situations of rapid change. The size of the worldwide fund is small considering that it will probably have to be spread among several countries. But such funding can be made invaluable as visible demonstration of our support in countries where the changing situation is such that quick and effective economic support from the United States is critical to achieving outcomes in our national interests.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Our request for FMS and IMET of $63.7 million is the largest we have sought for Latin America in 3 years. Although that represents a 65% increase over the amount originally requested for Latin America in the 1980 budget, it is close to the average of the programs Congress approved for 1977 and 1978. It is still substantially below the Latin American programs of earlier years. Moreover, since most of the program is for FMS credits, which require appropriations for only 10% of the total amount, the actual request for appropriations is small—only $14.6 million.

This increased request does not reflect a general increase in assistance to the region. On the contrary, the programs we are asking that you approve for important South American countries are shrinking to levels that are largely symbolic. In 1979, 1980, and 1981 we will offer FMS loans of between $3 and $6 million to Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, and between $10 and $12 million to Colombia. Such loans to Peru, for example, represent less than one-half of 1% of its total military budget.

A squadron of 18 F-5E fighters—the aircraft we have made available to major Latin American countries in lieu of our more advanced planes—costs approximately $75 million, exclusive of spare parts and training. A squadron of Mirages or Soviet SU-22s costs substantially more, but credit from the U.S.S.R. or France is often available with concessional interest rates and repayment periods.

Obviously, a U.S. loan of $4 million, offered not on concessional terms but at 11.4% interest, with 5–8 years to repay, neither provides major assistance to friendly governments nor offers any alternative to major purchases from suppliers who offer concessional credit.

Our FMS sales, both cash and credit, to all Latin America have declined from a high of $212 million in 1974 to $81 million in 1978 and $33.2 million in 1979. FMS sales to South America, excluding the two countries where sales are prohibited by law, dropped from $120 million in 1974 to $30 million in 1979. That represents less than 3% of total South American arms purchases from outside the area.

There are, of course, a number of reasons for this decline. In a few cases, we have denied the sale of major weapons systems in accordance with our policies on conventional arms restraint. We have also deliberately curtailed our sales to some countries where major human rights violations have occurred. In particular, we have avoided a close military relationship with countries where the military has overthrown civilian regimes and is making little or no progress toward a return to democratic government. Pursuant to that policy, we terminated all military and most economic assistance to Bolivia last year when a military officer overthrew the elected President of that country.

Fortunately, that intervention was quickly terminated by the people and the armed forces of Bolivia themselves, and we were able to resume assistance. Where military governments have made firm plans for elections and have prepared to return their countries to civilian control, where human rights situations have shown decided improvement, we have sought to respond by modest increases in our security assistance.

I began by noting that the Administration is seeking increased security assistance in FY 1981 in Latin America. Given the essential stability of our South American programs, it will be evident to you that most of the increase is being sought for Central America and the Caribbean. In his message to the Congress last November on the supplemental request, President Carter said that we would be reprograming $5 to $10 million in FMS credits and IMET funds for the Caribbean and similar amounts for such programs in Central America.

We are considering reallocating about $14 million in FMS credits and $500,000 in IMET to the Central American and Caribbean countries, within the worldwide levels which we hope will be approved by the conference committee on the FY 1980 appropriation bill. As you know, those levels are austere. FMS credits for the rest of Latin America in 1980 are being cut by $9.5 million below the President's request in order to fund, in part, the necessary increases in the Caribbean and Central America. IMET funds for the rest of Latin America are being cut by more than 20%.

It is time now to establish these new programs in the regular annual budget process, responding to the new and critical circumstances in our southern neighbors. Permit me to touch briefly on each of the countries where we are proposing new or substantially increased security assistance in 1980 and 1981.

The Caribbean

Our largest program in the Caribbean has traditionally been in the Dominican Republic. In the past, however, it has averaged only a half million dollars a year in FMS credits and a similar amount in IMET. Yet the Dominican Republic has the fifth largest population and the fifth largest military force among all Latin American FMS recipients. Its population and armed forces are almost the same size as those of Bolivia, which is receiving $4 to $6 million a year in FMS credits. Moreover, it now has a lengthening record of free elections, civilian government, and respect for human rights. Its military equipment suffered extensive damage from hurricanes last year. We are considering $3.8 million in FMS credits in FY 1980 and are requesting $3 million in 1981.

We began a small IMET program in Barbados in 1979, continued it in 1980, and propose a modest $84,000 for 1981. Training has so far been limited to the members of Barbados' new coast guard, but the government is interested in expanding training to the Barbados regiment. In response to a request from Barbados, President Carter determined the country to be FMS eligible last June, and we are preparing to offer a $1 million credit in FY 1980 to purchase a small patrol plane and other equipment for the coast guard.

We are requesting authority for a $5 million FMS program in 1981 to finance the purchase of communications and navigational equipment for the

coast guard and perhaps transport and other equipment for the Barbados regiment. These expenditures will strengthen the security not of Barbados alone but of the entire eastern Caribbean area.

We are initiating very small—$8,000—IMET programs in FY 1980 with three other eastern Caribbean states—St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Dominica—and we propose to continue these at approximately the same level in 1981. All three countries have discussed cooperation with Barbados and each other in coastal and maritime patrols, and our training would be in this area.

We also propose to offer IMET of up to $25,000 each to Guyana and Jamaica. Their defense relationship has, until recently, been largely with the United Kingdom. We believe it is important to open the door to a cooperative relationship with the United States in military training. We do not want the primary alternative to the United Kingdom to be Cuba.

Central America

In part, the assistance we are reprograming for Central America in 1980 and the appropriations we seek for 1981 reflect improvements in the Central American human rights situation. We suspended assistance to Nicaragua in 1978. The bitter and bloody civil war in that country has since ended; a government with evident wide popular support has been established; and the human rights situation, although still mixed, has improved greatly.

A small amount of IMET funding, $7,000, was used by the new government in FY 1979, and small FMS cash purchases have been made. We are considering $3 million in FMS credits and about $250,000 in IMET for Nicaragua in 1980.

El Salvador. Assistance was terminated at the request of the military government in 1977 because of its concern over our human rights reports. The overthrow of that government by a civilian-military junta which was clearly more representative, committed to democratic government, and determined to improve respect for human rights was followed by urgent requests for nonlethal equipment for the armed forces and training in its use.

The junta has now been reconstituted with the participation of the Christian Democrats. That government has not yet completed its evaluation of its security assistance requirements. In order to be in position to respond rapidly to possible requests, we have tentatively allocated $4.5 million in FMS credits and $350,000 in IMET for El Salvador in 1980.

Honduras. Preparations continue for national elections in April, and there is every indication that there, as in Peru, the military junta will peacefully turn over power to an elected civilian president. In response to the Honduran Government's growing concerns over its ability to defend its territory against covert penetration and agitation, we are considering $3 million in FMS credits and about $350,000 in IMET in 1980.

In FY 1981, we are seeking $5 million in credits, $500,000 in training for each of these three countries, and a similar amount to assist Panama in preparing itself to participate in the joint defense of the canal. The emphasis in all four countries will be on nonlethal equipment. Transportation and communications are the priority needs: jeeps, heavy-duty support vehicles, radios, helicopters, aircraft engines and spare parts, transport aircraft, and coastal patrol boats.

International Military and Education Training Program

In discussing individual countries, I have referred several times to the international military education and training program. In dollars it appears to be a small program. However, in my opinion, it is our most important security assistance program in Latin America. As our role as a supplier of military hardware has declined, the program has become our most significant channel of contact with the military in many countries. For many Latin American military, these courses provide the only exposure they will ever receive to American strategic concepts and American values. It is our only instrument to encourage the development of professional military officers, proud of their technical military skills and conscious of their nation's external security requirements. Without strong professional training, too many become politically oriented officers, seeing their role as governing, instead of defending, their countries.

It is sometimes implied that an end to U.S. training and contact with Latin American military officers would somehow reduce the number of military governments in Latin America. That proposition seems to me highly questionable. Latin American officers are going to be trained, many of them in other countries, whether we offer training or not. Those officers trained by our military, in our schools, are given a strong professional orientation and are exposed to our concept of the proper role of the military. I hope that as you examine the budget requests, you will give particular consideration to the value of these inexpensive but valuable training programs.

There is one issue related to IMET that I would like to bring to the committee's attention. We are, of course, always interested in encouraging aid recipients to move from grant aid to self-financed purchases of needed training. Several Latin American countries are now reaching a stage where they can afford to purchase some or even all their military training.

We would like them to continue to seek their external training requirements from the United States, to maintain the close relationship among the hemisphere's military forces which contributes to our mutual security. But the Latin American countries are well aware of the fact—and have repeatedly drawn our attention to it—that training in U.S. military schools purchased through FMS cash sales is extremely expensive. It is noticeably more expensive than the same training provided through the grant IMET program.

For example, to put an army officer through the command and general staff course at the School of the Americas in Panama costs a country $3,318 when that sum is charged against his country's IMET allocation. If Venezuela or any of the other eligible Latin American countries should seek to pay cash for that same course, they would be charged $38,598—11 times as much. The jet engine mechanic's course at the Panama schools costs only $199 under the IMET program; if purchased under FMS, it would cost $2,940.

Of course, one reason why the charge for IMET courses conducted in Panama is less than that for the same courses conducted in the United States or under FMS is that the fixed costs of the Panama schools are a separate line item, not charged to individual countries. But the schools are not filled to capacity. With no addition to fixed costs, additional personnel could be trained under FMS cash if the charges were set at a more reasonable level. I invite your attention to this problem because it would be desirable to make U.S. military training more competitive and more attractive to countries that pay for it with their own funds.

I might add that this comparison of costs which I have just made also illustrates the immense importance and

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climate in which a new rorld is now coming to life.

Our mission is to promote order, not to enforce our will; our mission is to protect our citizens and our national honor, not to harm nor to dishonor others; to compel restraint, not to provoke confrontation; to support the weak, not to dominate them; to assure that the foundations of our new world are laid upon a stable superpower balance, not built on sand.

This is a worthy mission for a great nation, for a caring people, and for loyal friends. It is the historical mission of the United States of America, and the United States of America will fulfill this mission.

QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION

Q. I have two questions on your speech. You referred to frequent solemn commitments made by the Iranian Government officials. What were these commitments and who made them? And on Soviet expansion, is there any connection, or have you found any connection between the Iranian militants that are holding the hostages and the Soviets, and have you given any diplomatic recognition to this by way of communications with the Soviets?

A. The commitments were made directly to us and through intermediaries that several things would happen: First, that frequent and adequate visits could be made to the American hostages to determine their physical and their psychological well-being, to assure that they were getting adequate medical care, and were living under conditions that were humane.

We also had firm commitments, including a report to us from the highest Iranian officials in the government, that through a unanimous vote within the Revolutionary Council, as approved by the students and approved by Khomeini, that the hostages would be transferred from control of the terrorist students to the government itself. These kinds of commitments were made from time to time, and invariably before the commitments were carried out, they were either aborted or those responsible for carrying them out, through timidity, failed to keep their commitments.

I cannot say that we have proof that the terrorists who hold the hostages in the compound are controlled by the Soviet Union. The Tudeh Party in Iran is relatively small in number. In recent months it has been highly supportive of Khomeini and the mullahs and those who are close to him, possibly as a political ploy to seek some better treatment from the Ayatollah Khomeini.

The Soviets, in recent weeks, have had a very strong and constant radio propaganda effort going into Iran expressing their approval of the actions taken by the militants in the compound. We complained to the Soviet Union strongly and repeatedly and, for awhile, that propaganda effort was assuaged. In recent days, however, it has built up again.

Our course is clear. By responding firmly, we intend to halt aggression where it takes place and to deter it elsewhere.

Q. Continuing on the issue of the hostages, you said in your speech just now that you will use every legal power that you have to free the hostages, and the other day in your formal statement, you said that other actions may be necessary if the hostages are not promptly freed. Two questions: What kind of legal power are you thinking about using and, two, what do you mean by "prompt"? What is the timetable, if you will, for the actions that you might take particularly in the light of the very violent threats that are now being made by the militants?

A. I think it would be ill-advised for me, as President, having the ultimate authority and responsibility for the nation's actions, to spell out in any sort of detail an exact time schedule or exactly what options are available to us.

Under international law, however, since we are an aggrieved nation caused by not only the action of terrorists but also having the terrorist actions condoned by and even supported by the government, the breadth of the rights that we have to take action to redress this grievance is quite extensive.

Q. On the subject of, for instance, allied support—we are getting reports that you—conflicting reports as to whether or not they are going to support us or not. What kind of specific commitments are you getting from them to either withdraw their envoys or to apply similar sanctions as you have applied?

A. Through my own personal messages, either with cables or on the telephone, I have relayed my urging to the allies to give us their full support. The support has been, on occasion, effective. On other occasions, we have been disappointed.

Recently, since the effort that has been made to have the hostages transferred or released has been ineffective, we have increased our effort to get the allies to act on their own initiative to seek the release of the hostages.

I talked to some of the European leaders very recently. Yesterday and today, the foreign ministers of many nations met in Lisbon. They have decided to go to the Iranian officials to demand that the hostages be released immediately and to insist upon a time schedule for the release of the American hostages. Options that are available to them if such action is not forthcoming would have to be chosen by those autonomous and independent nations and their leaders.

We have suggested such things as the imposition of the sanctions as voted by the U.N. Security Council, blocked legally by the veto of the Soviet Union, and also the withdrawal of their diplomatic personnel from Iran or possibly the breaking of relations with Iran. I cannot tell you what those allies and other friends of ours might actually do, but we are putting as much proper effort as possible to induce the allies to act strongly and in a concerted way, hopefully to break the present deadlock and to resolve the crisis.

. . . .

Q. I have a couple of political questions. Why did you let Secretary Vance take the fall for the U.N. resolution vote on the Israeli settlements? Shouldn't you have fired him or taken responsibility yourself as Eisenhower did with the U2 and Kennedy did with the Bay of Pigs?

A. Cy and I considered that there was enough blame or culpability to go around, and we both took a maximum amount, politically speaking. And as I said to news people, personally, I'm responsible for anything that goes on in our nation. It would obviously have been better in retrospect for me to study very carefully the text of the U.N. resolution for which I approved a positive vote.

My understanding was that there were no references in the text at all to Jerusalem and that we would clearly make sure that the world understood that

we did not favor demanding publicly the dismantling of the existing settlements. Those two items had been discussed between me and Begin at Camp David, and Sadat understood our position. And I feel now, and felt then, that for us to be clearly on the record as favoring those two parts of the resolution are in contradiction to the further peace prospects that we are now pursuing.

But it was a matter of Cy Vance being responsible for what happened at the State Department. I'm responsible for everything that happens in the government, including the error that was made.

Q. On another point, you've been accused of manipulating foreign affairs for political advantage. There was a White House celebration of the Camp David accord 2 days before the New York primary, when in fact the actual anniversary date was the day after the New York primary. There was a 7:18 a.m. press conference to announce the breakthrough on the hostages the day of the Wisconsin primary, and the next day that fell through. Your pollster, Pat Caddell, said that the press conference had a big impact on the Wisconsin primary. Your press secretary, Jody Powell, said it was not. Which one is right, and what do you say to your critics about this?

A. I think Jody is right. And I think the results of the New York primary proved that holding of a reception at the White House on a Sunday afternoon to commemorate the anniversary of the Peace Treaty did not materially affect the outcome of the voters' decisions in New York.

Anyone who said that I have contrived recent events in foreign policy to gain re-election obviously doesn't understand the political process. If I could contrive international events to help me in the election, I would have made several differences in what has actually occurred.

Q. You spoke rather eloquently a minute ago about Soviet expansion. Governor Reagan suggested earlier this week and others have charged rather forcefully that there would never have been an Iran, never have been an Afghanistan and the kind of Soviet expansionism that we're talking about currently, if world leaders had not really lost confidence in American leadership and American resolution during your Administration. They cite, for example, inaction in Somalia, Ethiopia, Yemen, and flip-flops on such things as the Soviet troops in Cuba and the U.N. vote on Palestine. What's your response to this kind of fundamental criticism?

A. I think the people in the Kremlin would agree completely with what Mr. Reagan has said. That the invasion of Afghanistan was not the fault of, nor the responsibility of, President Brezhnev and the Politburo but was the responsibility of the President of the United States. That's obviously a ridiculous claim that could only damage our nation's prestige coming from a responsible person and help the Soviets in their claim that they had adequate provocation from this country to take this unwarranted action. And I'm sure the same response would come from the terrorists who hold our hostages captive in the American Embassy in Tehran. I think they would agree with candidate Reagan that this was really not their responsibility or their fault, but the United States is somehow culpable for this abhorrent and inhumane action.

So, I do not agree at all with the premise which predicated those statements, but I'm sure that our enemies or our abusers in the Kremlin or in the compound among the terrorists would agree completely.

Q. I'm not exactly sure that their intention was to say that you are in collaboration with the Kremlin here; I think the argument is—

A. I don't maintain that they claim that I was in collaboration. But what I say is that that line of argument that an invasion of a sovereign country with 100,000 troops or the taking over of a compound with innocent American hostages is somehow the fault of the United States or its President is completely fallacious and does not help our country and does not help us resolve those issues that are so important for us to resolve.

Q. No, but the basic line of argument is somewhat different. They're saying that if we have a long history of inaction, inability, to deal effectively with our commitments around the world, that that then leads and misleads other world leaders, particularly in the Soviet Union, to believe that they can take actions with impunity without expecting to get any kind of retaliation from the United States. I think that's the basic argument and it traces back to this charge that there is this sense among a lot of world leaders of a weak leadership in the White House, in the United States during this particular critical period around the world. Now that contributes to these miscalculations by other national leaders.

A. Your interpretation of what they might have meant when they said this or that is interesting to me but I find it still lacking in conviction.

The record is that our nation has always stood firm and resolved against aggression. The Soviets have used their surrogates to go into nations with troops, ostensibly at the invitation of the host government. This occurred in Angola, as you well know, with Cuban troops, I think in 1975–76. I has occurred before and since then, when the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia, when they invaded Hungary, when they took over East Germany, took over Poland. I don't believe that anybody could say that was because the United States was weak or vacillating.

We have made steady progress, in my judgment, in expanding the beneficial impact of our nation throughout the world. The Communist government philosophy, and what occurs within those nations, is not attractive enough to gain adherents without the use of violence or force. It's not an accident that East Germany has a wall built around it. It's not designed to keep people out of East Germany; it's designed to keep people in East Germany. And had the Soviets been successful in selling to one of their neighbors in Afghanistan the attractiveness of a totalitarian government under communism, similar to what exists in Moscow, then they would not have had to put 100,000 troops into an innocent country to subjugate those people and to force them to accept a puppet government.

This week we have seen in Cuba a bankrupt nation, kept alive economically, by the skin of their teeth, only with the infusion of $3 or $4 million a day from the Soviet Union. When they temporarily opened the gates to the Embassy of Peru, 10,000 Cubans filled that Embassy to escape political persecution and economic deprivation in Cuba. So for anyone to claim that it's actions of the United States, or a failure of democracy or the failure of a President that has caused these kinds of forceful actions, in the absence of convincing ideological truths that have changed the shape of the world, that's a completely fallacious example.

Our resolve is steady. NATO is strong. We've got many new friendships. Our country is now building up for the first time our military forces, after a long, steady decline. We have very good interrelationships with our allies. Our efforts toward peace are very sound and

Common Market countries that raised this issue with you when you were in Europe a few days ago; are they doing anything?

In other words, is there something more than simply what's said publicly actually going on right now?

Secretary Vance. There are currently no talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on this issue. The matter was raised and discussed between me and the ministers of the four countries which I visited. Indeed, at the time that I was in Europe the subject was discussed in the meeting of the Nine, which was held in Rome, and they issued a statement on that.

Following the issuance of that statement, I was asked my views with respect to the statement which they had issued, and I stated that I was in general agreement with the substance of what was being said by the Nine in that statement.

Q. Do you think your Olympic committees will go along with the boycott, and do you have an assessment of how many Olympic committees will go along?

Foreign Minister Talboys. As far as New Zealand is concerned, I can tell you this: What the government has stated is that the government would welcome a change in venue.

I read a report this morning of a statement made by Mr. Lance Cross on his return from a meeting of the IOC [International Olympic Committee]. I think here in the United States, in which he said, as I recall the statement, something to the effect that if a number of other countries indicate that they would attend alternative games or not attend Moscow, then he thought it very likely that the New Zealand teams would not attend either.

Foreign Minister Peacock. Yes. So far as Australia is concerned, I think our opposition is clearly known and nothing further has developed since I left Australia, to the best of my knowledge, and that is that the Australian Government is strongly in favor of a boycott. It's indicated this to the Olympic Federation. It is in the process of consulting with that federation, and it, therefore, hopes the federation will accept its view.

Q. Could I ask you if as a result of this meeting we'll see any change in New Zealand's quite significant trading links with the Soviet Union?

Foreign Mininster Talboys. When you talk of New Zealand's quite significant trading links with the Soviet Union, I think that what one needs to bear in mind is the point that has been made on many occasions—both by a Prime Minister, by myself, and by other ministers—that what New Zealand seeks is an opportunity to sell livestock products in markets around the world.

We have, as a result of policies pursued in Europe, in Japan, in the United States, had to diversify our markets—sort of seek markets in other parts of the world. Some of those markets we have found in the Soviet Union. What we've been talking about is normal or traditional trade, and it will continue.

Q. Your communique talks about a Soviet threat with the countries that produce oil. Do you detect any specific Soviet threat to those countries or to the sea lanes by which that oil is carried out of there?

Secretary Vance. The presence of tens of thousands of Soviet forces in Afghanistan presents a potential threat which is quite obvious. Those troops previously were not in that area. They now are in a position which puts them some 300 miles closer to the sea lanes and immediately adjacent to Iran which has oil fields, as you well know, so that the mere fact of their presence presents a threat that was not present before the invasion.

Q. Was there any discussion or decision on the possibility of U.S. warships using Fremantle as a navy base in the Indian Ocean?

Foreign Minister Peacock. We previously indicated that Cockburn Sound in that area is available. We're in discussion with the United States on that issue, as indicated earlier.

Defense Minister Killen. They are using it and have used it for some time. There will be units of the U.S. Navy in Cockburn Sound in connection with an exercise now in the Sandgroper in another couple of days.

Foreign Minister Peacock. It's referred to in the communique—Sandgroper.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE, FEB. 27, 1980

The 29th Meeting of the ANZUS Council was held in Washington on the 26th and 27th of February, 1980. The Honorable Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State of the United States; the Right Honorable Brian Talboys, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of New Zealand; the Honorable Andrew Peacock, Foreign Minister of Australia; and the Honorable D. J. Killen, Minister of Defence of Australia, represented their respective governments.

In opening the meeting, the Secretary of State emphasized its particular importance in view of the new international situation stemming from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Australia expressed their great appreciation for New Zealand's willingness to advance the date and change the venue of the meeting.

The Council members agreed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a nonaligned country, was a blatant violation of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations. The Council noted that this action had been condemned by an overwhelming majority of the members of the General Assembly and by more than 35 Islamic Foreign Ministers meeting in Islamabad.

The treaty partners further agreed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan challenged the independence of all states. The Soviet action calls for appropriate political responses according to national interests and capacities, as well as for defence preparedness. The Council recognized that individual nations could contribute in different ways to promoting a stable international order and to strengthening the political environment against threats to national independence. It recognized that firm support by the international community for the sovereignty and independence of small countries, especially developing countries, must be accompanied by international cooperation in the economic field to which all members of the United Nations should make a fair contribution, in order to strengthen the economies of developing countries and to establish a more effective and more equitable international economic order.

The use or threat of force by the USSR against countries vital to the flow of petroleum to the East and West could, the Council agreed, endanger the independence and economic viability of many nations, both developed and developing. In the discussion of recent events in Afghanistan, emphasis was placed on the importance of a strong, consistent, and enduring stand in opposition to the use of force in extending Soviet or other influence over sovereign governments. The Council members agreed on the importance of convincing the USSR that it cannot profit in the long run from such actions. They further agreed that the complete withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the restoration of a

truly nonaligned, neutral government in Afghanistan responsive to the wishes of the Afghan people were necessary for the security and peace of the region.

The American Council member outlined the economic measures which the United States has taken vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan. He expressed appreciation for actions already taken by the other treaty partners in their relations with the USSR. The Council members agreed on the desirability of close consultation on these matters.

In view of the failure of the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, the Council agreed that it would not be appropriate for the Summer Olympics to be held in Moscow. It considered that the Olympics should be transferred to another site or sites and noted proposals that, if necessary, alternative competitions should be arranged in the latter half of 1980 in which all world-class athletes would be invited to participate. The Council agreed that there would be close and continuing consultations among the three governments on this question.

The Council also discussed the composition and level of forces in the Indian Ocean that would be appropriate to demonstrate allied support for security of the area and determination to deter further Soviet adventurism. It agreed to explore fully the possibilities for enhancing the effectiveness of the treaty partners' military activities in the Indian Ocean, without prejudicing the fulfillment of their respective responsibilities in the Treaty area. The Council reviewed United States plans for its military presence in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. These included enhanced maritime surveillance and anti-submarine patrolling, increased military training and assistance to various countries in the region, and arrangements for secure access into the Indian Ocean for alliance forces. The Council noted that later in the year Australia will deploy a carrier task group in the Indian Ocean led by the aircraft carrier HMAS MELBOURNE. Naval and air support will be given by New Zealand as resources permit.

The Council took note of the decision to allocate greater resources to defense announced by the Prime Minister of Australia February 19. They further noted that consultations on joint cooperation at both operational and policy levels take on a new urgency in the uncertain strategic prospects resulting from the present Southwest Asian crisis, that operational planning in response to the crisis is well under way, and that additional measures for military cooperation are being explored.

Council members reiterated the importance of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, and expressed concern that development and spread of the capability to acquire nuclear weapons would further harm security and international stability.

The American Council member informed his colleagues that, despite the adverse political climate engendered by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, effective mutual constraints on strategic nuclear weapons remain of great importance in ensuring world peace and security. For this reason, the US administration remains firmly committed to ratification of the SALT II Agreement and to the general principle of seeking effective and verifiable arms control agreements as a matter of national interest and policy. The Australian and New Zealand members welcomed a continued emphasis by the United States on arms control and disarmament measures that enhance security, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB). In this regard, the Council acknowledged that the current military and political climate is not conducive to resumption of US-Soviet talks on arms limitations in the Indian Ocean.

The Council members considered the tensions along the borders of Indochina resulting from the invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnamese forces sustained by Soviet support. They expressed their strong concern over the danger to peace and stability arising from the present crisis and their desire to see the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.

The ANZUS partners strongly endorsed efforts of Southeast Asian countries to bring about the restoration of peace and security in their region. They reaffirmed their support for the UNGA resolution, sponsored by the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which called for the Kampuchean people to be able to choose democratically their own government, without outside interference, subversion or coercion.

With regard to tensions along the Thai-Kampuchean border, the Council viewed the particular concern the possibility that the hostilities could spill over into Thailand. The Council called on Viet Nam to respect Thailand's territorial integrity and to avoid actions which would endanger the civilian Khmer concentrations along the border, or risk escalation of the fighting or confrontation with Thai military units. The Council stressed the great importance it placed on Thailand's security and territorial integrity, and noted the continued relevance of the Manila Pact.

Noting the great suffering inflicted on the Kampuchean people, the Council members strongly emphasized the necessity for continuing relief efforts within Kampuchea and along the border of Kampuchea and Thailand. They also underscored the requirement for international efforts to deal with the problems of refugees, hunger, and disease until displaced Khmer can return to their homes and they called upon the authorities in Kampuchea to cooperate with the international relief program.

The problem created for many of the countries of Southeast Asia as a result of the persisting refugee exodus from Viet Nam was reviewed by the Council. The members noted the continuing importance of the humane policies of first asylum of countries in the region. They expressed gratification at the very large number of refugees resettled outside Southeast Asia during the past year, which has relieved pressures on first asylum countries of the region. The opening of the Bataan Refugee Processing Center (RPC) and the prospective opening of the Galang RPC were also viewed as significant additions to the ability of the region to cope with the refugee problem, as was the decision by China to take an active part in refugee resettlement. Members agreed on the need for continuing world-wide participation in refugee resettlement and support for the UNHCR [U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees] Indochina program. They called upon Viet Nam to refrain from creating internal conditions that motivate its people to attempt to escape. Recognizing that several thousand Vietnamese flee their homeland each month despite all handicaps, members reaffirmed support for the principle of responsibility of flag states for refugees rescued at sea. In those instances, where flag states did not accept this responsibility, members supported other means to assist the refugees such as through the Sea Rescue Resettlement Reserve of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

In addition to the tragic plight of Indochinese and Khmer refugees, the Council members took particular note of the many thousands now fleeing the occupation by Soviet forces of Afghanistan. The Council urged that all independent governments contribute monetarily or in kind to the international and humanitarian effort, coordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to maintain the Afghan refugees until they can return safely to their homeland. The Council noted with appreciation the efforts of the Pakistan Government to receive and care for the Afghan refugees.

Welcoming the accession of Kiribati to independence since the last Council meeting, the Council reaffirmed the importance it attaches to the peaceful progress of the South Pacific.

The Council welcomed the expression of concern by South Pacific governments in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Council reaffirmed the commitment of the ANZUS partners to cooperate with the South Pacific states in support of a common interest in a secure and peaceful environment in which the South Pacific countries can most effectively pursue their national policies. It welcomed the continued development of regional cooperation among the Pacific Islands.

The Ministers took note of progress made towards self-determination in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and welcomed the increased participation of the Micronesian governments in regional organizations.

The Council noted the increased importance of its members reducing their dependence on imported fuels in the light of recent events in South West Asia. They recognized that recent dramatic increases in the price of oil will also have a disruptive

Effect of U.S. Withdrawal

U.S. withdrawal from the ILO apparently contributed to the progress that has been achieved. Western countries played a more active role in pressing for reforms. A majority of ILO members successfully resisted efforts to subvert due process and constitutional procedures. Equally important, the U.S.S.R. generally was unable to capitalize on the U.S. absence.

Benefits of Membership

Although withdrawal may have promoted reforms, continuing to remain outside the ILO would not have yielded additional benefits to the United States. Those ILO members which worked to achieve the gains that were made would have felt disillusioned if the United States had failed to return. Moreover, while the Western group has become more cohesive and effective, there remains a clear need for the kind of presence that only we can provide. This is especially true on human rights issues. By rejoining now, we can resume our seat on the governing body before the June 1980 annual conference. Specifically, membership in the ILO offers the United States:

- The opportunity to participate in and influence the formation of international labor standards, which directly affect labor codes in developing countries;
- The opportunity to participate in and influence voluntary agreements such as codes of conduct for multinational enterprises, the ILO version of which is regarded by U.S. labor and business as the most constructive yet developed;
- A framework in which the U.S. labor movement and business community can be in contact with their counterpart organizations throughout the world;
- Influence over ILO execution of U.N. Development Program projects, totaling about $40 million in 1980;
- An important forum in which the United States can carry on discussions with the Third World;
- Participation in the U.N. system's most effective mechanism for promoting the human rights of workers; and
- Participation in the ILO's studies of development, which pioneered the basic human needs approach to development and directly influenced World Bank and Agency for International Development programs.

Membership Costs

Our contribution to the ILO will be about $25 million in 1980. Administrative support costs of U.S. participation could amount to an additional $500,000.

[1] Taken from the Department of State publication in the GIST series, released Feb. 1980. This outline is designed to be a quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy statement. ■

U.S. Policy on Apartheid

by William Dunfey

Statement in the U.N. General Assembly on November 8, 1979. Mr. Dunfey is U.S. Alternate Representative to the 34th U.N. General Assembly.[1]

My Government shares the total and inalterable opposition of this body to the institutionalized system of racism called apartheid. We are committed to affirmative policies which promote genuine social and political change in South Africa. We believe that economic forces are particularly important in an effort to effect the kinds of changes in South Africa we all desire. In the last several days, other speakers have introduced reports of a possible nuclear event into this debate. Because these comments are based on information which originated with my government, I shall address this issue briefly.

As the members of this Assembly are aware, my government has had an indication of the possibility of a low-yield nuclear explosion in the area of the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic, although we do not have corroborating evidence. It is important to understand that we cannot confirm that a nuclear explosion took place nor, obviously, can we say at this time who was responsible. We are continuing to investigate this matter. Earlier in this session, a distinguished delegate called upon the Assembly to address this issue, not in panic, but with facts. We could not agree more.

My government has made clear that a fundamental objective of our national policy is to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have joined others in expressing concern that South Africa's nuclear facilities could be used to develop a nuclear explosives capability. The U.S. Nonproliferation Act of 1978 provides, as a minimum condition for the licensing of nuclear exports to any country after March 1980, that it have all its nuclear activities under international safeguards. As a practical matter, however, the United States ceased exports of nuclear materials or equipment to South Africa 4 years ago.

My government calls on South Africa and all other countries which are not parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty, to adhere to that treaty and to act promptly to place all their peaceful nuclear activities under international safeguards.

U.S. Approach

In recent years the U.S. Government has taken a number of actions to underscore our opposition to the apartheid system in South Africa. Following the death of Steve Biko, the United States supported a mandatory arms embargo in the Security Council. In addition, the United States has unilaterally imposed a ban on all exports of whatever nature to the South Africa military and police.

On October 4, 1979, speaking before ambassadors and ministers comprising the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in New York, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance reaffirmed that unless a system of government evolves there in which all South Africans can participate equitably, our relations with South Africa would inevitably deteriorate.

The United States opposes the racially motivated bannings and detentions in South Africa. We oppose the pass laws and other such forms of social discrimination. We oppose the policy of separate development under which black South Africans are systematically being denied citizenship in their own country and instead are being documented as nationals of so-called independent homelands. We oppose the current lack of equal opportunity for all races regarding employment, job promotion, and education. We oppose the lack of opportunity for full political participation by all the citizens of South Africa, regardless of race or color.

We do note, however, that there have been some signs of a more flexible attitude on the part of white South Africans over the last year and that the present South African Government has taken steps to eliminate some aspects of discrimination in the economic area. These have included steps to eliminate

most categories of legal job reservations, recognize trade union rights for blacks, and lift some restrictions on the operations of black businesses.

Unfortunately, most of these steps have been hedged with qualifications that could seriously dilute their impact. It is too soon to say that they have, in fact, led to real, specific changes, and we reiterate our position that any changes that leave the basic framework of apartheid intact are by definition inadequate. Apartheid is also based on practices as well as laws—practices frequently sanctioned by the South African Government.

Economic Focus

The presence of U.S. corporations in South Africa has become an important political issue in the United States and a focus of the more general debate on U.S. policy toward South Africa. Our degree of economic involvement represents potential leverage for social and political change. Since 1973, we have urged U.S. firms operating in South Africa to institute, maintain, and expand enlightened employment practices for their black employees, including improvements in wages, working conditions, fringe benefits, and opportunities for advancement, as well as dealing with legitimate representatives of black workers, including black unions.[1]

Students on many U.S. campuses have focused their efforts on college and university investments in U.S. corporations doing business with South Africa. Many institutions have been under pressure to divest themselves of all stock of companies doing business with, or in, South Africa, and about a dozen have done so. At this time, many college and university boards are urging corporations in which they own stock to work for social change in South Africa. For now, we believe the latter initiative is a valid means to confront the apartheid system realistically, but we are monitoring closely the progress of such initiatives. If their effects prove neither significant nor rapid enough to satisfy our commitment to end apartheid, we will consider other ways to bring about change.

The "Sullivan Principles"

One of the more successful of the intiatives to bring international pressure to bear on South Africa has been that undertaken in the United States by the Reverend Leon H. Sullivan. His action in launching a set of principles for fair employment practices by U.S. companies doing business in South Africa and in subsequently established reporting and monitoring procedures has set the pace for corporate conduct and procedures in South Africa.

There are now 135 U.S. companies which have signed the "Sullivan principles." These companies represent 75% of the work forces on the payrolls of U.S. corporations doing business in South Africa. The Sullivan initiative springs from the private corporate world. It brings together U.S. companies voluntarily to pursue a common objective based, realistically, on their growing awareness that an investment in an apartheid environment is not in their interest.

Following the lead of the Sullivan principles, 13 similar codes of conduct have emerged from other nations with corporations doing business with South Africa. Also, this year, 10 of the largest South African corporations, employing more than one-half million black workers in mining and other labor intensive areas, have agreed to implement the principles.

The third report on the progress of U.S. companies doing business in South Africa in implementing the Sullivan principles was issued October 18. While the report indicated that the principles had become an important force for social change in South Africa, it is clear that the companies should not be satisfied with the current progress and need to push their effort significantly further.

Commitment to Combat Apartheid

There are many groups in the United States today calling for stronger measures to combat apartheid in South Africa—in the private sector, in churches, on university campuses, and in Congress. And indeed, my government's objective remains fundamental, not peripheral or token change. In this context we recognize, as do their sponsors, that the existing principles and procedures concerning corporate conduct in South Africa need to be applied so as to insure their relevance to this objective.

They should address additional significant problems of labor and social conditions in South Africa, including, for example, migratory labor, minimum wage, and influx control. They should examine the continuing role of banks and lending institutions. This would require effective monitoring systems for activities of all foreign firms. In this regard, it is important that fair employment principles and procedures be supported by all those who trade with and invest in South Africa.

While we believe that corporate principles for fair employment practices in South Africa can have a cumulative effect on South African labor policies and practices, we also recognize that they can affect the structure of the basic apartheid system itself only in combination with an unrelenting commitment from the world community that apartheid must end. And apartheid will end only when the people and the South African Government, motivated both from within and without, accept the inevitability of change. In the final analysis, it is those persons in influential positions in South Africa, particularly those who now dominate its economic life, who must catalyze and promote the fundamental changes for which the majority of the population yearns—and to which my government remains firmly committed.

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[1] USUN press release 115. ■

value of our U.S. military schools in Panama. We would have to appropriate substantially larger amounts of IMET if all of our Latin American training programs had to be conducted in the United States. The Panama Canal treaties provide for the continued operation of the School of the Americas until 1984. We will need to plan carefully, and to consult closely with you, about their future after that time.

In sum, the programs we are proposing in both economic and security assistance are modest. They are designed to respond with limited resources to the changing situation in Latin America. They will contribute significantly to improving the lot of the poor. They are useful instruments in support of U.S. policy objectives. In Central America our programs are of potentially great importance given the tremendous changes taking place there. I hope you will be able to support these lean program proposals fully.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica
Recommendations relating to the furtherance of principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at London Oct. 7, 1977 at the 9th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting.[1]
Notification of approval: Japan, Jan. 28, 1980.

Collisions
Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with regulations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587.
Acceptance deposited: Indonesia, Nov. 13, 1979.
Accessions deposited: China, Jan. 7, 1980; Peru, Jan. 9, 1980; Samoa, Oct. 23, 1979; Thailand, Aug. 6, 1979; Uruguay, Aug. 15, 1979.

Consular
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Ratification deposited: Norway, Feb. 13, 1980.

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Ratification deposited: Norway, Feb. 13, 1980.

Copyright
Universal copyright convention, as revised, with two protocols annexed thereto. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.
Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, Dec. 7, 1979.

Customs
Customs convention on the international transport of goods under cover of TIR carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20, 1978.[2]
Accession deposited: Romania, Feb. 14, 1980.

Defense
Memorandum of understanding for the cooperative support of the 76/62 OTO Melara Compact Gun (OMCG), with annexes. Open for signature Oct. 24, 1978. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1978; for the U.S. July 17, 1979.
Signatures: Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, U.S.

Environmental Modification
Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Feb. 12, 1980.

Finance
Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into force for the U.S. Nov. 30, 1977.
Accession deposited: Dominica, Jan. 29, 1980.

Fisheries
Convention on future multilateral cooperation in the northwest Atlantic fisheries. Done at Ottawa Oct. 24, 1978. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1979.[2]
Acceptance deposited: Japan, Jan. 4, 1980.

Load Lines
Amendments to the international convention on load lines 1966, relating to amendments to the convention. Adopted at London Nov. 12, 1975.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, Jan. 10, 1980.

Maritime Matters
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Dominica, Dec. 18, 1979.

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965. Done at London Nov. 19, 1973.[1]
Acceptances deposited: Brazil, July 6, 1978; Argentina, Jan. 29, 1980.

Meteorology
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11, 1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Dominica, Feb. 21, 1980.

Narcotic Drugs
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976.[2]
Accession deposited: Morocco, Feb. 11, 1980.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Ratification deposited: Barbados, Feb. 21, 1980.
Succession deposited: St. Lucia, Dec. 28, 1979.

Pollution
Convention on long-range transboundary air pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979. Enters into force on the 90th day after the date of deposit of the 24th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or succession.
Signatures: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S., Yugoslavia, Nov. 13, 1979; Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Denmark, European Economic Community, Greece, Holy See, Italy, Liechtenstein, Portugal, Romania,[3] San Marino, Spain, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Nov. 14, 1979.

Property—Industrial—Classification
Nice agreement concerning the international classification of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised. Done at Geneva May 13, 1977. Entered into force Feb. 6, 1979.[2]
Ratification deposited: France, Jan. 18, 1980.[4]

Refugees
Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.
Accession deposited: Yemen (Sana), Jan. 18, 1980.

Safety at Sea
Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the safety of life at

sea, 1974. Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.[1]
Ratification deposited: U.K., Nov. 5, 1979.

Space
Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Mar. 29, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1972; for the U.S. Oct. 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.
Accessions deposited: Syria, Feb. 6, 1980; Trinidad and Tobago, Feb. 8, 1980.

Sugar
International sugar agreement, 1977, with annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978; definitively Jan. 2, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Feb. 6, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Brazil, Feb. 5, 1980.

Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos Oct. 25, 1973. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1975; for the U.S. Apr. 7, 1976. TIAS 8572.
Ratification deposited: Benin, Nov. 13, 1979.

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), as revised, relating to the aeronautical mobile (R) service, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva Mar. 5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1979, except for the frequency allotment plan for the aeronautical mobile (R) service which shall come into force on Feb. 1, 1983.[2]
Approval deposited: Hungary, Nov. 15, 1979.

Terrorism
International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 19, 1979.[1]
Signatures: Canada, Feb. 18, 1980; Liberia, Jan. 30, 1980; Panama, Jan. 24, 1980.

Tonnage Measurement
International convention on tonnage measurement of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 1969.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Korea, Jan. 18, 1980.

Trade
Protocol for the accession of Colombia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 1700). Done at Geneva Nov. 28, 1979. Enters into force on the 30th day following the day upon which it shall have been signed by Colombia.

UNIDO
Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.[1]
Signatures: Afghanistan, Feb. 13, 1980; Bangladesh, Jan. 2, 1980; Bolivia, Burundi, Jan. 25, 1980; Gabon, Jan. 8, 1980; Honduras, Feb. 5, 1980; Liberia, Jan. 30, 1980; Malawi, Feb. 12, 1980; Syria, Feb. 1, 1980.
Approval deposited: China, Feb. 14, 1980.
Ratifications deposited: Philippines, Jan. 7, 1980; Yugoslavia, Feb. 8, 1980.

Wheat
Protocol modifying and further expanding the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Austria, Feb. 27, 1980.

BILATERAL

China
Agreement on trade relations. Signed at Beijing July 7, 1979.
Entered into force: Feb. 1, 1980.

Dominican Republic
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Sept. 28, 1977 (TIAS 8944), with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Santo Domingo Jan. 3, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1980.

Finland
Extradition treaty. Signed at Helsinki June 11, 1976.
Instruments of ratification exchanged: Feb. 11, 1980.
Enters into force: May 11, 1980.

Federal Republic of Germany
Administrative agreement relating to addition of an educational program under paragraph 4, article 71, of the Supplementary Agreement of Aug. 3, 1959 (TIAS 5351). Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn Nov. 23 and Dec. 28, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.

Hong Kong
Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 8, 1977, as amended (TIAS 8936, 9291, 9611), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Hong Kong Jan. 28 and Feb. 6, 1980. Entered into force Feb. 6, 1980; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Indonesia
Arrangement relating to a visa system for exports of cotton, wool, and manmade fiber apparel manufactured in Indonesia. Effected by exchange of letters at Jakarta Oct. 1 and 15, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 15, 1979.

Jamaica
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Aug. 8, 1977 (TIAS 8824). Signed at Kingston Feb. 8, 1980. Entered into force Feb. 8, 1980.

Japan
Treaty on extradition, with exchange of notes. Signed at Tokyo Mar. 3, 1978.
Instruments of ratification exchanged: Feb. 25, 1980.
Entered into force: Mar. 26, 1980.

Korea
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of June 7, 1979. Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul Jan. 25, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 25, 1980.

Mexico
Treaty on extradition, with appendix. Signed at Mexico May 4, 1978. Entered into force Jan. 25, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Feb. 6, 1980.

Minute 260 of the International Boundary and Water Commission amending and extending minute 240, as amended and extended (TIAS 8712, 9290), relating to emergency deliveries of Colorado River waters for use in Tijuana. Signed at El Paso Aug. 14, 1979. Enters into force upon approval of the two governments.

Agreement amending the agreement of Feb. 26, 1979 (TIAS 9419) relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Sept. 11 and Nov. 20, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 20, 1979.

Agreement on cooperation in cases of natural disasters. Signed at Mexico Jan. 14, 1980. Entered into force provisionally, Jan. 15, 1980; definitively, when each party shall inform the other by way of diplomatic note of the completion of the necessary legal requirements in its country for entry into force, and such notification is received by the second party.

Agreement establishing a U.S.-Mexico committee for assistance in cases of disaster, as amended by exchange of notes at Mexico Mar. 28, 1972. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 3, 1968. TIAS 6481, 7308.
Terminated: Jan. 15, 1980.

Agreements amending the agreement of Nov. 9, 1972, as amended (TIAS 7697, 9436), concerning frequency modulation broadcasting in the 88 to 108 MHz band. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico Sept. 5, 1979, and Jan. 23, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 23, 1980.

Nicaragua
Agreement relating to privileges and immunities for U.S. military personnel in Nicaragua for the purpose of furnishing assistance in connection with flooding. Effected by exchange of notes at Managua Dec. 17 and 18, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 18, 1979.

Peru
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Apr. 26, 1978 (TIAS 9604), with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Lima Feb. 14, 1980. Entered into force Feb. 14, 1980.

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Peace Palace at the Hague, Netherlands, headquarters of the International Court of Justice.

(Photo courtesy of the United Nations)

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Secretary of State

HODDING CARTER III
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor

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progressive and successful. I have no apology at all to make for our country, or for the administration which I head.

Q. Somewhat along this same line: You spoke today of how we are responding firmly—by responding firmly we intend to halt aggression where it takes place and to deter it elsewhere. I think one of the things that troubles a lot of people is that— speaking specifically now of our reaction to the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, aside from our not going to the Olympics, which has a moral force, but which will not stop the games, and aside from our not selling grain to the Soviets, who do seem able to obtain it elsewhere—in dealing with a country which does not appear to be swayed by moral considerations in international affairs, what else can we do to halt aggression? Is there anything else that we can do, beyond the moral force of whatever policies we espouse?

A. As President I have available to me the resources of the strongest nation on Earth, economically, politically, and militarily. The judgment that I have to make when we're faced with a challenge or with a responsibility is to decide which of those powers or forces that exist substantially at my command to be executed. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, I decided to exercise the economic and political authority of this country and not to go to war and to exercise what military resources we have.

Politicall,, we went to the United Nations, along with other countries, and in an absolutely unprecedented fashion, an overwhelming portion of the nations of the world, including some nations that are subservient to the Soviet Union or dependent upon the Soviet Union, voted to condemn the Soviets and to call for the withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan. Thirty-four Moslim nations, not all of whom are our friends at all, some very closely aligned with the Soviet Union, voted unanimously to condemn the Soviets and demanded that the Soviets withdraw.

I made a speech to the joint session of the Congress, the State of the Union speech, and spelled out the commitments that we would make to maintain steadily, even if we have to stand alone, the economic contraints, our absence from participation in the Olympics, and so forth. We are inducing—I think we'll have substantial success—other nations to join us in these restraints. We go further than other nations, but we are the leader of the world. We're not as vulnerable as some others are to economic or political pressure put on them by the Soviet Union because of proximity and because of our innate strength. So I think it's necessary for us to go a little further than the other countries.

I don't believe there's any doubt in my mind or in most people's minds that a very clear signal has been sent to the Soviet Union. Your action in Afghanistan is condemned; it will not be accepted; the status quo will not be revived that existed prior to Afghanistan; and further aggression by you will result in the possible exercise of additional authority and power by the United States and other countries above and beyond economic and political actions.

[1]Text from White House press release. ■

News Conference of April 17 (Excerpts)

Since last November, 53 Americans have been held captive in Tehran, contrary to every principle of international law and human decency. The United States began to implement a series of nonviolent but punitive steps designed to bring about the release of our hostages.

In January we received information and signals from the Iranian authorities that they were prepared to enter into serious discussions to bring about the release of the hostages. At that time the United States decided to defer additional sanctions, and then these discussions resulted in commitments from the top authorities in Iran including a transfer of the hostages to government control to be followed by their release.

These commitments were not fulfilled. Earlier this month, April the 7th, I announced a series of economic and political actions designed to impose additional burdens on Iran because their government was now directly involved in continuing this act of international terrorism. This process is moving forward. We've imposed economic sanctions, and we have broken diplomatic relations with Iran. Recently, a number of other nations have recalled their ambassadors, and these countries are now considering sanctions that they may be prepared to invoke in the near future.

Even while these deliberations continue, officials in Iran talk about not resolving the hostage issue until July or even later. We are beyond the time for gestures. We want our people to be set free. Accordingly, I am today ordering an additional set of actions.

First, I am prohibiting all financial transfers by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to any person or entity in Iran except those directly related to the gathering of news and family remittances. As of today, any such transaction will become a criminal act.

Second, all imports from Iran to the United States will be barred.

Third, I intend to exercise my statutory authority to protect American citizens abroad by prohibiting travel to Iran and by prohibiting any transactions between Americans and foreign persons relating to such travel or the presence of Americans in Iran.

Again, this authority will not now be used to interfere with the right of the press to gather news. However, it is my responsibility and my obligation, given the situation in Iran, to call on American journalists and news-gathering organizations to minimize, as severely as possible, their presence and their activities in Iran.

Fourth, I am ordering that all military equipment previously purchased by the Government of Iran, which I had previously impounded, be made available for use by the U.S. military forces or for sale to other countries.

And finally, I will ask Congress for discretionary authority to pay reparations to the hostages and to their families out of the more than $8 billion in frozen Iranian assets in the United States. These assets will be available to satisfy contract and other commercial claims of American firms against Iranian Government entities and to reimburse claims of the United States for the heavy military and other costs we have incurred because of Iran's illegal actions.

If a constructive Iranian response is not forthcoming soon, the United States should and will proceed with other measures. We will legally forbid shipments of food and medicine, and the U.N. Charter, as you know, stipulates interruption of

communications as a legitimate sanction. Accordingly, I am prepared to initiate consultations with the member nations of INTELSAT to bar Iran's use of international communications facilities.

The measures which I am announcing today are still nonbelligerent in nature. They are a continuation of our efforts to resolve this crisis by peaceful means. The authorities in Iran should realize, however, that the availability of peaceful measures, like the patience of the American people, is running out. I am compelled to repeat what I have said on previous occasions: Other actions are available to the United States and may become necessary if the Government of Iran refuses to fulfill its solemn international responsibility. The American hostages must be freed.

. . . .

Q. What have you accomplished with these sanctions so far, and have you set a deadline before summer for a new belligerent stand? And also, did you have any reason to believe that the allies are going to back up our actions, or are they fair weather friends?

A. From the very beginning of the crisis in Iran brought about by the seizure of our hostages, I have had two goals in mind from which we have never deviated: First of all, to protect the interests of our country and its principles and standards and secondly, and along with it on an equal basis, to protect the lives of the hostages and to work as best I could under the most difficult possible circumstances to secure the release of our hostages safely and to freedom.

We have had three options available to us: economic, political, and military. So far, we have only exercised the economic and the political measures—in the [International] Court of Justice, in the United Nations, in our own economic actions which are now inflicting punishment on Iran's economy, and in the marshaling of support among other countries.

I can't predict to you exactly what other nations will do. In recent days, I have communicated with almost all of the major nations' leaders, asking them to take peaceful action, economic and political, to join with us in convincing Iran that they are becoming increasingly isolated from the rest of the civilized world, and increasingly vulnerable to dissension and fragmentation within, and to danger from without, particularly the Soviet Union to the north of Iran.

Recently, our allies and friends have withdrawn their ambassadors to decide what they should do in the future. I understand from some of the leaders that next week they will have another meeting to decide what further steps to take now that Bani-Sadr, the President of Iran, and others have refused to take action to release the hostages after our allies had demanded directly that Iran take this action.

If this additional set of sanctions that I've described to you today and the concerted action of our allies is not successful, then the only next step available, that I can see, would be some sort of military action which is the prerogative and the right of the United States under these circumstances.

Q. Why didn't you embargo food right now as some of us had been led to believe you had already decided to do?

A. We have considered extending the embargo to food and drugs, which is obviously an item that we could include. We, first of all, are complying with the U.N. Security Council definition of sanctions and we are encouraging now our allies to take similar action.

Secondly, because of decisions made by us, the attitude of the American people, the attitude of shippers of food and drugs, this trade is practically nonexistent. As I pointed out to you today, unless there is immediate action on the part of Iran, these items and the interruption of communications are still available to us for a decision by me.

. . . .

Q. There's been some ambiguity, perhaps partly deliberate, about the circumstances and timing of military measures, if they are to be taken, against Iran. One element of that ambiguity was a remark you made in an interview with the European television last week that suggested that if our allies support us sufficiently in taking sanctions, then it might be less necessary for you to take unilateral military measures.

My question is, to what extent does the timing of military measures depend on what our allies do and to what extent does it depend simply on the Iranian response?

A. It depends on three factors. One is the effectiveness of the accumulation of economic and political sanctions that we have taken against Iran. Secondly, it depends upon the effectiveness of the sanctions to be imposed upon Iran by other nations in the world, including some of our key allies. And thirdly and most importantly, of course, it depends upon the response of Iran to these actions and the condemnation of the rest of the world.

I do not feel it appropriate for me to set a specific time schedule for the imposition of further actions which may include military action, but it's an option available to me.

I think our key allied leaders understand the timeframe under which we are acting and making our plans and, their decisions next week, I think, will be colored, perhaps, by the messages that I have exchanged with them, both by cable and by direct telephone conversations, which continue.

Q. There have been reports that you have designated Hamilton Jordan as your special envoy on Iran to negotiate on the hostages and that generally, he has become one of your top foreign policy advisers. Could you explain to us some of these new functions of his and his qualifications for them and also confirm a report that on one or more of his secret missions he wore a wig and other disguises?

A. I've never known about any disguises or wigs. Hamilton is not one of my major foreign policy advisers. He does not claim to be an expert on foreign policy. Hamilton is very valuable to me in the proper interrelation of foreign policy decisions with domestic decisions. He does attend most of our high-level discussions on both domestic matters and foreign policy matters.

Almost every member of the White House staff who is involved directly or indirectly in international affairs and also those in the State Department and perhaps even those in the Justice Department have been involved at various times in the attempt that we have made to convince the Iranian Government and their officials to release the hostages. This does include Hamilton, but he's not designated exclusively at all to play this role.

Q. You mentioned that there's a statement from Iranian officials that they may not consider the hostage question until July. Without talking about a deadline, is that acceptable? Could it go on that long?

A. I would think that would be an excessive time for us to wait.

Q. Despite the compelling objective of obtaining the release of the hostages, what is the possibility that a future military action by the United

one's own region, could encourage aggression elsewhere.

Deterrence requires sacrifice. The United States is willing to bear its share. It is vital that the burden of sacrifice be shared among all our allies—for the sake of peace, for the sake of our alliances, and for the sake of the public support which makes those alliances strong.

The Soviet invasion is not only a challenge to our interests but to those of our allies as well. While there should be a division of labor, it must be an equitable one.

We do not seek nor are we asking our allies to dismantle the framework of East-West relations. We do ask that they take measures designed to deter the Soviets from new adventures that could produce new crises. It is important that we and our allies stand together in our condemnation of aggression.

This firm stand also serves a second purpose: the withdrawal of all Soviet military forces from Afghanistan.

Western pressures do not stand alone. The Soviet actions have been swiftly and strongly condemned by the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world. The Soviets are facing a staunch, broadly based Afghan resistance. These factors all combine to impose a continuing cost on the Soviets for their aggression.

We also support efforts to restore a neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan, with a government that would be responsive to the wishes of the Afghan people. With the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops, we would join with Afghanistan's neighbors in a guarantee of true neutrality and of noninterference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

Let me be clear that so long as Soviet forces remain in Afghanistan, the sanctions we have undertaken in response to the Soviet invasion will remain in force. We see no sign of Soviet withdrawal. The evidence is of a continuing buildup.

Let me be equally clear, however, that our intention is to remove the sanctions when Soviet troops are fully withdrawn from Afghanistan. This would include the tighter criteria we announced last week governing exceptions from controls on high technology exports to the Soviet Union. However, the changes we have proposed in the list of items to be controlled would, if adopted by the Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy (COCOM), remain in place; such changes were being considered even before the invasion of Afghanistan, as necessary to promote Western security interests and to reflect the state of Soviet technology.

Nor will we alter our firm position opposing participation at the Moscow Olympics. The February deadline has passed.

Our response to the immediate situation is part of our long-term strategy in the region, as we work with others toward a cooperative security framework. Our purpose is not to dominate any nation; our purpose is to help the nations of the region preserve their independence and build their strength so that they can resist domination by others.

We advance this objective in several ways.

- We are persisting in our efforts for peace in that broad region. A comprehensive settlement between Israel and its neighbors remains a paramount American goal. It would strengthen the security of Israel, to which we remain unshakably committed. It would enhance the security of Israel's neighbors and the stability of the region as a whole.
- In South Asia, mutual suspicions between India and Pakistan harm the security of both and heighten the regional danger. We will continue to support their efforts to resolve the issues dividing them. We seek good relations with both. Our assistance to either one is not directed at the other.
- We are working with the nations of the region to foster their economic progress and political stability. The conditions inviting internal disorder cannot be remedied by military force. They can be met as governments move to meet the expectations of their people in their own ways and within their own traditions.
- We are strengthening the basis for security cooperation in the region—through military assistance, through access to facilities, and through our increased presence. We have reaffirmed in these new circumstances our commitment to the 1959 agreement of cooperation with Pakistan. The nature of our economic and security assistance will depend both on Pakistan's assessment of its needs and our own resource capabilities.
- Finally, we seek to improve our relations with nations throughout the area, wherever there is a basis of shared interests. Our diplomacy is grounded in support for the independence of others and respect for their traditions and concerns.

I have concentrated on our approach in this one area because of its immediate importance and because it illustrates a more general proposition: Globally, as well as in this region, our posture must be to maintain our own and allied military strength while pursuing an active, affirmative diplomacy. Both serve the full range of our interests.

U.S. Security

Our most fundamental interest is to maintain our security through an assured balance of military power. For more than 15 years there has been a steady growth in Soviet military programs and budgets. They have doubled their defense efforts over the past two decades. There is no sign of abatement in this trend.

During most of that same period our own efforts, in real terms, decreased. We have reversed this downward trend. For if it were to continue, the current overall balance in military forces would be dangerously altered.

The increases in defense spending that this Administration has proposed require sacrifice at a time of economic difficulty. They are sacrifices we must make now for the sake of our future security. As we proceed, we should not underestimate our existing strength. We want no dangerous miscalculations of our power or our will.

Simple U.S.-Soviet force comparisons, for example, ignore the principles of collective security that are the core of our defense strategy. On the whole, our allies make a significantly greater military contribution than Soviet allies. Combined NATO strength rests upon an economic foundation more than twice the size of that of the Warsaw Pact. And our alliances also have a fundamental cohesion that is far less certain on the Warsaw Pact side.

A fair measurement of the balance must also account for the fact that the Soviets have fully one-fourth of their ground and tactical air forces deployed along their border with China.

More broadly, our purpose in the world is in basic harmony with the deep determination of nations around the world to defend their sovereignty. A purpose in conflict with nationalism—a quest to dominate and control others—presents far more difficulties and dangers, as the Soviets are learning from the nationalists in Afghanistan.

Most important, we are moving in an orderly fashion to anticipate and remedy the potential gaps in our defenses—strategic, theater nuclear, and con-

ventional. Our real defense programs are growing. Reinstatement of draft registration will advance our capacity for sharp increases in military personnel should a future crisis require it.

To portray an America standing immobile in the face of growing danger may be fashionable, but it also is patently false.

Our security begins with the balance of strategic forces. The Soviet nuclear arsenal constitutes the one credible, direct threat to the continental United States. To effectively deter that danger we must have a capability for certain and appropriate retaliation to any level of attack. We must also maintain forces which are, and are perceived to be, essentially equivalent to those of the Soviet Union, to avoid the possible military or political consequences that an imbalance might bring.

These requirements—flexible response and essential equivalence—are advanced by our programs to modernize and improve the three elements of our triad of strategic force: the MX mobile land-based missile, the Trident submarine and missile programs, and the air-launched cruise missiles for our manned bombers.

Our security is also based upon collective defense. The security of our allies is synonymous with our own.

The Soviet Union, with its Warsaw Pact allies, has increased its capability to mount a heavy attack, with little warning, in Europe. To counter that danger, President Carter in 1977 recommended to NATO a Long-Term Defense Program to improve allied capabilities in each of 10 vital areas ranging from air defense to maritime posture. The program was adopted in 1978. It is being implemented.

Last December in response to Soviet theater nuclear modernization, the NATO ministers agreed to a plan for modernizing our theater nuclear forces while we seek equal negotiated limits on both sides. These force improvements reflect a common perception in NATO of the growing threat to Europe—and a common determination to respond. I will not pretend that there is unanimity in the alliance on all international issues. But NATO is united on its central role, and the alliance is making progress to guarantee that its capabilities will be sufficient to meet its obligations.

We have security interests in Asia similar to those in Europe. We are committed to maintaining our strength in Asia. Our close association and alliance with Japan reflect strong economic ties and shared security interests. Our defense cooperation is expanding. Japan's self-defense forces are undergoing steady improvement. We have urged Japanese leaders to expand these programs, within the limits set by the Japanese constitution.

We attach great importance to our alliances with our ANZUS [security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States] partners—Australia and New Zealand. We stand firmly behind our other security commitments in the region.

In response to the confirmed sharp buildup in North Korea, we are maintaining our strength in that area. At the same time, the strength of our South Korean ally is growing. Next year, for example, South Korean defense spending is expected to reach nearly 6% of its gross national product, compared to roughly 4% in the early 1970s.

Conclusion of a revised base agreement with the Philippines has been an important, positive development for the sustained defense of the region.

. . . if we shortchange our programs of security assistance now, we will be shortchanging our own future safety.

Our forces in East Asia not only reinforce our security commitments there; because of their mobility they help protect interests that we and our Asian allies share outside the immediate region, such as those in the Persian Gulf.

Our European and Asian alliances have long encompassed our major defense priorities. They do not, however, define the perimeters of our security interests. We must also be prepared to reinforce the capacity for resistance to aggression in areas beyond our alliances. Let me take a few moments to address this important question.

With an inescapable stake in the health of the international economy, we cannot idly watch vital resources fall under the control of an outside force. Our interests require that we be able and willing to help others resist challenges to their sovereignty and to counter, in particular, a growing Soviet ability to project its power.

Our ability to project our power is unsurpassed. But improvements must be made. Enhancing the mobility of our rapid deployment forces will be an important step forward. Plans for maritime prepositioning ships and a new large cargo aircraft will further strengthen our ability to respond quickly when crises occur.

The confidence of our friends and our political influence in the world depend, in part, upon our military strength and our will to use it if necessary. We must be seen as fully reliable. Our strength must be perceived as fully sufficient to meet realistic threats.

Certainly there are limits to what we can and should do. We would undermine the confidence of our friends and allies through bellicose pronouncements or a posture that implied an interest in dominating other sovereign states. The use of American military force is not a desirable American policy response to the purely internal politics of other nations. As the President said in his State of the Union address, ". . . our power will never be used to initiate a threat to the security of any nation or to the rights of any human being."

No easy formula can determine in advance when we should use military force beyond our alliance areas. The proper response in each case must be a function of the importance and immediacy of the American and allied interests at risk; the source and character of the threat; the potential involvement of friends and allies within and beyond the region affected; the prospects for success and the potential costs of our involvement; and other factors.

Our system rightly gives responsibility to both the President and the Congress for committing our military forces to combat. To sustain such a commitment requires a firm public base.

Obviously, direct military involvement is not our preference. The best answer to outside pressure is indigenous strength. Sensible programs of security assistance and arms supply can help our friends build their own capacity to resist. A policy which concentrated solely on our own military strength and failed to provide for legitimate security needs of our friends would be worse than shortsighted. It would be dangerous; for such a policy would increase the danger of conflicts and international confrontations that might be avoided if local security balances are preserved.

Let me emphasize that if we shortchange our programs of security assistance now, we will be shortchanging our own future safety. Such programs are not

we interested in arms control with the Russians at all at this point?

A. Yes, I think we intend to try to keep the fabric of East-West relations in order, and one of the ways we can do that is to pursue arms control negotiations with them. They're in our interest. They're perhaps in our mutual interests. So we've been meeting with them on a number of arms control matters, the mutual and balanced force reductions, the negotiations in central Europe. Other negotiations go forward.

We continued to talk to them about the SALT Treaty and to indicate to them our desire not to prevent its subsequent ratification when the right time comes. So I would say that arms control, the prospect of arms control, is one of the avenues for possible improvement of our relations with the Soviet Union if and when the situation stabilizes.

Q. Prime Minister Begin of Israel is arriving in Washington this week close on the heels of President Sadat of Egypt who met with President Carter this past week and delivered some very strong expressions of concern here about Israeli settlements on the West Bank.

The question is hanging at the moment as to whether or not Mr. Carter plans to deliver a tough message to Mr. Begin that "it is a time to bring an end to your government's settlement policy or we're going to have to get tough in some way." Would you expect that the President will indeed deliver such a message?

A. We look forward to Prime Minister Begin's visit just as we did to President Sadat's. We had a good session with President Sadat—constructive—and made progress. I think we'll have the same kind of a session with Prime Minister Begin.

As you know, the autonomy talks have gone on for some time. Ambassador Linowitz [Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations] has indicated that progress has been made, but the two meetings with the heads of state give an opportunity to give a new impetus to the autonomy negotiations. I think the President will be exploring with Prime Minister Begin ways in which those autonomy talks can be speeded up looking toward some very substantial progress by the year-end deadline of May 26th.

Q. It's now been well over a year and a half since the Camp David summit. There's been a great deal of tongue-clucking by the Administration about both the settlements on the West Bank and the lack of progress on Palestinian autonomy, but nothing happens.

We do have the capability of getting very tough with Israel through the threat of cutting off economic and military aid for instance. Why are the President and this Administration so reluctant to apply real pressure on Israel?

A. You say nothing has happened, and I just have to disagree with you on that. Egypt and Israel have diplomatic relations. Traffic goes back and forth between the countries. They've exchanged ambassadors. That's a very historic step. So a great deal has happened.

In addition to that, I would remind you—I believe it's correct to say—that all elements of the Camp David agreement have been abided by up to the present time, some of them even in advance of the deadlines. So we're not dissatisfied with the progress under the Camp David agreement. And I think the President will be talking with Prime Minister Begin in the same frame of mind as he did with President Sadat: How can we keep this progress going? We together have taken these important steps. We've made this progress. Now let's keep moving down the line.

Q. Do you really mean to say that you are not dissatisfied with the continuing expansion of Israeli settlements on the West Bank?

A. Our view on that is well known. Yes, we think the settlements are an obstacle to progress in this area. We've told the Israelis that not only for months but for a long time, but I think that particular aspect does not prevent our making progress on the autonomy talks. Indeed, that is one of the issues that will have to be discussed, and progress made on it as well, in connection with the autonomy talks.

Q. A general question on U.S. foreign policy: In a political year, virtually everything the President does at least is open to the possibility that he's doing it for political reasons. To what extent has the campaign infringed upon foreign policy over the last few months?

A. I haven't seen any indication that it has. Indeed, perhaps the opposite is more true. I think foreign policy has infringed on the campaign. Sitting here in the State Department we ask for and get a great deal of the President's time. He occupies himself on foreign policy naturally a great deal of his time, especially in the midst of crises such as the Iran crisis and the Afghanistan crisis. So the President has been prevented from campaigning, and he's been having to rivet his attention on these matters of foreign policy. So I would say the effect has been more the other way.

Q. It is noted that he has made a couple of important announcements vis-a-vis Iran on primary days, and his famous news conference on the morning of the Wisconsin primary escaped no one's attention. It's certainly sometimes—the impression is certainly there that there is a connection between the two.

A. I was there that morning and the reason he made that statement that morning was because Bani-Sadr had made a speech in Iran that day that required a response. We had waited for that speech. We had waited for an indication that progress might be made, and the President responded in due course in good order. But the triggering event there was not the Wisconsin primary but the speech made by Bani-Sadr.

Q. When Senator Kennedy accuses the President on the campaign trail, as he has repeatedly, of betraying Israel, now doesn't that impinge on the conduct of foreign policy? Doesn't that sort of box the President in in getting tougher with Israel for instance?

A. The President is absolutely committed to the security of Israel. He is committed to making the process work. He has not betrayed Israel. Indeed, our support for Israel is one of the main elements of American foreign policy. So it's just inaccurate to charge the President with that. ■

Visit of Kenyan President Moi

President Daniel T. arap Moi of Kenya made a state visit to the United States February 19–22, 1980. While in Washington, he met with President Carter and other government officials. Following is the text of the White House statement issued on Feburary 20.[1]

President Carter met this morning for an hour and 15 minutes in the Cabinet Room with President Daniel arap Moi of the Republic of Kenya. President Moi is in Washington on a 4-day state visit at the invitation of President Carter. In addition to their meeting this morning, the two leaders will meet again tonight at a state dinner in the White House.

The two Presidents reviewed the very close relations which exist between the United States and the Republic of Kenya. They discussed developments in East Africa and the importance of regional cooperation and understanding in that area. They also reviewed developments in southern Africa and agreed upon the importance of free elections and a peaceful settlement in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

The two Presidents discussed the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and agreed on concerted action in not participating in the Olympic Games in Moscow. They also discussed a range of issues concerning regional stability in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas, including the measures required to insure mutual security in that region.

The two Presidents also discussed specific problems in the Middle East, during which President Carter expressed his gratitude for Kenya's support and President Moi's personal interest in efforts to secure the release of our diplomats being held hostage in Tehran.

Bilateral issues were also reviewed, including U.S. assistance programs in Kenya.

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 25, 1980, which also contains President Carter's and President Moi's exchange of remarks at the arrival ceremony on Feb. 20 and their dinner toasts that evening. ■

President Moi and President Carter (White House photo by Karl Schumacher)

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CORRECTION

In the April 1980 issue, the first sentence of the last paragraph on page 6 should read: "The United States has often taken the lead and is a major participant in both emergency and long-range Sahelian programs."

the integrity and the sovereignty of all nations and the right for them to live in peace behind recognized and secure borders.

It specifies that the relationship that has now developed between Israel and Egypt should not be confined to those two nations, but the same kind of thrust should extend to the relationship between Israel and all its neighbors. It is a foundation for future success with nations that so far have not chosen to take advantage of this wonderful opportunity.

This document specifies the organization of a self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza derived through free elections held by the people who live in those two troubled areas. And with the establishment of a self-governing authority, Israel has agreed to withdraw the military government and the civilian administration associated with it and then to withdraw all its troops from the occupied territories and then the remainder of those troops to be located in specified security locations.

The people of those two territories are granted autonomy and, as Prime Minister Begin said many times in the presence of President Sadat and me, not just autonomy, full autonomy—full autonomy, he said many, many times.

It is important for us to know that the agreement calls for a strong local police force and for that local police force to be interrelated with law enforcement officials in Jordan and in Egypt and in other surrounding countries.

It is important for us to remember that security arrangements should be agreed upon; that there should be a recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; that the Palestinians have a right to participate in the determination of their own future; and that the Palestinian question should be resolved in all its aspects; and that the nations involved—that is Egypt, Israel, we and others—should provide for the resolution of the problem of the Palestinian refugees.

You can see how far-reaching this document is, and Prime Minister Begin, President Sadat, and I are pledged to carry out all these agreements on our word of honor and on the honor of the nations that we represent. It is a solemn commitment which cannot be lightly ignored or violated.

The world now may be skeptical about the prospects of success. But the world is not nearly so skeptical now as it was before Camp David or before the Peace Treaty was signed between Israel and Egypt. We have overcome difficulties in the past, and the United States plays a full role in assuring that the negotiations now underway will be successful.

A week from now, Prime Minister Begin will be here, and he has the same commitment to the success of this effort as is shared between President Sadat and myself. We cannot afford to fail because of these two nations committed to peace and led by courageous men who are determined not to fail.

Tonight I would like to propose a toast to the people of Egypt, a proud and ancient nation, which has provided leadership for the world through many generations and for its great leader, President Anwar Sadat, his lovely wife, and all the human characteristics that are so fine and noble, which they represent, and I would like to propose a toast to peace.

President Sadat

My dear friend, President Carter, Mrs. Carter, dear friends: Thank you for your kind words and genuine hospitality. As you well know, it is always a pleasure for us to visit your great country and work with you for the noble cause of peace and friendship among nations. The historic steps we have taken together on the road to peace constitute the most positive contribution to that cause.

We are determined to pursue our mission until a comprehensive settlement is achieved. This was our pledge when we started together, and it remains our firm commitment. If a comprehensive settlement was a necessity at the time we began our endeavor, it is an absolute must today.

The talks we had today confirmed my confidence in your unwavering commitment to justice and morality. You have demonstrated once again your sensitivity to other people suffering a denial of rights. You have proven your determination to stand firm by your commitments.

You set a shining example for genuine concern and unselfish concern for peace and stability in every corner of the world. You fully realize the interdependence and community of interests between all nations. Today, as ever, you shouldered your responsibility with vision and courage.

In the weeks and months ahead, we shall continue to work together for the consolidation of peace. We shall spare no effort in our concerted drive to effect a genuine change in the West Bank and Gaza. A real transfer of authority must take place, and a new era of reconciliation should begin. This would be in the interest of all nations, not the Palestinian people alone. No one benefits from the continuation of occupation and the perpetuation of conflict. No one profits from the escalation of tension and the deepening of suspicion and distrust among those who live in the same region. Everyone stands to gain from a just and lasting peace in the cradle of civilization.

I am happy to say that we are quite satisfied with the development of our cooperation in various fields. This is greatly appreciated by every Egyptian. We are determined to intensify the creative exchange between our peoples for the good of all nations. Such a healthy and sound relationship based on mutual respect and trust can promote a higher degree of universal understanding and cooperation. It sets a model for human interaction and solidarity with those who believe in the oneness of the destiny of man. Let us pledge to continue this march and reinforce our friendship in every possible way.

Dear friends, permit me to ask you to rise in a tribute to our great friend, President Jimmy Carter and Mrs. Carter, to all of you present tonight, to every American who lent us his support and understanding and to the ever-growing friendship between our nations. God bless you all.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, APR. 9, 1980[3]

President Sadat and President Carter have completed 2 days of extensive talks in which they reviewed carefully and in depth a wide range of issues, including the Middle East, southwest Asia, Africa, and the remaining issues in the current autonomy negotiations.

The talks were held in the spirit of the close relationship which President Sadat and President Carter have developed along with Prime Minister Begin in working together to bring peace to the Middle East. Both leaders reaffirmed their conviction that the Camp David agreement and the subsequent Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel have produced the first tangible steps, after decades of conflict, toward achieving real peace in that troubled area of the world. President Carter praised the scrupulous implementation of the Peace Treaty, at times even ahead of schedule, noting that both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have proved to the

Visit of Israeli Prime Minister Begin

Prime Minister Menahem Begin of the State of Israel made an official visit to Washington, D.C., April 14–17, 1980, to meet with President Carter and other government officials. Following are an exchange of dinner toasts at the White House on April 15 and a White House statement issued on April 17.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, APR. 15, 1980[1]

President Carter

I would like, first of all, to welcome all of you to the White House. We are extremely delighted to have our guests from Israel come here to see us again, particularly Prime Minister Begin and his lovely wife.

Mr. Prime Minister, as you may know, this is an election year in the United States. I don't know if the word has gotten to Israel yet. [Laughter] But I have noticed that when Prime Minister Begin and I agree, we both prosper, not only in public acclaim but also politically. When we don't quite agree, neither one of us benefits substantially. [Laughter] Lately, for instance, my own policies have caused him some trouble, as you may have noticed a month or so ago, on the West Bank of the Jordan, and I might say that our disagreement also caused me some trouble on the east bank of the Hudson River. [Laughter, Applause]

When Prime Minister Begin comes in the White House, it's an experience not only of a personal pleasure but also with the realization of the making of history. There are a few people in this world who, because of personal courage and integrity and deep commitment and sensitivity to others and tenacity, are able to change the course of human events. And obviously, our visitor tonight, Prime Minister Begin, is one of those men.

This is an historic house, and the friendship that binds our two countries together and the tremendous achievements of this great statesman, I think, make a good confluence of both pleasure and history.

Monday will be the 32d birthday of the nation of Israel. I can't be in Israel; I wish I could. I am sending, Mr. Prime Minister, my mother to represent me on that delightful occasion.

As you know, 2 years ago we were together on the South Lawn of the White House to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the founding of the State of Israel.

On that occasion, I thought that it would be good for our nation to commemorate with the large group of American Jewish citizens and all of us—the 220 million of us—the terrible historic lesson that we learned from the Holocaust. Since then, the committee has been to Israel and to some of the devastating locations in Europe to assess how our own nation might commemorate this historic and bligating event in the passage of human life and through human history.

We have now appointed the Holocaust commission to establish a proper memorial in our country, an outgrowth directly of the 30th anniversary event on the South Lawn of our White House.

I think it is obvious that when Prime Minister Begin was elected Prime Minister, and obviously for the 25 or 30 years prior to that, many people said it is impossible to bring peace to Israel, and particularly between it and its most powerful Arab neighbors. Prime Minister Begin proved those people to be wrong.

It has been less than 2½ years—it is hard to believe—since the historic meeting between Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat in Jerusalem, an act that literally shook the world and inspired all human beings to believe that peace was indeed possible, even among the most historic and bitter of enemies.

It was less than a year following that when Prime Minister Begin met with President Sadat at Camp David and came forward with an agreement—the Camp David accords—that was announced here in the White House one Sunday afternoon.

This agreement is now the basis for our current search for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. It is founded on the principles espoused in U.N. Resolution 242. It calls for an honoring of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity and the political independence not only of Israel but of all nations in the Middle East.

It is committed to the proposition that each nation there, with a special emphasis on Israel, has a right to live in peace behind recognized and secure borders. This accord, or agreement, signed with our word of honor and with our nation's honor, calls for the establishment of a self-governing authority among the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza area. It calls for Israel, after the establishment or inauguration of this self-governing authority, to withdraw its military government, the civilian administration. And then it calls for withdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces and a redeployment of them to specified security locations.

It calls for a strong police force among the people who live on the West Bank and the Gaza area, with proper liaison to be established with the adjacent police forces in Israel, Jordan, and Egypt.

It calls for a preeminent recognition of the need for all of us to guarantee the security of Israel and its neighbors. It calls for the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. It calls for Palestinians' right to participate in the determination of their own future. It calls for us to resolve the Palestinian question in all its aspects. And it calls on us to resolve the refugee problem.

This combination, which was carefully hammered out between Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat at Camp David, is still the binding document under which we are presently engaged in further pursuit of peace. It is world their dedication to sparing their people the agony of war.

In their discussions, the two Presidents asserted again their joint determination to pursue to successful conclusion within the Camp David framework the current autonomy negotiations as another step toward a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. They focused on ways to accelerate the peace process and to resolve the remaining issues in the negotiations.

President Carter plans to pursue these discussions in an equally thorough examination next week with Prime Minister Begin.

The two Presidents reaffirmed that the objective of the parties is to do everything possible to reach agreement by the May 26 goal set out in the agreement which President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin sent President Carter at the time they signed their Peace Treaty.

[1] Text from White House press release.
[2] For text of the Camp David accords, see BULLETIN of October 1978, p. 7.
[3] List of participants in the discussions omitted here (text from White House press release). ■

Istanbul he had a series of telephone conversations with senior members of the Iranian governmental structure, including the Ayatollah Beheshti, who was then Secretary of the Revolutionary Council; Mr. Ghotbzadeh, then Minister for National Guidance; and Mr. Bani-Sadr, the supervisor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that time. During these conversations Mr. Clark made it very clear that the United States regarded the seizure of the hostages and the Embassy as totally illegal and unjustifiable. Although Mr. Clark never had an opportunity to carry out the essential function that he was supposed to perform—namely to open negotiations with the Government of Iran—nevertheless, he managed to lodge unequivocal protests which made clear—if, indeed, any clarification was needed—that an enormously important dispute had arisen between the two states.

Such protests were repeatedly voiced as the United States pursued its efforts to resolve the dispute. On 9 November, just 5 days after the hostages had been seized, Ambassador Donald McHenry, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, presented to the U.N. Security Council the letter which is set out at page 133 of our Memorial. In that letter the United States asserted that the action taken by the Government of Iran against our Embassy and diplomatic personnel struck at the "fundamental norms by which states maintain communication, and violate the very basis for the maintenance of international peace and security and of comity between states." The United States requested the Security Council to consider what might be done to secure the release of the hostages, and over the next several weeks the Security Council and the General Assembly responded with a series of statements and resolutions calling upon Iran to release the hostages without delay. These statements are set forth in our Memorial at pages 134, 135, 140, and 27–28. I will have more to say about the actions of the United Nations at a later point, but I should simply note here in passing that from an early point in the crisis, the conduct of the Government of Iran was vigorously protested both by the United States and by the United Nations.

During the time it was making these public protests with respect to Iran's illegal conduct, the United States was also employing diplomatic channels for the same purpose. During the first few days following the Embassy takeover, the United States asked other governments which maintained embassies in Tehran to make demarches on the Iranian Foreign Ministry calling upon Iran to release the American hostages. Indeed, other countries have pursued that goal so vigorously that on 30 November, as indicated at page 132 of our Memorial, the Ayatollah Khomeini confessed that "probably not a day passes" without such messages from third countries being received by the Iranian Foreign Ministry.

Iran's Use of the Hostages for Political Coercion

Thus far in my argument I have emphasized four basic facts: first, that the Government of Iran very clearly was aware that it had an obligation to protect the American Embassy and its diplomatic personnel from the mob; second, that it had the capability of doing so; third, that the Government of Iran made an apparently deliberate political decision that the Embassy and its personnel should be seized and implemented that decision not only by failing to provide protective security forces but by sending in the Revolutionary Guards to insure that the invaders would succeed in their mission; and fourth, that the United States reacted promptly, peacefully, and constructively to those events.

At this point, then, I would like to turn to another aspect that I have touched upon but not yet emphasized; namely, that the Government of Iran, once it had accomplished the capture of the American hostages, decided to use those hostages as a political instrument for coercing the United States into taking specific political actions desired by the Iranian authorities.

As the Court is aware, various different kinds of political action have been demanded by the Iranians during the crisis, but at the beginning of the dispute the single most basic demand was that the United States send the former Shah back to Iran for prosecution. As early as 7 November the Ayatollah and the students began to demand the extradition of the Shah, and the same demand was echoed at every level of the Iranian Government. On 7 November, for example, in discussing the question whether Mr. Clark would be received by the Iranian Government, the Ayatollah Khomeini declared that the return of the Shah was a precondition not only for release of the hostages but for the mere opening of discussions with the United States. As stated 2 days later on the Tehran radio, the Ayatollah was absolutely firm in the position that until the deposed Shah had been extradited, there could be no negotiations with any American envoys. The declaration to that effect is set forth at page 206 of our Memorial.

The efforts of the Iranian Government to coerce the U.S. Government reached an initial crescendo on 17 November: At that time the Ayatollah Khomeini had decided that certain female and black hostages then held captive in the American Embassy should be released, and on 17 November the Ayatollah issued an official decree to that effect which was broadcast over the Tehran radio, as indicated at page 95 of our Memorial. In the decree it was stated explicitly that once the specified hostages had been released the remaining American hostages would be held under arrest until the American Government had returned the Shah to Iran for trial and he had returned all of the wealth that he had allegedly plundered.

I submit that the Iranian decree of 17 November, as set forth at page 95 of our Memorial, is a unique document in the history of modern international relations and quite appalling in its implications. In that official pronouncement the government not only confirmed its role in bringing about and endorsing the seizure of the Embassy and the hostages, it also confirmed that the Iranian Government itself was holding diplomatic personnel captive in an attempt to bring about desired political action. As I shall subsequently explain when I address the merits of our claims, it is the position of the United States that the conduct of the Iranian Government, as exemplified in the decree of 17 November, in a very real sense constituted compound or multiplied violations of international law: The Government of Iran violated the law when it failed to protect the Embassy and the American diplomatic personnel; it compounded that violation when it supported and endorsed the capture; and it compounded the violation again when it began to use the hostages as an instrument of coercion or blackmail. As I stand here today, this brutal strategy, a negation of the rule of law, has not attained its stated objective; on the other hand, for international peace it has raised grave risks which have been

avoided only because of the self-control of the U.S. Government and the American public.

U.S. Restraint

Incidentally, if I may be permitted a personal aside, I happen to reside only a few blocks from the Iranian Embassy in Washington, and I pass the Iranian Embassy almost every day on my way to and from the State Department. Almost every day over the past 4½ months I have been struck anew by the irony of the fact that while our Embassy and our diplomats in Iran have been in a state of captivity, the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington has been fully protected by the United States and has been going about its business in a perfectly peaceful fashion without the slightest molestation of any kind.

For 4½ months our Embassy has been physically held captive and has been totally unable to function as an Embassy, and the Iranian Embassy in Washington has been functioning without interruption throughout.

For 4½ months—more than one-third of the year—the American hostages have been imprisoned and for at least part of this time, bound hand and foot and intimidated and threatened and harassed in inhumane conditions, while the Iranian diplomats still in Washington have been left free to come and go as they please, to carry out their diplomatic duties, and to enjoy the ordinary peaceful pleasures of life.

For the past 4½ months the premises and records and documents and archives of the American Embassy in Tehran have been ransacked, used at will by the militants in Tehran, and discussed in the public press by high Iranian officials, while the Iranian premises and archives in Washington have been preserved inviolate.

I submit that the restraint thus demonstrated by the United States should not be regarded as a sign of weakness. It should be regarded as a sign of strength, a demonstration of the ability of the U.S. Government and the American people to overcome and control the very strong and understandable temptation to strike back at Iran. In the decision to exercise such restraint the U.S. commitment to the rule of law has played a great part, and we are gratified by the fact that our commitment has been supported by almost universal approbation of our restraint and by a correspondingly universal condemnation of the conduct of the Government of Iran, especially as reflected in the proceedings of the United Nations.

Nevertheless, we feel very strongly, indeed, that if such condemnation is to operate as a deterrent to repetition of the Iranian conduct, either in Iran or elsewhere, there is one more element that must be added; namely, a final judgment of this Court on the merits of the claims of the United States. It is because we believe that a clear and emphatic judgment is bound to be a deterrent to future and similar violations of international law that we have been moving forward as vigorously as we can in pursuit of a final decision.

Iranian Government's Control

At this point I should like to pause to comment on a relatively recent development which some may regard as undercutting our claim that the Government of Iran itself continues to be a wholehearted participant in the violations of international law that have occurred in this case. In very recent weeks, according to press accounts, there has developed a certain tension between some elements of the Iranian Government and the so-called militants occupying the Embassy compound. The newly elected President, Mr. Bani-Sadr, and some of his colleagues have criticized the students for their recent independence of action, asserting that the students are improperly attempting to act as "a government within a government." I respectfully submit, however, that this recent tension should not be permitted to obscure the fundamentally important fact that from 4 November down to the present time, the students have repeatedly emphasized their subservience to the orders of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Again and again they have stated to the world that they would obey any instructions received from the Imam, who continues to be the supreme authority in Iran and to whom even the elected President is answerable under the Constitution. On 17 November, as I noted earlier, the Ayatollah directed the students to release certain specified hostages, and the students obeyed. On 28 December the students were asked whether an order from the Ayatollah to release the rest of the hostages would be obeyed, and they replied unequivocally in the affirmative. In very recent days there may have arisen reason to doubt that the students will obey orders from Mr. Bani-Sadr; but as recently as 10 March the students reiterated their willingness to bow to the authority of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Such recent reaffirmations are reflected in several of the Supplemental Documents which we will be submitting to the Court.[1]

The power to control the fate of the hostages, therefore, lies in the Ayatollah's hands, and he has decided against their release for the time being. Instead he has publicly announced that the question of the hostages is for the National Assembly to decide.[2] That body will not even take office until late April at the earliest, and it may not begin functioning until the month of May.[3] In the interim the Ayatollah supports the continued detention of the hostages. It is, thus, entirely clear that the internationally wrongful acts for which the United States seeks judicial redress have been and are under the continuous control of the leader of the Government of Iran, which must take full responsibility for the conduct of which we complain here.

U.S. Efforts in the United Nations

As I mentioned earlier all of the U.S. reactions to the conduct of the Government of Iran have been peaceful actions taken within the law, and I would like at this point to describe for the Court the additional actions which the United States has taken in seeking to bring about a solution to its ongoing dispute with Iran over the hostages and the Embassy. Those efforts started with the immediate dispatch of Mr. Ramsey Clark on a mission to negotiate with the Government of Iran, but after an extended stay in Istanbul seeking to open negotiations Mr. Clark returned to the United States totally rebuffed.

The next step was to take the matter up with the United Nations. On 9 November 1979, as I mentioned earlier, Ambassador McHenry urgently requested on behalf of the United States that the Security Council undertake immediate deliberations as to what might be done and the same day the President of the Security Council expressed, and I quote, "profound concern over the prolonged detention of American diplomatic personnel in Iran." I might note, incidentally, that it now seems odd that a statement issued on 9 November, just 5 days after the attack on the Embassy, should have referred to the prolonged detention of

States, even including a blockade, might be too high a price to pay in terms of the damage to the allied oil supplies, and the further risk of war?

A. That's a balance that I will have to assess and on which make the ultimate decision. I have not discussed specific military steps with our allies that I might take. I think they are familiar through news reports and through just commonsense analysis of those available to us that the interruption of commerce with Iran is a kind of step that would be available. We announced in November, I think November the 20th, that this was one of those steps that we would reserve for ourselves to take in the future. I think we used the phrase, "interruption of commerce with Iran." It would be severe in its consequences for Iran and much less severe for any particular customer of Iran.

Because of sanctions against Iran and because of the fragmented nature of their own economic system and because of their inability to buy adequate spare parts and continue their exploratory operations of the production of oil, their shipments of oil in the international markets have dropped precipitously. So a total interruption of Iranian oil shipments to other countries would not be a devastating blow to those countries. It would certainly be an inconvenience; it would certainly be serious. And we have been trying to avoid that kind of action, and we are still attempting to avoid that kind of action. But I cannot preclude that option for the future if it becomes necessary.

Q. Some of your critics, especially those who work for Senator Kennedy, have suggested that your announcements and actions on Iran—many of them seem timed to influence the presidential primaries. They cite the announcement the morning of the Wisconsin primary and, I'm sure, will point out that today's announcements and this press conference come just a few days before the Pennsylvania primary. What's your response to that?

A. I would like for you to look at the calendar since the first of January and find a time that wasn't immediately before or immediately after a primary. As you know, we have 35 primaries this year in a period of about 5 months, which is an average of 7 primaries per month. And I have never designed the announcement of an action to try to color or modify the actions of voters in a primary. These occurrences are too serious for our nation. And the particular instance to which you refer in Wisconsin was a time when we had negotiated for many weeks in anticipation of such an announcement that the hostages would be transferred to control of the government and subsequently released.

That decision came through official action by the Iranian Government, the Revolutionary Council. President Bani-Sadr made the announcement himself early in the morning our time, about noontime Iranian time. It was a completely appropriate time for it to be announced. But I do not make, and have not made, and will not make decisions nor announcements concerning the lives and safety of our hostages simply to derive some political benefit from them.

Q. It seems a lot of people we've seen don't find your effectiveness too great these days. We find this in the polls and elsewhere, and at least it's not as high as they'd like, as good as they'd like. My question is this: Is the job today of being President too big, too complex for a President, any President? Are there too many factors outside of your control to be effective?

A. The job is a big one; there's no doubt about that. Under any normal circumstances, being President is not an easy task. The greatness and strength of our country, the support of the American people, the derivation through democratic processes of authority and responsibility, and the ability to act is a reassuring thing to me and all my predecessors who've served in this office and lived in this house.

This year, almost in a unique way, we've had additional responsibilities. I think it's been 25 or 30 years, for instance, since an incumbent Democratic president had to run a political campaign while he was still in office. I don't deplore that. The right of my opponents to run is theirs. But that's an additional complicating factor. It was obviously an additional burden for our entire nation, not just for me, to have American hostages captured in Iran and to have the Soviet Union invade Afghanistan, which was a departure from 25 years of policy on their part not to use their own military forces to cross the borders into a previously undominated country.

The combination of these three factors, in addition to very high interest rates and inflation rates, brought about primarily by worldwide escalation in oil prices, has made this an extremely difficult job even compared to normal times. I don't deplore it. I'm not trying to avoid the responsibilities, and I believe that the action of the American people so far during the electoral process has not been a complete endorsement of what I have done or of what I have accomplished. But I think the results so far compared to what was anticipated 6 months ago in spite of these unpredictable kinds of crises that have afflicted our nation have been very gratifying to me and an indication that the American people are fairly well satisfied. We've got problems, yes. But I am not despairing, and I am not fearful; I don't think the American people should be either.

Q. Do the sanctions that you announced today bar the families of hostages and other humanitarian-minded Americans from traveling, assuming of course, that the terrorists will allow them into the Embassy?

A. Yes, it would unless they had received a specific permit either from the State Department or the Attorney General.

Q. You have just recently encouraged foreign auto makers to invest in plants in this country presumably to hold more jobs here. But in recent days the auto workers are complaining they've lost a significant number of jobs. And they are suggesting putting restrictions on foreign imports, at least as a short-term remedy, and they're planning to be here and lobby for this. I wonder how you feel about restrictions on imports?

A. I'd like to respond to your question without it being characterized as a criticism of anyone. I remember the first few months that I was President sitting in the Cabinet room, over just adjacent to the Oval Office, talking to the leaders of the American automobile manufacturers—manufacturing firms—all of the leaders there, all the firms represented, encouraging them to comply with the impending legislation in the Congress to require the production of small and efficient automobiles for the American market.

Their unanimous reply was that this was an inappropriate thing for them to do, that the market was not there for the small and efficient automobiles. Subsequent events, which could not be completely predictable, have shown that the American people are now demanding, in

order to conserve energy, the small and efficient automobiles, precisely the kind of car that we were encouraging them to make 3 years ago or more.

At this moment every single small, efficient automobile that can be produced by American manufacturers has a ready market. Because they are now in a transition period from the large gas-guzzling automobiles to the manufacture of the small and efficient cars, there is a very difficult time for employment and American production because the market's not there for the big, heavy, inefficient automobiles.

So to replace the number of cars that Americans could be producing that are small and efficient that are not being produced, foreign imports are coming in at a very high level. There are several things that we could do—prevent those foreign cars from coming in, deprive the American consumer from buying them, which would drive up the price of domestically produced small cars enormously or would result in Americans having to buy the large and inefficient gas guzzlers which they do not want.

I think that would be ill-advised, so we are trying to carry over, as best we can during this transition phase, minimal damage to the American automobile worker, as I described in my statement, encouraging the American manufacturers to shift toward the small and efficient cars as rapidly as possible, and as an additional thing, encouraging Volkswagen and other foreign manufacturers to come into the United States to employ American automobile workers—highly trained—to produce the foreign-designed cars during that period.

Later, I have no doubt that the American manufacturers who are highly competent and who make superb vehicles will rapidly shift to the small and efficient cars. When they do, I think the foreign imports, even those manufactured here, will have a much more competitive market.

But I cannot freeze now imports of the small foreign cars that American consumers want just to protect an industry that is now transferring its attention to the small cars to be manufactured here.

Q. I would like to get back to the subject of Iran if we might. There have been published reports that the Soviet Union has already taken some steps to counter the effects of a boycott or a blockade, should you decide to take that route as the days go on, the reports that truckloads of various food supplies and other commodities are already coming across the Soviet border into Iran. Do you have any independent confirmation of this; and don't you think if it is true this would undermine any future type of a naval blockade?

A. The fact is that I guess historically there has been a fairly substantial level of trade between the Soviet Union and Iran. Before the recent revolution there were plans afoot for substantial increased shipments of natural gas from Iran into the Soviet Union in exchange for the barter of goods and perhaps hard cash.

The rail lines and the road system which interconnects Iran and the Soviet Union are quite limited in their capacity. They may be used now at capacity. I don't really know the specifics about that. But I think that the quantity of goods that would be interrupted by a possible blockade, which I'm not predicting now specifically will take place, could not possibly be filled or replaced by the limited transportation routes by land, either from Turkey or Iraq or the Soviet Union, certainly not from Afghanistan at this time.

Q. I was wondering, is it your belief the American people will continue indefinitely to provide the main defense of Western Europe when there's a story in the papers this morning that showed pluralities in both West German and Britain now oppose backing the United States in a future dispute with the Soviet Union?

A. The United States has never provided the majority of or the overwhelming portion of troops or fighting equipment in Europe for the defense of Western Europe against the Warsaw Pact. The number of troops that America has in all in the European theater is about 300,000. We and our NATO allies combined have, I think, more than 2 million. I don't remember the exact figure.

We have always provided the strategic nuclear umbrella for the protection of Europe, and we've had direct control, as you know, over most of the tactical nuclear weapons. I saw results of a poll today from Germany that showed that over 80% of the people in West Germany, Federal Republic of Germany, favor a boycott of the Moscow Olympics by the Federal Republic of Germany.

I think the NATO alliance is as strong now as it has been in any time in my memory, since the war. Under very difficult economic circumstances, the major nations in the alliance have committed themselves to a real growth in defense expenditures. Under heavy pressure, propaganda efforts by the Warsaw Pact nations, the allies voted last December to go ahead with a modernization of theater nuclear forces—a very difficult decision. And my own personal relationship with the leaders in those countries, both the heads of state and military and diplomatic, show a very strong commitment to the alliance and a very strong support for us.

I have sometimes been disappointed at the rapidity of action and the substance of the action taken by some of our allies in the Iranian and the Afghanistan question. But we look at things from a different perspective. We are much more invulnerable than they are to any sort of conventional attack. Germany, for instance, is a divided country—17 million Germans live under Communist rule in East Germany, and Berlin is especially exposed.

Most European countries have a much higher dependence on foreign trade than do we. But I think within the bounds of the limitations and difference of perspective, although I have sometimes been disappointed, I think they have performed adequately. And I believe recently, the last few days and I believe next week, we will see a strong rush of support to join us in the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, which will be a heavy propaganda and psychological blow to the Soviet Union in condemnation of their invasion, and I believe their support for us in Iran will prove that the premise of your question that we don't have their support and cooperation is inaccurate.

. . . .

Q. In the last 10 days you've talked with the leaders of Israel and Egypt at length about their negotiations on Palestinian autonomy. And you've said, today in fact, that the problems look less formidable now. Can you tell us where the give is and where you see the hope that these two parties might reach agreement by May 26th or any other time in the near future?

A. I am not able and have never been able to speak for Egypt or to speak for Israel. The negotiation is basically between those two countries. We have faced much more formidable obstacles in the past than we presently face, both prior to the Camp David accords and also prior

gifts to other nations; they are investments which serve our security interests as well as theirs.

East-West Relations

As we fulfill the needs of defense and deterrence, our second interest is in fashioning a relationship with the Soviet Union in which our fundamental competition is bounded by restraint. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and their adventurism in Africa and Asia have done real damage to this relationship and to the immediate prospects for a more peaceful world.

We are prepared to impose costs on aggression for as long as necessary. We will promote America's interests and values in all of our dealings. But we seek no cold war, no indiscriminate confrontation. It is not in our interest, even during a period of heightened tensions, to dismantle the framework of East-West relations constructed over more than a generation. Even if we could discount the direct implications of an unbounded competition for our own interests—and we cannot—our relations with our allies and our credibility throughout the world would still call for a diligent, good faith American effort to sustain a framework for peace.

Thus, even as we have responded to Soviet aggression, we have also held to our formal obligations. We are denying specific benefits to the Soviet Union, but we have not abrogated formal agreements. Progress has been suspended, but when Soviet behavior allows, the door to a more stable and mutually beneficial relationship—a competition bounded by restraint and a regard for each other's interests—will be open.

Meanwhile, we should avoid framing our discussions of East-West relations in ways that suggest a false choice between extremes: between some utopian state of perfect detente on the one hand or, on the other, a condition of implacable hostility. In fact, realism and safety require that we conduct relations in the continuum between those two poles. At times there will be greater progress in areas of mutual interest. At others, as now, the adversarial elements in our relations will be prominent. There will always be elements of both.

In seeking to deter further aggression and pressing for an end to the invasion of Afghanistan, we are working to create the conditions that will enable us to return to building a more stable relationship.

Arms Control

A third and related area of emphasis is arms control. Our interests have been well served by the arms control agreements to which the United States and the Soviet Union are parties. In 1963 we halted poisonous nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere. The SALT I Interim Agreement froze the number of offensive strategic missiles when the Soviets were building up in that area and we were not. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty headed off a potentially costly and destabilizing arms race in these defensive weapons. In the same fashion, the SALT II Treaty would serve this country's paramount security interests.

We must all think through very carefully the consequences of a no-SALT world. What would that world look like?

- Without SALT, there would be no agreed limit on the number of strategic systems the Soviets could build. They could easily reach a total of 3,000 delivery systems over the next 5 years, more than 700 beyond what the treaty allows.

We must all think through very carefully the consequences of a no-SALT world. What would that world look like?

- Without SALT, there would be no limits on the number of separate warheads each missile can carry. Each of the Soviet Union's heaviest missiles—the SS–18s—could theoretically deliver 20 or even 30 nuclear warheads, instead of the 10 the treaty allows. On those 308 SS–18s alone, the Soviets could mount as many additional warheads as their entire strategic force holds today.
- Without SALT, our own defense planning would be seriously complicated. For example, the MX program would be more difficult to design and build and less certain to achieve its purpose.
- Without the treaty, our ability to monitor Soviet strategic forces—and thus evaluate Soviet capabilities—could be impaired, since there would be no constraints on the deliberate concealment of those forces.
- Without the treaty, the likely increase in Soviet strategic capabilities would compel further defense expenditures that could compound our already difficult budget choices.

The security advantages of SALT II have been reinforced by recent events. At a time of increased tensions between the superpowers, effective mutual constraints on strategic arms become all the more important.

For these compelling reasons of security, we should move ahead with ratification at the earliest feasible time. In the interim, it is most important that both sides continue to observe the mutual constraints of SALT I and SALT II. Our own strategic programs are consistent with those agreements. We will, of course, continue to review our strategic arms requirements with the Congress, and we will keep a close watch on Soviet actions to see that they are exercising a similar degree of restraint.

For the same reasons, we will continue wherever feasible to pursue balanced and verifiable arms control agreements at other levels—in the mutual and balanced force reduction talks, on antisatellite warfare, on banning nuclear weapons tests, on chemical warfare, and in other areas. The theater nuclear forces negotiating offer remains on the table. And we have called upon the Soviet Union to pursue it with us.

None of these efforts is undertaken as a favor to others; each one serves the national security interests of the United States, as well as others.

Our willingness to seek restraint in strategic weapons reinforces other critical arms control efforts. In particular, we must be concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons. The technology is losing its mystery. Six countries have already carried out nuclear explosions. At least a dozen more could produce a weapon within a few years of deciding to do so. The risks in this progression are self-evident. Regional nuclear arms races have become a real danger. The presence of nuclear arms in volatile areas multiplies the chance that they will be used.

Thus we continue to press for the widest adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. We are urging others to take necessary steps to bring the treaty of Tlatelolco into full force. And we vigorously support the improvement and application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

In 1977 President Carter also initiated the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, to involve both producing and consuming nations in a joint search for ways to realize the benefits of nuclear power while limiting the risks that nuclear weapons will be developed. This was not a negotiation that resolved

all differences; it was a technical study that illuminated problems and possible solutions.

It has provided a better understanding of the economics, technology, and risks associated with the nuclear fuel cycle, and it produced consensus on a number of middle-range goals. These include the possible value of an international regime to manage excess plutonium, stronger fuel supply assurances for consumers under effective nonproliferation controls, and conversion of research reactors from use of highly enriched uranium fuels. Differences remain in many areas, but the essential task has been advanced by this common effort.

More countries will approach the nuclear weapons threshold in the decade ahead, some with uncertain intentions in regions of tension and conflict. The time remaining to reduce the appeal of nuclear weapons and to develop safer ways to address legitimate energy needs is slipping away. Our nonproliferation efforts are more vital now than ever before.

Energy Crisis and the World Economy

Fourth, it is plainly in our interest to act now to forestall a future energy disaster. For, quite simply, that is what we could face. We now import some 40% of the petroleum we use. This year alone, the bill for these imports will come to some $90 billion. That energy dependence fuels our inflation. It strains the dollar. It drains our balance of payments. It increases our vulnerability.

As much as anything else we do in the coming decade, our effort to gain control of our energy future—to conserve, to expand our own production, and to develop new and renewable fuels—will determine not only the quality of our lives at home but the strength of our position in the world.

We must also recognize the profound consequences of the global energy crisis for other consuming nations whose economic health affects our own. Our allies are even more dependent than we on the production and pricing decisions of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] and on political events in oil producing nations.

The point is vividly illustrated by the plight of Turkey, which now spends 70–80% of all its export earnings to pay for oil imports. Because of a shortage of fuel, it is only able to keep its industry functioning at something less than 50% of capacity. It would be hard to exaggerate the strains that the energy crisis places on many nations such as this democratic and strategically placed ally.

The developing countries are even more burdened by the rising price of oil, the inflation it helps to fuel, and the debts it brings. This year, developing countries will spend on oil and debt servicing alone three times what they will receive in outside economic assistance from all the industrial democracies and the OPEC countries.

The United States has a direct stake in the economic vitality of developing countries. They are increasingly important as partners in trade—both as markets and sources of supply. And the political effect of their economic stagnation can have serious consequences for us—with major social disruptions, a reversal of progress toward democratic rule and human rights, and new openings for violence and radicalism.

In short, our economy and ultimately our security depend upon whether we can gain control over our own energy future, and whether the world economy can manage the hard transition ahead. We have made some progress in the past few years. While our economy was growing last year, our oil consumption declined. The elements of a national energy policy are taking shape.

. . . our economy and ultimately our security depend upon whether we can gain control over our own energy future, and whether the world economy can manage the hard transition ahead.

Continued progress at home will give impetus to our international efforts—working with other consumers for more stringent conservation and developing new energy resources through World Bank financing and our bilateral assistance.

As we grapple with the energy problem, it is important that we not lose sight of our broader economic interests or jeopardize the real progress that has been made in the past few years to open and strengthen the international economy.

Despite the persistence of protectionist impulses in times of economic difficulty, the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations was able to agree upon significant reductions in barriers to trade—a result which both improves our access to foreign markets and helps to curb inflation at home. Current economic strains must not erode this major achievement.

The global economic structure is being strengthened in other ways—through negotiation of commodity agreements, progress on the common fund, and more funding for the multilateral development banks.

The International Monetary Fund, in particular, has a key role in helping countries through this time of adjustment and also in recycling OPEC's enormous surpluses. To fulfill these vital missions, the increase in IMF quotas scheduled for later this year is essential. We also have a stake in assuring the necessary capital for the World Bank, the International Development Association, and the regional development banks.

Let there be no mistake. The years ahead will be trying ones for the international economy. The trend in oil prices is alarming. The OPEC countries will continue to run massive surpluses—estimated at over $100 billion for 1980—which means corresponding deficits for other nations. The developing countries will be hardest hit—and faced with the painful choice between stunted growth and deeper debt.

The steps we have taken only buy us more time. We must use that time to make fundamental adjustments in our energy consumption and production patterns. Our older industries must be streamlined and retooled to meet the inevitable challenge of a more open and competitive world economy. More investment must be earmarked for new product lines and advanced technology. For that is necessary to restore the balance in international commerce—and to assure future prosperity for the American people.

Regional Peace

A fifth element in our global strategy is to help achieve peaceful resolutions of disputes in troubled regions of the world. The task is an imposing one, and it is not without costs. It is always difficult to work for accommodations which cannot fully satisfy the demands of any side, because they must be accepted by all sides. We must be prepared for frustration.

But working for peace is directly relevant to our interests in collective secu-

Human Rights Conditions in Non-Communist Asia

Statements by Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard C. Holbrooke and Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia M. Derian before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 6, 1980.[1]

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE

I am very pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you to speak about our human rights policies in Asia.

Let me begin by reaffirming that human rights is an integral element in U.S. foreign policy in East Asia. In our relations with any specific country, there must, by necessity, be a number of objectives—national security concerns, economic and commercial ties, cultural relations, broad foreign policy goals, and, of course, human rights. Over the past 3 years in East Asia, we have made significant progress on the human rights front without damaging or subordinating our other objectives.

As Vice President Mondale said in May of 1978, the refugee problem is the number one human rights issue in East Asia today. During the past 5 years, the Communist regimes of Indochina—Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea—have dislocated hundreds of thousands of people in those countries; the number may be in the millions.

In Kampuchea the Pol Pot regime began the destruction and forced migration of the Khmer population. This has been perpetuated and compounded by the Vietnamese invasion and subjugation of Kampuchea. Nearly half a million Khmer refugees are now in Thailand and on the Thai border. Massive numbers of Khmer have been killed or starved. The food denial policy of the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin regime is perhaps the most egregious example of continuing human rights violations in Kampuchea.

In 1978 Hanoi began sending its ethnic minorities and "undesirables" out to sea in boats, leaving them to wash up on the shores of neighboring countries. Finally, the largest Laotian city is now in Thailand at the refugee camp of Nong Khai, and it increases every day as new refugees arrive from Laos.

The initial burden of this refugee migration has fallen on Hong Kong and the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and most especially on Thailand. They have responded with compassion, providing shelter and first asylum, until the refugees can be systematically resettled. The United States has made a major effort to ease the refugee burden on ASEAN, working with the United Nations and international voluntary organizations to feed, shelter, and resettle the refugees. Thus the issue of human rights has been the key to our response to the continuing tragedy in Indochina. I believe we all have a duty to try to keep the world's attention focused on this situation.

At the same time, we are also seeing significant progress in human rights conditions in the non-Communist countries of East Asia. Our own attention to the human rights cause has contributed to this progress, without jeopardizing our other very important objectives in our relations with these countries. In fact, U.S. relations with the countries of non-Communist Asia have improved across the board in recent years.

Let me cite a few examples. In Korea the assassination of President Park last October sent a profound shock through the Republic of Korea. The period of adjustment and transition is now underway, and the present interim Government in Seoul is dedicated to the goal of a more broadly based political system. Work is underway to write and adapt a new constitution to enable national elections for a President this year.

With regard to the Philippines, where we have manifold, complex, and close relations, there have been a number of recent improvements in the human rights situation. The government has responded positively to domestic criticism of military abuses in the areas of active insurgency. One week ago there were elections for governors, mayors, and thousands of lesser officials, for the first time since 1971.

In Indonesia the government completed on schedule its 3-year program to release approximately 30,000 prisoners detained in the wake of the 1965 coup attempt by the Indonesian Communist Party. This resolves a major focus of international concern. The United States, international organizations, and Indonesia are cooperating to ease the situation in East Timor. While problems remain, I believe your visit there, Chairman Wolff [Lester L. Wolff of New York], showed that on this front too, progress is being made.

I do not mean by these comments to underestimate the problems that still face us. Asia encompasses a cultural, linguistic, political, and economic diversity unsurpassed in any other region of the world. Some governments face external military threats or internal armed insurrections and have consequently suspended constitutional guarantees of freedom or instituted martial law. Others enjoy a shaky political stability which tends to expand perceptions of sedition and seditious activity. In a great many Asian countries, governments must cope with aspirations of ethnic and cultural groups which threaten the stability of the social order.

I recognize that the next decade will be a difficult one for all of the countries of Asia, and particularly for the cause of freedom in that part of the world. On balance, however, I believe that America's championing of freedom in Asia has already contributed to an improvement in the basic human condition in this part of the world and that we shall continue to see further progress in the future.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN

I welcome the opportunity to participate in this joint hearing of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee and the Subcommittee on International Organizations.

The letter of invitation from the subcommittees asked me to evaluate

human rights conditions in non-Communist Asia; review the process by which the State Department's human rights reports on the countries in this area are prepared; assess the effect of our policy in promoting changes in human rights conditions in the countries in question; comment on whether we sacrifice moral and diplomatic influence by continuing assistance to human rights-violating countries; and, finally, speculate on the possibility of the non-Communist countries of Asia joining together to address their human rights problems.

Before addressing these questions, I would like to mention briefly three important human rights issues in Communist Asia. First, Vietnam's internal policies, particularly toward ethnic Chinese, have generated a large refugee exodus, leading uncountable numbers to drown at sea. Second, the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea have aggravated the danger of mass famine. Third, while the People's Republic of China has engaged in some relaxation of strict internal controls, the removal of Democracy Wall to a less accessible location is disappointing.

I would like to turn now to the question of human rights conditions in non-Communist East Asia. As you know, last week the Department of State submitted to the Congress lengthy and comprehensive reports on human rights conditions in 154 countries, including those of non-Communist East Asia. Therefore, my prepared remarks this morning will simply highlight the most important concerns in each.

Korea

The interim government under President Choi released most political prisoners and has abrogated emergency measure 9, which severely restricted individual rights. However, martial law provisions, announced immediately after President Park's death, have placed significant limits on the exercise of political and civil rights. A small number of dissidents have been arrested and sentenced to prison for staging peaceful demonstrations. President Choi has stated his commitment to a more liberalized political system, and amendment of the constitution is underway in the National Assembly which has resumed operation with the participation by the opposition party.

Philippines

Since 1972 President Marcos has exercised unrestrained executive authority under martial law. Political and civil rights are greatly restricted. Rights are more restricted in rural provinces, particularly where there are active insurgencies. Reports of the incidence of military abuses of civilians in outlying areas have significantly increased during 1979. The government tried and dismissed some military personnel for abuses and held hearings in several locations on the problem. The government admits to holding 579 persons as public order violators—persons accused of subversion, sedition, and rebellion. Most of these persons can be considered as political prisoners and are held in the Manila area. The clergy, which became more critical of Marcos in 1979, alleges that additional numbers are held in the provinces. Local elections, the first since 1971, were recently held.

Indonesia

Detainees from the 1965 coup attempt were either released before December 31, 1979, or, in 23 cases, are being brought to trial. Although no reliable figures are available, it appears that many thousands of East Timorese have died of hunger and in warfare since 1975, and this subject has been a matter of international concern. This year East Timor has been opened up to relief efforts by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Catholic Relief Service and to diplomatic and journalists visits. A congressional delegation visited the island last month.

Other Indonesian human rights issues include the broad powers of detention held by security authorities, the lack of bail and habeas corpus in existing legal codes, and the need to replace the anti-subversion law and the old Dutch penal code. The government has introduced legislation in Parliament, a draft law on criminal procedures, which is designed to replace the series of colonial laws which now provide the primary guidance for the legal system.

Taiwan

For the past quarter century, Taiwan officials have considered the country still in a civil war situation. Some positive trends have been overshadowed by government actions taken after opposition demonstrations in Kaohsiung last December 10. Taiwan authorities began a general crackdown on the leadership of *Formosa* magazine which had organized the demonstration. About 24 people were arrested and charged with the capital crime of "sedition" and will reportedly be tried by military tribunals. Among those arrested were the prominent Taiwanese legislator (Wong Shin Shay) and several members of the Presbyterian Church. Another 37 are still in custody, and it appears that they will be tried in civil courts, presumably on lesser charges. Three opposition magazines were also closed.

Thailand

Parliamentary government was reestablished with national elections in March, the martial law order permitting detention without trial was repealed, and prisoners were released. The government has retained some restrictions on media content and an internal security law with arbitrary detention provisions. Both measures are seldom used. Although Thailand initially took steps to forcibly repatriate Khmer refugees, they have reversed this policy and work closely with foreign and international organizations to provide assistance to refugees.

Malaysia

During 1979 the government invoked the Internal Security Act to arrest participants in a strike by union members against the national airline on the grounds that this constituted interference with a essential service. This action provoked strong reactions within Malaysia and abroad, and all detainees were subsequently released.

An insurgent threat and the possibility of communal conflict are cited to justify legislation which makes it legal to arrest and detain, without trial, persons suspected of activities that threaten general "civic order."

Singapore

On January 31, Amnesty International issued a report accusing the Singapore Government of systematically stifling political dissent by continuing to detain people without trial and maltreating prisoners. Political power in Singapore is concentrated in one ruling party, the People's Action Party. It dominates the Parliament, having won all seats in the past three elections with approximately

almost impossible again to believe that 13 months ago Israel and Egypt were in a state of war, a state that had continued over a period of 30 years. And last year, at this same place—the White House of the United States of America—that Peace Treaty was signed.

It has been observed meticulously. And I might add my voice to President Sadat's in saying that Israel has honored the difficult terms of this treaty with truthfulness and with honor; and I might add, with generosity. Its terms were very strict, but those terms have been met not grudgingly at the last minute but ahead of time and with an extra expression of a common commitment to peace.

Israel has already withdrawn from more than two-thirds of the Sinai and, in a time when oil is particularly precious, has relinquished oil wells that were on acknowledged Egyptian territory but were developed by, discovered by Israel. We have guaranteed Israel to meet its needs for oil in the future if its supply should be interrupted, and, of course, our country will carry out this commitment meticulously as well.

Now there is full diplomatic relations—recognition of each other. An exchange of ambassadors, open borders, tourism is building day-by-day between these two ancient enemies who are now friends.

This is an exciting time, and we have made a lot of progress. Now we are moving to the next step—how to carry out those detailed, complicated, very carefully negotiated agreements at Camp David; how to define the self-governing authority; how to set up the procedure for the elections. They are difficult issues. We acknowledge them to be so.

Last week President Sadat was here with me. We discussed those difficult issues. Today, with Prime Minister Begin, we have discussed them as well. As we walked toward Prime Minister Begin's car at noon today, we both acknowledged—I started to say admitted—we both acknowledged that we have had even more difficult times in the past, but when he and I and President Sadat have set our minds to overcoming an obstacle or answering a difficult question, so far—and I knock on wood—we have never failed.

It would be a tragedy, having come this far, to fail. As I said earlier, Prime Minister Begin represents those characteristics that can insure success, and those characteristics are shared by his heroic partner in this effort, President Sadat—courage, sensitivity,

Prime Minister Begin, President Carter, and Secretary Vance (background) (White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)

tenacity. And I think that this will bode well for the world in the future.

I might say in closing that our nation also has a special relationship with Israel—a relationship built on mutual respect and admiration; a shared past and a shared future; a realization that one of the most vital aspects of the security of the United States of America is a strong, free, independent, peaceful, and secure Israel. We have made commitments in the past to Israel that are vital to them. We have committed ourselves never to negotiate with nor recognize the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] until after the PLO has acknowledged U.N. Resolution 242 as a basis for peace and also recognized Israel's right to exist.

We have expressed ourselves strongly and forcefully and consistently as being opposed to the establishment of any independent Palestinian state in the West Bank area, and we believe very strongly, and I am sure Prime Minister Begin shares this belief, that Jerusalem should be undivided and that all should have access to the worship places there.

I might close by saying that we believe that together we can continue to achieve a just and a lasting peace for all in the Middle East, and, a little more than a year ago when we signed the historic Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt, Prime Minister Begin said, and I would like to quote his words in closing: "Peace unto you—*shalom, salaam* forever."

I would like to ask all of you to rise and join me in a toast. To the brave and free people of Israel in one of the world's great nations and to a courageous and enlightened, farsighted, and successful leader of those free people, Prime Minister Begin and his lovely wife.

Prime Minister Begin

The President just said that when we agree, we both prosper. Therefore, I would like to say immediately that I agree with the President that Jerusalem should remain undivided. [Laughter, Applause]

This is a unique week in our life. It started with Remembrance Day of the greatest tragedy that ever took place in the annals of mankind since God created man and man let loose the Devil. And it will end with the greatest victory a persecuted ancient people achieved through the sacrifices of its best men during the rule of our independence in the land of our forefathers.

We use the word "Holocaust." What does it mean? Nothing more than a word, but that wound will not be healed for generations—many generations to come. We lost 1½ million of our children. We lost our sages, our professors, our doctors, our rabbis, our brains, our hearts, our beloved ones. Such is the wound in our hearts. And there it will be to the last day of our lives.

But there is the command to live,

the divine command to overcome, to continue, to struggle for a just cause until it wins the day and, therefore, after the tragedy, we struggled, we give sacrifices, and, with God's help, we won the day, and a country of our own and means to defend our people.

During this memorable week, I look around and see the world in turmoil and liberty in danger. In Iran, the most reactionary revolution that ever happened in the history of mankind took place. Customs and laws which were sacrosanct for ages, not only in time of peace but even during war, are being trampled under foot with incomprehensible dark fanaticism and absolutely intolerable blind hatred.

There are the hostages there—for the last 5 months. Perhaps I can say that no other nation in the world understands the American people these days better than our nation does. Nobody can understand as we do what it means to see our sons and citizens kept hostage, threatened with their lives, getting ultimata which we cannot fulfill, and look upon the families who spend sleepless nights and restless days thinking of their dear ones, longing for them—loving wives and mothers.

We feel deeply for the President, who is so preoccupied with this human and humanitarian question, and for all the American people. As I spent a certain period of my life in Russia not, as the previous Soviet Ambassador in our country before they severed diplomatic relations with us told me, "not in too good conditions." [Laughter]

Some people ask me: "In your opinion, you know the Russians, what would they have done?" I gave an unequivocal answer. "The very same day they would have marched on Tehran, and they wouldn't have given a damn for the hostages." They would have conquered Tehran. The Khomeini army is a mob. It is no match for any army, not for the Soviet Army. But this is the difference: The American people try every avenue, accept patience and pain just to make sure that the hostages come back home alive and well.

We have had such experiences—how many, how many. Our children were taken hostages not only our men. And just 10 days before I came to this great country, five of our children were taken hostage and threatened with death, and one boy 2½ years old—I saw the little coffin that I will never forget—got killed.

Four other children—1 year, 2 years old, babies—were saved by our soldiers. In the spirit of self-sacrifice which our army has got in itself, with their blood, 11 boys—11 soldiers—were wounded, several of them severely. One of them got killed. Four children were saved, although wounded; wounded children, hostages.

This is the first reason why we are so grateful to the President that he found time to invite President Sadat and me and my colleagues and to deal with our problems of the Middle East and the bilateral relations we have, although his mind is with the hostages and their families, as the minds of all the American people are. At such a juncture, to find time for such talks is a measure of devotion and of moral greatness.

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in one of the most dangerous and serious moves after the Second World War. Some people compare it with the invasion into Czechoslovakia in August 1968. It is not a true comparison. It is a fact that Czechoslovakia went through a horrible tragedy. The Czechs and the Slovaks started to breathe some freedom under the man, who is already forgotten, Dubchek, and that beginning of liberty was crushed by the tanks of the Warsaw Pact countries.

But still, Czechoslovakia was in the Soviet orbit, and then the famous, or infamous, Brezhnev doctrine was created which even Yugoslavia and Romania—two Communist countries—did not recognize—no country in the world ever recognized. Afghanistan never was in the orbit. It is a neighbor of the Soviet Union, of the so-called Socialist countries. It was invaded. It is an ancient people, a fighting people. They do fight the huge Soviet Army of more than 100,000 soldiers; they resist as any proud people should an invader.

But to the world, there is a grave danger every day. Through Baluchistan, the Soviet Army can reach the Indian Ocean in no time, and there is no real force to stop them there.

Iran may become a Communist country anytime. We know the tactics. There is the Tudeh Party, the most servile to Moscow except the French Communist party—well organized, the only really organized group in Tehran. And they, the Communists, support Khomeini with his fanaticism because, since the days of Lenin, the Communists have developed a theory which is called a revolutionary situation. It means strikes, disorders, fights on the street, demonstrations, and in this atmosphere, they used to say, power lies on the street. Bow and take it. Then they take it. And with the long border between Iran and the Soviet Union—1,500 miles—who can stop it if such a thing happens? And it may happen anytime, any day.

Therefore, we live in a dangerous period. But there is one solace: Free nations can, if they wish to, stand together.

The great people of the United States have many allies throughout the world, but I would say, looking out of experience into this world, that there are two categories of American allies. The first are allies, and the second are reluctant allies. May I tell you that Israel belongs to the first category.

We are a small nation, but may I have the *chutzpah* to say—[laughter]—a courageous nation. No, no, no—not me, the nation is courageous. It is conceived in courage and born in fight and reborn in resistance to tyranny, to oppression. And we are your ally in good and in bad days, we stand by you and stand with you, and we shall always be together and defend liberty so that tyranny never wins its night.

Under these circumstances, may I ask the following question: Should Israel be weakened or should it be strengthened? I know your attitude toward the so-called Palestinian state ruled by the PLO. That organization is bent on the destruction of Israel. It will not destroy Israel. How can it? It never will. But it is bent on it. It wrote about this destruction brazenly. It never changed it, not one word.

But even a corridor leading to such a Palestinian state would be a mortal danger to us. No peace. Peace is lost and bloodshed, more even than in Lebanon, much more. And, therefore, we must be very careful, very careful.

There are some who say, especially in Europe, that now, after the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan—and as there is oil in the Earth beneath the surface of the sheikdoms, which only the free West could have taken out because otherwise it would still be beneath the surface.

Some people say that now we must find favor with the Islamic world—with the Arab world—even at the expense of Israel. They say so cynically. This is called expediency and with our experience of our generation in the 1930s in Europe, we do know now that expediency is not a realistic policy. To the contrary; it takes revenge on those who sacrifice ideals for the sake of expediency. At Israel's expense, at the expense of our security, of the lives of our children, I believe that the United

the hostages. Little did we know that that detention would still be continuing almost 5 months later.

At any rate, in his statement of 9 November the President of the Security Council called attention to the violations of international law involved. As indicated at page 134 of our Memorial, he urged "that the principle of the inviolability of diplomatic personnel and establishments be respected in all cases in accordance with internationally accepted norms," and on the same day the President of the U.N. General Assembly appealed to the Ayatollah Khomeini for the release of the hostages—as demonstrated at page 135 of our Memorial.

Ironically, it was shortly after these U.N. declarations that the authorities in Iran began to threaten criminal trials of the hostages. The Ayatollah Khomeini made a series of such threats himself, and as indicated at page 183 of our Memorial, the U.S. Government responded with a series of statements charging that any such trials would be clear violations of international law. The same protest was also asserted by the Secretary General of the United Nations on 20 November.

It was on 25 November, with captivity and threats of trial continuing, that the Secretary General exercised his extraordinary authority under Article 99 of the U.N. Charter to convene the Security Council in an urgent effort to resolve the crisis which the Secretary General characterized as a serious threat to the international peace and security. He made a full statement to the Security Council on 27 November stating in part that over the preceding 3 weeks he had been continuously involved in efforts to find a means of resolving the problem. At the same time he announced that the then Foreign Minister of Iran, Mr. Bani-Sadr, had requested that the meeting of the Security Council be adjourned until 1 December in order to allow him to participate personally. The Council granted that request. In fact, when the Security Council reconvened on 1 December the Iranian Government had changed its mind and boycotted the meeting.

The initial result of the Security Council deliberations, as the Court is aware, was Security Council Resolution 457 [December 4, 1979], which is reprinted in our Memorial at page 140. In that resolution the Security Council reaffirmed "the solemn obligation of all States Parties to both the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations . . . and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations . . . to respect the inviolability of diplomatic personnel and . . . premises," and it also called upon Iran to immediately release the hostages.

In this connection I should point out one significant aspect of the language of Resolution 457. As I mentioned earlier in my argument, the evidence clearly establishes that the Government of Iran was a direct and active and continuing participant in the capture and continuing detention of the hostages, and those facts seem to have been clearly recognized by the Security Council. The resolution of 4 December urgently called upon the Government of Iran—not the students but the government itself—"to release immediately the personnel of the Embassy of the United States . . . ." In another portion of the resolution the Council called upon the two governments "to take steps to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them," but in the earlier paragraph relating directly to the hostages, there was no call "to take steps" to achieve the hostages' release. On the contrary, there was simply a direct command to the Government of Iran "to release," thus recognizing the fact that in substance, if not in form, the hostages were and are in the custody of the Iranian Government.

U.S. Efforts in the ICJ

Throughout this period—in the months of November and December 1979—the U.S. Government continued its efforts to achieve a resolution of the dispute through peaceful means, and for present purposes the most important of those efforts was our institution of the present proceeding before this Court. When we filed our Application on 29 November we had in mind two different kinds of commitments previously made by the Government of Iran. First, in each of four different treaties, as cited in our Application, Iran had formally acquiesced in and bound itself to the proposition that a dispute of the kind presented here is within the jurisdiction of this Court. Frankly, we did not see how Iran could make any plausible argument that this dispute is not within the jurisdiction of this Court, and, in fact, Iran has not done so. Secondly, at the time we filed our Application we had in mind that as a member of the United Nations, Iran has formally undertaken, pursuant to Article 94, paragraph 1, of the U.N. Charter, to comply with the decision of this Court in any case to which Iran might be a party. Accordingly, it was the hope and expectation of the United States that the Government of Iran, in compliance with its formal commitments and obligations, would obey any and all orders and judgments which might be entered by this Court in the course of the present litigation.

These considerations prompted the United States, when it filed its Application on 29 November, to file simultaneously a request for an indication of provisional measures. As the Court is fully aware, we respectfully requested the earliest possible hearing on that request, and the Court acknowledged the gravity of the matter by allowing both parties full argument on 10 December.

The Court will recall that on the day before the hearing, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran made a formal submission to the Court in the form of a letter transmitted by telegram. Although we will have more to say about the letter of 9 December at a later point, I should like to note now two significant aspects of that letter. My first point appears in the first paragraph of the letter and, indeed, in the first sentence of that paragraph, which I should like to quote:

> First of all, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran wishes to express its respect for the International Court of Justice, and for its distinguished members, for what they have achieved in the quest for just and equitable solutions to legal conflicts between States.

Again, that seemed to us to be a good sign in terms of the likelihood that Iran would obey any orders entered by the Court.

The second significant feature of the Iranian letter of 9 December, I submit, was the total absence of any legal or factual argumentation to the effect that the Iranian seizure of the hostages and the Embassy was lawful. Although the U.S. Application and Request for Provisional Measures had made clear that we were accusing the Government of Iran of flagrant and plain violations of Iran's international legal obligations under the four cited treaties, the Iranian letter of 9 December made absolutely no response to those charges. The Court will recall that the letter simply took the position that the Court should not take cognizance of the case on the theory that the seizure of the hostages was only "a

marginal and secondary aspect" of a larger problem. The net result of that Iranian position on 9 December, I respectfully submit, was and is that the Government of Iran has virtually conceded the total illegality of the course of conduct upon which it embarked on 4 November 1979.

At this point, incidentally, I should take note of the fact that a second message was conveyed by Iran to the Court just 2 days ago. I will not discuss that message separately, however, because it really is simply a reiteration of the message of 9 December. Two or three sentences of the earlier message have been omitted and the position of another sentence has been changed, but the substance of the two is absolutely identical. Thus in substance, if not in form, all that Iran has chosen to say to the Court about the case is set forth in the message of 9 December—and we read that letter as a concession of illegality.

Furthermore, and more importantly, there is other documentary evidence that confirms such a concession. The fact is that in the 4½ months since the attack on the Embassy, both the new President of Iran, Mr. Bani-Sadr, and the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr. Ghotbzadeh, have expressly acknowledged that the seizure of the Embassy and the hostages was carried out in violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and another government official has expressly acknowledged the responsibility of the Iranian Government for all that has transpired. These significant facts are set forth in Supplemental Documents 18, 115, and 139, as well as at page 23 of our Memorial.

|*Recess*|

Before the recess I had been pursuing a chronology of the proceedings in this case and I had reached 15 December when the Court announced its unanimous decision to order provisional measures calling upon Iran to insure the immediate release of the hostages and the immediate restoration of the premises of the Embassy to U.S. control. I think it is fair to say that the world generally regarded that pronouncement by the Court as a major step toward the solution of the crisis and hoped that that would turn out to be so. It is tragic that it has not as yet.

The Government of Iran has remained not only unmoved by the Court's action but, if I may say so, defiant. As reflected in an annex at page 141 of our Memorial, on 16 December—just 7 days after he had expressed profound respect for the Court—the Foreign Minister of Iran referred to the Court's provisional measures as a "prefabricated verdict" which was "clear . . . in advance," and instructed the Iranian Embassy here in The Hague officially to reject the decision. That reaction, I submit, simply reemphasizes the responsibility of the Government of Iran for the seizure and continuing captivity of the hostages.

Security Council Resolution 461

The United States, disappointed by Iran's decision to continue in this illegal course of conduct, thereafter returned to the U.N. Security Council and sought further action from the Council. On 31 December 1979, the Security Council adopted Resolution 461, which is set forth in our Memorial at pages 27 and 28. In that resolution the Security Council again recognized that the hostages were being held in Iran in violation of international law and that the situation resulting from the conduct of Iran could have grave consequences for international peace and security. The resolution also took into account the order of this Court of 15 December and reemphasized the responsibility of states to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force. The resolution then urgently called, once again, on the Government of Iran to release the hostages immediately and announced the decision of the Security Council, in the event of noncompliance by Iran, to adopt effective measures under articles 39 and 41 of the U.N. Charter. Although the Security Council has since been prevented from carrying out its decision to adopt effective measures against the Government of Iran, the fact remains that the members of the Security Council were unanimous in expressing the view that the conduct of which we complain here constitutes a plain violation of international law and that the hostages should be released immediately.

U.N. Commission of Inquiry

My discussion has now reached the point in January when the United States filed its Memorial. Since 2 months have now elapsed since that filing, and since that 2-month period has encompassed some events in which the Court has a proper interest, I intend to turn to this new subject now. Regrettably, since the hostages remain in captivity, the fundamental problem of which we complain here has not been altered in any of its legal essentials, but there have been a number of developments which are worthy of comment and which are reflected in the Supplemental Documents which we are submitting to the Court. In summarizing these events, I shall not attempt to trace through every twist and turn of Iranian politics. As the Court is aware from the public press, over the past 2 months there has been literally an outpouring of varied and confusing and inconsistent political statements from many different figures on the Iranian political scene, and I must content myself here with a summary of only the most significant events based on the supplementary documents.

One major political development occurred in late January when Mr. Bani-Sadr was elected President of the Islamic Republic. I think it fair to say that the world generally regarded the installation of the new President as a hopeful event which might well lead to a new element of stability on the Iranian political scene, thus perhaps improving the chance that the Iranian Government would begin to behave responsibly with respect to the hostages.

Then in February the Secretary General of the United Nations decided, building on his January discussions in Tehran, to form a commission to visit Iran as an aid toward the solution of the hostage crisis. The commission was officially established by the Secretary General on 20 February;[4] in the last several weeks, as the Court is aware, the commission has visited Iran and conducted a series of interviews. On 11 March it left Iran with its task unfinished because the Ayatollah Khomeini had, in effect, refused to create the conditions necessary for the completion of the commission's work.[5]

You have asked us to respond to a question as to whether the commission of inquiry in any way affects the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to these proceedings, and I should like to give a detailed answer to that question at this point. In our view, the answer to the question is very clearly no. To demonstrate that that is so, I should refer at once to the official announcement of the establishment of the commission on 20 February.[6] The announcement of the Secretary General is short, and I should like to read it in its entirety.

I wish to announce the establishment of

to the Mideast peace treaty conclusion.

Now we are carrying out the Camp David agreement. When I discuss these matters with President Sadat or Prime Minister Begin, they have never deviated one iota from the exact language and the exact provisions of the Camp David accords. It's looked on almost as a sacred document.

There are differences of interpretation about what is actually meant by "a refugee" or what is actually meant by "full autonomy" and so forth. But we're now in the process of negotiating how much authority and power and influence and responsibility to give to the self-governing authority, how exactly it will be composed—those are the two basic questions—and how that self-governing authority is to be chosen. And once that's decided, Israel is completely ready to withdraw their military government, the civilian administration, to withdraw their own forces and to redeploy them in specified security locations and to let those new duties and responsibilities be assumed by the Palestinian Arabs who live in the West Bank/Gaza. That will be a major step forward, and if we can accomplish that then the details of exactly how to administer water rights and exactly how to administer land and how to administer other specific elements of security like controlling terrorism, which are now the difficult issues being negotiated, I think will be resolved without delay.

Text from White House press release. ■

News Conference of March 14 (Excerpts)

. . . .

Q. Is Israel keeping faith with the Camp David accords and the autonomy talks when, by government policy, it continues to confiscate the land of Palestinians?

A. There is nothing specifically in the Camp David accords concerning the settlements themselves. There is an agreement in the treaty between Israel and Egypt about settlements that have been established in the Sinai region, which is Egyptian territory. I might say concerning that, that our policy is set by me, as President. There has been no change in our policy. That policy is guided by U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, the basis of all of our negotiations; by every word in the Camp David accords, signed by me on behalf of our nation; and by Begin and Sadat on behalf of Israel and Egypt. We intend to carry out that agreement.

Right now we are indulged in some very difficult but very important discussions and negotiations to establish full autonomy on the West Bank, Gaza area. I believe that these discussions can be successful. It's crucial to our own nation's security that they be successful, that we have peace in the Middle East; and it's, I think, crucial to the whole region that these discussions be successful.

I might add one other point. It's not easy. We've had tedious negotiations at Camp David. We had tedious negotiations almost exactly a year ago, when we finally concluded and signed the Mideast peace treaty. Our principles are well known by Prime Minister Begin and by President Sadat, and I stay constantly in touch with them and our negotiators to make sure that we are successful.

I believe that we will have peace in the Middle East, with a secure Israel behind recognized borders, with the Palestinian question being resolved in all its aspects, and with peace between Israel and its neighbors.

Q. You say the policy is set by you.

A. Yes.

Q. And this is a question about the recent mixup on the U.N. resolution. My question really goes to process. The resolution was not the resolution that you wanted. Are you the only one who can determine that it's not the resolution you want? Does your staff not know when it's not a resolution that you want, or is it possible that some of your foreign policy advisers are trying to make policy for you?

A. I don't think anybody in my Administration doubts that I'm the one who sets the policy. The U.N. resolution, as it was passed, was not in accordance with the policy that I have established. It was not in accordance with the agreements that I had made with Prime Minister Begin, well understood by President Sadat.

We had agreed among us that we did not approve, as an American Government, of the settlements on the West Bank and Gaza area—that they were an obstacle to peace. But we also had agreed that during the time of the negotiations, we would not call for the dismantling of existing settlements. That was to be resolved as an issue in the ongoing negotiations.

Also, President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and I agreed on a paragraph in the Camp David accords concerning Jerusalem. It called for—and we still believe that there should be—an undivided Jerusalem but that those who look upon those places in Jerusalem as holy places should have unimpeded access to them for worship.

This resolution in the United Nations violated those two very important and basic principles. Those issues have not yet been resolved. There is nothing in this resolution at the United Nations that established the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza area. That will be established after a 5-year interval period, during which full autonomy is enjoyed by the residents of the area. So, the resolution was in violation of my policy.

I might say that I have absolute confidence in Secretary Vance. I have seen him days and days and weeks negotiating to achieve the security of Israel and the peace of Israel. It was an honest breakdown in communications between me and the United Nations. I'm responsible for anything that goes wrong in this government, and I'm also responsible, on occasion, for things that go right. Secretary Vance is responsible for the State Department. But to say exactly how the communica-

tions broke down is very difficult to do.

But I made it known as quickly as I discovered it that this resolution did violate the policy and disavowed our vote for it.

. . . .

Q. Given the fact this is an election year, do you still intend to push ahead with Senate ratification of SALT? If so, when will you ask the Senate to ratify SALT? The second question deals with the Trident submarine. When that begins sea trials in July, I think under the SALT I agreement you will need to begin decommissioning Polaris submarines to stay within the limits of the SALT I agreement. Will you begin decommissioning Polaris submarines when Trident begins its sea trials, or will you opt for technical violation of the SALT I agreement?

A. The agreement which we presently have with the Soviet Union, which I intend to honor as long as they reciprocate, is to comply with all the terms of the interim SALT agreement, which is known as SALT I.

SALT II has been signed by me and President Brezhnev. I consider it binding on our two countries. It has not yet been ratified. We will observe very closely to make sure that the Soviets comply with this agreement. I will not ask the Senate to ratify SALT II until I have a chance to consult very closely with the congressional leadership on the Senate side, particularly Majority Leader Byrd and others who work with him, both Democrats and Republicans.

Because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it is obvious that we would not be successful in ratifying the SALT II Treaty at this time. It is still on the calendar. It will not be brought up until after that consultation takes place. I will also continue to consult with congressional leadership as far as compliance with SALT II is concerned.

But my present intention, within the bounds of reciprocal action on the Soviet Union and consultations with the Senate and, to some degree, the House leadership, I intend to comply with the provisions of SALT II.

Q. I'm a bit confused by that last answer. You both said that you regarded the treaty that you signed as binding on this country and that you would consult on compliance with it. I guess the question then comes down to whether or not the United States, in absence of ratification, would observe the provisions of SALT II and the notion that it's in its own best interests and, I suppose, inviting Soviet comparable action. Is that what you're saying to us?

A. Ordinarily, when a treaty is signed between the heads of two nations, the presumption is that the treaty will be honored on both sides absent some further development. One further development that would cause me to renounce the treaty would be after consulting with the Members of the Senate to determine an interest of our nation that might cause such a rejection; in which case I would notify the Soviet Union that the terms of the treaty were no longer binding.

So, there will be two provisos in the continued honoring of the SALT II Treaty. One is that the Soviets reciprocate completely, as verified by us, and, secondly, that the consultations that I will continue with the Senate leadership confirm me in my commitment that it's in the best interests of our country to do so.

Q. Can you give us some new word on the hostage situation in Iran? Is the Administration content to just wait until the parliament is elected, or do you have any plan to resolve this? Do you plan to bring any more pressures on Iran?

A. We are not content for the innocent American hostages to be held by terrorists for one single day. This is an abhorrent act in direct violation not only of international law but the very Islamic principles which these militants profess to espouse and to support. We have done everything we possibly could in the last 4 months to honor the principles of our nation, to protect the interests of our nation, to try to preserve in every way the health and the lives of those hostages, and to work for their freedom.

I don't know when they'll be released. We have constant negotiations and attempts to provide continuing communication with the leaders of Iran. I believe that when there's a stable government in Iran, which may possibly occur after the elections—the vote, as you know, began today. But our past few days have been characterized by bitter disappointments, because, in effect, commitments that had been made by the newly elected President and administration of Iran were not honored, because prior to these parliamentary elections, they obviously do not have the authority to speak and carry out their own commitment. Whether they'll have that authority after the elections are completed I don't know. I certainly hope so.

. . . .

Q. Why did we let in over 9,000 Iranians to come here and be citizens of this country after they took our hostages? Was that an accident or what happened?

A. No, it's not an accident. There's a difference between a great and a free and compassionate democratic nation on the one hand, and other countries from which refugees flee, looking for freedom, looking for the right to worship as they please, trying to escape possible persecution. We have screened the immigrants very closely, and in every instance, they have been determined to have a real, genuine, legal interest, and reason for coming to our country.

It would not be advisable for us, it would not be humane for us, it would not even be decent for us, in my opinion, when we have an intense confrontation—an extremely emotional confrontation—with a revolutionary country like Iran to refuse to accept refugees who are trying to escape circumstances there and coming to our nation for a haven. This was a decision made by me, it's in accordance with the American law, and I believe it's in the best interests of our own country to do so.

. . . .

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Mar. 17, 1980. ■

rity and the freedom of other nations from outside domination. Regional conflicts pose the danger of wider confrontations. Disputes between our allies—as in the case of Greece and Turkey—weaken the common defense. And as a magnet draws iron, Third World conflict seems to draw the interest of the Soviets, the Cubans, or others prepared to exploit disorder.

We can take satisfaction that real progress in the pursuit of peace has been made.

The 1979 Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt is an historic achievement. We have no more urgent diplomatic priority than the effort to complete and broaden that peace so that Israel, the neighboring Arab states, and the Palestinian people will be able to live securely and with dignity.

Our immediate attention must be on the autonomy negotiations. Ambassador Linowitz [Personal Representative of the President to the Middle East Peace Negotiations] has worked hard and ably to focus and accelerate the talks, which have now begun to center on the substantive issues that lie at the very heart of the negotiations—issues like security, water, and land. We have no illusion about the complexity and sensitivity of the problems that remain. But in this evolutionary process we have overcome seemingly intractable obstacles before.

The President has invited President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to Washington for talks in April. They know that the Camp David process provides the best opportunity in 30 years to bring the security of peace to the Middle East. We cannot let it slip away.

There has also been an historic breakthrough in southern Africa. The nation of Zimbabwe will soon become a reality, through the realism of the parties, the skill of British diplomacy, the commitment of other African states, and because of the constructive role played by the United States. The steadfastness of the Congress in resisting attempts to lift sanctions prematurely played a significant part in assuring that bargaining and balloting, not bullets, are shaping Rhodesia's future.

I want to be sure the importance of this event is understood. We have a wide range of interests in Africa—security interests, economic interests, an interest in political cooperation on all global issues. In my judgment no policy could have served those interests better than our stalwart support for the principle of majority rule, with minority rights, in Rhodesia. And nothing could have weakened us more there than to waver in this crucial effort.

Peace and stability are at risk in other parts of the world—in the eastern Mediterranean, in Southeast Asia, in northwest Africa, in our own hemisphere. All of those cases have some bearing upon American interests. At the same time there are, of course, practical limits on what we—or any one nation—can do.

The nature of our involvement will vary—from support for the efforts of others, to mediation ourselves, to helping maintain a balance of forces if that is required to induce the parties to settle. But in each case we are determined to employ the influence we have to develop workable alternatives to war.

We advance regional peace in another tangible way, by striving to limit the destructiveness of war when it cannot be prevented. Since 1977 the United States has taken the lead in working toward negotiated limits on conventional arms transfers. While we remain convinced that such agreements can contribute to a safer world, we do not at this time foresee progress.

In the absence of agreed international restraint, we do not plan to reduce further the ceiling on our owns arms transfers. But the other elements of our arms transfer policy continue to serve our interests. Arms transfers must be based on assessments of U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. The policy has a dual effect:

- To facilitate those arms transfers that clearly promote the security of the United States and our allies and friends, and
- To restrain transfers that are in excess of legitimate defense needs, that could promote regional arms races or increase instability, or that otherwise do not advance U.S. interests.

In short, our purpose in supplying arms is security, not profit.

Positive Bilateral Relations

Sixth, we have an interest in building positive bilateral relations with all countries, wherever there is a basis of shared concerns. Scores of new countries—and new centers of power—have emerged since the end of the Second World War. The international landscape—and thus the nature of diplomacy—has been altered fundamentally. Questions of direct importance to us are determined not in a few capitals but among 155. Our access to resources and to defense facilities cannot simply be declared; it must be agreed. We seek positive relations around the world not because we have a compulsion to be liked but because our interests and the well-being of our people are at stake.

This interest in a broad network of relationships is reflected in our international approach.

- This Administration has worked especially hard to strengthen our core partnerships with our traditional allies. If there appear to be new strains among us, they flow principally from the fact that we are facing up to hard, new challenges together.
- We often have an interest in working with nations whose ideologies are different from ours. In a diverse world our exact scale of values will be replicated rarely if at all. It would make no sense to limit our influence by refusing to pursue specific areas of shared interest with other nations because of broader disagreement.

This is why we oppose, in principle, country-by-country limitations on our aid and trade programs. Obviously we will not have such relationships when there is not yet a basis for cooperation—as is now the case in Cuba and Vietnam. But our diplomacy is undercut when such restrictions are cast in law.

The establishment of full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China illustrates the value of an open approach. It is, in its own terms, an accomplishment of historic importance—an achievement of economic as well as diplomatic meaning, global as well as regional significance. Normalization is not an end in itself. It is the beginning of continuing efforts to improve our relations with Beijing. Similarly, we are working toward improved relations with the nations of Eastern Europe.

- The pursuit of our interests also requires that we stress an inclusive form of diplomacy, in which all who have a stake also have a role and are encouraged to accept a share of the responsibility for hard decisions. Our diplomacy on Namibia and Zimbabwe is a case in point. Such multilateral efforts are time-consuming and complex. But building coalitions is a process that Americans, with our own pluralistic traditions, well understand. Abroad, no less than at home, on many issues it is the only way to achieve workable results.

Our interest does not require that

others be like us or always side with us. We seek their willingness to find areas of mutual interest or balanced compromise when our interests may clash. A quest for uniformity is not realistic, nor is it required. The Soviets may demand ideological purity; we can serve our interests in a world of diversity.

In this context, let me dispute the suggestion that in our dealings with the Third World we have to choose between two approaches; competing with Soviet ambitions in the Third World by seeing the developing nations primarily through an East-West prism or dealing with the Third World primarily in terms of Third World problems. These are sometimes presented as exclusive options.

But the choices presented—between an interest in Third World concerns and a determination to counter Soviet in-roads—are false. In fact, the two are twin strands in a single strategy, for the best strategy for competing with the Soviets is to address the practical interests of Third World countries themselves—not only their security concerns but their goals of economic and political justice as well.

It would be misleading, of course, to gloss over our real differences with developing countries on a wide range of issues. But we can bargain most effectively, to our mutual benefit, when they are confident that we share the goals of equitable economic growth and political independence.

Certainly there have been painful disappointments and setbacks. But because we have supported those goals, our relations with most of the nations of Africa, Latin America, and Asia are better than they have been for many years.

Human Rights

The seventh way in which we advance our interests in the world—indeed our long-term security—is through support for human rights. When the two concepts—human rights and national security—are uttered in the same breath, it is often to express an unavoidable conflict, a fundamental tension between the pursuit of the good and the pursuit of the practical.

I strongly reject the idea that there is a fundamental incompatibility between the pursuit of human rights and the pursuit of self-interest. By this, I do not mean to say that there can never be a conflict between human rights concerns and security concerns. We cannot escape the hard decisions that must be made in such cases. We must constantly weigh how best to encourage the advancement of human rights while maintaining our ability to conduct essential business with governments—even unpopular ones—in countries where we have important security interests.

But the fact remains that over the longer term, our pursuit of human rights is not only generally compatible with our national security, it contributes to that security.

We know from our own national experience that the drive for human freedom has tremendous force and vitality. It is universal. It is resilient. And, ultimately, it is irrepressible. Just in the past several years, we have seen that drive for a fuller voice in economic and political life gain new expression in Portugal and Spain and Greece; in Nigeria and Ghana and Upper Volta; in Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic; and elsewhere. These countries make a compelling case for the proposition that the tide in the world is running toward human rights and that it is in our interest to support it.

The United States cannot claim credit for these developments. But we can find proof in them that our policy of furthering human rights is not only consistent with American ideals; it is consistent with the aspirations of others.

Our support for those aspirations enables us to regain the political high ground in competition for world influence. It stands in vivid contrast to the practices of the Soviet Union abroad, as Afghanistan demonstrates, and at home, as the internal exile of Andrei Sakharov again makes clear. In short, our willingness to press for human rights progress gives credibility to our commitment to freedom. And it is that commitment which has always been one of America's most enduring strengths in the world.

Our support for human rights serves our interests in another way. As President Carter put it in his State of the Union address,

> In repressive regimes, popular frustrations often have no outlet except through violence. But when peoples and their governments can approach their problems together—through open, democratic methods—the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and far more enduring.

As the President suggested, divergent views cannot be long repressed without sowing the seeds of violent convulsion. And once the ties are broken between a government and its people, outside intervention cannot secure its long-term survival. Thus it is profoundly in our national interest to support constructive change before such ties erode and the alternatives of radicalism or repression drive out moderate solutions.

How each society manages change is a matter for it to decide. We cannot and should not write social contracts for others. But we can help others promote—in their own ways—peaceful and orderly reform.

We do that by clearly expressing our opposition to official torture, arbitrary arrest, and other abuses of individual liberties. Whatever short-term quiet they may provide, they engender long-term bitterness.

We do it by reinforcing efforts to open economic and political institutions to broader national participation, so that they are better able to accommodate conflicting views and interests.

And we do it by focusing development assistance on helping governments meet the basic human needs of their people. In doing our part to meet the greatest moral challenge of our times—the plight of hundreds of millions of human beings who lack adequate food or health care—we are also addressing the root causes of instability. We must recognize, in the demand of these people for their basic human rights, that stability can only come through peaceful progress, not through a desperate effort to preserve the status quo.

Nowhere do we see more clearly the race between radical and peaceful change than in Central America today. And nowhere is our commitment to peaceful change more clearly tested. In Nicaragua our challenge is to join with others in the region to help the Nicaraguan people and government succeed in building a stable, healthy, democratic society out of the debris of dictatorship and civil war. We cannot guarantee that democracy will take hold there. But if we turn our backs on Nicaragua, we can help guarantee that democracy will fail.

Failure to appropriate needed American aid has jeopardized our interests. It has weakened the position of the private sector, which would receive the majority of our assistance. It has made it more difficult for the Nicaraguan Government to pursue a development strategy that includes important roles for both the public and private sectors. And it has played into the hands of the Cubans. Those who are most concerned about the potential for radical revolution in Latin America

70% of the vote. In Singapore discussion of certain ethnically sensitive topics is prohibited.

The press is circumspect in its treatment of the government, due, at least in part, to the need for annual renewal of publishing licenses. The government enjoys broad popular support, and its record in economic and social matters is excellent. The Amnesty report contends, however, that significant advances in the social and economic areas have been accompanied by rigorous internal political repression.

Japan

Japan is a parliamentary democracy in which democratic institutions are well-established. Human rights are guaranteed by the Japanese Constitution and secured by a just and efficient legal system. Freedoms of speech, press, religion, and assembly are guaranteed by law and respected. In 1979 Japan completed ratification of the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

Burma

Burma has an authoritarian system of government under president Ne Win. Freedom of expression is limited. Public criticism of the leadership is not tolerated nor is political assembly nor organizing outside of government-sponsored mass and party organizations. The exact number of political prisoners is uncertain but believed by observers to be between 150 and 250.

Human Rights Reports and Policies

I would like next to address the other questions posed in your letter of invitation. Several concern the process by which the human rights reports are written. Last year, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and two of the deputies serving in my office testified before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations. The process remains essentially the same today. It is also fully described in the introduction to the 1979 report submitted last week.

In answering the question as to whether U.S. pressure brings about changes in human rights policies, I realize I am up against the perennial bottom line. Does the policy make a difference?

There is no doubt that the human rights issue has come to the center of world attention over the past several years. There has been a geometric increase in world consciousness, and significant improvements in human rights conditions have occurred in every region of the world over the past 3 years. When improvements are made, we prefer to regard them as the results of decisions made by the governments and peoples involved. But I am confident that the policy has contributed to an environment in which such changes are much more likely.

Military Assistance to Violators

Let me now address the issue of whether the United States sacrifices its moral and diplomatic influence by continuing military assistance to severe violators of human rights. Human rights remain a very high priority in foreign policy decisionmaking. There are also security interests which may require, on occasion, the provision of U.S. assistance to a serious human rights violator. In such cases, we have undertaken in clear, direct, and persistent ways to emphasize our concerns about human rights conditions no matter how important the security relationship. The U.S. Government uses all other means at its disposal, including private diplomatic interchange, symbolic public acts, careful review of economic aid programs, and prohibition of the export of police equipment.

Regional Institutions

I turn last to the final question in your letter to Secretary Vance. "Is it possible for non-Communist countries to join together to address their own human rights problems?" You have raised a profound and important question. I hope it will be one we can explore further.

The year 1979 saw considerable progress in the building of regional and international institutions for the protection of basic human rights. These institutions can do the most to advance and to secure human freedoms. You are familiar with the Organization of African Unity's call for the establishment of a permanent pan-African body for the protection of human rights.

In our own hemisphere, the American Convention on Human Rights recently came into force. An Inter-American Court of Human Rights has been established and is meeting in Costa Rica. In Western Europe, the Council of Europe's Human Rights Commission and Court of Human Rights continue to be active.

Unfortunately, such activity as yet has no analogue in non-Communist or Communist Asia. Clearly it is not for outsiders to prescribe the precise forms regional human rights cooperation might take, but one could imagine the ASEAN states investigating the possibility of establishing a human rights organization in the framework of that association. There is also the possibility of nonmember states being prepared to associate themselves in this particular activity.

Whatever form institutions finally take, it is vital that those interested in and committed to human rights in the region join together and discuss what kinds of institutions they can fashion. Creating a regional human rights consciousness, a necessary prelude to any institution, will be a long and difficult task. There will be formidable obstacles along the way—some put there by some of the governments affected—but I believe the goal is attainable.

It is my hope that most governments eventually will accept what President Carter pointed out in the State of the Union address to the Congress January 23. He said: " . . . when peoples and their governments can approach their problems together—through open, democratic methods—the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and far more enduring."

There is no more important task in non-Communist East Asia than to forge a regional commitment to internationally recognized human rights and to craft regional machinery which can insure that these rights are protected and enhanced for the peoples of the region. The United States is ready to do what it can to promote such a regional effort. In the final analysis, the task only can be accomplished by the peoples concerned.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

German Chancellor Visits U.S.

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany made an official visit to the United States March 4–6, 1980. While in Washington, D.C. (March 4–6), he met with President Carter and other government officials. Following is the text of the joint press statement issued on March 5.[1]

Chancellor Schmidt and President Carter (White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)

President Carter and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Schmidt, held a lengthy conversation in Washington, March 5, during the Chancellor's official visit to Washington, March 4–6. The Chancellor, who last met with the President in June 1979, was in Washington at the President's invitation.

The conversation between the President and the Chancellor covered a wide range of political, security, and economic issues of mutual interest for the two countries. Their meeting followed an intensive period of high-level consultations between the two governments, including visits to Washington and Bonn by the respective Foreign Ministers and several exchanges between the President and the Chancellor. The President and the Chancellor agreed on the necessity of continuing these close consultations in order to assure full coordination of the policies followed by the two countries on major international issues. They also agreed that intensified bilateral and multilateral consultations between all of the Western allies were essential, particularly in light of the current international situation.

The Chancellor expressed his highest respect and admiration for the President's exceptional statesmanship in the crisis caused by the illegal and abhorrent holding of the hostages in Tehran and for the courage and patience shown by the American people.

In their review of the international situation, the President and the Chancellor agreed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had created a serious threat to international peace and security. They confirmed their determination, together with their allies, to take the measures necessary in the circumstances to guarantee their security and defend international stability as also stated in the joint Franco-German declaration of February 5, 1980.

They reiterated their governments' condemnation of the Soviet invasion and called upon the Soviet Union immediately to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. They noted with satisfaction that their assessments of the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were quite close, and they agreed upon the measures which each country should take in response to the Soviet action, including the need for urgent assistance to Turkey and Pakistan. The President noted with satisfaction the decision of the Federal government to coordinate Western assistance to Turkey in 1980. The President and the Chancellor expressed the determination of their governments to make major contributions to the common effort of assisting Turkey and Pakistan. In this connection, the Chancellor proposed a debt rescheduling for Pakistan.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that the independence of the countries of the Third World is an essential element of world peace and stability. They underlined the necessity not only to recognize the independence and self-reliance of the Third World countries but also to assist those countries economically and politically on the basis of equal partnership.

The President and the Chancellor discussed the importance of increased efforts to strengthen NATO defenses. They reaffirmed their strong support for the NATO Long-Term Defense Program and for the NATO aim of 3% annual real growth in defense spending. The President noted the strong efforts of the Federal Republic in the defense field in recent years and welcomed the Chancellor's statement that the Federal Republic would achieve 3% real growth in its 1980 defense budget as it has in the past. The President reviewed U.S. defense programs which have been made much more urgent in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Chancellor agreed that it was essential for America's allies to share equitably in collective defense efforts to meet the needs of the common defense.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has also had a seriously detrimental effect on the economic relations of the West with the U.S.S.R. They agreed on the importance of taking, in coordination with their allies, the necessary measures. They also

States will never, under no circumstances, adopt such a policy, and as we are your ally, the United States is our ally and we will always stand together.

Israel shouldn't be weakened. Israel fulfilled a very serious role—I say so without boasting—with every government it had, under all governments in the Middle East, to stop Soviet expansionism indirectly and directly. I remember when there was a threat of Syrian invasion into Jordan with Soviet help. We were asked—it is now disclosed in two books written by two Americans—to bring about the putting to an end of that danger, and we put it to an end. And there is another example which I prefer not to mention tonight.

We really fulfilled the role and we can do so in the future. May I also say with humble pride, the army of Israel is not the worst in the world. So Israel should be strengthened for Israel's sake, it deserves—we suffered so much, we lost so many—but also for the sake of the free world should be strengthened, mustn't be weakened under any circumstances. This, the reason why we did so much for peace.

Yes, last year and a month ago we signed the Peace Treaty. Now I think I will ask a rhetorical question. Nobody is going to answer it, but I will put it and I, myself, will reply to it. Who is the architect of the Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel? And the answer is the President of the United States, Mr. Jimmy Carter. [Applause]

It was the turning point in the annals of the Middle East. Let us imagine the state of war for 31 years—five wars, five meetings on the battlefield. The Secretary of State, who is here, will remember how moving it was that moving scene which we shall never forget when wounded soldiers of Egypt and Israel met at El Arish together with the President of Egypt and me and the Secretary.

And the invalids who bodily suffered in the wars embraced each other, shook hands, and said to each other, as the President of Egypt and I said to each other: "No more war. We shall never again raise arms against each other." Could there be more beautiful words than those simple words? "No more war. We shall not raise arms against each other."

We also gave proof to the oldest of philosophical teasers: that every war is avoidable. What is absolutely inevitable is peace. Peace must come. We gave sacrifice for it. The President already mentioned it, therefore, I will not repeat—that oil well, that our oil fields, with the help of an American company, but with the toil of our men—how much toil did we invest in it? Now we get the oil, that quantity, but how much do we have to pay for it? You better don't ask. [Laughter] And every month the prices go up. But you should also remember this: Out of that money we all pay, and every several months, more and more, there goes a million dollars per day for a terrorist organization with a Nazi philosophy called PLO. And all of us share in that million unwillingly, but in fact.

And for 9 months, the whole burden of fulfillment of the Peace Treaty commitment was on our shoulders. We did it. We fulfilled it—to the date, to the day, to the dot. Now, there is a mutual commitment of normalization of relations. Again, both sides do it honorably.

Now there is the question. May I, Mr. President, quote you and, through this quotation requote myself. There is the question of the full autonomy for the inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, in my language, the proper language—[laughter]—and the Gaza district. And we want to keep what we promised, what we wrote, and what we signed—full autonomy for our neighbors. We will deliver them in peace and in human dignity and in justice and in liberty. We don't want to oppress them. We don't want to oppress anybody.

You should know that in the Bible, scores of times it is written love a stranger, don't do any wrong to a stranger because you were strangers in Egypt—not in Egypt of President Sadat, another Egypt, much older one.

But this is written in the Bible. We don't want to do any wrong to anybody. We never want to do any wrong. We just came to the land of our forefathers. And therefore, we want to grant to give them, to assure them this full autonomy. We shall do so. There are difficulties with that negotiation. My dear friend, Dr. Burg, the Minister of Interior, who is here, is the head of the negotiating team—all of you know him now as a wonderful man, mighty sense of humor which we need very badly sometimes, sage—and they achieve much, not enough yet.

We now face difficulties, yes. But we shall solve them. We want to have it solved by the 26th of May, as we promised each other, as a goal not as a deadline. We believe in lifelines, not in deadlines. So, we shall do our best.

Before I came here, there were rumors in the American press and also in the Israeli press that pressure is going to be exerted on me and my colleagues. And God knows what is going to happen in the Cabinet Room when we meet. As we already met, and we talked for hours on end, I can attest that nothing happened in the Cabinet Room, and no pressure was exerted and no confrontation took place. And the Cabinet Room, as it became a familiar place to me, was the same Cabinet Room in which all of us felt friendship for each other, understanding for each other, and together we looked for solutions and for formulations and all the brains worked and on both sides sat some brainy people who did their best and who will do so in the future.

So there is hope that we may meet the date. If we don't, the sky is not on our heads, we shall continue negotiating until we reach the agreement which is necessary. We want it with all our hearts, and we shall honor it as we do honor the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and all its commitments. The people of Israel will next week celebrate, as the President said, the day of independence when glory came back to our ancient people, when we got our Parliament, our government, our army—all the attributes of sovereignty in the land of our forefathers.

From generation to generation, this day will be always a great holiday in our hearts, amongst our people. But during the holiday, we shall also always remember our friends—remember you, Mr. President, and all of you dear friends, leaders, and representatives of the great American people. We shall stand together, and together we shall labor for liberty so that it will win the day and triumph in the world.

I raise my glass to the great American people, which is the guarantee to the success of liberty throughout the world, the President of the United States, my dear friend, who contributed so much to peace in the Middle East between Egypt, Israel and in the future between other states and Israel. I say to all of you, as it is our tradition, *L'chaim*.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, APR. 17, 1980[2]

Prime Minister Begin and President Carter have completed 2 days of extensive talks following the talks with President Sadat last week on the remaining issues in the autonomy negoti-

ations and on global security and the situation in the Middle East. These talks were held in the traditional spirit of friendship and close cooperation which characterizes relations between the United States and Israel.

President Carter reaffirmed the longstanding American commitment to the security and well-being of Israel and to the achievement of a just and lasting peace between Israel and its neighbors. Prime Minister Begin reiterated Israel's warm friendship for the United States and its strong support for the firm role of the United States in helping to preserve the security and independence of the states of the Middle East.

The President and Prime Minister consider that these talks have been helpful in advancing the autonomy negotiations. They reaffirm their dedication to the Camp David agreement of September 17, 1978, their satisfaction over the smooth implementation of the Treaty of Peace Between Israel and Egypt of March 26, 1979, and their determination to pursue to successful conclusion within the Camp David framework the current autonomy negotiations as another step toward a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. They reiterate their view that lasting peace can be achieved in the Middle East only through a comprehensive settlement.

Prime Minister Begin reaffirmed the objective set out in his and President Sadat's letter to President Carter of March 26, 1979, to do everything possible to reach agreement by May 26, 1980, the 1-year goal they set for themselves in that letter. President Carter reaffirmed the determination of the United States to do everything it appropriately can to assist Israel and Egypt to achieve that goal. To this end, it has been agreed, following consultations with the Government of Egypt, that the negotiating delegations of Egypt, Israel, and the United States will meet for accelerated negotiations in both Israel and Egypt beginning before the end of April in Herzliya.

Prime Minister Begin and President Carter affirmed the determination of their two countries to continue to work closely together in every sphere and in particular in the joint effort they have undertaken together with President Sadat to bring a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace to the Middle East.

[1] Text from White House press release.
[2] List of participants in the discussions omitted here (text from White House press release). ■

Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty Marks First Anniversary

The following remarks were made at a White House reception on March 23, 1980, by President Carter, commemorating the first anniversary of the Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel.[1]

President Carter

A year ago, many of you joined us here at the White House for a thrilling moment: the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. We stood in the bright spring sunshine, filled with a hope of a new beginning for a nation which I love here and for two nations in a region which had long been at war.

We knew the difficulties ahead, yet we were exhilarated by the prospects for peace. We watched the leaders of two great peoples who had long been enemies embrace each other and embark on a new and a promising relationship—two men of courage, President Anwar Sadat and Prime Minister Menahem Begin. They astonished the world. They had silenced for awhile the voices of cynicism and hatred and despair. They had done the impossible. They had achieved peace.

That day culminated a year and a half of patient and often very difficult negotiations following President Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem. I remember the moment at Camp David—it was a Sunday afternoon—when we suddenly knew that peace was possible. And I remember the moment in Cairo, following my visit to Jerusalem, when we were able to proclaim to the world that a treaty between these two great nations was at last within our reach, and then the ceremony here, bringing to an end 30 years of war.

Prime Minister Begin spoke to all of us that day: "Peace unto you," he said. "*Shalom, salaam* forever." Many things have happened since that day almost exactly a year ago, things which once seemed even beyond dreaming. The borders have been opened. Ambassadors have been exchanged between the two countries, based on full diplomatic recognition. Ordinary citizens have become sightseers in a neighboring land from which they had long been completely excluded. It's no longer harder to travel between Tel Aviv and Cairo than it is between Tel Aviv or Cairo and New York. Israelis and Egyptians in all walks of life have clasped each other's hands on the streets of Jerusalem and in Cairo, Alexandria, and Tel Aviv, in friendship.

Israel has returned a large part of the Sinai to Egypt, and Egypt has accelerated the normalization process even faster than we had envisioned a year ago. The doubters had history on their side, for these things had never happened before. Yet the practical dreamers also had history on their side as well, for now it has been proven that we need not repeat old patterns of hatred and death, of suffering and distrust.

Benjamin Franklin, who negotiated the treaty with England following the American Revolution, said that he had never seen a peace made, however advantageous, that was not censured as inadequate. No treaty can possibly embody every aim of any particular party to a treaty. What a treaty can do, through negotiation and compromise, is to protect the vital interests of each of the parties involved. That's what was done here 12 months ago.

We all know that our work is incomplete until the peace can be extended to include all who have been involved in the conflict of the past in the Middle East. We must prove to all people in the Middle East that this peace between Egypt and Israel is not a threat to others but a precious opportunity.

When I stood before the Knesset at a moment when it seemed that the peace treaty prospects had reached an impasse, Prime Minister Begin reminded us that this must be a peace not of months and years but forever. We've come to the first year. We must now look at the world as it is and find ways to continue living in peace with one another.

This treaty between Egypt and Israel is only one step on the way to a comprehensive peace throughout this troubled region. At Camp David, President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and I agreed on a second step, which is now underway—negotiations to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. That concept offers a first real hope for keeping our common pledge—a pledge made by all three of us—to resolve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects while fully

a commission of inquiry to undertake a factfinding mission to Iran to hear Iran's grievances and to allow an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the United States. Iran desires to have the commission speak to each of the hostages.

The Secretary General's statement then listed the names of the five members of the commission and then he continued as follows:

> The members from Algeria and Venezuela will serve as the Co-Chairmen of the commission. The commission, which will leave for Tehran from Geneva over the weekend, will complete its work as soon as possible and submit its report to the Secretary General.

It should be noted that, as stated by the Secretary General, the commission's responsibilities were very limited, both in terms of function and in terms of subject matter. As to function, the commission of inquiry was to serve as a factfinding body, which obviously makes clear that it was not to reach legal judgments or otherwise engage in the function of adjudication as such. In addition, so far as the process of finding facts is concerned, the subject matter is confined to what the Secretary General described as "Iran's grievances." The Secretary General also expressed the hope that the process of allowing Iran to express its grievances—and having the commission find the facts with respect thereto—would promote an early solution to the crisis between the two governments, but neither the Secretary General nor the two governments gave the commission any responsibility whatever with respect to the adjudication of the claims of the United States. That function remains entirely, and we think very clearly, within the jurisdiction of this Court. The conclusions which I have just expressed are fully corroborated, I submit, by the statements made by officials of both of the governments involved. On the U.S. side, on 20 February following the establishment of the commission, the White House declared that both the United States and Iran "have concurred in the establishment of the commission, *as proposed by* the Secretary General." The statement[7] took specific note of the Secretary General's statement that the commission "will undertake a factfinding mission." While the statement included language to the effect that the commission would hear grievances of "both sides," its reference in that regard was in the context of the stated hope that the commission would help bring about the early release of the hostages for whose welfare the American people have been concerned for so many months. The White House statement flatly asserted the position of the United States that the commission "will not be a tribunal."

Subsequent statements by U.S. officials are consistent on this point. In a press briefing on 23 February,[8] the State Department spokesman reiterated the understanding that the purposes of the commission were to hear Iran's grievances and to bring about an early end to the crisis. He emphasized that "the official mandate is as stated in the Secretary General's own release on this subject." That position was reemphasized by the spokesman on 26 February when he said:

> The Secretary General has outlined the objectives of the commission that he put together and sent to Iran. He has projected what it is; we agree with that.[9]

In response to questions at a press conference the following day, the Secretary of State of the United States repeated this understanding of the commission's objective and also added the following:

> Let me say that the understanding of the United Nations and ourselves has been clearly set forth by the Secretary General. He was asked what the mandate was after a question had been raised as to the nature of the mandate, and he confirmed it was as he had originally stated it.
>
> I think the terms of reference and the understanding with respect to those terms of reference was clear, remains clear, and I think they have been correctly reflected by what the Secretary General has said.[10]

The Iranian Government has also made relevant statements on this subject, and those statements clearly indicate the understanding on the part of Iran that the commission has no function with respect to the claims which are presently pending before this Court. In announcing the establishment of the commission, President Bani-Sadr stated the Iranian view that the commission was to engage in "an inquiry and investigation into past American intervention in the internal affairs of Iran through the régime of the former Shah and investigation of their treachery, crimes, and corruption."[11] Similarly, in a message issued on 23 February, the Ayatollah Khomeini referred to the commission as a body which is "investigating and studying past U.S. interventions in Iran's internal affairs through the bloodletting Shah régime."[12] And in an interview on 25 February, President Bani-Sadr stated to German correspondents that "it is the task of the committee to investigate the crimes of the Shah and his dependence on the United States and to make the results known to the world public. The committee has no other mission."[13]

It is evident, I submit, that neither the Secretary General nor either of the two governments involved has ever viewed the commission as having any responsibility for the adjudication of the U.S. claims which are now before this Court. Even if the commission had met with full success in its mission to Iran, the United States would still be presenting its claims here today. It is thus very clear, we submit, that the jurisdiction of this Court has been and remains unaffected by the activities of the U.N. commission.

Perhaps the best way for me to conclude my discussion of the commission is to quote from Judge Lachs' opinion in the *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf* case. In discussing the relationship between the functions of the Court and other methods of peaceful settlement of disputes, Judge Lachs used language which to my mind precisely fits the crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations since 4 November, and I would like to quote:

> The frequently unorthodox nature of the problems facing States today requires as many tools to be used and as many avenues to be opened as possible in order to resolve the intricate and frequently multidimensional issues involved. it is sometimes desirable to apply several methods at the same time or successively. Thus no incompatibility should be seen between the various instruments and fora to which states may resort, for all are mutually complementary. Notwithstanding the interdependence of issues, some may be isolated, given priority and their solution sought in a separate forum. In this way it may be possible to prevent the aggravation of a dispute, its degeneration into a conflict. Within this context, the role of the Court as an institution serving the peaceful resolution of disputes should, despite appearances, be of growing importance.

The U.S. Government consented to the establishment of the U.N. commission in the hope that by providing Iran with an opportunity to air its grievances, the climate would be that much more favorable for the release of the hostages and the eventual resolution of other issues now pending between the two states. Unfortunately, the commis-

sion's efforts have not yet borne fruit. But, and I think this is the critical point made by Judge Lachs in the passage I have quoted, the Secretary General's attempt to allow Iran to air its grievances by establishing the commission was not and is not in any way incompatible with the simultaneous pursuit of our case before this Court or with the Court's full and prompt consideration of our case on the merits.

That concludes my discussion of the factual background underlying the claims of the United States, and I should like now to turn for just a moment to a preliminary review of the legal issues.

Summary of Substantive Legal Principles

As the Court will recall from the hearing which took place on 10 December, the United States relies in this case upon four treaties, the first and most significant of which is the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. As we pointed out to the Court at that time, the purpose of that convention, to which both the United States and Iran have long been parties, was to codify a set of principles which have been firmly established in customary international law for centuries. The essential principle involved is that diplomatic agents and their staff and the embassy premises in which they serve enjoy an immunity and inviolability which must be respected in all events and that in no circumstances may the receiving state arrest or incarcerate such persons or enter or seize such premises. One of the essential provisions of the Vienna convention, article 22, reads as follows:

> 1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving state may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.
>
> 2. The receiving state is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.
>
> 3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment, or execution.

As I shall explain later in our presentation, the Iranian course of conduct that commenced on 4 November has included flagrant and very serious multiple violations of every one of these three paragraphs of article 22.

Turning from the physical premises to the more important question of the immunity of the people within such diplomatic premises, article 29 of the same Vienna convention provides that every diplomatic agent "shall be inviolable" and "free from any form of arrest and detention." Moreover, article 31 requires that every such agent enjoy complete "immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State." There is absolutely no doubt but that the Government of Iran had a duty to prevent any seizure or detention of any of the U.S. diplomatic agents and staff in Tehran. Under article 9 of the Vienna convention, Iran could, in effect, have expelled any of the American diplomats whom Iran considered objectionable, but the Government of Iran was totally without any legal right to seize, or to allow the seizure of, any of the American diplomatic personnel involved in this controversy.

The basic rights that I have just been describing find relevant elaboration in a number of other treaty provisions to which we will be referring at a later point in our presentation. For present purposes it is enough to say that additional relevant guarantees of protection are set forth in the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, in the New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, and in the 1955 bilateral Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran. Under the latter treaty, for example, the Government of Iran was and is under a legal obligation to insure that all U.S. nationals in Iran receive "the most constant protection and security," as well as "reasonable and humane treatment," but as we will later describe to the Court treaty provisions of this kind, as incorporated in the four treaties to which I have referred, have been violated by Iran on a multiple and daily basis for the past 4½ months.

[At this point in the proceedings, Mr. Schwebel summarized the U.S. arguments on the jurisdiction of the Court to render judgment.

- The United States and Iran are, as members of the United Nations, parties to the Statute of the Court.
- The United States and Iran are parties to four conventions whose paramount provisions Iran has violated and continues to violate.
- These four conventions or their protocols give to the Court jurisdiction to render judgment upon any dispute that arises between the parties to those conventions over their interpretation or application.
- There is a dispute between the United States and Iran.
- That dispute is over the interpretation or application of the conventions.
- Resort to alternative means of third-party settlement, which are referred to in these conventions, is entirely optional. There is no requirement of preliminary recourse to such alternative procedures.
- Even if *arguendo* preliminary recourse to these alternative means of peaceful settlement, namely arbitration or conciliation, were to be viewed as normally required, on the facts of *this* case such recourse would not be.
- In any event, any need for such recourse has been obviated in this case by the lapse of time.
- The remedies sought by the United States in this case are appropriately addressed to the violations by Iran of the four conventions in question; accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction to grant those remedies.

Mr. Schwebel then expanded on these points, and Mr. Owen resumed his presentation to the Court.]

MAR. 19, 1980

It is now my privilege to resume the argument on behalf of the U.S. Government, and I propose now to discuss the U.S. claim on the merits as against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Iran's Nonparticipation in Court

At the outset I would like to make one preliminary comment about the fact that the Government of Iran has deliberately decided not to participate in the proceedings before this Court. There are situations, of course, where it is not fair to infer anything substantive about the merits of the case from an absence of this kind, but for a series of reasons we think that it is very apparent that this is not such a situation. In the first place, there is absolutely no reason at all why Iran, if it had any defense to make in this proceeding, should not have appeared here to make it. In various countries of the world, including

U.S. Call for an Olympic Boycott

Address before the U.S. Olympic Committee House of Delegates in Colorado Springs, Colorado, on April 12, 1980.

I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you on behalf of the honorary President of the U.S. Olympic Committee—the President of the United States. And I am delighted to be in the lovely community of Colorado Springs, the home of the U.S. Olympic Committee.

I speak to you as leaders dedicated to amateur sport and as citizens dedicated to America's best interests. I know that everyone in this room loves our country. And I want to express the nation's gratitude for your efforts at Lake Placid to persuade the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to move or postpone the Moscow games. I thank your leaders as well for stating that the committee would be guided by the President's decision on the best interests of the nation.

As we meet today, the lesson of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan still waits to be drawn. History holds its breath; for what is at stake is no less than the future security of the civilized world. If one nation can be subjugated by Soviet aggression, is any sovereign nation truly safe from that fate? If 100,000 Russian troops, and the barbaric use of lethal gas, and the specter of nightly assassinations —if these fail to alarm us, what will? If the Soviet lunge toward the most strategic oil-rich spot on Earth fails to unite us, what will? And if we and our allies and friends fail to use every single peaceful means available to preserve the peace, what hope is there that peace will long be preserved?

While history holds its breath, America has moved decisively. To show the Soviet Union that it cannot invade another nation and still conduct business as usual with the United States, our country has embargoed 17 million tons of grain, tightened controls on high technology trade, limited Soviet fishing in our waters, raised our defense budget to upgrade all aspects of our forces, strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, intensified development of our rapid deployment forces, and offered to help other sovereign states in the region to maintain their security.

On April 12, 1980, by a vote of 1,604 to 797, the U.S. Olympic Committee agreed not to send a U.S. team to the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow.

In the U.N. General Assembly, the United States joined more than 100 other nations in an unprecedented majority calling for the immediate, unconditional, and total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. But the President, the Congress, and the American people understand that a world which travels to the Moscow games devalues its condemnation and offers its complicity to Soviet propaganda.

I am convinced that the American people do not want their athletes cast as pawns in that tawdry propaganda charade. And I urge you to respect that undeniable consensus. Your decision today is not a question of denying our Olympic team the honor they deserve; for the American people, as you know, deeply respect the sacrifice we are asking our athletes to make. It is no longer a question of whether participation in the Moscow Olympics confers legitimacy on Soviet aggression. When the Communist Party prints a million handbooks to tell its top activists that the Summer Games mean world respect for Soviet foreign policy, surely that issue is behind us.

Nor is it a question of drawing a line between sports and politics. That line the Soviets long ago erased. When billions of rubles are diverted to the games from Soviet domestic needs; when Moscow and other Olympic cities are purged of dissidents who might speak out; when Soviet children who might meet Western people and ideas on the streets are packed off to internal exile; when Soviet emissaries roam the globe offering athletes expense-paid trips to Moscow; when Soviet sports officials distort the number of teams committed to participating—surely the issue of Soviet politics in Soviet sports is also behind us.

Above all, the decision you will make today is not a choice between a sports issue and a national security issue; for the President and Congress have made it clear that the Olympic boycott is a genuine element of America's response to the invasion of Afghanistan. It is an unambiguous statement of our national resolve. It is a keystone in our call to our allies for solidarity.

We must not—and cannot—break that link between America's power to check aggression and America's call for an Olympic boycott. Your vote is a test of our will, our confidence, our values, and our power to keep the peace through peaceful means. It is not a partisan issue—for both political parties resoundingly supported the President's action in Congress. It is not a parochial issue; for the American people overwhelmingly agree that we must not go to Moscow.

And it is not just a national issue—for citizens and governments throughout the world share our judgment. From his exile in Gorky, Andrei Sakharov—the unsilenceable father of human rights and the father of the Russian H-bomb—calls on America, saying that "a united position on the Moscow Olympic Games must obviously be a basic part" of the world's response. This morning, as many as 50 nations—leading political and sports powers—await your signal to join us.

. . . if we and our allies fail to use every single peaceful means available to preserve the peace, what hope is there that peace will long be preserved?

Athletes and sports organizations and national bodies around the world await your lead to mobilize their commitment. They do so for good reason. Today virtually every industrial nation on Earth is dangerously dependent on Persian Gulf oil. How could we convince the Soviets not to threaten the gulf, if a blow was dealt to our deterrent? How could our government send a message to Moscow, if tomorrow's *Pravda* brags that our policies have been repudiated?

It is fitting that the same ancient nation that gave us the Olympics also gave us democracy; for your decision here is truly a referendum on freedom.

Berlin Olympic Games

And thus it is also a referendum on America's character and fundamental values. The athletes here, and the athletes you represent, may have been born a full generation after the Berlin Olympics. But as their advisers and trustees, you bear the responsibility of linking that history to their duty. For the story of Hitler's rise is more than an unspeakable tragedy, more than a study in tyranny. It is also a chronicle of the free world's failure—of opportunities not seized, aggression not opposed, appeasement not condemned.

By the fall of 1935, the Nazis had passed the notorious Nuremberg laws reducing the Jews to nonpersons and were flexing their military muscle. For a hopeful moment, American opinion was galvanized—and editorials and amateur athletic unions across the country urged a boycott of the Berlin Olympics. An American member of the International Olympic Committee, Ernest Jahncke, made the plea most eloquently when he wrote the President of the IOC:

> If our committee permits the games to be held in . . . Germany, . . . there will be nothing left to distinguish [the Olympic idea] from the Nazi ideal. . . . It will take . . . years to reestablish the prestige of the games and the confidence of the peoples of the world. Sport will lose its beauty and its nobility and become, as it has already become in Nazi Germany, an ugly, ignoble affair.

The call for a boycott was rejected. And the reasons for rejection are bone chilling—even across all these decades. Do not drag sports into the arena of politics, they were told. It will destroy the Olympic movement, they were told. It will only penalize our American athletes, they were told. Solutions to political problems are not the responsibility of sporting bodies, they were told. Let us take our Jews and blacks to Berlin and beat the Nazis, they were told. If America refuses to go, we will be the only ones left out in the cold, they were told.

Such reasons prevailed. Only weeks after American attendance was assured, Nazi troops took the Rhineland; and Hitler readied Germany for the games. His preparations cast uncanny foreshadows. For he expelled foreign journalists, who told the truth about persecution. He ordered his vicious propaganda concealed from foreign visitors. And he too looked forward to legitimacy. As Joseph Goebbels boasted on the eve of the Olympics, the Reich expected the games "to turn the trick and create a friendly world attitude toward Nazi political, economic, and racial aims."

It worked. Not even Jesse Owens' magnificent personal triumph diminished Hitler's international propaganda success—a coup he linked directly to his master race doctrine. We revere Jesse in death as in life; for he was an exemplary American, an inspiration to millions everywhere, and a personal friend loved by many of you here today. But neither Jesse's achievements in Berlin nor any words spoken at the games prevented the Reich from exploiting the Olympics toward their own brutal ends. Listen to Nazi War Minister Albert Speer's report on the Fuhrer's mood as the happy spectators left Berlin: "Hitler was exulting over the harmonious atmosphere that prevailed. . . . International animosity toward Nazi Germany was plainly a thing of the past, he thought." Before long, the Nazi war machine scarred the face of Europe, and soon the night closed in.

The Need for Sacrifice

We are far from that time—but not from that script. Like you, I understand the ideals of sport—for sportsmanship is synonymous with fair play. Like you, I am in awe of the Olympic tradition—stretching over centuries, reaching out across cultures.

And like every American, I know the exhilaration of Olympic victory. Few moments in my life match the electricity I felt at Lake Placid. And few human experiences can compare to the years of sacrifice, pain, and yearning that you and our athletes have invested in this summer. But I also know, as you know, that some goals surpass even personal achievement. To any young athletes who feel singled out for suffering, I say: it is war above all that singles out our young for suffering. And it is war that our peaceful resolve can prevent.

Everyone across the board is being asked to sacrifice. We need only ask the farmers of the midlands if they have sacrificed. Or ask the workers in our export industries if they have sacrificed. Or ask the computer companies whose products have been embargoed. Or ask the businesses whose years of planning have come undone. Or ask the young sailors in the Indian Ocean task force. Or ask the American families whose taxes support our defense budget. Or ask the Afghan athlete who faces the Soviets not on a field in Moscow but as a resistance fighter in Kabul.

A heavy burden lies on your shoulders. We recognize the enormous price we are asking our athletes to pay. We recognize the tremendous sacrifice we are asking of sports officials. But on behalf of the President of the United States, I assure you that our nation will do everything within its power to insure the success of the Los Angeles games; to help the Olympic Committee restore its finances; to provide even greater assistance to the development of amateur sport; and, above all, to recognize the true heroism of our athletes who do not go to Moscow.

I believe all Americans will thank you—both for the contribution you make to our national security and to the further integrity you confer on amateur sport; for I believe that the Olympic movement will be forever strengthened by your courage. You will have restored to the modern Olympics the ancient "truce of the gods." No nation may serve as the Olympic host while invading and subjugating another: That was the rule for the Greek city-states, and that must be the rule again today.

Forty-five years ago, when an American official took his stand against Berlin, he said this:

> Place your great talents and influence in the service of the spirit of fair play and chivalry—instead of the service of brutality, force, and power. . . . Take your rightful place in the history of the Olympics. . . . The Olympic idea [has been rescued] from the remote past. You have the opportunity to rescue it from the immediate present—and to safeguard it for posterity.

His words reach out to us across the decades. History rarely offers us a second chance. If we fail to seize this one, history itself may fail us.

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[1] Text from White House press release. ■

and growing Cuban influence in the region should be the strongest supporters of our efforts to help Nicaragua build a better future.

Our essential challenge in El Salvador is similar. In October reformist military officers overthrew a military dictator in order to forestall the outbreak of a violent and bloody civil war. The Revolutionary Junta of Government, which includes the Christian Democratic Party, is committed to peaceful, sweeping change. An impressive agrarian reform has already turned more than 224,000 hectares of land over to the rural poor. The ultimate success of the program will depend heavily on our ability to provide technical and economic assistance.

The dangers of the situation are clear in the tragic and despicable assassination of Archbishop Romero. If reform fails, El Salvador will become a battleground between the radical left and the radical right. A moderate solution is still possible. It is in our interest. We will pursue this interest by helping the Government of El Salvador pursue progress.

In short, we pursue our human rights objectives not only because they are right but because we have a stake in the stability that comes when people can express their hopes and find their futures freely. Our ideals and our interests coincide.

Environmental Concerns

Eighth and finally, we cannot define our interests so narrowly as to exclude from our immediate attention a series of other global trends that darken the horizon. We face a world population that could double in the next generation, overwhelming our global resources; already, for example, the world's tropical forests are disappearing at a rate of 50 acres a minute. The worldwide flood of refugees displaced from their homes—some 7-8 million people today—is growing. The enormous international traffic in narcotics costs our society nearly $50 billion each year and destroys thousands of lives. The mounting wave of international terrorism strikes at the very heart of civilized order.

Imagine for a moment how different our world could be for our children if we do not address these problems now on an urgent basis. To relegate these matters permanently to the back burner of our foreign policy is to invite even more serious consequences for us in the future.

- Thus we have increased our bilateral aid commitment in family planning. The United States is the world's leading donor in this area.
- We have focused greater attention and greater resources on efforts to deal with such potentially harmful environmental trends as the shrinking global base of tropical forests and farmland and the creeping spread of deserts.
- The United States has taken a leading role in relief and resettlement of refugees, particularly in Southeast Asia where the need has been most acute. Humanitarian considerations alone would compel our generous response. Our political and strategic interests reinforce that requirement; for massive refugee flows heighten tensions in regions already unsettled by political and military conflict. We must help friendly governments which are risking severe internal strains as they shoulder a growing refugee burden.
- Wherever possible, we have strengthened our bilateral cooperation with governments striving to halt the production of narcotics within their borders.

We face a world population that could double in the next generation, overwhelming our global resources . . . .

The steps that we take now to address such global issues can prevent our being engulfed by them later. But let me make a fundamental point here: On these—and on many of the other challenges I have discussed this morning—there can be no exclusively American solutions. There can only be international answers, or there will be no answers at all.

The blight of terrorism is an especially urgent case in point. No nation can defeat it alone. We have been working actively through the United Nations and other multilateral institutions to build an international consensus on the criminality of terrorist tactics. International conventions—on aircraft sabotage, hijacking, the protection of diplomats, and against the taking of hostages—play a crucial part. We need wider support for the principles that governments should not give in to terrorist blackmail and that both those who commit and those who support terrorism have to be punished. Every feasible step—unilateral and multilateral—must be employed.

In this and many other areas, the truth is that we cannot assure our future security without a framework for global cooperation on issues that affect many nations and many peoples. That is why we have welcomed and supported the growing strength of regional associations such as the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Association of South East Asian Nations.

And that is why we need to support, and continue to help strengthen, the United Nations and its affiliated institutions. It is a center of global politics. The collective expression of world opinion embodied in recent U.N. votes on Afghanistan and Iran demonstrates that our interests can be advanced there. In the Middle East and elsewhere, its peacekeeping operations reduce tensions. On refugees; on the fight against hunger, illiteracy, and disease; on strengthening international resistance to terrorism; and on other issues of importance to us, the United Nations is making a concrete contribution.

Certainly, there are limits to what international organizations can accomplish. But to dismiss them as irrelevant or inconsequential would be folly. The simple fact is that we need them and they need our support. The institutions of international cooperation and international law are essential to the practical advance of our interests in the world.

Conclusion

I know that no one is more acutely aware of the breadth and complexity of our challenges than the members of this committee. We face a broad agenda. It requires constant, hard choices among compelling yet competing interests. In a dangerous world, it requires a willingness to defend our vital interests with force when necessary and a diplomacy of active and constructive engagement to reduce the dangers we may confront. It requires sacrifice in resources for our defense and help for other nations, in reduced consumption of energy, and efforts to control inflation. It will test our wisdom and our persistence.

We will be badly served if we fail to understand a world of rapid change and shy away from its complexity. The flat truth is that complex problems can sel-

dom be resolved by simple solutions.

Some have said that we are trying to do too much. I say that we cannot afford to do less, in our own national interest.

Some say that in trying to do too much, we have accomplished too little. I say that in strengthening our military posture, in reemphasizing and strengthening NATO, in negotiating the SALT II Treaty, in normalizing relations with China, in helping achieve peace between Israel and Egypt and a framework for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, in advancing peace in Zimbabwe, in the Panama Canal treaties, in the successful multilateral trade negotiations and other improvements in the international economic system, in closer ties to developing nations, and in promoting human rights—in all these areas, I say we are on the right road, even if it is a long and difficult one.

Some say that in seeking peaceful change toward human justice in every area of the world, we encourage radicalism. I say that the world is changing, that human beings everywhere will demand a better life. The United States must offer its own vision of a better future, or the future will belong to others.

Some have said that the executive and legislative branches cannot collaborate effectively on foreign policy. I say that the record over the past few years has been a good one.

Some say that America is in a period of decline. I am convinced they are wrong.

There is no question that the years to come present a somber prospect. Soviet challenge in Afghanistan and beyond, energy crisis, revolutionary explosions when expectations run ahead of progress—such current events are all too likely to be harbingers of the trends of the coming decade. This is the reality we confront.

But it is also a reality that our strengths—military, economic, and political—give us an unmatched capacity for world leadership. We can succeed if we combine power with determination, persistence, and patience. We can make progress if we promote the full range of our interests and use the full range of our strengths.

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[1]Press release 68. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Deputy Secretary Christopher Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher was interviewed on ABC's "Issues and Answers" on April 13, 1980, by Bob Clark and Barrie Dunsmore of ABC News.

Q. There are reports today that President Carter has asked this country's major allies to break off diplomatic relations with Iran next month if the hostages haven't been released by then. Is this true?

A. Let me put that in context for you. As you know, the President, last Monday, the 7th of April, took a series of serious steps with respect to Iran. We really entered a new phase where we're going to be very determined and very deliberate.

We've asked our allies to join us in taking severe economic sanctions against Iran. The allies asked their ambassadors in Tehran to meet with President Bani-Sadr to let him know the seriousness of the matter. And now those ambassadors are returning to their capitals. We hope and expect that the allies will be acting with respect to those matters of economic sanctions within the next few days. Perhaps they'll act jointly on the 21st of April at the time of the foreign ministers' meeting of the European Community.

Now if that doesn't work, if there's no progress, if the hostages are not released, the President has asked the allies to seriously consider further diplomatic steps. He's expressed the hope that they will join us in taking the kind of diplomatic steps that we took last week.

Now as far as that date, I don't want to confirm any specific date or even a particular month, but I will say the timeframe is not a long one. The President said yesterday it's not a matter of months, and it's not more than a matter of several weeks.

Q. You say the President has asked the allies to take the—if further economic sanctions don't work—to take the sort of diplomatic sanctions that we took last week, and that was a total breakoff of diplomatic relations with Iran. So the President has asked our allies to do that. Is that correct?

A. Yes, he asked them to do that if there was no progress and if the hostages had not been released after these other sanctions had had an opportunity to be effective.

Q. Ever since the President made his announcement various spokesmen for the government have hinted about the possibility of using the military option if these things don't work out. But it's been nothing more than hints, and as a matter of fact, the other day Jody Powell [White House press secretary] seemed to be backing away a little bit from that. How realistic is a military option?

A. Let me talk to you about the options that remain. The President took a number of very serious steps last Monday. As you know, he broke diplomatic relations. He took the steps with respect to visas. He put into effect severe economic sanctions. He called for a census of the claims against Iran. Now those steps deserve some time to work. We also deserve to give our allies an opportunity to join us.

But if those things are not effective, then the President will obviously have to consider the other options that are open to him. He has some nonmilitary options that are left. They are somewhat difficult to implement, but they are serious steps and he'll have to consider those. Out beyond those there are military options. The President has always reserved the right to take options that would be permissible under international law of a military character if nothing else worked.

I think that's where we are now. The President has taken severe steps. We hope that they will be effective. If they're not effective, then there are other options, both nonmilitary and military in character, that the President will consider.

Q. It seems, however, that the Administration is quite happy to let the news media speculate on what the other options, the military options might be. My question is that when the students or the militants are threatening to kill the hostages if even the slightest military action is taken, how realistic does that option become?

A. I think the President is determined that we will succeed in our goals with respect to the hostages. We've always had twin goals and that is to secure their safe release and at the same time not do anything to impair the credibility and honor of the United States, not give

agreed that in shaping economic relations with the Soviet Union care must be taken not to strengthen the U.S.S.R.'s armament efforts and military potential.

The President expressed his support for the proposal announced February 19 by the Foreign Ministers of the European Community aimed at reestablishing a neutral, nonaligned, and independent Afghanistan, on the basis of total and prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that participation in the Olympic Games would be inappropriate as long as Soviet occupation in Afghanistan continues. The President stated that the United States would not participate in the Olympic Games in Moscow. The Chancellor emphasized that it is up to the Soviet Union to create the conditions that athletes from all countries will be able to participate in the Olympic Games and that at present such conditions do not exist.

The President and the Chancellor reiterated their countries' commitment to the reduction of tension throughout the world. They agreed that in the current period of heightened tensions it is desirable to maintain the framework of East-West relations that has been built over two decades.

The President and the Chancellor stressed their continuing support for the arms control negotiations. The Chancellor welcomed the President's recent statement that he planned to seek ratification of the SALT II Treaty by the U.S. Senate as soon as this was practicable. The President and the Chancellor agreed that the NATO allies should continue to press ahead with their December 20, 1979, initiative in the MBFR [mutual and balanced force reduction] talks in Vienna, their long-range theater nuclear force (LRTNF) deployment decision of last December 12 as well as their offer for negotiations in the framework of SALT III aiming at limitations on U.S. and Soviet LRTNF on the basis of equality. They expressed regret that the Soviet Union had responded negatively to the U.S. proposal, based on the December 12 decision within the alliance, on arms control negotiations involving long-range theater nuclear forces. They reaffirmed the determination of the alliance to keep this offer on the table. They expressed their concern that the continuing Soviet LRTNF arms buildup increases the existing imbalance.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that at the upcoming followup meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which will take place in Madrid this fall, the allies should conduct a thorough review of the implementation of all aspects of the Helsinki Final Act and consider proposals aimed at furthering the objectives of the Final Act. In this respect, they reaffirmed the position taken by the Foreign Ministers of the alliance on December 14, 1979.

Having in mind the need to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, the President and the Chancellor discussed the latest developments in that region, in particular the autonomy negotiations currently underway between Egypt and Israel within the Camp David framework. They agreed on the urgent need for progress in these negotiations.

The President and the Chancellor reviewed the current international economic situation, with particular emphasis on the energy problem and financial questions arising from the recent sharp increases in oil prices. They agreed that the program adopted by the seven-nation economic summit in Tokyo last June remained valid and that its objectives should be pursued. They stressed the need for further urgent efforts aimed at expanding alternate sources of energy, in particular coal, nuclear, renewable resources as well as coal gasification and liquefaction, and reducing energy consumption by all means possible. They pledged to cooperate with other nations in taking new medium- and long-term actions to these ends in the International Energy Agency and at the Venice economic summit.

They expressed particular concern over the worsening economic conditions of the developing countries resulting in large measure from the continued increase in energy prices and expressed the readiness of their governments, together with other countries, including the OPEC countries [Organization of Petroleum Countries], to seek ways to help oil-importing developing countries produce more energy. They agreed that in the present circumstances healthy growth by these countries is essential to a prosperous world economy and that both the OPEC countries and the industrial countries should help.

The two heads of government exchanged views about the actions they are taking to overcome inflation and achieve sound and sustained growth. The President described the Administration's program of fiscal restraint, efforts to reduce energy consumption and to increase energy supplies, and steps to curtail present rates of inflation. The Chancellor expressed confidence in the prospects of success of these actions and described the current stance of monetary and fiscal development and energy policy in the Federal Republic of Germany. The President and the Chancellor stressed the importance of resisting protectionist measures that would impede trade, retard growth, and add to inflation.

The two heads of government agreed that the key to success in the economic field is to be found in holding to present economic policies over a sustained period. They shared the view that if these policies are continued and strengthened, the main industrial countries can restore noninflationary growth from which all will benefit.

The President and the Chancellor saw in this visit further proof of their fundamental commitment to the North Atlantic alliance and of the close friendship and partnership between their countries. They were agreed that it is not only the common security interests that link the two countries together but also their common principles and values, their democratic way of life, and their belief in the inalienable rights of man.

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[1] Lists omitted here of those F.R.G. officials in the Chancellor's party and the U.S. officials with whom he met. Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Mar. 10, 1980, which also includes the President's and Chancellor's remarks to reporters on Mar. 5 and their dinner toasts that evening. ■

Transactions Prohibited for Olympic Games

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, MAR. 28, 1980[1]

The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the continuing interference by the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of that country constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. An overwhelming majority of the U.N. General Assembly, including countries of varying political and religious persuasions, economic strength, and geographical circumstance, have joined in a condemnation of the Soviet Union's aggression.

In response to the Soviet action, the President has taken certain national defense measures. He has also imposed a number of restraints on normal economic, cultural, and political exchanges with the Soviet Union. These have included an embargo on grain and other agricultural products, an embargo on phosphate shipments, and the application of more rigorous restrictions on the export of high technology and other strategic commodities.

With respect to the Moscow Summer Olympics, the President has announced that neither he nor the American people would support the participation in the Olympics by the U.S. Olympic Team, and he has urged U.S. businesses not to participate in or contribute to the holding of the summer games in Moscow.

The President is now taking additional steps to make clear the U.S. Government's firm opposition to participation in the Moscow summer games. He has today directed the Secretary of Commerce to take the following actions:

1. To deny all pending validated license applications for goods and technology to be used in support of or in connection with the Summer Olympic Games in Moscow;

2. To revoke all outstanding export licenses for Olympic-related exports that have not already been shipped;

3. To impose validated license controls on all exports not now requiring validated licenses to be used in support of or in association with the Summer Olympic Games in Moscow. No such licenses shall be granted;

4. To prohibit other transactions and payments associated with all Olympic-related exports. Among other transactions, the order will bar NBC from making any further payments or exports under its contracts relating to the U.S. television rights for the Olympic Games. (NBC has previously announced that it would not exercise these rights if no U.S. team took part in the games.)

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[1] Read to news correspondents by White House press secretary Jody Powell (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Mar. 31, 1980). ■

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protecting the security and the future of Israel.

The autonomy talks will lead to a transitional arrangement. Further negotiations will be required after 3 years or so to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. Egypt, Israel, and the United States are now committed to the success of this course that we set for ourselves at Camp David, a course based on these accords and on U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. As we all three pledged at Camp David, through these current negotiations Israel can gain increased security, and the Palestinians can participate in the determination of their own future and achieve a solution which recognizes their legitimate rights.

For the past 10 months our negotiators have done the patient work of defining these difficult issues. As we meet today, Ambassador Sol Linowitz [personal representative of the President for the Middle East peace negotiations] is in Israel, and he will soon be going to Egypt to help move the talks forward. And next month I will be meeting here with President Sadat and with Prime Minister Begin. It's time for us to review the progress that we've made so far and to discuss the way to move forward even faster. These two summit meetings are not meant to replace the negotiators who have worked so hard and have come so far but to help them to expedite their vital work. I look forward to seeing these two men once again. They are my friends.

In the 13 days at Camp David and the meetings I've had with them before and since, I've come to know them well. Both the men have deep religious convictions. Both are men whose personal sense of the history of their own nations has shaped their lives since early childhood. It should never be forgotten that after a generation of unsuccessful efforts engaging the talents of a legion of fine statesmen, it took courage and vision to create this first major step toward peace. It will also require courage and vision—perhaps even more—and a commitment to fulfill not only the letter but the spirit of the Camp David accords and to realize our dreams of a permanent peace.

The period between now and the completion of the talks will certainly not be easy as we work to resolve some of the most complex and emotional issues in the entire world. Both Egypt and Israel will now be facing difficult decisions in making an effort to answer difficult questions, and they will need patience and understanding—theirs and also ours. Yet in the resolution of these questions lies a great promise for achieving the comprehensive peace which is coveted by Egypt, Israel, the United States, and all people of good will everywhere.

The United States will continue to work patiently and constructively with both Egypt and Israel as a full partner in the negotiations. These negotiations presently ongoing are the road to peace. They can succeed. They must succeed.

Let me make one thing clear. Domestic politics cannot be allowed to create timidity or to propose obstacles or delay or to subvert the spirit of Camp David, or to imply a lack of commitment to reach our common goal. This is time when we must continue that political vision that made possible the treaty which we celebrate today. As Prime Minister Begin said here last year: " . . . now is the time for all of us to show civil courage in order to proclaim to our peoples and to others: No more war, no more bloodshed, no more bereavement."

At Camp David, we invited others to adhere to the framework of peace and to join in the negotiations. The negotiations must be based on a commonly accepted foundation. As these talks move forward, let me reaffirm two points. We will not negotiate with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, nor will we recognize the PLO unless it accepts Resolutions 242 and 338 and recognizes Israel's right to exist. And we oppose the creation of an independent Palestinian state.

The United States, as all of you know, has a warm and a unique relationship of friendship with Israel that is morally right. It is compatible with our deepest religious convictions, and it is right in terms of America's own strategic interests. We are committed to Israel's security, prosperity, and future as a land that has so much to offer to the world. A strong Israel and a strong Egypt serve our own security interests.

We are committed to Israel's right to live in peace with all its neighbors, within secure and recognized borders, free from terrorism. We are committed to a Jerusalem that will forever remain undivided, with free access to all faiths to the holy places. Nothing will deflect us from these fundamental principles and commitments which I've just outlined.

As you all know, also, the United States has broadened and has deepened its valuable friendship with Egypt, the largest and the most powerful and the most influential Arab nation on Earth. President Sadat, with his heroism, has brought about profound changes not only in the rest of the world but in Egypt's own internal life. And he has made Egypt a leader among nations in the pursuit of peace. We support Egypt's security and its well-being, and we will work with Egypt to insure a more prosperous and a peaceful life for the Egyptian people.

As President Sadat said at this house a year ago: "Let there be no more wars or bloodshed between Arabs and Israelis. Let there be no more suffering or denial of rights. Let there be no more despair or loss of faith. Let no mother lament the loss of her child. Let no young man waste his life on a conflict from which no one benefits. Let us work together until the day comes when they beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning-hooks."

Isaiah, in chapter 42 in the Bible, says of a great servant of God, "A bruised reed he will not break; a dimly burning wick he will not quench . . . I have given you, as a covenant to the people, a light to the nations to open the eyes that are blind."

Today, as the earth is reborn in springtime after a long winter, we lift high that dimly burning wick of peace before the nations of the world. In its light all can see that, amid the disappointment and the dangers, mankind can still prevail against its own evils, against its own past, against all the efforts that would separate us one from another and make us enemies. We must not be mean nor stingy nor lacking in courage. We must not betray the trust of those whose faith is in us.

Down through the centuries the children of Abraham have spoken daily of their longing for peace in their greetings. President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin are children of Abraham, and they are men of peace. I ask your prayers that full peace may yet be ours. I pray that the dimly burning wick which we have lit may yet ignite a blazing flame of peace that will light the world.

I and President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin join in with you in our fervent prayer: Peace, *shalom, salaam.*

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[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Mar. 31, 1980, which also includes the remarks on this occasion by Ashraf Ghorbal, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States, and Ephraim Evron, Israeli Ambassador to the United States. ■

course of conduct which has been pursued by Iran and thus to create the maximum deterrent against its repetition by any country in any part of the world.

Order of Presentation

I should like now to explain the order in which we propose to present our case to the Court. At the outset I propose to review the factual events which have occurred during the 4½ months that the American hostages have been held in captivity in Tehran. At the hearing which the Court held on December 10, we described a number of the relevant events, but in the ensuing 3 months there have emerged a number of additional facts which are plainly relevant to our case on the merits, and I would be glad of an opportunity to present them to the Court.

Thereafter, we would appreciate it if the Court would hear from my colleague, Mr. Stephen Schwebel, who appears as Counsel in the case. Mr. Schwebel will develop our argument to the effect that the current dispute between the United States and Iran falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the Court and that there is no valid reason why the Court should not proceed to adjudicate the claims currently being presented by the United States.

Following Mr. Schwebel's presentation, I would appreciate it if the Court would allow me to resume the argument and to develop, in additional detail, the specific substantive claims advanced by the United States as against Iran. I would propose to include within that discussion a point which, in our view, deserves particular attention —namely, that although the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was originally seized by a mob of people who did not purport to be agents of the Government of Iran, in fact, the mob received almost immediate support and endorsement from the government and have since been operating with the authorization of the chief of state of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a result, as I shall explain in more detail, the Government of Iran is internationally responsible for all of the conduct upon which the U.S. claims in this case are based.

In the course of describing those claims I shall also observe that, although the Government of Iran has suggested that it has grievances of various kinds against the United States, none of those grievances has been presented to this Court, and none can be treated as having any relevance whatever to these proceedings. No such alleged grievance can be allowed to interfere with or detract from the pending claims of the United States.

Finally, I shall develop our contentions as to the relief which we seek in this litigation. In essence, we seek a series of declarations which will conclusively establish to all within the international community that the Government of Iran has committed gross violations of its international obligations to the United States and that it is bound to put an end to the present unlawful situation.

We also seek a declaration to the effect that Iran's unlawful conduct has given rise to an obligation to make reparations to the United States. As indicated in our Memorial [January 15, 1980], the determination of the amount of damage that is due to the United States must necessarily be postponed until Iran's ongoing unlawful conduct has been brought to an end, but it is, nevertheless, important that the Court now affirm that the United States is entitled to reparation in an amount to be subsequently determined.

Sources of Information

As a preliminary matter, I should make one comment about the factual sources upon which we have had to rely in formulating our claims. Since the U.S. nationals who would normally be supplying the relevant information to the U.S. Government are now in captivity, all normal sources of information have been completely unavailable to us throughout the crisis, and to a very large extent we have had to rely on press reports of actions taken and statements made by the Government of Iran. Under some circumstances, of course, isolated press reports may be of questionable reliability, but the events that have occurred in Tehran over the last 4½ months have been so dramatic that they have been covered by a multitude of reporters whose reports are substantially unanimous as to the essential facts, giving a clear indication of substantial reliability. In any event, as to many of the events in the story, the press reports are all that we have—not through any fault of the U.S. Government but as a direct result of the unlawful conduct of the Government of Iran.

The fact that the Respondent in this case is responsible for depriving us of direct proof of our allegations, I respectfully submit, entitles the United States here to rely upon the principle laid down by the Court in the *Corfu Channel* case. There the Court took note of the predicament of a state which had been made the victim of a breach of international law and which for that reason was unable to obtain direct proof of its claims. The Court stated as follows:

> Such a State should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence. This indirect evidence is admitted in all systems of law, and its use is recognized by international decisions. It must be regarded as of special weight when it is based on a series of facts linked together and leading logically to a single conclusion. [*I.C.J. Reports 1949*, p. 18]

It is our submission, of course, that the inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence upon which the United States is entitled to rely here overwhelmingly demonstrate multiple and flagrant violations of international law by the Government of Iran.

I should note also that many of the facts to which I will give special emphasis during my argument are referred to in our Memorial with appropriate citations to the source materials. When I refer to a fact which could not be included within our Memorial, I shall be relying upon the Supplemental Documents which the Court has given us permission to submit. We have supplied the Registrar with a typewritten version of our presentation which contains appropriate citations to sources and which also contains headings to which we shall not refer during our oral rendition.

Political Structure in Iran

Turning to the facts, I propose to start with one brief comment on the political structure which has existed within Iran throughout the relevant period. As the Court is aware, the Islamic revolution in Iran began in late 1978. The former Shah left the country, and the reins of power thereupon came into the hands of the Ayatollah Khomeini. With great rapidity, the Ayatollah established himself as the *de facto* chief of state, and he has been, without any question, the supreme political authority in Iran ever since that time.

Throughout the period with which this case is concerned, the Ayatollah Khomeini has been in direct control of the Iranian Armed Forces; he has received foreign envoys, accepted resignations of prime ministers and other

the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, the intensely strained relations which arose as between Iran and the United States last November have given rise to a very high volume of civil litigation in which the Government of Iran appears as a litigant, both offensively and defensively. There are almost 200 such cases now pending in many different courts, and the Government of Iran has demonstrated its ability to litigate with vigor in any forum that it chooses. It has retained able counsel in several different countries and mustered all of the arguments that could possibly be presented in such cases. So far as we know, out of all the different courts involved, this is the only court in which Iran has failed to appear.

In such circumstances, I suggest, the reason for the Iranian absence is clear: If Iran had any possible defense to be presented on the merits, it would be here to present it, but it has none.

Indeed, I suggest that that conclusion is supported by the letters which the Government of Iran sent to the President of the Court on 9 December and 16 March. Those letters did not present disrespectful or casual comment. They set forth a most respectful and carefully thought-out position, and for that reason their silence on certain matters is as significant as their actual words. The fact that Iran made absolutely no attempt to argue that its conduct with respect to the hostages in the Embassy is legally defensible is a matter, I submit, of which the Court is entitled to take note.

World Opinion on Seizure

Moreover, the indefensibility of Iran's conduct is corroborated by the truly unanimous reaction of the countries of the world. Obviously, there are many countries in which the Iranian revolution is regarded with great sympathy and approval. There are many countries that will support Iranian positions on different issues, provided that there are grounds for doing so. So far as we know, however, there is not a single country in the world which has suggested in any way that the Iranian conduct in seizing the Embassy and the hostages was justified within the framework of international law. The absolutely unanimous view that Iran has broken the rules is reflected in the vote of the Security Council on 4 December, and in the outpouring of opinion from countries all over the world within the last 4½ months. That opinion, I should emphasize, is shared by states representing every shade of political and economic, and even religious, persuasion. It is shared by the largest countries in the world and by the smallest. It is shared by the richest, the poorest, and by the East and West; by the aligned and nonaligned—in fact, by everyone.

The Iranian Government would clearly prefer that this were not so. Seeking to mollify, to some degree at least, the worldwide criticism which has come raining down upon the Iranian Government since the seizure of the hostages, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr. Ghotbzadeh, has suggested that the ordinary rules of diplomatic immunity are essentially irrelevant because, he has said, they were devised by, and for the benefit of, what he refers to as "the big powers." It is Mr. Ghotbzadeh's theory that the purpose of the international legal principles involved is to prevent prosecution of "the crimes that the representatives of the big powers have committed in the small countries," a comment which is reflected at page 223 of our Memorial.

Along the same lines, the grandson and adviser of the Ayatollah Khomeini h asserted, as indicated at page 130 of r Memorial, that the Embassy seizure has found favor in the Third World, that the seizure of diplomats as hostages is *not* regarded by Third World populations as violating international law, and that "the poor and underprivileged despise the legal and meddlesome minds of the rich and powerful."

The actual reactions of such states demonstrate that this Iranian thesis is factually incorrect in every particular. The views of the smaller countries, including countries in the Third World, are reflected in the records of the U.N. Security Council debates during December and January. Just as one example, let me refer to the views expressed by the representative of Zaire, who explicitly called on the Government of Iran to bring itself into compliance with the principles of international law. He stated as follows:

> We in the Third World who continue unswervingly to strive for the democratization of international relations, for a more just and equitable system of international relations, protected from fear, arbitrary actions, and the rule of force, but guaranteed by the force of law, attach the utmost importance to this, bearing in mind the means available to us, because we are convinced that in a world without principles and laws we should be the losers.[14]

The same theme was urged by the representative of Panama, appealing to the Iranian authorities to "cease their illegal and inhuman detention of persons protected by international law." He stated:

> . . . for a small country, existence as a nation is only possible in a world in which law and order prevail. The sole weapon, the only defense of a small nation, lies precisely in the maintenance of the legal system that governs international relations.[15]

Again, the respresentative of Gabon referred to the long-established principles of diplomatic immunity and made the following observation:

> Respect for these diplomatic customs is even more fundamental for countries such as ours, which owe their very existence in the face of power politics and hegemony of all kinds to the recognition of this international law. . . .[16]

And finally, the same position was summed up by the representative of Portugal in the following terms:

> In any country the rule of law is the best defense of ordinary people against oppression and tyranny. Similarly, between states, international law is the only defense of the small, poor, and weak countries against the rich and powerful.[17]

It is simply inaccurate for the Government of Iran to suggest that there is an element of world opinion which regards their hostage-taking as lawful. There is not. The small and nonaligned countries, together with the major powers from East and West, including such countries as the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, and France, are totally agreed that the seizure of the American Embassy and the capturing of the American hostages in Tehran constitute flagrant and continuing violations of international law.

The principles of international law which this Court is being asked to vindicate are of deep concern to *all* states; for they are indispensable to a civilized international order. Moreover, although I regret the need to make this observation, there is clear evidence that the world is entering upon a new era of terrorism in which the seizure of hostages, including particularly diplomatic hostages, is a political technique which is being used with increasing frequency. In most such cases, it is true, diplomatic agents have been seized by

terrorist groups who reflect at most a minority political position within the particular country involved, but it is, nevertheless, the fact that in the past decade diplomats from a great many different countries have been seized and detained for political purposes. Just in one recent episode, the seizure of the Dominican Embassy in Colombia, diplomats from no less than 14 different countries were taken captive, including diplomats from Austria, Brazil, Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, Israel, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Switzerland, Uruguay, the United States, the Vatican, and Venezuela.

Every one of these episodes, of course, reflects a terribly serious situation for the affected states. But the severity of the episode in Tehran far exceeds any of the other examples, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In Tehran the host government itself participated from the outset, seizing a large number of hostages and maintaining their captivity for months on end in order to achieve its political purposes. From the point of view of the future of international relations and world peace, the events elaborated in the present record are truly frightening and ominous. Unless the world community takes every possible step toward condemning and discouraging such conduct, the rule of international law will be gravely imperiled.

Lack of Relevant Exceptions to Diplomatic Immunity

Before I begin my discussion of the particular substantive rules which Iran has violated since 4 November 1979, I should like to address myself to the second question put by the President of the Court yesterday. That is, "whether a state may have an inherent right in any extreme circumstances to override its obligations under the rules of diplomatic and consular law to respect the inviolability of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises, and if so, in what circumstances." As discussed in our Memorial at pages 49 and 53, there have been suggestions that the general rule of inviolability is subject to a few extremely narrow exceptions. Arguably, the police agents of a state may apprehend a diplomatic agent who is actually in the act of committing a crime or briefly use force to restrain a diplomatic agent who is engaged, for example, in an actual assault upon another person. Even these limited exceptions, however, are controversial, particularly in regard to the inviolability of premises.

In any event, we submit that by no stretch of the imagination can any of these possible exceptions have any application in the present case. The American Embassy and its personnel were not seized to avert an imminent peril of the kind envisaged in these possible exceptions to the rule of inviolability. Instead, as indicated by the statements of the Government of Iran, the apparent purpose of the seizure and of the prolonged detention of the hostages was and is to coerce the United States into complying with certain Iranian demands. Iran is under no obligation to maintain diplomatic relations with the United States or to permit the United States to maintain an Embassy in Iran or even to tolerate the presence in Iran of some officials whom Iran may consider objectionable. But having established diplomatic relations with the United States, Iran is obligated to respect the inviolability of the U.S. diplomatic mission and its personnel, an obligation which exists even in time of war.[18]

In short, any exceptions to the rule of inviolability have no application in this case, and this Court was absolutely correct when it stated in its order of 15 December that the rule of inviolability is "unqualified."

Categories of U.S. Claims

Against that background, I should like now to turn to the specific claims asserted here by the United States. As we see it, there are five broad categories of unlawful conduct from which those claims arise. They are, first, the seizure and continuing detention of the American hostages in Tehran. Second, the harsh treatment and other conditions associated with that detention. Third, the interrogation and threatened trial of the hostages. Fourth, the invasion and occupation of the U.S. diplomatic and consular premises in Tehran. And fifth, the failure of the Iranian Government to bring the perpetrators of these crimes to justice.

Seizure and Detention of the Hostages

In setting forth the U.S. claims as they arise from the seizure and continuing detention of the American diplomatic agents and staff in Tehran, we are relying upon what is probably the oldest and most fundamental rule of diplomatic law.

As I indicated yesterday, it has been established customary international law for centuries that every diplomatic agent enjoys diplomatic immunity and that under no circumstances may he be seized by the receiving state, either as a hostage or for any other purpose. The rule of personal inviolability was followed even in early civilizations, simply because a diplomat cannot perform his functions without such a rule. Many authorities view the principle of inviolability as the core or central principle from which all diplomatic privileges and immunities have been derived. It is a rule which has found such universal acceptance that according to one leading authority, as set forth in our Memorial at page 40, from the 16th century down to the present time no receiving state has authorized or condoned a breach of a diplomat's personal violability.

This is not to say that there have not been instances when a diplomatic agent has been unlawfully detained. The point is that although there have been such instances, the practice has been for the receiving state to recognize the seizure as a violation of international law and to make amends in one way or another. For example, in 1917 the American Minister to Guatemala was briefly detained by the Guatemalan police. In that case, however, the President of Guatemala immediately apologized and issued orders that the officers involved be punished. Similarly, in 1932 when the American Minister in Ethiopia was attacked by police officers, the Ethiopian Government brought about the prosecution of the officers and gave broad publicity to the resulting sentences.

I think it is truly safe to say that, with the possible exception of the present Government of Iran, there is not a single government in the world which would dissent from the fundamental proposition that every diplomat is entitled to absolute personal immunity from attack or seizure, except in exceptional circumstances which are not relevant here.

The universal acceptance of these principles, of course, led to their inclusion in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and that convention gives rise to the most important claims asserted by the United States in this proceeding. Specifically, article 29

U.S. Foreign Policy: Our Broader Strategy

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 27, 1980.[1]

I welcome the opportunity to join with you in looking beyond immediate events to America's overall posture and purposes in the world.

For the past 4 months, our primary concern has been drawn to an area of immediate crisis—southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. Terrorism in Iran and Soviet aggression in Afghanistan have required concentrated attention. But even as we address these current challenges, we must constantly place our response to specific events within our broader strategy. Our present actions must not only meet immediate crises; they must advance our long-term interests as well.

Over the past several years I have met with the committee many times on specific elements of our foreign policy. These hearings offer an opportunity to consider America's wide-ranging interests, how they relate to each other, and our overall course.

I hope these hearings can also serve another purpose: to help crystallize broad agreement on the general course that best suits America's interests and needs in the coming decade.

I do not suggest that a full consensus behind a detailed foreign policy is now likely. In a world of extraordinary and growing complexity, a world in which our interests are diverse, we cannot escape choices which in their nature are the stuff of controversy.

But I do believe that despite differences on decisions that we have made and that we and others will make during the 1980s, our nation can now shape a new foreign policy consensus about our goals in the world and the essential strands of our strategy to pursue them.

This consensus can be built around agreement on two central points.

• First, the United States must maintain a military balance of power. Our defense forces must remain unsurpassed. Our strategic deterrent must be unquestionable. Our conventional forces must be strong enough and flexible enough to meet the full range of military threats we may face. As a global power, we must maintain the global military balance. Our strength is important to our own safety, to a strong foreign policy free from coercion, to the confidence of allies and friends, and to the future of reciprocal arms control and other negotiations. Our strength also buttresses regional balances that could be upset by the direct or indirect use of Soviet power.

• The second central point is this: that our military strength, while an essential condition for an effective foreign policy, is not in itself a sufficient condition. We must nurture and draw upon our other strengths as well—our alliances and other international ties, our economic resources, our ability to deal with diversity, and our ideals. By drawing fully on these strengths, we can help shape world events now in ways that reduce the likelihood of using military force later. A global American foreign policy can succeed only if it has both these dimensions.

Some have argued that a strong response to Soviet military growth and aggression is overreaction. But to disregard the growth of Soviet military programs and budgets or to explain away aggression as a defensive maneuver is to take refuge in illusion.

It is just as illusory, and just as dangerous, to believe that there can be a fortress America or that the world will follow our lead solely because of our military strength. America's future depends not only on our growing military power; it also requires the continued pursuit of energy security and arms control, of human rights and economic development abroad.

As we look to the 1980s, our first obligation is to see the world clearly. We confront a serious and sustained Soviet challenge, which is both military and political. Their military buildup continues unabated. The Soviet Union has shown a greater willingness to employ that power directly and through others. In that sense, Afghanistan is a manifestation of a larger problem, evident also in Ethiopia, South Yemen, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere.

The world economic order is undergoing dramatic change. An energy crisis has rocked its foundations. Economic interdependence has become a daily reality for the citizens of every nation. At the same time, the assertion of national independence has reshaped the political geography of the planet. There is a profusion of different systems and allegiances and a diffusion of political and military power. Within nations, we see an accelerating rise in individual expectations.

These challenges require a full American engagement in the world—a resolve to defend our vital interests with force if necessary and to address potential causes of conflict before they erupt. These hearings can help illuminate how best to order and serve the wide range of interests we have in a world grown increasingly complex.

In my remarks today, I will discuss eight central American interests for the coming years. Each is broad in its own terms. But I do not believe that any of these interests can be narrowed, much less disregarded, without doing damage to the others.

• Our most basic interest, and first priority, is the physical security of our nation—the safety of our people. This requires strong defense forces and strong alliances.

• It also requires that we and our allies firmly and carefully manage a second area of concern: East-West relations.

• A third interest—controlling the growth and spread of nuclear and other weapons—enhances our collective security and international stability.

• Fourth, we must confront the global energy crisis and strengthen the international economy; for doing so is central to our well-being as a people and our strength as a nation.

• A fifth interest, peace in troubled areas of the world, reduces potential threats of wider war and removes opportunities for our rivals to extend their influence.

• Our diplomacy in troubled regions and our ability to pursue our global economic goals are strengthened by pursuing a sixth interest: broadening our ties to other nations—with China, for example, and throughout the Third World.

• The advancement of human rights is more than an ideal. It, too, is an interest. Peaceful gains for freedom are also

steps toward stability abroad and greater security for America.

• And finally, we cannot disregard our interest in addressing environmental and other longer term global trends that can imperil our future.

Pursuit of each of these interests helps shape the kind of world we want to see. Each is important—as a part of this broader conception and because failure in one area can lead to failure in another.

Can we say that our security is more threatened by the growth of Soviet military power or by the strains we can foresee in the international economy? By the prospect of nuclear weapons in the hands of additional nations or by the prospect of social and political turmoil in many regions of the world?

The hard fact is that we must face each of these and other challenges simultaneously. Clearly, our interests do collide in particular circumstances. There will be no escaping the difficult task of weighing our interests against each other, moving each forward whenever possible.

Our course in the world must be defined by a mix of interests, sensibly balanced, meeting always the central imperative of national security for our country and our people. No simple slogan or single priority can answer in advance the dilemmas of the coming decade.

Nor can we define our security interests in ways that exclude any region. To do so could leave beyond the lines of our interest nations of genuine importance to our well-being or tempt others to believe that we were ceding to them new spheres of influence.

Certainly, we will always have regional priorities. As I shall discuss in more detail, by history, strategic location, and shared values, our allies in Europe and the Far East are central to our planning, as is our hemisphere.

We have also, in recent years, responded to new dangers in a region of growing strategic importance—southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. Because of its present urgency and its relevance to our overall foreign policy, let me begin there.

Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf

Our first concern is the continued, illegal detention of Americans in Tehran. Rarely have our determination and our judgment been so severely tested as in our efforts to free them. We will not rest until all of our people are free. As long as their cruel torment continues, this matter will remain at the forefront of our national agenda.

We have pursued a policy of firmness and restraint. This is the most practical course consistent with our national honor and the safety of the hostages. International condemnation of Iran and the economic measures which have raised the costs to Iran of their illegal actions are bringing home to Iranians the fact that the holding of the hostages is harmful to their interests and to the success of their revolution. But divisions within Iran have prevented progress.

We continue to work toward a peaceful resolution of the crisis. The United States agreed to the U.N. commission of inquiry to hear Iran's grievances and to work for a resolution of the hostage crisis. We regret that the commission was unable to carry out its full mandate in Tehran. But we continue to support its mission. We are prepared to see its work go forward as soon as positive conditions exist.

We will not rest until all of our people are free.

We are reviewing again our options in the event tangible progress is not now made.

There is only one question at issue here: the illegal detention of our diplomatic personnel and American citizens in contravention of international law and practice. We accept Iran's revolution as a fact; we do not question the right of the Iranian people to determine their own future; we do not reject Iran's desire to bring its grievances to the attention of the world. But Iran must first live up to its fundamental responsibilities for the safety, well-being, and release of the hostages.

Several broader conditions in the area also converge to demand our attention.

• One is our direct interest in the Persian Gulf region. Roughly one-quarter of the oil we import comes from this area of the world. For our allies, the proportion is higher—two-thirds in the case of Western Europe, three-fourths for Japan. Loss of this oil would create havoc not only in the world economy but for the security of our alliances.

Our stake in the region, however, involves more than oil. Peace and stability in the area are critical to the future of our friends there and affect the broader peace. Our strength and skill in supporting their independence will demonstrate to them and to others the constancy of our purpose in the world.

• Another condition is the potential for turmoil and instability, caused by tensions between and within nations.

• A third condition is the geographic accessibility of this critical region to the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan increases and dramatizes the potential threat to the security of nations there and to the world's free access to natural resources and shipping routes.

That is the fact, whatever we may speculate about Soviet aims or intentions cannot be known with certainty. Even if they could, intentions can change. Our response must be based upon Soviet capabilities and Soviet behavior. To respond firmly to these realities now is not to be apocalyptic; it is simply to be prudent.

Thus we are moving to deal with a new security situation. We have increased our own naval presence there and we are working with others on access to additional air and naval facilities in the region. We are consulting with others on steps to reinforce the deterrence to any future Soviet aggression.

These steps serve an explicit and unmistakable purpose. As President Carter has said: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

We are also acting to impose a serious and sustained price for the aggression that is being committed against Afghanistan. The steps we have taken—on grain, on technology, on the Olympics, and in other areas—have two purposes.

First, by responding firmly to aggression, we seek to deter it elsewhere. To pursue business as usual in the face of aggression is to tempt new adventures or risk miscalculation.

Detente cannot be divorced from deterrence. To oppose aggression now is to promote peace in the future—to foster the conditions for progress in East-West relations. To assume that we can obtain the benefits of detente while ignoring the need for deterrence would be shortsighted and dangerous. To assume that detente is divisible, that aggression need be met only when it directly threatens

in to terrorism. We continue to pursue those goals and will keep all of our options before us. We're not going to telegraph our decisions. I understand it's natural for there to be speculation about them, but the President is moving deliberately. But we are on a new course of determination and deliberation in order to increase the pressure.

Q. But the student militants holding the hostages said this weekend that they have put explosives in the walls of the U.S. Embassy and will, in their words, "blow the hostages sky high" if we take any slightest military action. How do you deal with threats like that whether they're credible or not, and at the same time even talk about military action?

A. We have to weigh them very carefully. There are so many statements coming out of Iran that one can't credit any particular statement. We have heard that statement before. Nevertheless, we will have to do what we think is in the best interests of the hostages and in the best interests of our country. We will try to weigh as well as we can the many statements that come out of Tehran, but at the same time I think we can't give credibility to any one claim, any one charge, any one pressure point from their side.

Q. And another statement that has come out of Iran this weekend comes from President Bani-Sadr who said yesterday that he will invite an international organization to visit the hostages to check on their health and monitor visits to them. Would you see this as a hopeful development?

A. That statement apparently came in connection with his meeting with the ambassadors from the European Community. Frankly, from their standpoint, that was a very disappointing meeting. He did not promise that the hostages would be released. He did not give any indication that he had a plan for that. What he did say is that perhaps an international organization such as the Red Cross could visit.

Now naturally we would welcome such a visit. We always have said that anyone who could see the hostages, who could determine their condition, some reliable outside observer to do that would be desirable. But that's not the real solution. The real solution is to get them released. We have heard so many indications that they would let international agencies in to inspect them or to see them that frankly we've become somewhat skeptical. We'll be glad if it happens, but that isn't the end of the line. The end of the line is to get them released.

Q. And in that meeting you speak of, President Bani-Sadr also said he rejected a demand by representatives of our allies that the hostages be released by a specified date. Is that a setback at this stage to our continued and escalating efforts to involve our allies in this process?

A. No, I would think it would be helpful in that regard because those ambassadors will go back and report to their capitals that Bani-Sadr is not under the present circumstances prepared to do anything. And I think that will encourage the allies. It certainly ought to encourage them to take the kind of economic sanctions we're asking them to take.

Q. Let's talk about the allies for a moment. This week the President expressed disappointment with what the allies had done to that point. What makes you think that you're going to get the kind of cooperation in terms of economic sanctions that we want? It was easy enough for us to do it, after all, because it didn't really cost us anything, but it would cost countries like Germany and Italy a great deal to do that.

A. It wasn't cost free here. As a matter of fact, we've asked for sacrifices from Americans all across the board both in respect to Iran and Afghanistan. And, fortunately, the American people have been united, and they've been terrific on this subject.

Now the allies during the months of January, February, and March—while there was a real negotiating track, while there was a possibility of achieving something either through the United Nations or through other negotiating efforts—had suggested that we not press for the sanctions. But I think they realize that that phase has come to an end. And I hope that they will understand the seriousness of the matter now. We're looking for action from them at this point, not words.

Q. Do you hope—I mean do you really think you're going to get it, and what would be the timeframe again?

A. I would hope, as I said earlier, that when their ambassadors come back and give this report that that will give them a realistic picture of what's happening in Iran. And then they're going to meet in the European Community, I understand, on the 21st of April. And it's my hope that they will take action at that time to impose the sanctions as if the U.N. resolution had not been vetoed by the Soviet Union, that is that they will ban all shipments to Iran except for foods and medicine.

Q. Are we threatening our allies even implicitly by suggesting that, if they don't go along, we'll have to blockade the Persian Gulf and they'll have to cut off trade anyway?

A. The statement of a reality sometimes communicates itself as a threat. I think the fact is that if we are not effective with the sanctions that are in place now and if the allies don't join us and if the subsequent nonmilitary actions that we might take—if none of those things works, then we'll have to consider other options, and those may be less attractive than the options that are open to us now.

Q. Is there somewhere down the road another type of threat, that is the threat that has been talked about from time to time over the past 6 months of putting more realistic pressure on the allies perhaps in the form of letting them know that we will have to reduce our support to NATO unless they give us more help in this crisis in the Persian Gulf area?

A. I'd like to respond to that by saying that our alliance is really the bedrock of our security. Our allies are important to us, and we're important to them. So I don't think we're talking about the security relationship here. We're talking about what good allies and good friends do for each other when there is trouble.

Now this is not just trouble for America. This is trouble for the world as a whole. They happen to be our hostages, but the principle involved is a principle of international law. It's a principle of international human rights. And so I think the allies will want to join us in resolving this problem.

Q. But we are approaching the 6-month mark now in the holding of the hostages and we've gotten precious little help from the allies. Doesn't the moment come where we have to get tougher, and the question is being asked increasingly editorially across the country who really needs allies who don't stand with us at critical moments.

A. We need our allies. One hundred and sixty-two days have gone on. I think

they're aware of that. I think they're aware that we're in a new phase of this both from their standpoint as well as from our standpoint. And I'm hopeful that they see the situation in terms that will cause them to take some action within the next 2 or 3 weeks.

Q. Do you feel that the U.S. Olympic Committee's decision yesterday will help to bring around some of the allies on the subject of boycotting the Olympics?

A. Yes, I think that was a most welcome decision. I think the Olympic Committee deserves our congratulations. The Vice President said it was a referendum on freedom, and the referendum came out right.

I think it's a very good bet that our allies will join us, our principal ones, in boycotting the Olympics. I think we'll see that happening over the course of the next month. And I think the whole process is greatly strengthened by what happened in Colorado yesterday.

My own feeling is that the Olympics, if they do ever take place, will only be a shadow of what was expected before the brutal invasion of Afghanistan.

Q. You sound very hopeful that our major allies will join us. Can you be a little more specific? Are you talking about all of our major allies in Europe: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, all of those?

A. Each one is a somewhat separate case, and each of them has different relationships with their Olympic committees. But I think I'll just stand on the point that I believe that at the end of a month from now, or at least before May 25th, you'll find most of our major allies—our principal allies—joining us in boycotting the Olympic Games.

Q. One of the anomalies of this past week has been the feud between Iraq and Iran heating up once again. How seriously do we consider that particular problem? Could it be a factor in the hostages' future?

A. We know about that mainly by what we read in the newspapers. As you know, we don't have diplomatic relations with Iran now, but we have not had diplomatic relations with Iraq for some time. We're not involved in any way in the controversy between the two of them. It's a longstanding controversy. It has roots in ethnic problems, religious problems, boundary problems between them. But we're out of that picture.

Now as far as the relationship to the hostage situation, that's a very hard calculus to make, but I would have to say that on balance that anything that increases instability in the area tends to add an additional threat to the hostages. But it's nothing that we can do anything about at the present time. It's only something that we're watching from the sidelines, not involved.

Q. We're not involved at the moment, but I think one of Iraq's concerns is that the Soviet Union would attempt to exploit the situation in Iran, and despite the fact that the Iraqis, as you know, have been receiving aid from Russia for a long time, they evidently are very concerned about that possibility. Is the United States concerned, and what would our response be if Iraq were threatened by the Russians?

A. Our response would be a serious one if any of the countries in the Middle East were invaded by the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union were to invade Iran or to invade Iraq, we would have a reaction somewhat similar to the invasion of Afghanistan.

That's exactly the kind of a problem that we foresaw when we said that the invasion of Afghanistan was a major international matter, a violation of international law, and something that the international community had to respond to with strength and determination.

Q. What do you see at the moment as the role of the Soviet Union? Are the Russians indeed supporting Iran as they appear to be in this conflict with Iraq, or could there be something else beneath the surface that might revive their old alliance with Iraq?

A. Right now I see the Soviet Union having their hands full in Afghanistan. Just before coming up here, I read an analysis of the comparability between the difficulties the Soviet Union is having in Afghanistan and those that we had in Vietnam. They're obviously not a completely parallel situation, but let me say that the Soviet Union is having a great deal of difficulty in Afghanistan. Their generals are asking for more troops. They're having a great difficulty using the Afghan Army. They're pouring in additional troops. It's now well over 100,000, probably over 110,000.

So I would say that's the main preoccupation of the Soviets at the present time. It's very hard to read their intentions with respect to Iraq.

Q. You say the Soviets are having a great deal of trouble in Afghanistan. Is this good or bad in the long run? Does it reduce the danger that they might eventually try to drive on to the Persian Gulf because their hands are so full now in Afghanistan or what is danger?

A. I think the combination of the international pressure on them because of the action they've taken and the difficulty they're having will tend to deter them in the future. Our whole policy with respect to that invasion has been first to make them pay a heavy cost for that and, second, to deter them from taking comparable action in the future.

I think they are being shown that when they try to go in and take over an independent country, shoot up its mosques, and execute a number of its people, that they can't easily subjugate that kind of a country. The Afghan people are a brave and determined people and they're giving the Soviets a great deal of difficulty. If I were sitting in the Soviet Union, I would not regard that as the kind of event that would encourage me to repeat it.

Q. It's been announced that Secretary Vance will meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Vienna next month. What would be the purpose of that meeting? Is there any hope to improve U.S.-Soviet relations as long as the Afghan affair goes on?

A. I'd have to quarrel with your premise. That was certainly not announced from here. There have been no specific arrangements for such a meeting in Vienna.

That being said, let me say that I think it's important for us to keep the lines of communication open to the Soviet Union. We've been meeting here with their diplomatic officials. Secretary Vance met, as you know, with Ambassador Dobrynin the other evening. We do not want to go back to the cold war situation with the Soviet Union and at the right moment we want to continue whatever contacts we can with them that might be of a useful nature. But I don't know whether such a meeting will take place in Vienna.

Q. What is our response to recent Soviet suggestions on arms control? Are

U.S. Presses Case in World Court on American Hostages in Iran

On March 18, 19, and 20, 1980, the International Court of Justice met to hear oral arguments on the case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran *brought by the United States against the Islamic Republic of Iran. At this phase, the United States made its final arguments on the jurisdiction of the Court and the merits of the case. On December 15, 1979, the Court had granted the U.S. request for interim measures of protection, reserving further proceedings for a later date.*

Representing the United States in this case were Roberts B. Owen, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, as Agent; Stephen M. Schwebel, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State, as Deputy Agent and Counsel; Thomas J. Dunnigan, Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., of the U.S. Embassy in The Hague, as Deputy Agent; and David Small, Assistant Legal Adviser, Ted L. Stein, Attorney-Adviser (both of the Department of State), and Hugh V. Simon, Jr., Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in The Hague, as Advisers.

The following is taken from the U.S. oral argument made to the Court by Mr. Owen.

MAR. 18, 1980

Once again I have the honor to appear before the Court as Agent of the Government of the United States of America in the case concerning *United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran*. As we commence the present hearing, I should like to emphasize the extraordinary importance of the case which we will be presenting to the Court.

I start from the premise that the paramount purpose of the United Nations, as recited in the opening words of the first article of the U.N. Charter, is to maintain international peace and security. Similarly, the maintenance of peaceful relations among states is the essential function of this Court and of those principles of international law under which nations conduct their diplomatic relations. To the extent that a state uses force to assault the mechanisms of peaceful diplomacy, it strikes at the jugular of the entire system by which the world seeks to maintain the peace.

These principles have been so uniformly recognized that for literally centuries no state has used force against the diplomatic envoys and embassies of another. Occasionally, rebellious political groups or individuals have assaulted embassies and diplomats, but governments have not. For centuries international wars have come and gone, but by universal agreement embassies and their diplomatic staffs have been regarded as inviolable from official interference through the use of force.

That great tradition of recognizing and honoring the inviolability of embassies and diplomats has now been shattered for the first time in modern history. On 4 November 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and more than 60 of its personnel, were forcefully seized with the cooperation and endorsement of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Moreover, this shattering attack upon the mechanisms of peaceful relations among nations was not a temporary aberration for which apology and reparation were quickly made; the captivity of 53 American diplomatic agents and staff has continued under the official auspices of the Iranian Government for 4½ months. It seems hard to believe, but the attack on the American Embassy in Tehran occurred more than one-third of a year ago, and 53 of my countrymen are still held in precarious captivity as I stand before the Court today.

During these hearings, as the Court listens to the argument of the Government of the United States, I would respectfully request that the Court continuously bear in mind the implications of the Iranian conduct in terms of the cause of world peace and the cause of fundamental human rights and freedoms. Consider, if you will, what would happen to the fabric of international relations if this Court and the world community were to exhibit any degree of tolerance for what the Iranian Government has done and continues to do. Such tolerance would promote repetition, and repetition would lead, tragically, to the unraveling of orderly international relations. It is for this reason that I submit, very seriously, that in this case the Court has a compelling responsibility to condemn, in the most severe terms, the

THE LEGAL ADVISER

Roberts B. Owen was born in Boston and grew up in Cambridge, Mass. He attended the Phillips Exeter Academy in Exeter, N.H. He entered the Naval officer training program in 1943, was commissioned in 1945, and served on a troop transport in the North Atlantic in 1945–46.

After his discharge from the Navy, Mr. Owen attended Harvard and graduated with honors in 1948. He then attended Harvard Law School and graduated with honors in 1951. In 1951–52 he was a Fulbright scholar at Queens' College in Cambridge, England, and received a diploma in Comparative Legal Studies.

From 1952 until 1979, Mr. Owen practiced law in Washington, D.C., with the law firm of Covington & Burling. He specialized in trial and appellate practice covering a wide variety of subject matters with some emphasis upon antitrust litigation and *pro bono* litigation on behalf of citizens groups.

Mr. Owen was sworn in as the Legal Adviser to the Department of State on October 4, 1979. ■

Visit of Egyptian President Sadat

President Anwar al-Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt made an official visit to Washington, D.C., April 7–10, 1980, to meet with President Carter and other government officials. Following are an exchange of dinner toasts at the White House on April 8 and a White House statement issued on April 9.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, APR. 8, 1980[1]

President Carter

First of all, let me welcome everyone here. In our great country we have a lot to be thankful for. I won't take my entire time to describe the blessings that we have in the United States but one of the blessings that we have tonight is to have two very close friends to come and visit us, along with their family and their official family from Egypt. Sometimes when people walk into a home, there is an instant feeling of warmth and friendship and common purpose and even a degree of love. And that is the way we feel when the Sadats come to visit us at the White House.

That is not the only thing I am thankful for. Every day, when the election progresses through its long and torturous route, I am thankful that one man is not running against me in the United States. [Laughter, Applause] How would you like to run against Anwar Sadat for President of the United States? [Laughter] I would guess that he is possibly the most popular man not only in our country but in most parts of the world, because he has demonstrated in his own life in a unique and exemplary way statesmanship, understanding of others in a strong and compassionate and self-confident manner, and the epitome of political courage.

When he decided in his fashion to make an historic trip to Jerusalem, it transformed the attitude of the world. There was a shock that went through society in almost every nation on Earth and a thrill that one person could change instantly a discouraging and even debilitating deadlock which had given four wars in 30 years.

It is hard to think back now on those troubled times because so much has changed in the last 30 months—a time when Israel was hated and despised by almost all Arab governments, when no Arab leader had the temerity to even meet with or talk to or recognize diplomatically or acknowledge the right of Israel to exist, and President Sadat decided to change all that. And he was received with gratitude and friendship and with courage by Prime Minister Begin and the people of Israel.

A lot has happened since then, and the response has been extraordinary—an unprecedented achievement of an accord, an agreement, a mutual commitment between Israel and Egypt after 13 days of intense negotiations at Camp David when the limit of, I would say, human commitment and tenacity and perseverance and patience was tested, and we came out with a signed document that laid the groundwork for the future.[2]

I have reread this document lately, and it is filled not only with achievement but with promise. It would be inconceivable that we would let this promise slip from our grasp and end the hopes and the confidence and the aspirations of two troubled peoples and, indeed, the entire world with failure. It is inconceivable.

It is important for us to remember that peace between Israel and Egypt is not a threat to others. It is a possibility for the realization of the hopes of the Palestinians and the hopes of all Israel's neighbors and, indeed, all the nations of the Arab world to live in peace and to slowly but inevitably remove hatred from their hearts and to seek for common understanding. It is not easy. No one claims that it is easy. It hasn't been easy so far, but it is important.

The two countries have set May 26th as a goal date for the consummation of the expectations at Camp David, and I think we should not forget the promise that still exists in a live and vital way of success.

I just summarized on a piece of paper the elements—the basic elements—of the Camp David accords. It is a brief document. And I would hope that all of you might get a copy of it and just read it over because it is, indeed, extraordinary. It specifies that the U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 will be a basis for future negotiations in the relationships between Israel and all its neighbors. It expresses a firm commitment to the respect for the territory and the independence and



President Sadat and President Carter (White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)

officials, delegated authority to the Revolutionary Council, and, in general, exercised ultimate control over all important governmental decisions. To date the Ayatollah and his immediate colleagues have admittedly been operating as an interim government, but under the Constitution which was formally adopted in December 1979, the Ayatollah will continue to be the supreme authority in the political structure of Iran. Indeed, although Mr. Bani-Sadr has now been elected President, Principles 5, 107, and 110 of the Iranian Constitution expressly place the ultimate power to govern in the hands of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who is identified by name in the Constitution, and that constitutional arrangement will obviously continue in force even after the installation of a new legislature in April or May.

It should be emphasized additionally that the Ayatollah's role is not titular; as demonstrated by additional facts which I shall describe in a moment, the Ayatollah Khomeini enjoys ultimate power of decision over the entire governmental apparatus and over the so-called militant students who have been holding the American hostages in captivity for so long. Against that political background I should like now to turn to the autumn of 1979, when the story of this case begins.

Attack on the Embassy and the Iranian Government's Responsibility

Before describing what happened on 4 November 1979, the date of the actual seizure of the American Embassy, I should like to refer to two significant events which occurred before and after 4 November. The two dates involved are 1 November 1979 and 1 January 1980. The two dates have something in common: On each an Iranian mob threatened to attack a foreign embassy, and on each the Government of Iran took effective action and protected the embassy in question.

Let me begin with 1 November 1979. Four days previously the Ayatollah Khomeini had delivered an inflammatory speech saying, in effect, that all of the problems of Iran stemmed from America, and, in the next few days, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran heard rumors that a mass demonstration in the vicinity of the Embassy was planned for 1 November. On the morning of 1 November, the people in the Embassy took stock of the security situation and concluded that there were a sufficient number of Iranian police in the area to deal with the planned demonstration, and, in that conclusion, they were correct. At one point during the day, there were as many as 5,000 demonstrators marching back and forth in front of the Embassy, but the Chief of Police was present with adequate forces, and the government kept the entire situation under complete control. We think it is indisputable that on 1 November the Government of Iran recognized its duty to provide complete protection for the Embassy and all those within its walls, and on that day the government fulfilled its duty in a completely satisfactory way.

Exactly the same phenomenon occurred 2 months later, although a different embassy was involved. On 1 January 1980, a large mob physically attacked the Soviet [Tehran] Embassy in Tehran, [of the Soviet Union,] but, again, the security forces of the Iranian Government were on hand to prevent its seizure. Regrettably, those forces were unable to prevent the defilement of a Soviet flag, but the news films of the attack of 1 January, as well as the films of a second attack on the Soviet Embassy on 3 January, graphically portrayed the security forces of the Government of Iran protecting the Embassy premises. As I shall indicate in a moment, the events of 1 November and 1 and 3 January stand out in dramatic contrast with the events which began to unfold on 4 November 1979.

At this point in these proceedings the Court is certainly familiar with the story in general terms. It has been told in the Application which we filed on behalf of the United States [November 29, 1979], it was amplified in our Request for Interim Measures of Protection [November 29, 1979] and in the oral argument which we presented to the Court on 10 December, and it has been laid out in considerable detail in the Memorial which we submitted on 15 January. Nevertheless, I would like to touch briefly on some of the more important facts which have particular significance in the context of these proceedings on the merits.

First of all, the evidence makes clear that the Government of Iran, including the Ayatollah Khomeini, either knew or should have known in advance that the U.S. Embassy was going to be attacked by an organized group of people who claim to be university students. In the preceding days the Ayatollah had made a number of speeches calling for anti-American demonstrations, and the students have since publicly proclaimed that when they attacked the Embassy they were acting in response to the Ayatollah's call to "intensify their attacks against America."

Moreover, the students have recently revealed that prior to the attack they consulted with a man named Mosai Kho'ini, an official of the Iranian Government's broadcasting organization. They wanted to know whether the proposed attack would be consistent with the policy of the Ayatollah Khomeini, and he confirmed that it would. Moreover, Mr. Kho'ini then contacted Mr. Ghotbzadeh—then in charge of Iranian broadcasting and now the Foreign Minister of Iran—to urge him to support the attack when it occurred, and, as we know, that support was given. All of these facts are set forth in our Supplemental Documents Nos. 18 and 111. In addition, the son of the Ayatollah Khomeini has stated that before the attack, he was in touch with the attackers, although he has said that he did not know an attack would actually be made.

On 1 November, as I mentioned earlier, the police authorities were fully aware that in that period there was a very real danger that the current demonstrations in the Embassy area might lead to an attack, and the police had demonstrated through their actions of 1 November that they had the ability to deal with and thwart any such attack if they wished to do so. The simple fact is that on 4 November, when an attack actually occurred, they evidently made a deliberate choice *not* to do their duty.

On 4 November there was a demonstration of approximately 3,000 people in front of the American Embassy. The size of the crowd was not unmanageable; it was substantially smaller than the crowds of 5,000 and more than the Iranian security forces had previously demonstrated their ability to control. But, 4 November they evidently decided to stay out of the way. The relatively small group which carried out the assault on the American Embassy was hardly a formidable military force, and, yet, according to eyewitnesses, the Iranian security personnel stationed in the area simply "faded" from the scene. Since that was exactly the opposite of the conduct which they had displayed during the much larger demonstration 3 days before, it is hard to believe that their mysterious withdrawal resulted

from anything other than a deliberate political decision by their superiors.

Now, this last conclusion is supported by the dramatic events which followed. As soon as the attack began, responsible officials in the Embassy began to make repeated calls for help to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and all such calls were ignored. Responsible Iranian officials were certainly aware of the need for help. It happens that the American Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Bruce Laingen, was at the Foreign Ministry at the time of the attack, and he made repeated, urgent, and personal appeals to the Iranian Foreign Minister seeking government assistance. Although ample security forces were available, absolutely nothing was done to prevent the attack from going forward and succeeding.

Moreover, the deliberateness of the decision to allow, and indeed encourage, the attack is made clear by yet another significant event. It appears that, as a result of the repeated American requests for assistance, specific orders were actually given to an official security force known as the "Revolutionary Guards." According to a subsequent official statement, as reflected at page 85 of our Memorial, the Revolutionary Guards were actually ordered to proceed to the Embassy immediately, but, instead of being ordered to terminate the attack which was then going on or to clear the Embassy grounds of intruders, they apparently were ordered to protect the attackers. According to the statement to which I have just referred, the students later thanked the Revolutionary Guards for their support in taking possession of the Embassy.

All this makes it apparent that when the Embassy was seized and the captives taken, whether or not the Government of Iran had a role in actually planning the attack, the government was itself an active participant in the entire venture. The *de facto* chief of state incited the attack, the police authorities did nothing to prevent it, the Foreign Minister did not respond to calls for help, and the Revolutionary Guards provided protection for the Embassy attackers. As we will emphasize in later portions of our argument, it is difficult to imagine a course of conduct which more flagrantly violates uniformly recognized norms of international law.

The complicity of the Iranian Government in the operation has been shown again and again by that government's own subsequent conduct. Starting on the very day of the attack and continuing in the days and weeks that followed, a whole series of Iranian Government officials—from the Ayatollah Khomeini down through the governmental structure—have treated the invading militants as national heroes. On 4 November the Ayatollah telephoned the students to approve of their capture of the American diplomats, the Foreign Minister "endorsed" that action, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards pledged continuing support by his forces, the public prosecutor joined in, and—perhaps strangest of all—the *judiciary* expressly endorsed these plain violations of the law.

In connection with these official endorsements of the actions taken by the militant students, I suppose that it might conceivably be suggested that the Government of Iran felt powerless to prevent such violations of law and, therefore, should not be criticized too harshly for participating in and condoning this course of conduct. As a matter of law, of course, no such defense could be accepted, and it is also refuted by the *facts*. Indeed, refutation is to be found in an event which took place just 2 days after the seizure of the American Embassy.

On 6 November an Iranian mob seized the Consulate of Iraq in retaliation for an Iraqi seizure of an Iranian Consulate, but, within a matter of hours, the Ayatollah Khomeini had issued an order directing that the Iraqi Consulate be surrendered by the mob, and they obeyed by 5:00 p.m. These facts, which reemphasize the practical control exercised throughout this period by the Ayatollah Khomeini, are set forth at pages 203 and 204 of our Memorial. From 4 November down to the present day the Ayatollah has simply not chosen to exercise his power to free the hostages and clear the Embassy.

U.S. Reactions to the Seizure

Protests by the United States began to be heard by the Government of Iran from the moment of the inception of the attack. As I have mentioned earlier, the beginning of the attack prompted immediate calls for help from the senior U.S. official in Tehran, Mr. Laingen, who vigorously protested the government's failure to prevent the attack and demanded that the Government of Iran fulfill its duty to protect the Embassy and its personnel.

Moreover, as soon as it became apparent that the seizure of the Embassy and the American diplomats was more than temporary, the President of the United States summoned a former U.S. Attorney General, Mr. Ramsey Clark, to Washington and commissioned him a special emissary to travel to Iran and seek the release of the hostages. Mr. Clark's principal responsibility was to negotiate with the authorities in Tehran, and he set off for Iran on 7 November, stopping in Istanbul to change planes.

That was as far as he got. By the time Mr. Clark reached Istanbul, the Government of Iran, through the Ayatollah Khomeini and others, had stated very clearly that the hostages would not be released until the United States had fulfilled certain political demands, including particularly the extradition of the former Shah, who was then undergoing treatment for cancer in a New York hospital. On 7 November, when Mr. Clark had reached Istanbul, the Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed that discussions between the United States and Iran could not even begin until the Shah had been turned over to the Iranian authorities. Demonstrating his power in the official hierarchy in Iran, the Ayatollah forbade any official of the Government of Iran or of the Revolutionary Council to meet with Mr. Clark or any other U.S. envoy.

I need hardly remind the Court that under the U.N. Charter, all states, including Iran, have an obligation to seek to resolve disputes by peaceful means, including of course negotiation, and yet on 7 November, as reflected at page 204 of our Memorial, the Ayatollah decreed that there could be absolutely no negotiations with any American envoy until after the Shah had been extradited. Iran had, in effect, declared its intention to pursue its goal by coercion, the seizure of hostages, instead of by negotiation. According to a statement issued on 20 November by the Ayatollah's son, there were other elements within the Government of Iran who favored discussions with President Carter's special envoy, but that view was flatly rejected by the Ayatollah and he, after all, was and is the ultimate authority in Iran.

This is not to say that there were no conversations between Mr. Clark and the authorities of Tehran. As a matter of fact, while Mr. Clark was in

of the convention provides in the most explicit terms that "the person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable," that he shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention," and that "the receiving State shall treat him with due respect" and "take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom, or dignity." All of these principles constitute simply a codification of previously existing law. In addition, the 1961 convention added the principle that the same privileges and immunities should be enjoyed by the members of the administrative and technical staff of a diplomatic mission. The relevant provision of the 1961 Vienna convention is article 37.

With these fundamental principles in mind, it really requires no argumentation to demonstrate that on 4 November 1979, the Government of Iran embarked on a course of conduct which violated these principles in the most flagrant and indisputable way. At that time, with the assistance of the government's Revolutionary Guards, the so-called student followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini physically captured some 63 U.S. nationals and a number of non-Americans as well. In addition, three U.S. diplomats have been physically confined within the premises of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, bringing the total number of detained Americans up to 66 individuals. That total, of course, does not include the six additional Americans who were able to slip away from the Embassy at the time of the attack and achieve a safe refuge and eventual escape through the good offices of the Canadian Government. As to the 66 Americans who have actually been in captivity, all but two enjoyed diplomatic status either as agents or staff. The other two are an educator and a businessman who happen to have fallen into the hands of the student followers of the Ayatollah, and as to those two individuals we claim no personal immunity as such. On the other hand, as indicated in our Memorial, those two individuals, being present in the Embassy, were entitled to the immunities arising from their presence there, and as U.S. nationals within Iran they were separately entitled to receive "the most constant protection and security" under the treaty of amity between the United States and Iran.

Of the 64 persons who were and are entitled to diplomatic immunity 13 were released on 20 November pursuant to an order issued by the Ayatollah Khomeini. In that same order the Ayatollah commanded, in effect, that the remaining 51 diplomatic agents and staff be continued in confinement, and their confinement continues to this day. As I mentioned earlier, three of them, one of whom is the American Charge d'Affaires Mr. Bruce Laingen, are confined in the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and the other 48 are held by the so-called militant students

Direct Responsibility of the Iranian Government

As I noted yesterday, we think it is really beyond dispute that since 4 November all of the confined Americans have been under the continuous authority of the Ayatollah, to whom the student captors have repeatedly pledged their allegiance. On 17 November, when the Ayatollah directed that 13 be released and that the remainder be detained, the students obeyed with precision. A few weeks ago, when the President and the Foreign Minister sought to bring about the transfer of the hostages from the custody of the students to the custody of the government, the students quickly focused on the question whether the transfer had been ordered by the Ayatollah. They made claim that if the Ayatollah issued such an order for a transfer they would obey, but when he declined to do so they retained the hostages in their custody. It may be that some officials of the Islamic Republic would prefer that the hostages be released, but it is the will of the Ayatollah that has controlled to this day.

Under the circumstances, I respectfully submit, the Court has no real alternative but to attribute the conduct of the students to the Government of Iran. Time and again since 4 November officials of the Iranian Government have acknowledged that the students are acting on behalf of the state,[19] and the facts have been publicly recognized by nations throughout the world. We have reviewed the debates in the Security Council in December with respect to the responsibility of the Government of Iran in carrying out these violations of international law, and those debates, as well as the resulting resolution, make clear that all of those who participated were agreed on the responsibility of the Iranian Government itself.[20] As soon as the Ayatollah, the chief of state, decides that the hostages are to be released, they will be, but so long as he adheres to the belief that the detention of the hostages serves his political purposes, they will presumably remain in captivity.

It should be noted that in a very real sense this conduct on the part of the Iranian Government constitutes a retreat from the standards which Iran itself has endorsed for many years. In 1924, for example, an Iranian mob attacked and killed one Maj. Robert Imbrie, an American Vice Consul in Tehran, and the Persian Government immediately recognized that by failing to protect Maj. Imbrie it had violated an international legal obligation which it owed to the United States. At that time the government acknowledged its responsibility, agreed to pay an indemnity to the Major's widow, and initiated action to apprehend and punish the offenders. More than 50 years ago the Government of Iran recognized its legal responsibilities, but it has refused to do so today.

At a much earlier point in my presentation, I made mention of the fact that the conduct of the Iranian Government toward the hostages represents compound violations of international law, and the point, I think, is well illustrated by the Imbrie case to which I have just referred. Under the treaties upon which the United States relies, the Government of Iran has had a continuing obligation to protect U.S. nationals from seizure or other harm and to prevent such crimes from going forward, and this duty of protection and prevention arises under article 29 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, under articles 2 and 4 of the New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents, and under article II of the 1955 treaty of amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran. In other words, the conduct which we have described to the Court at such length has violated Iran's duties of protection and prevention under several different treaties and yet, I submit, that it would be a vast understatement to suggest that the Government of Iran is guilty of nothing more than a failure to protect the Americans and prevent the crimes. The most significant fact is that, far from merely failing to protect the individuals and prevent the crimes, the Iranian Government itself has participated in the seizure and in the commission of the crimes, thereby compounding the violations many times over. Where a policeman fails to prevent a kidnapping from taking place, he may be criticized at one level, but

where he affirmatively participates in the kidnapping, he is engaged in a far more flagrant violation of the law.

Conditions of Hostages' Captivity

At this point I would like to turn to a related, but somewhat different set of grievances stemming from the seizure of the hostages. It relates to the conditions under which these U.S. nationals have been held in captivity. It would be one thing if the Iranian Government had placed these individuals under house arrest and allowed them to continue to live in relatively humane conditions. Such conduct would, of course, have constituted a serious and totally unacceptable violation of international law, but it would not have been nearly as egregious as the conduct which has occurred in fact.

As I embark upon this aspect of the case, I should remind the Court that we do not, of course, have access to the 53 individuals who remain in captivity in Tehran today and, therefore, cannot furnish the Court with any very concrete information as to exactly the conditions under which these hostages have been existing for the past several months. On the other hand, the Court may also recall that on 20 November, 13 of the hostages were released, and those released hostages have provided the U.S. Government with detailed information as to the manner in which they were treated during the first 2½ weeks of their captivity. Affidavits containing such information are available for the Court's *in camera* inspection, if they are desired. Although there appears to have been some variation as among the treatment of different hostages, it is fair to say that the conditions which existed during the first 2½ weeks of incarceration were harsh. Without going into great detail I might simply give some examples of the kind of treatment meted out to these people in the early period of their confinement.

The female hostages were tied to straight chairs facing the wall and kept in that position for 16 hours a day. All windows were boarded up, and inside electric lights kept burning 24 hours a day, thus inhibiting sleep. The hostages were frequently blindfolded—the punishment for attempting to speak to another hostage or for disagreeing with one of the guards was to be blindfolded for many hours at a time. Hands were kept either bound or handcuffed at night, thus inhibiting sleep. Some hostages were required to sleep on the cold bare floor with their hands tied, without blankets or other amenities. In some cases changes of clothing were not permitted and a bath or shower was permitted only rarely. Several hostages were repeatedly threatened with guns and other weapons. On one occasion a student who was interrogating a woman hostage showed her his revolver to let her know that one of its several chambers was loaded and then proceeded to intimidate her by pointing the gun at her and repeatedly pulling the trigger. Happily, he stopped in time, but the experience must have been terrifying. The hostages have not been permitted to see newspapers or obtain news in any other fashion. We also know that on a number of occasions some of the hostages had been paraded blindfolded before hostile and chanting crowds. I submit that if one closes one's eyes and imagines the sort of terror that would necessarily be evoked by that treatment, one gets some inkling of what these people have been put through.

Despite repeated requests to allow contact between the hostages and their government, all such contact has been absolutely prohibited. On a few isolated occasions an outside observer has been allowed to see some of the hostages, presumably because such visits have served the interests of their captors. But the Secretary General of the United Nations was not allowed to see any of the hostages during his visit in late December and early January, and the U.N. commission was denied access to the hostages in the Embassy despite the prior assurances of the Iranian Government.

All of these actions, we submit, have constituted flagrant violations of the international legal obligations which the Iranian Government owes to the United States and to the hostages themselves.

Under article 26 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, all of the American diplomatic and consular officials have been continuously entitled to "freedom of movement and travel" within Iran and, under articles 27 and 35 of the same convention, they have been continuously entitled to free communication with their government.

All of those fundamental rights, which are absolutely essential to the performance of diplomatic and consular functions, have been totally denied for 4½ months. Instead of being left free to go about their diplomatic and consular duties, they have been confined like common criminals. As indicated during the Security Council's debate, particularly by the representative of Portugal, the Government of Iran has imposed upon these hostages, what that representative described as "an inexcusable form of cruel and inhuman treatment."

I think it is striking, incidentally, that at the beginning of the Second World War, when the Axis and Allied Powers went to war against one another, the practice of each government was to politely escort the diplomatic agents of the enemy out of the country or intern them in comfortable quarters pending exchange, whereas here the Iranian Government, with which the United States is not at war, has subjected our people to harsh confinement.

Moreover, over and above the other severe aspects of this confinement, it is apparent that some or all of these individuals have been subjected to grueling interrogation under conditions which by definition constitute coercion—as illustrated, for example, by the woman who was so alarmingly interrogated at the point of a loaded revolver.

Apparently, the Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers have been hoping to find evidence that some of these hostages are, to use their words, "spies" and have permitted coercive interrogation for that purpose. All of this has been done under the auspices of the Ayatollah who explicitly stated on 18 November, as indicated at page 215 of our Memorial, that his student followers were properly carrying on these so-called investigations. The Ayatollah declared as follows: "What our nation has done is to arrest a bunch of spies who, according to the norms, should be investigated, tried, and treated in accordance with our own laws."

Needless to say, this treatment of the hostages constitutes an independent and gross violation of international law. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides in the most straightforward terms that every diplomatic agent "shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State" and that he shall not be "obliged to give evidence as a witness." If the clear terms of the convention preclude interrogation of these Americans in an official courtroom of Iran, *a fortiori* the convention precludes interrogation behind closed doors under hostile and coercive conditions as apparently endorsed by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Again, it is dif-

presented to the commission before it departed from Tehran.

Question of Applicability of Consular Convention

First, Judge Oda has asked whether there are any personnel among the hostages to whom the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations alone applies. Our answer is that all of the U.S. consular personnel involved were serving in a diplomatic mission on 4 November, with the result that under article 70 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations—to which Judge Oda has referred—all such consular personnel were and are entitled to exactly the same privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by diplomatic agents under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In short, there are no personnel among the hostages to whom the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations alone applies.

Judge Oda's first question also inquired as to the significance which the United States attaches to article 70 of the consular convention. The significance is exactly that implied by Judge Oda—that all of the diplomatic and consular agents held captive in Tehran are entitled to the same privileges and immunities; namely, the privileges and immunities conferred by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Question of U.S. Consulates

In his second question Judge Oda has pointed out that at page 60 of the U.S. Memorial we set forth our then current knowledge of the status of the U.S. Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz, whose operations were suspended in February 1979. Judge Oda has asked the United States to supply any available information as to what has happened to these Consulates from February 1979 onwards, and I am afraid that we are not in a position to add very much to the facts which were set forth in the Memorial. All that I can add is to say that from February 1979 until the seizure of these Consulates in November 1979, the premises were under the custodial care of local employees. In November, of course, both of the Consulates were seized, and the United States has no information as to the status of the properties since that time.

As his third and final question Judge Oda has inquired whether it is the contention of the United States, in so far as the Tabriz and Shiraz Consulates are concerned, that Iran has an obligation to do anything more than protect the consular premises. As an example, Judge Oda has asked whether we contend that Iran has an obligation to accord full facilities for the operation of these two consulates.

I should point out that up until the present time, at any rate, Iran has evidently desired to maintain consular relations with the United States. Iran currently operates four consulates in the United States, located in Houston, San Francisco, Chicago, and New York City. To the extent that Iran wishes to continue such relations, it has an obligation to afford the United States full facilities, on a reciprocal basis, for the operation of our corresponding consular posts in Iran. In these proceedings we are not contending that Iran has an obligation to maintain consular relations between the two countries, but, so long as consular relations exist, Iran must accord us full consular facilities and the immunities that follow therefrom.

Question of Exceptions to Diplomatic Immunity

Turning to your own question, I shall be pleased to attempt the further clarification you have requested of our views concerning exceptions to the obligations normally owed a diplomatic mission. You have asked specifically if the receiving state, convinced of unlawful activity on its territory by the sending state's diplomatic mission or other services, may, by reason of sanction, necessity, or self-defense, depart from the obligations normally incumbent upon it with respect to diplomatic and consular relations.

First, let me say that such exceptions to the general rule of inviolability as have been discussed in the International Law Commission and elsewhere relate to the right of an individual—such as an individual police officer—to defend himself against an actual assault or similar action by a diplomatic agent. As I said in my answer to your earlier question, even such very limited exceptions are controversial and, of course, can have no conceivable application to the present case.

On the other hand, your question may refer to self-defense in a different sense; that is, the state's inherent right to self-defense, as confirmed in article 51 of the U.N. Charter. I would observe that the right of self-defense is emphatically not a right to act lawlessly. The state, when it acts in the exercise of its right of self-defense or on the basis of the ultimate necessities of national existence, does not operate in a realm beyond the reach of international law. The law of armed conflict—with which, of course, the Court is familiar—embodies a whole host of restraints upon state conduct, even in the most compelling of circumstances. We think it most significant that the taking of hostages is absolutely proscribed, even in armed conflict. Moreover, authorities from Grotius to Lauterpacht agree that if a state like Iran feels itself injured by another, some form of reprisals may be appropriate, but reprisals against the diplomats of the offending state, either as individuals or as a mission, are absolutely prohibited. The necessity for continuing respect for diplomatic inviolability, even in time of war, is crystallized in article 44 of the Vienna convention, which obligates a receiving state to permit and facilitate the departure of diplomats representing a country with which that state is at war. Indeed, if Iran were now at war with the United States, it would have a clear obligation, under article 45 of the convention, to "respect and protect the United States Embassy."

Finally I should note that if Iran at any time had felt that its supreme security interests so required, it could, of course, have compelled all U.S. diplomatic personnel to depart from Iran on a wholesale basis, but I submit that there can be no possible legal justification for what it did in fact on 4 November 1979.

Question of Mandate of U.N. Commission

Finally, Judge Gros has inquired as to the grievances which, according to the understanding of the U.S. Government, Iran may bring before the U.N. commission.

First, I would point out that the commission has suspended its operations for the time being. Assuming, however, that the commission resumes its work, the Secretary General has declared that the commission's function will be to hear whatever grievances Iran may wish to bring before it. That is to say, the commission would receive whatever lawfully obtained information the Iranians wanted to present to the commission and, thereafter, the commission would report on the basis of that information. I should emphasize, however, that the commission is not to be a tribunal which would reach conclu-

sions which would be binding either on Iran or on the United States.

I wish to make one further observation on the subject. In this case the United States has advanced very specific claims against Iran, and this Court, I submit, has a duty to decide whether those claims are valid. If Iran harbors any alleged grievances which it considers to constitute some sort of defense against the claims of the United States, it has been afforded every opportunity to bring those defenses before this Court. The fact is that Iran has presented no defenses or counterclaims here, and for that reason I respectfully submit that the Court cannot properly concern itself with any grievances or allegations which may have been voiced by Iran elsewhere.

In concluding my observations on Judge Gros' question I should like again to refer the Court to Judge Lachs' opinion in the *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf* case and to the Court's opinion in the *ICAO Council* case. Judge Lachs, quite properly in our view, pointed out that "notwithstanding the interdependence of issues some may be isolated, given priority, and their solution sought in a separate form." While Iran contends that its grievances, whatever they may be, are interconnected with the claims of the United States before this Court, a contention that the United States has not accepted, Iran has chosen, to use Judge Lachs' phrase, to isolate those grievances from these proceedings and to air them before a separate body, namely, the U.N. commission. But that choice—Iran's choice—not to utilize the processes of this Court cannot constitute an obstacle to the Court's consideration of the claims of the United States over which the Court assuredly has jurisdiction. It would be extraordinary, to say the least, to adopt a rule which permits a respondent state to frustrate resort to this Court merely by referring to generalized and entirely hypothetical defenses or counterclaims which it refuses to present as such to the Court and which it intends to handle instead through an entirely nonjudicial hearing before some other forum. To quote the Court in the *ICAO Council* case:

> The competence of the Court must depend on the character of the dispute submitted to it and on the issues thus raised, not on those defenses on the merits or other considerations which become relevant only after the jurisdictional issues have been settled.

This rule, we submit, applies *a fortiori* when the respondent has not even appeared in order to present such potential defenses or other considerations for which it is openly seeking consideration elsewhere.

Conclusion of Argument

On behalf of the U.S. Government I believe that I have now submitted an answer to every question which has been propounded by the Court and I would propose now to conclude the presentation of the U.S. Government.

In doing so I would hark back to 10 December, at which time the Court was considering the U.S. request for an indication of provisional measures, and I took the liberty of urging the Court to act on that request with the maximum possible expedition. I emphasized that at that time more than 50 American lives were in imminent peril and that it was critically important to those individuals, as well as the world community and the rule of law, that the judicial function be performed as quickly as possible. The U.S. Government is grateful to the Court for its action in responding to that appeal and granting the requested relief just 5 days after the request was heard.

I hope that the Court will recall also that in the days immediately following the Court's order of 15 December the United States pressed forward with this case as rapidly as possible. We filed our Memorial on 15 January, well ahead of the schedule that would be followed in a normal case. Moreover, it was our hope at that time that the Iranian Government would file a counter-memorial on 18 February, in accordance with the orders of the Court, in order that the parties could come to grips with the dispute between them. In mid-February we were still anxious to proceed with this case as rapidly as possible.

In one of his questions, Judge Morozov has pointed out that on 19 February we found it necessary to ask this Court for a brief postponement of any further oral hearings. The reason, as I have explained, was that the Secretary General's appointment of the U.N. commission had raised the hope that when the commission had heard Iran's grievances the Government of Iran would decide to release the hostages, and we were concerned that if we appeared before the Court and made strong charges against Iran, as we have in these past 3 days, the confinement of the hostages might be unnecessarily continued. I want to assure the Court, however, that throughout the entire period the United States has been determined to press the case forward just as rapidly as it could, consistent with the welfare of the Americans who are in captivity in Tehran.

As you know, our tenuous hopes for a quick release of the hostages in February were shattered in early March when the U.N. commission found itself unable to pursue its mission. In short, the situation today is very different than it was when we

REFERENCES

Throughout his oral argument, Mr. Owen referred to several documents which were printed in earlier issues of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN.

Issue of January 1980

U.S. Application to the ICJ, p. 38.
Request for Interim Measures of Protection, p. 40.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 457 of Dec. 4, 1979, p. 51.

Issue of February 1980

Oral argument before the ICJ by Attorney General Civiletti and Department of State Legal Adviser Owen on Dec. 10, 1979, p. 41.
Text of the Court order of Dec. 15, 1979, p. 49. U.N. Security Council Resolution 461 of Dec. 31, 1979, p. 68.

Issue of March 1980

Announcement of January 15, 1980, that the United States had filed its Memorial with the ICJ, p. 60.

Issue of April 1980

White House statement of February 20, 1980, concerning the establishment of the U.N. commission of inquiry, p. 47.

In addition, a monthly chronology of events concerning Iran from November 1979 through February 1980 is printed in the above issues of the BULLETIN. ■

with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 8249.
Ratification deposited: Israel, Dec. 18, 1979.

Containers
International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037.
Ratification deposited: Poland, Jan. 14, 1980.
Accessions deposited: Australia, Feb. 22, 1980; Italy, Oct. 31, 1979.

Cultural Property
Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export, and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris Nov. 14, 1970, at the 16th session of the UNESCO general conference. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1972.[2]
Ratification deposited: Cuba, Jan. 30, 1980.[3]

Cultural Relations
Constitution of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Concluded at London Nov. 16, 1945. Entered into force Nov. 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.
Acceptances deposited: Botswana, Sept. 24, 1979; Equatorial Guinea, Nov. 29, 1979; Sao Tome and Principe, Jan. 22, 1980.

Diplomatic Relations
Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.
Accession deposited: Burma, Mar. 7, 1980.

Human Rights
International covenant on civil and political rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.[2]
Accession deposited: Nicaragua, Mar. 12, 1980.

International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.[2]
Accession deposited: Nicaragua, Mar. 12, 1980.

Labor
Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Adopted at Montreal Oct. 9, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 20, 1948; reentered into force for the U.S. Feb. 18, 1980. TIAS 1868.
Readmission: U.S., Feb. 18, 1980.

Law
Statute of the International Institute for the unification of private law. Done at Rome Mar. 15, 1940. Entered into force Apr. 21, 1940; for the U.S. Mar. 13, 1964. TIAS 5743.
Acceptance deposited: Tunisia, Jan. 1, 1980.

Load Lines
International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London Apr. 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629.
Accessions deposited: Qatar, Jan. 31, 1980; Samoa, Oct. 23, 1979.

Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331), relating to amendments to the convention. Adopted at London Nov. 12, 1975.[1]
Acceptance deposited: German Democratic Republic, Feb. 21, 1980.

Maritime Matters
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptances deposited: Benin, Mar. 19, 1980; United Arab Emirates, Mar. 4, 1980.

Amendments to Articles 17 and 18 of the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044). Done at London Sept. 15, 1964. Entered into force Oct. 6, 1967. TIAS 6285.
Acceptance deposited: Benin, Mar. 19, 1980.

Amendment to Article 28 of the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285). Done at Paris Sept. 28, 1965. Entered into force Nov. 3, 1968. TIAS 6490.
Acceptance deposited: Benin, Mar. 19, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Done at London Oct. 17, 1974. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1978. TIAS 8606.
Acceptance deposited: Burma, Jan. 29, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Done at London Nov. 14, 1975.[1]
Acceptances deposited: Bulgaria, Mar. 4, 1980; Burma, Jan. 29, 1980; Ghana, Feb. 5, 1980; Maldives, Feb. 25, 1980; Portugal, Mar. 3, 1980; United Arab Emirates, Mar. 4, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Done at London Nov. 17, 1977.[1]
Acceptances deposited: Bulgaria, Mar. 4, 1980; German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Feb. 5, 1980; Liberia, Dec. 14, 1979; Maldives, Feb. 25, 1980.

Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London Apr. 9, 1965. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1967; for the U.S. May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251.
Acceptance deposited: Argentina, Jan. 29, 1980.

Meteorology
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11, 1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Fiji, Mar. 18, 1980.

Nuclear Material
Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Oct. 26, 1979. Open for signature at Vienna and New York Mar. 3, 1980. Enters into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the 21st instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval.
Signature: Dominican Republic, U.S., Mar. 3, 1980.

Oil Pollution
International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes, as amended. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the U.S. Dec. 8, 1961. TIAS 4900, 6109, 8505.
Acceptances deposited: German Democratic Republic, Jan. 25, 1979;[3,4] Republic of Korea, July 31, 1978; Qatar, Jan. 31, 1980.

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.[2]
Accession deposited: China, Jan. 30, 1980.

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068.
Ratification deposited: Portugal, Feb. 15, 1980.

Patents—Microorganisms
Budapest treaty on the international recognition of the deposit of microorganisms for the purposes of patent procedure, with regulations. Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977.[1]
Ratification deposited: France, Feb. 21, 1980.

Pollution
Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.
Ratification deposited: Portugal, Apr. 14, 1978.
Accessions deposited: Papua New Guinea, Mar. 10, 1980; South Africa, Aug. 7, 1978.

Property—Industrial
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, as re-

vised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1–12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. Articles 13–30 entered into force Apr. 26, 1970, for the U.S. Sept. 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization of deposit of accession: Korea, Feb. 4, 1980.

Trademark registration treaty, with regulations. Done at Vienna June 12, 1973.
Accession deposited: U.S.S.R., Feb. 7, 1980.[3,4]
Enters into force: Aug. 7, 1980.

Property—Intellectual
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm, July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Accession deposited: Colombia, Feb. 4, 1980.

Publications
Statutes of the international center for the registration of serial publications. Done at Paris Nov. 14, 1974, and amended Oct. 11 and 12, 1976. Entered into force Jan. 21, 1976; for the U.S. Mar. 31, 1978 (provisionally).
Accession deposited: Senegal, July 12, 1979.

Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted at New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.[2]
Ratification deposited: Gabon, Feb. 29, 1980.

Refugees
Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.
Accessions deposited: Colombia, Mar. 4, 1980; Liberia, Feb. 27, 1980.

Rubber
International natural rubber agreement, 1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Enters into force Oct. 1, 1980, provided certain conditions have been met.
Signatures: France, U.S., Jan. 8, 1980; Indonesia, Mar. 17, 1980; Malaysia, Jan. 28, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Malaysia, Jan. 29, 1980.[4]

Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.
Acceptances deposited: Qatar, Jan. 31, 1980; Samoa, Oct. 23, 1979; Yemen (Sana), Mar. 9, 1979.
Notification of denunciation: Argentina, Dec. 5, 1979, effective Dec. 5, 1980.
International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Enters into force May 25, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Jan. 28, 1980.
Ratifications deposited: Argentina, Dec. 5, 1979; China, Jan. 7, 1980.
Acceptance deposited: U.S.S.R., Jan. 9, 1980.
Approval deposited: Hungary, Jan. 9, 1980.
Accession deposited: Peru, Dec. 4, 1979.

Space
Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Done at New York Jan. 14, 1975. Entered into force Sept. 15, 1976. TIAS 8480.
Ratification deposited: Austria, Mar. 6, 1980.

Sugar
International sugar agreement, 1977, with annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978, definitively Jan. 2, 1980.
Ratifications deposited: Dominican Republic, Mar. 19, 1980; Indonesia, Feb. 27, 1980.

Telecommunications
Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for the planning of the broadcasting-satellite service in frequency bands 11.7–12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3) and 11.7–12.5 GHz (in Region 1), with annexes. Done at Geneva Feb. 13, 1977. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1979.[2]
Approvals deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, Jan. 3, 1980;[5] Paraguay, July 10, 1979.

Terrorism
International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 19, 1979.[1]
Signatures: Greece, Mar. 18, 1980; Sweden, Feb. 25, 1980.

Trade
International dairy arrangement. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9623.
Acceptance deposited: Australia, Feb. 1, 1980.

Transportation
Agreement on the international carriage of perishable foodstuffs and on the special equipment to be used for such carriage (ATP), with annexes. Done at Geneva Sept. 1, 1970. Entered into force Nov. 21, 1976.[2]
Senate advice and consent to accession: Mar. 20, 1980.

UNIDO
Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.[1]
Signatures: Australia, Mar. 3, 1980; Iraq, Feb. 26, 1980; Ivory Coast, Feb. 21, 1980; Laos, Mar. 5, 1980.

Wheat
Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, Mar. 12, 1980.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, Mar. 12, 1980.

World Heritage
Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226.
Acceptance deposited: Nicaragua, Dec. 17, 1979.
Ratification deposited: Haiti, Jan. 18, 1980.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Aug. 2, 1978 (TIAS 9389), with agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca Mar. 7, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 7, 1980.

Bolivia
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of May 31, 1978 (TIAS 9518). Effected by exchange of letters at La Paz Feb. 28, 1980. Entered into force Feb. 28, 1980.

Dominican Republic
Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 7 and 8, 1979 (TIAS 9454), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Mar. 5 and 7, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 7, 1980.

Finland
Extradition treaty. Signed at Helsinki June 11, 1976. Enters into force May 11, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Mar. 4, 1980.

Japan
Treaty on extradition, with exchange of notes. Signed at Tokyo Mar. 3, 1978. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Mar. 4, 1980.

Mexico
Agreement relating to tariff concessions.

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Secretary Muskie

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EDMUND S. MUSKIE
Secretary of State

HODDING CARTER III
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor

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EDITOR'S NOTE

The statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 27, 1980, printed in the May BULLETIN on page 16, was by Secretary Vance, not Secretary Muskie. We regret if the introductory paragraph may have caused any confusion to our readers.

SPECIAL (See Center Section)

Secretary Muskie's News Conference of May 20

approached them I had some trepidation, but in every instance they reached their arms out for me and we embraced each other, and I could feel that their concern was about me, not about them. And they made the comment to me, "God bless you, Mr. President. We'll pray for you, Mr. President. And we are proud of our son or our husband who was willing to give his life for our country and for freedom."

Our commitment to a world that represents human rights has been heard by all people, by free people and also by those who do not know the meaning of freedom. The eagerness of large numbers of Cubans, for instance, to flee their own country is eloquent testimony to the failure of the totalitarian Castro regime.

We must insure that the Cubans who arrive in the United States and the Haitians who arrive in the United States will be treated with all the humanity and the compassion which we've extended to other groups and which we extend to each other. Every family probably in this room, which came to our country, came here as immigrants, sometimes as refugees. And we should not be callous to those who come in our present day and age under the same or even more difficult circumstances. In order to bring an end to the suffering and the death on the high seas and to permit us to best allocate scarce Federal resources, the process of bringing in these refugees must be orderly, and it must be in accordance with our laws.

We're working vigorously yesterday and today with 16 nations and with international organizations, at a conference on refugees in Costa Rica, to develop alternatives that will permit a safe and orderly evacuation of the Cubans who are seeking to leave. For ourselves, we will give highest priority to family reunifications, and we prefer, of course, prescreening in Cuba or in a third country, such as Costa Rica. Let me emphasize again that we treat those seeking asylum and those who are refugees from Cuba, from Haiti, and from other countries, equally on a case-by-case basis as is required by American law.

And finally I'd like to say to you that America's foreign policy must always reflect the kind of people we are. We are a strong people, we are a caring people. We care about human rights, we care about decent living standards, we care about the independence of nations, and we care about the rights of individual human beings. We have a sober, responsible recognition that American power is especially important in a turbulent world where others depend upon us for their safety and for their freedom. Our interests and our ideals serve each other. Our power must be used in the service of both interests and ideals.

The course I have mapped to you today in this brief outline form is neither simple nor easy, but it's a sound course, the safe course which we must pursue. Our foreign policy deserves your understanding and your support, not only for our nation's own security but in order that people everywhere can be certain of America's commitment to use its vast power with a clear, firm, steady purpose: to seek for all humankind what we have —a future of progress, of freedom, and of peace.

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[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 19, 1980, which also contains the transcript of the question-and-answer session held following the address. ■

News Conference of April 29 (Excerpts)

Before answering questions this evening, I would like to say a few words about the rescue mission in Iran. I share the disappointment of the American people that this rescue mission was not successful, and I also share the grief of our nation because we had Americans who were casualties in this effort to seek freedom for their fellow citizens who have been held hostage for so long.

But I also share a deep pride in the commitment and courage and the integrity and the competence and the determination of those who went on this mission. They were prepared to do their duty, and they did their duty. I can think of no higher compliment for a Commander in Chief to pay to brave men.

It was my responsibility as President to launch this mission. It was my responsibility to terminate the mission when it ended. This was a decision that was shared completely by the field commander in charge of the rescue team and by the officer in charge of the overall force that was involved in the rescue effort.

There is a deeper failure than that of incomplete success, and that is the failure to attempt a worthy effort, a failure to try. This is a sentiment shared by the men who went on the mission. Sunday I met with a large group of men who were the core of this effort, and yesterday I visited in the San Antonio area the five men who were most seriously wounded.

They all shared a common message to me and to the American people. The first message was one of regret—deep regret—that they failed to carry out the mission as planned. The second one was an expression of thanks to me for giving them the honor to attempt to deliver to freedom the American hostages. And the third was a request expressed almost unanimously by them to be permitted to try again.

Our nation does face serious challenges, serious problems. And the meeting of those challenges and the solution of those problems require sacrifice. Sometimes we, who are safe, consider the sacrifices to be onerous, but I forgot those sacrifices when I looked into the face of these men who are not only willing but eager to give their lives as a sacrifice for others whom they did not know personally, but in a determination to grant freedom to them.

Our goal in Iran is not to conquer; neither was theirs. Their goal was not to destroy nor to injure anyone. As they left Iran, following an unpredictable accident during the withdrawal stage with eight of their fellow warriors dead, they carefully released, without harm, 44 Iranians who had passed by the site and who were detained to protect the integrity of the mission. This is in sharp comparison to the ghoulish action of the terrorists and some of the government officials in Iran in our Embassy this weekend who displayed, in a horrible exhibition of inhumanity, the bodies of our courageous Americans. This has aroused the disgust and contempt of the rest of the world and indicates quite clearly the kinds of people with whom we have been dealing in a peaceful effort to secure a resolution of this crisis. They did not bring shame and dishonor on those fallen Americans. They brought shame and dishonor on themselves.

We will continue to try for a peaceful solution. As we see the consequences of the actions that we've already taken, economic and diplomatic actions continue to punish Iran, a nation that is suffering from economic deprivation and from political fragmentation because they persist in this inhuman act.

We will not forget our hostages and we will continue to take whatever steps are necessary and feasible to secure their safe release and their return to their homes and to freedom.

Q. Would you consider an early summit meeting with your principal allies who seem to seek some reassurance about the basic thrust of your foreign policy, and I'm talking about a meeting prior to the Venice summit in June?

A. No. I see no need for this. There is no doubt among our allies about our basic foreign policy, nor have they indicated any such doubt to me. I'm sure of that. When we do meet in Venice in June the primary purpose of this annual meeting is to discuss economic matters—energy, inflation, unemployment, the development of our common resources, and a better life for our people. But we have an adequate time for political discussions and for discussions about diplomatic matters, and I see no urgency nor need to meet prior to that time.

Q. After so many months of restraint, why did you undertake a mission that involved—endangered so many lives, a mission that you said was not feasible all along? And, with all due respect, has national pride taken precedence over the safety of the hostages, that is the need to end this problem?

A. No. I think the time that we chose was a proper time. We devoted those months of our hostages' incarceration to repeated and varied diplomatic efforts directly and through intermediaries, through the United Nations, through our friends, and others. We were promised repeatedly by Iranian officials, by the president and prime ministers, foreign minister, by a unanimous vote of the Revolutionary Council, even by the terrorists themselves that the hostages would indeed be released by the terrorists and turned over to control of the government at which time further steps could be taken to secure their complete release and their return home.

Beginning back in November, when the hostages were first taken, we began preparations for a rescue mission which would have had to be undertaken had the hostages been injured in any way. At the time we began final plans for this particular rescue mission, we had concluded repeated exercises and training of both men and equipment and technique and procedure and had honed it down to a fine operation which everyone believed had a good chance for success.

Had we waited later it would have been much more difficult to conclude the mission successfully because of the increasingly short nights and because of the prevailing winds being likely to change, making strong headwinds against our planes and helicopters, and because the temperature of the air made it more difficult to lift large loads required in this long and very complicated process.

So we exhausted every peaceful procedure, we waited until the proper moment. We could not logically have waited much longer, and I think the decision was made properly.

Q. This is from the side that says you went too far: What were the odds on the success of the mission? And then the second question, that you didn't go far enough: Why didn't you press ahead with only five helicopters, overrule the guy on the ground?

A. I think the mission had to be planned with an optimum number of both men and with the equipment they required in order to insure secrecy, incisiveness, staying on a very rigid schedule, accommodating unforeseen circumstances. And at the time the mission was terminated, we did it with great regret. There had been a prior understanding among all of us involved in the detailed planning that if we got below six functioning helicopters the mission to actually go in for the rescue attempt would have been very doubtful of success and ill-conceived.

The recommendation came back from the refueling operation in the desert area that since they were down to only five helicopters that the mission should not be undertaken, the actual rescue attempt. The commanding officer of the entire operation agreed, made this recommendation to me, and I agreed myself. The people who were on the ground in charge of the rescue team were extremely eager, courageous, dedicated, and determined to succeed. When they recommended that it not be done, that was a major factor in my decision, but I made the final decision.

Q. You said a great nation like the United States can be forgiving of its enemies without losing face or bringing insult on itself.

A. Yes.

Q. In view of the painful bloodshed and loss of life suffered by so many Iranian people under the Pahlavi rule, by the 53 hostages and their families, and now by the families of the American soldiers killed in the rescue attempt, isn't there some honorable way that the mutual sorrow of the Iranian people and now the American people can resolve this crisis without further confrontation? Can you now, will you now, make a gesture to the people of Iran so that the bloodshed and suffering can be put behind after 27 years?

A. It's important for American people and for all the world to realize the tremendous restraint that we have demonstrated. We have tried every possible and feasible effort to resolve this crisis by humanitarian and peaceful means. We are still continuing those efforts.

The fact is, though, that a horrible crime, as measured by international law, by diplomatic custom, and against humanity itself, is being perpetrated at this very minute. The 53 hostages being held are not guilty of any crime. The crime is being committed by terrorists who are kidnapping innocent victims, sponsored by and approved by government officials themselves. In two votes in the Security Council of the United Nations, unanimous votes, Iran was condemned for this action. And in the International Court of Justice, that decision was confirmed.

We have nothing against the Iranian people, and we still want to see this issue resolved successfully and peacefully, but there is no guilt that I feel on behalf of our nation for what occurs in Iran. We were very careful on this particular operation to cause no harm or injury or death to any Iranians.

It is a very troubling thing for me that Americans, because of an accident, did lose their lives and were injured. They were not met by any Iranian forces. No Iranian officials discovered the presence of the American rescue team until several hours after the last one had left Iranian soil.

So we want this issue to be settled, but we cannot deal with inhumane people who have no respect for international law, who violate the tenets of their own religion, and who persecute innocent people who are American citizens and deprive them of their freedom for 6 months. There is no equality about it at all.

We are eager to see this issue resolved, but Iran is the nation which is committing a crime. We have tried to settle this in accordance with international law and peacefully, and we will continue to do so.

Q. You have noted that Iranian leaders joined in the desecration of the bodies of American servicemen.

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Do you think that this will affect our negotiations to try to free the hostages, and what effect do you think it will have?

ficult to think of a more gross violation of international law than locking up diplomatic envoys and subjecting them to this kind of treatment. As the Court recognized in the provisional measures which it indicated on 15 December, it seems clear that for the past 4½ months the Government of Iran has been subjecting the American hostages in Tehran to, what the Court described as "privation, hardship, anguish, and even danger to life and health."

It should be noted that even if all of the 53 Americans still in captivity in Tehran were ordinary U.S. nationals, as contrasted with diplomatic agents and staff, the treatment which has been meted out to them by the Iranian Government would, nonetheless, be far below the minimum standard of treatment which is due to *all* aliens, particularly as viewed in the light of fundamental standards of human rights. Paragraph 1 of article II of the 1955 treaty of amity between the United States and Iran explicitly requires Iran to provide reasonable and humane treatment in every respect to U.S. nationals in Iranian custody, together with the most constant protection and security. The right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention and interrogation and the right to be treated in a humane and dignified fashion are surely rights guaranteed to these individuals by fundamental concepts of international law. Indeed, nothing less is required by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Allegations of Espionage

As I indicated a moment ago, at various times during the last 4½ months the Iranian Government has attempted to justify its treatment of the American hostages by asserting that some of the hostages are spies who have violated the laws of Iran and who, therefore, may be treated as common criminals.

Yesterday Judge Gros posed three questions about such allegations, and perhaps this is an appropriate point for me to provide the answers.

He asked whether, in any diplomatic exchanges prior to 4 November 1979, the Government of Iran voiced criticisms to the effect that the U.S. diplomatic and consular personnel in Iran had engaged in espionage or other unlawful actions against the Government of Iran. The answer is that on several occasions during that period representatives of the Iranian Government suggested to American officials in very general terms that the United States was somehow engaged in some sort of conspiracies or subversive actions against the new Iranian Government, but on each of those occasions the American representatives unequivocally denied the charges and asked the Government of Iran to produce any evidence that it might have to support its allegations. At no time did any Iranian official respond to these requests by presenting any evidence or other material bearing on any alleged conspiracy or acts of subversion attributable to the United States.

Moreover, I should emphasize that none of the generalized suggestions made by the Iranian officials related to any of the diplomatic or consular staff in Iran. At no time during the period involved did the Iranian Government raise any question about the propriety of any activities of the American Embassy in Tehran. In response to Judge Gros' question whether the Iranian authorities ever indicated an intention to declare any member of the U.S. diplomatic or consular staff *persona non grata*, or "unacceptable," the answer is that they did not.

Next, Judge Gros has referred to the repeated suggestion, as advanced by the Ayatollah Khomeini and others, that the American Embassy in Tehran was not really a proper diplomatic mission but instead a "den of espionage." The response of the United States is that the charge is untrue; the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was a normal diplomatic mission operating as such missions normally do.

In response to Judge Gros' further question whether the United States was involved in sabotage operations in Kurdistan or Khuzestan, or had plans of intervention in Iran, the answer is no.

Apart from the answers which I have just given, I should also make clear that for at least two reasons, the Iranian allegations of spying, which have been advanced in an effort to justify the seizure of the Embassy, cannot properly enter into this Court's decisionmaking process in any way at all. In the first place, those Iranians most closely associated with the spy charges apparently do not appreciate the fact that the collection and transmission of information about the host country is one of the most fundamental functions that diplomatic agents are expected to perform. I have no doubt that when the U.S. Embassy was operating in Tehran there was a flow of information about Iran from that Embassy to the State Department in Washington and that there is today a flow of information about the United States from the Iranian Embassy in Washington to the Iranian Foreign Ministry in Tehran. Such activity obviously is normal and proper as confirmed by the fact that article 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations explicitly lists such activities as a normal part of diplomatic agents' functions.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, even if there had been some so-called spying on the part of one or more of the hostages, proof to that effect would, nevertheless, be absolutely irrelevant to the present proceedings. Long-established principles of international law and long-established state practice make clear that if a diplomatic or consular agent engages in espionage or other unlawful conduct directed against the receiving state, that does not give the receiving state the right to arrest him or interrogate him or subject him to any other aspect of the criminal prosecution process. Under article 31 of the diplomatic convention it is clear that every such agent enjoys complete immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state, no matter how displeased that state may be with particular conduct. This is not to say, of course, that the receiving state is without a remedy. Obviously, it has the right at any time and for any reason to declare a diplomatic agent *persona non grata* and thus, in effect, bring about his expulsion from the country.

Exactly that remedy has been continuously available to the Government of Iran if it was dissatisfied in any way with the conduct of any of the U.S. diplomatic and consular personnel. But instead of invoking the only lawful remedy available to it, the Iranian Government chose instead the flagrantly unlawful alternative of seizing the diplomatic agents and confining them for months on end in harsh and inhumane conditions. There is no possible way, I submit, that that conduct can be justified.

Threat of Trials

Before I leave the subject of the treatment of the hostages, I should mention one additional problem which, though it has not actually come into existence as yet, constitutes a potential threat in the future. As the Court will recall from our earlier oral presentation and our Memorial, over the past 4½ months, various different figures on the Iranian

political scene have advanced the notion that at some point in the future some or all of the American hostages would be put on trial in the criminal courts of Iran. These suggestions have been advanced by Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh, by the students, and, indeed, by the Ayatollah Khomeini himself.

Moreover, different types of penalties have been threatened as appropriate sentences following such criminal trials. One Iranian magistrate, as indicated on page 107 of our Memorial, has suggested that the hostages should be remitted into slavery, but the more frequent suggestion has been that once the hostages have been tried and convicted, they should be brought before a firing squad, as indicated for example, at page 101 of our Memorial. Although it is difficult to tell how seriously these suggestions have been advanced, they take on an ominous significance when it is recalled that in recent months over 600 Iranian nationals have been tried in peremptory fashion before revolutionary courts and then put to death.

Needless to say, any kind of criminal prosecution of any of these hostages would constitute fresh violations of the express prohibition set forth in article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. I will not labor the point at this time, however, because although threats of criminal prosecution were heard with great frequency at an earlier stage of the crisis, there have been relatively fewer such suggestions since early December, perhaps because on 15 December this Court expressly called upon the Government of Iran to provide to all American diplomatic and consular agents immunity from criminal prosecution. Nevertheless, the Supplemental Documents which we have been submitting to the Court demonstrate that occasional threats of criminal trials are still being made[21] and for that reason, as I shall indicate later in my submission, we have included an appropriate provision on the subject in our prayer for relief.

Violations of Premises and Archives

That concludes my discussion of the treatment of the hostages, and at this point I would like to turn to a different subject, namely the legal violations affecting the physical properties of the United States in Tehran. By physical properties I refer both to the real estate—the Embassy in Tehran and the Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz—and also to another important category of property, namely the files, records, and equipment located within these buildings. All of these properties, of course, were seized in the early days of November 1979.

As to the seizure of these properties I will not dwell on the facts. The Court will recall that on 4 November the students assaulted the compound, cut chains, removed window bars, attempted to set fire to the Chancery, burned through steel doors with torches, and by these methods gained possession of all of the buildings in the compound—possession which was then confirmed by the presence of the Revolutionary Guards. Some hours after the seizure of the Embassy, similar seizures were made of the U.S. Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz, again with the cooperation of the Revolutionary Guards. Obviously, the Embassy compound remains in the control of the militant students, but the U.S. Government has no reliable information as to the current status of the two consular properties.

Once again, there can be no possible dispute as to whether the physical invasion of the diplomatic and consular premises of the United States was lawful. Article 22 of the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations is as explicit as it can be on that point. Similarly, article 27 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations explicitly provides that the receiving states shall respect and protect the consulate premises. The importance of such respect and protection is emphasized by the fact that under article 27 the consular premises are to be protected even where consular relations have been severed or where a consular post has been closed.

At an earlier point in my argument I commented on how striking it is that the legal principles on which we rely in this case are so uniformly regarded as valid, and the principle of the inviolability of the premises of a diplomatic or consular mission is no exception. Over the years, of course, there have been relatively rare occasions when a mission has been attacked, but this appears to be the first case in many centuries in which a receiving state itself has participated in the attack and then retained possession of the premises and attempted to use that unlawful possession to political advantage.

At this point it may be appropriate for me to remind the Court of the marked inconsistencies that have occurred as between different actions taken by the Iranian Government. Yesterday I mentioned that both before 4 November and after that date, threats of attack were made against the Embassies of the United States and the Soviet Union, and on those other occasions the Iranian Government acknowledged in a straightforward fashion that it had an obligation to protect the missions involved. On those occasions it deliberately obeyed the rules of international law, but on 4 November and since, the Iranian Government has deliberately disobeyed those rules. In so doing I respectfully submit it has indisputably subjected itself to liability to the Government of the United States.

With respect to physical properties, I should also refer, at least briefly, to the fact that as widely reported in the press the militant students who have occupied the Embassy premises for the past 4½ months appear to have thoroughly ransacked all of the diplomatic and consular archives and documents upon which they could lay their hands. Indeed, there have been recent press reports to the effect that when the students discovered that some private documents had been shredded, that is torn up, in order to preserve their privacy, they painstakingly pieced the shreds together in order further to invade the privacy of the Embassy records.

Moreover, the occupiers of the Embassy have not refrained from using these private records in public from time to time; to use their own words, they have "exposed" groups of Embassy documents, claiming that they prove this or that with respect to alleged American espionage, and I think it is remarkable how little sympathy these supposedly dramatic exposures have elicited in other countries of the world. The fact is, of course, that there is the universal recognition that it is totally illegitimate to seize the archives and documents of a diplomatic or consular mission. Under the express terms of article 24 of the diplomatic convention and article 33 of the consular convention, all such archives and documents are to be inviolable at all times and wherever they may be.

It seems particularly shocking that these fundamental principles of diplomatic law should be tossed aside so casually, not only by the militant students and not only by the Iranian Government at large but even by the Ira-

asked for the brief delay in the hearings. The signals, if I may use that term, that are coming out of Iran suggest that the detention of the hostages may continue indefinitely and no one in this courtroom has any way of knowing how long the Government of Iran will continue to hold the hostages. Since the U.S. Government continues to view this Court as the most promising hope for bringing about the ultimate release of the hostages through the entry of a binding and enforceable final judgment, the United States wishes at this time to press forward to judgment as rapidly as possible.

Given the fact that I once urged expedition upon the Court and then urged a brief delay, I am reluctant to presume upon the Court by requesting expeditious action now, and yet I feel duty bound to do so. In making this request the primary focus of my government's interest is upon the well-being of the 53 Americans still held in captivity, but my government is motivated by broader concerns as well. As I stated in my opening remarks 2 days ago, if it becomes clear that a country like Iran can seize diplomatic agents and hold them hostage for indefinite periods of time in order to coerce desired political action, it can only lead to a complete unraveling of the fabric of peaceful international relations. For these reasons our call for judgment is urgent. Since the dispute before the Court continues to imperil international peace, I submit that the high responsibilities imposed upon the Court by the U.N. Charter call for the entry of the final judgment requested in this case as rapidly as possible.

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I respectfully request that the Court enter judgment in favor of the United States and against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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[1] For these and other indications of Ayatollah Khomeini's control over the hostage situation, see Supplemental Documents 13, 21, 34, 58, 52, 65, 66, 72, 101, 102, 115, 117, 133, 134, 135, and 140.

[2] Supplemental Documents 100, 102, 134, 135, and 141.

[3] Supplemental Documents 107 and 152.

[4] Supplemental Document 156.

[5] Supplemental Documents 149, 151, 161, and 162.

[6] Supplemental Document 156.

[7] Supplemental Document 157.

[8] Supplemental Document 158.

[9] Supplemental Document 159.

[10] Supplemental Document 160.

[11] Supplemental Document 90.

[12] Supplemental Document 100.

[13] Supplemental Document 106.

[14] U.N. doc. S/PV. 2175, 1 Dec. 1979, at p. 58.

[15] U.N. doc. S/PV. 2176, 2 Dec. 1979, at p. 47.

[16] U.N. doc. S/PV. 2175, at p. 22.

[17] U.N. doc. S/PV. 2175, at p. 12.

[18] See, for example, articles 44 and 45 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

[19] See, for example, Memorial, pp. 16–18, 92, 95, and 215; Supplemental Documents 3, 21, 65, 72, 79, 100, 115, 129, 130, 135, and 139.

[20] See, for example, U.N. doc. S/PV. 2175 at 11 (Norway), 12 (Portugal), 28–30 (Bolivia), 38 (Nigeria); S/PV. 2176 at 22 (Federal Republic of Germany), 23–25 (Austria), 33–35 (Malawi), 42 (Panama), 53 (Spain); S/PV. 2177 at 5 (Swaziland), 11 (Belgium); S/PV. 2182 at 26 (Singapore).

[21] Supplemental Documents 20, 37, 40, 117, and 138. ■

PUBLICATION OF PROCEEDINGS

At the conclusion of the case concerning *United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran*, the International Court of Justice will publish the verbatim texts of the Court's proceedings—including the oral argument, the U.S. Memorial, and all Supplemental Documents—in its *Pleadings, Oral Arguments, and Documents* series. ■

U.N. Inquiry Commission Suspends Activities

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, MAR. 10, 1980[1]

The commission of inquiry, after consulting with Secretary General [Kurt] Waldheim and the authorities in Tehran, has decided that it should suspend its activities in Tehran for several days. The commission will return to New York to confer with the Secretary General. We understand it is prepared to return to Tehran in accordance with its mandate and the instructions of the Secretary General when the situation requires.

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[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Mar. 17, 1980. ■

Iran Chronology, March 1980

March 3

After waiting 3 days for a decision by Iranian authorities, the U.N. commission of inquiry presses Iran to end uncertainty over seeing hostages.

March 4

Iranian militants set new conditions for a meeting between the hostages and the commission of inquiry stating that such a meeting, during which the members could inquire into the living conditions and health of the hostages, would only be possible provided the commission's report managed to convince the United Nations that the Shah and the United States were guilty of "crimes" against Iran.

March 6

Militants, under pressure from Iranian authorities, agree to surrender hostages to governing Revolutionary Council.

March 7

Iranian Government announces that Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh will be given custody of the hostages.

March 8

Militants and Ghotbzadeh accuse each other of lying over whether Khomeini had approved a plan under which the inquiry commission could meet with the hostages, thereby blocking plans for the transfer.

March 10

Khomeini supports militants' move which blocked hostage transfer.

Commission of inquiry departs Iran after failing to see hostages.

March 16

Iran holds first round of parliamentary elections. Returns indicate clergy-dominated Islamic Republic Party leads.

March 18–20

International Court of Justice resumes sitting to hear oral arguments on the case concerning *United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff* in Tehran brought by the United States against Iran. During this period, the United States makes final arguments on the jurisdiction of the Court and the merits of the case.

March 19

Based on information from the 13 hostages released November 20 concerning inhumane treatment of the remaining hostages, U.S. renews its request to the International Court of Justice to order Iran to speed up their release.

March 20

Fearing the hostages will be held indefinitely, the U.S. again urges ICJ judges to hand down an order as quickly as possible to release them.

Ambassadors representing nine members of the Common Market and Greece, recommend that their governments consider breaking relations with Iran if all else fails to win release of the hostages.

March 23

Deposed Shah departs Panama for Egypt despite U.S. fears that his departure would damage efforts to free the hostages.

March 24

Shah arrives in Cairo, the sixth country in which he has sought refuge. President Sadat says Shah's stay in Egypt will be permanent.

Islamic clerical groups call for demonstrations to protest the Shah's move from Panama.

March 25

Team of U.S. physicians, including the Houston heart surgeon Dr. Michael E. DeBakey, fly to Cairo to prepare for surgery on the Shah.

March 26

Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, leader of the Islamic Republican Party, announces he favors holding trials for those hostages accused of espionage if the Shah is not returned to Iran to stand trial.

March 27

Because of charges of irregularities and fraud in the first round of parliamentary elections, Iran postpones indefinitely the second round, thereby delaying any decision on the hostages.

Revolutionary Council, urged by President Bani-Sadr, appoints a seven-member commission to look into the alleged irregularities.

March 28

Shah undergoes surgery.

Iran publicizes an alleged message from President Carter to Khomeini admitting "past mistakes" in U.S. policy toward Iran. Carter Administration denies allegations.

March 30

U.S. and its Western allies are said to make major efforts to pressure Iran to take steps to release hostages. Bani-Sadr reportedly receives two letters—delivered by Swiss emissaries—from President Carter warning that if steps are not taken to release the hostages, the U.S. would initiate actions against Iran which would include:

- An embargo on trade of all goods except food and medicine;
- Expulsion of Iranian diplomats from the U.S.; and
- A request that U.S. allies take limited economic steps against Iran and withdraw their representatives.

March 31

U.S. gives Iran until April 1 to announce steps to remove hostages from militants' control or face new U.S. economic and political retaliations. ■

Middle East Peace Process: A Status Report

by Secretary Vance

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 20, 1980.[1]

There has been a great deal of discussion about the subject of today's hearings: the events surrounding the U.S. vote in the U.N. Security Council on March 1. I know that all of us here are aware of the importance of approaching our discussions today with a view to their possible impact on our efforts for a comprehensive peace. In this regard, Ambassador Linowitz [Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations] is leaving tomorrow for a round of particularly sensitive negotiations with the Egyptians and Israelis.

Over the years the United States has been forthright in stating its position on these issues. We have made clear:

- Our unwavering support for Israel's security and well-being;
- Our longstanding commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the Middle East, including Israel's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
- Our support for Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts as the foundation of a comprehensive peace settlement;
- Our belief confirmed by Egypt and Israel at Camp David that negotiations are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338;
- Our conviction, shared by Egypt and Israel, that a comprehensive peace must include a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects;
- Our firm position that we will not recognize or negotiate with the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] so long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;
- Our unswerving commitment to the negotiating process laid out at Camp David; and
- Our strong view that in the interim the parties should conduct themselves in accordance with international law and common-sense restraint so as to build trust that a sequence of successful negotiations can bring about a just, honorable, and lasting peace for all.

After nearly 30 years of stalemate and strife, we finally have seen concrete progress toward peace through negotiations. President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and President Carter embarked on a process that has led to the Camp David frameworks, the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, and the present negotiations to establish full autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. At the request of the parties, the United States is a full partner in these negotiations.

It is important to stress that the objective of all three partners is a peaceful settlement compatible with the Camp David accords and achieved through negotiation. The approach which has begun to bear fruit in the last 2 years is to reach accommodation on those issues that can be tackled now and then to use the progress made in the present stage to facilitate resolution of the tougher issues in later phases of negotiations. It is critical to this process that each side gain trust that a negotiated settlement on fair terms is possible.

Let me turn now to several specific issues.

The Present Negotiations

The current negotiations provide the context for concrete discussion of individual issues. It is important to define what the current negotiations are and what they are not.

They are not, for example, designed to define the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. All issues relating to permanent institutions in these areas are to be resolved in a later negotiation where the Palestinians can participate in the determination of their own future through the process set forth in the Camp David accords. Our concern is that unilateral acts tend to prejudice the outcome of those negotiations and, therefore, to undercut the avenue to a peaceful and honorable resolution of these complex issues.

The current negotiations are an effort to establish a self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza for a transitional period while fully protecting Israel's security. In order for that effort to succeed, some important issues will have to be resolved.

The current negotiations must also define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exer-

Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico Oct. 31 and Nov. 8, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 8, 1979; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Norway
Extradition treaty. Signed at Oslo June 9, 1977.
Instruments of ratification exchanged: Mar. 7, 1980.
Entered into force: Mar. 7, 1980.

Peru
Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. Signed at Washington July 6, 1979.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Mar. 25, 1980.

Sri Lanka
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Mar. 25, 1975 (TIAS 8107), with agreed minutes. Signed at Colombo Mar. 18, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 18, 1980.

Trinidad and Tobago
Agreement on trade, with related letter. Signed at Washington Dec. 19, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.

United Kingdom
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at London Dec. 31, 1975.
Instruments of ratification exchanged: Mar. 25, 1980.
Entered into force: Apr. 25, 1980.

Agreement amending the convention of Dec. 31, 1975, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Effected by exchange of notes at London Apr. 13, 1976.
Entered into force: Apr. 25, 1980.

Protocol amending the convention of Dec. 31, 1975, as amended, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at London Aug. 26, 1976.
Instruments of ratification exchanged: Mar. 25, 1980.
Entered into force: Apr. 25, 1980.

Second protocol amending the convention of Dec. 31, 1975, as amended, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at London Mar. 31, 1977.
Instruments of ratification exchanged: Mar. 25, 1980.
Entered into force: Apr. 25, 1980.

Third protocol further amending the convention of Dec. 31, 1975, as amended, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at London Mar. 15, 1979.
Instruments of ratification exchanged: Mar. 25, 1980.
Entered into force: Apr. 25, 1980.

[1] Not in force.
[2] Not in force for the U.S.
[3] With a declaration.
[4] With a reservation.
[5] Applicable to Berlin (West). ■

March 1980

Events pertaining to Iran can be found on page 60.

March 1
U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 465 regarding Israel's settlements policy. While voting for the Resolution, the U.S. Representative makes clear U.S. opposition to the section calling for the dismantling of existing settlements.

March 3
President Carter states that the affirmative U.S. vote on Resolution 465 took place because of a failure of communication. The U.S. should have abstained.

In accordance with the 1974 Trade Act, President Carter notifies the Congress that as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. no longer has reasonable access to commercial markets there and that it is not in the U.S. national interest to continue preferential duty-free treatment. Therefore, he intends to suspend Afghanistan as a beneficiary developing country for the Generalized System of Preferences, effective in 60 days. Reinstatement will be considered when Soviet troops withdraw.

Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau is sworn in for a fourth term.

March 4
Robert Mugabe, co-leader of the Patriotic Front guerrilla alliance wins an absolute majority in the 100-member House of Assembly.

West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt makes official visit to Washington, D.C., Mar. 4–8.

March 5
Agha Shahi, Pakistan's adviser to the President for Foreign Affairs, states that Pakistan will not accept the U.S. proposal of $400 million in defense and economic aid.

March 11
Robert Mugabe is formally appointed Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia.

March 13
P.R.C. Vice Foreign Minister, Zhang Wenjin, visits U.S., Mar. 13–23.

March 19
Italian Prime Minister, Francesco Cossiga, resigns.

March 21
Japanese Foreign Minister, Saburo Okita, visits U.S. Mar. 19–22.

March 25
Archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar Arnulfo Romero, is assassinated.

British Olympic Association votes to participate in Moscow Summer Olympics.

March 29
U.S. and Turkey sign a new 5-year defense agreement based on their common membership in NATO. ■

Department of State

March 3–31

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*48	3/3	Itinerary of German Chancellor Schmidt's official visit to the U.S., Mar. 4–6.
*49	3/3	U.S. Organization for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), study group CMIT, Apr. 8.
*50	3/3	U.S. Organization for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), study group B, Mar. 27.
*51	3/3	Advisory Committee on International Intellectual Property, Mar. 20.
52	3/4	Vance: address before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Mar. 3.
52A	3/4	Vance: question-and-answer session following address in Chicago, Mar. 3.
*53	3/5	U.S., U.K. expand transatlantic air service, Mar. 5.
*54	3/6	U.S., Hong Kong establish specified limits on six textile categories.
*55	3/7	U.S., Canada discuss Popular River bilateral monitoring arrangements.

*56	3/11	Robert E. White sworn in as Ambassador to El Salvador (biographic data).
*57	3/10	Mabel Murphy Smythe assumes duties as Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (biographic data).
*58	3/11	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group international multimodal transport and containers, Mar. 26.
59	3/11	Status of U.S. contribution to international relief efforts for Khmer relief.
*60	3/17	U.S., Dominican Republic amend textile agreement, Mar. 5 and 7.
*61	3/17	CCITT, study group D, Apr. 15.
*62	3/18	Vance: statement before the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee.
63	3/20	Vance: statement before Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
*64	3/21	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, Apr. 28.
*65	3/21	CCIR, study groups 10 and 11, Apr. 22.
*66	3/21	U.S., Scandinavian aviation consultations concluded.
*67	3/25	Robert C. F. Gordon sworn in as Ambassador to Mauritius (biographic data).
68	3/27	Vance: statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
*69	3/27	SCC, SOLAS, working group on carriage of dangerous goods, Apr. 8.
*70	3/27	SCC, SOLAS, working group on the subdivision, stability, and load lines, Apr. 9.
*71	3/29	SCC, SOLAS, working group on radiocommunications, Apr. 17.
*72	3/28	Harry H. Pollak designated Special Assistant and Coordinator of International Labor Affairs (biographic data).
*73	3/31	James Eugene Goodby sworn in as Ambassador to Finland, Mar. 26 (biographic data).
†74	3/31	1951 "Foreign Relations of the United States," Volume I: National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy.

* Not printed in the BULLETIN.
† Held for a later issue. ■

"The Eagle and the Shield"

This 637-page book, prepared under the auspices of the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration, was largely researched and written by the late Richard S. Patterson, formerly a historian in the Department of State and for many years the government's expert on the history of the Great Seal. Publication, originally planned for 1976, was delayed because of Mr. Patterson's death that year. The book was completed by Richardson Dougall, retired Deputy Director of the Department's Historical Office.

The history of the Great Seal begins on July 4, 1776, when the Continental Congress approved the following resolution: "*Resolved*, That Dr. Franklin, Mr. J. Adams and Mr. Jefferson, be a committee, to bring in a device for a seal for the United States of America."

Replacing the last standard official history of the Great Seal—that by Gaillard Hunt issued in 1909—this new history, *The Eagle and the Shield: A History of the Great Seal of the United States*, traces the designing of the seal in the period 1776–82 and the execution and use of the various seal dies from 1782 to 1976. Much new information is included. The book has more than 50 pages of illustrations—two in color and many printed here for the first time. It also contains chapters on the seals of the President and Vice President of the United States and on the seal of the Department of State.

Copies of *The Eagle and the Shield* may be ordered from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for $12.00 each. Checks or money orders, made payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany order. The stock number of this publication is 044-000-01543-9. ■

International Law Digest, 1977

The *Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law* contains materials relating to U.S. international legal practice for 1977. This 1,081-page, fifth annual edition was edited by John A. Boyd with a foreword by Herbert J. Hansell, formerly the Legal Adviser of the Department of State.

It contains 15 chapters dealing with such varied topics as the implementation of President Carter's human rights policy, the constitutionality of the transfer of U.S. property to Panama in the 1977 canal treaties, the litigation concerning the return of the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary, conservation efforts in behalf of bowhead whales, and the Bermuda II agreement concerning air service between the United States and the United Kingdom.

Some of the precedent-setting items reported include the U.N. resolution imposing a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, the 1977 U.S.-Canada agreement concerning transit pipelines, the announcement of America's first deepwater port, and the new special consular services handbook on protection of American nationals arrested, on trial, or imprisoned.

Of special interest to lawyers is the chapter on private international law featuring key portions of the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules of arbitration and the 1977 arrangements between the American Arbitration Association, the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce concerning the arbitration of contract disputes between U.S. business firms and Soviet foreign trade organizations.

An appendix to the *Digest*, edited by Michael Sandler, Detlev F. Vagts, and Bruno Ristau, reviews the sovereign immunity decisions made by the Department of State during the period 1952–77. This case-by-case review of the immunities of foreign states and their officers quotes extensively from previously unpublished diplomatic notes.

Copies of the *Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law*, 1977 may be purchased from the Superintendent of

Edmund S. Muskie takes the oath of office as U.S. Secretary of State on May 8, 1980. The oath was administered by Judge Frank Coffin (right) while Mrs. Muskie holds the Bible. Looking on are President Carter and Ellen Muskie Allen. (White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)

The official flag of the Secretary of State is a white disc bearing the coat of arms of the United States on a blue field with one white, five-pointed star in each corner.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Edmund Sixtus Muskie was born on March 28, 1914, in Rumford, Maine. He was graduated *cum laude* from Bates College in Lewiston, Maine, in 1936, where he was a Phi Beta Kappa and class president. In 1939 he was graduated from Cornell University Law School. He enlisted in the U.S. Navy during World War II and served in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters.

Secretary Muskie was elected to the Maine House of Representatives in 1946, 1948, and 1950. He served as minority leader during his second and third terms. From 1951 to 1952 he was the State Director of the Office of Price Stabilization and was the Democratic National Committeeman from 1952 to 1956.

Mr. Muskie was elected Governor of Maine in 1954 and served two terms before being elected to the U.S. Senate in 1958. During his 22 years in the Senate, he served on the Foreign Relations Committee, the Governmental Affairs Committee, the Environment and Public Works Committee, and as Chairman of the Budget Committee. In 1968 he was the Democratic nominee for Vice President.

He has traveled extensively throughout Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. In 1965 he accompanied Senator Michael J. Mansfield on a presidential trip to 13 nations to explore peace initiatives and to determine official attitudes toward the Vietnam war. His autobiography, *Journeys*, was published in 1972.

Mr. Muskie was nominated by President Carter on April 29, 1980, to be Secretary of State, confirmed by the Senate on May 7, and sworn in as the 57th Secretary of State on May 8 in a ceremony at the White House.

Press release 128 of May 15, 1980. ■

Senate Confirms Edmund S. Muskie as Secretary of State

The following is the text of the statement by Secretary-designate Edmund S. Muskie prepared for his confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 7, 1980. Later that day the Senate confirmed his nomination by a vote of 94 to 2, and he was sworn in at the White House as Secretary of State on May 8.[1]

Let me begin with a basic point: I believe now, as I believed a week ago, that the Congress must be a full partner in designing our international posture and must be fully informed on its implementation. The Administration, the nation, and our foreign policies are the stronger when the Congress is consulted before major policy decisions are made, and during the course of major negotiations.

This is the first of what I expect to be many discussions with this committee. I look to Capitol Hill—to my colleagues and friends here—for guidance as well as support, for suggestions and healthy challenge. I also want to take a moment to offer some general views—on our foreign policy, on the role of the Secretary of State, on the connection between our international posture and our condition at home.

We are a nation of great power. Our actions and decisions have global effects. For our own people, for our friends around the world—and for those who are not our friends—our fundamental course must always be clear.

I have brought no detailed new blueprint to this hearing. Only days ago I was seated on your side of this room. In the days ahead I will be carefully reviewing all significant elements of our international posture. Presumably I will recommend to the President that we adjust some old policies and assert some new initiatives. But I can certainly state this much now; I would not be here if I did not support the central elements of the foreign policy now in place—the policy that has been fashioned by President Carter and Secretary Vance.

While there may be changes, there will also be continuity. Our nation's foreign policies will continue to serve our nation's interests—the same interests that previous Administrations and previous Secretaries of State have sought to defend and advance.

Foreign Policy

Let me begin with my fundamental beliefs. I believe in strong American defenses. We must maintain the military balance. We must continue to modernize all elements of our defense forces. Dollars spent on defense, as in any other area, must never be dollars wasted.

I believe in strong alliances—in our collective defense, in continuing to strengthen our forces, in consulting regularly and with trust.

I believe in a firm and balanced policy toward the Soviet Union. The search for common ground has been disrupted not by American preference but by Soviet action. While aggression continues we must not relent in imposing a heavy price. As Soviet policies allow, we must never be blind to opportunities to work for peace.

I believe that balanced arms control agreements fortify our security. The SALT II agreement is no gift to our rivals; it can serve our own interests by limiting the threats we face.

I believe in a positive diplomacy of active engagement. It is in our interest to work for peace in troubled areas, especially the Middle East. It is to our advantage to improve our relations with nations which have interests in common with us—including many whose views and values differ from ours. We must build our new relationship with the People's Republic of China. We must continue to broaden our ties to the nations of the Third World and of Eastern Europe.

I believe in strong American defenses. . . in strong alliances. . . in a firm and balanced policy toward the Soviet Union. . . that balanced arms control agreements fortify our security. . . and that America must stand for human progress.

And I believe that America must stand for human progress. Our freedom and rights are more secure when freedom and human dignity are advanced around the world. Our own economy is strengthened by the economic progress of others. We must lead international efforts to surmount an international energy crisis and its consequences; to address the condition of hundreds of millions of human beings living in degrading poverty; and to strengthen an international trading system that is fair to our workers and our farmers, our businessmen and our consumers.

These past months have been times of great trial. Terrorism in Iran, aggression in Afghanistan, radical escalation in the price of petroleum—these and other challenges will test us fully in months to come.

But the past few years have been times also of accomplishment and strong American leadership. Modernization of conventional and theater nuclear forces in NATO, Camp David, SALT II, China normalization, the Panama Canal treaty, peace in Zimbabwe, regular economic summits, successful multilateral trade negotiations, human rights advances in many countries, each is a new strength we can use to buttress American leadership in the future.

I am confident of that leadership or I would not be here before you. Americans want their country to be a constructive international presence. And we are. We have many strengths, not least of which is our system of values, founded upon a belief in individual worth.

Role of the Secretary of State

Your inquiry today is directed not only to the substance of our foreign policies but also to my concept of the role of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State must carry out a number of duties. And priorities must be set among them. These are my priorities.

First, and most important, the Secretary of State is the principal adviser to the President on foreign policy issues. He must have the primary responsibility for recommending our foreign policy course, and seeing that the President's decisions are then implemented. President Carter has made it clear that he expects me to play this role, and I intend to do so.

Second, the Secretary of State is the President's principal spokesman for his foreign policies. I intend to be very active in this role. I strongly believe in the value of clear and direct public discussion of our

A. The man who supervised the desecration of the bodies was a member of the Revolutionary Council. I think it is accurate to say that other members of the Iranian Government did publicly condemn this abhorrent act and have now promised to deliver the American bodies to intermediaries to be delivered ultimately back to our country. We hope that this commitment will be kept, and I pray that it will.

But the fact that the terrorists participated in the desecration is an indication of the kind of people they are and a vivid indication of the difficulties that we have experienced in getting what seems to be required—a unanimous decision by terrorists, the top officials, the Revolutionary Council, and the Ayatollah Khomeini before this crime can be terminated.

Q. Why have you permitted the taking of the hostages in Iran to continue to monopolize your time and your attention when there are other international crises that are equally important to the security of this country and when your preoccupation with what has happened in Iran only seems to make the Iranian leaders more stubborn?

A. There is no way that I could possibly confine my activities or my attention to one single facet of American life or diplomacy to the exclusion of others. It has been a major preoccupation of mine and the American people that these hostages are held. But we've had to deal with simultaneous domestic and international problems concurrently.

We have, for instance, met, I think, as forcefully as is practicable and advisable the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, mounting economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, marshalling support of other nations for the boycott of the Olympics, letting the Soviets know that 104 members of the United Nations are condemning their action in the invasion of Afghanistan.

I've spent a great deal of time the last couple of weeks, for instance, continuing our negotiations for peace between Israel and Egypt and the establishment of autonomous government in the West Bank and Gaza area. I've worked on inflation problems in our nation and also on the problem of employment and the dealing with the diplomatic relationships of a routine nature with other countries.

So, we have an ongoing program in this goverment that is being well cared for. It's unfortunate that the hostage situation has been the human kind of concern that has been dominant in our consciousness even when we were doing our duties in other matters.

Q. There seems to be a growing impression in this town that your national security adviser [Zbigniew Brzezinski] is gaining influence at the expense of your Secretary of State—even speculation that that may have been a factor in Mr. Vance's resignation. Would you care to comment on this?

A. That's an erroneous report. I think we have a very good and proper balance of advisers who comprise the National Security Council—who work with me on military and foreign affairs. I think that Secretary Vance expressed, as an honorable man, very meticulous in his language, his reason for resignation. I regretted his decision. Under the circumstances, I think it was the proper one, but never in the past and never in the future while I'm here will there be any unwarranted intervention in the carrying out of the foreign policy under the aegis of the State Department.

But I reserve the right to receive advice and counsel from my advisers. That's the best way I can make the proper decision once I have all the facts and all the advice that I seek.

Q. You've been widely applauded, judging by the polls, for having made this effort with regard to freeing the hostages. And it seems to me that if there are any lingering misgivings among the American people, it is among those who wonder whether the whole plan could have worked without serious danger to some of the hostages and perhaps to our international interests. Secretary Vance has been too meticulous, in your words, to have expressed objections, but he's supposed to have had objection to the whole operation. Within the limits of security, could you tell us enough about the further planned phases of this operation so that Americans will understand that it could have worked?

A. It would be inadvisable for me to describe the operation beyond the point that actually did occur. We had intended to place the rescue team in an isolated region within a proper distance of Tehran, and then if everything was satisfactory, if they were undetected, if there was no apparent change in the circumstances within the compound itself, if the weather conditions warranted and equipment was in a satisfactory condition, only then were we to undertake the actual rescue operation.

There's a general consensus, with which I think no one disagrees, that the actual rescue operation would have been the easiest of the three phases. The most difficult, the intrusion into Iran and the placement of those forces, and the second most difficult, the actual extraction of our hostages and men from Iran after the rescue itself, from the compound.

But the details of what would have been undertaken is something that I would prefer not to comment on since it did not occur.

. . . .

Q. I'd like to follow up an earlier question. Were there aspects of the military plan that we are not familiar with that perhaps provided the basis for Secretary Vance's dissent, perhaps air strikes, and if not, could you tell us what your understanding is of just what his dissent was about?

A. I think it would be better to ask him about the specifics. I think I can say accurately that Secretary Vance preferred that we not take any kind of action inside Iran that might have had any connotation of a military nature. His preference was to wait longer instead of mounting the rescue operation, but I made the decision based on the overwhelming recommendation and concurrence with other advisers. I have no doubt at all in my mind that it was the right decision.

Had the operation been successful or even had it been concluded without complete success, it would have ended a continuing crisis that is destabilizing for the people of Iran, that's causing them immense political and economic suffering at this very moment, and it would have made unnecessary the upcoming economic pressures on Iran which will be much more severe when our major allies impose those same kinds of economic sanctions on Iran the middle of next month. It would also have meant that we could have begun restoring Iran as an accepted nation in the world structure and remove the reasons for condemnation of them.

So in my opinion the operation had a very good chance of success. And it would have brought to a conclusion this unfortunate holding of our hostages and ended what is a very destablizing political situation in that region of the world.

Q. Just to be specific, there was no other aspect of the plan with which we are not familiar that provided the basis of his dissent; it was just a broad and general dissent?

A. I believe that's accurate, but you might want to follow that up with Secretary Vance later, but I believe that to be a completely accurate statement.

Q. When you were planning the rescue attempt did you believe that all the hostages could have been removed from Iran safely or did you feel that some could have been killed in the process? And secondly, do you think that the United States would be better off to end the crisis now even if it means extreme danger to the hostages?

A. Obviously an operation of this kind would have had some risk, but we were convinced that the hostages could be removed successfully and safely.

Q. Does it seem to you that if you cannot resolve this crisis soon it may cost you your renomination or reelection? And does it seem to you that, as Harry Truman said and as you have said, the buck stops there, that that would be a fair judgment?

A. The political connotations of the holding of our hostages is not a factor for me. I've had to make decisions that on occasion might very well have been unpopular, and some that I have made may prove to be well advised in the judgment of the American people. But I've had to make those decisions under the most difficult circumstances, dealing with a nation's leaders who cannot speak for their own country and who constantly change their position and even constantly change their own identity. But I see no relationship to this effort that I am continuing with the prospects or lack of prospects of political benefit to me or approval in a political circumstance.

Q. As we look at the situation in Iran in terms of what they may understand you might do, what have you led Iran's leaders to believe would happen if they harmed the hostages? Do you think such fear is saving the hostages' lives now, and, if there is such fear, does that encourage you to refrain from further military action that could endanger them?

A. In November, I think it was November the 20th, we were constantly hearing from the terrorists who held our hostages that they would be immediately tried for war crimes and executed. We spelled out to the public and therefore to Iran the extreme adverse consequences to them if such action should be taken without being overly specific but letting them know that there would be serious consequences for their nation and their people. We specifically spelled out one step in that process short of military action and that was the interruption of commerce to Iran.

Our nation is firm in its resolve. It's remarkably united. Our people have been surprisingly patient. But I don't think there's any doubt among the leadership in Iran, in the government, or among the terrorists themselves that it is to their advantage not to physically harm the hostages whom they hold. And I hope they will be convinced as time goes by—not much time, I pray—that the adverse consequences of the action that we have already taken, with diplomatic and political isolation and with economic sanctions, is fragmenting their own structure of government and dividing their own nation and preventing Iran from making the progress that was envisioned when they had the revolution itself.

It's a remarkable commentary on this fragmentation that in spite of the deep commitment of their new Constitution, the Ayatollah Khomeini, and their public officials, they have not even been able to hold an election in Iran after months of effort.

So I believe that being joined by our allies in similar kinds of economic sanctions might very well be a factor that would bring the Iranians to realize that it's much better for them to release the hostages unharmed and to resolve this crisis.

Q. Can you tonight assure the American people that there is no connection between the inability of the American military to retain highly skilled maintenance and technical personnel and the abnormally high failure rate of the helicopters on the rescue mission? And in a broader sense, does this high failure rate worry you if it came to a showdown between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf?

A. There is no connection, because we focused the enormous resources of our nation and its elaborate military capability on this particular equipment that was used in this operation. Had there been some shortage of either technicians or spare parts or maintenance capability, it would not have been permitted in the particular case of the helicopters, the C–130s, or the equipment the men took in for the rescue operation. So there is no connection between those at all.

Q. Could you explain why you appointed Senator Edmund Muskie to succeed Cyrus Vance when Senator Muskie has limited foreign policy experience and holds only a secondary position on the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate?

A. Senator Muskie has more than 20 years experience in the Senate. He's been heavily involved in foreign affairs there as a member, as you point out, of the Foreign Relations Committee. He's played an active role in nationwide campaigns throughout this country as a vice presidential candidate and also as a presidential candidate himself. He's familiar with our entire nation. I think he's highly sensitive about the aspirations and ideals of our country that ought to be mirrored in its foreign policy.

He's also had a remarkable position in the Senate as the chairman of the Budget Committee, where every single proposal made for the expenditure of Federal funds in the foreign affairs field or the military field or the domestic field has to come before his committee for careful analysis before it goes to the appropriations committees.

So, because of that broad range of experience and the esteem with which Ed Muskie is held in this country by Democrats and Republicans and, indeed, because of his international reputation, I consider him to be extremely well qualified to serve as Secretary of State.

Text from White House press release of April 29, 1980. ■

nian Foreign Minister, the chief of the Iranian diplomatic service. In an interview, which is reprinted at page 110 of our Memorial, the Foreign Minister proudly announced that the government had taken possession of the U.S. Embassy's documents and planned to make such use of them as might be directed by the Ayatollah Khomeini. I think that any one of us would be hard-pressed to think of a more outrageous violation of international legal principles applicable to the inviolability of the premises and archives of diplomatic missions.

Insofar as the substantive claims of the United States are concerned, I want to make one more major final point. Judging by the outpouring of criticism that has rained down upon the Government of Iran as a direct result of the course of conduct which commenced on 4 November, virtually every country in the world is saying to itself, "there but for the grace of God go I." Countries throughout the world recognize that if this can happen to American diplomats in Tehran, it can happen to other diplomats wherever any diplomatic mission is located.

Iran's Duty To Prosecute or Extradite Offenders

It is quite obvious to the Court, I am sure, that one of the principal reasons for our bringing this case here and one of the principal reasons why our bringing of the case has received such wide acclaim is the widely shared concern that a way must be found to deter similar seizures in the future. The need to create a deterrent, I submit, is an overwhelmingly important factor in the present proceedings.

In this respect it seems to us vitally important to look to the provisions of the New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents. That convention, to which both the United States and Iran are party, defines certain crimes which are plainly involved in this case, and it then tacitly recognizes that if such crimes are to be prevented in the future, a strong element of deterrence is required. Not surprisingly, the element of deterrence contemplated by the convention is prosecution on the conventional theory that if an offender is forcefully prosecuted, similar offenses are less likely to occur in the years ahead. Specifically, article 7 of the convention explicitly provides that when a crime of this kind is committed within a specific state, that state shall have a duty, if it does not extradite the offender, to submit his case "without exception whatsoever and without undue delay" to the appropriate prosecuting authorities for the purpose of prosecution.

On the facts before the Court in this case, therefore, the Government of Iran has had a continuing duty ever since 4 November to submit to the appropriate prosecuting authority the case or cases against those who have been responsible for the commission of crimes against the U.S. Embassy and its personnel in Tehran.

Having in mind the evidence indicating the complicity of senior Iranian officials in the seizure of the Embassy and the hostages, you have asked for our views as to the implications for the purposes of this case of our suggestion that there is a duty on the part of the Iranian authorities to set the prosecutorial machinery in motion. Our answer is that Iran's obligation under international law to submit alleged offenders to its competent authorities for prosecution, if it does not extradite them, is in no way affected by the circumstances that some of the accomplices in the crimes may have been official personnel. Neither the New York convention nor customary international law recognizes any exception to the obligation for alleged offenders who occupy governmental office. States have, in practice, prosecuted governmental officials for acts that violated diplomatic immunity, as witness the Guatemalan and Ethiopian episodes which I mentioned earlier.

The Court may be concerned that a declaration that Iran is required to submit alleged offenders to its competent authority for prosecution could not be effectively implemented where high governmental officers are implicated in the crimes, or where the government, as a matter of policy, has encouraged or acquiesced in the commission of the crimes. I submit, however, that political or practical difficulties in the implementation of the Court's judgment do not detract from the entitlement of the United States to such a judgment. Moreover, the Court should render an affirmative declaration as to the duty to submit for prosecution in order to provide the maximum deterrent against future crimes of this kind. It is important, we submit, that the Court declare to the world that the duty to prosecute and to submit for prosecution exists in such circumstances. Even if the Government of Iran persists in its role as an outlaw, the vast majority of states will obey the rules declared by this Court, and the probability of such obedience will be an important deterrent against future violations of the rules of diplomatic relations. It is for this reason that the United States is persisting in seeking a declaration that the Government of Iran has a duty to submit for prosecution those who have committed these offenses.

On this question of providing deterrents against future violations of such laws, I should add that our claim in this respect does not solely depend on the New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons. On the contrary, even if that convention had never come into existence our claim would find, we think, ample support in customary international law.

For example, an effort was made to codify customary international law on this subject in the 1961 Harvard draft convention on the international responsibility of states for injuries to aliens, and article 13 of that draft convention provides as follows:

> Failure to exercise due diligence to afford protection to an alien by way of preventive or deterrent measures is wrongful if the act is generally recognized as criminal by the principal legal systems of the world.

In other words, where a state owes a duty to protect an alien, that duty encompasses a duty to deter future attacks, and I have previously referred to the fact that under the 1955 treaty of amity between the United States and Iran, the Government of Iran has had a continuing duty to provide all U.S. nationals with the most constant protection and security. Similarly, as I have also noted, under article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Iran had a special duty to take all appropriate steps to prevent attacks upon our diplomatic personnel, and I submit that that duty also encompasses a duty to submit the cases of offenders for prosecution and thereby deter future attack.

The existence of such a duty has been recognized by international tribunals. An example is a case entitled *The Claim of Walter M. Dexter*, which was decided in the 1940s by the U.S.-Mexican Claims Commission. The offense in that case was murder, and the claim under international law was that

the Mexican Government had failed not only to prevent the murder but also to apprehend and punish the offender. The holding of the tribunal on this point was as follows:

> The authorities of the Mexican Government were under an obligation to take appropriate measures for the apprehension and punishment of those participating in the murder of Dexter and failure to do so establishes Mexican liability under international law.

By the same token, we respectfully submit that the failure of the Iranian Government to prosecute the perpetrators of the crimes involved in this case establishes Iranian liability to the United States and its affected nationals.

This brings me to the conclusion of the argument with respect to the substantive claims which we are asserting in this case. As I have indicated, the case does not involve one or two or three isolated acts in violation of international law. On the contrary, commencing on 4 November, the Government of Iran has brought about a steady stream of offensive actions which have been continuing minute by minute and hour by hour and day by day for 4½ months. When one considers the entire breadth of the case, literally hundreds of different offenses have been committed. But for present purposes, it is useful to break these hundreds of different actions down into five major categories: the seizure and continuing detention of the hostages; the harsh and inhumane treatment imposed upon them; the totally unlawful interrogation to which they have been subjected; the seizure and continued holding of the diplomatic and consular facilities of the United States in Iran, including the ransacking and defilement of the archives and documents; and the failure on the part of the Government of Iran to prosecute those who have, in fact, been carrying out the government's orders.

During my description of these activities, I have not attempted to identify for the Court every single treaty provision which has been violated by each separate action. I have focused instead upon the fundamental treaty provisions and principles for the sake of clarity. In our Memorial, however, we have identified a series of additional treaty provisions which have been violated by the same courses of conduct which I have been describing during my presentation.

Iran's Response to U.S. Claims

Having summarized, and I hope clarified, the substantive claims of the United States I want to pause briefly to consider again the question whether the Islamic Republic of Iran has any possible defense against those claims. As I noted earlier in my argument, although the Government of Iran has been given every encouragement by this Court to appear and present defenses, and although the Iranian Government has demonstrated its continuing ability to litigate effectively and vigorously in other courts, it has deliberately chosen not to present any substantive defense to the present claims.

We are left then with the narrow question of whether the letter of 9 December, which was presented to the Court in the name of the Foreign Minister of Iran just before this Court's prior hearing, or its virtually verbatim copy —the letter received just 2 days ago— contain any factual or legal argumentation which should be taken into account by the Court in reaching its decision on the merits.

On that score, I have nothing to add to what the Court itself said on this subject in its order of 15 December. Although I hesitate to characterize the Court's own words I think it is fair to summarize the Court's comments of the Iranian position in these terms.

First, although the Government of Iran has suggested that its hostage-taking should be regarded merely as a secondary or marginal aspect of a larger dispute, that suggestion is laid to rest by the contrary view of the Secretary General and the Security Council of the United Nations, both of whom regard the hostage-taking in and of itself as a serious threat to international peace.

Second, if the Government of Iran really believes that its own conduct should be considered together with, and as justified by allegedly grave misdeeds on the part of the United States, it could have responded accordingly by presenting such alleged offenses in a counter-memorial, but having failed to act, Iran is scarcely in a position to argue that its own inaction should preclude the Court from considering the legitimate claims of the United States. As the Court observed on 15 December, there is no reason why the Court should decline to take cognizance of one aspect of the dispute on the basis of an assertion that the dispute has other aspects which have not been brought before it.

In short, on 15 December the Court could perceive no obstacle to its consideration of the present claims of the United States, and those claims continue today to be both unanswered and, I submit, unanswerable.

Since Iran has failed to defend, within the meaning of article 53 of the Court's Statute, we must enable the Court to satisfy itself both that it has jurisdiction of the case and that the claims are well founded in fact and law. With all due respect, I submit that since neither the facts nor the law are subject to serious dispute, the requirements of article 53 have been fully met and that the United States is, therefore, entitled to judgment on the merits of our claims.

Iranian Assurances of Embassy Protection

In the course of our presentation, I believe that we have given complete answers to a number of the questions which were posed by three Members of the Court yesterday. But according to my reckoning there are two questions to which we have not yet responded. That is, two questions posed yesterday. One posed by Judge Gros and one by Judge Tarazi. In order to fulfill our obligations to the Court I would like now to state each of the two questions and the answer of the Government of the United States.

First, Judge Gros pointed out that the Memorial of the United States refers to three undertakings which were given by the Government of Iran to the Government of the United States with respect to the protection of the Embassy, and Judge Gros has asked that we communicate these undertakings to the Court. The answer of the United States is as follows:

On Sunday, 21 October, there was a meeting between the Iranian Prime Minister, the Iranian Foreign Minister, the Iranian Ambassador to Sweden, the American Charge d'Affaires, and the visiting Director of Iranian Affairs from the U.S. Department of State. The American Charge d'Affaires informed the Iranians of plans for the former Shah to come to the United States, and he explained our concern about the possible public reaction in Tehran. He requested assurances that the Embassy and its personnel would be adequately protected. The Foreign Minister gave those assurances without hesitation. On

cised in the West Bank and Gaza. These arrangements should assure full autonomy for the inhabitants of these territories while providing for the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

There is, also, the question of how the elections will be conducted which will produce the freely elected body called for by the Camp David frameworks. Those elections should assure that that body has the popular support necessary to carry out, during the transitional period, its responsibilities as agreed among the parties.

On the question of security, let me reaffirm the statement in the Camp David accords that: "All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond." That commitment is an integral part of the Camp David frameworks, and this Administration intends to see that it is honored in full.

The U.N. Resolution

In February, we were faced with a draft resolution on the question of Israeli settlements which was circulated in the Security Council.

We disagreed with a reference in the resolution to dismantling existing settlements and sought unsuccessfully to have it removed. As often happens in the U.N. Security Council, therefore, we stated our reservations without opposing the resolution as a whole. President Carter has stated clearly our view that this call for dismantling was neither proper nor practical.

As you know, we did succeed in removing paragraph seven of the draft, which called on Israel to assure the exercise of religious freedom in Jerusalem, thereby wrongly implying that it is not already doing so.

There was a misunderstanding, however, with regard to our position on other references to Jerusalem in the resolution. The President understood that all references to Jerusalem would be removed before we would vote for the resolutions, believing that in the present phase of the autonomy negotiations it would not be helpful to raise the issue of Jerusalem in a U.N. resolution concerning settlements. I believed that what the President wished to have removed was the reference to Jerusalem and related material contained in paragraph seven. I was mistaken and have accepted full responsibility for this misunderstanding.

As Ambassador McHenry [Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations] stated in the Security Council immediately following the vote, the United States considers Resolution 465 as recommendatory rather than binding. With regard to the references in the resolution to "Palestinian and other Arab lands," it is our position that this phrase should not be construed as in any way prejudicing the outcome of the autonomy negotiations or negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.

As the President unequivocally stated on March 3, our policies with respect to settlements in occupied territory, and with respect to Jerusalem, have not changed. I think it is important that I take a moment to reiterate briefly our policies on these two issues.

Settlements in Occupied Territory. U.S. policy toward the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories is unequivocal and has long been a matter of public record. We consider it to be contrary to international law and an impediment to the successful conclusion of the Middle East peace process. We have consistently urged Israel to halt actions to create new settlements or to seize land to expand existing ones. We regard such restraint as particularly important while the autonomy negotiations are underway.

The Camp David frameworks do not refer specifically to Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. Nevertheless, certain questions concerning the status of the settlements during the transitional period will obviously have to be resolved in the course of the autonomy negotiations.

The permanent resolution of the settlements issue must then be decided in the subsequent negotiations on the final status of the occupied territories.

Jerusalem. Our policy on Jerusalem has remained consistent under the past four Presidents. As President Carter stated on March 3, our position on the status of Jerusalem has not changed. That position remains as indicated by the President in his letter to President Sadat signed at the time of the Camp David accords.

With respect to the future of Jerusalem, it has been our consistent position that the final status of the city must be settled in the context of negoti-

Arms Sales to Egypt

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, FEB. 25, 1980[1]

Over the past several days, we have had a number of questions about proposed American arms supply relationship with Egypt. As you know, Assistant Secretary of Defense, David McGiffert, has been in Cairo discussing a proposed program with the Egyptian Government. Those discussions, which took place over a period of about 5 days, are not complete, and Mr. McGiffert is now on his way back to Washington. Let me address what is the result of that meeting. This is necessarily going to be general, in that we must still deal with specifics with the Hill; some of it remains to be refined in specific terms.

The discussions concerning the U.S. military assistance in Cairo included Minister of Defense Kamal Hassan Ali, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Ahmed Badawi, and other Ministry of Defense officials. The team from the United States was led by Assistant Secretary McGiffert.

The U.S. team conveyed President Carter's decision concerning the amount of dollar credits potentially available for defense purchases and his decision that the United States was prepared to consider for sale to Egypt M60A3 tanks and F–15 and F–16 aircraft.

In light of these decisions by President Carter, the Egyptian Government has provided to the U.S. team a request for military equipment and other services, including 40 F–16 aircraft, about 250 M50A3 tanks, and a variety of other equipment. The United States will submit the major items requested to the U.S. Congress for review in accordance with U.S. legal requirements.

With respect to F–15 aircraft, the Egyptian Government expressed appreciation for the offer of the United States and decided to postpone action on that offer until a later time so as to devote available resources to the balanced equipment acquisitions outlined above. The Egyptian Government hopes in due course to order such F–15 aircraft as may be necessary for its defense needs.

The program agreed to by the two governments is a step in the long-term program based on the common interests of the two governments and peace and security in the area.

[1] Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III. ■

ations for a final peace. We believe that whatever solution is eventually agreed upon should preserve Jerusalem as an undivided city. It should provide for free access to the Jewish, Muslim, and Christian holy sites without distinction or discrimination for the free exercise of worship. The solution should assure the basic rights of all the city's residents. We have taken no position on exactly how the final status of Jerusalem might be defined.

The Peace Process

In sum, there has been no change in U.S. policy as we continue our dedicated efforts toward a comprehensive settlement. Before turning to your questions, I would like to say a few final words about the Middle East peace process as a whole. Over the past 3 years, there is no foreign policy goal on which the President and I have worked harder than a genuine peace in the Middle East. The achievement at Camp David, the Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel, the launching of negotiations to establish full autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza are historic accomplishments, particularly when viewed against the past history of this tragic conflict.

It is critically important that we concentrate our full and undivided attention on the autonomy negotiations and do all we can to give these talks the best possible prospect for success. The autonomy negotiations offer the first real opportunity for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza to achieve full autonomy within the context of assured Israeli security, as the next step toward achieving a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement.

As reflected in the agreement reached at Camp David, such a peace is deeply in the interests of the United States, of Israel, of Israel's neighbors, and of the world. Every decision we have made—and will make—is designed to move us toward that goal.

With this in mind, the President has invited President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin each to come to Washington in early April to discuss with him how best we can accelerate the movement toward our mutual objective.

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[1] Press release 63. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Protecting U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf Region

by Harold Brown

Address before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City on March 6, 1980. Mr Brown is Secretary of Defense.[1]

The 1970s closed with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The 1980s opened with the ensuing debate, both in this country and around the world, about how to respond to the invasion. At times confused, at times angry, at times profound, this debate is not yet resolved.

In my remarks today, I want to talk about U.S. interests—some of them vital—in that part of the world, about the nature of the challenge presented by the Soviet threat there, about our response to that challenge, and particularly about how our military capabilities fit into an overall security policy framework for the region and contribute to that response.

While recent events in Afghanistan are of critical significance, they are by no means the entire problem. Any discussion of the appropriate U.S. response must begin by placing these specific events—the invasion and its consequences—in the broader context of historical and possible or likely future developments.

The full context of the Soviet invasion includes historical Russian ambitions in that region, a 20-year buildup of Soviet military forces, the more recent development of Soviet power projection capabilities, and the very recent upheavals in the Islamic world.

Interpretations of the reasons for the Soviet invasion vary. The simple fact is that their motives are very likely to be mixed, and we don't know the exact mixture. But policymakers cannot avoid dealing with both the specific incident—the invasion—and the longer range question of how to deter such actions in the future. Reflecting this, the U.S. response since the December invasion has been on two levels:

- Extracting a real price from the Soviets for this specific case of outright aggression and
- Continuing to design a strategy and to develop a set of economic, political, diplomatic, and military measures to deter or defeat similar Soviet moves in the future—moves that could more directly threaten U.S. interests.

U.S. Interests

U.S. interests related to the Persian Gulf-southwest Asian region, certainly in the short term, focus on the safe and speedy release of the Americans held hostage in Tehran. For the longer term, our interests can be stated quite simply:

- To insure access to adequate oil supplies;
- To resist Soviet expansion;
- To promote stability in the region; and
- To advance the Middle East peace process, while insuring—and, indeed, in order to help insure—the continued security of the State of Israel.

Let us look more closely at each of these in turn.

Oil is the lifeblood of modern industrial societies. Sixty percent of the world's imported petroleum comes from this region: about 13% of the oil consumed in the United States and much higher percentages for our allies—45% for Germany and 75% for France and for Japan.

The loss of this oil to the economies of the West and the industrialized Far East would be a blow of catastrophic proportions.

Even given success in the much needed effort to reduce American dependence on imported oil, the loss of Persian Gulf supplies would do irreparable damage to our allies and friends. In fact, Soviet control of this area would make virtual economic vassals of much of both the industrialized and the less developed worlds. The U.S.S.R. would not even need actually to interrupt the flow of oil.

Russian dreams and schemes of expansion and dominion in this region go back to Tsarist days. But our long term interests, and those of the area, are best served if the countries of that region are free to develop in their own ways, not subject to foreign pressure of domination. Putting Soviet power astride, vast oil resources would, for

Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for $12.75 each. A check or money order, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany order. The stock number for this edition is 044-000-01720-2. Earlier editions of the *Digest* may also be purchased in the same manner. They are:

1973, Stock number 044-000-01525-1, 618 pages, $7.50
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1951 U.N., Western Hemisphere Foreign Relations Volume

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Volume II, The United Nations: The Western Hemisphere is the second of seven volumes for the year 1951 and was prepared by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State.

This volume of 1,673 pages presents high-level documentation (nearly all of which is newly declassified) on the policies of the United States in the United Nations on such major issues as the Chinese representation question, admission of new members, Soviet peace propaganda, the Southwest Africa question, and the draft international covenant of human rights.

It also includes the record of U.S. relations with the American Republics and Canada. Of particular note are those papers dealing with the fourth meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; hemisphere defense; economic and technical assistance policy; the attitude of the United States toward Communist activity in Guatemala; negotiation of military matters with Brazil and Venezuela; and political and economic relations with Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Panama, and Peru.

Copies of this volume may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for $20.00 each. Checks or money orders, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany order. The Department of State publication number is 8962. ■

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foreign policies. And I intend to consult very closely with the Congress on the shape and direction of our foreign policies.

Third, the Secretary of State must make sure that the State Department and the Foreign Service, as a whole, are fully engaged in the processes by which policy is made and in discussions of foreign policy with the Congress and our public. Neither the Secretary nor the Department can succeed if they do not have confidence in each other, and work together.

I intend to make full use of the Department and our Ambassadors in a fourth role: the conduct of our diplomacy abroad. There are times when only a Secretary of State can manage a negotiation for our nation. But to the extent possible, I will limit my own travel and rely on our skilled diplomats.

A Secretary of State has other roles, as well: in administration of the State Department, in helping manage and coordinate the overseas activities of U.S. Government agencies, and in managing the flow of information from the State Department to the White House and other agencies. Each must be carried out efficiently. Each should require less of the Secretary's time than the first roles I discussed.

This is my concept of the job. The President has said that he supports me in it. I will need your support, and counsel, as well.

Concluding Thoughts

Let me conclude with these thoughts. I come to this new assignment after 22 years as a member of the U.S. Senate. I have participated with many of you in the foreign policy debates of the past decade—indeed, the past generation.

Through these trials our society has been moved to strengthen and vigorously exercise our machinery for dissent and disagreement. That is all to the good. We are better for it.

But our challenges call on us to focus as intently upon another part of our national character—our ability to pull together and respond as Americans when our interests are under attack.

I do not believe there can be unanimity on the great and complex questions before us. But there can be a spirit of cooperation as we address them. I appear before you today in that spirit. ▪

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Secretary Vance Resigns; Senator Muskie Nominated

SECRETARY VANCE'S LETTER OF RESIGNATION, APR. 21, 1980[1]

Monday, April 21

Dear Mr. President:
I have the greatest respect and admiration for you and it is with a heavy heart that I submit my resignation. It has been a privilege and a high honor to serve you and our nation. I look with pride and satisfaction at the many actions and new directions which have marked our foreign policy under your leadership. The Panama Canal Treaty, the Camp David Accords, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, the strengthening of our military forces and our alliances, the negotiation of the SALT II Agreement, the Zimbabwe settlement, and the new thrust and direction given to our relations with the nations of the Third World are several of these major steps.

I know how deeply you have pondered your decision on Iran. I wish I could support you in it. But for the reasons we have discussed I cannot.

You would not be well served in the coming weeks and months by a Secretary of State who could not offer you the public backing you need on an issue and decision of such extraordinary importance—no matter how firm I remain in my support on other issues, as I do, or how loyal I am to you as our leader. Such a situation would be untenable and our relationship, which I value so highly, would constantly suffer.

I shall always be grateful to you for having had the opportunity to serve. I shall always have for you the deepest respect and affection, and you know you can count on my support for your continued leadership of our nation.

Respectfully yours,

CY

PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE, APR. 28, 1980[1]

April 28, 1980

To Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
I accept your resignation with regret, but with deep appreciation for your dedicated and effective service to me and to our country.

As mentioned in your letter, we have had notable accomplishments under your leadership as Secretary of State. I share your pride in what has been achieved.

Because you could not support my decision regarding the rescue operation in Iran, you have made the correct decision to resign. I know this is a matter of principle with you, and I respect the reasons you have expressed to me.

You leave your post with the admiration and best wishes of a grateful nation. Our close friendship and partnership during challenging times have been a source of strength and reassurance to me.

I look forward to your continuing advice and counsel on matters of importance to the United States—our country, which you have served so well.

Your friend,

JIMMY CARTER

SECRETARY VANCE, APR. 28, 1980[2]

I believe that all of you have received copies of my letter to the President and the President's letter to me.

I have the greatest admiration for the President, and I am most grateful for the opportunity which he has given me to serve him and our nation.

As I leave office, I'm proud to have been able to participate in the important foreign policy actions and new directions which have been taken under President Carter's leadership. They are important, not only for the present but for the future of our nation as well.

As you know, I could not support the difficult decision taken by the President on the rescue operation in Iran. I, therefore, submitted my resignation to the President last week. I have told the President that I continue to support fully his policies on other foreign policy issues. I have assured him that he can count on my support for his continued leadership of our nation. He will always have my deepest respect and affection.

Thank you all whom I have gotten to know well over these last 3½ years. That has also been a pleasure for me.

Q. What is it about the rescue mission that you could not support?

A. I do not want to go into details. I think my position is very clear on that, and that's all I want to say. Thank you very much.

Q. Is anybody else leaving with you?

A. No. I hope that everyone in the Department will stay and support the Acting Secretary and the President, and I'm going to tell him that.

Q. Are you going back to Wall Street?

A. I haven't made up my mind what I'm going to do. That might well be the case.

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, APR. 29, 1980[1]

I'm extremely pleased to announce to the nation that Senator Ed Muskie has accepted my offer to become our next Secretary of State. Senator Muskie brings to the senior position in a President's Cabinet years of experience in foreign policy, a very deep and profound knowledge of our country, the esteem and respect of his fellow Senators, sound judgment, and integrity which will be a great asset in this challenging position.

His extensive knowledge of foreign affairs will be a very valuable asset as he joins Warren Christopher, who will be the Deputy Secretary of State, and their partnership will be of great benefit to our entire nation. This will provide continuity for our foreign policy and give us the strength and wisdom which is necessary in this important post.

I'm very grateful this afternoon that Secretary Vance has joined us. He has served with distinction and with honor. The constructive accomplishments of his administration as Secretary of State have brought credit not only to him but to our nation as well.

Our country has always benefited in times of trouble when strong men and women have come forward to serve. I'm very glad that the strength and vision of Senator Ed Muskie will now be applied to the tasks that face us all—the challenge of defending our nation's honor, of promoting our national interest, of providing leadership throughout the world and maintaining our country at peace.

It's a distinct pleasure and honor for me to introduce to this group and to our nation Senator Ed Muskie who will be our next Secretary of State. Ed, congratulations to you.

SECRETARY-DESIGNATE MUSKIE'S QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION, APR. 29, 1980[3]

Thank you very much, Mr. President, for that generous expression of confidence. You notice I didn't say thank you for the appointment. I'll reserve that judgment until later. But, in any case, it is a pleasure to have this—and a privilege—opportunity of service in a new field in the months ahead.

I've got to say at the outset that I leave the Senate with very genuine regret. It has been my home and my life for more than 20 years. I hope that I've contributed something to making it a better institution.

May I say secondly that to follow in the footsteps of a close friend and a man for whom I have the most profound respect is a silver moment. Cy Vance has been a dedicated and effective world leader. He has left a legacy of good will and concern for the welfare of all people. He has dedicated himself to the endless search for peace.

The world is in turmoil. The issues are complex. But I believe that in this instability the United States must be perceived as stable and as a source of strength in the free world.

As Secretary of State, I will devote my full energies to achieve these goals. I respond to this challenge with genuine hope. America remains a land of great opportunity.

If these are dangerous times, they are also times of uncommon opportunities. I harbor no doubt that the great majority of Americans share that view and will sacrifice to that end, and I cannot stand in the wings when so much is at risk and so many have raised questions about the country's sense of purpose.

And so let me end as I began: First to thank the people of Maine for their unstinting support for many years and to recognize a great contribution already made by Secretary Vance and my thanks to the President for an awesome but a stimulating challenge as I face the months ahead. Thank you, Mr. President.

Q. Will you take questions here? When did the President ask you to be his Secretary of State?

A. He asked me in Nashville, Sunday evening, at a time when I was not aware of Secretary Vance's resignation and so when the President got through to me I thought probably all he was interested in was arranging for a fishing trip in Maine. [Laughter]

Q. Did you have any doubts when he asked you? Did you do any soul searching?

A. I don't think I really had doubts, that I would have no choice eventually. It did occur to me, as is often the case, all of the questions that I had to deal with and resolve before I could say yes, if that was my final determination. My first question was one

President Carter announces his intention to nominate Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine to be Secretary of State on April 29, 1980; from left to right are National Security Adviser Brzezinski, Mrs. Muskie, Senator Muskie, Vice President Mondale, and President Carter. (White House photo by Karl Schumacher)



Interview With Foreign Correspondents

President Carter was interviewed in the Oval Office on April 12, 1980, by Fred Emery (British Broadcasting Corp.), Winifred Scharlau (North German Television—ARD), Andre Celarie (French Television's Antenna 1), and Antonello Mareschalchi (Italian RAI-TV).[1]

Q. It's apparent there's great disappointment in this country over insufficient support of your policy in the Iran crisis. What is it exactly that you want your European allies to do?

A. I think the most important aspect of the Iranian and the Afghanistan problems is not the disappointment that we feel with our allies but the consistency and unanimity that we all share, in this country and in Europe, about the threat to peace that has been put forward, not only by the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan but by the terrorist attack on our Embassy and its officials in Iran. There has been a unanimous condemnation of these two acts as a threat to peace.

Our country has obviously moved forward much more aggressively in Iran, because our people are directly involved. We have tried for the last more than 5 months, through every peaceful means, through every diplomatic means, to bring about a resolution of this crisis, to protect the honor and integrity of our country, and to secure the safe release of our people back to freedom.

We've now found that because of many reasons, the Iranian Government—what there is of it—has not been able to deliver on their commitments to transfer the hostages to safe care and then to release them altogether.

We do need the full and aggressive support of our allies. What we ask specifically of them is that they carry out now two basic proposals. One is to honor the sanctions against Iran that were voted and supported by all of them in the U.N. Security Council earlier this year. The final action of the U.N. Security Council was stopped by a Soviet veto. And secondly, if this should prove to be unsuccessful, then to join us in strong diplomatic moves against Iran, to show them that we all do stand together in this condemnation of terrorism, a threat to our country, to all of them, and particularly the smaller nations which don't have the economic or political or military power to protect their interests.

Q. With reference to what you just said, Mr. Brzezinski [Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs], said that "if all the allies gave their solidarity, such solidarity could render unnecessary the application of other measures." But that means that if they don't give their full solidarity, you'll think of enforcing other measures. Which ones, and when?

A. Yes, we do, and we don't have much time left. The American people are ready and eager to see this matter resolved. Under international law we are a seriously aggrieved party, and we have a breadth of options available to us—economic, diplomatic, military options as well.

To the extent that the allies can join with us in making effective the diplomatic and economic pressures that might cause the Iranians to release the hostages, then we can forgo the requirement that we take additional, stronger action. We prefer to keep our action nonbelligerent in nature, but we reserve the right to take whatever action is necessary to secure the safe release of our hostages.

Q. You said you have not much time. Can you give us an idea of timing?

A. It's not a matter of many weeks or certainly not a matter of months. It's not appropriate for me now to set a specific date. But we have sent to the heads of nations—all of those represented by you—a specific date, at which time we would expect this common effort to be successful.

Q. Mr. Powell [Jody Powell, White House press secretary] said yesterday that the next moves won't be military. But if the militants take action against the hostages—physical action or a trial—what will be your action?

A. Our action would be very strong and forceful and might very well involve military means.

What Mr. Powell said is consistent with my policy that we do intend to exhaust not only our own diplomatic and economic action—and there are other actions of an economic nature that we can take against Iran—but also to exhaust the common effect of concerted action on the part of our allies, which we have requested very clearly both privately and publicly. And following that, we will be required to take additional action which may very well involve military means.

But if our hostages are injured or if any of them are killed, then we would not delay in taking much stronger action of an incisive nature.

Q. Yesterday the European Foreign Ministers have been received by President Bani-Sadr [of Iran], and they hinted the possibility of a sanction. Is that step enough for you?

A. I think I've answered that question already by saying that economic sanctions, as supported by all of your nations in the U.N. Security Council, would be one of the steps, and we would expect additional diplomatic steps to be taken unless an immediate favorable response is received from the Iranians.

I have talked to the leaders of the countries represented here—some within the last 2 or 3 days, some within the last 2 or 3 weeks—and have made it plain to them that the experience that we have suffered with the Iranians is constant misleading statements, constant delay, constant failure to carry out commitments made, either because of a deliberate attempt to mislead or because of timidity and a failure to have authority enough to carry out a commitment even if it was made in good conscience.

But I think that we have now an opportunity, if strong and concerted action is taken by our allies in Europe and our friends and supported by additional economic measures that we are now contemplating, to avoid the military action or other stronger belligerent action that would be always an open option for us.

Q. In pursuing what you've said is an aggressive or a more aggressive policy toward Iran, and if we also were to join in with you in that, aren't you not only failing to get the hostages back but also driving Iran and its oil into the arms of the Russians?

A. I don't think anyone could find fault with me because I have not been adequately patient. We have seen 53 innocent Americans held by terrorists,

first of all, and then later supported by and condoned by the official Government of Iran in complete contravention to every standard of human decency and morality and in contravention of diplomatic procedures and international law. This has been a situation condemned on two occasions by the entire membership of the U.N. Security Council; the International Court of Justice has confirmed this opinion.

And we have been extremely patient. Our patience is running out. And if I have been criticized in my own country for any aspect of my behavior, it's been because we have been too patient, not too precipitous.

Q. Yes. I wasn't really questioning that you've been too patient. I was suggesting, now that you've switched from the patience to a course that is pushing up against Iran, that you might get to a point now where you would have to, say, choose between the American national interest and the lives of the hostages. How would you choose in a situation like that?

A. I have tried to avoid making that choice, and I think it would be inappropriate for me in a public forum to describe what I have done. But I don't think that, at least at this date, we have taken any action or made any decision that is inimical to our nation's best interest and also to the interest of the hostages and their lives.

Obviously, the paramount interest has to be what's best for our nation and its security, but we are trying to honor that commitment without endangering the lives of the hostages.

Q. In grappling with this crisis, have you ever come to the point, in your heart, where you thought you should devote all your time to it and not seek a second term of office?

A. I don't see any incompatibility between the two. I have devoted an enormous amount of time to the hostage question. It never leaves my mind for any waking moment. It's a question and a problem that permeates the consciousness of our entire nation.

What we have tried to do is to act with moral decency, with restraint, with sensitivity about the revolutionary and chaotic nature of the situation in Iran, to protect our nation's interest, to honor as best we could the sensitivities of other countries, and to protect the lives of the hostages. This is a very complicated question. At the same time, obviously, I have to deal with the normal matters that fall on the shoulders of a President here in the Oval Office, and, in addition, I have been managing the campaign for reelection. But I have never let the Iranian question suffer because of unwarranted attention to a campaign effort.

Q. Have your decisions to break off diplomatic relations and to enforce sanctions based on the belief that the moderates in Tehran can be written off?

A. No. Some of the moderates in Tehran, I think, have made an honest effort to secure the transfer of the hostages from control of the terrorists and subsequently to achieve their release to freedom.

Quite often we have been informed, on several occasions, that the Revolutionary Council has made a unanimous decision to make this transfer, that the transfer was approved by the militants in the compound, and we have been informed by the top Iranian officials that this action had the approval of Khomeini himself. Subsequent events have proven that this degree of unanimity which seems to be required under President Bani-Sadr's government has not been achieved.

It has been a very frustrating experience, but we've not written off any element of possible support that might be available to make the crisis come to an end.

Q. Coming to another subject, Afghanistan: You surely knew what was going to happen; you surely knew about the buildup. Why didn't you warn anyone, and by warning, maybe prevent it or have the Russians think twice about it?

A. I didn't know what was going to happen.[2]

Q. You were not informed that there was buildup at the border with Afghanistan?

A. Yes, we obviously had extremely good intelligence about the placement of Soviet troops around the border of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. They had been there for a long time—months, even years, some of them. We also knew about the increased Soviet presence in Afghanistan of military personnel, in the nature of a few hundred.

It was only Christmas Eve when a massive airlift began to move strong Soviet troops into the area around Kabul, and it was only a day or two later, as you know, when the Soviets had the leader of Afghanistan, President Amin, assassinated, along with some of the members of his family.

This was the first time that the Soviets had used their own very powerful military forces for an invasion of a neighboring country since the Warsaw Pact itself was formed. It was an unprecedented action on their part, therefore, for the last quarter-century.

I have tried since I've been in this office not only to strengthen the constant moral commitment of this nation and to strengthen that commitment on the part of other nations—human rights, the preservation of democracy, the honoring of international borders, the effectuation of peace among disputing parties—but also to increase our military strength, in NATO and in other places in the world. I think we've been successful in that.

What is required now, with this gross violation of the principles of detente and this gross violation of human decency and the principles of international law on the part of the Soviet Union, is a clear message to them, unified if possible, that they will not be permitted to continue this invasion with impunity, that the consequences of their invasion will be very severe for them.

I had, in the most powerful nation on Earth, the options of acting economically or politically or militarily. We chose to exercise, along with many other nations, a political and economic route and to hold in reserve stronger action in the future, if necessary, to preserve peace in that troubled region.

A hundred and four members of the United Nations joined in condemning the Soviet invasion, calling for their withdrawal. They have not withdrawn. As a matter of fact, within the last few days they have moved additional major military units into Afghanistan. They are in direct violation of international law, and they are also threatening the advantages of detente, now and in the future.

To the extent that the Soviets are convinced not only that the United States is going to take economic action against them but other nations as well will take action against the Soviet Union—to that extent we believe that ultimately they will withdraw from Afghanistan. But they have certainly shown no evidence at this stage of any inclination to withdraw their forces. They are steadily building up their forces instead.

Q. Chancellor Schmidt [of West Germany] said yesterday that the

the following day, 22 October, the American Charge d'Affaires and the visiting Director of Iranian Affairs again met with the Foreign Minister. The Charge, in a discussion of the Shah's travel to the United States, again requested assurances that the American Embassy and its personnel would be protected. The Foreign Minister renewed his assurances that protection would be provided. The Shah, incidentally, arrived in the United States the next day, 22 October. On 31 October, the Embassy security officer met with the Commander of the Iranian National Police at the American Embassy. The Police Commander told the security officer that the police had been told to provide full protection for the American personnel. This is our answer to Judge Gros' question.

The following day, 1 November, there was a demonstration of 5,000 people around the Embassy and complete security was provided. Three days later, however, the assurances were breached, and the Embassy was sacked under the protection of the Government of Iran.

Judge Tarazi has asked whether responsible U.S. authorities were aware of the fact that granting of authorization to the former Shah to visit the United States in order to obtain medical treatment for cancer might possibly lead to the occupation of the Embassy and the seizure of the hostages. The answer is that such officials were aware that the admission of the Shah might result in some sort of violence against the Embassy, and it was precisely for this reason that the United States requested assurances from the Iranian Government that adequate protection for the Embassy would be provided following the arrival of the Shah in the United States. As I have just indicated, clear and firm assurances were provided on three occasions during the last days of October, and on 1 November, at which point the Shah had been in the United States for more than a week, the Government of Iran honored its assurances in full. The breach of those assurances occurred 3 days later, giving rise to the tragedy with which we are concerned in this case.

Relief Sought by the United States

Finally, I should like to turn to the question of the relief which we seek in the Court's final judgment. In such a judgment we are seeking three quite separate types of relief. To over simplify, we seek first declarations to the effect that various actions attributable to the Government of Iran have violated various legal principles, embodied not only in customary international law but in the four specific treaties on which we rely. Second, we seek a judgment that in order to bring the foregoing violations to an end, the Government of Iran shall take certain specific corrective steps. And third, since grave injury has been done both to the United States and to its nationals in Tehran, we seek a decision by the Court that the United States and its affected nationals are entitled to recover financial reparations in an amount which cannot yet be determined but which can and should be determined in a subsequent proceeding to be conducted when Iran's unlawful conduct has been terminated.

I shall now briefly discuss these separate forms of relief. First, I think that there is and can be no question whatever but that the United States is entitled to a declaration that in the ways specified in detail in our Memorial, the Government of Iran has violated and is continuing to violate its international legal obligations to the United States and its nationals. It has long been a part of the jurisprudence of this Court that such declarations serve the vital function of establishing the legal situation between the parties with binding force so that the legal position thus established cannot again be called into question insofar as the legal effects ensuing therefrom are concerned. For that proposition I would refer the Court to the decision in the case of the *Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzow), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 13*, at page 20.

In reliance upon that well-established principle, the U.S. Government is respectfully requesting that the Court adjudge and declare that the Government of Iran, through the conduct described in our Memorial, has violated its international legal obligations to the United States, as provided by articles 22, 24–27, 29, 31, 37, 44, and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; articles 5, 27, 28, 31, 33–36, 40 and 72 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; articles 2, 13, and 18–19 of the 1955 treaty of amity between the United States and Iran, and articles 2, 4, and 7 of the New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents.

With all due respect to the Court, the clarity of the facts and the legal principles is such that we consider our right to the specified declarations to be beyond dispute. This brings me to the question of whether the Court should now direct the Government of Iran to take specific action to terminate its continuing unlawful conduct. In suggesting an affirmative answer to that question, I am keenly aware of the fact that at an earlier stage in this case we asked the Court for somewhat similar relief in the form of provisional measures and that Iran's subsequent refusal to comply with the resulting provisional measures has surely created doubt as to whether it will comply with the final judgment of this Court. In response, I will simply draw an obvious legal distinction.

Within the community of international legal scholars there is at least some doubt as to whether an indication of provisional measures under article 41 of the Court's Statute is binding and enforceable, but there can be no equivalent doubt about a judgment of the Court on the merits. Conceivably, the authorities in Iran have felt that they were not legally bound by the provisional measures indicated by the Court on 15 December. But article 94 of the U.N. Charter specifically requires obedience to the final judgment on the merits and provides for its enforcement.

In these circumstances, I submit, the only proper assumption that can now be made is that if the Court now incorporates, in its final judgment, appropriate directions for the termination of Iran's continuing unlawful conduct, the Government of Iran will bow to the U.N. Charter and obey. As to the right of the United States to such relief, we think the law is clear. In the Court's 1971 advisory opinion in the *Namibia* case, it was very clearly held that once the Court has made a binding determination that an unlawful situation is in existence, and I will now quote the Court's language:

> It would be failing in the discharge of its judicial functions if it did not declare that there is an obligation, especially upon the members of the United Nations, to bring that situation to an end. [*I.C.J. Reports 1971*, p. 82]

The present unlawful situation in

Tehran can be terminated, if not completely remedied, by obedience to the provisions which we have requested in our Memorial.

MAR. 20, 1980

In order to terminate the unlawful situation in Iran, the United States respectfully requests that the Court include within its final judgment the following five provisions.

1. The Government of Iran shall immediately insure that the premises of the U.S. Embassy, Chancery, and Consulates are restored to the possession of U.S. authorities under their exclusive control and shall insure their inviolability and effective protection as provided for by the treaties in force between the two states and by general international law.

2. The Government of Iran shall insure the immediate release, without any exception, of all persons of U.S. nationality who are or have been held in the Embassy of the United States or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran, or who are or have been held as hostages elsewhere, and afford full protection to all such persons in accordance with the treaties in force between the two states and with general international law.

3. The Government of Iran shall, as from that moment, afford to all the diplomatic and consular personnel of the United States the protection, privileges, and immunities to which they are entitled under the treaties in force between the two states and under general international law, including immunity from any form of criminal jurisdiction and freedom and facilities to leave the territory of Iran.

4. The Government of Iran shall, in affording the diplomatic and consular personnel of the United States the protection, privileges, and immunities to which they are entitled, including immunity from any form of criminal jurisdiction, insure that no such personnel shall be obliged to appear on trial or as a witness, deponent, source of information, or in any other role, in any proceedings, whether formal or informal, initiated by or with the acquiesence of the Iranian Government, whether such proceedings be denominated a trial, grand jury, international commission, or otherwise.

Before I move on to the fifth paragraph in this series of affirmative steps to terminate the Iranian violations, I should note, with respect to the fourth paragraph, that it will have no effect on the U.N. commission assembled by the Secretary General, if indeed that commission ever resumes its functions. The fourth paragraph would prohibit any of the hostages from being obliged to give evidence before any sort of commission, but it has never been contemplated that the Secretary General's commission would take testimony or evidence from the hostages. It is true that it was contemplated that the commission would visit the hostages and speak to them, primarily for the purpose of assessing their health, welfare, and general status, but the commission has no authority to interrogate the hostages in any substantive sense and will not do so. Accordingly, the fourth paragraph, which is squarely based upon article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, will not interfere with any legitimate international efforts to resolve the crisis.

This brings me to the fifth and last of the declarations which we are requesting in order to bring an end to the Iranian violations of international law. This last declaration would read as follows:

5. The Government of Iran shall submit to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, or extradite to the United States, those persons responsible for the crimes committed against the personnel and premises of the U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Iran.

As I have previously stated, we regard such a declaration of the utmost importance, in order to maximize the possibility that persons who engage in hostage-taking, and particularly in taking of diplomatic hostages, will be properly punished, thus creating a deterrent against such future violations of the fundamental rules of diplomatic law.

Finally, we seek financial reparations from Iran, and we think that there can be no doubt whatever as to our entitlement to such a remedy. As demonstrated at page 78 of our Memorial, this Court has repeatedly held that where, as here, a state has committed a breach of its international legal obligations, it must pay reparations in order to wipe out as far as possible all of the consequences of its illegal acts so as to reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if such acts had not been committed. In short, when the damage has been done, the United States and its nationals must be made whole insofar as possible.

At the present time, of course, it is not possible to measure the damage, in part because the political situation in Iran precludes us from obtaining essential information and in part because the damage is actually continuing day by day. For example, we know that there has been substantial physical damage to the buildings included within the Embassy compound, but it would take an extensive technical evaluation of the damage in order to put a financial value on it, and there is no way that such an evaluation can be made now. Again, we know that individual hostages have been subjected to severe psychological stress and may have sustained physical injury as well, but by definition we cannot have access now for the purpose of determining an appropriate reparation figure. When the hostages have returned home and the U.S. premises have been returned to our control, it will be possible to make the necessary evaluations, but not before.

Despite the impossibility of determining the amount of reparations at this stage, we believe that we are clearly entitled now to an immediate declaration which will make clear to the world, including the Government of Iran, that reparations in some amount will eventually be due. The issue of our entitlement to some amount of reparations is ripe for judicial decision; given the nature of the Iranian conduct and the clarity of the Iranian violations, I can think of no conceivable reason why our right to reparations should not now be declared in principle, thus narrowing the remaining issues between the parties; and we think it likely that such a declaration will accelerate the final resolution of the dispute. As pointed out at page 79 of our Memorial, the Court's 1974 opinion in the *Fisheries Jurisdiction* case makes plain that it is entirely proper for the Court to make a general declaration establishing the principle that compensation is due, even though a further proceeding may be necessary in order to receive evidence and establish the amount. As I conclude my argument with respect to the terms of the judgment, I wish to formally confirm to the Court that the final submissions of the U.S. Government are as stated at pages 80 and 81 of its Memorial.

I shall now address myself to the several questions which were posed

the first time, give the Soviet state international economic leverage on a par with its military might.

Stability in the region does not mean the absence of change. It does require a strong measure of security for each of its states and opportunities for the nonviolent resolution of local tensions and differences. The influences of both the industrialized West and Islamic fundamentalism will continue to touch directly the lives of individuals and the future of nations in that region. But there is a role for us to play in building individual and collective local security, while at the same time discouraging such destabilizing developments as the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Middle East peace process is a fundamental component of U.S. policy as is our commitment to the security of Israel. These aspects of striving for a stable and secure Middle East have taken on new significance in the wake of the recent events in Iran and Afghanistan.

The road to peace in the Middle East is long, steep, and hazardous. But progress along that road has been—viewed overall—one of the great success stories in international affairs. In 1973 Israel and Egypt were at war. When this Administration took office, the only international exchanges between the two nations came from the barrels of guns used in border attacks.

In 3 short years, we have witnessed the Camp David accords, the frameworks for a comprehensive peace, and open borders and exchanges of ambassadors. In pursuing peace we will continue to honor our national commitment to the security of Israel. We will also work with our Arab friends to provide a security framework that helps protect the region from Soviet expansionism and any consequent threats to the free flow of oil which is so important to them and the rest of the world.

As we seek to advance these four interests, our determination to respond to any threat to them is clear. As President Carter said in his State of the Union speech: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

International Complications for the Soviets

Before I elaborate on our strategy and capabilities to deter any such threat in the future, I would like to outline several other factors which compound Soviet calculations in the area and could contribute to the solution of our problems there.

First and foremost of these is the resurgence of Islam, reinforcing an historic trend toward nationalism in that part of the world. Unlike the Soviet Union, we are not seeking to insulate a large Islamic population from the influences of their religious tradition. We do not seek to suppress religious activism in the Islamic world. And this is true even with respect to Iran. As we have made clear many times during the continuing hostage crisis, if there is an external threat to Iran's Islamic revolution, it comes from the Soviet Union, not from the United States.

Second, and related to the first, is the active resistance of nationalistic peoples to outside domination. Recent events in Afghanistan remind us—and, more immediately no doubt, the Soviets—of the timeless truth of Toynbee's description of the classic problem of invaders:

> . . . an overweening self-confidence, bred by this mistaken belief in their own invincibility, then leads them on to court disaster by rashly attacking still unbroken peoples whose spirit and capacity for resistance takes them by surprise.

I do not mean to imply that the Soviets cannot prevail in Afghanistan. They can—but only at a price, and it is a steep one. And whatever problems the forces of religion and independence which are sweeping the area create for us, let us not forget that ultimately they can help inhibit Soviet expansionism.

Third World concerns have played what is to some observers a surprising role in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion. Afghanistan had been friendly, indeed pro-Soviet. An underdeveloped nation, it historically has been a buffer state between great power rivals. The swift dispatch of Soviet tanks, helicopter gunships, and tens of thousands of troops to suppress "friendly" Afghanistan rightly shocked much of the Third World.

Our allies and the other industrialized democracies—and, to take a different example, China as well—share our interests and concerns in the area—and, by and large, our evaluation of the dangers—even if they do not accept every element of our formulas for dealing with the situation. Western Europe and Japan, even more than we, depend on the oil resources of the region. Many of our allies have historic ties to countries there.

While we seek allied support in the region, we must realize that direct contributions are not the only way they can help. For example, increased allied contributions to their own security provide us greater flexibility in the measures we must take to bolster our military capabilities for meeting threats to the peace and our common interests in the Persian Gulf and southwest Asia.

These diverse factors can help us meet the challenge posed by the Soviets—indeed, they are an indispensable part of the total response. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the United States must take the lead in organizing a comprehensive response to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and must be an effective deterrent to still more dangerous actions they might otherwise be tempted to take in the future. This comprehensive response must have many facets—military and nonmilitary.

Nonmilitary Components of Deterrence

The first nonmilitary ingredient is an effective, long term energy policy to reduce our dependence on imported oil. This objective is crucial to our national security in the future.

However, it must also be clearly understood that no conceivable combination of measures—conservation, stockpiling, or alternate energy sources—can totally eliminate the near term security problem that is created by threats to the gulf and its oil. The hard fact is that there is nothing the United States—or our industrial world partners or the less developed countries—can do in the coming decade, or probably even the next, that would save us from severe damage if the bulk of the oil supply from the Persian Gulf were cut off for a sustained period.

The issue here is not, as some have claimed, one of going to war for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries or to avoid waiting in gas lines. Conservation is necessary in any event. But to advocate it as a substitute for U.S. leadership in strengthening the security of the area is simply to fail to grasp, or to wish away, the gravity of the true situation, as it affects not

only us but our allies and friends. Even an energy self-sufficient America would not be secure in a world in which Western Europe or Japan or Turkey or Brazil could be made energy hostages of a hostile power.

The second nonmilitary aspect is economic assistance to those countries in the region that are grappling with the problems of development. A particularly important example is the case of our ally Turkey. Economic uncertainty tends to fuel political instability. Helping a country solve its internal problems enables it to deal more effectively with common security and other regional concerns. We look to our friends in the industrialized world and to the wealthy oil producers in the area to bear their full share of this part of the task.

Military Components of Deterrence

Let me turn now to the military components. In our military planning for the Persian Gulf and southwest Asia—as indeed across the board—our first objective is to deter; that is, we seek to make clear that there will be major risks and penalties associated with aggression. We must be able, if need be, to defeat aggression at various levels. Without question, such an ability and the will to use it constitute the most effective deterrent.

Before I move on to discuss the kinds of forces that are necessary to carry out this objective, let me make four general observations about the military components of our response.

First, while the terms "rapid deployment forces" and "power projection" are relatively new additions to the jargon, the military missions they signify are not new at all. The United States has been in the rapid deployment and power projection business for a long time. If you doubt that, ask the Marines who 5 years ago celebrated their 200th anniversary.

In both World Wars, in Korea, and then in Vietnam, we showed that we were able to sustain very large military forces very far from our shores. Whatever our other difficulties in those cases, the logistics capability which the United States demonstrated was impressive indeed. Moreover, it has long been a part of our military doctrine to be ready to engage in contingencies in remote areas, without unacceptably compromising our ability to maintain deterrence and defense in other theaters.

Second, I reject altogether the proposition that we should not develop the capability to use military forces effectively because we might then be tempted to use them unwisely. I believe the American people and their political and military leaders are wise enough—and, one might add, experienced enough—to understand and accept a few simple truths.

- Military forces alone cannot solve all the world's problems.
- Their commitment is a very serious business.
- Such forces and the will to use them when necessary are essential to the defense of our vital interests.
- Those interests must be carefully defined.

We must be guided by the lessons of history and not haunted by its ghosts.

Third, there have been some press reports of alleged U.S. reliance on a "trip wire" strategy, in which we would, by preference or necessity, quickly resort to theater nuclear weapons to defend against Soviet attack in the area. Several points need to be made. Any direct conflict between American and Soviet forces carries the risk of intensification and geographical spread of the conflict. We cannot concede to the Soviets full choice of the arena or the actions.

But that by no means implies that escalation to the use of nuclear weapons will be the consequence of a U.S.-Soviet clash in southwest Asia. In part to make such a result less likely, a major portion of our effort in the region is devoted to improving the conventional strength we can bring to bear there. In fact, given U.S. capabilities and those of others whose interests would be threatened by Soviet aggression, given the difficulties inherent in any Soviet military actions beyond its borders in rugged terrain and hostile surroundings, and given our wide range of options both to exploit other Soviet vulnerabilities and to defend against attack, conventional deterrence and defense are feasible goals.

My fourth general observation is that this overall response is, and must be, a multilateral one, involving local forces, U.S. forces, and those of other countries outside the region. For example, we are working with several countries in the region for increased U.S. access to local facilities. We are talking with both potential contributors and potential recipients concerning programs of economic support and security assistance—which are necessary complements to our other efforts. And we are consulting with countries both in the region and outside concerning military cooperation there.

Despite the complexities inherent in multilateral action by independent nations, on the whole we have been quite successful in our endeavors, and we expect this to continue. I should note that in many instances, we seek not formal, public guarantees and agreements but rather the establishment of a pattern of quiet consultation and parallel pursuit of common security goals.

Meeting the objective of deterrence will require a combination of local forces for self-defense, U.S. forces present in the area, and, as appropriate, U.S. and other forces capable of rapid deployment to reinforce threatened areas.

In most cases—indeed, to some degree in all cases—local forces in a country under attack or directly threatened would mobilize for its defense. We cannot hope, nor do we plan, to defend peoples in the region who will not help defend themselves. By that same token, where we are involved, we do not expect to stand alone. Because aggression against one could spread to threaten all, others in the regions may well—and surely ought to—join in the collective defense. The kinds of assistance they would contribute would vary greatly from case to case, ranging from providing necessary access and support facilities to mobilizing forces that would stand alongside our own to deter and engage an enemy.

In addition to indigenous forces, deterrence involves both U.S. military presence in a troubled region and U.S. forces which can be quickly moved to it. What is important is the ability rapidly to move forces into the region with the numbers, mobility, and firepower to preclude initial adversary forces from reaching vital points. It is not necessary for our initial units to be able to defeat the whole force an adversary might eventually have in place. It is also not necessary for us to await the firing of the first shot or the prior arrival of hostile forces; many of our forces can be moved upon strategic warning and some upon receipt of even very early and ambiguous indications.

An effective U.S. response to ag-

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that I really was not in a position to answer, and that is whether I was the person to fill what I thought was a great responsibility at a time when the country needed it filled by an oustanding individual.

I had real doubts that I was that person. I can think of others who've had more actual foreign policy experience. I can think of others who have more foreign policy contacts around the world and the world with which he must deal. I'm not a foreign policy technician. I'm simply a Senator of 22 years who's had the exposure to foreign policy that a Senator with that length of service would have. So I did have those doubts.

Q. Do you have any doubts about the President's policy, for instance the raid and the attempt to rescue the hostages? Do you think that was a correct decision which Mr. Carter made?

A. I don't think it's appropriate at this point for me to undertake a review of the past. More than that, in response to any other questions that may be on the tips of your tongues, I don't think it appropriate for me to speak as the foreign policy spokesman of the State Department until I am confirmed. You will all understand that, although I have had the kind of exposure to foreign policy that a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will have, that before I can really speak as the spokesman I will have to undergo a process of long briefings with respect to the incident which your question raises and others.

Q. Will you be the number-one foreign policy adviser? There seems to have been some conflict in the past, some confusion as to who really speaks for the Administration as between former Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski [Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs].

A. The President has left no doubt in my mind on that score.

Q. What was the answer? [Laughter]

A. No doubt that I'll be the foreign policy spokesman.

Q. May I ask you a question as a Senator, then? Have you endorsed President Carter for reelection and, if not, why not?

A. I did not accept this job for political reasons and will not associate it with political reasons. I have not endorsed a candidate in this campaign.

Q. Were you and the President together in Nashville or did he call you up there?

A. He was not with me in Nashville. [Laughter] I think he might have enjoyed it, but, no, he was not. I was there alone, and he called me there.

Q. What do you hope to accomplish when you go back to Maine tomorrow?

A. I simply wanted to go back to Maine and to say to my people on my own turf how grateful I am for the opportunities for service they've given me and to express my appreciation for that and to tell them personally my reasons for accepting this new responsibility.

Q. Have you decided when you will resign from the Senate, and have you a preference or have you had discussions regarding a successor, somebody to fill the remaining 2½ years of your term?

A. I would assume that I will resign from the Senate when I am confirmed in this job, and I don't know how long that process will take. It may take the rest of this session, I don't know. [Laughter]

About the second question you raised, I have discussed the matter of my succession with the governor today in Maine, and he is giving it his consideration.

Q. Is that his choice or yours?

A. It's his choice.

Q. Are you confident this Iranian hostage situation can be settled without an actual situation such as war—

A. If I were not confident that that route should be pursued with whatever prospects for success, ingenuity, persuasion, diplomacy, and all of the peaceful means that may be available to us could achieve, I wouldn't be taking this job.

Q. In other words, you're not a hawk on this matter?

A. I don't automatically classify myself before considering any question of war and peace.

Q. Will you be prepared to recommend military action if all the peaceful means seem to have failed?

A. If I were to answer that "yes," I'd be immediately labeled as a hawk, so I won't answer that question yes or no. I'd consider the options and obviously my effort would be to deal with the peaceful options available to us.

Q. How do you feel about Mr. Vance's resignation? Do you think he did the right thing in light of his feeling about military action, or do you think he should have waited?

A. I think any man who holds public office who feels he cannot do so without violating his principles does a courageous thing when he resigns the office. I was asked questions like that when I ran for Vice President, and that was my answer then, and it is my answer now. I could never be critical of a man who does anything as a matter of principle, and I think that's what Secretary Vance has done.

Q. On the other side of your career question—your choice today—after 22 years in the Senate, why, at this point, to leave it?

A. I was never elected for life. I was elected for 6 years at a time, and I'm approaching the time when I would have to consider running again, but frankly, you know, I've never been a stagnant kind of individual. I've been in the Senate 22 years. I'm still stimulated by the challenges that it offers, but here's a whole new arena in which to deal, whole new set of challenges, whole new kind of authority, a chance for growth. I mean, how could I say no? Especially when the President of the United States says it's important that I say yes?

Q. You've left a little ambivalence here, if I may—

A. If I have, then I've had a successful press conference. [Laughter]

Q. Did you take this job on because you really believe in President Carter's foreign policy, or whether you think, as you put it, the times are so perilous that you could not stand by and let it fail, if it perhaps is failing?

A. I believe it's important at this time in our country's history that the best possible people undertake to shape our foreign policy for the future, as well as consider whatever mistakes may have been made in the past, you know, calls upon all of us to respond when we are told that we have something to offer. And it is in that spirit that I have accepted this assignment and am honored to do so and with that, thank you all very much.

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[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 5, 1980.

[2] Press release 100.

[3] Text from White House press release. ■

U.S. Interests and Ideals

Address before the World Affairs Council in Philadelphia on May 9, 1980.[1]

For the past 6 months, all our policies abroad have been conducted in the glare of two crises—the holding of American hostages in Iran and the brutal invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. In meeting these crises our tactics must change with changing circumstances. But our goals will not change and have not wavered.

We will not rest until our fellow Americans held captive in Iran—against every tenet of law and decency—are safe and home free.

Along with other nations which have condemned Soviet aggression, we will continue to impose economic and political costs on the Soviet Union until it withdraws its armed forces and restores the independence of Afghanistan.

These two crises underline the reality that our world is indeed a dangerous place, but what I want to emphasize today is that amid the crises of the moment, no matter how profoundly significant they are, the fundamentals of American foreign policy are being carried forward with consistency, with strength, and with determination.

The central reality that confronts America today is that of a complex world, a world that is turbulent because it is politically awakened in its entire breadth for the first time in its collective history.

Our world is one of conflicting hopes, ideologies, and powers. It is a revolutionary world which requires confident, stable, and powerful American leadership—and that's what it is getting and that's what it will continue to get—to shift the trend of history away from the specter of fragmentation and toward the promise of genuinely global cooperation and peace.

Effective Foreign Policy

So we must strive in our foreign policy to blend commitment to high ideals with a sober calculation of our own national interests. Unchanging American ideals are relevant to this troubling area of foreign policy and to this troubled era in which we live. Our society has always stood for political freedom. We have always fought for social justice and we have always recognized the necessity for pluralism. Those values of ours have a real meaning, not just in the past 200 years ago or 20 years ago, but now, in a world that is no longer dominated by colonial empires, and it demands a more equitable distribution of political and economic power.

But in this age of revolutionary change, the opportunities for violence and for conflict have also grown. American power must be strong enough to deal with that danger and to promote our ideals and to defend our national interests.

That's why the foreign policy which we've shaped over the last 3 years must be based simultaneously on the primacy of certain basic moral principles—principles founded on the enhancement of human rights—and on the preservation of an American military strength that is second to none. This fusion of principle and power is the only way to insure global stability and peace while we accommodate to the inevitable and necessary reality of global change and progress.

The complexity of interrelated and sometimes disturbing events and circumstances requires that we in America increase the degree of public understanding of our foreign policy and public support for it. It is extremely complicated. It is rapidly changing in its tactical confrontations on a day-by-day basis, and the degree in a democracy with which Americans do understand these complex issues is a prerequisite for success. Foreign policy no longer has a single or simple focus, such as defeating Nazi aggression or repelling of a monolithic Stalinist threat. Instead, Americans must be mature enough to recognize that we need to be strong and we need to be accommodating at the same time. We need to protect our own interests vigorously while finding honorable ways to accommodate those new claimants to economic and political power which they have not had in the past.

There are two obvious preconditions for an effective American foreign policy: a strong national economy and a strong national defense. That's why I placed the highest priority on the development of a national energy policy which our country has never had. That's why we must win the struggle against inflation, and I've been very pleased lately at the trend in interest rates and the good news we had this morning on the producer price index. The Congress and I are moving resolutely toward this goal. In fact, every single American is involved. This common effort to deal with the worldwide economic challenge does require some sacrifice, and I am determined that the sacrifice will be fairly shared.

The response of our democracy to economic challenges will determine whether we will be able to manage the challenge of other global responsibilities in the 1980s and beyond. If we cannot meet these international economic problems successfully, then our ability to meet military and political and diplomatic challenges will be doubtful indeed. Although it will not be easy, the innate advantages of our nation's natural bounty which God has given us and the common commitment of a free people who comprise American society give us the assurance of success.

We must also be militarily strong. The fact is that for 15 years the Soviet Union has been expanding its military capabilities far out of proportion to its needs for defense—a 4% or 5% real growth above the inflation rate compounded annually for 15 years has caused us some concern. For much of this same period, our spending for defense had been going down. If these adverse trends had continued, we would have found ourselves facing a severe military imbalance, an imbalance all the more threatening because of mounting global turbulence. That's why I have launched a broad modernization of our strategic and conventional forces and worked to strengthen our alliances. We and our allies have pledged ourselves to sustained real annual increases in our defense spending.

Our task is to build together a truly cooperative global community, to compose a kind of global mosaic which embraces the wealth and diversity of the Earth's people, cultures, and religions. This will not be an easy task. The philosophical basis of such a community must be respect for human rights as well as respect for the independence of nations.

In promoting that prospect for a future of peace, we will stay on the steady course to which we have been committed now for the last 3½ years. We pursue five major objectives:

comparison between the present international situation and the situation which led, after Sarajevo, to the First World War, is not totally wrong. Nobody wanted war; nobody was able to avoid it. What do you think of that?

A. Chancellor Schmidt is a very wise statesman, and I think he's analyzed the situation accurately. To the extent that an unclear signal is sent to an aggressor nation, to the extent that a step-by-step increasing escalation of aggression is permitted by the rest of the world, the temptation comes for that aggression to reach proportions such that the vital interests of other countries are not only endangered but severely damaged.

We've got a volatile situation in the Persian Gulf-Southwest Asian region under any circumstances. And for the Soviets to exercise their massive military power to completely subjugate another nation, to kill literally thousands of its people every week, to wipe out villages, is a clear signal to the rest of the world that they have no regard for the advantages of detente and that they are not willing to live in accordance with international law.

And I believe that unless we let a clear signal go to the Soviet Union that we allies stand united in not only condemnation of this action but that we are going to take firm actions to show the Soviets that they will suffer because of it, that might lead to increasing encroachment by the Soviet Union against other countries.

Q. Four years ago your campaign message was an act of faith. You were speaking of love and friendship between nations, and we were moved by this. But won't you be forced by the events of the 1980s to speak in totally different terms?

A. No, the terms are not totally different. It's the Soviet action which has violated moral principles and human decency and international law. It's the Iranian terrorist action which has violated moral decency and international law and human principles.

We have combined a commitment to peace, a commitment to morality, the protection of human rights, the honoring of good relationships with all countries in every aspect of foreign policy that we pursue. This has been exhibited in our effort in the Middle East to bring about peace, to honor democratic principles and majority rule in Africa, the opening up of China to new friendship with our country, and in other areas around the world.

At the same time, however, we have seen that it is necessary to have a strong and consistent strengthening of the military capability of the United States and our allies. Six to 10 years ago there was a feeling in even my own Democratic Party that NATO could be partially abandoned, that we could draw down at least half our troops or maybe, some advocated, all of our troops and that we could let our military strength deteriorate.

I have reversed that. And I think we've had extremely good response from the members of NATO who've now committed themselves to a long-term defense commitment, also made a decision on the theater nuclear force, which was difficult for some nations in Europe, who've committed themselves to build up the budget allocation for defense purposes on a steady, moderate, but sustained basis.

So, the relationship between strong moral commitments to human decency and human rights on the one hand and strong and adequate and predictable and sure and steady buildup in our military capability to match an enormous buildup in the Soviet Union are, I think, completely compatible one with another.

Q. After the invasion of Afghanistan, you said in a television interview then, and I quote: "My opinion of the Russians has changed more drastically in the past week than in the previous 3 years." Now, are you saying that you believe the Russians never themselves believed in detente?

A. I think the Soviets would like to avoid any sort of major confrontation with powerful nations like ourselves, including all those represented here.

The Soviets have shown a consistent inclination to extend its own influence, through violence, into other areas of the world. They've done this primarily through surrogates.

In Vietnam now, they are encouraging the Vietnamese to invade and to subjugate and to destroy the fabric of the nation in Kampuchea. In Angola, through their surrogates, the Cubans, they have 30,000–40,000 troops there to prevent the full expression of free will by the Angolan people to choose their own government. In Ethiopia, as you know, there are several thousands of troops there by the Cubans, supported financially and otherwise by the Soviet Union.

What happened in Afghanistan was, as I said earlier—this is the first time in more than a quarter of a century when the Soviets have used massive troops of their own to invade and to dominate a freedom-loving, deeply religious, and independent nation. They now have more than 100,000 heavily armed troops devoted to the subjugation of Afghanistan. And this is a radical departure of the Soviet Union from their more recent policy as far as using military force is concerned.

Q. But in suggesting that there can't be any normal East-West relations until they've now withdrawn from Afghanistan, aren't you in fact suggesting that we really have to return to a sort of semipermanent cold war?

A. I would hope that our clear commitment to avoiding any acceptance of the status quo while the Soviets are involved in the violation of international peace and international law would send a clear signal to the Soviet Union that the consequences of their action will be severely adverse to themselves.

As you know, the leaders of some of your nations have made direct appeals to the Soviet Union to withdraw their troops and to establish a nonaligned or independent or neutral country or government in Afghanistan acceptable to the people of that country. We would support this effort. But the Soviets, contrary to the assurance given to me by [Soviet President] Brezhnev and given to, I know, at least, [French] President Giscard by Brezhnev, have not withdrawn their troops. In my judgment, they have no inclination to withdraw their troops at this time; they've shown no evidence of that.

And only by the Soviets realizing, finally, that they cannot prevail in this unwarranted aggression will they be induced to restore the previous boundaries and to let Afghanistan have a peaceful nation with a government of their own choosing. I would prefer that the government and the nation be nonaligned.

There is another very important, tangible, and symbolic action that we must take without delay, and that is to make it clear to the world that we will not send our nation and our nation's flags to Moscow for the Summer Olympics while the Soviets are invading Afghanistan. This is a morally indecent act on their part and I cannot imagine the democratic or freedom-loving nations adding an imprimatur of approval

to the Soviets' invasion by sending teams to the Moscow Olympics. Our Olympic team will not go to Moscow, and my hope and expectation is that the other nations represented here will take similar action.

Q. Getting back to the problem of detente, we are, of course, close allies, and there's no doubt about it. But we have different positions; we in Europe live close on the East-West border. And do you take into account the fact that America may live with a serious deterioration of East-West relations, but Europe, particularly Germany, is much more strongly affected.

A. Yes, I am very clear in my knowledge of that difference. Each country has a different problem and a different need to have an independent reaction to the threats that do present themselves to us all.

We know very clearly that Germany is a divided nation with 16 or 17 million people living under communism, a totalitarian government imposed upon them. We recognize the vulnerability of Berlin. We recognize the importance of trade, exports in particular, to Germany, which are greater than our own dependence upon exports. I recognize all those things.

But still, we feel that within the bounds of complete independence of a decision by each government to make, that a consistent approach must be made to the Soviet Union to let them know that we do want to have arms control, we do want to have the advantages of detente, but we are not going to accept armed aggression in a vital area of the world—where the interests of Europe are much more seriously threatened even than our own because of a heavier dependence on exported oil from that region—and that further aggression will be severely met by a more consistent and a more forceful action.

This is what we advocate. Exactly what action we have taken, at substantial sacrifice to us, we do not expect that to be exactly mirrored by action among other nations.

Farmers are very similar to one another all over the world. I happen to be a farmer. We have taken action to eliminate 17 million tons of grain sales to the Soviet Union. This was a difficult decision for me to make, particularly in an election year. But I think the American farmers have decided, as demonstrated by votes in key agricultural States, that they are willing to make this sacrifice—a financial sacrifice—in order to let the signal go clearly to the Soviet Union.

So, I believe that if we want to have peace, want to have future trade, want to have a perpetuation of the advantages of detente, if we want to have a consistent commitment to controlling weapons and to lessening tensions in the world, we have got to respond effectively and forcefully and, I believe, peacefully to Soviet aggression when it's so blatant and so immoral as is taking place at this very moment in Afghanistan.

Q. Coming back a moment to what you said a moment ago about the American team not going to Moscow. Does this mean that you may apply those legal measures to prevent them to go, and will you expect the European countries to do the same?

A. I have had indications from all of the European leaders represented by you distinguished news reporters that we share a common commitment not to add our voice of approval to Soviet aggression by going to the Moscow Olympics.

The U.S. Olympic Committee has already made a public statement quite early this year—I think in February or March—that they would honor the decision made by me and an almost unanimous vote in the U.S. Congress in both Houses and also by overwhelming public opinion in this country that we should not attend the Moscow Olympics because of the invasion. I have no doubt that the U.S. Olympic Committee will make this decision.

Q. But then you will enforce, legally, if some athlete will try to go on his own. As I understand, France and England have such a situation.

A. My understanding of Olympic rules and principles is that athletes are not recognized for competition in the Olympics representing themselves, that they must represent a nation. And therefore, a decision made by a nation's government or a nation's Olympic committee is a final decision, and individual athletes are not recognized as competitors in the Olympics.

Q. Yes. Public opinion in Europe is not so sure that boycotting the Olympic Games will be an effective measure to challenge the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. Europe agrees with your ultimate aim in Afghanistan, but it doesn't necessarily agree with the means you suggest. It feels that going to the games and boycotting only the parade and all the ceremonial events will be more effective with the Russians. Wouldn't you agree?

A. No I don't agree with that at all, but obviously each nation would have to make its own decision. We're not trying to force our will upon others, but we make our position clear.

The Soviets have, obviously, a great interest in the propaganda benefits to be derived for itself by an expression of participation with them in the Olympics in Moscow. Their own official publications and handbooks say that the granting to Moscow of a right to have the Summer Olympics is an endorsement, in effect, of the Soviet foreign policy and a recognition of the peaceful nature of the Soviet Government.

I think for a country to go to Moscow to participate in the Summer Olympic Games, to raise its flag in the Olympic stadium when the host government is engaged at that moment in an unwarranted and inhumane invasion of a free and independent country is abhorrent to the normal principles on which democracy is founded. I feel very strongly about this subject, and I believe that the overwhelming number of American citizens do as well. The opinion of Europeans may or may not be different; I have no way to know that.

But I know that it will be a very difficult problem for the Soviet Union to explain to the rest of the world and to explain to its own citizens why 20 or 30 or 40 or 50 or maybe 70 other nations refuse to participate. As a matter of fact, when the United Nations voted earlier this year to condemn the Soviet Union, I think 104 countries voted in this way. The Soviet citizens never knew about the outcome of the U.N. condemnation. The Soviet Government is misleading its own people.

My own judgment is that many Soviet citizens do object to invasion of other countries, do object to a direct threat to peace that might bring great adverse consequences to themselves. And I believe that this would be a very clear signal to the world and to the Soviet people that the Soviets have made a serious mistake in Afghanistan.

I don't claim that not going to the Summer Olympics will be the single factor that would result in a withdrawal of their troops, but I believe that going to the Soviet Union is, in effect, an endorsement of the invasion and an endorsement of the violation of morality, human decency, and international law.

yesterday and this morning by a number of different judges of the Court.

Question of Deferral of Oral Proceedings

Judge Morozov's first question recalls that on 19 February—which happens to have been one day prior to the announcement by the Secretary General of the formation of the U.N. commission—the U.S. Government requested the President of the Court to defer oral proceedings in this case for the time being, with the result that the present hearings have taken place some 3 weeks later than they otherwise would. Judge Morozov's first question correctly suggests that there was a relationship between the proposed work of the proposed U.N. commission and the U.S. request for a brief postponement. Against that background Judge Morozov has asked the following question:

> If the establishment by the United Nations of a special commission, and the activity of that commission, does not relate specifically to the question of the release of the hostages, and if the Court should, according to the U.S. Government, consider the case as one of urgency, what was the reason why the U.S. Government has wasted approximately 1 month before pursuing the defense, with the assistance of the Court, of its diplomatic and consular staff detained in Tehran?

In order to understand the reason for our request on 19 February, it is important to understand that there is a distinction between what the U.N. commission was directed to do, in terms of actual work, and the side-effects which might be expected to result from that work. As we have previously explained, the commission was sent to Iran in order to give Iran a chance to air its grievances. The commission was to hear *Iran's* grievances and make a report with respect thereto, but it was not part of the commission's function to hear the U.S. grievances with respect to the seizure of the U.S. Embassy. On the other hand, it was the hope of the Secretary General and the U.S. Government that, once Iran had been given an opportunity to air its grievances before the commission, this would, in fact, lead the Government of Iran to release the hostages.

Against that factual background I would answer Judge Morozov's question in this fashion. We knew that any oral hearings before this Court on the merits would involve strong charges against Iran, and we thought that those charges might be an irritant which might cause the Iranian authorities to continue the captivity of the hostages, whether Iran's grievances had been heard by the U.N. commission or not. We wanted to do nothing which might unfavorably affect the hostages. That was the reason for our request for the relatively brief 3-week postponement, but, as I shall subsequently explain, the situation is different today. Today, with the captivity of the hostages continuing, we urgently need the Court's assistance in resolving the hostage dispute, and at the conclusion of my presentation I will ask the Court, with respect, to render its decision as rapidly as possible.

Question of Restraint, Assets Freeze, and U.S. Threats of Force

As Judge Morozov has correctly noted, during the presentation on behalf of the United States, we have called attention to the policy of restraint which the United States has followed in its relations with Iran during the hostage crisis. In this connection Judge Morozov has asked the following question:

> How would the U.S. Government explain such well-known acts on its part as the freezing of Iranian investments in the United States and abroad which, according to the press and broadcast reports, amount to some $12 billion?

The facts are that for many years the Iranian Government has maintained very large deposits in U.S. banks, both in the United States and abroad. In the early days of November, shortly after the seizure of the American Embassy, Iranian Government officials threatened suddenly to withdraw all Iranian funds from U.S. banks, to refuse to accept payment in dollars for oil, and to repudiate obligations owed to the United States and to U.S. nationals. Given the enormous sums of money involved, those threatened actions by the Government of Iran constituted nothing less than an attack on the stability of the world economy and the international monetary system. Moreover, the threat by the Iranian Government to repudiate all of the loans made by U.S. banks and other institutions constituted a totally unlawful threat and placed in jeopardy billions of dollars of U.S. claims against the Government of Iran.

For these reasons the United States came forward with a peaceful response which we considered totally appropriate under accepted principles of international law and comity among nations. In response to Iran's efforts to harm the U.S. economy and the dollar, and having in mind Iran's unlawful detention of American hostages, the President of the United States simply froze all Iranian assets in U.S. control for the time being, in part simply to make it possible for U.S. claimants to be made whole if the Government of Iran carried through with its threats to repudiate all of its obligations to such claimants. At the same time the U.S. Government has made it clear that once the hostages have been released the United States will be willing to open negotiations looking toward a mutual settlement of claims, which in turn will lead to the lifting of the freeze. In the meantime, the United States regards the freeze of Iranian assets as a justified, prudent, and proportional measure of restraint in the circumstances.

In his second question Judge Morozov has also asked the following:

> Is it possible to regard such acts [that is, I take it, the freeze], as well as threats to use other unilateral measures of coercion, and threats to use force against the Islamic Republic of Iran, as in conformity with the U.N. Charter and with paragraph 47 (B) of the Court's order of 15 December 1979, which required the U.S. Government not to take any action, and to insure that no action is taken, which may aggravate the tension between the two countries or render the existing dispute more difficult of solution?

In responding to that question I should note at the outset that the freezing of the assets occurred more than a month before the entry of the Court's order of 15 December, and we are quite confident that it was not the Court's intention, when it entered that order, to call upon the United States to lift the existing assets freeze. Moreover, as we pointed out in the course of the hearings which took place on 10 December, under the jurisprudence of this Court and accepted principles of international law, obedience to a provision of the kind cited by Judge Morozov is required only on a reciprocal basis—which means that the United States would be obliged to obey the order only if Iran did so as well. In fact, the United States has complied with the order, but Iran obviously has not.

As to the suggestion in Judge Morozov's question that the United States may have threatened to use force against Iran, there have been no such threats in fact, although the United States has drawn attention both to the rights of the United States under international law and to the use of force

and coercion by Iran in violation of Iran's obligations under paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 2 of the U.N. Charter. As the Court is aware, every effort which has been made by the United States in seeking a solution to the present crisis has been peaceful.

Judge Morozov's third question asks whether the actions to which he referred in his second question—meaning particularly, again, the U.S. freeze of Iranian assets—are in compliance with the provisions of the 1955 treaty of amity between the United States and Iran.

The answer is that the assets freeze—which constituted a peaceful response to the hostile actions previously taken by the Government of Iran—did not violate the treaty of amity. As we have previously explained in detail, on 4 November 1979, the Government of Iran began to engage in sustained violations of several articles of the treaty of amity, including article 2, paragraph 4, article 13, article 18, and article 19. Accordingly, under accepted principles of treaty law, as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the United States was under no obligation, after 4 November, to extend to Iran the treaty benefits to which Iran would have been entitled if it had itself complied with the treaty of amity. There has been no violation of that treaty by the United States.

Question of Request for Arbitration

In his fourth question Judge Morozov has asked whether the United States ever made a written suggestion to the Government of Iran directed to bringing the present dispute to arbitration as provided for in article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 treaty of amity. The answer is that the United States made no such suggestion, and in that connection I would make two brief observations. First, as we read article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 treaty of amity, it simply does not provide for arbitration; indeed, it makes no mention of arbitration. That provision does contemplate the possibility that disputes between the parties may be "satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy," but I would remind the Court that on 7 November the Ayatollah Khomeini flatly forbade any diplomatic negotiations between the two governments. I might add that this prohibition was in clear violation, in our view, of Iran's obligation under paragraph 1 of article XXI of the treaty of amity, which in effect required Iran to provide an opportunity for consultations. I respectfully submit that there is absolutely no basis for a suggestion that the United States has failed to live up to any of its obligations under article XXI or to satisfy any of the preconditions to filing suit in this Court under that article.

In his fifth question Judge Morozov has similarly inquired whether the United States, through a written suggestion to Iran, sought to bring the dispute to arbitration as provided for by article 13 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents.

With respect, I believe that the United States has addressed that question in its Memorial, at pages 42 and 43 and also, if I may say so, in the presentation made here by Mr. Schwebel. We have urged, and continue to urge, that article 13's provision for arbitration assumes a respondent state party which recognizes its obligation to settle its disputes by peaceful means, including negotiation and arbitration. From the very outset of the crisis on 4 November, however, the Government of Iran has been committed to a course of coercion and has flatly refused to have direct contact with U.S. officials. The answer to the question, therefore, is that the United States did not make a suggestion of arbitration to Iran for the simple reason that, in our judgment, such a suggestion would have been completely futile. Indeed, we believe that Iran's refusal to allow such discussions has stopped Iran from asserting that the U.S. application was premature or should have been preceded by a formal suggestion that the dispute be arbitrated.

Conversely, ever since the time when Mr. Ramsey Clark made his aborted effort to open negotiations, the United States has maintained and declared its willingness to seek a peaceful solution and has pursued a number of avenues to that end.

Question of Obligation To Prosecute or Extradite

Turning to Judge Morozov's sixth question, he has inquired as to the basis for the submission in the U.S. Memorial that the Government of Iran has an obligation either to submit to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution or to extradite to the United States those persons responsible for the crimes committed against the personnel and premises of the U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Iran. As Judge Morozov has noted, that submission appears at page 80 of the Memorial.

The basis for the submission is article 7 of the New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. Under that article Iran has a duty either to take steps toward prosecution of the offenders or to extradite them, and under the treaty the choice is Iran's. The treaty does not require extradition, but it permits it as an alternative to submission for prosecution.

The fact is that there is no extradition treaty between the United States and Iran, and under international law, absent such a treaty, there is generally no obligation to extradite, but, at the same time, international law does not prohibit extradition without a treaty. Consistent with this last principle, article 8 of the New York convention provides in paragraph 2 that a state which makes extradition conditional on an extradition treaty *may* consider the New York convention as a legal basis for extradition for crimes covered by it.

Question of a "Larger Dispute"

Finally, Judge Morozov has referred to the Iranian assertion that the dispute before the Court is only part of a larger dispute between the two countries, and, in that connection, Judge Morozov has inquried whether the United States recognizes the existence of such a larger dispute between the United States and Iran.

I can answer the question only in this fashion. At various times in recent months, as I indicated yesterday, various officials of the Iranian Government have voiced generalized allegations of misconduct as against the United States, and, of course, the U.S. Government recognizes that such allegations have been made. On the other hand, the Government of Iran has never brought forward any specific dispute for peaceful resolution, and the U.S. Government is, therefore, not in a position to describe the characteristics of the dispute, if any, which the Iranian authorities believe to exist. It may be that, during its visit to Tehran, the U.N. commission heard specific allegations of a concrete nature, but the proceedings of the commission were not public, and the United States does not know what grievances, if any, were

gression in this or other troublespots consists of several ingredients. The first—an enhanced continuing peacetime presence—will involve primarily naval forces. Our current naval power in the region is greatly superior to that of the Soviet Union in the area. It provides us with an immediate tactical air capability. I might add that the French also have a powerful naval force in the Indian Ocean. Further, we are continuing to make improvements, begun several years ago, in the facilities on Diego Garcia. We will have a permanent presence in the region that is much greater than it was a year ago.

Prepositioning of equipment is the vital second ingredient. We have begun a program to procure a number of maritime prepositioning ships, which will give us greater flexibility and avoid the problems of large, permanent U.S. bases overseas in sensitive areas.

As a near term option, we are now actively assembling a seven-ship force of commercial-type vessels, including roll-on, roll-off ships, break-bulk cargo ships, and tankers to provide us with this capability within the next several months. These ships will be loaded with unit equipment, supplies, fuel, and water that would enable a Marine amphibious brigade of some 10,000 men, as well as several U.S. Air Force fighter squadrons, to operate until further logistic support can arrive from the United States.

The loaded ships will be prepositioned within a few days' sailing distance of the Persian Gulf-Arabian Sea area. In an emergency they could move to a designated port near the objective and join up there with personnel and planes flown directly from U.S. bases. This arrangement will provide us the capability of responding to a crisis in the area in days rather than weeks.

Mobility—especially air and sealift capabilities—is the third ingredient. We are not without such capabilities today. For example, the first land-based tactical aircraft could be in the region in a matter of hours and significant units backed up by AWACS [airborne warning and control system] within a few days. The first battalion of the 82d Airborne Division could arrive within 48 hours of a movement order; the entire division could close in in about 2 weeks. A full Marine amphibious force (one division and air wing) could be deployed in 4 weeks.

Moreover, we are now programing major improvements to our rapid deployment capabilities. Several years ago, we started procurement of KC-10 aerial tankers, and we are now accelerating our purchases. We have also begun a long-term program for procurement of a new "CX" transport aircraft—either of new design or based on an existing aircraft—for long-distance deployment of out-sized cargos. We are also, as an interim measure, in the process of acquiring high-speed civilian ships which have immediate military sealift potential.

Fourth is the access and transit rights which I alluded to earlier. We are intensively—and I judge successfully—negotiating increased access to port, airfield, and other facilities to improve our ability to sustain naval and aircraft deployments.

Let me again emphasize the difference between seeking access and seeking permanent bases. Essentially, we are asking various countries in the area to enable us to come more effectively to their assistance if and when they need and want us. This is far different from asking them to host permanent U.S. garrisons.

Frequent deployment and exercises in the area comprise another key ingredient. We have increased the scale and pace of our periodic naval task force deployments in the region.

For example, to take a specific point in time, last October the U.S.S. *Midway* carrier battle group was conducting an exercise in the Indian Ocean with naval units from the United Kingdom and Australia. Additionally, four ships of the U.S. Mideast force were on station in the Persian Gulf. A second aircraft carrier battle group from the western Pacific arrived in the Arabian Sea in December. Since that time, more than 150 carrier-based tactical aircraft and 14 warships have been continuously available in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea to maintain a visible U.S. presence.

Our ability to project air power at extended distances has been further demonstrated by three B-52 sea surveillance and three airborne warning and control missions flown in the Indian Ocean area. Finally, a Marine amphibious unit will arrive in the Arabian Sea later this month. And even earlier, we deployed tactical aircraft there—for example, F-15s and AWACS to Saudi Arabia—as part of our response to the threat to North Yemen.

In the debate growing out of the Persian Gulf crisis, we seem sometimes to labor under attack from a curious combination of critics. On the one hand, there are those who pound the podium and call for ill-defined tough measures—often to cure problems for which there is no military solution—while at the same time eroding our military capabilities. On the other hand, different voices declare that we face no real problems except those created by our own overreaction and thus need not be concerned about our military capabilities.

Adopting either attitude as our nation's policy would leave our security in great hazard and would give a seriously and dangerously wrong signal to the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

The policies and the approach I have outlined are not steps toward war. They are designed to build strength and to prevent war. What we are doing constitutes a necessary and reasonable response to real needs. The massive growth of Soviet military capabilities is a fact. Their willingness to use surrogates and, indeed, units of the Red Army to assert military and political power outside the borders of the Soviet Union has been demonstrated. The United States and the nations to which we have the closest ties are now, and will be for a long time, linked by a highly vulnerable lifeline to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

Perhaps the Soviets will never move to threaten that lifeline. Perhaps the more "benign" interpretations of their invasion of Afghanistan—if the word "benign" can be used at all—are correct. But, as policymakers and as responsible citizens and world leaders, we cannot safely assume that it is. Indeed, the actions that we must take to guard against the consequences of the immediate threat posed by recent aggressive Soviet behavior are probably the most effective way to moderate future Soviet actions over the long term.

We are not saying to the Soviet Union that competition is the only path between us. We remain willing to cooperate in those areas where our interests overlap, as in the case of SALT. But where they threaten our interests, we will meet them on that ground as well.

We must demonstrate to the Soviet Union that:

- The invasion of Afghanistan is

seen, throughout that part of the world that is not ruled from Moscow, as a callous violation of the norms of international behavior;

- Their stated justification for it is universally regarded as a transparent misrepresentation; and
- The international community believes that similar steps in the future carry the gravest dangers for the Soviets as well as for the rest of us.

For the United States to assume its proper role in deterring such aggression in the future, we must have adequate military capability and the will to use it if necessary. If we intend to remain a major world power, and to preserve our own pluralistic and economic systems, then we must engage over the long haul in an economic rebuilding, a program to reduce our dependence on imported energy, and, not least, an enhancement of our military capability, including an ability to deploy forces rapidly to areas far from but vital to us, in a security framework that helps to stabilize such regions.

These tasks will not be easy. They cannot be done as a one-time crash program. They will not be inexpensive. But if we fail to carry them out, the 21st century will be a dangerous one indeed for our ideals, for our society, and for our children.

[1]Text from Defense Department press release 87–80. ■

Exports of Nuclear Fuels Extended

LETTER TO THE CONGRESS, FEB. 7, 1980[1]

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) amended the Atomic Energy Act to establish new criteria for nuclear exports. Included was a requirement that the U.S. have a right to consent to the reprocessing of fuel exported from the U.S.

Our agreements with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) do not contain such a right. To avoid disrupting cooperation with EURATOM, the NNPA included a proviso permitting continued cooperation until March 10, 1980, if EURATOM agreed to negotiations concerning our cooperation agreements.

In July 1978, EURATOM agreed to discussions on the agreements on the understanding that the issues being studied in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) would not be addressed in the US–EURATOM discussions until completion of INFCE, and that the results of INFCE would be taken into account in the final negotiations. We have had two rounds of such discussions with EURATOM—in November 1978 and September 1979. A third meeting is scheduled for April 1980, shortly after INFCE concludes its work.

To continue nuclear cooperation with EURATOM after March 10, 1980, we have to extend our waiver of the provision relating to U.S. approval of reprocessing. Under the law, this can be done only on an annual basis, and only after a Presidential determination that failure to cooperate would seriously prejudice the achievement of U.S. non-proliferation objectives or would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security. The Act further provides for notification to the Congress of any such determination.

During the November 1978 and September 1979 discussions with EURATOM, progress was made in clarifying the issues and positions relating to our agreement for cooperation. Our next session with EURATOM, in April 1980, will be our first chance to deal with the substantive issues addressed in INFCE and to determine how we can factor the results of that study into our agreement for cooperation. Our continued cooperation with EURATOM during this period is essential to demonstrating our reliability as a reliable partner in the sensitive area of energy supply—and thus improving the prospects for international acceptance of measures to limit proliferation.

For these reasons, I have determined that failure to continue peaceful nuclear cooperation with the European Atomic Energy Community would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. non-proliferation objectives and would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security of the U.S. I will therefore issue, in the immediate future, an Executive Order extending the waiver of the application of the relevant export criterion of the NNPA for an additional twelve months from March 10, 1980.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

[1]Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Walter F. Mondale, President of the Senate (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 11, 1980). ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture
International agreement for the creation at Paris of an International Office for Epizootics, with annex. Done at Paris Jan. 25, 1924. Entered into force Jan. 17, 1925; for the U.S. July 29, 1975. TIAS 8141.
Accession deposited: Angola, Apr. 6, 1979.
Convention on the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at Washington Mar. 6, 1979.[1]
Ratifications deposited: Colombia, Mexico, Mar. 6, 1980.

Antarctic
Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. Adopted at Washington Oct. 5, 1979, at the 10th Antarctic Treaty consultative meeting. Enters into force when approved by all the contracting parties whose representatives were entitled to participate in meetings held to consider measures.

Atomic Energy
Agreement amending the agreement of June 14, 1974, for the supply of uranium enrichment services for a nuclear power facility in Yugoslavia. Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade and Vienna Feb. 26, 1980.
Entered into force: Feb. 26, 1980.

Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Mar. 13, 1980.

Protocol relating to an amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Done at Montreal Oct. 16, 1974.[2]
Ratifications deposited: Colombia, Feb. 15, 1980; El Salvador, Nicaragua, Feb. 13, 1980; U.K., Feb. 29, 1980.
Entered into force: Feb. 15, 1980.

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of the convention on international civil aviation (Chicago, 1944; TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 1977.[1]
Ratification deposited: Portugal, Mar. 18, 1980.

Collisions
Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with regulations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587.
Accessions deposited: Australia, Feb. 29, 1980; Qatar, Jan. 31, 1980.

Conservation
Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora,

Department of State

bulletin

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• First, to enhance not only economic but also political solidarity among the industrialized democracies;

• Second, to establish a genuinely cooperative relationship with the nations of the Third World;

• Third, to persevere in our efforts for peace in the Middle East and other troubled areas of the world;

• Fourth, to defend our strategic interests, especially those which are not threatened in Southwest Asia; and

• Fifth, to advance arms control, especially through agreed strategic arms limitations with the Soviet Union, and to maintain along with this a firm and a balanced relationship with the Soviets.

Allied Solidarity

Our first objective, solidarity with our allies, is the touchstone of our foreign policy. Without such solidarity, the world economy and international politics may well degenerate into disorder. This is why we have led the North Atlantic alliance in its program to upgrade its conventional forces. And last winter, in an historic decision, NATO agreed to strengthen its nuclear missiles in Europe in order to respond to a very disturbing Soviet missile buildup there.

Next month the seven leading industrial democracies will hold a summit meeting in Venice. I look forward to being there with the other six leaders of our most important allies. It's our collective intention not only to make the summit another milestone for global economic cooperation but also to advance our political and our strategic solidarity.

Cooperation With the Third World

Second, we will persevere in our efforts to widen the scope of our cooperation with the newly awakened nations of the Third World. By the end of this century, 85% of the world's population will be living in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. In the last several years—through the Panama Canal treaties, through our commitment to majority rule in Africa, and through normalization of relationships with China—we have vastly improved the relationship of the United States with these regions. We can be proud of our accomplishments in building strong new bridges to the developing world.

The United States respects the desire of the developing nations for genuine nonalignment, and we respect the nonaligned movement as the expression of that desire. Nations which value their own independence are already resisting efforts to subvert the nonaligned movement and make it a tool of Soviet foreign policy. Last year's meeting in Havana was a notable example of Soviet failure, through their puppet Castro regime, to convince the other nonaligned countries to be subservient to the Soviets. The United States is eager to work with countries, which pride themselves on their independence, for the resolution of conflicts and for the promotion of greater global social justice.

Regional Peace

Third, we'll continue to work for peace in the Middle East. Such peace is essential to all parties concerned. Israel deserves peace and Israel needs peace for its long-term survival. The Arab nations require peace in order to satisfy the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and to insure that their own social development can move forward without disruption and without foreign intrusion. The West, including the United States, must have peace in the Middle East or run grave risks that the radicalization of that area will draw outsiders into its explosive conflicts.

The Camp David process has already led to the first peace treaty between Israel and an Arab state. Of course, Egypt is the largest and the most important and the strongest Arab state. We are determined to reach a comprehensive settlement. And we will not be diverted from that goal.

Sol Linowitz [Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations], our negotiator, is just now returning from the Middle East, and I will be meeting with him this weekend to get a full report from him on progress made and to determine the steps that our country will take in the coming weeks to bring a successful conclusion to this very difficult effort.

As we continue our efforts in the Middle East, I take pride, as well, in the contributions that we have also made in other areas, such as the Panama Canal treaties already mentioned and the achievement of peace and majority rule in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. These are major accomplishments not only of benefit to the people directly involved but to our national interest as well. And it may very well be that in retrospect in years ahead, looking back on this Administration and this time, that those particular efforts, making new friends among literally billions of people, as in China and America, this will be recognized as the most important achievement of our time.

Defense of Strategic Interests

And fourth, and very important, the West must defend its strategic interests wherever they are threatened. Since 1945 the United States has been committed to the defense of our hemisphere and of Western Europe, and then later of the Far East, notably Japan and Korea. These commitments for common defense are very valuable to the people involved in those other areas, and, of course, they are extremely valuable to us as well.

In recent years it has become increasingly evident that the well-being of those vital regions and our own country depend on the peace, stability, and independence of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf area. Yet both the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the pervasive and progressive political disintegration of Iran put the security of that region in grave jeopardy.

I want to reemphasize what I said in my State of the Union address on January 23:

> Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

Peace is what we want. Peace is what we have maintained. Peace is a prerequisite for progress. Peace is a policy of our country. The maintenance of peace must be predicated on adequate American strength and a recognition of that strength not only by our own people and our allies but by our potential adversaries as well. We have been provoked in the last few months. Every action has been designed to take advantage not of our military force, which is formidable and unequaled, but on the benefits of the use of our alliances and on economic, political, and diplomatic efforts.

The steps that we are taking on our own, and with the cooperation of others, involve complicated measures, considerable expense, and a careful balance between the collective security needs of the region involved and its political realities. These political realities, again, are difficult to understand, extremely complex, and in every instance rapidly changing. We are making good progress. We must—and we will—make more progress.

The necessity of common action in the Southwest Asian region is dictated not by any belligerence on the part of

peace-loving nations but by the clear strategic threat that stems from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A failure to respond convincingly to that contemptuous act of aggression would only invite its repetition.

Beyond the violence done to Afghanistan's independence and its people, the Red Army troops consolidating their hold there are also taking positions from which Soviet imperialism could be extended more deeply and more dangerously in the politics of this vital area. Afghanistan had long been a buffer against outsiders seeking to dominate that region. Any quick examination of a map will convince you of the truth of that statement. That is the historic role to which Afghanistan must be restored. Soviet success in their invasion of Afghanistan, even at the high cost in blood and the high cost in respectability which Moscow is now paying, could turn Afghanistan from a roadblock against aggression into a launching pad for future incursions.

This would threaten Pakistan and Iran but not just those nations alone. Soviet aggression in Afghanistan—unless checked—confronts all the world with the most serious long-term strategic challenge since the cold war began. To underestimate the magnitude of that challenge would constitute an historic error—an error with probably historic consequences.

America's position is clear. It is consistent, as well, with the interests and with the commitment of our allies, whose well-being—along with our own—is intimately tied to the security and the independence of this strategically vital region. We must therefore work together in meeting the challenge which we face in common.

Our goal is the withdrawal of Soviet occupying troops, the neutrality or nonalignment of Afghanistan as a nation, and the encouragement of the formation there of a government acceptable to the Afghan people. Those goals and commitments are clear. They are simple. They are extremely important and they are shared with almost every other people on Earth.

Within this region itself the nations must also realize that our desires match theirs—to cooperate in the preservation of the region's independence, stability, and peace.

Arms Control

Fifth, this Administration has been and remains committed to arms control, especially to strategic arms limitations, and to maintain a firm and balanced relationship with the Soviet Union. Our resolve to pursue this goal remains as strong as ever.

Early this morning I had breakfast with the new Secretary of State, Ed Muskie, and with my other close foreign affairs and defense advisers. We expect later on this coming week that Ed Muskie will meet with the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. They will be discussing these issues, again, in a clear, consistent, forceful, proper, balanced way. One statement that we will make very clearly is that arms control and strategic arms limitation are of crucial importance to the United States, to the people of the Soviet Union, and to all other people on Earth.

The SALT II agreement is a major accomplishment of my Administration. It contributes directly to the security of the United States, and we intend to abide by the treaty's terms as long as the Soviet Union, as observed by us, complies with those terms as well. Of course, we will seek its ratification at the earliest opportune time.

The time is also fast approaching when we must think beyond SALT II—to negotiating wider and more comprehensive arrangements dealing both with additional categories of strategic nuclear weapons and with weapons of less than intercontinental capability. If the decade of the 1980s is not to become the decade of violence, we must make renewed efforts to stabilize the arms competition and to widen the scope of arms control arrangements.

After close consultation with our allies and with the Soviet Union we intend to pursue these expanded efforts to control weapons of all kinds.

Detente with the Soviets remains our goal, but detente must be built on a firm foundation of deterrence. The Soviets must understand that they cannot recklessly threaten world peace. They cannot commit aggression, and in doing that they must realize that they cannot still enjoy the benefits of cooperation with the West, and specifically with us. They must understand that their invasion of Afghanistan has had a profound adverse effect on American public attitudes toward the Soviet Union.

We represent a strong but peaceful nation and there can be no business as usual in the face of aggression. The Soviets will not succeed in their constant efforts to divide the alliance in Europe or to lull us into a false belief that somehow Europe can be an island of detente while aggression is carried out elsewhere. But let me be equally clear that the way to improve relations is open if the Soviets alter their conduct. That is the path we prefer.

Together these five objectives that I have outlined are the compass points that guide America's course in this world of change and challenge. They link our specific actions to each other, to the past, and to the future.

Our foreign policy is designed to be responsive to the revolutionary age in which we live. To be effective, it must have the wise understanding and the wide support of the American people. That depends on public realization that foreign policy is not a matter of instant success. We must expect prolonged management of seemingly intractable situations and often contradictory realities. To play our historic role of protecting our interests and at the same time preserving the peace, the United States must be steady and constant. Our commitment to American ideals must be unchanging and our power must be adequate and credible.

Humanitarian Concerns

While we seek to attain our broad ultimate objectives, we must never lose sight of immediate human suffering. We have not forgotten and we will not forget the 53 Americans imprisoned in Iran.

Our nation places a great value on human life and on human freedom. We will continue to make every effort, using peaceful means if possible and through collective action with our allies, to obtain the release of our countrymen. And we will remind the Iranian leaders that the integrity and the independence of their own country can only suffer from this policy of theirs that led to international isolation and also internal disintegration. We have no permanent quarrel with the Iranian people. We wish to fashion a relationship of dignity with them, once this illegal action has been put behind us.

Our nation has continued to act responsibly and in good faith toward both the people and the leaders of Iran. Our rescue attempt was a mission of mercy—not a military attack. No Iranian was killed or harmed in any way. Its only aim was to rescue innocent victims of terrorist exploitation. I regret only that it did not succeed, and that eight gallant young men died in the accident as the rescue team was leaving its desert rendezvous.

This morning I participated in a memorial service for those eight young men. And before the service I met individually with every family involved. As I

Q. I wanted to get you right, there, on the numbers you think countries might not be going; you said 50 or 60 or 70. Is that just a hope on your part, or do you have some indication? Because I think if as many countries as that were to boycott, it would possibly affect arrangements in all countries.

We have a problem in Britain, where we're split right down the middle. The government supports your boycott totally, and the British teams want to go. Public opinion is not so sensitized as in America. Probably most of the public think they should go. But if you could bring some evidence that as many countries as that would stay away, I think it would have an effect.

A. The evidence is in the final action. I think I gave a broad range of countries which might join us. I think 20 or 30 nations have announced already that they would not go.

Q. As many as that?

A. Yes. And the question is: How many of the European countries will go to the Olympics, and how many are willing to announce their decision, hopefully, as early as possible?

I know that the Olympic Committee in Great Britain has announced that they prefer to go, but that they would assess future developments before they make a final decision. My understanding is that one of those future developments that they would assess is the willingness of the Soviet troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan.

I have no expectation at all that prior to the deadline date for the acceptance or rejection of the Moscow Olympics invitation—I think the 24th of May—that Soviet troops will be withdrawn. The contrary is the evidence. They are increasing their military involvement in Afghanistan. And it may be that when your own Olympic Committee assesses this fact that they might reverse themselves and decide not to send a team.

I have seen news reports that some of your superb athletes, whom I admire very much, have announced that they would like to go individually. I understand that the International Olympic Committee rules do not permit an athlete competing on his or her own, that it must be part of a national team.

But we are seeing very shortly the evolution of commitments. We have private assurances from some other nations that they will join in the boycott of the Olympics, but I am not trying to speak for them. They can speak for themselves.

Q. The Olympic question is just one example of diversity between the United States and Europe. You expect the Europeans to follow suit. It is a surprise to you that there is what you might call a lack of solidarity, if no proper and real consultation prior to your announcement of the boycott has taken place?

A. Let me correct the premise that seems to be the basis for your question. In the first place, there is no evidence that there are differences between us in whether we will or will not go to the Olympics. The U.S. Olympic Committee is going to decide very shortly, maybe today, that they will or will not go. Other Olympic committees will be deciding in the future. I don't think we'll have any clear evidence of either complete compatibility or incompatibility before May, when the final decisions are made.

There is a sharp difference of opinion in my own country. The athletes themselves, many of them, do prefer to go to the Olympic Games. I believe the U.S. Olympic Committee itself, the Congress, the American people, and myself do not believe that we should go to the Olympics. And my statement to you is that we will not go.

On your other premise, we do not expect compliance with a decision made by us because we demand unanimity or demand some sort of action by other countries. Each country must make its own decision. We make our position very clear, and it's predicated not on what other nations might do but on our own decision. If all of the nations go to the Moscow Olympics, we will still not go. But each country, including your own, must make that decision for itself.

I think in action concerning Iran we have let our allies and our friends know very clearly what our position is. We've tried to keep them informed about action that we would take before it was taken.

Sometimes it's not necessary or advisable to have complete consultation, because events change so rapidly that that's not possible, and sometimes we need to take unilateral action without complete consultation with anyone. But I would guess that in my own Administration—in the last 3 years—we've had at least as good consultation as has ever been the case with our European allies and particularly during a time of peace.

Q. You said that the allies have freedom of choice, and yet Thursday you were a little bit disappointed about the fact that the allies ask for protection, for leadership, and then they want to do whatever they want, which puzzles a little bit, with due respect, our governments, about American foreign policy—some lack of communication, some mistakes, like the one Ambassador McHenry [Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.] did at the United Nations. Now, don't you think that makes all our governments think that such a government is accident prone, incident prone?

A. I think every government makes mistakes. And I would guess that there have been decisions made by all of your countries and their governments that didn't get my immediate approval or the approval of the American Congress or the approval of the American people or the approval of the American media.

We live in a pluralistic society, and each country is strong, forceful, independent, and also each country has a different perspective, depending upon its particular relationships with its neighbors and with other countries around the world. We expect that diversity. We're not the Warsaw Pact, where complete conformity is demanded and achieved within a group of nations. We recognize the necessity for diversity, and I think this diversity is very beneficial.

For instance, Germany has taken the leadership in strengthening the economy of Turkey. We follow this leadership, with appreciation of the initiative that Germany has taken. The French have been extremely effective in some elements of development of democratic principles and the protection, for instance, of the integrity of Zaire. Great Britain has done an extraordinarily good job, in my opinion, in bringing about majority rule in Rhodesia, soon to be Zimbabwe. We look to Italy to help us with the entire Mediterranean area and to give me advice on how we can better have a policy for the southern regions of NATO.

So, each country is different. We have taken the leadership in the Mideast. Some of our decisions, some of our policies have been criticized within your own countries and also, I might say, within my own country. But we've made good progress: the present situation in the Mideast, with peace between Egypt and Israel, the two most pow-

erful nations, the two nations aligned with the West, the two nations which are very strong, stabilizing factors there, and the present effort to move forward now with the preservation of Palestinian rights in the West Bank/Gaza area, of full autonomy there, the realization of a solution to the refugee problem, the enhancement and protection of the security of Israel behind recognized borders—this effort is the only one that has a chance for success.

And even those who have criticized our own effort, for instance, in this particular instance have not put forward any alternative proposal that might even get the attention or participation of the parties who are in dispute. Obviously this is sometimes a fumbling, sometimes a disappointing, sometimes a frustrating, sometimes a highly argumentative relationship; all of these efforts were. But we're making progress.

And we recognize the independence and the autonomy and difference among our countries. But the common bind which holds us together, a belief in freedom, a belief in democracy, a belief in basic human morality, the preservation of human rights, a common, strong commitment to security—these kinds of things are much more important than any small differences that might exist among us as each nation tries to do the best it can to protect its own interests and to enhance those principles that I've just outlined to you.

Q. But you yourself wish to see the Camp David agreement fully implemented. Unfortunately we seem still very far away from that end. How do you intend to make Mr. Begin change his mind?

A. We all change our minds. I think it would be a mistake for me at this point to predict what's going to happen in the future. I'll be meeting with Prime Minister Begin this next week; I met with President Sadat this week.

If you would go back 2 years at the situation then and compare what has been accomplished during this period, it is indeed almost a miracle. Then no Arab nation would even speak to Israel nor recognize its right to exist nor negotiate with it. Now we have the most powerful Arab nation of all recognizing Israel as a country; ambassadorial exchanges have been made; the borders are open; trade is being enhanced and negotiating taking place on a daily basis.

The commitment has been made by Prime Minister Begin himself to grant full autonomy to the Palestinians on the West Bank, to resolve the Palestinian question in all its aspects, to give the Palestinians a voice in the determination of their own future.

These are the kinds of things that were inconceivable 2 years ago. I know how difficult it was for Prime Minister Begin to agree, for instance, to withdraw from the Sinai and to commit himself to give up oil wells that were vital to Israel's security and also to agree that the Israeli settlers in the Sinai would be withdrawn in the next phase.

The Egyptian-Israeli treaty has been honored meticulously by both sides. And I don't anticipate any ease of success in future negotiations between Israel, Egypt, and all its neighbors, but we're making the best effort we can. And there have been very good and very profound concessions made on both sides in an effort to achieve peace in this vital area of the world.

Q. With the settlement policy, particularly on the West Bank, your government has told Israel that you oppose that, and yet they go on snubbing you, if you like, even humiliating the United States by keeping on the settlements, like even in Hebron and so on. Why don't you actually take a step like reducing aid to Israel by the amount that it costs for the settlements?

A. We have a respect for Israel's independence and autonomy as a nation, just as we respect the independence and autonomy—

Q. But the West Bank is not an independent nation, is it?

A. The decision made by Israel in their government is worthy of respect as an independent nation, just as we respect the right of Great Britain to disagree with us, or other nations as well.

Our position on the settlements is very clear. We do not think they are legal, and they are obviously an impediment to peace. The Israeli Government, however, feels that they have a right to those settlements.

Under the Camp David accords, the Israelis have committed themselves to withdraw their military government and its civilian administration and then to redeploy military forces in selected security locations. When and if this is done, in my judgment, the basic question of the settlements will effectively be resolved. The Israelis will still maintain that Jewish citizens, Israeli citizens, have a right to live wherever they choose. As you know, many Arabs live in Israel itself.

But the ultimate status of the West Bank and Gaza is to be negotiated among Israel, the people who live in the region, the Jordanians, and the Egyptians. And this is what has been already prescribed in the Camp David agreement. There are obviously very strong differences of opinion between Israel and its neighbors, and between Israel and us on this particular instance, but we have to honor those differences and work as best we can to resolve those differences peacefully.

Q. Can America regain credibility militarily without reintroducing the draft system?

A. Yes, of course. I don't think, again, the premise of your question is well founded. We have no absence of credibility militarily. Our nation is the strongest nation on Earth militarily.

We have been concerned for the last 15 years by the extraordinary buildup in Soviet military strength. Year by year they have had a substantial real addition in commitment in their budget to their military forces. In the last 3 years, beginning in 1977, we have joined with our allies, including your country, in building up the strength of our own nations to match that extraordinary additional threat from the Soviet Union.

We are, at the same time, pursuing an effort to control weapons, including nuclear weapons. The SS–20, which is a severe threat to all the nations represented here except our own—it can't reach us yet—is to be matched now, finally, by an increase in theater nuclear force commitments. We consider this a very strong step forward.

We are maintaining an adequate military force without a draft. I see no reason to have a draft. We will commence registration this year in order to prepare for some eventuality in the future that might bring about a military crisis calling for a draft, but whether we have a draft or not is not an important issue at all as far as the overall strength of our country is concerned.

Q. In the context of your slight dissatisfaction about the behavior of the allies, how do you consider the possibility of success to our many economical problems at the forthcoming economic summit in Venice at the end of June?

control of spare parts for U.S. equipment will enable us to monitor these agreements. Let me also note that we have not yet authorized any exports under these new guidelines.

To lend perspective to the list of articles we are prepared to consider licensing for export to China, let me read you a partial list of articles we do not intend to export to China: firearms; artillery; ammunition; explosives; naval vessels of war; tanks; combat aircraft such as those designed for gunnery, bombing, or missile launching; and aircraft designed for refueling.

Let me now say a word about the role of Congress. Our relationship with China is so important that we intend to take special care to consult with Congress as we move ahead in improving our relations with that country. The Congress has established by law an elaborate reporting system with regard to the sale of articles on the Munitions Control List, and we will, of course, comply with all requirements of law regarding exports of Munitions List articles to China. Meanwhile, we will continue to keep Congress informed of significant developments in other areas of U.S.-China relations.

[1]The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Crisis in Indochina

Statements before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 24, 1980, by Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Victor Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.[1]

MR. HOLBROOKE

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before this committee again to follow up my testimony of last September on the crisis in Indochina. I propose to outline the current military situation in Indochina, describe the impact that the continuing war in Cambodia is having on the region, and set out the actions and policies we and our friends in East Asia and the international community are following to try to deal with the crisis. Ambassador Palmieri will be discussing the refugee and relief issues involved. Although they will be discussed separately, they are obviously closely intertwined with the political and military questions. It is appropriate, therefore, that you have asked both of us to appear here together.

Conflict in Cambodia

The conflict in Cambodia continues, with Hanoi now maintaining 180,000–200,000 soldiers in Cambodia, 50,000–70,000 of whom are operating along the Thai-Cambodia border. During the last 6 months an intensification of small-scale Vientamese military sweep operations has occurred throughout the country but primarily in western Cambodia near the Thai-Cambodia border, where the remaining resistance is concentrated.

The situation remains perilous. If Vietnamese military operations were to strike at, or even brush against, the refugee concentrations along the border, either intentionaliy or inadvertently, they could force tens of thousands of Khmer to flee into Thailand. Such an event would add further to the desperate plight of these people. It would test the resources and capabilities of Thailand—which deserves great credit for its humanitarian response to the hundreds of thousands of refugees who have already arrived on its border—as well as those of the international community as a whole.

Furthermore, we remain concerned about the possible spillover of the fighting itself into Thailand and the potential for regional destabilization and wider conflict such an expansion of the fighting would have. We have urged both Moscow and Hanoi to insure that Vietnamese forces exercise restraint along the Thai-Cambodia border. And we have noted their assurances that the Vietnamese will not attack or invade Thailand.

We do not have a clear picture of the situation inside Cambodia. We know that small-scale, scattered military resistance to the Vietnamese occupation exists throughout much of the country, with occasional clashes. Most visitors to Cambodia report a pervasive sense of insecurity and a lack of firm military control outside the major towns.

The limited nature of the Vietnamese military drive in western Cambodia and the tenacity and commitment of the Khmer Rouge soldiers indicated that the Khmer Rouge will survive the dry season as a viable fighting force. It appears likely to emerge with roughly 20,000 troops able to operate effectively in western Cambodia and, to a lesser extent, throughout the country.

The failure of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia to engage and reduce significantly Khmer Rouge forces during the current dry season, the increasing hemorrhage of high-ranking Heng Samrin officials who seek refuge in Thailand from Vietnamese domination, and the continuing clashes and insecurity throughout the country make it most likely that Hanoi will be unable during this dry season to establish full control throughout Cambodia. At this point Vietnam seems trapped into either a humiliating withdrawal from Cambodia or, in order to maintain control, the maintenance of a large garrison force of soldiers and administrators in Cambodia for an indefinite period.

China-Vietnam Confrontation

The People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (S.R.V.) continue a tense confrontation. Earlier this month the Chinese terminated the second round of Vietnamese-Chinese negotiations which took place in Beijing, proposing that talks resume in the second half of 1980. The Vietnamese have responded with

sharp criticism but have suggested that the talks resume in Hanoi on July 15.

The two rounds of talks thus far have failed to move the two sides toward any sort of accommodation. Vietnam has stressed limited measures to stabilize the border, mutual withdrawal of forces from the border region, creation of a demilitarized zone, and prisoner exchanges, while making only passing reference to the broader range of S.R.V.–P.R.C. relations. Of these only the prisoner exchange has been concluded. The Chinese, for their part, have insisted that "crucial and fundamental problems," such as Vietnam's ties to the Soviet Union, Vietnamese troops in Cambodia and Laos, and conflicting claims in the Parcels and Spratlys, will have to be resolved before relations can be improved.

The underlying differences in the two positions appear to offer little hope for rapid resolution. Over the near term, at least, Sino-Vietnamese relations will continue to be characterized by acrimony and distrust.

To launch its attack last February, China positioned roughly 500,000 troops along its border with Vietnam; currently we believe there are less than half that number stationed along this border. Vietnam, on the other hand, has considerably strengthened its forces in the border region, roughly doubling the 100,000 it had prior to the Chinese attack last February. Thanks to Soviet assistance, Vietnam has also significantly strengthened the firepower of its forces as well.

For the time being, however, the test of strength and wills between the two nations is being conducted in the political, diplomatic, and psychological arenas and, of course, in Cambodia.

Tension in Laos

Tension in Sino-Lao relations heightened considerably in the aftermath of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the fighting between China and Vietnam last year, with Vientiane following Hanoi's political and diplomatic lead. The Lao requested the termination of Chinese roadbuilding programs in northern Laos and the departure of all Chinese aid technicians. Lao propaganda has echoed Hanoi's anti-Chinese lines, and the Lao have continued to support Vietnam's aggression in Cambodia. In January the Foreign Ministers of Vietnam, Laos, and the Heng Samrin regime met in Phnom Penh and affirmed their solidarity.

Despite Lao and Vietnamese charges, we see no evidence of a Chinese military buildup along the Sino-Lao border at this time. The Lao appear to have reinforced their forces on the border slightly. The Vietnamese, who now have about 45,000 troops in Laos, appear to be selectively relocating various units but do not appear to have significantly reinforced them. Current dispositions, as well as terrain factors, suggest little likelihood of major military action in the near future.

Insurgency continues, however. This brings me to an issue which concerns us deeply: the reports of the use of poison gas in Laos, primarily against the Hmong insurgents.

I know that you, Mr. Chairman [Senator John Glenn], have cosponsored with Senator Weicker a resolution condemning the reported use of lethal chemical agents in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan and calling on the United States to raise its concerns with other countries and to take urgent diplomatic action to halt any such use of lethal chemical agents. We have made some suggestions as to language on that resolution, and we support it.

When we began to receive the first reports of the use of poison gas in Laos in 1978 we raised these reports and our concern about them directly with the Lao Government. I expressed our concern directly to the Acting Lao Foreign Minister when I visited Laos in 1978. We have increased our activity as more reports have come in. In June and September of last year we sent study teams to Hmong refugee camps specifically to interview those who claimed to have been the victims of a gas attack or to have witnessed one. Other refugee testimony has been collected regularly as we have continued to monitor the situation closely and to examine all reports and other information.

To this point, we have been unable to obtain tangible evidence of the use of poison gas. We believe, however, that refugee testimony is persuasive that some kind of lethal chemical agent has been used and that such reports themselves fully justify our raising our concern.

Accordingly, we have continued to raise our concerns repeatedly and directly with the Lao Government, as well as with Hanoi and Moscow. The Lao have categorically denied any such use, and Hanoi and Moscow have echoed their denials. We have shared the reports of the study teams with them and with the international community generally. We have raised the issue in the last two session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission and in the current U.N. Disarmament Committee meetings.

We will continue to raise with other governments and with international organizations our concern about the reports we receive, pressing for adherence to the 1925 Geneva convention on chemical warfare, urging that any use be stopped and arguing for the establishment of an international commission to investigate the charges.

The question of poison gas, Lao support for Vietnamese aggression against Cambodia, Lao statements of support for the militants holding our diplomats hostage in Iran and for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the lack of progress in resolving MIA [U.S. soldiers missing in action] issues have precluded improvement in our relations with Laos. We are, however, working actively to engage the Lao in a continuing dialogue on issues of mutual concern in the hope that at some point progress will become possible.

Impact of the Conflict

Obviously two of the main ramifications of the conflict have been in the refugee and relief fields, which Ambassador Palmieri will be addressing. The response of the American people and government to the needs of the refugees expelled from Vietnam, to the pressures such huge numbers of refugees placed on the countries of first asylum, and to the basic human needs of the starving hundreds of thousands of Khmer has reflected the highest values and traditions of our nation. Our efforts in these fields have been recognized by the countries of Southeast Asia as among our most important contributions in East Asia. We can take pride in what we have done, while recognizing that there is much left to be done.

Vietnam

There are other victims in East Asia today, and one of the major victims of Hanoi's aggression in Cambodia is the Vietnamese people themselves. The diversion of economic resources from development to military aggression against a neighbor, the termination or reduction of foreign aid programs, the reconversion of army units which had been shifted to economic reconstruction back to regular military service, the requirement for the average young male Vietnamese to continue to fight

President Carter's pledge to double our rate of resettlement of Indochinese refugees to 14,000 a month was a critical factor in generating new resettlement pledges by over 20 countries at the Geneva conference last July. This demonstrated willingness on the part of the international community to share the burden led the nations in the region to resume granting of first asylum.

Against this general background, let me outline for the committee how we propose that the United States participate—consistent with the Refugee Act of 1980—in international resettlement efforts during the remainder of this fiscal year. By eliminating the previous geographic and ideological restrictions on granting of refugee status, the act enables a more flexible system for refugee admissions and assistance. We intend to avail ourselves of this flexibility to establish admissions criteria that are as comprehensive and equitable as possible. In doing so, we will pay close attention to the resettlement needs of refugees in regions not explicitly encompassed by the prior legislation.

Let me be frank in pointing out, however, that it will take time to translate the goal of greater equity into a workable system. Many of the factors which contributed to our previous refugee admissions practices will of necessity continue to play an important role for some time. Indeed, these factors should be taken into account as we strive to define the elements of a more equitable system.

Among the considerations which have helped shape our admissions proposals for FY 1980 are the following.

- We must continue to be sensitive to the needs of refugees with close ties to the United States. We shall remain dedicated to reunifying families and to aiding those who have had past employment ties to the United States.
- Where the United States has stood uniquely as a symbol of freedom from oppression for a particular group, we must respond to their understandable aspirations for safe haven in our country.
- We must consider how our participation in refugee resettlement efforts can further our broader foreign policy objectives—for instance, by promoting the stability of friendly, democratic governments in countries of first asylum.
- And we will continue to be guided by our assessment of the opportunities for resettlement in other countries and the practical limits on U.S. resources.

Refugee Admissions

In FY 1980, we propose to admit into the United States 231,700 refugees. This figure includes over 114,000 refugees admitted before April 1 under previous statutory limits and parole programs authorized by the Attorney General and approved by the Congress. For the second half of the fiscal year, we propose to admit approximately 117,000 refugees, including up to 3,500 of the Cubans at the Peruvian Embassy in Havana.

Let me briefly review the major groups of refugees we propose to admit and the considerations underlying these proposals.

Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, we face a human tragedy of staggering dimensions. The enormous Indochinese refugee burden is also a continuing challenge to the stability of neighboring nations. We propose to continue to resettle 14,000 Indochinese refugees per month in the United States—a total of 168,000 this fiscal year. This level would continue the admission rate pledged last year by President Carter and previously authorized for FY 1980 under the Attorney General's parole authority, with congressional concurrence. In addition to the major humanitarian dimension of this commitment, it is an important, tangible demonstration of U.S. support for the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] nations.

At the Geneva conference last year, the world community more than doubled its resettlement offers and the Vietnamese pledged an end to forced departures. Since the conference, the rate of new arrivals of "boat people" has declined. Resettlement in third countries has increased. This has somewhat eased the burden on first-asylum countries. Boats of refugees are not now being pushed back to sea.

Nevertheless, the situation remains grave. In addition to some 150,000 Khmer in temporary holding centers in Thailand, some 230,000 Indochinese remain in refugee camps. Many of those in refugee camps have been waiting for resettlement for as long as 5 years. Without sustained resettlement commitments from the United States and other countries, these people face a bleak future—an existence without hope. Many are haunted by the prospect of forced repatriation, with persecution or possible death in their homelands. Flagging international interest, a sharp new influx of refugees, or new tension in the region could prompt changes of policy toward the refugees by the countries of first asylum.

Most of the Indochinese refugees we propose to admit this year have ties to the United States—relatives already in this country or past associations with the U.S. Government or U.S. institutions. In addition, we propose to admit a substantial number of refugees who have been languishing for years in refugee camps and have no other resettlement prospects.

Let me note that some of the Vietnamese qualified for admission by virtue of family ties or political persecution may come directly from Vietnam to the United States, if the Vietnamese authorities permit the planned "direct departure" program to go forward.

U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. From the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, we propose to admit 33,000 and 5,000 refugees, respectively. It has been the policy of the United States to offer a haven to any refugee from the Soviet Union who wishes to resettle in this country. This will remain our policy. We deplore the restrictions by Soviet authorities that have resulted in a recent decline in the number of Jews allowed to leave the Soviet Union. Should these restrictions be eased and the trend reversed, we are fully prepared to consult the Congress immediately on additional admissions and the necessary funding to accommodate all Soviet Jews who seek admission to the United States. We also anticipate admitting Soviet Armenians and other Christians who wish to resettle here, as well as Eastern Europeans of diverse backgrounds who have suffered discrimination in their homelands.

Latin America. We propose to admit 20,500 refugees from Latin America. This figure includes 19,500 Cubans. The United States has a long and proud history of aiding Cubans fleeing repression under the Castro regime. To date some 800,000 Cubans have resettled in the United States. In recent years, Cuban refugee admissions have been limited primarily to former political prisoners and their families and to cases involving family reunification. Persons in these categories will continue to comprise the bulk of the Cuban refugees we will admit.

The rush to the Peruvian Embassy compound in Havana nearly 2 weeks ago by some 10,000 Cubans seeking asylum is stark evidence of the oppressive conditions under which Cubans live. The large number of these persons who have expressed a desire to resettle in the United States is vivid proof that the United States remains a strong symbol of freedom and safe haven.

We are hopeful that the international effort begun yesterday with the movement of the first group of refugees from Havana to Costa Rica will continue at an accelerated pace—particularly in view of the deteriorating health and sanitation conditions at the Peruvian Embassy.

For our part, we have pledged to accept up to one-third of these Cubans for resettlement in the United States, to a maximum of 3,500. This figure is included in the 19,500 Cuban admissions total. We intend to give priority to refugees seeking family reunification and former political prisoners and their families.

A number of other countries have offered to accept some of these people. We anticipate that additional pledges will be forthcoming.

It is our hope that arrangements can be made to move these Cubans to Peru or a third country where they can be processed for final resettlement in an orderly manner.

In addition to Cubans, we anticipate admitting 1,000 other refugees from various parts of Latin America. These include Central Americans fleeing civil strife in their homelands.

Africa. We are strongly committed to expanding admissions of refugees from Africa. The geographical restrictions in the previous legislation severely limited the number of Africans who could qualify for refugee status. Nearly all of those who did qualify came from the Horn of Africa, defined by the prior legislation as a part of the Middle East. The Refugee Act of 1980 eliminates this restriction, making it possible for refugees in any part of Africa to apply for admission. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) currently is developing temporary procedures for reviewing applications from Africans, pending the establishment of an INS presence in Africa.

We propose 1,500 admissions this fiscal year for African refugees. This level constitutes a three-fold increase over last fiscal year. It is our best estimate of the number who will wish to apply for and will qualify for refugee status during this fiscal year. Our experience in the coming 6 months should provide us with a sound basis for adjusting this number in calculating FY 1981 admission levels.

Middle East. We shall maintain our longstanding policy of resettling persons fleeing political and religious persecution in the Middle East. We propose to admit a total of 2,500 refugees from this region. This reflects a growing demand for resettlement among religious and ethnic minorities in the region, such as Christians from Iraq. Internal repression and now the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have also created large numbers of Afghan refugees, some of whom are also seeking admission to the United States.

REFUGEE ADMISSIONS, FY 1980

Area of Origin	Approximate Number Admitted First Half of Fiscal Year	Approximate Number To Be Admitted Remainder of Fiscal Year	Total Number of Admissions for FY 1980
Asia			**169,200**
Indochinese	84,000	84,000	168,000
Other	600	600	1,200
Soviet Union	18,000	15,000	**33,000**
Eastern Europe	2,000	3,000	**5,000**
Middle East	500	2,000	**2,500**
Latin America			**20,500**
Cubans	9,000	10,500	19,500
Other	64	936	1,000
Africa	120	1,380	**1,500**
SUBTOTAL	**114,284**	**117,416**	**231,700**
Asylum Status Adjustments			**2,500**
TOTAL			**234,200**

We recognize that there remain large regional disparities in the numbers of proposed refugee admissions. I believe the considerations I have noted compel these disparities for the present. As I have indicated, however, we are determined to develop a system which permits refugees in all parts of the world freely to apply for admission to the United States and to have their applications fairly considered.

In addition to the refugees we propose to admit into the United States from abroad, the act also authorizes an adjustment to permanent resident status of up to 2,500 persons in the United States who have been granted political asylum. These 2,500 would bring to 234,200 the total number of refugee admissions and adjustments for this year.

The cost to the Federal Government of processing, transporting, and initially resettling these refugees in the United States will be approximately $267 million for FY 1980. We estimate that domestic assistance—funded through the Department of Health, Education and Welfare—will cost an additional $243 million. A number of other Federal agencies will incur lesser expenses for providing services to these refugees.

It is important to note that the private sector, particularly voluntary agencies, contribute generously to refugee resettlement programs. Our ability to work closely with dedicated private organizations and individuals has helped to make resettlement a remarkably effective process.

The U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs [Ambassador Victor Palmieri] will be working with the Departments of State; Justice; and Health, Education and Welfare—and with the Congress—to refine the admissions criteria and procedures needed to implement the new act.

The refugee admissions I have discussed constitute a major commitment by our government and by the American people. Helping these persecuted and uprooted persons begin new lives in our country will require the creative use of limited resources. But I am confident that our nation, which provided a new life for our forefathers, will faithfully uphold this humanitarian tradition and meet this challenge.

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[1] Press release 92. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Q. Did anyone visit the sites before the actual landing, or was there a team—

Secretary Brown. We knew from photography and other methods that the site was a salt desert, very similar to many areas in the southwestern United States, on some of which the team had practiced. So we knew it was suitable. And, indeed, it proved so to be.

Q. Have the bodies of the servicemen been returned also?

Secretary Brown. The bodies of the dead have not yet been returned. During the extraction it was concluded that the mission would be jeopardized if an attempt had to be made to recover them. But other efforts are being made; diplomatic efforts are underway.

Q. Were any of our NATO allies notified beforehand? And if not, why not?

Secretary Brown. The secrecy of this mission would have been compromised by informing others about what we were in the process of doing. Secrecy was vital to avoiding alerting of the Iranians to it. And in the event secrecy was preserved, and it was preserved by confining knowledge to a very, very small group of people. Only those who had an absolutely essential part in the preparation, even within the Defense Department. And even they knew only the minimum necessary to carry out their duties. For that reason, I can't say how many people, because different people knew different numbers.

Q. How can you say that you are not going to rule out any options, no more than you did before, when, in fact, you have just blown one of your options and you couldn't conceivably—

Secretary Brown. I will just repeat what I said. We have not ruled out any option. And we want, still, to resolve this as peacefully as we can.

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, APR. 26, 1980[3]

Because of my desire that Congress be informed on this matter and consistent with the reporting provisions of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (Public Law 93–148), I submit this report.

On April 24, 1980, elements of the United States Armed Forces under my direction commenced the positioning stage of a rescue operation which was designed, if the subsequent stages had been executed, to effect the rescue of the American hostages who have been held captive in Iran since November 4, 1979, in clear violation of international law and the norms of civilized conduct among nations. The subsequent phases of the operation were not executed. Instead, for the reasons described below, all these elements were withdrawn from Iran and no hostilities occurred.

The sole objective of the operation that actually occurred was to position the rescue team for the subsequent effort to withdraw the American hostages. The rescue team was under my overall command and control and required my approval before executing the subsequent phases of the operation designed to effect the rescue itself. No such approval was requested or given because, as described below, the mission was aborted.

Beginning approximately 10:30 AM EST on April 24, six U.S. C–130 transport aircraft and eight RH–53 helicopters entered Iran airspace. Their crews were not equipped for combat. Some of the C–130 aircraft carried a force of approximately 90 members of the rescue team equipped for combat, plus various support personnel.

From approximately 2 to 4 PM EST the six transports and six of the eight helicopters landed at a remote desert site in Iran approximately 200 miles from Tehran where they disembarked the rescue team, commenced refueling operations and began to prepare for the subsequent phases.

During the flight to the remote desert site, two of the eight helicopters developed operating difficulties. One was forced to return to the carrier Nimitz; the second was forced to land in the desert, but its crew was taken aboard another of the helicopters and proceeded on to the landing site. Of the six helicopters which landed at the remote desert site, one developed a serious hydraulic problem and was unable to continue with the mission. The operational plans called for a minimum of six helicopters in good operational condition able to proceed from the desert site. Eight helicopters had been included in the force to provide sufficient redundancy without imposing excessive strains on the refueling and exit requirements of the operation. When the number of helicopters available to continue dropped to five, it was determined that the operation could not proceed as planned. Therefore, on the recommendation of the force commander and my military advisers, I decided to cancel the mission and ordered the United States Armed Forces involved to return from Iran.

During the process of withdrawal, one of the helicopters accidentally collided with one of the C–130 aircraft, which was preparing to take off, resulting in the death of eight personnel and the injury of several others. At this point, the decision was made to load all surviving personnel aboard the remaining C–130 aircraft and to abandon the remaining helicopters at the landing site. Altogether, the United States Armed Forces remained on the ground for a total of approximately three hours. The five remaining aircraft took off about 5:45 PM EST and departed from Iran airspace without further incident at about 8:00 PM EST on April 24. No United States Armed Forces remain in Iran.

The remote desert area was selected to conceal this phase of the mission from discovery. At no time during the temporary presence of United States Armed Forces in Iran did they encounter Iranian forces of any type. We believe, in fact, that no Iranian military forces were in the desert area, and that the Iranian forces were unaware of the presence of United States Armed Forces until after their departure from Iran. As planned, no hostilities occurred during this phase of the mission—the only phase that was executed.

At one point during the period in which United States Armed Forces elements were on the ground at the desert landing site a bus containing forty-four Iranian civilians happened to pass along a nearby road. The bus was stopped and then disabled. Its occupants were detained by United States Armed Forces until their departure, and then released unharmed. One truck closely followed by a second vehicle also passed by while United States Armed Forces elements were on the ground. These elements stopped the truck by a shot into its headlights. The driver ran to the second vehicle which then escaped across the desert. Neither of these incidents affected the subsequent decision to terminate the mission.

Our rescue team knew, and I knew, that the operation was certain to be dangerous. We were all convinced that if and when the rescue phase of the operation had been commenced, it had an excellent chance of success. They were all volunteers; they were all highly trained. I met with their leaders before they went on this operation. They knew then what hopes of mine and of all Americans they carried with them. I share with the nation the highest respect and appreciation for the ability and bravery of all who participated in the mission.

To the families of those who died and who were injured, I have expressed the admiration I feel for the courage of their loved ones and the sorrow that I feel personally for their sacrifice.

The mission on which they were embarked was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran. It was not directed against the people of Iran. It caused no Iranian casualties.

This operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's powers under the Constitution as Chief Executive and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces, expressly recognized in Section 8(d)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. In carrying out this operation, the United States was acting wholly within its right, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to protect and rescue its citizens where the government of the territory in which they are located is unable or unwilling to protect them.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

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[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Apr. 28, 1980.

[2] Text from White House press release.

[3] Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Walter F. Mondale, President of the Senate (text from Weekly Compilation of May 5). ■

Additional Sanctions Against Iran

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, APR. 17, 1980[1]

Pursuant to section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703, I hereby report to the Congress that I have today declared a further national emergency and exercised the authority granted by this Act to impose further prohibitions on transactions with Iran.

I am enclosing a copy of an Executive Order I have issued today making this declaration and exercising these authorities pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1641(b).

1. The circumstances necessitating the exercise of this authority are the continuing events in Iran, including the actions and omissions of the Government of Iran in violation of its obligations under international law, which caused me to declare a national emergency on November 14, 1979, and to take the action set forth in Executive Order No. 12170 of November 14, 1979, and Executive Order No. 12205 of April 7, 1980, and the additional unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States created by events subsequent to November 14, 1979, in Iran and neighboring countries, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

2. The events in Iran and neighboring countries threaten the strategic and vital interests of the United States. The occupation of the United States Embassy in Tehran and the taking and holding of American citizens hostage there and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan are flagrant violations of the international order upon which the security of all nations and international peace are based. Such actions in a region of such vital importance to the United States, and most of the world, constitute a grave threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States.

3. For these reasons, I find it necessary to prohibit the following:

(a) Effective immediately, the direct or indirect import from Iran into the United States of Iranian goods or services, other than materials imported for news publication or news broadcast dissemination.

(b) Effective immediately, any transaction with a foreign person or foreign entity by any citizen or permanent resident of the United States relating to that person's travel to Iran after today. (I am simultaneously authorizing the Secretary of State to institute passport and departure controls to restrict travel to Iran by citizens and permanent residents of the United States.)

(c) Effective seven days from today, the payment by or on behalf of any citizen or permanent resident of the United States who is within Iran of any expenses for transactions within Iran.

The prohibitions in paragraphs (b) and (c) will not apply to a person who is also a citizen of Iran or a journalist or other person who is regularly employed by a news gathering or transmitting organization and who travels to Iran or is within Iran for the purpose of gathering or transmitting news, making news or documentary films, or similar activities.

4. Effective immediately, I have also amended Executive Order No. 12205 to prohibit payments, transfers of credit or other transfers of funds or other property or interests therein to any person in Iran, except for purposes of family remittances. This prohibition also does not apply to news gathering activities.

5. I have also directed the Secretary of the Treasury, effective fourteen days from today, to revoke existing licenses for transactions by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States with Iran Air, the National Iranian Oil Company, and the National Iranian Gas Company previously issued pursuant to regulations under Executive Order No. 12170 or Executive Order No. 12205. This will have the effect of closing down the offices in the United States of those entities.

6. In addition, I have ordered that all undelivered military equipment and spare parts purchased by Iran through the Department of Defense under the Arms Export Control Act now be distributed to our own Armed Forces or transferred to other buyers. The delivery of these defense articles was suspended in November 1979, and they are presently in storage or in the procurement pipeline.

7. This action is taken with respect to Iran and its nationals for the reasons described in this report.

JIMMY CARTER

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12211, APR. 17, 1980[1]

Further Prohibitions on Transactions With Iran

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, Sections 1732 and 2656 of Title 22 of the United States Code, and Section 301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1631), in order to take steps additional to those set forth in Executive Order No. 12170 of November 14, 1979, and Executive Order No. 12205 of April 7, 1980, to deal with the threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States referred to in those Orders, and the added unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States created by subsequent events in Iran and neighboring countries, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with respect to which I hereby declare a national emergency, and to carry out the policy of the United States to deny the use of its resources to aid, encourage or give sanctuary to those persons involved in directing, supporting or participating in acts of international terrorism, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1-101. Paragraph 1-101(d) of Executive Order No. 12205 is hereby amended by the addition of a new subparagraph (v) as follows:

(v) Make any payment, transfer of credit, or other transfer of funds or other property or interests therein, except for purposes of family remittances.

1-102. The following transactions are prohibited, notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licenses granted before the date of this Order:

(a) Effective immediately, the direct or indirect import from Iran into the United States of Iranian goods or services, other than materials imported for news publication or news broadcast dissemination.

(b) Effective immediately, any transactions with a foreign person or foreign entity by any citizen or permanent resident of the United States relating to that person's travel to Iran after the date of this Order.

(c) Effective seven days from the date of this Order, the payment by or on behalf of any citizen or permanent resident of the United States who is within Iran of any expenses for transactions within Iran.

Ambassador Linowitz Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations, was interviewed on CBS's "Face the Nation" on April 20, 1980, by George Herman, CBS News (moderator); Robert Pierpoint, CBS News; and Terence Smith, The New York Times.

Q. After the visits of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, the President sounded reasonably optimistic about further progress in the Middle East, but Mr. Begin, when he returned to his homeland, said he had given away nothing. Can there be progress unless somebody gives away something?

A. First let me say a word about why the meetings that were just held were deemed by the President to be successful, to have been very productive.

The object of the meeting with Prime Minister Begin, as with President Sadat, was to come together in order to talk frankly about issues of greatest consequence, to exchange ideas, to see whether there might be some room for finding new answers to questions that thus far had eluded answers.

So there was an agreement that the May 26th date ought to be reconfirmed as the objective, that efforts ought to be made to accelerate the negotiations, that new mechanisms ought to be explored and new ideas discussed, and this was precisely what the President had hoped for.

Now against that backdrop, the answer to your question is, yes, there can be progress because what is called for is not the kind of major concessions that were perhaps suggested by Prime Minister Begin when he repeated his position but rather give and take here and there in a manner that will insure that we move toward the autonomy that both parties have sought and for which they've committed themselves.

Q. Let me amend my first question with some language that I picked up from your first answer and try it again.

In your meeting with Prime Minister Begin, and I suppose also with President Sadat, did you find, as you said, new room for solutions, and was there, as you said, a little give and take here and there by both sides?

A. Yes. I think it's fair to say that there was a recognition on the part of each of the leaders that there had to be some flexibility if we are to reach an agreement.

Prime Minister Begin feels very strongly, as he has asserted again and again, about some critical issues.

It was possible in the course of these discussions, however, to put before him the concerns of President Sadat and those of President Carter with respect to those issues and see if there might not be some way of finding a common way which would meet his concerns and yet move us forward. That did take place in the course of our discussions with him, as indeed it did when we talked with President Sadat.

Q. Coming off of those discussions, do you see enough ground to suggest that the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza would be encouraged sufficiently to come into this process? They so far have not.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think they will?

A. I don't know, but I hope they will. As you know, we have long been trying to get the Palestinians to become involved in these discussions and these negotiations. When the Camp David accord was entered into, it was with the anticipation and with the hope that Palestinians might join the negotiations as a member of the Jordanian or Egyptian team. This they have adamantly refused to do.

When I first became involved in these negotiations some 4½ months ago, I then said that if I were a Palestinian at that time I would not have wanted to join the negotiations.

What I meant was that at that time there had only been discussions, semantics, and procedural matters and no substantive areas that are of real consequence to the Palestinians.

Today I believe there is reason for them to look long and hard at what we've done. We have made progress. We have come to some agreement on substantive issues. We are moving in the direction of establishing full autonomy, and, therefore, I hope we can interest them in joining the talks.

Q. You talk about some flexibility. You talk about some give and take. You say you are moving forward in a substantive way. Did you, for instance, make any progress at all on autonomy, and, if so, what does it now mean to the Israelis versus what does it mean to the Egyptians?

A. Let me first point out the basic problem we have in these negotiations. The phrase "full autonomy" has never been defined under the circumstances with which we're dealing. So what we're up to really is trying to fashion a definition which will be acceptable to both parties.

You may know the story of the little girl who was once drawing a picture and the man said, "What are you drawing?" She said, "I'm drawing a picture of God." The man said, "No one knows what God looks like." And the kid said, "They will when I'm through."

Well, in a sense, if we want to know what full autonomy is, they'll know when we're through. We're trying now to put meaning into that phrase, and I think as a result of these discussions we did move closer to a mutually acceptable understanding as to what autonomy ought to mean, and, therefore, I think we've made some progress.

Q. All right, but let's be specific. Does it mean anymore than the right to decide who sweeps the streets in the Arab villages and the Arab cities, or does it really mean that they will have the right to rule themselves as they and the Egyptians want?

A. Unless this full autonomy does give the Palestinians the sense that they are going to have a very substantial measure of control over those things which are important in their lives, they won't enter these talks. They won't become involved in the elections, and, therefore, they won't be participants.

Therefore, it's clearly understood by both sides that the autonomy plan that emerges must be credible, must be viable, must really make sense in terms of the language used.

Q. When Mr. Begin returned just the other day to Israel—I mean I'm looking at the article here and he ticked off areas in which he did not give, he said to his people, obviously playing to his constituency as well, but if you look at them—no concession on sovereignty in east Jerusalem, no concession on continuing construction of Israeli settlements, no

concession on the question of security and control of the security situation in the West Bank—what does that leave you? Where do you go from there?

A. It's very important to differentiate areas of agreement and areas of disagreement. Nobody was suggesting to Prime Minister Begin when he was here that sovereignty be divided in Jerusalem. The only question that ever arose was whether or not the Arabs in east Jerusalem ought to have some way of participating in the election of the self-governing authority. That was it.

And the President reaffirmed again and again Jerusalem will remain undivided. So that is not an issue that caused any concern, nor was there disagreement on that.

Q. But he says there was this historic debate in the Cabinet Room for 2 hours on the question of east Jerusalem. Was that on the question of voting in east Jerusalem?

A. Yes. I'm flattered by the historic designation, but it was an interesting discussion back and forth, and it was on that question of should the Arabs in east Jerusalem have the right to participate, should they be encouraged to participate in the vote?

Q. How did it come out?

A. We still have differences of opinion on that.

Q. Then there really wasn't any progress after this historic debate.

A. No. I said that we still have differences of opinion. I didn't say there had not been any progress.

Q. What was the degree of progress? Or give us an example of what progress was made on that issue.

A. I think the progress that was made was a clearer understanding on both sides of the positions of each.

For example, Prime Minister Begin does understand why the Egyptians feel so strongly that it would not be wise for us to assume that you could elect a self-governing authority without the participation in some form of the Arabs in east Jerusalem.

And I think with that awareness we're now going to go back and enter into these negotiations starting a week from now hoping that his discussion will have been helpful as we move forward.

Q. You say the President said again and again that Jerusalem would remain an undivided city.

A. Yes.

Q. Under Israel?

A. He didn't say that. That is not the issue. The issue at the moment is to leave Jerusalem aside. And the President has committed himself that Jerusalem be undivided with free access to members of all the faiths to their holy places. That issue is now over to the side, and nobody is trying to talk about how it ought to be touched at all in the future. At some point later on we'll have to look at that issue.

Q. There was a report on Israel radio that a mutual defense pact between the United States and Israel was discussed in these talks. Is that correct?

A. I heard that report, too. I was not present when any such discussion took place. If it did, it may have been raised between the President and Prime Minister Begin. I was not a party to any such discussion.

Q. Another way to approach that is whether either Prime Minister Begin or President Sadat laid out expectations or things that they want to see for their countries as a result of agreeing on autonomy.

A. You mean was there bargaining?

Q. Yes.

A. No. I was not present at any point where there was any bargaining in return for moving forward in these autonomy negotiations.

Q. What about the very difficult issue of the settlements? President Carter has said again and again that the continuation of the Israeli settlements is a roadblock to peace. Was that said again to Mr. Begin, and what was his reply, and was any progress made on that issue?

A. It was said again to Mr. Begin who asserted again and again as you say. I have had occasion to say it to him various times. The President has. The Secretary of State has and so forth.

Prime Minister Begin believes that both security considerations and as of right Israel ought to be able to continue with these settlements.

Prime Minister Begin recognizes we believe it is an obstacle to the negotiations. We think it unwise from Israel's point of view to be taking these steps at this moment when we are trying to find an answer to the autonomy.

I can't say there was any give on his part in connection with that issue.

Q. But if you were a betting man, would you bet that Israel will establish or at least or even name new settlements in the time between now and the expiration of this deadline, May 26th?

A. I really don't know, but I deeply hope not.

Q. Is this a domestic political issue on which the United States and the Egyptians can bring pressure on Mr. Begin—the settlements issue?

A. I don't think we ought to talk in terms of pressure on Mr. Begin. Our role in this case is that of the full partner, the catalyst if you will, the party trying to bring the two closer together.

I don't think it's going to be productive to try to flex muscle or use pressure on Mr. Begin in order to get him to adopt a position that we believe is in Israel's own best interest.

I think what we have to do is work with him, make sure that he fully understands why we feel as we do, that we are committed to Israel's security, that we want to do everything we can to ensure that Israel's future is not prejudiced in any respect, and we hope that on that basis he will agree that we can make progress.

Q. Aren't we—we, including the United States—a little bit in a dangerous situation on this question of negotiating the future of the Palestinians? It sort of reminds you of Britain and Germany dividing up Czechoslovakia without even a representative of Czechoslovakia at the bargaining table. That's what is happening to the Palestinians in a sense. Their future is being determined without their presence.

A. Only because they don't want to be there. The thing that's most distressing—

Q. But you yourself said that up until recently had you been a Palestinian you would not have come.

A. Up until 3½–4 months ago I would have hesitated because, as I said, we had not yet begun to get into the substantive issues. This has now happened. And, therefore, I am hoping that today the Palestinians will take a

A. We all share the same basic problems: an extraordinary threat to our own security because we are so heavily dependent on imported oil; an almost unprecedented level of inflation, certainly within this generation; the threat that as we control inflation in the future effectively that the unemployment rate will go up in our nations; the need to avoid protectionist steps in international trade; the proper treatment of the less developed countries, which are often dependent on a single commodity and haven't let the advantages of a technological world be extended to them.

These kinds of problems are common among us, and it's extremely beneficial to me—I'm sure it's beneficial to the other participants in the economic summits—to share these problems with one another. In Venice, I think we'll have another opportunity to discuss these problems. I think we've made very good progress in the other three summits with which I have been involved, and I have no doubt that the beautiful setting in Venice and the hospitality of the Italian people and the common realization of our purposes and challenges and opportunities will make this next summit conference also effective.

Q. You refer to the French action in Africa. What about the Middle East? President Giscard d'Estaing has made a statement, and it looks like the European countries agree with his conclusions. According to your opinion, is that policy helping or damaging your own policy in that situation?

A. I don't agree with the statements made by President Giscard d'Estaing, but I certainly recognize his right to make them. And I'm not sure that all of the European countries agree completely with what he has said.

In my opinion, the best opportunity for the realization of our hopes, which are common among all of us, in the Mideast, surrounding Israel, rests in the further progress to be envisioned under the Camp David accords. It is a basis for an adequate peace settlement for Israel and all its neighbors. I don't believe that President Giscard d'Estaing has put forward an alternative negotiating process that would be acceptable by the parties in dispute, that might replace the Camp David accords.

The Palestinians have legitimate rights, which we are trying to honor. They have a right to a voice in the determination of their own future. These two statements, among others, have been recognized by not only ourselves and the Egyptians but also by the Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Begin.

So, I believe that it would be better for the European countries to give us a chance to continue the Camp David process unless there is a clear vision or delineation of a preferable alternative, and I see no prospects of this being put forward.

Some have moved toward a recognition of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]. We have no intention of recognizing the PLO nor of negotiating with the PLO until they first acknowledge the effectiveness and authenticity of the U.N. Resolution 242 and also recognize Israel's right to exist. This is a clear policy of ours which will be honored.

But we are as determined as others to see the refugee question resolved, full autonomy established in the West Bank/Gaza, a secure Israel, recognized borders, and peace.

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Apr. 21, 1980.

[2] The President misunderstood the last part of this question. Beginning as early as Oct. 1979, the United States did publicly and privately warn the Soviet Union against invading Afghanistan. [White House clarification] ■

Southern Rhodesia: Eve of Independence

by Richard M. Moose

Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 27, 1980. Mr. Moose is Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.[1]

It is always a pleasure to meet with you to exchange views on Rhodesia. However, I am particularly pleased to be asked to discuss that country with you today in the wake of elections which most observers have agreed were reasonably "free and fair" and on the eve of independence when Rhodesia will become Zimbabwe.

The realization of an independent Zimbabwe under a democratic constitution following free and fair elections was one of the primary goals of the Administration's policy in southern Africa. We undertook to offer the leaders and the people of Zimbabwe an opportunity to realize their aspirations through a peaceful, negotiated settlement. We wanted to create an alternative to armed struggle. Through what began as a joint U.S.-U.K. negotiating effort and ended in a brilliant and daring U.K. negotiating effort, our objectives were attained.

Transition Period

I will not dwell on the transition period which is already very familiar to most of you. In spite of some very tense moments, elections were held as scheduled February 27–29, and all the parties participated. The Commonwealth observer group, which had been designated an important role at the August Commonwealth conference in Lusaka, issued an interim report which stated essentially that under difficult circumstances the elections were "free and fair." Other official and nonofficial groups reached generally the same conclusion; this information accorded with our own appraisal which was reflected in the Secretary's statement of March 2, following the election but before the results were announced. That statement said, ". . . our own assessment [was] that the results of the election will reflect the will of the people of Zimbabwe."

The statistics are impressive: A record 2.7 million people, 94% of the electorate, voted. Robert Mugabe's ZANU/PF [Zimbabwe African National Union/Patriotic Front] party won a clear-cut majority of 57 parliamentary seats, obtaining 63% of the vote. Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front party won 20 seats (24% of the vote), mostly from the Matabele area, and Bishop Muzorewa's United African National Council won but 3 seats (8% of the vote). The other parties were shut out.

Few predicted that Robert Mugabe's appeal would be as strong as it was. His strength resulted from various factors, including:

- His image as a nationalist who organized the principal and most successful fighting force;
- His identification with the majority Shona tribal group;
- His ability to project himself as a winner; and
- Muzorewa's relatively lackluster performance during his period in office and his close identification with the whites and with South Africa.

In the past, Prime Minister Mugabe was labeled a dedicated Marxist in many circles. His former rhetoric has on occasion been somewhat strident. However, I believe we should judge him in an African context and deal with him both on his presently stated intentions and his future actions. As the leader of a guerrilla, nationalist movement, he accepted assistance from wherever he could obtain it. The People's Republic of China was a principal supporter, as was Yugoslavia, Romania, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and some African states. However, the Soviet Union did not forge a close relationship, principally because of Mugabe's insistence on being independent of outside powers and also because the U.S.S.R. was a staunch backer of Nkomo and ZAPU [Zimbabwe African People's Union].

Government's New Approach and African Reactions

It is impossible, of course, to predict the exact course Mugabe will take. However, he has adopted a moderate and conciliatory approach in recent months, and his initial steps in the postelection period have been encouraging. For instance, he has indicated:

- His recognition of the important role whites play in Zimbabwe and his desire for them to remain;
- His intention to work within the free enterprise system and to bring changes gradually so as not to jolt the basic productivity of the economic structure;
- His plan to concentrate on underutilized land for redistribution for Africans and leave highly productive European farm land intact;
- His nomination of General Peter Walls to preside over the integration of the armed forces and his appointment of two prominent whites in his Cabinet; and
- His allocation of four Cabinet portfolios to ZAPU to broaden the base of his government.

The reaction throughout black Africa to developments in Zimbabwe has been positive. Zimbabwe is expected to become a member of the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the OAU, and the front-line states soon. The Prime Minister has also stated his intention to pursue a nonaligned foreign policy, and that he will seek good relations with all Zimbabwe's neighbors.

Through his public acknowledgment that South Africa "is a reality," Mr. Mugabe indicated he will seek to work out a pragmatic relationship with that country, perhaps along the lines which now exist between Mozambique and South Africa. In this connection, however, Mugabe has made a distinction between not allowing Zimbabwe to be used as a forward base for military activities directed against the republic and opposition to apartheid which he has forthrightly condemned.

The South African reaction to date has been reserved, but nevertheless encouraging. The dire predictions which many made about the consequences of a Mugabe victory have not materialized. There is growing comprehension within the South African Government that it is in its own self-interest to establish a realistic relationship with the new government in Zimbabwe, and that to have a relatively stable, effective administration in Zimbabwe is far preferable to economic and political turmoil with all its negative consequences for that country. The front-line countries, especially Zambia and Mozambique, have a real interest in insuring that things work out well in Zimbabwe. These states suffered enormously from the Rhodesia conflict and are now anxious to concentrate on nurturing their own national development.

The British have stressed to us repeatedly Mozambique's past splendid cooperation in helping to move the entire Zimbabwe settlement process forward and the need for Maputo's continued positive role as an influential actor in the region. Lord Soames [U.K. Governor in Rhodesia until April 18, 1980] just completed a visit to Maputo where he was warmly received. Zambia, too, has played a constructive role in the context of the Rhodesia settlement.

Prime Minister Mugabe has witnessed at first hand the severe difficulties which confront newly independent governments which attempt radical change too quickly. Therefore, he is likely to move cautiously, and will seek Western cooperation as he charts his country's future. The new Prime Minister understands that to succeed, his government must enable the people of Zimbabwe to improve their own well-being. He knows that his government must produce results and he is looking to us and others in the West to help. He has already spoken of his high esteem for the United States and his desire to form genuine bonds of friendship with America. He will also be looking to the United States to honor its pledge at Lancaster House to cooperate with a multidonor effort for economic and agricultural development for Zimbabwe in a regional context.

The Need for Assistance

One of our first steps to assist the new process has been a $5 million contribution to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees for refugee repatriation. We also plan to get underway a modest, but highly visible, assistance program as soon as possible after independence. We have already sent a congressional notification on reprogramming $2 million from FY 1980 regional economic support funds. While we will have to work out details

U.S. Aid to Zimbabwe

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, APR. 14, 1980[1]

When Zimbabwe becomes independent, it will need considerable external assistance for postwar rehabilitation and broad-based development. The British have appealed to a number of countries, including the United States, to meet these needs. The United States is prepared to respond.

During the Lancaster House conference on a Rhodesian settlement, we indicated we would join a multidonor effort to assist in the agricultural and economic development of an independent Zimbabwe within the framework of a wider development concept for southern Africa.

In keeping with that commitment, the United States plans to make available $15 million in assistance for Zimbabwe. We have already pledged $5 million to the U.N. High Commission for Refugees for use in its ongoing repatriation of an estimated 250,000 Zimbabwean refugees from neighboring countries. This will make a total U.S. contribution of $20 million this fiscal year. In the next fiscal year beginning October 1, 1980, subject to congressional appropriations, we expect to make assistance available amounting to $25–30 million.

Independent Zimbabwe will be a key element in the future stability and economic development of the entire southern African region. The United States is committed to helping the people of Zimbabwe achieve the peaceful and prosperous future they so richly deserve.

[1] Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III. ■

and die after four decades of fighting and dying have produced economic stagnation and popular malaise throughout Vietnam.

We do not see any signs that such difficulties are yet causing a rethinking of Hanoi's course in Cambodia. Hanoi continues to refer to the situation in Cambodia as "irreversible." There has been no letup in Vietnam's military commitment or any suggestion of interest in a political settlement.

Nevertheless, the current economic difficulties and the popular unease must continue to weigh on Hanoi's mind. Recent changes in the Hanoi leadership, in which Interior Minister Tran Quoc Hoan and State Planning Commission Chairman Le Thanh Nghi were both replaced, suggest that Hanoi is aware of these pressures. Hanoi may eventually come to realize that the interests of its own people can best be served by focusing the energies of the Vietnamese nation on its own development.

The Soviets and Vietnam

As is true in certain other regions of the world, the Soviet Union must bear a major part of the responsibility for the human suffering and the increased instability in the region.

The Soviet Union is providing Vietnam essential support for its military activities in Cambodia. Soviet shipments of military equipment to Vietnam more than quadrupled from 1978 to 1979. Soviet support, which costs the Soviets close to $3 million a day, has included some new sophisticated military equipment but consists primarily of replacement and resupply for existing weapons, as well as petroleum and food. Soviet technicians and dockworkers have played a key role in the functioning of Haiphong, Vietnam's major port. The Soviets have placed 12 AN–12 transport planes, with Soviet crews, in Hanoi's service. These planes fly extensively between Ho Chi Minh City and western Cambodia bringing in military supplies essential to Vietnam's military activities there. Without such Soviet support, the Vietnamese would be unable to maintain their effort in Cambodia at anything like its current level.

As a result of their support for the Vietnamese the Soviets have gained access to naval and air facilities in Vietnam. Soviet ships and submarines call at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay. Soviet long-range aircraft operate out of Danang on an increasingly regular basis. Earlier this month a Soviet frigate made a precedent-setting call at the Khmer port of Kompong Som, thus projecting a Soviet naval presence further into Southeast Asia. Through their increased access to these facilities, the Soviets have significantly enhanced their military capabilities, not only in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific but also in the Indian Ocean.

Soviet activities, such as the recent concentration of over 10 ships in the South China Sea off Vietnam, introduce a new destabilizing element into Southeast Asia, a region whose nations wish to exclude big-power rivalries and to create a stable system of independent nation states in which all nations could concentrate their energies and resources on nation-building and economic development.

Vietman's close alignment with the Soviet Union has also served increasingly to isolate Vietnam in the region, in the nonaligned movement, and in the international community generally. The 91–21 vote on the U.N. General Assembly resolution concerning the situation in Cambodia last November testifies to Hanoi's isolation. In time such isolation may help bring Vietnam to reconsider the price it is having to pay in terms of its oft-proclaimed dedication to its independence and sovereignty, as well as in terms of its relations with its neighbors, the nonaligned community, and with the rest of the world.

U.S.-Vietnamese Relations

Another reflection of the isolation which Vietnam has created for itself is that movement toward normalization of relations between Vietnam and the United States remains suspended. Vietnam is the third most populous Communist nation and maintains one of the world's largest military establishments. As recent events in Southeast Asia have all too well demonstrated, Vietnamese actions impact directly on the United States.

We want to be in the best possible position to exert a positive influence on Vietnamese policies and actions. In particular we want to encourage the Vietnamese to act on their pledge to provide the fullest possible accounting of missing U.S. personnel, to implement an orderly departure program to help resolve refugee and family reunification issues, and to move toward the observance of international accepted standards of human rights.

At the beginning of this Administration we made it clear that in order to put the hostility of the past behind us and to enhance the peace and stability of Southeast Asia, we were ready to normalize our relations with Vietnam. That remains our objective. From the first meeting in May 1977, we stressed to the Vietnamese that we could not agree to economic aid as a precondition to normalization and that progress toward normalization would inevitably be affected by Hanoi's policies toward its neighbors.

Vietnam's insistence that we agree to provide direct economic assistance as part of any agreement to establish relations blocked progress for a year and a half. In the fall of 1978 Hanoi stated that it would no longer demand a U.S. commitment to bilateral economic assistance as a *quid pro quo* for normalization and that it would continue its efforts to provide an MIA accounting.

These statements were followed, however, by the massive forced expulsion of the boat people and the December Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. In these circumstances, we halted further movement toward U.S.-Vietnamese normalization as not being appropriate or conducive to regional stability at this time.

While normal relations between our two countries remains our ultimate objective, we cannot move in this direction under current circumstances. The Vietnamese are well aware of our views. We have periodic talks with them on such issues as MIAs, refugees, and the famine and the conflict in Kampuchea to insure that they fully understand our views and in the hope of moving them to more responsible courses of action. We will continue these contacts and keep Congress fully informed.

Dealing With the Crisis

We have worked closely with our friends and allies to meet the dangers and difficulties posed by Vietnamese and Soviet policies in Indochina. In response to the pressures and tensions in the region created by the overwhelming number of Vietnamese refugees pouring into the countries of first asylum in the region, last July we doubled our intake of refugees for resettlement in the United States to 14,000 a month. Our move stimulated a broad international response and has significantly eased the tension in the region.

We continue to urge the Vietnamese to treat their own people humanely so that they no longer feel compelled to flee and to stress to the

Vietnamese the importance of the maintenance of the moratorium on the government-sponsored mass illegal exodus. We have made every effort, working through the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, to establish an orderly departure program out of Vietnam which will allow Vietnamese with ties to the United States to leave.

Faced with the threat to Thai security posed by Vietnamese military activities along the Thai-Cambodia border, we have expedited deliveries of previously ordered military equipment to Thailand and, with the cooperation of this committee, increased our foreign military sales credits to the Thai as well.

We have publicly stressed the importance we place on Thailand's security and territorial integrity and noted the continued relevance of the Manila Pact, most recently in last month's ANZUS [security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and United States] communique.

We have contributed over $80 million to the international relief effort to respond to the desperate famine in Cambodia. We are working with international agencies and other countries to pressure the Vietnamese to permit wider distribution of food within Cambodia and greater international access to the country. We are consulting closely also on how to respond to the continuing requirement for large amounts of food and medicine in order to keep the Khmer people alive; the next meeting will be in New York only 2 days from now.

Faced with the continuing violations of human rights in Cambodia and the reports of the use of poison gas in both Laos and Cambodia, we have pressed bilaterally for any use of poison gas to cease and, at the U.N. Human Rights Commission, for international action to look into both situations.

In addition to dealing with these symptoms, we have also sought to deal with the root political causes. In November last year the U.N. General Assembly, by a vote of 91–21, approved a resolution proposed by the five ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] and 26 other nonaligned nations on the situation in Cambodia. This resolution:

- Appealed for humanitarian relief to the civilian population of Cambodia;
- Urged all parties to the conflict to facilitate humanitarian relief efforts;
- Called on all parties to observe fundamental principles of human rights;
- Called for a cessation of hostilities and the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia;
- Appealed to all states to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of Cambodia;
- Resolved that the people of Cambodia be enabled to choose democratically their own government without outside interference, subversion, or coercion; and
- Requested that the Secretary General explore the possibility of an international conference on Cambodia.

In addition to the concerns reflected in our refugee policy and relief effort, we have steadfastly supported ASEAN in the face of the insecurity and tension stemming from the Vietnamese aggression in Cambodia and the threat to the region posed by the expanding Soviet access to the region. In response to these concerns, we have fully endorsed the ASEAN–U.N. General Assembly resolution as providing a base for progress toward peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

We and our friends and allies have worked unceasingly to promote a political solution to the crises. In February I visited all the ASEAN capitals and conferred with their leaders. We met with our ANZUS partners here in Washington at the end of February. Australian Prime Minister Fraser, Japanese Foreign Minister Okita, and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang have all visited Washington in the past month, as has Prince Sihanouk. These meetings, which have covered a wide diversity of issues, have also provided the opportunity for intense exchanges of views on the situation in Indochina.

Others have been active as well. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers recently met with the Foreign Ministers of the European Economic Community; they reviewed the threat to the peace posed by both Vietnamese-Soviet actions in Cambodia and Soviet aggression against Afghanistan and called for early implementation of the ASEAN–U.N. resolution on Cambodia.

We have explored with all how we might proceed toward a political settlement which at a minimum would promote the key goals of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, the emergence of a genuinely independent and neutral Cambodia at peace with its neighbors and with a government which represents its people and respects their rights, and the return to regional stability and balance by the elimination of the Soviet military intrusion in the region.

Although none of the active participants in the fighting yet seem interested in a peaceful settlement of the issues, we will continue to see what role we can play in the promotion of a peaceful and stable Cambodia. Meanwhile, we believe it is vital to persist in our response to the humanitarian needs of the region to the best of our means and abilities—knowing as we all do that the ultimate resolution of the painful and tragic situation, however distant, can only come as a result of the mutual efforts of all concerned.

AMBASSADOR PALMIERI

I appreciate this opportunity to bring you up to date on the refugee and humanitarian-relief situation in Southeast Asia. Since my confirmation by the Senate in December, I have made two trips to Southeast Asia during which I inspected the refugee camps and border settlements in Thailand and the other countries of first asylum and consulted with ministers of those governments, international relief officials, and voluntary agency workers. Wherever I went I interviewed refugee families and became a witness to the suffering they have endured. In recent weeks I have also made trips to a number of cities throughout the United States where Indochinese are being resettled. There I held discussions with mayors and other local and state officials and the sometimes frightened but always determined people—"strangers in a strange land"—who are seeking to make the difficult transition from Asian refugee to American resident.

Based on these observations, I have the greatest concern about the situation in Kampuchea and the Southeast Asian refugee crisis, and I welcome this opportunity to share this concern with you and the members of the subcommittee.

First, despite the efforts of the international community, the desperate human needs for food and medical assistance within Kampuchea are being only partially met, and there is the grim prospect, now that the last wet season's small rice harvest has been fully consumed, that renewed famine and disease will lay waste again to that tortured population.

Second, there is no end in sight to the refugee flow from Indochina, and there is no reason to expect to see one so long as the people of Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam lack either food or future.

U.S. Attempts Rescue of American Hostages in Iran

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, APR. 25, 1980 (1:15 AM)[1]

The President has ordered the cancelation of an operation in Iran which was underway to prepare for a rescue of our hostages. The mission was terminated because of equipment failure. During the subsequent withdrawal of American personnel there was a collision between our aircraft on the ground at a remote desert location in Iran. There were no military hostilities, but the President deeply regrets that eight American crew members of the two aircraft were killed and others were injured in the accident. Americans involved in the operation have now been airlifted from Iran, and those who were injured are being given medical treatment and are expected to recover.

This mission was not motivated by hostility toward Iran or the Iranian people and there were no Iranian casualties.

Preparations for this rescue mission were ordered for humanitarian reasons, to protect the national interests of this country, and to alleviate international tensions. The President accepts full responsibility for the decision to attempt the rescue.

The nation is deeply grateful to the brave men who were preparing to rescue the hostages.

The United States continues to hold the Government of Iran responsible for the safety of the American hostages.

The United States remains determined to obtain their safe release at the earliest possible date.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, APR. 25, 1980 (7:00 AM)[1]

Late yesterday, I canceled a carefully planned operation which was underway in Iran to position our rescue team for later withdrawal of American hostages who've been held captive there since November 4th.

Equipment failure in the rescue helicopters made it necessary to end the mission. As our team was withdrawing, after my order to do so, two of our American aircraft collided on the ground following a refueling operation in a remote desert location in Iran. Other information about this rescue mission will be made available to the American people when it is appropriate to do so.

There was no fighting; there was no combat. But to my deep regret, eight of the crewmen of the two aircraft which collided were killed, and several other Americans were hurt in the accident.

Our people were immediately airlifted from Iran. Those who were injured have gotten medical treatment, and all of them are expected to recover.

No knowledge of this operation by any Iranian officials or authorities was evident to us until several hours after all Americans were withdrawn from Iran.

Our rescue team knew, and I knew, that the operation was certain to be difficult and it was certain to be dangerous. We were all convinced that if and when the rescue operation had been commenced that it had an excellent chance of success. They were all volunteers; they were all highly trained. I met with their leaders before they went on this operation. They knew then what hopes of mine and of all Americans they carried with them.

To the families of those who died and who were wounded, I want to express the admiration I feel for the courage of their loved ones and the sorrow that I feel personally for their sacrifice.

The mission on which they were embarked was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran; it was not directed against the people of Iran. It was not undertaken with any feeling of hostility toward Iran or its people. It has caused no Iranian casualties.

Planning for this rescue effort began shortly after our Embassy was seized. But, for a number of reasons, I waited until now to put those rescue plans into effect. To be feasible, this complex operation had to be the product of intensive planning and intensive training and repeated rehearsal.

However, a resolution of this crisis through negotiations and with voluntary action on the part of the Iranian officials was obviously then, has been, and will be preferable.

This rescue attempt had to await my judgment that the Iranian authorities could not or would not resolve this crisis on their own initiative. With the steady unraveling of authority in Iran and the mounting dangers that were posed to the safety of the hostages themselves and the growing realization that their early release was highly unlikely, I made a decision to commence the rescue operations plans.

This attempt became a necessity and a duty. The readiness of our team to undertake the rescue made it completely practicable. Accordingly, I made the decision to set our long-developed plans into operation. I ordered this rescue mission prepared in order to safeguard American lives, to protect America's national interests, and to reduce the tensions in the world that have been caused among many nations as this crisis has continued. It was my decision to attempt the rescue operation. It was my decision to cancel it when problems developed in the placement of our rescue team for a future rescue operation. The responsibility is fully my own.

In the aftermath of the attempt, we continue to hold the Government of Iran responsible for the safety and for the early release of the American hostages who have been held so long.

The United States remains determined to bring about their safe release at the earliest date possible. As President, I know that our entire nation feels the deep gratitude I feel for the brave men who were prepared to rescue their fellow Americans from captivity. And, as President, I also know that the nation shares not only my disappointment that the rescue effort could not be mounted because of mechanical difficulties but also my determination to persevere and to bring all of our hostages home to freeedom.

We have been disappointed before. We will not give up in our efforts. Throughout this extraordinarily difficult period, we have pursued and will continue to pursue every possible avenue to secure the release of the hostages. In these efforts, the support of the American people and of our friends throughout the world has been a most crucial element. That support of other nations is even more important now. We will seek to continue, along with other nations and with the officials of Iran, a prompt resolution of the crisis without any loss of life and through peaceful and diplomatic means.

Secretary Muskie's News Conference of May 20

Q. If I could begin with a two-part question. Did you leave the Vienna meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko with any feeling of hope that the Soviets would withdraw from Afghanistan under any foreseeable circumstances? And second, do you think that beginning dialogue with the Soviets is damaged at all, or affected at all, by the meeting between President Giscard and President Brezhnev in Warsaw?

A. With respect to the first point, there was no change in the position the Soviets have taken publicly with respect to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. There was support for the so-called Afghan proposal, which surfaced a day or two before the meeting with Mr. Gromyko; and that, presumably, was offered as a basis for consideration.

With respect to the Giscard meeting with Mr. Brezhnev, I would not think that the Giscard meeting in any way changes my perception of the Soviet position on the withdrawal of troops.

Q. Does it affect or complicate the dialogue between the United States and the Soviets to have a third-party conducting parallel discussions?

A. Until I have a report, from whatever sources are interested in reporting to us, on what took place in that meeting, it is difficult to answer that question. I may say that it seems to me that such a meeting is a proper subject for consultations.

I had no message pressed home more firmly to me from our NATO allies than the importance of consultations when it involved possible U.S. actions. Consultation to me, up until this moment, has always been a two-way street. I hope that that is what it means in connection with our NATO friends.

Q. The other night at Worcester, in a tribute to Hubert Humphrey, you spoke of two ideals of the late Vice President: one is that the United States be a haven and, secondly, his great commitment to arms control.[1] You seemed to endorse both principles. But I wonder if you could tell us in practical terms how you feel about Cuban refuge in this country, whether you feel it should be unlimited, whether you think the Haitians should be treated as political refugees, too. And when you speak in terms of arms control and how you see them as part of a security arrangement, are you prepared to try to reverse what the Administration has done about arms control, which, of course, is to put it on a very, very back burner?

A. With respect to the refugee question, I think our ideals and our national standard for 200 years are still the American ideal of the open asylum for people fleeing political repression. We are, of course, at the moment—not only we, but other nations—overwhelmed by refugee problems, many of them associated with attempts to seek freedom and to get away from political repression. And the overwhelming nature of the problem is such as to require not only an implementation of our own ideals but also of seeking effective international cooperation in dealing with these problems.

In order to achieve ideals, one always finds it necessary to deal with practical problems for implementing them; and we certainly do face them with respect to Cuba, with respect to Kampuchea, and with respect to other areas of the world, and many of these problems, incidentally, seem to be connected with the Soviet Union in one way or another.

With respect to arms control, our objective, I think, is still clear. We think that our own national security is promoted by effective arms control agreements. The Soviet Union, with its action in Afghanistan, has had the effect of diminishing the prospect for senatorial approval of the SALT II Treaty. That does not mean that we have lost our interest in it, nor have we dropped our commitment to it. But the Soviets, by that single act, have created the problems which now have put achievement of that objective beyond reach to a greater extent than it was 6 or 8 months ago.

Q. In reference to that Afghanistan situation, you do say that there was no change in the formal position when you met with Gromyko, but did you get any hint at all that the Soviet Union may be planning to withdraw from Afghanistan before the summer Olympics?

A. I have no basis, as a result of those talks or any other information, to indicate the Soviets plan such withdrawal in that time frame.

Q. Speaking of the Olympics, the Olympic boycott appears to have collapsed. There is a rush of countries going to the Olympics now. Do you feel that your position has been undercut by many of America's friends on that?

And two, do you feel that perhaps your meeting with Mr. Gromyko, in effect, gave them an excuse for voting to go to the Olympics and undercut your own position about the boycott?

A. Taking the second part of your question first, insofar as the governments are concerned, I have no reason to believe that the meetings with Mr. Gromyko in any way undercut or diluted any support that governments were prepared to give for the boycott initiative. Whether or not they may have affected Olympic committees is a question to which I have no answer.

My impression is that the Olympic committees in various countries were inclined to exercise independent judgment —judgments independent of their governments, in any case. There were more of them in Europe among the smaller European countries in the last 24 hours than we would have liked to have seen. On the other hand, there are now 45 countries definitely committed to joining the boycott. And that surely means that this is not an Olympics. It is an athletic event, but it won't be an Olympics. And it would seem to me that that point should be very clear to the Soviets, and it should be very clear to Olympic committees which have been justifying their opposition to the boycott on the grounds that it somehow tarnishes the Olympic ideal.

My own view, of course, is that the invasion of Afghanistan is 180 degrees opposed to the Olympic ideal, and that those who seek to promote the Olympic ideal ought to be interested in deterring and dissuading countries from engaging in that kind of adventurism. So I would hope that with respect to those countries where the Olympic committees have made decisions to go to Moscow, they will reconsider them. And in some instances, there are constituent-supporting bodies within those countries which have decided to join the boycott, notwithstanding the decision of the national Olympic committee.

The prohibitions in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section shall not apply to a person who is also a citizen of Iran and those prohibitions and the prohibitions in section 1–101 shall not apply to a journalist or other person who is regularly employed by a news gathering or transmitting organization and who travels to Iran or is within Iran for the purpose of gathering or transmitting news, making news or documentary films, or similar activities.

1–103. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby directed, effective fourteen days from the date of this Order, to revoke existing licenses for transactions by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States with Iran Air, the National Iranian Oil Company, and the National Iranian Gas Company previously issued pursuant to regulations under Executive Order No. 12170 or Executive Order No. 12205.

1–104. The Secretary of the Treasury is delegated, and authorized to exercise, all functions vested in the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*) to carry out the purposes of this Order. The Secretary may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the Federal government.

1–105. The Secretary of the Treasury shall ensure that actions taken by him pursuant to the above provisions of this Order, Executive Order No. 12170 and Executive Order No. 12205 are accounted for as required by Section 401 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641).

1–106. The Secretary of State is delegated, and authorized to exercise in furtherance of the purposes of this Order, the powers vested in the President by Section 2001 of the Revised Statutes (22 U.S.C. 1732), Section 1 of the Act of July 3, 1926 (22 U.S.C. 211a), and Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1185), with respect to:

(a) the restriction of the use of United States passports for travel to, in or through Iran; and

(b) the regulation of departures from and entry into the United States in connection with travel to Iran by citizens and permanent residents of the United States.

1–107. Except as otherwise indicated herein, this Order is effective immediately. In accord with Section 401 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641) and Section 204 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703), it shall be immediately transmitted to the Congress and published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

JIMMY CARTER

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[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Apr. 21, 1980. ■

Secretary Brown Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown was interviewed on CBS's "Face the Nation" on April 27, 1980, by George Herman, CBS News (moderator); Ike Pappas, CBS News; and Henry Trewhitt, Baltimore Sun.

Q. The Iranian militants and their Ayatollah have put the bodies of the dead Americans on display at the American Embassy. Is there an Administration reaction to this event?

A. You will recall that yesterday President Bani-Sadr said that the bodies of our fallen who died in this mission would be returned without condition. Apparently we now have a suggestion that there is going to be a barter for those bodies. That is something in which we do not propose to engage. We find this another very disappointing and troubling example of the difficulty of dealing with this situation.

But it is a long tradition even among enemies—and we are not enemies of the Iranian people—that the bodies of fallen soldiers are returned.

Q. In view of this newest atrocity by the militants and their public gloating display of our dead and the suggestion that they be exchanged for Iranian money funds held in this country, what do you think now about the safety of our hostages in the wake of our abortive attempt to rescue them?

A. We continue to hold Iran responsible for the safety of the hostages, and for that reason we believe that our hostages will not be harmed. One can never tell in this kind of situation.

It was, in part, our concern for the deteriorating security situation in Iran—as you know, they have significant hostilities across the Iranian-Iraqi border and those of you who have seen pictures of the riots that were taking place recently in Tehran, I think, will agree with me that that security situation is deteriorating. That's part of the reason that we felt we should make an attempt at rescue at this time.

So that security situation is not good. There is a danger. There has been danger, but we're going to continue to hold Iran responsible for the safety of those hostages.

Q. What is your course from here? I know the Administration is still holding its options open theoretically for another rescue attempt if necessary. That seems to be more remote now than it might have been a couple of days ago.

But don't you have to do something? Isn't the United States seen to be immobile in this situation now and does the politics—and I don't mean in a political sense—but doesn't the politics dictate action?

A. The hostages, as you know, have been there for almost 6 months. We have followed every possible path and kept open every option. We will continue to keep open every option, and we will spare no effort in the attempt to get our hostages returned.

We need to see what we've done and what we're doing as two parallel paths. We attempted to solve the situation quickly and by rescue operation, but at the same time we were proceeding and will continue to proceed along the other track, the diplomatic-economic track.

That one, of course, now becomes even more important. We intend to pursue the line of sanctions. Of course in that attempt the cooperation of our allies is particularly important and indications are that they are going to continue to cooperate.

Q. Do you feel now that the rescue option has been eliminated, that you have no chance now of rescuing the hostages since they have been dispersed to other areas outside of the Embassy in Iran? And also, there seems to be some suggestion this morning that the hostages may be better off because they have been taken out of the American Embassy, that there may be a chance now to get them out by peaceful means.

A. We're still not going to foreclose any option, any option in terms of U.S. actions. You will recall in the past, a number of us downgraded the rescue possibility and now you know one of the reasons why. That was part of the element of surprise. So if I say now no rescue is impossible you may not believe me anyway. But I'm not going to say anything about individual options except to say that they will all be kept open.

As to the movement of the hostages, I don't really want to speculate what effect that will be or what that will have. I will note this, however;

that if, indeed, the hostages have been moved out to a number of separate locations, and we're not really sure of that—we know what we've been told—if they've been moved out to a number of separate locations, then what you have for everyone to see is a group of kidnappers holding groups of Americans in various parts of another country—Iran—and the government not doing anything about it—the Iranian Government not doing anything about it.

That dispersal, if it takes place, makes it even clearer what the nature of the action in holding the hostages is. It's not a political action in terms of the usual sense. It clearly is a set of kidnappings.

Q. Why now? Did the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have anything to do with delaying this operation?

A. No, the timing is the result of the following factors. First, the question is why didn't we wait? And the answer to that is that as the summer goes along, it gets hotter, and helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft range and payload go down as the temperature goes up.

Moreover, the winds shift pattern in a way that produces a headwind going into the rendezvous point, and the helicopters were stretched as regards their range already.

And finally, the nights get shorter, and this operation had to be carried out at night. So if it had gone another week or two or more than a couple of weeks into the summer or later into the spring and on into the year, it would have gotten harder and harder to the point of impossibility.

The other question is, okay, why not earlier in that case? The answer is that it took time to plan and to practice this operation. New equipment had to be developed, and modifications had to be made to some of the aircraft. People had to be selected and trained. We had to develop new communications equipment and so on.

Moreover, the plan itself changed. Some of the earlier plans that we looked at really looked to us to have a rather small chance of success. This was judged by me and by the senior military people—by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others—to have a good chance of success, but that was only after the plan had changed a number of times and had been practiced in its latest form.

Q. You've been asked an awful lot of questions about the operation itself, but there are still an awful lot left and we'll try a couple on you. Did the plan ecompass also the rescue of Mr. Laingen and his two colleagues? [Charge d'Affaires L. Bruce Laingen being held in the Iranian Foreign Ministry]?

A. I don't want to talk about any part of the plan that wasn't carried out. I'll talk about what happened up to the point that the operation aborted or perhaps a little after, but I don't want to go into the whole thing for obvious reasons.

Q. I understand. Let me try another one somewhat along the same line. This was an operation by considerable American force in an area quite close to the Soviet Union. Did we have, for example, any contact with the Soviet Union on the hot line to assure them that there was no massive invasion?

A. We did communicate with other countries at a point when it became clear that the operation had aborted so that they would not mistake its nature. Until that time, that is, until it had aborted, until all our forces were out, no one else knew about it, and we're really quite sure about that.

Q. We know about the helicopter failures. We know about the dust storms, about all the fine details. In your opinion, what was the one reason for the failure of this mission?

A. I don't think you can give a reason, a single reason, because there was no single effect on the helicopters. Various helicopters had different difficulties. They all encountered substantial quantities of swirling dust which caused vertigo. There was one pilot who was actually on the ground and thought he was moving and had vertigo. Another helicopter had a hydraulic failure and so on. One helicopter turned back, and we have not yet had a debrief on that and so we can't really tell. There were several different factors that came together and caused the number of helicopters available to drop below that which had previously been established as the level of prudent risk to continue.

Q. But we were told that it was just bad luck. Now I don't think that's a scientific enough explanation or a professional enough explanation.

A. I haven't used the word bad luck. I've given you several things that happened each of them independent of the other.

Q. But these elements were not factored into the planning, the possibility of dust storms or what?

A. All the possibilities were factored in. The events proved to be worse than we had expected, not worse than we could have conceived. It would have been possible to conceive even more adverse conditions, but in setting an operational plan of this sort, what you do is you decide how bad things are likely to be and then you put in a prudent safety factor. And then if things are much worse even than that safety factor has allowed for, then you abort the operation.

If you try to account for everything that might conceivably happen, then the operation grows in size and scope and starts to produce difficulties merely by nature of its size.

Q. Since you mentioned the safety factor, did you have any other helicopters available to you on the *Nimitz* or on any of the other carriers?

A. No, we went to—six was the number that we needed in operating condition at the refueling point after the refueling to have good confidence of proceeding on. We, therefore, started with seven, which is the standard factor for large helicopters. We then decided to take an additional safety factor and go with eight. And that's how many went over the coast.

Q. But did you have more on the carrier?

A. There were not more, but even if there were more, by that time it would not have been possible to add helicopters because you're already getting quite late in the operation. You would have had to add additional refueling and so forth. And under those circumstances had there been additional helicopters on the aircraft carrier, we would still not have been able to go on with the operation.

Q. Do you draw any general lessons from this about the quality of personnel, the quality of maintenance? You lost a third of your assets really in this operation.

A. We started with eight helicopters. At the refueling point we had six, one of which lost a hydraulic line and could not go on. One of the other ones that dropped out of the mission dropped out for mechanical reasons, different mechanical reasons. One turned back because of operational difficulties. And as I say, we haven't finished the debriefing on that. So far as we know, a quarter of them suffered mechanical difficulties.

good hard look at what we're doing and will want to join in these negotiations.

It is, indeed, difficult for us to be sitting at that table trying to fashion an autonomy plan that should be acceptable to people who are not even represented.

Q. Are we in any kind of direct contact with them or is this going through Israel or how do we sort of invite them?

A. I've talked to Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza myself when I've been in the Middle East and tried to elicit their points of view. I've talked to some here in this country. The Egyptians are talking to the Palestinians and so are some of the Israelis. We are all trying to elicit their point of view and I think all trying to encourage them to become participants.

Q. Another missing partner in the negotiations as conceived at Camp David is King Hussein of Jordan. Is there any prospect of drawing him into this process? Are you going to go and see him and fill him in after these talks?

A. As you may know, I did see him in January, and at that time we did have a very good and thorough discussion about the situation as it then stood and what our plan was for the future. It is my hope, and pursuant to his invitation, that I will have further opportunities to talk with him and fill him in on what's going on.

Q. Will you do that on this next trip that you're going to make?

A. I don't expect on this next trip. On the other hand, I want to keep flexible on that. If it seems desirable under all the circumstances, it might be worth doing, but at the moment I don't have that on my schedule.

Q. I find myself a little puzzled. You keep saying that it's not proper to bring pressure on Prime Minister Begin. But after all, the United States spends a great deal of money helping the Israelis, perhaps more than any other per dollar investment we make anywhere in the world. Is it not proper because of domestic American politics? Is that what you're saying?

A. No, I'm not saying that. I'm saying that what we're trying to do is help the Israelis and the Egyptians find common ground because it's in their own best interests.

Look, they've got a Peace Treaty now which is working which they've implemented completely and scrupulously. They have committed themselves to these ongoing negotiations in which they are deeply involved. They both have indicated in the Camp David accord that they think a comprehensive peace ought to come to the Middle East.

What we ought to try to do in every way possible—using our good offices, using our persuasion, using everything we can in the way of being a helpful partner—is to bring them together and give them the opportunity to see why it's in their own best interests to make an agreement in accordance with the Camp David accord.

It's not in their own best interests or ours to begin swinging a cudgel or acting as though they can be forced into doing something, because they won't unless they are convinced that it's right for them to do it.

Q. Wouldn't a little conviction come from suggesting that the United States taxpayers have an interest in this and that Prime Minister Begin might show a little more flexibility on, for instance, the settlements issue or he might not get so much U.S. aid?

A. They are aware, of course, of the relationship between our country and theirs and the money that we have made available to them, and they are properly appreciative of that, but I'm back to the fundamental question: What is it we're trying to do?

We're trying to help the parties understand why it's in their own best interests to continue these negotiations and come up with an agreement. That's the course we ought to be on, and that's the question to which we are committed.

Q. Let me ask you about President Sadat and the posture he took in the talks that preceded these last by a week. Did he suggest, as he did in a press conference at Blair House, that if no significant progress was made by May 26th that he would pull out of this process and go for the European initiative which basically is to take the matter to the United Nations and try to get recognition of Palestinian rights there?

A. No, he did not. What he did say—

Q. But he did raise that with reporters in a rather conspicuous way when he was talking to them.

A. I thought what he had said, as I got the report, was that if there were no progress by May 26th he would have to look at other alternatives, including the European initiative. That, I guess, does reflect what I believe is his position, but he was very clear in his commitment to the Camp David accord and to this process in his hope that progress would be made, in his belief that progress would be made, and that his conviction that this present course of action was the best one for Egypt, the best one for Israel, and the best one for the Palestinians.

Q. So he has a decision to make then about or around May 26th which is whether or not sufficient progress in his opinion has been made to justify going on.

A. I think that's true of both parties, but what we are hoping for is that there will be sufficient progress so that both will want to continue the negotiations.

Q. Wouldn't it be, I suppose, simple and maybe politically expedient since there are elections here, and Mr. Begin has problems of his own and Mr. Sadat, for the parties to simply agree to go on for another 6 months and get past the electoral period; in other words extend the deadline of negotiations for 6 months?

A. I believe they will if they are convinced that progress is being made and more progress can be made. I think that's exactly what may evolve, but both of them want to be sure that they are on a course which promises success.

Q. You said you talked and we know you talked to some Palestinians —mayors and so forth. Some of them probably were secret leaners toward the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]. Fairly soon now former Ambassador [to the United Nations] Andrew Young is to meet with Yasir Arafat in his travels in the Middle East.

Would you expect that former Ambassador Young, as an old friend of the President and as a friend of this Administration, will communicate with you what he learned from Yasir Arafat? Will there be some indirect connection through Mr. Young?

A. I did not know that Andrew Young was going there, and I don't know whether—

Q. They're both in Kuwait, and the report from there is that they are probably going to have a meeting.

A. I have no anticipation that Andrew Young will come back and have anything that he wants to report to me about.

Q. Or to the President?

A. I don't know. As I said, I don't know about that. So far as I know from what you've said this is not an official mission. I have never heard of it before. It sounds to me like a private meeting between him and Mr. Arafat if it's scheduled to take place.

But our position is entirely clear and has been reiterated and needs to be said again perhaps that we—the United States—is committed not to recognize or negotiate with the PLO unless and until it accepts Resolutions 242 and 338 in the United Nations and recognizes Israel's right to exist in peace and free of terrorism. Unless and until that happens we're not going to enter into negotiations with the PLO.

Q. Have we had any indication at all that the PLO is willing to give on that point?

A. We have had occasional whispers in that direction and then they die out. So I don't know where that stands. It may well be that there are problems within the PLO if they come up against that decision. But so far as I know, nothing has gone beyond a whisper.

Q. What role are they playing behind the scenes here? Are they actively discouraging the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza from participating or are they neutral on the point? What is the function and the role right now of the PLO?

A. I can't say I really know. I do know this: That to the extent that there are others dangling other prospects before the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza instead of the current negotiations—

Q. You mean such as the European initiative?

A. For example, this could be unhelpful to our efforts because it suggests that if you don't join now perhaps something better will come along months from now.

There's not substance as far as I know to these hopes, but it does perhaps distract the Palestinians from wanting to come in and join the negotiations.

I can't say specifically what the PLO is doing, nor what the relationship may be between the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza and the PLO. But the central fact is the one that I want to stress, that right now the most helpful thing that could happen would be to keep us moving in the direction of trying to implement the Camp David accord.

Q. This is probably a question that the Israelis are asking their government, but I'm an American and let me ask my government. Is the political turmoil inside the other country—Israel in this case—complicating your job, the fact that there are various people trying to get Prime Minister Begin's job away from him?

A. No. Obviously we're aware of the political situation as they are aware of ours. On the other hand, we are dealing with the government of Prime Minister Begin. This is the man charged with the responsibility on behalf of his nation for going forward in these negotiations. This is the man who entered into the Camp David accord, who committed himself to full autonomy and self-governing authority. And, therefore, we are committed to working with him as the representative of the Israelis.

Q. But next week you sort of have an anchor out to windward. You're meeting with the leader of the Israeli opposition.

A. When Mr. Peres comes over next week, in accordance with a long established policy, the opposition leader of Israel will be meeting with government leaders in this country. I think he'll be meeting with the President, but this is something that we've done consistently. And he is, indeed, an important figure in this country, and we're looking forward to having an opportunity to hear his views.

Q. Let me try the Israeli side of the question. Are they showing any unhappiness over the possibility of a change of government in the United States?

A. I have never got into any political discussion in the course of these negotiations, and I've never heard that political aspect raised. Certainly when they were here they were aware that we're in an election year, and what effect this has on their thinking I don't know.

Q. You don't see any "Ronald Reagan in '80" buttons in Israel when you go there?

A. No, I haven't.

Q. I just wonder if the President seeing Shimon Peres, the leader of the opposition, is not a little of that pressure that you say we don't want to apply to Begin, what in effect is going to be pressure on him?

A. I really don't think it is. I know there's a chance it may be so construed, but I think it's a genuine effort to talk to a man who is important in Israel and who has ideas and who in the past has had an opportunity to talk to the President and is being asked to do so.

Q. There is a theory that there is really going to be no progress made in this whole autonomy for the Palestinians issue until after Israel has its next parliamentary election in 1981, next year. Do you subscribe to that?

A. No. I think that we are going to be able to make progress if there is the will to do it on the part of the respective governments. We have their commitment. We have the desire on the part of both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat to move toward the May 26th date, and I am unwilling to believe that they're not serious when they tell us that.

Q. Do you find a similar feeling on the part of other people in Israel when you go there?

A. To move forward toward this?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes, indeed. A number of people I talked to—people in high places—believe that we ought to do everything possible to try to move toward agreement. ■

with the new government in Zimbabwe, these funds are intended for use for rural rehabilitation, principally for health units in the "tribal trust lands."

The British have indicated, however, that there is an immediate need of some $40–45 million for reconstruction in Zimbabwe and have announced they will initially be contributing more than $15 million for this purpose. At the same time, the British have launched an international appeal to obtain assistance for Zimbabwe and have approached us to make a substantial contribution. We are examining how we can further expand the amount of our assistance since the short-term need is so great. Our review is not yet complete, but we hope to be able to increase our commitment during this fiscal year.

On a longer range basis, the British have pointed out that Zimbabwe will need significant help for economic development and continuing reconstruction. They underscore that this is a particularly good investment since the infrastructure has the potential to reach the take-off point within a comparatively short period of about 5 years. With the backing of the Congress, and we will be looking to each of you for support on this matter, we intend to develop a more substantial assistance program for FY 1981 for Zimbabwe.

We contemplate that these resources will be drawn from the southern African regional economic support fund account. We have not yet made any specific determination as to amounts, but are very much aware of this committee's recommendation and would hope to do even better. The utilization of these funds, of course, will depend upon many factors, including how the new government sorts out its own priorities and how Zimbabwe desires us to cooperate. We envisage that a significant portion of our aid might be directed at agricultural development, but this would not, of course, be used for any "buy-out" scheme.

It is our expectation that the present liaison office in Salisbury will be upgraded to Embassy status after independence. We also hope to have an ambassador nominated soon thereafter.

Implications for Southern Africa

Another point which I would like to stress is that the Rhodesian settlement has important implications for the southern African region as a whole. I have already referred to the interests of the front-line states in insuring that the settlement works. With regard to Namibia, how events evolve in Zimbabwe will certainly have considerable influence. It has been argued that because of the success at the polls of the parties representing the former guerrilla forces, South Africa will seek to delay for some time implementation of the U.N. settlement plan. Others reason that there will be considerable pressure for South Africa to opt for an internal settlement which it can more readily control. On the other hand, assuming the situation develops relatively smoothly in Zimbabwe, responsible officials in Cape Town and Pretoria should come to realize that a negotiated settlement among all the parties is the best way for a peaceful, lasting transition that will be in the long-range best interests of South Africa.

A stable society in Zimbabwe, which can effectively accommodate all of the races living there, can also provide an important model to South Africa. There are already some signs that those South Africans who were initially perturbed are taking a second look at Mugabe's stunning victory and are beginning to draw some conclusions for their own internal situation. There could be a greater sense of urgency in promoting domestic reform.

The Rhodesian settlement, therefore, has enormous implications for the southern African region as a whole—for Namibia, South Africa's internal system, and the direction of the front-line states. There are also potential pitfalls to be sure; but there are likewise great opportunities which we must seize. Our adversaries will seek to promote division and turmoil and to exploit any openings we offer them.

We must deny them such opportunities. Instead, we must lay aside our own past differences over our policy toward that area of the globe and join in recognizing that there is now an entirely new situation in Zimbabwe. To delay could be highly detrimental to our interests. We are on the verge of a widely accepted legal independence and government by majority rule for Zimbabwe. We, the Congress and the executive branch, must work together with the British and other concerned states in consolidating this impressive achievement.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Zimbabwe Becomes Independent

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, APR. 18, 1980[1]

Zimbabwe is now an independent nation. The official U.S. delegation to the independence ceremony in Salisbury, led by Governor [W. Averell] Harriman and Ambassador [Andrew] Young, has extended the congratulations of the American people and President Carter to the people and new leaders of Zimbabwe. It is our deep hope that Zimbabwe will set an example for further peaceful change in this important area of the world.

The United States established diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe today. This was accomplished at an official ceremony in Salisbury. Mr. Jeffrey Davidow, who has headed our liaison office in Salisbury, will be our charge d'affaires.

On April 14 we announced our plans for assistance to Zimbabwe. Today in Salisbury, Governor Harriman and Ambassador Young signed our first agreement, which will provide $2 million to the government for the repair of rural health clinics damaged by the war. We will soon enter into discussions with the government on the best uses for the further $13 million which we will make available during this fiscal year.

We take this moment to congratulate those who have made this important development possible. This includes the British Government led by Prime Minister Thatcher and [Foreign Secretary] Lord Carrington, the leaders of the African front-line states, and the parties to the negotiations. We are also proud of the constructive role played by the United States in this historic accomplishment. Because of these efforts, Zimbabwe now has peace, international acceptance, a government of majority rule, a constitution which protects the rights of all citizens, and an opportunity for economic growth and prosperity.

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[1] Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston. ■

Visit of Secretary Vance

Secretary Vance was in Ottawa April 23, 1980. Following is a news conference held by the Secretary and Secretary of State for External Affairs Mark MacGuigan that day.[1]

Secretary MacGuigan. I'll just say several words about the treaty—or protocol more exactly—which we have just signed. It has the effect of extending for 20 years, to the year 2000, the Canada-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement. I think its symbolic importance is more than that because in this protocol we actually increased the nuclear safeguards which were initially established to take account of the increased safeguards which both our countries now apply to the transfer of nuclear technology with other countries. In other words, we apply exactly the same standards to each other that we apply to other countries in the world. Given our longstanding partnership and the trust which we have in each other, it is a significant step that we are absolutely even-handed in this and that we are adding to ouselves, as well as to others, these additional nuclear safeguards.

Secretary Vance. I too am very pleased to sign this protocol which amends our agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. We value most highly the close cooperation which we enjoy with Canada in the nuclear area and our shared commitment to nonproliferation. As the Secretary of State for External Affairs has said, it is significant that the amendment which we signed incorporates the stronger nonproliferation requirements that both Canada and the United States have adopted in recent years. This is a very important step forward, and I am very proud to be here to sign this protocol with you.

Q. While you were having lunch with the Prime Minister, the House of Commons approved a unanimous resolution calling for early ratification of the fisheries treaty as a matter of great importance for Canada and for Canadian-U.S. relations. I was wondering whether you were able to give any assurances at all about ratification, early or otherwise, of the treaty?

Secretary Vance. We discussed at some length this morning—indeed, it was the first item on the agenda—the question of the fisheries treaty. I believe that the treaty which we negotiated very carefully over a period of a year and a half was, and is, a fair agreement. We will continue to support that treaty as drafted.

The hearings on the treaty have commenced in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I have written a letter subsequent to those hearings to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and to the leading Republican member, Senator Javits, and have indicated to them the extreme importance which I and my government attach to the ratification of the treaty.

The next step which will take place is that the committee will be sending me a number of questions it has which I will be answering very promptly. I cannot, at this point, give assurances on when the committee, or indeed the Senate, will act upon it, but I can assure you that I and the executive branch of the government attach the highest importance to it. As I said at the outset, I consider this to be a fair and proper treaty which I fully support.

Q. Is your government taking any initiatives toward the North American economic community or any kind of arrangement that would foster more common decisionmaking among the three countries on the continent?

Secretary Vance. Our relationship with Canada is close, strong, and, I think, growing ever stronger. We deal with probably more issues than any other two countries, not only in this hemisphere but anywhere in the world, as far as the United States is concerned. I believe that the mechanisms which we have adopted, and are working on, are good and satisfactory and will continue to develop.

We also have a good relationship with Mexico. We have there, next to Canada, the largest number of issues to deal with of any country in this hemisphere and one of the largest in the world.

I do not think it is necessary at this point to talk about any trilateral relationship or common market-type situation. There are people in the United States in private organizations which have been studying this issue, and I assume they will continue to do so, but I am satisfied with the relations which exist now.

Q. I assume that you and Mr. MacGuigan talked about the Iranian situation today. Last week British newspapers were very critical of the way the United States has gone about organizing sanctions against Iran, feeling they're being backed into a corner by some ineffective sanctions.

I wonder, how much consultation has your government had with other countries, including Canada, to come up with a coordinated and effective wide-ranging group of sanctions against Iran which countries are not only enthusiastic and eager to follow but are going to do it?

Secretary Vance. I think you have to go back to January. In January the question of sanctions was discussed at great length. There were extensive consultations which went on for a period of not only days but weeks in preparation for the vote in the United Nations on sanctions against Iran if the hostages were not released. The vote was taken, 10 nations on the Security Council voted in favor of the sanctions as spelled out in the resolution before the Security Council. That, as you all know, was vetoed by the Soviet Union and, therefore, did not go into effect. Certainly, there was clear and full and extensive consultations at that time.

What we are urging now, and have been urging with our allies and which we discussed again today, is the putting into effect of those sanctions which were only blocked by the fact that the Soviets previously vetoed them.

Q. As you know, the people of Quebec are voting in an historic referendum on May 20 on a question relating to Quebec's place in the confederation. In 1977 when Prime Minister Trudeau was in Washington, President Carter said in a television interview that if he were making his own preference, it would be that the confederation continue. Is that still the clear view of the Administration in Washington, and was it re-expressed to Prime Minister Trudeau today by yourself?

Secretary Vance. Our view is that this is an issue which should be decided by the Canadian people and will be decided by the Canadian people.

Q. Was it raised in your discussions with Prime Minister Trudeau today?

Secretary Vance. Not with Prime Minister Trudeau, no.

Q. The Canadian representative to the U.N. conference on the sea was, a few weeks ago, very upset

Third, the scale of the relief and resettlement effort required to meet the human needs of the refugees and the political needs of the first asylum countries in Southeast Asia is rapidly outstripping the resources of the international community. When one takes account of the equally compelling refugee needs of Africa and Pakistan and Central America, it becomes clear that there is a worldwide refugee crisis and that it poses not only a humanitarian dilemma but a massive financial dilemma as well. To place these concerns in proper perspective, let me sketch briefly the background of the present situation in Kampuchea.

Background of Situation in Kampuchea

The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea was launched at the time of the primary annual harvest in December 1978. Both the Vietnamese and the defending Democratic Kampuchea forces under Pol Pot used crop destruction and crop denial tactics, resulting in the loss of most of the nation's rice supply. Continued fighting and Pol Pot's retreat to outlying regions led to massive population shifts, which in turn disrupted planting in May and June 1979. Only about 10% of the arable land was planted in August for the annual harvest. International observers reported in the fall of 1979 that malnutrition and disease had taken a heavy toll and that large numbers of Khmer civilians were foraging for food across much of the country. By October there were 200,000 displaced Khmer pressing against the Thai border.

The United States began forecasting food shortages as early as March of 1979, and we urged international organizations to begin contingency planning against the expected famine in Kampuchea. In July, Secretary Vance called for an international humanitarian relief program to aid the Khmer people. The United States and potential donor countries agreed that distribution of relief supplies should be made under effective international supervision, monitoring, and control to insure against diversion of relief goods to military use, and that aid should be afforded to all Khmer in need regardless of the political control under which they existed. Negotiations with the Heng Samrin and Pol Pot authorities began in July but did not result in agreement to allow relief operations inside Kampuchea until September. Meanwhile, some border feeding programs had quietly begun in Thailand in June. These were expanded considerably in October to care for the large numbers of Khmer fleeing into Thailand after food shortages became acute and the Vietnamese renewed efforts to crush the Pol Pot resistance forces.

Indochinese Refugee Program Summary
(April 1975 through February 1980)

	No. of Refugees*
Total arrivals in countries of first asylum	**758,526**
Departures for resettlement to:	
United States	326,675
France	60,998
Canada	45,779
Australia	35,298
Germany	11,783
Other	34,773
TOTAL	**515,306**

*Figures do not include new Khmer refugees on the Thai border or the 270,000 Vietnamese who have sought to resettle in the People's Republic of China.

SOURCE: UNHCR, March 1980.

The breakthrough came in late September when the mission of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNICEF in Phnom Penh finally secured agreement to begin operations. Since November, shipments of food and medical supplies have been arriving at Phnom Penh and Kampong Som by ship, by airlift from Bangkok and Singapore, and by barge up the Mekong. Until the start of the year, however, the bulk of these stocks remained in the warehouses. Whether because of military priorities, logistical difficulties, or mere ineffectiveness of the Phnom Penh authorities, few if any international relief supplies were being moved to provincial depots for distribution to villagers.

During January and February, ICRC/UNICEF food supplies finally began to move out of Phnom Penh and Kampong Som to provincial depots. However, there remains a concern about equitable distribution. We are receiving reports that military personnel and government cadre are receiving an adequate food ration (which is the principal currency in Kampuchea and hence may represent a form of salary), while apparently other Khmer receive significantly smaller quantities. The issuance of a new currency in Kampuchea, expected shortly, may improve the distribution situation and reduce the importance of rice as a form of wealth.

To deal with the problem of distribution we have urged the international relief organizations to press the political authorities in Kampuchea for better operating arrangements to assure more equitable and more frequently monitored distribution. In considering our contribution to the Secretary General's recently announced $262 million appeal for Kampuchean relief through the balance of calendar year 1980, we have stated that important factors are improved cooperation on the part of the political authorities in Kampuchea with the relief effort, better monitoring of distribution of relief supplies, as well as the contributions of other donors in the general issue of humanitarian need. We would hope these discussions would produce sufficient pledges from the international community to meet the short-term needs of the relief program, as well as lead to support for the balance of the year. Our hope is that we can specify objective bench marks to determine the effectiveness of the program.

Meanwhile, the key to the survival of the Khmer people may well have been the border feeding operations in Thailand. To date over 150,000 Khmer have crossed into Thailand where they remain in holding centers under the care of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Additional large numbers of Khmer have gathered along the border to await improved conditions in Kampuchea and to receive food. Up to 15,000 tons of food per month are provided not only to Khmer along the border, but also to those who come from the interior to receive supplies and carry them back to villages. While most of the transients are from Battambang Province, some come from as far east as provinces along the Vietnamese border. Perhaps 500,000 people in the interior of Kampuchea have been fed by what has become known as the oxcart and bicycle brigade.

While the border feeding program to date has played an indispensable role in the infusion of food into western Kampuchea, since early January it has been disrupted in the major border agglomerations by outbreaks of fighting between armed Khmer factions who control the settlements. Since the border is ill-defined in the area of these settlements, it has been difficult for the Thai military authorities to maintain order, especially in light of the risks of contact with Vietnamese forces. It has also been difficult for the international organizations to

create controls insuring an equitable distribution of food within the settlements.

The bottom line, however, is that the bulk of Khmer in the border concentrations, without money or other resources, has been sustained by international relief efforts. We have been pressing the international organizations to make food distribution more equitable; but we must also recognize the enormously difficult circumstances under which this entire program is being carried out. News reports last week of continued internecine battles and civilian casualties among the Khmer groups underline the urgency of the situation.

The Need for Continued Support

To sum up the situation, we face a major dilemma and an expensive one. Until we are assured that the relief program within Kampuchea can prevent renewed famine, we cannot reduce border feeding operations. Accordingly, we must continue to support both programs while we bring every possible diplomatic pressure to insure the most effective and equitable use of the relief supplies.

A combination of the last wet season's small harvest and external aid have temporarily alleviated the severe food shortages and health problems evident inside Kampuchea last fall. But now that the principal harvest has been consumed, famine and disease will certainly reemerge before the next major harvest in December. International aid is essential to insure the survival of the Khmer people during the coming months and to discourage the movement toward the Thai border of additional large numbers of Khmer seeking food.

Since October of 1979 the United States has contributed almost $79 million toward the international relief effort for Khmer inside Kampuchea and for those who have fled to and across the border. In total, the international Kampuchean relief effort through mid-March has cost almost $206 million. In addition to our contributions to the Khmer feeding programs, we have also contributed $30 million to UNHCR for the care and maintenance of other Indochinese refugees in countries of first asylum, maintaining a 30% share of support for refugee assistance and Khmer relief.

International aid currently in the pipeline is scheduled to run out in May. But as noted above, U.N. Secretary General Waldheim has issued an appeal for $262 million to continue the relief program for Kampuchea for the remainder of the year. Donor countries will meet in New York on March 26 to consider pledges as well as issues of accountability, monitoring, and general effectiveness.

In addition to continuing feeding programs, our support is also essential for agricultural rehabilitation within Kampuchea. We have recently allocated an initial $3 million for an international program covering five key rice-producing provinces contiguous to the great lake (Tunle Sap). Two voluntary agencies are undertaking similar programs in two separate provinces, and we have contributed over $2 million to their efforts. If successful, agricultural rehabilitation should significantly reduce the need during 1981 for food supplies from abroad.

Developments Affecting Other Refugees

I would like to turn now to recent developments affecting refugees in Southeast Asia, other than the Khmer. As was outlined in testimony before this subcommittee last September, the Geneva meeting convened by U.N. Secretary General Waldheim on July 20–21, 1979, brought both worldwide attention and immediate humanitarian relief for the refugees and the beleaguered countries of first asylum. New contributions to the UNHCR relieved the financial strain of providing care and maintenance to a refugee population that had rapidly expanded to 370,000 in July. Offers of resettlement climbed to about 290,000 for the following year, reassuring the countries of first asylum of outside support. The Vietnamese pledge to stem "illegal departures" for a "reasonable period of time" resulted in a dramatic drop in the arrival rates of "boat people."

Within a short period after the Geneva meeting, this combination of factors had contributed to a restoration of the principle of first asylum improvement of camp conditions, a substantial decline in camp populations, and a general lessening of tensions throughout Southeast Asia. Today, 8 months later, there are still relatively high third-country resettlement rates and low arrival rates of boat refugees. But in the interim, the development of the Kampuchean crisis has added to the concerns of the Southeast Asian nations and strained international relief organizations.

At the same time, the recent deterioration of refugee problems in Pakistan and Somalia have further drained international resources for humanitarian relief. In addition, there remains an underlying uncertainty about future refugee flows from the countries of Indochina. Without renewed pledges of financial contributions and resettlement offers, the countries of first asylum could conceivably revert to the drastic measures they took last spring, particularly if there is a new influx of refugees from Vietnam. Let me review the trends of the last 6 months and our role in encouraging greater international support for efforts to deal with this pressing problem.

Before the Geneva meeting last July, non-Communist countries had resettled approximately 315,000 Indochinese since 1975. The United States accepted about 210,000 and France, Canada, and Australia accepted about three-fourths of the remaining 105,000. Since Geneva, the resettlement rate to third countries has more than doubled. During the first 5 months of this fiscal year, when we admitted 70,000 refugees, other non-Communist countries admitted nearly 60,000. Non-Communist third country resettlement of Indochinese since 1975 now totals almost 200,000. Additionally, another 250,000 people from Vietnam, most of them ethnic Chinese, are now resettled or in process of resettlement in the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). The P.R.C. has also agreed to accept 10,000 refugees from first asylum countries as its contribution to the international effort to meet the Indochinese refugee problem.

The sustained, high resettlement rates of third countries in the past 6 months have clearly been influenced by the U.S. rate. Maintaining the resettlement flow to third countries beyond the next few months will require energetic efforts on the part of the UNHCR, which only a few weeks ago issued an appeal to that end. The United States strongly supports the appeal and will continue diplomatic activities to encourage third country participation.

These efforts are particularly important because the decline in arrival rates of boat refugees since the Geneva meeting has mistakenly led some to think the problem is under control. Despite the drop in boat arrivals from a high of 45,000 in May and June to an average of less than 4,000 a month since October, land arrivals in Thailand from Laos have not abated, and arrivals from Kampuchea threaten to overwhelm the Thais. The total number of refugees in regular camps in Southeast Asia has dropped about 130,000 since July, but it still remained dangerously high at 243,000 on March 1, 1980. We expect that the flow may continue at about 15,000 refugees a month during the remainder of FY 1980. Even

Q. At almost exactly the same time that you were saying the allies are wholly with us on Afghanistan, the French were planning this summit meeting with Brezhnev, apparently without any consultation or without even having told you in Vienna that the meeting was planned. What is it, in your view, that the French think that they can accomplish by holding these independent talks?

A. I suppose their objective is to underline their determination to be independent. It is frustrating at times and even more. But they seem to perceive the dangers associated with Afghanistan in the same way that we do and seem as concerned to reverse the results of Afghanistan, especially as it has affected detente and slowed down the movement toward arms control and the other objectives that we sought to pursue with detente.

But they also insist upon their prerogative of independent thinking, independent initiatives, and independent approaches that, if practiced too fully, is not as conducive as they would like, or as they themselves have asserted, to the kind of mutual confidence and consultation which we all seemed to agree last week was essential to allied solidarity and unity.

We understand, of course, that differences of opinion in free societies are rather unavoidable; but nevertheless, after an expression of differences of opinion, action must be agreed upon, and consultation must be continuing. And I must say that I'm concerned that when I was being given a lecture on consultation, that the lecturer was not inclined to practice what he was preaching.

Q. Now that you have had a chance to discuss with the President your meeting with Mr. Gromyko, can you tell us anything about where you see the future of Soviet-American relations, perhaps in meeting Gromyko again, or what do you expect to do now?

A. My expectations with respect to the meeting with Mr. Gromyko were not high if one focused on the possibility of some significant change in attitude. But I thought it was useful to hold the meetings—and, indeed, necessary—in order that there be no misapprehension or miscalculation or misunderstanding as to what our real concerns are, what our real goals are, in the hope that by clearing the air on both sides in those respects, we might begin a dialogue that, eventually, would once again identify common interests that would serve us both.

If one were to accept the standard Soviet line, which has been stated and over again since Afghanistan, as their real perception of American activities and American policies since that time, then their perceptions needed some correction. Their perception, for example, was that we had deliberately, before Afghanistan, undermined and torpedoed—that wasn't the word they used—the SALT II Treaty.

And I thought it was important for me to make clear to him that, although the SALT II struggle was a very difficult one, the Senate had cleared its calendar of all domestic issues so we could begin debate in January or early February of this year; and that we were prepared to do that, and that we thought there was a fighting chance—and I did not try to overstate it, I said a "fighting chance"—of getting ratification. But their invasion of Afghanistan completely eliminated any prospect for getting a two-thirds vote.

I said they ought to take that into account. It's a political fact of life; it is not a precondition. It is not linkage; it is a fact of life that in order to get ratification of the SALT II Treaty, it's necessary to get a two-thirds vote in the Senate, and they have put that out of reach. And they ought to understand that.

So that if they are interested in SALT II and the benefits that this might bring to both of our countries and to the world in terms of lowering tensions and enhancing the prospect for peace, if they are truly interested in that, then they must take into account that by their act, and their act alone, they have made it infeasible in the present climate to press for ratification of the SALT II Treaty. And I thought it was important for them to know that.

Now if, in fact, detente was what many people in America think it was—simply another instrument or weapon for the Soviets to use to their own advantage and not a real commitment to the benefits of detente on a mutual basis—then they will perhaps ignore that fact. But if, in fact, they are concerned about detente, and they are really supportive of SALT II in terms of establishing equality rather than superiority on either side, if they are really concerned with lowering tensions and reducing the prospects for war and aggression, then they have got to take that fact into account. And it seemed to me very important to have this opportunity in these talks to make that point very clearly.

Now whether or not, going back home, they will consider and believe what I said to them, then perhaps they may begin to reconsider the policies which have led to this impasse.

Q. After talking to the President about this meeting, though, do you see any purpose or any prospect of a further meeting with Mr. Gromyko?

A. I think this all depends on how the digestion settles in both the Soviet Union and here. We are busy evaluating and reevaluating what was said, what was implied, what signals may have been sent, in order to get a feeling for what the Soviet reaction might be after their digestion settles down. And we'll do the same thing.

It will take a little time, I think, and additional events—the rhetoric that follows our meetings and so on. All of that could affect our final evaluation of what took place in my meeting with Mr. Gromyko.

Q. On the Palestinian autonomy talks, have you yet formulated any plans to break a stalemate? Do you think President Sadat will rejoin the talks and, if so, when? Thirdly, do you have any hopes of dissuading the European allies from recognizing the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]?

A. My impression with respect to the parties to the talks, Egypt and Israel, is that notwithstanding the present situation they are both firmly supportive of the continuation of the talks. And I might say this about those talks, that for the first time the two parties, Egypt and Israel—for the first time in the history of the Middle East since Israel's independence—the parties have come to grips with the hard, central issues which stand in the way of a genuine agreement on autonomy.

There are some six of them involving land, settlements, security, and so on, and having cleared away a lot of other issues involving the authorities, or the proposed authority of the self-governing authority, it is clear that with respect to most governmental functions affecting people who would be under the jurisdiction of the self-governing authority, basically agreement is within reach.

So, we are down to the six tough issues. Now, it would be nice if we had those all settled by May 26, but they are not going to be all settled. On the other hand, the parties have no choice but to deal with these six. There is no way of backing off from them or retreating from them. They are head-to-head, and they

are forced, by the nature of what has been achieved up to now and the nature of what has been agreed to up to now, to deal with these issues. And I think it would be a disservice to stability in the area, to the prospect of a further rallying of support for the results of this process if we were to back off, or if initiatives were taken by other countries which undercut this process.

That isn't to say that resolving these six issues is a simple matter. Obviously, it is not; and it is going to require time and persistence and encouragement and prodding. It is going to require all of the persuasive powers that interested parties can command in order to achieve results.

I understand, of course, that those who have not been involved in this Camp David process, including our European friends and moderate and more radical Arab countries, are dissatisfied with the process. But nothing that has been proposed from the sidelines, so far as I can see, holds out a better prospect for coming to grips with these six fundamental questions and the issue of autonomy any more effectively than these talks. If any intervention or any diversion, if the effect is to dilute the concentration that we now are able to force upon these issues, then we will be set back in time and probably set back in prospects for dealing with them.

I understand this is a difficult point of view to persuade parties other than those immediately involved to adopt, but I say what I say with great conviction. When I took office as Secretary of State, this is one of the issues I wanted fully explored for my own benefit before I move too far along in my office, and this is a conclusion that I have reached after calling back our Ambassadors from Egypt and Israel and Mr. Linowitz [Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations] and thoroughly discussing with others.

Q. The allies have done rather less than the United States had hoped for regarding Iran. Does this in any way change your strategy? And what, specifically, is now the strategy for the next few weeks and months regarding the hostages?

A. I am not sure I caught the first part of your question because I was—

Q. That the allies in Europe had done rather less regarding Iran on sanctions than we had expected, and I wonder if that will, in itself, make a difference in the strategy?

A. I would think that in order to put the response of our allies to our policies in proper perspective, one ought to focus on the fact that our policy toward Iran at this point consists of two elements—one, sanctions to keep the pressure on. It seems to us that any nation must be concerned in the long run with establishing a normal role in the family of nations for itself and for its people, a role that involves trade, commerce, the flow of goods, resources, and so on. Any nation, especially one emerging from a revolution against what they considered repression, must be concerned, because revolutions, after all, originate out of the dissatisfactions of the people who are subjected to any particular regime or government.

So the basis for the dissatisfactions is still there, and a new government once constituted is going to have to deal with it. And in order to deal with those problems—political, economic, possible threats from outside—in order to deal with those effectively the Government of Iran, as it emerges, must deal with them, must deal with other nations, and must deal with the problems of normalizing relations with at least every other nation in the world, if not the United States.

It seems to me that the sanctions are another way, and they are positive. They didn't go as far as the Community indicated it would go on April 22, but they are sanctions and they are a positive act of support. We ought to take it as such. As time passes those sanctions will have an increasing impact upon Iran.

The other part of our present posture is to pursue diplomatic channels wherever we can, not in search of surrogates for our position but in search of diplomatic initiatives designed to point out to Iran the consequences of growing isolation from the rest of the world in terms of its own well-being. At a time when authority has been fractured and divided as it has been since the taking of the hostages, it is difficult to force a sense of responsibility upon a fractured government. Once a government is constituted, once this parliament is constituted, then the responsibility and the accompanying accountability will fall very clearly upon those who have been elected to office. They will have to consider the relevance of a continued holding of the hostages to Iran's future and its own well-being.

It seems to me that an aggressive pursuit of the diplomatic option is called for at this point. The dynamics of the situation are working on Iran as well as upon us. It is terribly important that we keep that momentum and that we try to build on openings that are suggested. I doubt very much that we could do much effectively through obvious American surrogates. I think through more indirect diplomatic channels there are opportunities. We get indications of suggested opportunities from time to time. I think we have got to plow that field and fertilize it and get something growing, and I think that it is very important to pursue that option. The sanctions thing doesn't stand on its own feet. It has to be taken into account with others.

Q. South Korea is now in difficult times, politically and economically, particularly in the process of political liberalization, and I think the dialogue between North and South Korea is also not going so well. As the new Secretary of State, what is your policy toward the Korean Peninsula?

A. This might be an appropriate point to say that the moment I took the oath of office as Secretary of State, I didn't suddenly give birth to a full-blown range of policies across the whole range of American concerns and interests. When you ask me for my policy, often you will get not so much a policy as a personal reaction to a situation or a problem. I would like to make that distinction in order to give myself a little maneuvering room, as I have the opportunity to dig more deeply into some of these problems, and the Korean one is one such.

I must say that my reaction to the Korean situation is one of deep concern that it is moving away from liberalization policies, which I think are essential to its long-term political health. I would hope that all elements of the society would exercise restraint in this transition period, and that those in authority will find it expedient and appropriate to move in the direction of political liberalization. Beyond that, I would not want to comment.

Q. There is a widespread perception that the general outlines of the foreign policy that you champion are comparable to those championed by your predecessor, Mr. Vance. Given the doubts in Western Europe about the Carter Administration's foreign policy and given the antagonism of the Soviet Union toward that foreign policy, how do you see yourself in the 6 months until elections making an important differences?

A. I lost a presidential election in 2 months. It seems to me that 6 months gives me a lot of time to do something more positive. [Laughter] But I am not laboring under any illusion that I am a miracle man, nor that the problems as

But you have to remember again that this is a very, very taxing mission. These helicopters have a range with the additional fuel tanks that we added long enough to go this distance but not with any margin of safety—not with much margin of safety. And they were flying low to the ground in order to avoid discovery.

Q. Soviet radar?

A. Iranian radar. They were flying under very difficult conditions, more difficult than the weather forecast had shown.

You put all those things together, and I don't draw any conclusions about the general quality of our maintenance. I draw the conclusion, which I knew before, that helicopters are more difficult to operate and maintain than fixed-wing aircraft. We knew that before, and that's why we had a margin of safety here.

As for the quality of our personnel, they were brave, they were dedicated, they were well-trained, and naturally they ran into some difficulties, but I have no fault to find. We're going to have to again investigate, debrief, and so on. I think it would be a bad mistake for us to try to find goats among our personnel at this point.

Q. The allies feel betrayed because they weren't informed. We know why, you've explained why the allies were not told beforehand, but can we, do you think, count on them to support our sanctions now? Do you feel that they're going to go with us across the board on this?

A. All of our allies understand why they were not consulted and informed of this kind of operation. They had expected to be informed or consulted and discussed with before there was a military operation of the kind that had been talked about a great deal in public—blockade, mining. But naturally they understand that security cannot be maintained if a lot of people outside those who are actually doing the operation are informed about it.

With respect to their actions from now on, I believe they fully understand that it is important in order to avoid having to go to more extreme actions that they cooperate with us on the diplomatic front and the economic front and move forward on the sanctions.

And as I said earlier, the indications are that they are going to continue to do that as they have been doing.

One thing is clear from this rescue operation. The United States feels very strongly about the hostages and getting them back. Our allies understand this better now even than they did before, and I think the Iranians understand it better now even than they did before.

Q. This is a question the answer to which is not known to me but I'm sure must be known by now to the Iranians, and that is the nightmare in any operation of this kind where six, seven of our craft are left on the ground is, are any secret documents left in usable condition. Is any secret equipment left behind in usable or studiable condition?

A. There may well have been some equipment left in studiable condition, but it's too early to say because although, as you say, the Iranians know and you don't know, I'm not sure myself. Some of the helicopters were burning. We don't know for sure whether others might have caught fire or been destroyed even by the Iranians before they got to look inside. So we don't know for sure. It's a possibility, but I don't want to go further than that.

Q. Just to clarify one point you made earlier, you said we are continuing to hold Iran responsible for the safety of the hostages. Now is that a threat to use military action if they're harmed?

A. It's a simple statement and I'll repeat it, but I won't expand on it. We do hold Iran responsible for what happens to the hostages.

Q. There's a little interpretation also.

A. I'm sure you'll be willing to give it at great length, but I'm going to simply repeat it. We hold Iran responsible.

Q. Let me try to get at it this way if I may. There was a time when we were talking about—

A. You know, we're moving forward on the peaceful front. That's what we want. We want to get the hostages back peacefully, but we're going to hold Iran responsible for what happens.

Q. At one point, we were discussing the possibility of military action apart from the rescue mission.

A. Yes.

Q. Roughly mid-May or sometime later.

A. Yes.

Q. You say today that allied cooperation is at least as important as before and perhaps more so.

A. Yes.

Q. The allies say that they're going to take additional sanctions against Iran on May the 17th. Now doesn't this imply that you really are ruling out any further military action until sometime considerably after May the 17th to give their sanctions an opportunity to work?

A. I don't want to set forth the schedule or a deadline. I think that this is a time to stress peaceful ways of resolving a problem and I want to do—that's what I'm doing.

It is going to take time to resolve it peacefully. That's been clear from the beginning, and we want to press forward on that line without ruling anything out completely.

Q. Before you go altogether on the peaceful side, let me ask you, try one more time on the operation without asking you any of the details.

Are you worried about some friends of the United States in Tehran who might be threatened or damaged, might have been willing to help us or plans to help us, who might be damaged by the failure?

A. If you're talking about political elements in Iran favorable to the United States—

Q. I was being a little more specific. Some people who might have been either prepared or in the plan to help us in this operation.

A. I don't want to talk about the plan or the effects of the plan beyond the point at which it aborted.

Q. I understand.

A. There were additional parts to the plan. I just don't want to go into them now except to say that we weren't going to leave everybody there after the refueling. They were going to move to another place and hide out.

Q. So some people were not moved in the plan and is there some—have you heard anything that gives you reason to worry about them?

A. I'm simply not going to talk about the parts of the plan that we didn't execute.

Q. Does that apply also for the possibility that some of the hostages may have known that you were coming and how were they—

A. I would not want to say anything about that. That, I think—again, the best way to answer that is the way

I've answered, and I'm not going to go beyond that.

Q. The Foreign Minister of Iran, Mr. Ghotbzadeh, has said that if the United States tries something, they will block the Persian Gulf. Can they? Can we stop them?

A. That, I think, is one I can answer. Attempts to block the Persian Gulf, as has been suggested, by sinking ships in it, in the Straits of Hormuz, are not really feasible. That's a wide strait, and there's a wider one next to it. There is, of course, the possibility of military action, I suppose, implied in Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh's statement—a blockade of the United States or of the other countries in the gulf. I don't really think he means that, and I think, therefore, that this is not one of our more serious concerns.

I don't want to dismiss anything, but I would say that we're able to handle that from its military aspects. We have a very large and substantial and strong naval force in the area.

Q. Does the Administration still, as it was a couple of months ago, still think of quickly restoring relations with Iran once this situation is resolved—and I realize I'm looking far forward now—in order to preserve the Persian Gulf for the Western democracies?

A. If we can resolve—and I deeply hope we can—this hostage issue, then I think the way is open to and we're quite eager to establish good relations with Iran. They are obviously not going to go from what they are to deep friendship, but it's—and we don't expect that. But we do want to be friends with the Iranian revolutionary government. And we believe that a stable, a unified, a strong Iran, neutral, Islamic, is something that we could have good relations with. And we believe that would help the stability of the region. We believe it would help to block Soviet expansionism.

Q. Do you see anything that worries you about Soviet expansionism into Iran? You have worried about that publicly before.

A. Yes. I still do because it is clear that there are elements in this political broth in Iran that are really Soviet oriented and would like to turn Iran into a Soviet satellite or into another Afghanistan. That would be disastrous for the region. It would be very harmful to us and it would be terrible, indeed, for the Iranians. ■

National Security Adviser Brzezinski Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, was interviewed on ABC's "Issues and Answers" in Washington, D.C., on April 27, 1980, by Bob Clark and Sam Donaldson of ABC News.

Q. The situation in Iran appears to have taken a potentially dangerous new turn with the removal of the hostages from the Embassy to other locations and the threats that the Americans who died in the rescue mission—their bodies—will not be returned without concessions from us. Can you tell us how seriously you view the situation at the moment and just how much you know about it?

A. Let me say, first of all, that what the President ordered to be done was morally right and politically justified. We needed to take this action to help to relieve the situation. Our countrymen needed help. We had a moral obligation to do what we could to help them and we will persist in this effort.

Politically the region is stagnating, and Iran's political situation is deteriorating. It is important to bring this issue to resolution. What is now happening in Iran is unclear. We have no confirmation that the hostages have been removed. It is not clear if they are removed, in whose custody they would be retained. In any case, we continue to hold the Iranian Government responsible for the safety and well-being of these people.

Insofar as the bodies are concerned, President Bani-Sadr said, and honorably, that they will be retained—removed and returned to us immediately. We hold him to his word and will see whether the events, literally, within the next hours or days, justify our faith in his word.

Q. If the hostages have, indeed, been removed to other locations, how seriously would you view this, and is there anything we can do about it?

A. Obviously, there's nothing we can do about it because we do not have control over the hostages. Much depends in whose custody they will be retained. We will continue our efforts—all efforts—to obtain their release, and I believe that one of the very important lessons to be drawn from the events of the last few days, by everyone concerned, is that the United States, and the President of the United States, is prepared to do all that is necessary to obtain their release and will persist in these efforts; I repeat, will persist in these efforts.

Q. He can do all that is necessary, but what can he do? He's played a card. It failed. You said it was an honorable card, and I'm not arguing with that, but it failed. What next?

A. First of all, there is the longer term tract which involves collective actions designed to bring home to the Iranians, and particularly to those Iranians who are responsible for the fate of their country, that the continued political paralysis and international isolation of Iran, which the hostage situation is engendering, is bringing ruin to Iran itself. The country is gradually disintegrating.

Q. Now, you have said that for a long time.

A. Its peripheries are falling apart.

Q. Excuse me, you've said that for a long time.

A. Its enemies are gathering force. Responsible Iranians have to contemplate the consequences of this for Iran. And if a peaceful resolution is to be found, they have to play the role.

Q. If I may just ask about that, you and the President, and other Administration officials have made that point for a long time. It seemed to get us nowhere. Apparently you didn't believe enough at that point to let it play out. You took this action which failed.

A. We have made that point for a long time, but we're playing the situation here that unfolds slowly. We have adopted certain steps ourselves to bring home to Iran that Iran's well-being is being adversely affected by what it had done. More recently these steps have been strengthened by allied solidarity. The fact that Iran is increasingly ostracized in the world is a psychological, political, and economic situation which no responsible Iranian can ignore.

Q. Are you now conceding that it is a long-term proposition that those hostages will be there a long time?

A. We are not conceding anything of the sort. What I'm saying is that one has to have a long-term strategy for dealing

INFCE-Final Plenary Conference

by Gerard C. Smith

Statement at the final plenary conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) in Vienna on February 25, 1980. Ambassador Smith is Special Representative of the President for Nonproliferation Matters.

I am pleased to represent the United States at this concluding plenary conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). President Carter has asked me to deliver the following message:

The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, now completed, was a valuable forum in which to examine a number of the economic and technical issues, as well as the question of nonproliferation, as they relate to the development and continued use of nuclear energy. The evaluation's final reports contribute greatly to increased understanding among members of the international community.

I would like to express appreciation to the representatives of the participating governments and international organizations for their hard work over the past 2 years. The United States will carefully review the evaluation's results and take them into account in implementing its national and international policies with regard to the development and expansion of nuclear energy.

We all share the conviction that nuclear power is needed to conserve valuable nonrenewable resources and, in many countries, to reduce intolerable dependencies on imported fossil fuels. I believe we all seek to assure that nuclear power will be generated only under conditions serving to minimize risks of nuclear proliferation.

Working Group Reports

For over 2 years, since the INFCE Organizing Conference in Washington, representatives of the countries and organizations gathered here have labored jointly and diligently in an unprecedented undertaking in international cooperation. We have pooled our analytical talents to examine the various fuel cycles, their risks, and the ways in which such risks might be minimized through institutional and technological measures. We have explored ways in which nuclear supply assurances can be improved and have given attention to the special needs of developing nations.

We were not asked to negotiate solutions but rather to offer governments our collective analyses of the implications of different approaches.

The United States believes that INFCE has been a success. I would hope that all participants will join in accepting the working group reports with appreciation and in forwarding them for study by governments, the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and other appropriate international organizations. I propose that our special thanks be expressed to the IAEA for its essential help and to Professor Abram Chayes [Chairman of the Technical Coordinating Committee], whose leadership played a crucial role in assuring the successful and timely completion of this evaluation.

When I say that we believe that INFCE has been a success, I do not wish to imply that the United States, or any other nation, agrees with every statement in the reports. The participants in INFCE have worked as experts seeking consensus. Accordingly, the reports reflect a wide range of perspectives, judgments, and viewpoints. These include the views of developing countries eager to assure themselves of access to the benefits of nuclear power; the perspectives of both exporters and importers of uranium, enrichment services, and reactors; the views of those now engaged in developing breeder options; and the views of nations, like mine, which believe they can prudently defer moves implying a commitment to "a plutonium economy." All interested nations have had their views considered and reflected in the reports.

On most matters of substance, the members of the working groups and of the Technical Coordinating Committee were able to reach agreement on a single view. On some matters, however, such convergence was not achieved and the residual differences are expressed in the reports.

Without justifying or finding fault with the nuclear power policies of any nation or group of nations, the process has produced a common factual background and findings which should inform our thinking, facilitate new international understandings at the political level, and help achieve a more orderly international community as we seek to realize the benefits of nuclear power under conditions consistent with nonproliferation policies.

With the firm belief that INFCE has been constructive, I should like to refer to a few matters that strike us as particularly useful and also to mention briefly a few areas where we believe some cautions are warranted.

INFCE Process

I start with a word about the process of INFCE itself. Before its start there was understandably a very wide range of perspectives and insufficient mutual communication. The international nuclear community was in a state of some disarray. Tensions were developing between suppliers and consumers, and there were widespread misunderstandings of each other's problems and concerns.

INFCE has helped to remedy that situation. We now better understand each other's objectives, needs, and interests. All of us have a better appreciation of global nuclear energy needs and resources, worldwide concerns about nuclear proliferation, and the technical and institutional problems and possibilities that lie before us. We hope that the IAEA will review our findings with the participation of all interested states, so as to identify those INFCE matters that merit follow-on IAEA actions. And, we should strive to preserve the spirit, tone, and momentum of this effort.

The clear recognition in INFCE of dual objectives is important. The continued value that nuclear power has and will have for many of our economies is emphasized. There is also broad agreement that there are proliferation risks associated with nuclear power as well as measures that can and should be taken to make such risks more tolerable and manageable.

We all recognize that proliferation is basically a political matter and that if a nation elects to develop nuclear explosives, it can do so without misusing civilian nuclear power facilities. However, INFCE points out that such facilities can be misused and that for this reason, it is important to plan future fuel cycles with careful attention to proliferation risks. The United States recognizes that there are such risks in every fuel cycle. INFCE has not identified any technical solution that will eliminate such risks, but it has identified several major positive factors useful in future planning.

We accept INFCE's judgment that it is not appropriate to make broad generalizations about the comparative proliferation risks of different fuel cycles. For example, we appreciate the fact that comparison of the proliferation resistance of the once-through light water reactor cycle, with alternatives, must also include consideration of the location and types of uranium enrichment facilities and how they are to be safeguarded.

I believe we have all come to share the assessment that there are substantial risks associated with weapons-usable materials and the technologies that can produce them. Our collective acceptance of this premise should help steer the future of nuclear power in safer directions. New protective measures, including but not limited to improved safeguards, will be required to cope with fuel cycles involving ready access to significant amounts of weapons-usable materials.

We are now more conscious of the long-range implications of near-term actions, and we already are moving to constrain the use of weapons-grade materials in reactors when such use is not essential. The recent move to convert research reactors to use lower enrichment fuel is an example.

A single fuel cycle will not satisfy all nations' needs. Clearly, different national situations require different choices. For example, the need for and timing of breeder development will vary among countries depending on their technical infrastructure, electric grid size, confidence in access to uranium resources, and other factors. Especially important is the relationship between demand for power and the availability and price of uranium.

Demand-Supply Relationships

On the resource side, I believe that INFCE did a good job in evaluation of the factors bearing on prospective availability of natural uranium.

On the demand side, there will be a need for periodic revision of the estimates developed in INFCE. For example, since these estimates were prepared over 2 years ago, there have been large reductions in reactor orders and lengthy delays in construction schedules. This has resulted for the United States, which makes a major contribution to total demand, in a reduction in projections for 1995 nuclear capacity of about 30%. Since the urgency for construction of additional fuel cycle facilities and the introduction of new technologies depend on demand-supply relationships, it is important that estimates be kept up to date. This underscores the need to insure that such estimates are revised periodically.

Demand-supply relationships are also important in considering the adequacy of enrichment services. We appear to agree that there will be sufficient enrichment capacity through at least the mid-1990s, and new capacity can be brought on stream in sufficient time to meet demand that develops thereafter.

Major INFCE Issues

Reprocessing, recycling of plutonium in thermal reactors, and the need and timing for breeders were key issues in INFCE. From our perspective, several important insights emerge.

While reprocessing has been preferred by some nations as the way to deal with spent fuel, the evaluation makes it clear that other choices are feasible. Spent fuel can be safely stored on an interim or long-term basis, and terminal disposal without reprocessing appears to be a realistic option for either economic or nonproliferation reasons. I stress this point since I believe nuclear power can only benefit if flexibility exists in the choice of approaches.

The great majority of participants shared the view that, for economic reasons, when reprocessing plants are built they, like enrichment plants, should be large in scale. And, apart from economics, scale is an important consideration for nonproliferation reasons.

It is worth noting that all agreed that the economic advantage of plutonium recycle in light water reactors will at best be small.

Effective International Safeguards

INFCE working groups concluded that effective international safeguards are an essential feature of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Stress was laid on the special need to apply effective safeguards, particularly for the sensitive fuel cycle steps involving enrichment, reprocessing, and fabrication of fuel using plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Inclusion of safeguards planning at the earliest stages of plant design is called for. The importance of giving high priority to the testing and optimization of new improved safeguards methods for sensitive fuel cycle steps was emphasized.

In that connection, I would stress the importance the United States attaches to applying effective IAEA safeguards to all civilian nuclear facilities and to providing the IAEA with the additional funds, trained manpower, and policy support it needs to carry out its expanding safeguards responsibilities.

While safeguards alone will not be sufficient to minimize proliferation risks from sensitive fuel cycle activities, we are convinced that comprehensive safeguards coverage will be necessary if nuclear power is to play its proper role in meeting global energy needs.

Comprehensive Safeguards Coverage

The participants appeared to agree that constraints that now apply to reprocessing and to separated plutonium need to be reinforced by other protective mechanisms. For example, in addressing the particular concerns associated with separated plutonium, it was recommended that as one follow-on mechanism, special attention should be given to placing excess plutonium under international oversight. The United States is prepared to work cooperatively for an effective international plutonium storage regime. We are also participating in the IAEA study of international arrangements for spent fuel storage.

Breeders

The need and prospects for breeders understandably are given considerable attention in light of their promise and the interest that some nations have in this technology. There is no question that, over the long term, breeders could extend uranium resources in a dramatic way. This accounts for the heavy investments that the United States and other nations are making in developing the breeder and in assessing the feasibility, economic, and proliferation implications of its technology.

But the breeder is not without its costs, risks, and uncertainties. Some of these are identified in the report of working group 5, although that report focuses much more on the positive features of the technology. We note that the report concludes that breeder development and deployment are not likely to be economically attractive to nations with modest nuclear power programs.

INFCE has provided useful insights on the special needs of developing nations. As part of the IAEA's

against the United States, accused to take steps with U.S.S.R. against Canada on the mineral exploitation of the seabeds. Now that Canada took good positions on Iran and Afghanistan, is your government ready to express in this field a new "thank-you, Canada"?

Secretary Vance. We have a disagreement on the question of the seabeds. As friends do, from time to time, we cannot agree on everything. We do not agree on how the seabed issue should be handled in the Law of the Sea Conference.

Secretary MacGuigan. I might just add a word. We've had an excellent day in which we've had not only a good exchange of views but have reached an understanding, at least, in a general form on a great many points.

One of the few issues in which we actually had disagreement was with that issue. Here our national interests appear to be in collision because the amount of nickel to be produced is the matter of a differing kind of concern to Canada and the United States. So we have not agreed on that point, but we have agreed on many others.

Secretary Vance. Let me second that. We've had an excellent meeting today. We have covered a tremendously broad variety of bilateral issues as well as a very wide range of international issues. There has been a common view of almost all of these issues.

There are, however, as I said, times when friends and allies may have differing issues because of differing national interests on certain points. This was just one of the very few that took place.

Q. One of the questions which Mr. Beasley raised, who is our Ambassador to the Law of the Sea Conference, was the lack of consultation on the issues, partly a disagreement of the substance but also the process that was going on. Can you give an undertaking that the consultations would be much closer on proposals that are developed in the Law of the Sea after these meetings and others?

Secretary Vance. Yes, you can be fully assured that the consultations will be full, complete, and that we look forward to further consultations. I do not accept the proposition that consultations in the past have been inadequate.

Q. Moving on then to the fishing treaty. The issue there seems to be that the treaty is in some jeopardy in your Senate ratification. Amendments have been proposed. Do you view in any way that the treaty may be jeopardized? And if so, what can your Administration do to help the treaty go through in the form it was signed originally?

Secretary Vance. There were, at the hearing which was held the other day, dissenting views expressed by several of the people who were present at that hearing. I have made very clear, however, the position of my government; namely, that we support the treaty as negotiated and signed. We will do everything in our power to see that it is ratified in that form.

Q. If Quebec decides to become independent, is the United States prepared to recognize its right to self-determination?

Secretary Vance. That is a speculative question on which I do not wish to comment. I have already stated that this is a question for the people of Canada to decide. That is all I wish to say.

Secretary MacGuigan. The only discussion we had of that issue today was my warning Mr. Vance that he would probably receive a question of that kind.

Q. Canada joined with other NATO allies today in reducing the size of our Iranian Embassy here by 50%. That's one person. Considering the actions the Europeans took, are you pleased as you can be with the help you're getting from your European allies and Canada in terms of tougher sanctions against Iran, and is it everything you had hoped for?

Secretary Vance. I am pleased with the steps which have been, and are being, taken. I think it is of the utmost importance that the actions which were announced yesterday with respect to the adoption of the sanctions contained in the resolution which was in the Security Council be adopted. As you know, under what the European nations decided yesterday, this will have to go to their national parliaments in some cases, but they said this action would be completed by May 17. I think it is of the utmost importance that parliamentary action be taken and that the countries then be prepared to put those sanctions into place if the hostages have not been released.

Secretary MacGuigan. Perhaps I might add that the release which we made today was in response to the actions of the European Community yesterday. For those of you who heard me say yesterday that I didn't expect to announce such actions so soon, I wasn't aware at that time, being preoccupied with the Olympics yesterday, that the European Community had taken the steps that it had.

Q. During your visit here, have there been any expressions of reservation or warning from the Canadian side about the possible use of U.S. military action against Iran?

Secretary Vance. We have discussed Iran in great depth. We have discussed the various actions which have already been taken and the economic sanctions that we hope and expect will be taken by our allies in the very near future. We merely said that there are other options as well which exist. There is no need at this point to comment on them.

Q. Given the fact that Canada and Mexico are charging the United States the same export price for natural gas, is there any feeling in the Carter Administration of being caught in a squeeze through a price-fixing agreement between Canada and Mexico, and was this discussed today?

Secretary Vance. We did not discuss this today. This was discussed when Secretary [of Energy Charles W.] Duncan was up here previously. We were pleased by the action taken which, I believe, indicated that the current prices would be maintained until October.

Q. What assurances does the United States expect to offer Canada in order to get Canada to proceed with the building of the Alaska highway pipeline before the Alaskan sections are financed?

Secretary Vance. We did discuss the question of the Alaska pipeline. We discussed the problems that exist with respect to it in the fact that these matters are being worked upon in our two governments by those who have the responsibility for it. That is not in my area of responsibility. That is for others in my government to deal with.

Q. Canada and West Germany yesterday said they would join the boycott of the Moscow Olympics. How do you think that whole movement is going, and what more do you expect from America's allies in this matter?

Secretary Vance. I was very pleased to hear of the action taken by Canada and by the Federal Republic of Germany. I think the steps which were announced are very important.

It is my belief that the action taken by Canada and Germany will have a major effect on other nations which, having seen that action taken by them and similar action having been taken by the United States and many other nations, will also conclude that this is the right and proper step for us to take in light of the naked aggression which has been carried out against Afghanistan.

Q. What do you think of the fact that we continue to heavily subsidize petroleum products at a time when the United States is attempting to cut back?

Secretary Vance. I'm afraid that I'm going to have to hand that question over. Can you answer that?

Secretary MacGuigan. She was asking for your opinion concerning our domestic policy.

Secretary Vance. That's what I thought she was doing.

Secretary MacGuigan. Naturally, I'm going to defend that policy, and, naturally, you're going to say "no comment."

Q. Have you discussed with your Canadian counterpart or maybe with Mr. Trudeau the possible measures to be undertaken against the Soviet Union in regards to Afghanistan?

Secretary Vance. We discussed at length the question of Afghanistan and the steps which have been taken by the United States, and by other nations as well, in response to the action taken by the Soviet Union in invading Afghanistan and continuing to increase the number of troops in that country. We discussed also the consequences of the actions which have been taken.

I expressed my deep conviction of the need to maintain the actions which we took in response over an extended period of time. This is necessary in my judgment for two purposes.

One, I think it has to be very clear to the Soviet Union, as a nation which has invaded a neighboring nonaligned nation, that it must pay a cost for doing that.

Secondly, to make sure that it understands that a cost will have to be paid if there should be similar steps tried elsewhere and, therefore, that this would act as a deterrent to further aggression. We have to be prepared, in addition to that, to continue to maintain those actions or sanctions which have been taken in place until such time as Soviet forces are totally withdrawn from Afghanistan.

Q. Are you going to envisage some new actions or measures or sanctions against the Soviet Union, and what are they?

Secretary Vance. At this time, we are not contemplating any additional sanctions.

Q. I'd like to come back to this referendum question. You don't seem to be prepared to go as far on this subject as President Carter. In his interview in 1977 he said he recognized the distinct American national interest in the outcome of this referendum and that he felt it was in the interest of the United States that Canada stay together. Are you now saying you're not prepared to endorse that statement?

Secretary Vance. I am not repudiating anything the President said. I'm saying that this is a question for the Canadian people to decide.

Q. For 2 days earlier this week, Friday and Monday, in the Commons Mr. Trudeau said that basically the reason we wouldn't go along with the Olympic boycott was that Canada's getting in on it wouldn't make much difference. Then Canada suddenly decided to go along with it. Can you explain to me what difference it does make, why Mr. Trudeau was wrong, why we're going to have some effect?

Secretary MacGuigan. May I first put that question in perspective. What Mr. Trudeau said is that single action

U.S.-Canada Discuss Fuel Conversion Proposals

Discussions on U.S. plans to reduce reliance on foreign oil, involving proposals to convert some oil-fired power plants to coal or other fuels, were held in Washington on February 29, 1980, between U.S. and Canadian officials.

The meeting was held at the invitation of the State Department in response to Canadian concern that these proposals could lead to a worsening of the transboundary air-pollution problem now facing both countries.

U.S. officials explained the implications of the various proposals now under consideration within the Administration and the need to accelerate the reduction of reliance on foreign oil. Canadian officials indicated they fully supported this objective but expressed their concern that the program be carried out in an environmentally sound manner, pointing out that the President of the United States and the Canadian Prime Minister joined other leaders in pledging at the Tokyo summit conference last June to develop increased use of coal without damage to the environment.

Officials agreed that the transboundary air-pollution problem is a shared concern of both Canada and the United States and that all proposals should be examined closely with this problem in mind. They also reiterated their determination to make progress toward a cooperative air quality agreement to reduce transboundary air pollution as envisaged in the July 1979 announcement by the U.S. and Canadian Governments.

U.S. officials explained that plans under consideration by the Administration would address environmental concerns. Canadian officials emphasized their view that the coal conversion program should be implemented in a way which would maximize opportunities to reduce emissions of pollutants causing acid rain in both countries.

The U.S. officials undertook to convey Canadian views to the President before any decision is taken and to consult with Canada as details of the U.S. programs are developed in keeping with the long-established practice of both countries.

The meeting was attended by representatives of the U.S. State Department, Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, and Council on Environmental Quality. Canada was represented by the Department of External Affairs, the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, and Environment Canada.

Press release 46 of Feb. 29, 1980. ■

at our resettlement rate of 14,000 a month, plus approximately equal departures for other countries, there would still be about 150,000 refugees in camps by October.

I hasten to add that this picture assumes there is no change in the present circumstances. We know from our previous experience in this part of the world that changing conditions could easily produce an increased boat flow again, and that we could face another crisis as in the spring of 1979. Additionally, there are the hundreds of thousands of displaced Khmer on the border of Thailand.

We hope that most Khmer will seek to return to their homeland, but significant numbers from the Khmer holding centers may seek resettlement. This is an extraordinarily delicate situation, which is intimately related to the availability of foodstocks in Kampuchea, the continuing presence of Vietnamese forces in that country, and the desire of the Thai Government to see these displaced Khmer return to their country. If necessary, at an appropriate time we would be prepared to work with the UNHCR to address the problem of the residual Khmer population in Thailand and to seek resettlement opportunities for some of them elsewhere.

I do not wish to leave this matter of Indochinese refugee flows without pointing out that our attention has been focused on those events, the tragedies of the boat people and the Khmer, which by their sheer magnitude have dramatized this situation. These overshadow the steady, smaller flows of clandestine departures from Vietnam and of Lao and Hmong people from Laos. These people continue to risk their lives in fleeing the repression they find in their countries. I would hope that the governments of these countries would create conditions so that no one would feel compelled to flee and that those who wish to leave would be allowed to live under tolerable conditions until eligible to leave legally.

In this regard, we have made every attempt to work out arrangements under the orderly departure program negotiated by the UNHCR with Hanoi to facilitate the departure from Vietnam of those people who have close associations with the United States. Such associations would include persons with close relatives in the United States, former employees of the U.S. Government or other U.S. organizations, and other persons formerly associated with U.S. policies or programs.

We have long urged Vietnam, as I did when I met the Vietnamese Charge in Bangkok in January, not only to provide us the names of persons they will allow to leave that country but also to specify what their ties are to the United States. This would allow us to determine whether they appear to qualify for admission as immigrants or refugees. They are now providing this information, and we are moving, albeit slowly, toward a procedure of processing these persons.

It would be foolhardy to forecast that active implementation of the program can be anticipated shortly, but it is not outside the realm of possibility. We have been forthcoming in agreeing to most of Vietnam's conditions, and it is now up to the Vietnamese to implement the arrangements. If the program gets underway, then we may bring into the United States not only immigrants but as many as 1,000 refugees a month from Vietnam within the present allocation of 14,000 Indochinese refugees a month.

Such a development, I believe, will be a positive step toward resolving some of the factors which impel people to flee Vietnam. I would hope that the opening of a legal channel for departures to this and other countries would encourage people in Vietnam to wait there rather than to flee as boat refugees which has led both to the loss of many lives and burdened the countries of first asylum. Vietnam has also indicated that the continuation of its moratorium on assisting boat refugee departures hinges on the willingness of other countries to admit people directly from Vietnam under the orderly departure program. Developments such as these would reduce this particular problem to a manageable scale for ourselves, our ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] friends, and the Vietnamese.

Just as important to me as coping with the refugee challenge in Southeast Asia is improving the quality of resettlement of refugees in this country. To date the Indochinese program has been very successful on balance, thanks primarily to the commitment and generosity of the voluntary agencies. But now that we have greatly accelerated admissions and arriving refugees are no longer predominantly urban Westernized middle class with long ties to the United States, we are beginning to encounter problems in some areas of the country. We are working closely with the voluntary agencies, state and local service agencies, and community leaders to try to ease the transition of the refugees into American society without placing the burden unfairly on anyone.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

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Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations

by Matthew Nimetz

Address before the joint meeting of the Rotary Clubs of Franklin County in Columbus, Ohio, on February 26, 1980. Mr. Nimetz is Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.[1]

Ever since the end of the Second World War, the most dangerous factor in world politics has been the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. I would like to say a few words today about the relationship between the two superpowers, about the East-West balance in the third month of 1980, and about what it portends for the future.

But before addressing my main topic, I will express my belief that the long-term survival of this planet as a habitable environment for men and women will depend on our facing up to a series of other challenges. These include the population issue—you know that we are adding 1 million people every 5 days and expect a world population of 6–6.5 billion by the year 2000. They include the problem of providing food, shelter, and jobs to this exploding population; developing new sources of energy and using what we have more efficiently; controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons; protecting the international environment from threats to human health and the productivity of our oceans and land; accommodating ourselves—the richest nation on our Earth—to the needs and aspirations of the Third World nations. These are some of the most difficult problems we face. I leave them for you to ponder during the next decade or two.

An Unsuccessful Image

The challenge we face from the Soviet Union is, in some senses, much easier than those I have just touched upon. It is easier because, I believe, we have been largely successful in dealing with the Soviet challenge in all respects but one—and we can be successful in dealing with that threat as well if we have the determination and persistence to do so. The Soviet challenge is a broad one. It involves ideological, economic, and military challenges to Western ideals, to Western political and economic systems, and to Western security.

I say we have had significant successes in meeting this challenge because I think it is quite clear that the Soviet Union—and the Communist ideas it seeks to promote—has not attracted support in the world at large. Communist thinking is stagnant. Even Communist Parties in other countries, whether in power—such as Yugoslavia, Albania, China, and North Korea—or in opposition—Italy, France, and Spain—reject the Soviet Union as a model for their own futures.

The communism of the Soviet Union, established by revolutionaries to be the model for a future world, is generally regarded as empty rhetoric, as arid scholasticism, as an increasingly shabby facade for a brutalized and dispirited social system.

On the other hand, the West, for all our faults, remains dynamic, creative, and attractive. I find most revealing one phenomenon so obvious that most people ignore it, and that is the direction in which people migrate.

One of the Soviet Union's major problems is to keep its people locked in: They build walls, mine borders, and fill prisons—but still cannot suppress the wish of millions to escape Communist rule. Their most creative people—for example, their greatest writers and their greatest scientists—must be suppressed or exiled. On the other hand, one of our major problems is restricting entry into our country because of the attractiveness and freedom of our society. People vote with their feet—and they are walking, better, running, westward, not to the east.

Economic Model

As a method of organizing a complex advanced economy, the Soviet Union has also failed as a model. We estimate that last year the Soviet Union had just about the lowest growth rate in its postwar history. The Soviet Union has failed to create a successful modern agricultural section; it faces serious energy problems in the future; its labor supply is not expanding rapidly enough, and productivity is difficult to increase in a system that lacks real incentives; bureaucratic mismanagement is endemic.

Even East European members of the Warsaw Pact experiment with more flexible economic techniques that introduce elements of the free market system. Communist economies, such as those of Cuba and Eastern Europe, as well as the Soviet Union, face shortages now and will continue to do so in the future. The economic predominance of the West is overwhelming. If we take the United States, the West European nations, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand and compare them with the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, and Cuba, we find that the West's total GNP is about $6 trillion (1978) compared with about $2 trillion for the Soviet bloc.

I do not want to appear complacent about the United States or the West. We must pay attention to the vitality of our democratic traditions and insure that human and civil rights are freely and widely exercised; we must deal with difficult and deep economic problems, particularly energy and inflation; we must improve coordination among our allies; we must strengthen ties with the less-developed world and be more responsive to their needs and aspirations wherever compatible with our long-term interests.

Soviet Military Challenge

However, my main point is this: Unfortunately and dangerously, the primary Soviet challenge today and for the future is neither ideological nor economic but military. Although our GNP is nearly double that of the Soviet Union, the Soviets outspend us on defense. They dedicate approximately 13% of their GNP to their military—the U.S. defense share of GNP is about 5%.

This steady buildup of Soviet power over two decades, beyond what they reasonably need for defense, is ominous. The buildup is both quantitative and qualitative. Soviet weaponry has emerged in the last decade as among the finest produced in the world. Perhaps even more ominous is the skewing of the Soviet economy to provide the ever-growing industrial base for this massive effort—at a time when funds are so desperately needed for development of natural resources east of the Urals, not to mention raising the Soviet living standard.

In the strategic area, the Soviet Union has achieved parity with us; here the SALT Treaty recognizes this balance and prevents a dangerous round of competition for strategic nuclear superiority. In the European theater, the Soviets have developed and are deploying nuclear delivery systems—the SS-20 and Backfire Bomber—as well

complex as so many of these can be quickly resolved simply because I am a new face or a new figure, however unexpected and unanticipated my arrival on the scene was.

I do have, as one might expect, after 22 years in the Senate and 26 years at the highest level available in my State to political leadership, views about the world in which I live and the values my country represents and the objectives which we should pursue. Whether or not I am a carbon copy of my predecessor is a conclusion that is easy to reach. But I never found that I was a carbon copy of anybody else, and that has been made very clear to me by what I read in the press and hear on television.

There are those who wish I were a carbon copy of Mr. A or Mr. B, but I am not. I have a different way of approaching this job. One thing that struck me on arriving in Brussels was that for the first time my colleagues in the alliance were confronted with a Secretary of State who came out of politics, and that hadn't happened for a long, long time. I got the feeling that they thought they were talking to a compatriot, because they, of course, are all politicians coming from parliamentary systems. Whether or not that gives me an advantage in terms of persuasiveness or influence or credibility isn't a question that will be answered by comparing me with somebody who is my predecessor.

I am what I am. Mr. Gromyko says he is still puzzled as to what I am. Well, I hope he remains puzzled, because I think that one of the ways to be effective, at least around the Senate of the United States, is not to drop the second shoe, to leave people in doubt about what your next step is as long as they understand what your objective is. In my own way, after I get a feel for this job, I am going to try to make it clear, as low-key initially as possible, what I think are the limits within which allies are to be expected to cooperate, the limits within which we are prepared to try to pursue detente with the Soviet Union.

I think that there is a need to clear up confusion that may not be anybody's fault in particular. I am not interested in assessing fault, but I think that the perception of a Secretary of State who has a clear sense of direction, whether or not there is agreement with the direction, is an important first contribution to make. And that is not a denigration of Cy Vance, not at all. It is just that I am a politician. I have had to defend my support for foreign policies by going to constituents who could vote me in or out of office. I have had to learn to articulate my position to a mass audience who could control my viability, and I think that gives me a little different approach to the job than others.

With respect to the difference between ideals and the pragmatic next steps to take, I responded in part to that; I am going to look for the pragmatic next steps. I certainly don't expect to solve every problem, but I hope that if I do nothing else that I can give the American people a clearer perception of what this Administration and this government is trying to do, what its objectives are, what its values are and what the consequences of possible options for action may be, so that there is a clear understanding between us—those who temporarily are the governors and those who are the governed—as to what it is we are trying to do as a country to make the planet a more livable place.

Q. During the 1960s, NATO—and by that I don't mean all of the states—the leadership of NATO began a concerted attempt to orient the Western alliance along antigrowth, antiscience lines, the kind of thing that Brzezinski in that period was writing about as a postindustrial technocratic society. There has not been too much success in forcing Western Europe to orient along those lines. You, during your career, have had a public commitment to the Club of Rome, zero-growth, Malthusian perspective—the French and German leaderships have recently stated that they consider this kind of antidevelopment perspective to be a leading factor that is making the current situation very dangerous in terms of a general war danger.

What I would like a comment from you on is whether you see this kind of split in orientation as causing some of the problems now in the alliance and as one reason why Western Europe is having more success in their dealings with the Third World than we are?

A. I haven't dug deeply enough yet into the psyche of our European friends to reach any conclusion on the first part of your question. I must say that as I came to this job, Cy was quick to tell me that there was an environmental arm to the State Department. I am going to try to make it more visible, because I think that much of what we need to do to protect the environment, at the same time that we seek to insure our energy supplies, is to insure that while we are in the process of developing energy sources, we do not destroy the planet. That is a life-long commitment. If there are problems with respect to attitudes in other countries, then I hope I discover what they are.

Q. I understand your reluctance to get too deeply into the matter of Korea, given less than 2 weeks in office. We do have, it seems, an extraordinary situation that has emerged in that country. Just this morning, the civilian government has resigned. There are widespread demonstrations and acts of violence taking place throughout the country, and many of the civilian leaders of various factions have been arrested.

Can the United States, in your opinion, continue to support a military regime in an exposed place like South Korea, which seems to have little support from any faction of the civilian populace or political spectrum over a considerable period of time.

A. As one of my professors in law school used to say, that is a very good question [laughter], and I don't mean to be facetious in responding to it. I think for me to say anything beyond what I have said this morning should be said not in a news conference but elsewhere. I have indicated that I am deeply concerned that the government there has moved away from liberalizing policies, that I would hope it would get back on track, and that in the meantime there ought to be, I would hope, restraint on the part of all elements, so that the situation might be kept under some kind of stability.

I realize that I could make a stronger statement than that, but I don't think it would be useful at this point. I would hope that the relatively low-key nature of my response is not interpreted as a lack of interest in dealing with the problem. I think your question is an appropriate one.

Press release 129.

[1] For text of the Secretary's statement at Worcester, see press release 127 of May 18, 1980. ■

Editor's Note

Documentation on Secretary Muskie's trip to Brussels and Vienna in mid-May will be published next month.

SECRETARY BROWN'S NEWS CONFERENCE, APR. 25, 1980 (12:15 PM)[2]

Secretary Brown. As you by now know, we ordered last night the cancellation of an operation in Iran that was underway to prepare for a rescue of our hostages. The President has already provided the general background, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I are prepared to add some more detail.

Let me say at the outset that we all can be proud of the brave men who undertook this mission. They conducted themselves with skill and courage. And we are filled with sorrow for the eight men who gave their lives trying to rescue their fellow Americans.

Let me give you a brief summary of events before we take your questions. On the late evening and early morning of April 24 and 25 (Iran time), approximately 90 U.S. military personnel, together with the air crews, embarked on an operation to prepare for a rescue of the U.S. citizens held hostage in Iran.

The eight helicopters and associated transport aircraft were en route to a remote landing site, 200 miles from Tehran in the Iranian desert, that was to be used for refueling. Depending on the success of that and other steps, a later decision was to have been made as to whether to proceed with the actual rescue attempt.

Because we knew the long, arduous trip would tax the capacity of the helicopters, we added redundancy to assure we could continue if some became unusable. Two of the helicopters experienced problems en route. One landed in the desert and its crew was picked up by another helicopter, which proceeded to the refueling point. The second helicopter had difficulties, reversed course, and landed aboard the carrier *Nimitz* in the Arabian Sea. Upon arrival at the desert landing site, a third helicopter experienced a severe hydraulic malfunction which put it out of commission. The operations plan provided for termination of the mission if there were less than six helicopters operational at this point. Therefore, we decided to call off the remainder of the operation and to extract all of the personnel.

As the aircraft were preparing to depart—and this of course was in complete darkness—a helicopter and a C–130 aircraft collided. Both immediately caught fire. Eight of our men were killed and four others suffered burns. To insure the safe evacuation of the rest of the party, the commander on the scene directed his men to leave the helicopters and depart on the remaining C–130s. This left behind the four functioning helicopters, the helicopter that had experienced hydraulic malfunction, and the burning wreckage of one helicopter and one C–130.

No Iranian military forces were encountered at any point during the mission. However, approximately 50 Iranian civilians, who were passing by in a bus at about the time the first C–130 landed, were detained at the site. When the decision was made to terminate the rescue effort, all the civilians were allowed to depart unharmed.

As you can see from this description, the mission was complex and difficult. But it was the judgment of the Joint Chiefs and myself that it was operationally feasible. This judgment was reached after a thorough assessment, which included many practice exercises. Our plan was carefully conceived and the training exhaustive. The plan provided for the possibility of terminating the operation because of any difficulties, such as mechanical failure or detection by the Iranians of the mission. The flight to the assembly point and the refueling had been carried out with essential success, but we concluded, based on established criteria thoroughly considered earlier, that the number of helicopter failures rendered the chance of subsequent success—reduced that chance—to the point that dictated ending the mission.

I think you can understand why we felt that we had to try this difficult operation. In our opinion it represented the best course of action for getting our hostages out of Iran expeditiously. And it was also the course that raised the least risk of harming the Iranian people and the least risk of causing instability in this troubled region.

We are disappointed that the mission failed, we're saddened at the loss of our eight fellow Americans. But let no one doubt our resolve, and let no one misunderstand the meaning of these events. We will not rest until we have secured the release of the hostages. I'll take your questions.

Q. The Ayatollah has just put out a statement saying that there are 10 Americans that were killed and that there are 10 that are still wandering the desert. Can you confirm or deny any of that?

Secretary Brown. Yes, I can deny it, and I do. You know, a number of statements have come out of there, and it's naturally a time of confusion. I have no knowledge of anything of the kind he's talking about.

Q. How could you have secured the release of the hostages without massive bloodshed, given the fact that there is an estimated 150 armed Iranian militants guarding the Embassy?

Secretary Brown. I am not going to go into the details of any parts of the mission, beyond the parts that were actually carried out. I will say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff thoroughly reviewed this; I reviewed it, and the team itself was convinced that that was the part of the mission of which they were most confident.

Q. Did you fly from Egypt and refuel in Bahrain on your way to this—

Secretary Brown. We are not going to say anything about other countries. None of the countries—no other government in the entire region was aware of or informed of the prospect of a rescue operation. We relied heavily on our carrier task force, and I am not going to go beyond that in saying what the operational details were.

Q. The U.S. troops were—the U.S. Army, Marines, what units?

Secretary Brown. The team included individuals from each of the four services in the Defense Department, and I don't want to go beyond that.

Q. Were they volunteers?

Secretary Brown. They all volunteered for the units that they were in.

Q. Can you explain the circumstances leading up to the collision? Was there any reason for extra urgency in getting off the ground?

Secretary Brown. I'll ask General Jones [Gen. David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] to comment on that. He and I have talked about it, but he has been in more direct contact.

General Jones. We are still examining—

Secretary Brown. What happened in the crash.

General Jones. —the details and what happened in the crash. It was complete darkness. They had night vision devices. But it was unfortunate on the lift-off, it appeared that the helicopter struck the C–130, and they were both engulfed in flames.

Q. What sort of helicopter was it?

Secretary Brown. These were RH–53s. They are actually—they are

with a problem which may last a long time or which might be resolved more rapidly. In addition to that, one has the obligation to consider alternative courses of action which might resolve this problem more promptly. The rescue operation which the President ordered undertaken was planned literally from the first week of the hostage seizure. We undertook it at a time when we thought it was opportune. We certainly intend to work peacefully, if possible, to resolve this problem.

Q. But hasn't the failure of that rescue mission effectively ended any prospect for early release of the hostages?

A. I would not draw that conclusion. I hope that it brings home to Tehran a very important message, which until a week ago the Iranians were inclined to discount, and the message is this: Do not scoff at American power, do not scoff at American reach. It is in Iran's interest to resolve this problem peacefully. It is our preference to resolve it peacefully.

Q. Do you think that the failure of the rescue mission and the angry reaction of the Iranians to that mission increases or decreases the prospects for use of military power on our part?

A. I cannot answer that question, because I do not know exactly how the balance of rationality versus irrationality plays out in Tehran. My hope is that there are enough Iranian leaders within the revolution which recognize now as a fact who are concerned about Iran's well-being and realize that a perpetuation of this situation is likely to produce conditions for Iran which might be disasterous for its national well-being.

Q. You speak of the support we're now receiving from our allies, but hardly anyone believes that economic sanctions are going to effect early release of the hostages. Wouldn't you agree with that?

A. I'm not sure whether everybody feels that way. Our allies have concluded that a somewhat different sequence in steps than we would have preferred is now to be applied—namely, political sanctions first followed by economic sanctions.

Our collective judgment is that this is the best way to bring home to the Iranians the reality that they live in a very vulnerable part of the world, to remind them that in the past they have been subject to foreign domination, particularly Russian Soviet, and they are therefore creating conditions which may end up being very painful to themselves.

Q. Are you saying in all of what you have said so far that we are going to attempt another type of military operation against Iran or an attempt to free the hostages, and, if so, how can we do that?

A. I'm weighing my words very carefully. I'm saying that we are pursuing a collective policy designed to bring home to the Iranian leaders, those who are responsible, the advantages of a peaceful solution, a peaceful resolution to an illegal, abhorrent act which the entire international community rejects. We reserve to ourselves the right to pursue every course of action open to us to redress a situation in which we are the victims of an illegal, indeed, of a belligerent act.

Q. But to do what? Let me say to you that Secretary Brown—Defense Secretary Brown—yesterday, in discussing this problem, said one of the reasons why you didn't mine the harbors or attempt the blockade was because that would internationalize the problem, perhaps widen it, and perhaps not have the desired effect. Has that changed today? Can you go back now to a blockade strategy?

A. I will not discuss specific options, because specific options depend in the utility or disutility on the particular circumstances in which they are applied. All I can say is that the United States has a political and a moral obligation to do what it can to redress this issue. We undertook the rescue operation, knowing full well that it was risky.

We calculated very precisely its chances of success. We felt they were sufficiently high to warrant this activity, because we had a moral obligation to help our people. We have the political obligation to try to bring this problem to an end if the Iranians, themselves, are not capable of reaching the requisite decision.

Q. We know that Secretary Vance had very grave doubts about this operation, and Secretary Brown had some also. What were they?

A. Everyone recognized that the operation was risky. We also know from history that there are moments in which a certain amount of risk has to be taken. We calculated very closely what the risks were. We knew that we were undertaking something which involved risk.

We also knew that the stakes involved were very high. After the full weighing of this, after many exercises, after many tests, after weeks of meticulous planning, after extensive discussions in the National Security Council, in which all of the President's advisers took part, the President took the right decision, took the courageous decision. And I believe that this is a decision which the American people support. I will say for myself that I am proud to have been associated with it, I'm proud of what we tried to do and particularly proud of the American men who volunteered to go and to do what was necessary to be done.

Q. Was it just bad luck that it failed? It was not a question of a bad plan?

A. I believe the plan was good. The plan was extremely complex because of the difficulties involved, the enormous distances involved. Some of the precautions taken by the other side had to be taken into account. In an operation of this sort, you always have luck on your side to some extent to succeed, and bad luck can abort a situation.

This situation was aborted initially without any loss of life. The loss of life, unfortunately took place during the evacuation process due to an air collision. These things happen sometimes. Yesterday's headlines spoke not only of eight American dead but of some 140 Englishmen dead who died in a plane crash in the Canary Islands. These things do happen.

Q. Our allies, as you well know, have been concerned from the start that we would take some sort of military action that would inflame the situation and escalate the risk of confrontation even more with Iran or the Soviet Union.

They now seem more concerned than ever after this rescue mission and its failure. If we do get to the point where we have to take—feel we have to take military action, would you inform the allies so there would not be this bad feeling again?

A. Let me differentiate, first of all, between a sustained military operation and a rescue operation which is necessarily of shorter duration—

Q. I'm thinking of the seeding of mines in Iranian harbors as a serious military action.

A. I think an action of a more sustained kind would be an action which would lend itself to advance consultation. Insofar as allied reactions are concerned, let me say this. Our initial judgments are

that public opinion abroad understands necessity for a rescue operation, and, indeed, some of our allies themselves had undertaken such rescue operations—the Germans did, the French did.

Secondly, the President has already received a number of extremely warm personal messages from his associates, the leaders of our principal allies indicating their close support and understanding for the action we took.

Q. You said that you would consult our allies in a sustained military operation, if that was something that the President contemplates. I assume you would also consult Congress.

A. Of course.

Q. In advance?

A. Of course.

Q. Let me ask you a question about the bodies that we asked earlier on. It is said now by the Ayatollah Beheshti that we have to pay a price, some sort of price to get the bodies back of our dead. Is that acceptable?

A. If that is true, it's another step down in the moral degradation of a country which has had actually a very impressive, occasionally glorious, tradition. In addition to trading hostages, if the Iranian authorities now begin to trade in bodies, I think it is an indication of the depth to which they have sunk, and this will further contribute to their international condemnation and isolation.

Q. But, in fact, I take it there is nothing we could do about it, or would we be willing to do something if they asked for a price?

A. Your questions keep pointing to the fundamental dilemma we face—namely, that a group of terrorists, apparently with some complicity of the government, are holding our fellow countrymen. Our efforts over the last few months have been designed to obtain their release. These efforts will persist. We'll use whatever is necessary to obtain their release. I believe we have demonstrated last week how determined we are and how far we can reach.

Q. Is the answer to my question no?

A. This applies to the bodies. Obviously we cannot get the bodies out any more easily than the hostages.

Q. Would we pay a price for them?

A. We're not in the body-buying business. We are willing to do what is necessary through intermediaries or directly to obtain a dignified and humane resolution of the body issue if that is a new issue which the Iranians wish to create. I find it, simply as a human being, from a moral point of view, degrading to think that anyone would do that. Traditionally, even enemies return the bodies of warriors. I hope we don't embark on excessive speculation on the subject until we know for a fact that this degrading reality confronts us.

Q. If we can return to the question of our allies' concern that the situation in the whole Persian Gulf area is getting out of hand, and that we may, indeed, be heading toward a very serious confrontation with the Soviet Union, will our decision on whether or not to take any military action—will it be based on a very careful appraisal of how the Soviets might react to this?

A. I think it's important to look at the situation in the region in a wider perspective. We're dealing not only with the hostage issue in Iran, we're dealing with the progressive disintegration of Iran as a political entity. The country is polarized and to some extent increasingly radicalized. At the same time, the Soviets are in the process of occupying Afghanistan.

We are dealing, therefore, with a significant expansion of Soviet power southward. This does pose, potentially, a significant danger to the Persian Gulf region, a region of vital interest to Western Europe and to Japan and to us. This is why there is a wider dimension, a strategic dimension to this problem.

Q. There are many who think it also poses a very significant danger to us and even Barry Goldwater, this past week, who has been one of the leading hawks in Congress over the week—over the years—said that he fears we are being pulled toward a confrontation with Russia and a war for which we are not prepared.

A. I think it's important to remember that since World War II there first emerged the central strategic zone of Western Europe. The second central strategic zone for us was the Far East. In both places we have permanently stationed American forces. The third central strategic zone is southwest Asia, the Persian Gulf. There are no forces there. Iran, Turkey, to some extent Pakistan, Afghanistan as a buffer, were the protective shield. That shield is now being pierced. As a consequence, our friends in the region and our vital interest in this third central strategic zone are beginning to be threatened. This is why this is becoming a strategic problem.

Q. You say there are no forces today in the Persian Gulf area. Isn't that the whole nub of the problem that we may be moving toward a war for which we simply are not prepared?

A. First of all, it is not true to say that there are no American forces in the area. We have taken, under the President's leadership in the course of the last several months, deliberate steps to augment our military presence. We now have two aircraft carrier task forces in the area with considerable air punch. We are developing a search capability so that we

EC Invokes Sanctions Against Iran

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, APR. 23, 1980[1]

We welcome the EC Nine Foreign Ministers' decision [on April 22] to support our efforts to free the hostages by invoking the sanctions against Iran embodied in the U.N. Security Council resolution, vetoed by the Soviet Union last January.

Some of the European Community member states will require legislation to give effect to sanctions, and they have undertaken to obtain that legislation by May 17. We are hopeful that the necessary legislation will be promptly enacted so that the nations will be able to carry out their commitments to impose sanctions unless decisive progress has been made toward releasing the hostages, which we assume means release from Iranian control.

In the meantime, diplomatic staffs will be reduced, and visas will be required for Iranians traveling to EC countries. Military sales will be banned. We are awaiting the necessary parliamentary action as we give great importance to the joint action of all the European Community countries in this effort.

I just might add to that that this action by the European Community does underscore to the Iranians the extent to which continuing to hold the hostages isolates them in world opinion.

[1] Read to news correspondents by White House press secretary Jody Powell (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Apr. 28, 1980).■

follow-on activity, we would hope that the agency would give special emphasis to its recommendations of particular interest to the developing world.

Conclusion

In examining potential proliferation risks which arise from various approaches to nuclear power, the INFCE reports dealt extensively with possible measures to reduce such risks. It was generally found that a combination of new safeguards, technical, and institutional measures, such as multinational ventures, constitute a promising approach.

It will take major efforts by many nations to implement such measures by the time they are needed to deal adequately with the proliferation risks which are inherent in such sensitive facilities as reprocessing and enrichment plants. We hope such efforts will get underway promptly. We have for too long contented ourselves with merely talking about them.

Finally, INFCE has also formulated a number of important recommendations in the area of nuclear supply that should be given great weight in future governmental decisions. INFCE recognized in a variety of ways that a country pursuing a nuclear power program needs to be able to plan ahead with confidence regarding, for example, reactor fuel supply and disposition of spent fuel.

We all agree that it will be crucial to preserve a high degree of confidence and stability in nuclear supply relations if nuclear power is to remain a viable energy option and if the premature spread of sensitive facilities is to be avoided. Pointed observations may be found in the working reports about the need for greater predictability in nonproliferation conditions and the prejudicial results of abrupt or unilateral changes in supply conditions.

On the other hand, the reports recognize that suppliers cannot be expected to freeze their policies or to ignore situations that might seriously aggravate efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The call in the reports for a greater degree of confidence and predictability in the terms of nuclear trade presents us with a major challenge. The United States believes that this goal is achievable, and we intend to devote our energies and ingenuity to meeting this challenge in the immediate future. ■

Security Assistance Programs—Promoting U.S. Interests

by Matthew Nimetz

Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 27, 1980. Mr. Nimetz is Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.[1]

In his appearance before the full Committee on Foreign Affairs February 5, Secretary Vance described how security assistance programs promote U.S. foreign policy, national security, and development objectives. He observed that now, perhaps more than ever, active leadership by the United States requires that we support our words with resources.

We have taken concrete steps to accomplish this end. The President has recommended an increase in our defense budget to insure that our military forces are sufficient to meet the challenges we face. Complementing our defense programs are our foreign assistance programs, a major component of which is designed to promote U.S. security by helping our allies and friends strengthen their defenses and preserve the independence.

Both of these efforts—strengthening our own military capabilities and enhancing the capacity of our friends to defend themselves—must go hand in hand. Our friends and allies depend upon the United States to maintain a stable strategic balance. The steps we are taking to improve our strategic forces will insure that the balance is maintained.

Moreover, the force improvements underway with our NATO allies—both in theater nuclear and conventional capabilities—will assure that there is no imbalance in that critical part of the world. And, we are also moving to increase our capabilities to project our forces to other vitally important regions to improve our capacity to react promptly and effectively in crises situations.

A sound national security policy must be built upon a willingness and ability to protect and further our vital interests. It is also clear that we share mutual security interests with our friends and allies and that we must work with them in defense of those interests. A policy which concentrates solely on our own military capabilities and fails to take into account the legitimate security needs of our friends would be more than foolish; it would be dangerous. For not only do our security assistance programs help other nations defend themselves, and thus maintain local military balances, but they also constitute a tangible sign of the U.S. commitment to their continued independence. In this way, these programs provide the best available insurance that conflict and confrontation can be avoided.

In noting that we cannot fulfill our leadership role without adequate resources, the Secretary also stressed that the requests we are presenting are admittedly austere and were prepared with full regard for their budgetary impact. He noted in this regard, however, that we intend to keep these levels and their allocations under continuing review to insure that they are adequate in view of the challenges with which we must deal. In the last few weeks, we have been examining the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan for our own national interests and for the security of our friends. In addition, as you are aware, we have been consulting with various governments in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean region, as well as with our allies and friends in other regions, regarding cooperative responses to threats to the area. As a result, it is possible that we will be coming to you with additional requests to respond to these challenges or to meet especially pressing needs elsewhere. In any event, I assure you that we will not hestitate to request the resources we believe necessary to the tasks at hand.

The Administration's proposed FY 1981 foreign assistance legislation is now before you, and I should like to summarize the individual security assistance programs we are proposing for FY 1981. Later, I will discuss several of the more important substantive revisions we are proposing in legislation governing these programs.

Since the Department's regional Assistant Secretaries are appearing before appropriate subcommittees to address our various country requests, I propose this morning to examine the overall scope and purposes of our requests on a program-by-program basis.

For FY 1981, the Administration is requesting authorizations of appropriations of $2.98 billion to finance security assistance programs totaling $5.1 billion. As in past years, our FY 1981 request will provide funding for five major programs: foreign military sales (FMS) financing, the grant military assistance program (MAP), the economic support fund (ESF), peacekeeping operations, and the international military education and training (IMET) program.

FMS Financing

We assist friendly countries to meet their legitimate defense needs through the foreign military sales financing program by providing credits and loan repayment guaranties to enable eligible foreign governments to purchase defense articles and services, including training. In this way, FMS financing has facilitated the gradual transition from the military assistance program (MAP) as increasing numbers of nations become able to purchase military equipment and training when appropriate financing is available.

For FY 1981, we are requesting an appropriation of $734 million to fund a total FMS financing program of $2,840 million. Of the $734 million in appropriations, $500 million is intended for direct FMS credits for Israel, of which repayment would be forgiven. The remaining $234 million will be used to guarantee loans totaling $2,340 million to 35 countries, including $700 million for Israel.

Approximately 62% of the FMS financing program is for Israel and Egypt, both to finance needed defense purchases and to support our efforts to secure a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement.

Over the years, FMS has constituted the major source of U.S. security assistance which has allowed Israel to maintain a military capability adequate to meet the threat to its security. The FY 1981 FMS financing program, totaling $1.2 billion, will enable Israel to continue to fund its priority military requirements for air defense, armored vehicles, artillery, missiles, and ammunition. Of this amount, $200 million would be available only for sales related to relocation from the Sinai.

For Egypt, the proposed FMS financing program of $550 million will assist that country in maintaining and modernizing its existing military forces. It will also enable Egypt to continue its efforts to fill the gap left by the break in its earlier military supply relationship with the Soviet Union, terminated 6 years ago.

The third largest FMS program—totaling $250 million—is for Turkey. Turkey has great need of assistance to maintain its defense capabilities in support of NATO.

Other major FMS financing programs include $180 million for Greece, $175 million for Korea, $120 million for Spain, and $50 million each for Thailand, Jordan, and the Philippines.

In examining the FMS financing program, it is important to note that this is a loan program, with obligations being repaid as new financing is extended. In FY 1981, we anticipate receiving $1.59 billion in principal and interest from prior year loans. It is also important to recall that, except for the $500 million credit I have mentioned for Israel, all FMS appropriations are used as a guaranty reserve to support FMS-guaranteed loans from the Federal Financing Bank (FFB), with $1 in FMS appropriations being used to guarantee $10 in FFB loans. Since these loans are eventually paid back with interest at the cost of money to the U.S. Government, currently 11-3/8%, they result in no net cost to the taxpayer over the long run. I think you will agree few government programs can boast such an enviable attribute.

Military Assistance Program

Under the military assistance program (MAP) we provide defense articles and services to eligible countries on a grant basis. For FY 1981 we are proposing grant materiel programs for only three countries—Portugal, Spain, and the Philippines. We have important military bases and facilities in all three, and in the case of Spain and the Philippines, program levels result directly from negotiated agreements. The $105 million requested for FY 1981 will fund grant materiel and services programs totaling $79.6 million and, in conjunction with reimbursements, finance $56 million of program management expenses and delivery expenses for previously funded MAP materiel.

Economic Support Fund

The economic support fund (ESF) is used to provide economic assistance—in the form of loans or grants—to selected countries of special political and security interest to us. It serves to support U.S. foreign policy interests in political and economic stability in a number of regions. ESF can finance commodity import programs, economic infrastructure projects, or provide general budget support, in addition to funding projects that meet basic human needs in areas such as agriculture, health, family planning, and education.

We are requesting $50 million in unallocated ESF funds for use in meeting unforeseen developments where small amounts of ESF assistance can support important foreign policy interests. The need for such funds is clear. In recent years, we have had to rely on supplementals or reprograming from current programs to respond to developments unanticipated at the time of our budget request. Neither we nor the Congress believe supplementals to be desirable to meet unexpected emergencies. Supplemental requests, however small, are time consuming and consequently lessen the political and economic impact of our assistance. Reprograming is also a cumbersome device, which has the disadvantage of requiring the sacrifice of one important interest or policy goal—recognized by the executive and legislative branches alike—in order to satisfy another.

I can assure you that these unallocated funds will be used only to meet unanticipated, priority needs. They will not be used simply to fund programs beyond levels set by the Congress. All uses of these funds would be notified in advance to the Congress, in accordance with standard reprograming procedures.

For FY 1981, we are requesting an ESF program totaling $2,080.5 million. Of this amount $1,268.5 million will be for grant assistance and $812 million for loans. Over 70% of our ESF request is allocated for Israel and Egypt. As with FMS financing, the third largest ESF program, totaling $200 million, is for Turkey. This amount, together with amounts provided by other countries, will help Turkey to meet its critical balance-of-payments problems. Other major features of our request include $90 million for a southern Africa regional program to improve the prospects for reconstruction and peaceful growth following the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia peace settlement; $50 million for Sudan for balance-of-payments support; $50 million for Jordan for the Maqarin Dam; $30 million for the Philippines where we have important military facilities; and $25 million for Nicaragua for assistance in recovering from the ravages of civil strife.

by Canada would not be effective, that we wanted to act as part of a team.

Q. A large team, I think it was.

Secretary MacGuigan. Why don't you read my statement of yesterday?

Q. The Energy Minister, Marc Lalonde, said that there is no way we'll be able to build the prebuilt section of the Alaska gas pipeline and sell to the United States the gas that we have a great amount of until he gets "an iron-clad agreement" from the Americans that they'll go ahead with the top half, or the source half, of the pipeline. Did you give him that agreement?

Secretary MacGuigan. No, we're still working on the problem. Our commitment to bringing about the existence of the agreement remains as firm as ever, but I could give no commitment at this time that the funds could be raised.

Q. Canada and the Western Europeans now seem to have set May 17 as the deadline for some action on the part of the Iranians. Does the United States now accept that specific date as the date after which some further escalation of U.S. action will be started?

Q. Secretary Vance. No, we accept that as the date by which our European allies have indicated that they will act and by which we would expect that they will act.

Q. I'd like to ask either one of you if you could think of three things that happened today that might not put the Canadian or American public to sleep. I'm serious. I'm sure some very interesting things happened today, but I haven't noticed that they've emerged at this press conference, and I just wondered if either one of you could think of three important things that happened on either one of your behalfs today?

Secretary MacGuigan. I think that the most important happening today is the degree of consultation we've had. We have complained publicly from time to time, as you know, of a lack of consultation. I want to say publicly as well that this is a general problem in the Western alliance and not just something that the Americans can have attributed to them.

Today we had a very full discussion, but we're not finished yet. We've had a very full discussion of the issues, both bilateral and multilateral, and some issues such as Afghanistan and Iran and their consequences. We have canvassed at very great length. I think that this kind of exchange of views is of extreme importance so that we understand each other's point of view and what decisions or what possibilities lie before both of us.

With respect to bilateral issues, I might say that we have found the Secretary of State and his team most responsive on all issues, except perhaps the one we were discussing with respect to the Law of the Sea where there is a real collision of national interests which does not seem resolvable with respect to nickel production from the seabeds.

With respect to all the other issues I can recall at the moment, we had if not a meeting of minds as to the ultimate content at least a meeting of minds as to the procedures to be followed in dealing with that problem.

We have the assurance, and this is very important I think, from the U.S. Administration that they would give great priority to the approval by the Senate of the East Coast fisheries agreement which our two countries signed last year.

It seems to me, all of these things are very important achievements for the day.

Secretary Vance. Let me simply add to that that I agree on what has been said with respect to bilateral relations. In the international field we discussed three of the most important issues that exist—namely, Iran, Afghanistan, and Southwest Asia, the steps taken and to be taken in each of these cases—and, in addition to that, the situation in the Middle East and the prospects for the future in that area, including the prospects in the autonomy negotiations which, as you know, have a target date set of May 26 for completion.

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[1]Press release 99 of Apr. 24, 1980. ■

Procedures for Sale of Military Support Items to the P.R.C.

by Richard C. Holbrooke

Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 1, 1980. Mr. Holbrooke is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.[1]

I am pleased to appear here today to discuss U.S. policy and procedures for handling the sale of military support equipment to the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). With me today are Dr. Gerald Dinneen, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and Mr. William Robinson, the Director of the Office of Munitions Control in the Department of State. I know that the committee is interested in how the *Munitions Control Newsletter* on China was developed, how individual cases may be processed, and how the Congress will relate to that process. But before addressing these issues, I would like to offer some perspective on how the sale of support equipment to the P.R.C. fits into the wider framework of our China policy.

First, there has always been a security dimension to our relationship with China. Since Henry Kissinger's first trip to Peking in July 1971, security issues have been a feature of our dialogue with the P.R.C. Indeed, the strategic basis for reconciliation between China and the United States after a generation of estrangement was our shared interest in a global equilibrium. In the frequent high-level consultations with China which developed, we discussed on a wide range of international issues—seeking to limit disagreements where our interests diverged; promoting parallel policies where our interests converged.

Second, it is apparent that our security depends not only on our own power, but upon the global equilibrium of forces in which China plays an important role. We have—as we have stated publicly—a stake in a strong, secure, and friendly China. For its part China has an interest in a powerful and resolute United States maintaining strong alliances in Europe and Asia. Since we no longer regard each other as adversaries, we need no longer organize and deploy our forces in the expectation of conflict with each other. This is a matter of real significance to the security of both our peoples and to the East Asia region. It permits us to concentrate our resources on the real challenges we each face.

Third, with the normalization of our relations with China some 15 months ago, the scope and the quality of our bilateral cooperation has expanded dramatically. Recognizing that China's contribution to regional and global stability will be shaped by the success of its efforts to modernize its agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense; we have moved to provide some support for its attempts to achieve these well-known four modernizations. It was in the context that Secretary [of Defense Harold] Brown visited China in January. While in Beijing, Dr. Brown sought to broaden our strategic dialogue with China—adding an arms control strand to it—and laid the basis for further exchanges between our respective defense establishments. At the same time he made clear our willingness to countenance some transfers of technology to China that we would not approve for the Soviet Union. Finally, he indicated that we would be prepared to consider on a case-by-case basis sales of some military support equipment to China.

Fourth, these decisions do not foreshadow a U.S.-China alliance. Neither we nor the Chinese seek such an alliance. Nor do we anticipate any joint Sino-U.S. military planning. And we have no plans to sell arms to China.

Fifth, China's defense establishment is large but relatively backward. While China has sought some foreign assistance in improving its defenses, military modernization enjoys the lowest priority among the four modernizations. To the best of our knowledge, the many military missions China has sent abroad in recent years have concluded few major acquisitions of foreign equipment. We believe this reflects China's limited foreign exchange reserves and also China's interest in occuring technology rather than hardware.

Sixth, having indicated a willingness to sell certain types of military support equipment to China, we faced the need to define with some greater precision those types of equipment for which export licenses might be granted. Secretary Brown had mentioned trucks, certain types of radar, and communications equipment as illustrative of what we had in mind. But this did not furnish sufficient guidance regarding U.S. intentions to the Congress, the public, foreign governments, or U.S. industry.

Categories of Items

We have clarified our intentions in terms of categories on the U.S. Munitions List. These categories are familiar to U.S. business and readily comprehensible to others. They deal in general types of equipment rather than in specific models and so give us a degree of flexibility in making decisions on individual export requests. At the same time we were able to make clear, by the categories we excluded, the general criteria that were used in making this decision.

The equipment and technology we would be prepared to consider for sale to China:

- Must not be combat arms or ammunition, including vehicles and craft designed as platforms for combat arms such as warplanes and tanks;
- Must be items we would be prepared to sell to all our friends; and
- Must not contribute to chemical, radiological, bacteriological, nuclear, or missile programs.

This review left us with a list of equipment used largely for supply, maintenance, training, and communications. These are the items in the recently published *Munitions Control Newsletter.*

Export Control Process

Let me now outline briefly for you the export control process through which applications to sell military equipment to China will be addressed.

The Arms Export and Control Act authorizes the President to designate those articles which shall be considered arms, ammunition, and implements of war and to control their import and export in furtherance of world peace and U.S. foreign policy. The President has delegated this authority, through the Secretary of State and the director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, to the director of that bureau's Office of Munitions Control. Those articles so designated appear on the U.S. Munitions List, which forms part of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), Title 22 of the Code of Federal regulations. The Office of Munitions Control is responsible for authorizing commercial exports of Munitions List articles.

The Department of State, with the concurrence of the Department of Defense, decides which articles constitute arms, ammunition, and implements of war for export control purposes. The Department of State also consults with the Departments of Defense and Commerce to determine whether State or Commerce should have commodity jurisdiction over articles with both military and civil uses.

The Office of Munitions Control receives applications to export U.S. Munitions List articles via commercial channels. The office initially examines each application to determine whether:

- The article proposed for export is on the Munitions List;
- The article is excluded by U.S. Government policy from export;
- The article is excluded by U.S. Government policy from being exported to the intended destination;
- The application requires the views of other Department of State offices and other government agencies; and
- Other considerations reflected in the application are germane to approval or disapproval of an export authorization.

The Munitions Control office then judges each application based on various applicable statutes; the ITAR; U.S. foreign policy; precedents; technical views, whether a particular export is in the overall interest of the United States and other factors.

On security and technical matters, the Munitions Control office may seek the views of various agencies of the Department of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and other agencies. In matters concerning U.S. foreign policy, the office may request the views of regional and functional bureaus in the Department of State and of other agencies. Export license requests to China will likely involve all the above agencies on a regular basis.

As you see, we would consider each export license request involving China individually on its merits. In general terms, our consideration will bear in mind our national security and that of our allies. Specific considerations, in addition to the points I made earlier, will include the level of technology involved, the likely end-use, and how it would fit into China's current military posture. The legislated limit on the size of commercial military equipment exports, as set forth in the Arms Export Control Act, will, of course, also figure in any decision. Before export authorization is approved, we will require the usual assurances concerning transfers of U.S. equipment to third parties. Our

as modern tanks. For this reason the NATO allies took an historic decision last December to develop long-range nuclear forces and to proceed with the modernization program. The Soviet Navy has grown from a coastal defense force into a formidable fleet capable of worldwide operations.

This buildup in Soviet military forces has been accompanied by a lessening of restraints in the Kremlin with respect to the use of this military power. The U.S.S.R. has stockpiled weapons in large numbers and has shown little restraint in recent years in sending arms abroad, along with advisers and surrogate forces, with the effect that whole regions like the Horn of Africa and Southeast Asia have been destabilized. In the past year we witnessed Vietnamese troops, with extensive Soviet support, invade the nonaligned state of Kampuchea where they sentenced the existing rulers to death *in absentia*, installed a puppet government, drove hundreds of thousands of refugees into neighboring Thailand, and then positioned themselves to threaten and pressure Thailand, a longtime friend of the United States.

The Afghan invasion followed a similar pattern. This time Soviet forces themselves invaded the nonaligned state of Afghanistan, executed the existing ruler, installed a puppet government, forced hundreds of thousands of refugees into neighboring Pakistan, and are positioning themselves to threaten and pressure Pakistan, a longtime friend of the United States, as well as other countries in the region.

In both the Kampuchean and Afghan situations, Soviet power has been used to enter a relatively weak, nonaligned, buffer state, with the result that strong Vietnamese and Soviet forces are now deployed right up against the border of a traditional friend of the United States. The West bears not only the humanitarian burden of the refugees but must face new security problems for its friends. These two invasions are a clear lesson to the world about the dangerous situation we are all in.

It is noteworthy that both victims —Kampuchea and Afghanistan—were nonaligned countries. Although it is not fashionable in many parts of the world to be "aligned" these days, it is instructive that the Soviets have not chosen to attack our allies but rather to direct their forces against weak nonaligned countries with vaguely Marxist governments.

I believe these two invasions will cause many around the world to reassess the bases of their security. It seems clear to me that the experience of the recent past justifies the years of effort we and other free nations have put into our Western alliances and into the development of close defense relationships.

The U.S. response to the Afghan invasion has been prompt and decisive. I will not go into the catalog of steps that have been taken:

- The President's unmistakable warning about our vital interests in the Persian Gulf;
- Increase in our defense budget;
- Restrictions on sales of grain, fertilizer, and high technology items to the Soviet Union;
- Redeployment of forces to the Indian Ocean;
- Accelerated development of a rapid deployment force and discussions with several nations about access to facilities on and near the Indian Ocean;
- Suspension of scientific and other exchanges and the boycott of the Moscow Olympics; and
- Coordination with our allies and others on political and economic support for our efforts.

We welcome the decisions of the U.N. General Assembly and the Islamic conference; we welcome the strong opposition to the Afghan invasion among Third World nations and the growing isolation of Soviet surrogates such as Cuba. I believe this trend will continue as the world watches the bravery of Afghan resistance forces fighting for their freedom of their country and the right to worship in their religion.

Curbing Soviet Military Power

The critical factor in curbing Soviet military power, in my opinion, is not what we do now but whether we are prepared to be firm and principled during the next decade. An increase in the defense budget does not result in deliveries of hardware this year—but it does lead to the development of needed weapon systems for the late 1980s. An effective rapid deployment force is not created in a month or a year. Thus, a serious defense program involves a long-term commitment, both for us and our allies. It requires attention to strategic systems like the MX and cruise missiles, theater systems like those NATO is developing for Europe, a strong Navy capable of worldwide action, and adequate conventional forces to meet a variety of contingencies. It involves new weapon systems, but just as important less glamorous investment in maintenance, spare parts, training, and readiness. This is why I put such a premium on a sustained and coherent approach to meeting the Soviet military challenge.

Just as important as a strengthened defense program is the need to pursue a credible international diplomatic initiative that is consistent in approach and steadfast in purpose. Whatever threat we face, the United States is in the long term relatively invulnerable except to an all-out nuclear attack. Other nations, however, are much more vulnerable to subversion, threats, limited attacks, economic sanctions, and regional instability.

Friends abroad who put their trust in us are entitled to know that we will stand by them. They need assurances about their own security and about the extent of our commitment to help them. Adversaries abroad also act more rationally, and thus less dangerously, when they see clearly that U.S. policies are articulated coherently and consistently.

For these reasons, it is of paramount importance that friends and adversaries abroad take note that the

Canada, F.R.G. to Boycott Olympic Games

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, APR. 23, 1980[1]

We welcome the decisions of the Canadian and West German Governments over the past 24 hours on the issue of nonparticipation in the Moscow games. Both governments have asked their national Olympic associations not to send teams to Moscow. This reflects their recognition that, given the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Moscow remains wholly inappropriate as a site for the Summer Olympics.

We also welcome the Canadian call for a worldwide boycott, and we are hopeful that other nations of the world will heed this call and keep their teams home this summer.

[1] Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston. ■

executive branch and the Congress are working together harmoniously, that the vast majority of Americans support our firm policies, that our President has authority to make decisions and to execute them, and that this country is prepared to back its commitments with adequate resources in the critical decades to come.

Conclusion

I believe we now have achieved a national consensus in this country that can serve as the basis for a serious foreign policy for the coming decade. That foreign policy is based on several factors:

- National strength—military and economic—that assures our security and that of our allies;
- An acceptance of our responsibility to provide leadership to the Western world in meeting a common threat;
- Recognition of the fact that our leadership role requires that we engage ourselves actively in solving international problems, not as the world's day-to-day policeman but as a serious and permanent participant in a common effort to maintain the peace, assist our friends, and preserve our vital interests;
- A willingness to meet the ideological challenge of the left by making explicit our Western values and seeking improvements in the observance of basic human rights around the world; and
- By insisting that the principles of the U.N. Charter be observed and that there be no compromise with aggression.

But this is not all: We are not committed to a cold war with the Soviet Union. We are willing to engage in arms control negotiations to preserve the peace and maintain the military balance; we have an interest for greater cooperation with the Soviet Union because we recognize that, living on the same planet, it is in everyone's interest to work out our problems peacefully. But given the events of the recent past, it is the responsibility of the Soviet Union to demonstrate, clearly and convincingly, that it wants cooperation with us based on the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations, that it is prepared to demonstrate self-restraint and respect for our interests, so that mutual confidence and a relaxation of tension can develop.

While we wait for the Soviet leadership to demonstrate such an intent, we should be prepared to be patient, pursuing the long-term strategy—to which I alluded earlier—of strengthening the West and engaging the Third World in common pursuits. We may have to wait a decade or more, but what better alternative do we have, given my premise that time is on our side—so long as we use it wisely. ■

Refugee Admissions and Resettlement

by Secretary Vance

Statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 17, 1980.[1]

I am pleased to have this opportunity to consult with you, in accordance with the Refugee Act of 1980, on our plans for refugee admissions and resettlement assistance for FY 1980.

The Administration has long shared the views of this committee that a uniform, coherent, manageable policy governing refugee admissions to this country is necessary. The Refugee Act of 1980 represents a cooperative effort by the Congress and the Administration to establish the legal framework for such a policy. It is an accomplishment of which we all may be justly proud.

At the same time, the Refugee Act of 1980 is the beginning of the long and challenging task of formulating a more comprehensive and equitable basis for our refugee programs. We look forward to continuing to work closely with you in implementing the act.

I would like first to discuss with you briefly this morning our basic approach to the growing refugee problem, and then to address the major considerations which underlie our proposed FY 1980 refugee admissions.

U.S. Approach

Let me begin with a few words about our overall approach to refugee problems. Through an active diplomacy, through economic and security assistance programs, through practical support for human rights progress, we shall persist in our efforts to resolve the conflicts and ameliorate the underlying conditions that give rise to large numbers of refugees. At the same time, it is both in our national character and in our national interest to respond compassionately and sensibly to a mounting refugee problem.

Events around the world in the past few months vividly illustrate the magnitude and the complexity of the refugee problem confronting the international community. From Kampuchea, from Afghanistan, from Ethiopia, from many other countries, refugees totaling in the millions have fled their homes in the face of external aggression, political and religious persecution, and civil strife. They constitute a vast sea of uprooted, homeless, aggrieved people. We cannot be blind to their suffering, or to the consequences for stability and peace if we leave them to languish without hope.

In nearly every instance, an enormous burden has fallen on countries of first asylum—a burden most have borne with extraordinary compassion and generosity. But it would be unrealistic and unwise to expect that these nations can bear this burden alone. International efforts are essential, both to alleviate human suffering on a massive scale and to lessen the unsettling political, economic, and social tensions that large refugee populations can create for first-asylum countries.

Our initial objective in responding to specific refugee situations has been to join in international efforts to provide relief to the refugees in place—that is, in the countries of first asylum—and to promote voluntary repatriation of refugees where possible. Many nations have contributed generously—through the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and in other ways. The United States has been in the forefront among contributors to these international relief efforts. Often, the leadership of the United States has been instrumental in generating the broad international response these situations require.

In some cases, however, resettlement of refugees is a practical necessity. Last spring, for example, thousands of Indochinese fled their homes—by sea and by land—only to be turned back by neighboring countries already overwhelmed by large refugee populations.

the big helicopters. These are designed primarily for mine sweeping, but they have been adapted for special operations of this kind.

Q. Were there civilians or non-Americans?

Secretary Brown. This team that I am talking about was a Defense Department team, from all the services.

Q. Why did you call it so close? It seems to be close, 25% error, and then you had to cancel the mission. Why weren't more helicopters put into this?

Secretary Brown. We had carried out the exercise in practice in the United States in similar or as near-similar terrain and circumstances as we could arrange, and had succeeded in having the helicopters operate properly. We believed that we could get by with six. And we could have gotten by with six. Originally, we were planning to start with seven as a spare, with one spare. Because we recognized that operationally this was the most difficult part of the mission, this particular component, the one that was going to be stressed the most, we added an eighth helicopter before we went ahead. That was really quite considerable spares.

It is difficult to get helicopters out there without revealing what was going on, and that was one limit. Even if we had more helicopters, I think at some point adding them just adds to the possibility of additional difficulty. I think—you know, in retrospect, one can, of course, speculate what would have happened if there were more.

Q. Were the helicopters flown in all the way on their own? Or were they carried in fixed-wing aircraft, and did they come from the aircraft carriers or from ground bases?

Secretary Brown. The helicopters flew from the carrier, and they had been carried into the area on shipboard.

Q. What carrier, the *Nimitz* again?

Secretary Brown. They were aboard the *Nimitz*.

Q. Who was the officer in charge of preparing and checking for mechanical malfunction on the helicopters? As I understand it, you had eight helicopters and three of them malfunctioned.

Secretary Brown. No, I said three of them were not functioning after the refueling at the rendezvous point.

Q. Who was responsible for preparing—

Secretary Brown. I'll take responsibility within the Defense Department. We will—you know, we are examining what happened in detail. This operation was just terminated yesterday, and it is going to be thoroughly and exhaustively considered. I'm not looking for goats.

Q. Could you give us some hours? What time did this happen? Either our time or their time? And were the C–130s equipped with the fuel to refuel, and did the C–130s have the soldiers on them?

Secretary Brown. Well, the question—there are several questions. We're asked about the timing of this. The helicopters went and the C–130s went across the—entered the Iranian air space shortly after dark. The decision to terminate the mission was made at about a quarter to five, our time. There is a 9½ hour difference, and you can figure out what that adds up to—about 3:15, I guess.

Q. How long were they on the ground?

Secretary Brown. My recollection is that they were on the ground 3 hours all together.

Q. Does this failure rule out any further American military effort?

Secretary Brown. We're not going to rule out, you know, we're not going to rule out any options any more than we did before. We're going to do everything we possibly can to release the hostages, and we continue to believe that a peaceful solution is the best solution. We had hoped, of course, that we could do this with minimum force.

Q. Were the Soviets informed of this, either before, during, or immediately after the operation?

Secretary Brown. We informed a broad spectrum of countries immediately after the operation. Actually, it happened after we had extracted our forces, because no one in Iran knew that our forces had been there until after they had been extracted. But we then communicated the facts and indicated that this was a rescue operation and not a military action.

Q. How was the final rescue supposed to be effected?

Secretary Brown. I've said I will not talk about elements of the operation beyond those that were actually carried out.

Q. Could you tell us when the decision was made to go ahead with the operation?

Secretary Brown. The decision to proceed with this sort of an operation—that is, to prepare for a rescue including movement of forces, movement of aircraft, and so on—was made 2 weeks ago. But the actual decision to effect a rescue would not have been made until today.

Q. Why was this operation undertaken at this time when it, in effect, "pulled the rug out" from the effort to get allied sanctions? Can you identify the dead men?

Secretary Brown. We will identify the dead after their next-of-kin have been notified, and not before. We expect that will happen today, and then we will make identification.

Why did we go ahead now? All diplomatic efforts so far had failed, and this had been going on for 6 months. There was no reason to believe that the hostages would be released at any time in the foreseeable future. Various times had been mentioned you will recall—May, June, July, the end of the year, and indefinite. There was a danger posed to the hostages by the deteriorating security situation in Iran. There clearly is armed conflict across the border between Iran and Iraq, for example. There is, as those of you who have watched television lately are aware, considerable disorder in the streets of Iran.

We have considered, as you know, such things as interrupting commerce militarily. There are obvious complications with that. It further internationalizes the conflict, widens it, and might or might not have the desired effect. The crisis has been heightening tensions in what is already a volatile and vital region. There is a need to resolve that crisis. We need to remove a situation that complicates relationships among friends and allies. And the President and his senior Defense advisers—military and civilian—concluded that the rescue operation was a sound and feasible plan. We have considerable concern for the physical and psychological effects on the hostages of prolonged captivity.

All these are reasons for going ahead. The question is, why didn't we wait awhile? And the answer to that is largely operational. As time goes on in the region, temperature—physical temperature, that is—rises. The operations get more difficult; the nights get shorter. And all of that made it necessary to move relatively quickly if we were going to move at all during the next many months.

I want to say again that the courage and dedication of the members of this team really deserve, and I know will get, the support and the gratitude of all Americans. They trained well; they were professional; and they are dedicated.

Q. You said the decision to move airplanes and troops forward and prepare for rescue was made 2 weeks ago?

Secretary Brown. Essentially, the decision that we would make a serious attempt to prepare for rescue was made about then.

Q. Did that decision at that time include the date that you might undertake the rescue?

Secretary Brown. That was going to depend upon weather; it was going to depend upon how fast we could move things. You know, there was an earliest date but not a firm date.

Q. You talked about exercising, planning, and preparing for this in desert conditions and such, and yet you've only had 2 weeks. Did this all occur in this 2-week period?

Secretary Brown. No, no, no. The planning and training has been going on since November—

Q. How do you compare this operation with the successful operations carried out by the Germans and Israelis? Why can they do it, and we can't?

Secretary Brown. Tehran is not Entebbe. That's one reason. I'm not sure how many of you have flown 500 nautical miles on a helicopter in one trip, but not many people have. It's a difficult task, and no other country, in my judgment, could have attempted anything like this.

Q. Could you help me out on this quote by Secretary of the Air Force Hans Mark, who said that he looked at this plan you just attempted and, quote, "it just wasn't feasible." This was something he said in Biloxi, Mississippi, on April 4th.

Secretary Brown. Did he say he looked at this plan we attempted?

Q. Well, he said that—

Secretary Brown. Please quote it.

Q. The United States considered landing a helicopter at its Embassy compound in Tehran to free the American hostages and rejected the idea because it, quote, "just wasn't feasible," unquote, in an urban area.

Secretary Brown. I think that the plan that is described in that quotation would be very difficult. I have not described that plan, and I have not described our plan.

Q. Who commanded the operation, and where did the training take place?

Secretary Brown. I don't think we want to identify that yet, but we will be. We will be telling more about some of the people in a little while.

Q. Was this at the ultimate command of the President?

Secretary Brown. The ultimate decisions, as the President said, are his responsibility, and he takes responsibility for them. But the commander of the task force reported to General Jones, who reported to me, who reported to the President. That's the way it was done.

Q. What was the scene in the White House last night?

Secretary Brown. A number of people were working very hard, and we were very busy at it.

Q. You described the rescue operations—you said it wasn't really—you tried to—

Secretary Brown. It was not an attack on Iran in any way.

Q. Right, except that it would have been if you had gone in—you would have confronted Iranians. You also expressed concern about the tensions in the region. How come you don't see that tensions would not have risen if you didn't confront and probably kill a few Iranians?

Secretary Brown. It is, I think, not fruitful to speculate about how a successful rescue would have affected things in the region. I am convinced that a successful rescue would have affected them favorably.

Q. You have said that planning and training on this has been going on since November.

Secretary Brown. Yes.

Q. This was ordered by President Carter, this planning and training?

Secretary Brown. Oh, yes.

Q. I see. This is at the same time he is telling the American people that there would be no military action?

Secretary Brown. I, again, want to characterize this as a rescue operation, as I would characterize any attempts to rescue hostages.

Q. Did the personnel, as described in some reports, dress in some sort of Iranian garb?

Secretary Brown. No.

Q. Did you have any sense that you had been detected by Iranian military forces any time during this mission?

Secretary Brown. No.

Q. Do you have any radio communications between the operation and the White House last night?

Secretary Brown. There were communications between the task force and the Pentagon. There were separate communications between the Pentagon and the White House.

Q. How many people were involved on the ground in Iran, and how many worldwide; do you have a figure for us?

Secretary Brown. I think, as I said, they were on the order of 90 in the rescue force. There were, perhaps, a comparable number of air crews and support personnel involved there. How many worldwide is a much more difficult question, because you'd have to include all the carrier personnel, although they were not all directly involved, and so on. I think probably several times that number.

Q. Does the United States still have a viable military [inaudible]

Secretary Brown. I am not going to talk about specific options. I am saying, and I have said, and I will repeat that we continue to keep all our options open. We want to settle this peacefully, if we possibly can.

Q. Did the plane carry Iranian markings?

Secretary Brown. No.

Q. How many C–130s were there?

Secretary Brown. There were six C–130s.

Q. Was the Strategic Air Command warned of this ahead of time? And were the hostages aware that it was coming?

Secretary Brown. No, neither the hostages nor the militants who had captured—who are holding them hostage were aware, and the Strategic Air Command was not put on higher alert.

Q. Can you tell us where the force is located now? Where it has fallen back?

Secretary Brown. No. It has been extracted from Iran, and it is on its way back.

can inject our forces rapidly. We are intensifying our political-military consultations with some of the countries concerned. We are working closely with those who are not directly involved in our military efforts but would benefit from them—for example, Saudi Arabia, which is a staunch friend and in whose leadership we have high confidence—

Q. But Saudi Arabia is also very concerned about our taking any military action that might upset the balance.

A. You didn't let me complete my thought. Saudi Arabia, which is a staunch friend and which has a leadership in whom we have high confidence, has been extremely helpful to us on international economic issues. We recognize the need to create an environment which is secure, while respecting the Arab desire to protect their sovereignty through the absence of foreign bases on their soil.

Q. Some of the American allies and some of the American public have been saying that President Carter is really not competent and this is another indication that he's not up to the job. I assume that you do not accept that, but does that not complicate the problem now of working with our allies and also of trying to formulate a new policy?

A. Now that's such an absurd statement that I don't think one should spend too much time refuting it. But I'll take a minute or two just to remind that you this is the President who obtained the Panama Canal treaties against enormous odds. This is the President who obtained the first peace treaty ever between Israel and an Arab country. This is the President which moved us in a position to influence genuine reconciliation in southern Africa on the basis of majority rule. This is the President who bit the bullet on normalization of relations with China, thereby very greatly improving our strategic position in the world. This is the President who provided the leadership strength in NATO for a long-term development program. This is the President who has taken difficult decisions to increase the defense budget in peacetime. It's a pretty good record in 3 years. Much better than some of our predecessors.

Q. I did not want to interrupt you because I thought it was only fair for you to be able to make that case, but the polls seem to suggest that people are not confident in this President's ability to handle this particular crisis. That curve has been going down. Let me ask you the auxiliary question. Wasn't one of the reasons Mr. Carter took the action that you took this past week because of the political factor that he saw he had to do something?

A. Absolutely not. We took it because with the refinement of the rescue plan—at some point we concluded that the rescue plan was a viable option. Once the negotiating track had run out of steam, toward the end of March, and once we had indications from the other side that they were determined to continue holding the hostages indefinitely, we knew we had a narrow window left for the rescue option before the nights became too short and also the temperature too hot for an operation which included air breathing machines over long territory.

Q. You do seem to agree, in what you have just said then and previously, that the rescue option is no longer there.

A. No, I do not agree that the rescue option is not there. I'll not speculate in rescue options. One particular aspect of that rescue option has obviously been compromised, but I will not speculate on what can be done. I'll only repeat what I have said many times before: Let everyone draw an important lesson from this. This President and this country will do what is necessary, and we have the means for doing it, and one setback doesn't shape the future.

Q. We wouldn't go to war with Iran would we?

A. We will take actions which are appropriate. We prefer to resolve this problem peacefully through collective pressure. We hope, as I have said many times in this program, the Iranians will reach the right conclusion. But we're not going to sit indefinitely and have belligerent action imposed upon us.

Q. The 15 diplomats who have been held hostage for the past 2 months in Bogota, Colombia, apparently have been removed from the Embassy there, this morning, and are en route somewhere by plane. Can you tell us what you know about that?

A. Yes. We are very hopeful that within hours there will be a resolution, a positive resolution of this issue. And we expect to have good news including our own principal representative very, very shortly.

Q. Is this some sort of a compromise that has been struck with the militants or the terrorists who have held them so that some of their imprisoned leaders would be released from jail?

A. The Colombian Government was responsible for handling these negotiations, and I do not wish to preempt the specific information that will be released at the time when the good news—and I trust it will be good news for all of us—is made public.

Q. Do you know whether it is true that some of the diplomats are being flown to Cuba?

A. It may be the case, but I don't want to go beyond confirming the fact that I think that good news will shortly be released.

Q. By the way, back to Iran, Iran is claiming that the Government of Iraq has been overthrown and its President been killed. Do you know anything about that?

A. I haven't heard any information to confirm that. I don't believe that Radio Tehran has an established standard of accuracy and veracity.

Q. Another question on the hostages. The militant terrorists are once again threatening to try them. What would be our response?

A. Our position on the subject has been known previously, I believe publicly, on November 20th of last year, we stand by that. And the action we undertook last week probably reinforces the credibility of our position. ■

Iran Chronology, April 1980

April 1

President Carter, hoping for a transfer of the hostages from the militants to the Iranian Government, defers plans to impose new economic and political sanctions against Iran.

President Bani-Sadr states that the Revolutionary Council would accept control of the hostages only if the U.S. formally pledges not to do anything "provocative" until after Iran's new Parliament is elected.

April 2

President Carter publicly pledges to Iran silence about hostages as long as progress is being made to resolve the crisis.

April 3

Revolutionary Council fails to reach agreement in a debate over transfer of the hostages.

April 4

A leading clerical member of the Revolutionary Council, Hojatolislam Ali Khameini, threatens to deny Persian Gulf oil to the U.S. if it orders sanctions against Iran.

April 6

Khomeini rules that the hostages will remain in militant hands until their fate is decided by the yet-to-be-elected Parliament.

Four clergymen celebrate Easter with the hostages. They report that the hostages are in good health.

April 7

U.S. breaks diplomatic relations with Iran and imposes a formal embargo on U.S. exports.

President Carter announces that he would ask the Congress to permit Americans to settle claims against Iran by drawing on $8 billion in Iranian assets that are frozen in U.S. banks.

April 8

Khomeini welcomes breaking of relations with U.S. as a "good omen" and calls on Iranians to "celebrate."

April 9

Militants threaten to "destroy all hostages immediately" if U.S. begins military actions against Iran.

Shah is discharged from Cairo military hospital.

April 10

Meeting in Lisbon, Foreign Ministers of nine Common Market countries decline either to impose economic sanctions against Iran or scale down or close their embassies. They, instead, issue a new condemnation of the Iranian Government for detaining the U.S. hostages.

April 11

Iranians hold a Unity Day rally celebrating the breaking of diplomatic ties by the U.S., at the same time calling for the overthrow of the neighboring Iraqi Government.

April 12

In response to President Carter's plea for greater support, Ambassadors from the Common Market countries and Japan meet with Bani-Sadr to press demands for release of the hostages.

In a hostage resolution, the Inter-Parliamentary Union Council votes 80–0, with 20 abstentions, condemning the continued detention of U.S. hostages in Iran and denouncing the complacent attitudes of Iranian authorities.

April 13

Eight Common Market countries (Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Ireland) announce they would withdraw their Ambassadors temporarily from Iran in protest against the holding of U.S. hostages.

U.S. urges allies to impose economic sanctions against Iran later this month and break diplomatic relations by mid-May, if progress has not been made toward the hostages' release.

April 11

Officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross spend 8 hours interviewing the hostages.

April 18

In spite of President Carter's announcement banning all American travel to Iran, Mrs. Barbara Timm, mother of one of the hostages—Marine Sergeant Kevin Hermening—and her husband fly from Paris to West Germany en route to Iran to plead with Iranian authorities to allow her to visit her son.

April 20

Public notice is issued restricting the use of U.S. passports for travel to, in, or through Iran. The notice is effective for 1 year unless extended or sooner revoked by public notice.

April 21

Secretary Vance submits a letter of resignation to President Carter stating that he could not support the President's decision to attempt a rescue mission of the hostages in Iran.

Britain recalls its Ambassador, stating that there would be a major cutback in Embassy personnel and advising British nationals to leave Iran.

April 22

Common Market Foreign Ministers vote unanimously to impose full economic sanctions against Iran on May 17 unless "decisive progress" is made by them on freeing the hostages.

Four members of the Family Liaison Action Group (FLAG) leave for Europe to meet with British Prime Minister Thatcher, French President Giscard, German Chancellor Schmidt, and in Rome, the Pope.

April 23

Iranian Government announces new trading agreement with the Soviet Union, Romania, and East Germany. It also announces that in the event of a U.S. naval blockade, the Soviet Union had agreed to supply Iran by land.

The government also announces that American journalists would have to leave the country once their current visas and credentials expire.

Japan's Cabinet announces its decision to impose those diplomatic and economic measures recently announced by the EEC members.

April 24

Iran warns U.S. that if it tried to block Iranian harbors, Tehran might seek to cut off all oil supplies from the Persian Gulf.

Swiss Foreign Ministry announces, in the absence of formal diplomatic relations, it will represent U.S. interests in Iran.

U.S. agrees to Iran's selection of the Algerian Embassy to protect its diplomatic and consular interests in this country.

April 25

A mission to rescue the hostages—in planning since November—was aborted by President Carter because of equipment failures.

Khomeini denounces Carter for a "stupid act" and warns that a second attempt could endanger the hostages' lives.

April 26

Hostages are reportedly moved from the Embassy and dispersed throughout Iran to thwart further rescue attempts by the U.S.

April 27

Iranian officials publicly display the bodies of eight U.S. servicemen killed in the rescue attempt.

April 28

President Carter accepts Secretary Vance's resignation stating that he "respects the reasons" for Vance's decision.

April 30

Religious services are held in Iran for the eight U.S. servicemen.

Iran's London Embassy is seized by three armed men. Holding 20 hostages, they demand more rights for the Arab minority in Iran and the release of 91 political prisoners being held there.■

International Military Education and Training

Over the years, the international military education and training (IMET) program has been an important, cost-effective element of our security assistance program. IMET provides instruction and training on a grant basis to military personnel from friendly countries. For FY 1981 we are proposing IMET programs of $32.5 million to train personnel from 61 countries.

Our posts in the field, particularly those in smaller nations with which we have no military ties other than IMET, repeatedly stress the importance of this program and the access it provides to key military figures in the host government.

Another advantage of the IMET program is the exposure to American human rights values afforded by time spent in training in the United States and the impact which this has on the countries participating in the program. Although hard statistics are difficult to come by in this area, our experience leads us to believe that considerable periods in the United States in contact with our society has had a positive effect on those who have participated in these training programs. I would ask that this factor be given careful consideration in determining the appropriateness of our overall IMET request.

Moreover, IMET provides the only direct exposure available to many foreign military officers to the role armed forces play in a democratic nation. Again, I believe that this has a positive impact on the political evolution of their own countries.

And finally, I think it is important to keep in mind that military training constitutes only one small facet of a broad range of U.S. Government-funded exchange programs. According to a July 1978 General Accounting Office study, five government agencies--Agency for International Development; Department of Defense; Department of Health, Education and Welfare; the National Science Foundation; and the Department of State funded the bulk of U.S. exchange and training programs. These programs, in addition to military training, also focus on a wide array of education, technical, scientific, and cultural needs. In FY 1977, the latest year for which such data were available, these programs involved some 19,000 participants at a cost of approximately $147 million. IMET accounted for $25 million of these costs and approximately 5,000 participants.

Peacekeeping Operations

The peacekeeping operations program provides assistance to fund the Sinai Field Support Mission and the U.S. contribution to the U.N. Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP). For FY 1981 we are requesting a total program of $25 million. Of this, $16 million will be for the Sinai Field Support Mission to maintain the U.S. role in facilitating the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and $9 million for the U.S. contribution to UNFICYP, an amount equal to approximately 15% of total estimated costs for this activity.

Revisions in Legislation

Having discussed the various security programs we are proposing for the coming fiscal year, I should like to turn to the substantive revisions we would suggest be enacted in the legislation governing these programs.

As this subcommittee is aware, over the years the foreign assistance legislation has grown increasingly complex as new limitations, conditions, and prohibitions have been added and discretionary powers and funding have been reduced. The cumulative effect of these changes has been to make it more difficult for the United States to respond promptly and effectively to rapidly changing circumstances. In addition, the sheer volume of these restrictions and the passage of time sometimes cause them to operate in ways that were never anticipated when they were enacted.

Over the longer term, I propose that the executive branch initiate consultations with the Congress to determine how we might work together to revise current legislation governing security assistance programs. Our objective would be to produce a comprehensive revision of the security assistance legislation, designed to clarify and simplify its provisions in the context of the challenges facing us and our friends in today's world.

For FY 1981 our goals are necessarily more modest, and the legislation before you contains proposals for a few rather limited revisions in applicable legislation. These revisions, in our view, will provide for better management of our security assistance programs. They also recognize that our national interests require that the President be able to respond promptly and effectively to emergency situations endangering our security. At the same time, they reflect the responsibilities of the Congress for policy formulation and oversight.

Drawdown Authority

The first proposal would be to increase the President's military assistance "drawdown" authority under Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Currently, the President is authorized, subject to making certain findings and reports to the Congress, to draw up to $10 million in defense articles and services from the Department of Defense to furnish emergency military assistance in advance of appropriations. This authority provides the only real flexibility available to the President to meet a crisis with grant military assistance. The current limit of $10 million is simply too small to be effective, given today's inflation and the type of crises which we may face. We recommend increasing the limit from $10 million to $50 million.

If approved by the Congress, the use of the $50 million Presidential drawdown authority would be subject to the tight limitations currently applicable to section 506, namely, that the President provide the Congress with prior, written notification that an unforeseen emergency exists and that the emergency requirement cannot be met under any other authority available to him. I should note that although this authority has not been used in the past several years, it remains an important factor in considering our response to contingencies and a deterrent to those who would doubt our ability and willingness to support our friends promptly and effectively.

Presidential Waiver Authority

Our second proposal in the legislation before the committee would extend the President's waiver authority under Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to other security assistance legislation such as the Arms Export Control Act and annual authorization acts.

The present scope of section 614(a) can lead to anomalous results. The President may use section 614(a) to waive limitations applicable to grant programs under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, but not those applicable to sale and financing programs under the Arms Export Control Act. The Presi-

dent may use this section to waive limitations in the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act but not an identical limitation contained in an annual authorization act. These essentially arbitrary results have the effect of narrowing the President's ability to react quickly and effectively in emergency situations affecting our security.

Moreover, it must be remembered that when section 614(a) was enacted in 1961, it applied to the whole of our assistance programs—grant, loan, and sale, whether developmental or security—which were then all carried out under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

The enactment of a separate authority for military sales and financing programs in 1968 removed that element of our overall program from the reach of section 614(a). It must also be recalled that in 1961, our military programs were overwhelmingly grant programs, rather than sales and financing programs; the opposite is true today. Our proposal would reflect the original purpose of section 614(a) by restoring its applicability to our entire foreign assistance program.

If the President is to have a broadened general waiver authority, and we believe one is clearly required if we are to protect our foreign policy interests in rapidly changing situations, its scope should not be so circumscribed that its availability depends upon such arbitrary conditions as the form and location of a particular restriction. We believe it vitally important to demonstrate—to friend and foe alike—that the U.S. Government is willing and able to work together harmoniously to undertake decisive and effective actions in support of our interests.

Personnel Performing Defense Services

Thirdly, the Administration's FY 1981 legislation proposes a modification of the Arms Export Control Act to clarify the meaning of the limitations upon the performance of defense services for a country that may become engaged in self-defense or other military operations. Under the current Section 21(c) of the Arms Export Control Act, personnel performing defense services under FMS may not perform duties of a combatant nature. This restriction is broadly defined in statute to include "training, advising, or otherwise providing assistance regarding combat activities . . . in connection with the performance of those defense services."

We believe that serious questions are raised concerning whether services being peformed for a friendly country must be abandoned at a time when they are most needed—to insure its military forces are able to defend that nation and our own security interests protected—even where there is no possibility that the performance of such services would involve U.S. personnel in any form of military action.

The Administration's proposed FY 1981 bill retains the prohibition against the sale of combat services, conforming it to a comparable limitation on defense services performed on a grant basis under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. It must be stressed that the change proposed to section 21(c) would in no way constitute, and could not be construed as constituting, an authorization for U.S. military personnel to engage in military action. Moreover, it in no way affects the scope or applicability of the war powers resolution which is the legislation that deals with this issue in a comprehensive and authoritative manner. We believe that by deleting the unduly narrow qualifying language from section 21(c) the potential effectiveness of the law would be significantly enhanced without any detriment to U.S. interests or to U.S. personnel.

Military Construction

The Administration's proposed FY 1981 bill would amend the Arms Export Control Act to establish a separate chapter authorizing military construction. Section 36(b) now requires that the Congress be notified of all proposed FMS sales of defense articles or services over $25 million, including construction services. A separate chapter authorizing foreign military construction sales would recognize the different nature of construction, as opposed to other defense items or services.

Construction services, as you are aware, generally involve infrastructure-type projects, which while perhaps impressive in terms of total value, do not include weapons or arms. Moreover, since construction services are normally managerial in nature, their costs are only a small fraction of the overall construction transaction. Most of the actual construction services are performed by subcontractors from other nations.

And finally, the current requirement that proposed construction sales be subject to what, in practice, amounts to at least a 50-day congressional review period has been an irritant in our relations with purchasing nations and leads to higher final costs by delaying the start of projects.

We believe that a separate chapter authorizing military construction sales would be in keeping with other provisions dealing with the sales of construction services, such as Section 25(d) of the Arms Export Control Act, which requires a report providing an annual estimate and justification for our military sales program, but which excludes construction sales. It would also conform to our arms transfer policy, which recognizes the difference between military construction sales and other sales under FMS by not including construction within annual arms transfer ceiling levels.

Under the proposed separate chapter authorizing construction sales we would preserve the present requirement for quarterly reports listing sales made during the quarter, including an estimate of the value of the sales and a full description of the facilities to be constructed. Thus the Congress would be in a position to continue to monitor construction sales to insure that they are in keeping with overall U.S. foreign policy interests.

Arms Transfers

The final proposed modification contained in our FY 1981 authorization bill involves congressional review of proposed transfers under Sections 36(b) and 3(d) of the Arms Export Control Act. Existing law requires congressional review of a wide range of arms transfer proposals. As you know, all FMS cases over $25 million--no matter the equipment or services involved—all FMS cases over $7 million of major defense equipment, and virtually all third-party transfers—irrespective of value—are subject to 30 days' advance certification to the Congress. In the case of sales, this period is extended by an informal 20-day advance review and is often further drawn out, when notifications are deferred, to take into account scheduled congressional recesses.

We would propose to exempt from the requirement for 30 days' advance certification and review FMS cases involving transfers to NATO, any NATO member nation, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. In addition, the Administration's proposed legislation would exempt from advance certification all third-country transfers to these countries. It would also set a threshold on

dangerous way. Tens of thousands of Cubans are fleeing the repression of the Castro regime under chaotic and perilous conditions.

Castro himself has refused to permit them a safe and orderly passage to the United States and to other countries which are also willing to receive them. Repeated international efforts to resolve this crisis have been rejected or ignored by the Cuban Government. At least seven people have died on the high seas. The responsibility for those deaths and the threat of further loss of life rests on the shoulders of Fidel Castro, who has so far refused to cooperate with us, with those escaping his regime, or with other countries in establishing a legal and orderly procedure for dealing with this Cuban problem.

In keeping with the laws and traditions of our own country, the United States has provided a safe haven for many of these people who have arrived on our shores. Since the beginning of this crisis we have been operating under three basic principles. First, to treat the escaping Cubans with decency, fairness, and humanity; second, to observe and to enforce the existing U.S. law; and third, to work with other countries and with international organizations to develop an orderly and legal solution to this very painful human dilemma. That is still our fundamental approach.

But now we must take additional steps to end Cuba's inhumane actions and to bring safety and order to a process that continues to threaten lives. Therefore we will implement a five-point program to permit safe and orderly passage from Cuba, for those people who sought freedom in the U.S. Interest Section in Havana first of all; for political prisoners who have been held by Castro for many years; for those who sought a haven of freedom in the Peruvian Embassy, some of whom are still being held there; and for close family members of Cuban-Americans who live in this country and who have permanent resident status. Those four categories will be given priority in their authorization to come to our country.

First, we are ready to start an airlift and a sealift for these screened and qualified people to come to our country and for no other escapees from Cuba. We will provide this airlift and sealift to our country and to other countries as well, just as soon as the Cubans accept this offer. The U.S. Government will have aircraft ready and will immediately charter ships, one of which will be standing by in Key West to bring the first group of Cubans, after they are screened, to our country. These ships and the Key West planes will be ready to go to Cuba to receive properly screened Cubans for entry to the United States and to other countries, to help in their resettlement.

To insure legality and order, all people will have to be screened before departure from Cuba. We will work with the Congress, the Cuban-American community, interested nations, and the Cuban Government to determine the total number of people that we will receive, both on a monthly basis and during the next 12 months.

Second, tomorrow we will open a family registration center in Miami, and later perhaps in other communities, to begin receiving the names of people who are eligible for immigration to our nation because they are close members of Cuban-American families who have permanent residence here.

Third, the Coast Guard is now communicating with all boats which are en route to Cuba and those in Mariel Harbor in Cuba to urge them to return to the United States without accepting additional passengers. No new trips to Cuba by these unauthorized boats should be started. Those who comply with this request or command will have nothing to fear from the law, but we will insure that the law is obeyed. Persons who violate this requirement, and who violate U.S. immigration custom laws by traveling to Cuba to pick up additional passengers, will be subject to civil fines and to criminal prosecution. Furthermore, boats used to bring people unlawfully to this country will be seized. I have directed the various law enforcement agencies to take additional steps as necessary to assure that this policy and the law are obeyed.

Fourth, in an unprecedented and irresponsible act, Castro has taken hardened criminals out of prison and forced some of the boat owners who have gone to Cuba from our country to bring these criminals back to the United States. Thus far over 400 such persons have been detained. I have instructed the Attorney General to commence exclusion proceedings immediately for these criminals and others who represent any danger to our country. We will ask also appropriate international agencies to negotiate their return to Cuba.

Fifth, these steps are fully consistent with the consensus which was reached by 22 nations and 7 international organizations in the San Jose conference on May the 8th this last week. In addition, the Secretary of State will continue consultation with other nations to determine additional steps that the international community can take to resolve this problem. We will seek the help of the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and other international organizations as well.

The Cuban-American community has, of course, contributed much to Miami, to Florida, and to our own country. I respect the deep desire to reunite divided families. In the interest of that great and valiant ethnic community, and in the interest of our country, we will continue to work closely with the Cuban-American community to bring about a safe and orderly resolution of this crisis.

I continue to be greatly concerned about the treatment of Haitians who have also come to this country recently on small boats. I've instructed all appropriate Federal agencies to treat the Haitians now here in the same, exact, humane manner as we treat Cubans and others who seek asylum in this country. Our laws never contemplated and do not adequately provide for people coming to our shores directly for asylum the way the Cubans and the Haitians have done recently.

I will work closely with the Congress to formulate a long-term solution to this problem and to determine the legal status of the boat people once this current emergency is under control.

Q. Will you take a question? Do you think this will be a damaging issue in the campaign?

A. I don't know about how it will affect the campaign. We've had this as a very serious problem now for several weeks. We've tried to deal with it in accordance with our laws, with customs, with traditions, and, of course, in a humane fashion. And we also have tried to work, both with Castro, unsuccessfully, and with other nations and international organizations. We've done the best we could. This is a much firmer and more consistent approach. And, in my judgment, after advising with all of my Cabinet advisers involved and with the international organizations as well and with the Congress, I believe this will resolve this problem in a legal, orderly, safe, humane, and proper fashion.

Q. Do you think that Castro will go along with it?

A. I don't have that assurance.

Q. But if he doesn't go along with it, it's stopped, period?

A. We'll carry out our part of the policy as I described it.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, MAY 14, 1980[5]

After consultations with senior advisers and with Congress, and in the spirit of the San Jose conference, the President has decided to take the following steps to welcome the Cuban refugees in a legal and orderly process:

1. We are prepared to start an airlift or a sealift immediately as soon as President Castro accepts this offer. Our government is chartering two large, seaworthy ships which will go to Key West to stand by, ready to go to Cuba. To insure a legal and orderly process, all people will have to be screened before departure from Cuba. Priority will be given to political prisoners, to close relatives of U.S. permanent residents, and to persons who sought freedom in the Peruvian Embassy and in our Interest Section last month. In the course of our discussions with the Congress and with the Cuban-American community, the international community, and the Cuban Government, we will determine the number of people to be taken over the next 12 months. We will fulfill our humanitarian responsibilities, and we hope other governments will adjust their previous pledges to resettle Cuban refugees to take into account the larger problem that has developed. This will provide a safe and orderly way to accommodate Cubans wishing to enter the United States.

2. Tomorrow, we will open a family registration office in Miami to receive the names of close Cuban relatives of U.S. permanent residents who will be eligible for immigration.

3. The Coast Guard is now communicating with these vessels illegally en route to or from Cuba and those already in Mariel Harbor to tell them to return to the United States without taking Cubans on board. If they follow this directive, they have nothing to fear from the law. We will do everything possible to stop these illegal trips to Cuba. We will take the following steps to insure that the law is obeyed:

(a) The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) will continue to issue notices of intent to fine those unlawfully bringing Cubans to this country. As fines become due, they will be collected.

(b) All vessels currently and unlawfully carrying Cubans to this country will henceforth be seized by the Customs Service.

(c) Anyone who tampers with or seeks to move a ship to Cuba which has been seized will be subject to separate criminal prosecution.

(d) The Coast Guard will continue to review each vessel that returns to the United States for violations of boat safety law. Those found to be in gross violation of the law will be subject to criminal prosecution and additional fines. Furthermore, boats which are found to be safety hazards will be detained.

(e) Any individual who has been notified by INS for unlawfully bringing Cubans into the country and who makes another trip will be subject to criminal prosecution, and the boat used for such a repeat trip will be seized for forfeiture proceedings.

(f) Law enforcement agencies will take additional steps, as necessary, to implement this policy and to discourage the unlawful boat traffic to Cuba.

4. Castro has taken hardened criminals out of prison and mental patients out of hospitals and has forced boat owners to take them to the United States. Thus far, over 400 such prisoners have been detained. We will not permit our country to be used as a dumping ground for criminals who represent a danger to our society, and we will begin exclusion proceedings against these people at once.

5. These steps will make clear to the Government of Cuba our determination to negotiate an orderly process. This is the mission of the three-government delegation established by the San Jose conference last week. Our actions are intended to promote an international solution to this problem. We intend to continue our consultations with the participants of the San Jose conference and consider additional steps the international community should take to resolve this problem.

In summary, the United States will welcome Cubans seeking freedom, in accordance with our laws, and we will pursue every avenue to establish an orderly and regular flow.

The President continues to be greatly concerned about the Haitians who have been coming to this country on small boats. He has instructed appropriate Federal agencies to receive the Haitians in the same manner as others seeking asylum. However, our laws never contemplated and do not provide adequately for people coming to our shores in the manner the Cubans and Haitians have. We will work closely with the Congress to formulate a long-term solution to this problem and to determine the legal status of these "boat people" after the current emergency situation is controlled.

The Cuban-American community has contributed much to Miami, the State of Florida, and to our country. The President understands the deep desire to reunite families which has led to this situation. He calls upon the Cuban-American community to end the boat flotilla and help bring about a safe and orderly resolution to this crisis.

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[1] Read to news correspondents by White House press secretary Jody Powell (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Apr. 21, 1980).

[2] Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston.

[3] Text from White House press release.

[4] Made available to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

[5] Text from White House press release. ■

Department of State

bulletin

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Secretary Attends NATO Meeting in Brussels and Visits Vienna

Secretary Muskie was in Brussels May 13–15, 1980, to attend a joint session of the NATO Defense Planning Committee attended by Foreign and Defense Ministers. He then visited Vienna May 15–16 to represent the United States at the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Austrian state treaty. While in Vienna, he also met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Following are various remarks he made during the trip and the texts of the NATO communique and declaration issued on May 14.[1]

NEWS CONFERENCE, EN ROUTE TO BRUSSELS, MAY 13, 1980[2]

Q. Do you have any three or four main points you are trying to get across to the allies or to the Russians in these couple of days you have?

A. I think the first point that is very important to make is the continuity of our policy. I expect that we might have at least two questions as to whether or not Secretary Vance's resignation and my selection might represent a change of policy, at least with respect of the central questions that I am sure are on their minds about Iran and Afghanistan. So that's my first objective.

Secondly is to confirm allied support and unity behind our policy in Iran and Afghanistan and what we have asked them to do to be supportive.

Thirdly, although, of course, a principal responsibility of Defense Ministers is to insure that as the United States moves to strengthen our defense posture in the Persian Gulf area, our NATO defense posture is not weakened in any way. This requires consultation and coordination of policy and support. This ought not suggest that there is any weakening of our NATO support under consideration whatsoever. They ought to recognize the fact that as we put resources into the Persian Gulf area, given the need for budget austerity and so on, our resources could be strained in other areas.

So we would like them to understand that and be supportive. I'd say, of course, we would like to get out of this meeting a strong statement of support—continuing support—for our policies.

Q. When you say "strong statement of support," with respect to what—that strong statement of support? And also, can we expect you to try to get a commitment from the nine to live up to the April 22d pledge to impose an almost across-the-board ban—economic/diplomatic—against Iran if there is not decisive progress by May 17?

A. Yes, I think we have a right to expect a commitment, an understanding, that there may be some problems of precise compatibility between what they are able to do in the way of sanctions and what we are able to do; but, nevertheless, a strong commitment to go forward with the same sense of urgency and commitment to the objective—the objective, of course, being to maintain pressure on Iran while we explore by whatever means are available to us, diplomatic and otherwise, the problem of dealing with the hostage problem.

Q. Do you expect to get them to live up to April 22, not that they are going to say, "We support you but we are going to drastically dilute April 22"? I mean an across-the-board ban, which is what they promised.

A. As I understand, their promise was to implement the sanctions resolution which the Russians vetoed. That is what I understand it was meant to be. That is my objective—to get confirmation of that.

Q. Do you expect to have time to get into the question of the Middle East—to urge the Europeans to hold off their separate initiative to bring the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] into the process or seek to revise [U.N. Resolution] 242?

A. I would expect at least in the bilaterals, if not in the meeting tomorrow morning, that this question will arise. I expect it to arise, and I expect to urge them—and I think it is important to urge them—not to take any step that would divert attention from the Camp David process that might have the effect of relaxing the pressures on the Egyptians and the Israelis to continue to press for the Camp David process.

For the first time, really, under Ambassador Linowitz [Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations], the parties are coming to grips with the six "hard-knot" problems standing in the way of an autonomy agreement. I can't conceive of any other process that could get us closer to those central issues than this one. Any other process which was to undercut Camp David and start us down another road would involve delay in getting to those central issues—issues like land and settlements, issues like security, issues like the authority of the self-governing authority, issues like water, and so on. These are central to any autonomy definition. And we're there—we're pounding at them. Both parties—both Egypt and Israel—want to continue pounding at them in this process, and I would hope that our European friends would not take any step that would have the effect of relaxing that pressure and undercutting that process. I am going to make that case as persuasively as I can.

Q. How much time—the May 26 deadline has already slipped—but how far into the summer is this likely to go? At some point they are going to have to discern their interest.

A. They will have to determine what their interest is—the successful conclusion of this process, which would have a stabilizing effect and if successful gradually move the Middle East in that direction. That is going to be tough, of course. Or to start all over again. It's taken quite some time to get this far with this process. But where does their interest lie? I understand, of course, their concern about their oil sources, their concern for stability in the Middle East is more immediately significant to them perhaps than to us in those terms, but stability surely is their objective.

That's why I would expect to have a very vigorous discussion on this issue because I understand the pressures that play on them to take an initiative

on their own. I had a brief discussion with [British Foreign Minister] Lord Carrington about it—I expect to have more. I think that would be a very key issue in this discussion, not on the NATO agenda as such, but in terms of our common interest in the Middle East.

Q. As you may know, Khomeini has said the hostages are not going to be released until the Parliament is formed and the issue debated and I presume the allies are going to say to you: "Well, the imposition of harsh sanctions really is academic because they are not going to be released until the Parliament debates in any event, so why should we do it in that connection?" I mean, what are you going to say to them in that regard, and have you completed your review of Iran policy, and how do you see this crisis playing itself out?

A. My review of Iran policy is ongoing. I want to get much deeper into it.

Q. I meant the Administration.

A. Yes, there are two reviews—mine to get caught up to speed and the Administration's in terms of the aftermath of the rescue action. So we're doing it from a slightly different perspective, but with the same objectives in mind.

My feeling about this is that, on the basis of what I have learned to date, the Iranians are truly concerned about European sanctions. If they are, it can only mean that if applied, the sanctions would have an impact. There are a lot of pressures to which the Iranians are subject: questions of internal instability, struggle for power, economic deterioration, the threats on their borders, the postrevolutionary world in which it is going to have to live and provide for its people. There are internal pressures in Iran upon which we ought to build and economic pressures given their economic problems are bound to be effective pressures. I don't care what a religion preaches about the willingness of human beings to accept austerity as a way of life, people still have to eat; they still have to provide for their essential needs. And when their opportunities to do so are squeezed, their government must respond.

Indeed, the revolution itself is evidence of the truth of what I've just said. The revolution was initiated and succeeded because people were not satisfied with the kind of life they were getting under the Shah. Now a government—the new authority—which has taken over as a result of that popular unrest, cannot be insensitive to the economic problems that face Iran. So I think that this kind of pressure is essential. It will not, by itself perhaps, bring Iran around to our objectives of releasing the hostages, but it surely ought to improve the climate for doing so.

The second point, which I am really not ready to, or even in a position to, define is the posthostage relationship between the United States and Iran and the Western world. I would expect that at least the rational forces in Iran would be worried about that, concerned about it, and I think that to the extent that we could contribute in the development of our policy to a clarification of their role in the posthostage world, we might contribute then to the release of the hostages.

Now, the main roadblock here that I see is that the militants, who presumably still hold the hostages, have power internally only because they have the hostages. That is going to be a very critical point to get over, so it seems to me that a lot is going to depend upon the regular government authority taking over control of the hostages. You get that, and then you can begin to move into the areas of legitimate governmental concern—what we do about the future of our country, what do we do about the future of our own people, what do we do about our economic conditions? What do we do about our relations with the outside world? And any government which has the specific responsibility of being concerned with those things is a government subject to pressures from its own people.

Q. Now that you have reviewed the history, I guess, of the Iran crisis, is there anything that you would have done differently if you would have been on the job?

A. At the moment, I have really been learning—learning how to deal with you fellows, among other things. No, I have been reviewing policy, reviewing my thinking, consulting with the President, his foreign policy advisers, shaping my thoughts. More specifically, I have been addressing myself to these meetings this week and in the next 30 days which I must attend.

Q. Do you think there was a mistake at the onset to give the issue so much prominence since, as you just said, the value of the hostages is the *raison d'etre* of the militants?

A. The heart of the situation has sort of generated its own visibility, with the help of the media, of course. The fact that Walter Cronkite [of CBS Evening News] every night adds another day to the period—and that's his prerogative—of the number of days of imprisonment, keeps the issue before the American public constantly. And, of course, the President kept its visibility high by tying it to his own campaign plans. If there were a way of deescalating or reducing the visibility without reducing our efforts, that would be a useful thing. But you can't unscramble the history of the last 6 months.

Q. What is your expectation of your meeting with Mr. Gromyko?

A. I look forward to it. I had one long meeting with him almost 10 years ago. When I was running for a higher office, I went to Moscow and had a 4-hour meeting with Kosygin and a 3-hour meeting with Gromyko, so I had some exposure to the ways in which he conducted a dialogue at that time, and I know it requires a lot of patience, alertness, willingness, and ability to respond in a knowledgeable way. It requires a lot of preparation. He is a tough guy—a smart guy—staunch defender, without blinking, of all Soviet policies.

So I would expect that we're going to get a very interesting comparison of notes on who created the present stalemate in U.S.-Soviet relations, and why and what faults the other side has to overcome to improve relationships. That's an exercise you inevitably have to go through. But, I would hope that in that process of feeling each other out, there may be some indication on his part of priority Soviet concerns that we can build on to persuade him to change Soviet policy.

The point that I am going to emphasize with him over and over again is that the invasion of Afghanistan created a sea change, not only in the Administration's view of Soviet intentions but in the view of the American people and of the Congress.

With respect to SALT, there was no way that the Congress would consider ratification of SALT following that invasion. The Senate, indeed, had

try to understand what that impression may be.

Secondly, with respect to our own attitude, pain is a highly motivating force in our private lives, the lives of the nations, and the lives of countries, and it seems to me that sanctions are a very specific way of communicating to Iran the shape of the economic future with which they must deal. And I don't know how you can find a way to more directly influence their conception of that fact than the sanction rules. I would hope that our European friends would understand that and, on the other hand, if sanctions were rejected—I have not evidence they will be—the effect that would have upon Iranian intransigence in dealing with the central problem with which each of our governments is concerned, including in our future relationships, the role of Iran toward the Western world and the rest of the world. These are central questions.

The hostage question is peripheral; central to the families of the hostages, central of our own concerns, but there are other issues that we ought to move to deal with as rapidly as possible. And I would hope that we would find a way as directly, indirectly through all the diplomatic channels that are available to us, through all the ingenious ways of communications that we can devise. Both Iran and the United States will be better off once the hostage situation is behind us.

Q. How much time do you think the President has?

A. I think of the problem not in terms of time the President has but in terms of the time that we have to resolve the problem before events overwhelm us and move toward confrontation that world be nonproductive, unproductive for both Iran and the United States.

Q. In the light of recent diplomatic moves and contacts, have you any indications at all from the Russian side of any intention to withdraw from Afghanistan?

A. I would doubt that. If they had any such communication to make, they would make it before my meeting with Mr. Gromyko. Even then, I am not sure they would choose that time to [inaudible].

Q. Are you concerned that after the French Olympic vote that other European countries would now follow suit and the whole boycott movement is being [inaudible]?

A. I'm happy to have this question, and it is an opportunity to express my deep concern.

The failure of the Olympic boycott movement could undermine all of the slow, agonizing effort we've been making to make clear to the Russians that the course upon which they embarked when they invaded Afghanistan is a nonproductive course. I find it incomprehensible that the citizens of democratic societies—whether Olympic athletes or otherwise—could fail to understand this fact. For us to march into the stadium in Moscow, representatives of free nations, with our young people embracing Moscow under the guidelines which the Soviets themselves have described in their Olympic document as a confirmation of the rightness of their foreign policy, I find it incomprehensible that free people—whether Europeans or Americans, whether athletes or nonathletes—could contemplate allowing the Soviet Union to convert that act of participation in the Olympics as a confirmation of their system, their policy, and their aggression in Afghanistan. I am speaking not so much as a Secretary of State, but as a citizen of the United States whose father was born in Russian-occupied Poland in the last century.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, VIENNA, MAY 15, 1980[6]

Mr. Chancellor, may I, first of all, express my personal joy at being here in Vienna and in Austria. I came within 50 miles of Austria once years ago and was called back to the United States and have been looking forward to it ever since. And, I'd like first of all, because this is principally a festive and ceremonial occasion in the context of which we now have arranged for some serious business, to bring President Carter's warm greetings on this 25th anniversary celebration, as well as my own.

He has the closest and warmest feelings for Austria and the greatest respect for your own leadership and the quality of your leadership not only in your country but with respect to issues that cut across national lines which concern us all. You have spoken out on that from a position of neutrality, but neutrality does not mean to you an absence of responsibility to speak out on issues as you see them. And for that I pay you my personal compliments as well as those of President Carter.

I think it is appropriate to say on an occasion which is the celebration of Austria's independence 25 years ago that the issues involving independence of peoples are still with us and still require, I think, that we pay close attention to the threats to independence of peoples, and we are faced with difficult problems now in resolving conflicting national interests that threaten the interests of independent peoples. It is appropriate, I think, that on this occasion of celebration of your independence that we should be engaging in the next day or two in discussions with other countries with respect to the problems created by tensions today similar to those circumstances in which Austria was born as a free and independent state. May I congratulate you and express my great pleasure to be here, indeed.

Q. Will you comment on the latest suggestions on Afghanistan about the willingness to discuss the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan?

A. With respect to the latest Afghan proposal of which I have probably only a sketchy outline, I think it's significant more for its timing and its obvious purpose to affect the Islamabad conference than as a serious response to our demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The withdrawal issue is touched upon in the proposal as I have seen it only in the very most ambiguous terms, and it seems to be conditioned upon a recognition of the Babrak regime—a legitimation of the invasion by the Soviet Union. So I regard it as cosmetic and not a meaningful proposal at this point. Nevertheless, the fact that Russia feels the pressure of international condemnation to the point that for the first time reference to withdrawal is included in the proposal is an interesting development.

Q. What effect do you think that your less than enthusiastic reaction to the new proposal on Afghanistan will have in your negotiations tomorrow with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko?

A. I suspect it will be matched by less than enthusiastic reception on his part of what I have to say to him.

Q. But how do you think it will affect your talks, in any way, if at all?

A. I would expect these talks to begin, as I said yesterday, with sort of a diplomatic minuet as we each recite our reactions to the other's actions over the past 6 to 8 months. It will be a probing on each side for what possibilities there may be to meet the minimal requirements of the other side, and I do not expect a substantive achievement tomorrow.

I think it will be a mistake to raise expectations on that possibility, but I think it is useful that the talks are being held and that a dialogue has begun after an absence of 6 to 8 months. Beyond that, given the Soviet reaction to our response to the Afghan invasion over 8 months, I am not optimistic that the talks will reflect any marked or significant change in the Soviet defense of its intervention in Afghanistan, its justification, or its criticism of the actions taken by the United States. I think it would be unrealistic to expect that kind of a change in Soviet attitudes to take place tomorrow, and that's certainly no mystery given the nature of negotiations with the Soviet Union over the last quarter of a century or more.

So the probing may or may not lead to substantive discussions upon which further talks can be held. I make no predictions of that but, obviously, both sides are meeting in some expectation that the dialogue will continue and that it might eventually reach a constructive result.



(UPI photo)

Secretary Muskie and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

STATEMENT MADE AT THE AUSTRIA STATE TREATY CEREMONY, VIENNA, MAY 16, 1980[7]

I am honored and delighted to carry the warm wishes of the American people to the people of Austria on this proud day. And I bring with me as well, on this historic anniversary, a message of admiration and friendship from President Carter.

I am pleased that my first journey abroad as a neophyte U.S. Secretary of State should bring me to Europe and to this celebration. For today is an important milestone for Austria and its people. And for all of us, this occasion expresses the promise of peace. We celebrate today a great success. Twenty-five years ago, the four powers signed the agreement which ended the occupation of Austria. The national independence and integrity of this great nation were restored. And through the strength, the determination, and the imagination of Austria's leaders and people since that time, that covenant has been translated into a vibrant reality.

Austria today is a successful democracy. It is a prosperous and dynamic society—beyond the expectations 25 years ago of all but the most visionary. And over this period, Austria's role as a constructive force in the world has grown. It is truly a crossroads—common ground for all nations.

You have pursued the policy of active neutrality—the policy that underlies this treaty and that is embodied in your constitution—not narrowly and timidly but with vision and courage. The United States deeply respects Austria's perpetual neutrality, and we shall continue to support its independence.

The Austrian State Treaty was signed against the background of a troubled world. Tensions between nations were high, especially between the Western and Eastern victors in World War II. In a similar sense, today's celebration stands in contrast to the atmosphere that prevails over much of the world. A number of crises threaten international stability. Our economies—industrial and developing—face serious problems. We confront the specter of international terrorism—acts of inhumanity in disregard of the most basic principles of a civilized world. We see a world in considerable ferment—as nations and people assert themselves with growing fervor. All of these crises challenge the imagination of the international community as it has seldom been challenged before. And we must soberly face another reality. The principles of neutrality, of independence, and territorial integrity, so respected in the case of Austria, are today being violated.

Today, we are faced again with a vital lesson from the past: that an act of aggression anywhere threatens security everywhere. Today, no less than in the past, my country and others will oppose such actions—through the firmness and clarity of our response, through a strong defense and strong alliances. Our purpose is to preserve the balance and to reinforce the restraint on which peace rests for us and for others.

We shall continue to convey the costs of aggression so long as it continues for we are committed to building peace by creating an international environment in which national independence is respected. And we shall continue to work in other ways to build a more stable peace.

We seek to preserve the framework of East-West relations. We will continue to seek balanced control and reduction of armaments on the basis of equality. We remain committed to ratification of the SALT II Treaty, and we will abide by its terms so long as that practice is mutual. In accordance with the NATO decision of last December, we continue to favor an early negotiation to limit long-range nuclear weapons in the European theater, and we will continue to pursue the negotiations here in Vienna for a mutual and

congressional review of all other third-party transfers similar to that on direct sales, i.e., transfers of $7 million or more in major defense equipment and all transfers valued at $25 million or more.

These proposed changes would bring legislation affecting security assistance programs more nearly into line with our arms transfer control policy, which exempts NATO countries, our ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, United States pact] allies, and Japan from its controls. In view of our close security ties with these nations and the fact that sales involving them have ...ely, if ever, generated controversy; we believe that an exemption of this sort is fully justified. In addition, these changes would have the effect of applying similar criteria to third-country transfers under section 3(d) as those applicable to direct FMS sales under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act. We would be prepared to report to the Congress, on a quarterly basis, all third-country transfers involving less than $7 million in major defense equipment or non-major defense equipment items less than $25 million.

The modifications contained in the Administration's proposed FY 1981 legislation have been carefully designed to provide for better management of our security assistance programs and to afford the President the flexibility to respond promptly and effectively to unforeseen foreign policy and security emergencies. I hope they will gain your support and approval.

I look forward to working with you and the other members of the subcommittee in the months to come to insure that our security assistance programs continue to serve our vital foreign, economic, and national security interests.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

The following paper, developed by the Department of State, examines the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as well as the U.S. and international response to it.

The Soviets invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, following months of domestic political turmoil and growing Soviet involvement. This involvement grew steadily after the Marxist coup led by Nur Mohammad Taraki overthrew President Daoud's nonaligned republican government in April 1978. Although the Soviet Union played little if any role in this coup, the Russians afterwards moved quickly to establish predominant influence in Afghanistan.

Throughout 1979, they had sought to establish an effective government in Kabul. However, the instability of Afghan politics, the ineffectiveness of the new leadership, and a growing, internally based insurgency threatened the pro-Soviet regime's control over the country. As internal resistance grew to a regime perceived as anti-Islamic and Soviet-dominated, the Soviets steadily expanded their military presence and tightened their control over the government. Following a mid-September 1979 shoot-out which may have resulted from a Soviet attempt to remove then-Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, Taraki was murdered and Amin took over the government.

During the Soviet invasion in December 1979, Amin was killed during an attack by Soviet troops on his palace. Babrak Karmal, in exile in Eastern Europe, was installed by the Soviets as President. The initial announcements of Amin's overthrow, although ostensibly broadcast by Kabul Radio, actually came from a transmitter in the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Union now exercises almost complete control over all significant areas of Afghan Government activity. Babrak Karmal has virtually no independence or authority. Soviet advisers have gradually assumed greater authority over the government and now make many day-to-day decisions. Police and security forces are under tight Soviet control, with KGB (Committee for State Security) officers directly involved in their operations.

There are now some 80,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, with another 25,000–30,000 poised across the Soviet border. Soviet military advisers may now number as many as 5,000, compared with about 350 before Daoud was overthrown. As their number has increased, their role also has changed. Soviet influence is seen in most aspects of government policy. The Soviets are in virtual command of the Afghan Army from the Defense Ministry down to battalion level and, except for minor local operations, determine the activities of the Afghan Armed Forces. Some Afghan army units have been disarmed.

Despite Soviet and Afghan statements that the Soviets will remain in Afghanistan for only a short time, there is overwhelming evidence that Moscow is planning a prolonged occupation. The movement of additional forces to the Afghan border indicates that the Soviets plan to augment their forces. They are building permanent barracks and other installations within Afghanistan. Reservists originally sent to Afghanistan are being replaced by troops with longer terms of service. The decision to mount large-scale counterinsurgency operations suggests that they are determined to wipe out nationalist resistance. Given the determination of the resistance forces, this portends a long, bloody struggle.

All three of the Soviet-backed Marxist governments have engaged in brutal repression. When Taraki came to power in 1978, many officials of previous governments were executed; entire families were jailed; thousands were imprisoned with no pretense of judicial process. Executions at Pol-i-Charki prison near Kabul averaged about 50 a night. Amin stepped up repressive measures and maintained order by terror. Thousands were detained in nightly sweeps in Kabul. Although Babrak has promised major reforms, few political prisoners other than Babrak's followers have been released; executions continue; and there are now Soviet guards at Pol-i-Charki.

In the countryside, the successive Afghan governments have tried to stem insurgency. Villages have been destroyed. There were several mass executions, some in the presence of Soviet advisers.

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, they tried initially to avoid military actions that would antagonize the population. Frustrated in their efforts to win popular acquiescence in their intervention, however, they have begun to turn to more brutal methods. In the recent offensive in Konarha Province, they leveled villages with napalm and high explosives and forced thousands to flee to Pakistan. There is evidence that the Soviets have used chemical weapons in Afghanistan.

Afghan Resistance

Despite overwhelming Soviet military superiority, resistance has increased dramatically since the Soviet invasion. Resistance forces operate in the countryside and have been joined by Afghan troops. In some cases, entire units have defected to the resistance. Other units have mutinied, killed their advisers, and fought Soviet troops. Even those units that remain ostensibly loyal have been weakened by desertions; occasionally they have refused to engage in offensive operations.

Government control of the cities has declined sharply since the Soviet invasion. At various times, the government has lost almost all control in Herat, Qandahar, and Jalalabad. Most cities and many smaller towns have had general strikes and demonstrations. In Kabul, where previous Marxist governments had no significant problems, there was a popularly supported 6-day strike, accompanied by anti-government demonstrations, in February.

The Babrak government has virtually no popular support, and there is a widespread perception that his government is ineffective. The government is badly divided.

Over 700,000 Afghans have fled their homes, with most going to Pakistan. This is about 5% of the population; it may reach 10% by summer.

Soviet casualties probably have averaged about 500 a week, most of them the result of attacks on small groups of troops and convoys and of clashes with the Afghan Army. By the beginning of April, total casualties may have reached 7,000.

U.S. Policy

At stake in Afghanistan first is the freedom of a nation and a people. The Soviets are seeking to impose their control over Afghanistan and to destroy its independence and its right to self-determination.

Vital U.S. interests are involved in southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. We now depend on the Persian Gulf for roughly 25% of our annual oil imports. Our allies and others—developing nations as well as industrial—are even more dependent on oil from the area. About 66% of Western Europe's oil imports and 75% of Japan's come from the Gulf.

Our interest in the region goes beyond economics. Peace and stability in the region are also critical to the future of the nations there. The strength and skill the United States and others show in supporting their independence will demonstrate to them and to others the constancy of our purpose.

We cannot know with certainty Soviet intentions in the region—whether their motives in Afghanistan are limited or part of a larger strategy. The *fact* is that tens of thousands of Soviet troops are in Afghanistan. Soviet actions have increased the potential threat to the security of nations in the region and to the world's access to vital resources and shipping routes.

To respond firmly to this potential threat is not to be apocalyptic; it is simply to be prudent. As the President has said: "Aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease."

The actions we have taken in response to the Soviet invasion serve five broad objectives.

- Our first purpose is to impose a heavy price for Soviet aggression—because of our abhorrence of what is being done to the Afghan people and to help deter similar actions elsewhere. The steps we have taken—on grain, on technology, on the Olympics, on fisheries, and in other areas—convey our determination in the clearest terms. Indeed, the Soviets are paying a heavy price, not only in the measures we have taken but also in the condemnation they have received from an overwhelming majority of nations in the world and on the ground in Afghanistan.

- Our second goal is withdrawal of all Soviet military forces from Afghanistan. The sanctions we have undertaken will remain in force until all Soviet troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan. When Soviet troops are withdrawn, our intention is to remove the sanctions.[1]

To encourage withdrawal, the President has made clear that we are ready to support international efforts to restore a neutral, nonaligned Afghan Government responsive to the wishes of the Afghan people. With prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the United States would be willing to join with Afghanistan's neighbors in a guarantee of Afghanistan's true neutrality and of noninterference in its internal affairs. But the Soviets have shown no interest in such proposals; nor do we see any signs at this time of a Soviet withdrawal.

- This makes our third goal all the more important: to manage East-West relations, during a period of heightened tension, in ways that preserve their essential framework.

We will maintain the penalties of aggression for as long as necessary, but we seek no return to the indiscriminate confrontation of earlier times.

We will continue to pursue our national interest in balanced and verifiable arms control. The President has made clear our continuing commitment to ratification of the SALT II Treaty. The treaty serves our security interests. In accordance with international law, we intend to take no action pending ratification that would defeat the object or purpose of the treaty, so long as the Soviets act in a similar fashion.

We will not abrogate formal agreements with the Soviets.

We will continue to prepare for the Madrid CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) review meeting.

We will continue to build stronger relations with the East European nations.

And we remain prepared to build a more stable and productive relationship with the Soviets when circumstances permit.

- Our fourth goal is to work with the nations of southwest Asia and others to strengthen regional security, stability, and independence. These efforts include helping nations in the area to strengthen their defense capabilities and their political and economic stability, and strengthening our own ability to respond militarily to contingencies that would threaten our vital interests and those of our friends.

We will continue to work toward a comprehensive peace in the Middle East that would strengthen Israel's security, enhance the security of Israel's neighbors, and give greater stability to the entire region.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture
Convention on the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at Washington Mar. 6, 1979.[1]
Ratifications deposited: Chile, Feb. 14, 1980; Haiti, Mar. 26, 1980; Honduras, Feb. 27, 1980; Uruguay, Nov. 15, 1979.

Aviation
Protocol relating to an amendment [article 50(a)] to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal Oct. 16, 1974. Entered into force Feb. 15, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Apr. 3, 1980.

Copyright
Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.
Accession deposited: Czechoslovakia, Jan. 17, 1980.[2]
Ratification deposited: Holy See, Feb. 6, 1980.

Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.
Ratification deposited: Holy See, Feb. 6, 1980.

Protocol 2 to the universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.
Accession deposited: Czechoslovakia, Jan. 17, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Holy See, Feb. 6, 1980.

Energy
Agreement on an international energy program. Done at Paris Nov. 18, 1974. Entered into force provisionally Nov. 18, 1974; definitively, Jan. 19, 1976. TIAS 8278.
Extended to: the Bailiwick of Guernsey and the Isle of Man, Feb. 15, 1980.

Finance
Agreement establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, with annexes. Done at Washington Apr. 8, 1959. Entered into force Dec. 30, 1959. TIAS 4397.
Signature and acceptance deposited: Portugal, Mar. 25, 1980.

Maritime Matters
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Saint Lucia, Apr. 10, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Done at London Oct. 17, 1974. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1978. TIAS 8606.
Acceptance deposited: United Arab Emirates, Mar. 4, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Done at London Nov. 14, 1975.[1]
Acceptances deposited: Hungary, Mar. 31, 1980; Saint Lucia, Apr. 10, 1980; United Kingdom, Feb. 22, 1980.[3]

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Done at London Nov. 17, 1977.[1]
Acceptances deposited: Hungary, Mar. 31, 1980; Saint Lucia, Apr. 10, 1980; U.K., Feb. 22, 1980.[3]

Meteorology
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11, 1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Bahrain, Apr. 21, 1980.

Narcotic Drugs
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976.
Accession deposited: Malawi, Apr. 9, 1980.
Ratification deposited: U.S., Apr. 16, 1980.
Enters into force for U.S.: July 15, 1980.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation
Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Ratification deposited: Turkey, Apr. 17, 1980.[3]

Patents
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978; except for Chapter II. Chapter II entered into force Mar. 29, 1978.[4] TIAS 8733.
Ratification deposited: Hungary, Mar. 27, 1980.

Pollution
International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the U.S. Dec. 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.
Acceptance deposited: Papua New Guinea, Mar. 12, 1980.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954 (TIAS 4900). Done at London Apr. 11, 1962. Entered into force May 18, 1967; June 28, 1967 for Article XIV. TIAS 6109.
Acceptance deposited: Papua New Guinea, Mar. 12, 1980.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Done at London Oct. 21, 1969. Entered into force Jan. 20, 1978. TIAS 8505.
Acceptance deposited: Papua New Guinea, Mar. 12, 1980.

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068.
Accession deposited: Papua New Guinea, Mar. 12, 1980.

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels Nov. 29, 1969.
Entered into force: June 19, 1975.[4]
Accession deposited: Papua New Guinea, Mar. 12, 1980.

International convention on the establishment of an international fund for compensation for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels Dec. 18, 1971. Entered into force Oct. 16, 1978.[5]
Notification of succession: Tuvalu, Oct. 16, 1978.
Accessions deposited: Monaco, Aug. 23, 1979; Papua New Guinea, Mar. 12, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Dec. 29, 1972 on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter (TIAS 8165). Done at London Oct. 12, 1978.[1]
Acceptances deposited: France, Oct. 1, 1979; U.K., Mar. 21, 1980.[5]

Postal
Money orders and postal travelers' checks agreement, with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8232.
Ratification deposited: Spain, Dec. 21, 1979.

Second additional protocol to the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.
Ratifications deposited: Burma, Feb. 27, 1980; Spain, Dec. 21, 1979.
Accession deposited: Gambia, Feb. 1, 1980.

Refugees
Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.
Accession deposited: Nicaragua, Mar. 28, 1980.

Rubber
International natural rubber agreement, 1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979.[1]
Signature: Japan, Mar. 7, 1980.

Satellite Communications System
Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Accession deposited: Niger, Apr. 14, 1980.

Operating agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Signature: Niger, Apr. 14, 1980.

Sugar
International sugar agreement, 1977, with annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered into force provisionally, Jan. 1, 1978; definitively Jan. 2, 1980. TIAS 9664.
Notification of provisional application deposited: Colombia, Apr. 14, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, Mar. 27, 1980.

Terrorism
International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 19, 1979.[1]
Signatures: Bolivia, Mar. 25, 1980; Haiti, Apr. 21, 1980; Italy, Apr. 18, 1980; Lesotho, Apr. 17, 1980.

Trade
Protocol extending the arrangement regarding international trade in textiles of Dec. 20, 1973 (TIAS 7840). Done at Geneva Dec. 14, 1977. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1978. TIAS 8939.

Acceptance deposited: Argentina, Feb. 18, 1980.[6]

Agreement on trade in civil aircraft. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9620.
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, Apr. 2, 1980.

U.N. Industrial Development Organization
Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.[1]
Ratification deposited: Nicaragua, Mar. 28, 1980.
Signatures: Malaysia, Apr. 10, 1980; Somalia, Mar. 21, 1980; Trinidad and Tobago, Apr. 14, 1980.

Wheat
Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Egypt, Apr. 22, 1980; Guatemala, Apr. 28, 1980.

Food aid convention, 1980 (part of the International Wheat Agreement), 1971, as extended (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Mar. 11, 1980. Enters into force July 1, 1980, if by June 30, 1980 the governments referred to in paragraph (3) of Article III have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or declarations of provisional application, and provided that the 1979 protocol for the fifth extension of the Wheat Trade Convention, 1971, or a new Wheat Trade Convention replacing it, is in force.
Signatures: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Economic Community, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, U.K., Apr. 30, 1980; Austria, Switzerland, U.S., Apr. 29, 1980; Finland, Japan, Apr. 22, 1980; Norway, Apr. 24, 1980; Sweden, Apr. 9, 1980.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Aug. 2, 1978 (TIAS 9389), with agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca Mar. 7, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 7, 1980.

Botswana
Agreement providing for a radio facility for the purpose of relaying Voice of America programs to areas in Africa. Signed at Gaborone Mar. 28, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 28, 1980.

Canada
Protocol to amend the convention for the protection, preservation, and extension of the sockeye salmon fisheries in the Fraser River System of May 26, 1930, as amended (50 Stat. 1355, TIAS 3867). Signed at Washington Feb. 24, 1977.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Mar. 20, 1980.
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Mar. 31, 1980.

Protocol amending the convention for the preservation of the halibut fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea (TIAS 2900), with agreed minute. Signed at Washington Mar. 29, 1979.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Mar. 20, 1980.
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Mar. 31, 1980.

Colombia
Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 3, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9515, 9645), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Bogota Jan. 2 and 31, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 31, 1980.

Cyprus
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with related exchange of notes. Signed at Nicosia Mar. 26, 1980. Enters into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Haiti
Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 17, 1979 (TIAS 9595), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince Jan. 28 and Mar. 3, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 3, 1980.

Indonesia
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with agreed minutes. Signed at Jakarta Mar. 6, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 6, 1980.

Kenya
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with minutes of negotiation. Signed at Nairobi Mar. 6, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 6, 1980.

Malaysia
Agreement amending the agreement of May 17 and June 8, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9180, 9602), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and New York Jan. 8 and Mar. 27, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 27, 1980.

Malta
Agreement with respect to taxes on income, with related exchange of notes. Signed at Valletta Mar. 21, 1980. Enters into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification. Provisions shall have effect in respect of income or profits arising on or after the first day of January of the year in which the agreement enters into force.

Nicaragua
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Aug. 31, 1979. Effected by exchange of notes at Managua Feb. 11 and 13, 1980. Entered into force Feb. 13, 1980.

Norway
Extradition treaty. Signed at Oslo June 9, 1977. Entered into force Mar. 7, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Apr. 9, 1980.

Pakistan
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with minutes. Signed at Islamabad Mar. 25, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 25, 1980.

Poland
Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 9 and 12, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9064, 9213, 9640), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Warsaw Jan. 22 and Mar. 17, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 9 and 12, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9064, 9213, 9640), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of

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Cover:

Secretary Muskie

Richard M. Moose

Warren Christopher

Richard N. Cooper

Myles R. R. Frechette

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EDMUND S. MUSKIE
Secretary of State

William J. Dyess
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor

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cleared its schedule last fall for the debate to begin in January. As a matter of fact, we planned it so thoroughly that we haven't had much domestic legislation to consider in the early months of this year, because we had reserved that time. So this Soviet complaint that we did not really make an effort to ratify SALT is completely without foundation. There is, of course, opposition to SALT.

It would have been a tough fight to win at best. We all know that, and you all know that. But we were ready to go, and we thought—Senator Byrd's a pretty good nose counter—we had a fighting chance that if we could have begun the debate in January, we would have gotten the SALT ratification. I think it is important to make that point, and maybe as a Member of the Senate at that time, I could have been more persuasive with Mr. Gromyko on that point than the Administration had been up to that point.

Q. From his viewpoint, there was a sea change when we decided to convince the allies to put in missiles that can hit the Soviet Union—those 572 missiles that can reach the Soviet Union. What can you offer him in a way of allaying what, after all, he considers as a major departure, and, secondly, do you see any real chance that this meeting or even a future meeting will revive the long-shelved Administration emphasis on arms control—specifically, the SALT Treaty and other things that are totally gone by the board as we take this tough line?

A. What he has got to understand if he doesn't—we are not really sure what he understands and what he doesn't understand; he is a pretty sharp guy—what he has got to understand is that a steady Soviet buildup in nuclear arms and in conventional arms over a period of 15 years has finally generated a reaction all of its own, independent of Afghanistan. And coupled with Afghanistan, it has just intensified prodefense attitudes of this country, our people, and the Congress. He has got to expect that given the continued buildup by the Soviets—and it still continues—that the United States and our NATO allies are going to protect our interests.

With respect to theater nuclear forces (TNF), after all, they began the thing with the SS–20. The SS–20 generated alarm throughout Europe and it certainly did with us, and neither the SS–20 aimed at Europe nor the TNF is covered by the SALT II Treaty. We have offered to make those issues part of the negotiations moving toward SALT III. SALT II is not the end of the line. We have never included theater nuclear weapons in the SALT discussions up to this point, by mutual agreement. But so long as they continue to modernize their theater nuclear weapons, we surely have the option to do the same.

But that's a fact of life, and that ought to push both of us toward SALT III. We can't get to SALT III unless we ratify SALT II, and Afghanistan stands right in the way.

Q. You feel you can't have a SALT III unless you ratify SALT II? I mean, that's a judgment that you have decided that you can't put aside SALT II and start on SALT III right away?

A. I think that has to be the emphasis on this point. We've got to keep the pressure on the Russians. We've got to keep the pressure on the possibility for ratifying SALT II so long as the calendar makes it relevant. The calendar itself creates problems down the road, but I am not interested in looking that far away.

Q. But it seems that Afghanistan at this moment is the pivot. In other words, you've described another 1940s; you've described the cold war. Are they going to pull out of Afghanistan or are we going to blink or are we going to do something nice or what? I mean there's no end to this, is there?

A. I think they've got to get out of Afghanistan. I think they've got to move toward a neutralized Afghanistan, and they've got to recognize this fact. When I say that SALT II is tied to Afghanistan, I say it irrespective of the Senate vote count.

I just don't see any way that you can get through this in the Senate—to ratify SALT II—unless something is done to reassure the American people about Afghanistan. And I can see nothing short of withdrawal of troops that would that at this point, and I think he must understand that. I don't expect any substantive achievement, as I've already said, out of this meeting with Gromyko. But I will hope that we can have a forthcoming discussion of where we are and how each of us sees our present posture, so that there can be no doubt about the realities of the critical situation in our respective countries.

Whether or not there is a followup meeting is the question I leave up in the air. I would think that—I would hope—that I might present our point of view, and especially from the perspective of a recent Senator, in such a way as to give him some food for thought about the depth of the American feeling about what the Russians have done, about the breadth of it across our whole political spectrum, and about our desire not to move our whole political spectrum, and about our desire not to move into a cold war situation, but our desire to resume the process which produced the SALT II and which created hopes that we might slowly build up a peaceful world.

I hold that out not just as a carrot but as a very real, genuinely-held objective of this Administration and the American people—that we can get to that kind of post-Afghanistan world, put us both on the same track, moving in the same direction, towards goals that assure a peaceful resolution of issues rather than a violent one.

Q. I wonder whether I can take you back to the subject of sanctions again. Is it your understanding that for them to comply with their commitment, it would have to involve the cutting off of all existing contracts as well future ones, or is there some grey area there?

A. I would rather not prejudge that question at this point. I think I owe them an obligation to hear what they have to say.

Q. Has there been any slippage or is there any slippage on the subject of the Olympic boycott? There are reports that the French and the Germans are now leaning away from it.

A. The most recent vote we had was that of the German Olympic Executive Committee—which, we're told, is not binding—which was 12–7 for a boycott. Chancellor Schmidt has told me personally that once it's clear that the American position is solidly behind the boycott that West Germany will follow. That was, of course, when he was here in the United States. I have no evidence that he has changed his view about that.

The French vote, which I think takes place today, would be important. We have just got to wait for the vote. I talked to Mr. Poncet [Foreign Minister

Jean Francois-Poncet] about it yesterday, and we will just have to wait and see what the vote is. If we can get both of those, then I think we've won the fight.

Q. You mentioned the Soviet proposals. I guess there also have been some proposals for the neutralization of Afghanistan made by the British—by Lord Carrington when he was here. Can those go anywhere? Are you willing to discuss those with Gromyko? I may be a little bit off base on this, but my understanding was that Secretary Vance was prepared to discuss them with the Russians, provided there would be simultaneous Soviet troop withdrawal over an extended period. Does the Carrington idea of neutralization make any sense to you? Can it go anywhere?

A. It's an initiative which I think can be useful if the Russians respond to it. I think they should respond to it first.

The Russians like to be in a position to knock down proposal after proposal until you come up with the one they want. What I'm looking for is a proposal which forces both to focus on building on it. No proposal in its first form is going to settle this issue, but if some initiative is offered that we each accept as the basis for building an agreement, then I'd be interested in it. But I'm not going to agree in advance and by agreeing in advance put the Russians in a position to reject it.

Q. Earlier you sounded a little bit as if the idea that has been proposed —I think it might have been by George Ball—but the idea of a combination of incentives and penalties to the Iranians might make some sense to you. Is that something you are going to discuss with the Europeans—the idea of perhaps suggesting to the Iranians that if they release the hostages there might be unfreezing of assets within a certain amount of time? If they don't, there would be additional sanctions?

A. You know I think the question of sanctions generally, including the economic measures we took against Iranians, are a proper subject for consideration if the Iranians are willing to get to the point of discussing [inaudible]. We can't dilute the issue; but, I think that as we communicate through the diplomatic avenues that are available to us, and there are such, that there are these kinds of things that can be held out to us and to the Iranians as possibly useful in coming to a decision to release the hostages. I think it has to be done through third parties to try to identify the stakes that the Iranians have in the posthostage period that might be useful.

Q. You spoke about trying to persuade Mr. Gromyko to change Soviet policies. Do you think it is that simple, or does it require a structural change in their form of government of a new generation of leaders?

A. If we wait for those two events, we won't have any agreements. I think that we may not have any anyway. I will say to you in all frankness, I found the Afghanistan invasion so unexpected —not that I haven't always been alert to the dangers which the Soviet Union posed for us, but I found it such a sharp diversion from the policy that they have been practicing and following for a decade that it raised real doubts in my mind as to whether it made any sense to go forward with some of these other efforts to find areas of agreement. And as you all know, there are Soviet scholars who disagree with each other about the long-term significance of what they've done. So I think we have to be very alert, very careful to try to read that significance, and we have to read any proposal to resolve our present differences in that context. It's not going to be an easy task, and I find myself in a new role in respect to that, and I'm going to be a little cautious about it.

Q. What kind of neutralization plan for Afghanistan do you think would induce the Senate to take a more serious look at SALT? Do you have a bottom line on that? Anything short of a complete withdrawal—would that be acceptable?

A. I don't think you can get the Senate at this point to even react to a neutralization plan. It's too hypothetical, and the Senate is sensitive as a whole, as I am, to trying to answer problems related to the Soviet Union in terms of hypotheticals. Hypotheticals give them something to play with, and I am against it. I am for getting some pretty solid feel of their response to any proposal before endorsing one in advance.

Q. Would anything short of complete withdrawal—

A. Again you are trying by a series of questions, and I am not going to reduce the options. Any reduction of options simply would lead them to bring pressure on one area or another, and I'm not about to let them do that.

Q. I got the impression that if you're going to hold SALT as a carrot you're going to suggest that there could be action on SALT if they are forthcoming in Afghanistan. Is that what you're saying? That was my understanding, basically. That's oversimplified.

A. SALT is just one illustration of the issues. I brought SALT up because they have accused us of having been less than enthusiastic about SALT ratification. They've used SALT as a partial explanation for why they went ahead in Afghanistan. But there are other issues—an improvement in the whole range—on grain, on high technology—the whole range of areas in which we were broadening contacts, exchanges—commercial, agriculture, or otherwise—all of those promising initiatives which were gaining momentum are at stake here, not just SALT, but the whole range. I don't hold any of them as a carrot, but what I'm holding out is the challenge of normalizing relations between the Russians and ourselves, and I am saying to them the burden is on you to demonstrate to us that real normalization is truly our objective and Afghanistan, which you created, is the test.

Q. What is your attitude—and what do you sense—after this week or so of consultations with the President and other members of the Administration toward the possible trial of the hostages in Tehran if this were seen as the way by which they could resolve the matter within their processes?

A. I'm not under the impression at this point that that is an idea that is being actively or vigorously pursued in Iran, so it is not a contingency which we have been addressing this week.

Q. Some of those who recently been in Iran think it is—

A. It's hard to know how to use your time the first week, and that's something that has concerned me very much, but I've been reading the intelligence briefings. At this point, even though it's been talked about in the press—

Q. You talked about the tough guy Mr. Gromyko is. What kind of guy do you want NATO and our NATO allies to think you are?

balanced reduction of forces in Europe. We look forward to the forthcoming meeting in Madrid of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as an opportunity for a balanced discussion of developments since the conference in Belgrade. And the path to broader cooperation, to a lessening of tensions in Europe and elsewhere, is open when the policies of others allow. We are committed to a realistic search for common ground, but we must all recognize that detente can thrive only in an atmosphere of restraint, on a foundation of fidelity to the basic tenets of international law.

We remain hopeful that progress can be made, and this occasion strengthens our hope for the treaty we commemorate today is an enduring reminder. It is a reminder that even in the most difficult time, it is possible—indeed, all the more important—to work for a stable and peaceful world. So this celebration is not only a proud look backward, it is a reason for hope.

I am grateful for the opportunity to share this day with you and to confirm, once again, the friendship, respect, and support of the American people.

STATEMENT MADE FOLLOWING MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, VIENNA, MAY 16, 1980[8]

Mr. Gromyko and I had an obviously long and serious discussion about a number of practical problems, and the discussion fully justified my belief that it was necessary to hold this talk. I will not discuss any of the details. I think my duty is to report to the President and I shall do so. And I would hope that the meeting might lead to further discussions and that at some point along the way they may lead to a resolution of the differences that exist.

[1] Not printed here are the President's and Secretary's remarks before the latter's departure on May 13 (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 19) and the Secretary's departure remarks in Brussels on May 15 (press release 120 of May 21).

[2] Press release 117 of May 14.

[3] Press release 118 of May 13.

[4] Made at the conclusion of the NATO ministerial meeting (press release 119 of May 16).

[5] Press release 123 of May 19.

[6] Press release 124 of May 19.

[7] Press release 126 of May 20.

[8] Press release 125 of May 19. ■

Coup d'Etat in Liberia

by William C. Harrop

Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 29, 1980. Mr. Harrop is Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.[1]

I want to thank the committee for this opportunity to share with you information on the recent coup d'etat in Liberia and the executions which have followed it. As requested by the chairman, I will provide a chronology of events following the coup and leading up to the executions as these events relate to our asylum and refuge policy.

U.S.-Liberian Ties

The United States has always enjoyed a particularly close and special relationship with Liberia, a nation that was established in the middle of the 19th century largely by freed slaves from America. Historically, Liberia has been one of the most stable nations in Africa and, having never been a colony, escaped the trauma that accompanied and came after independence in much of the continent.

A ruling oligarchy, often referred to as the "Americo-Liberians" or "settler class"—constituting only 3% of Liberia's 1.8 million people—has dominated the political and economic life of the country since independence in 1847. An irony of the recent coup is that President [William R.] Tolbert had begun to make some progress in increasing the participation of indigenous people in the mainstream of Liberian political and economic life. Thus, the rising expectations of the indigenous people, in addition to their accumulated frustration at the lopsided distribution of benefits, contributed to Tolbert's downfall.

Roots of the Coup

The coup of April 12 was foreshadowed by the rice riots of April 1979 and the growing support for political groups opposed to the ruling True Whig Party. The roots of the coup lay in the indigenous people's resentment of the Americo-Liberians and the resentment of the "have-nots" for the "haves." This resentment was aggravated by the ostentatious wealth of the Tolbert family and the corruption of the privileged class in an era of pressing economic difficulties for Liberia as well as most other developing countries.

We have no evidence of external involvement in the coup. It appears to have been a spur-of-the-moment action, although a vague plan may have been in the back of Sergeant [Samuel K.] Doe's mind for some time.

The executions of the past week have been particularly unsettling since we had been led to hope that the military tribunal would not result in capital sentences. None of the officials who were executed had requested asylum or extended refuge from the United States. In the specific case of Foreign Minister [C. Cecil] Dennis, he, his brother, and their families did take shelter at the home of one of the Embassy officers immediately after the coup, but he voluntarily surrendered later the same day to representatives of the new government. Neither those former Liberian officials, who willingly surrendered to the new government, nor our Embassy could predict the harsh violence which was to follow.

Chronology of Events

On April 12, about 2 a.m., gunfire broke out in Monrovia around President Tolbert's Executive Mansion and quickly spread so that it became extremely dangerous to go anywhere that morning. Chargé [Julius W.] Walker and the other officials who were able to get to the Embassy immediately advised all Americans to stay at home and "keep their heads low."

It was during these early morning hours that Embassy personnel who had remained at home received calls or visits from four government officials. In the confusion of the gunfire in the streets and sporadic telephone service, the Embassy was unclear about what the four officials had sought.

As it turned out, in reconstructing the events of that night with the Americans who were contacted by these officials, the government officials did not request asylum either immediately or later on. The officials were

Foreign Affairs Minister Dennis; Justice Minister Joseph Chesson; Deputy Minister of National Security Will Clark; and Head of the National Security Agency Spencer Edriss. Chesson and Clark first called for information on the situation; Chesson apparently was not heard from again, but Clark later sent word that he wanted the Embassy to intercede with the new government on his behalf.

Embassy response had been to seek meetings with Chairman Doe and Foreign Minister [Gabriel Baccus] Matthews and to urge due process of law and respect for individuals' rights. The Embassy has emphasized these points strongly many times since the coup but has not intervened on behalf of any particular individual.

Spencer, Edriss, and Dennis were given refuge in the homes of Embassy personnel. Edriss told the Embassy officer that he would not be able to remain in Liberia and wanted to come to the United States. He said this as he was leaving to turn himself in and added that he would be in touch again when he was released.

Dennis and his brother, James, were contacted by an Embassy officer in the early morning hours of the coup to tell them what was going on. Cecil was not at home, but James later located him. Both Dennis families were given refuge in the Embassy officer's home. They had free access to the phone and were fed during this time. Around noon Dennis spoke of giving himself up. He then called the Embassy and spoke with the Chargé who expressed concern for both Dennis families.

Cecil Dennis did not at any point in these conversations ask for asylum or extended refuge. From the officer's residence he telephoned several other embassies to ask for a car to take him to the Barclay Training Camp. He did not ask for American assistance from the American Embassy official or anyone else in the Embassy. Gunfire would have prevented a car from driving across town—where the Embassy is located—at that time, and Dennis was presumably aware of this fact. Later that afternoon, Cecil's young cousin who worked at the Executive Mansion came to the residence. After being requested by Cecil to drive him to the stockade, the young cousin returned with two soldiers on foot. They went away in the young cousin's car to the stockade. The cousin returned to the Embassy residence later to say that Cecil had had no problems enroute and had been received in an orderly fashion at the stockade. Cecil's wife and the James Dennis family spent that night at the officer's residence.

The security situation in Liberia, where some 4,000 American citizens are located, is now improved, but the atmosphere remains very tense.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Liberia—A Profile

People

Population: 1,733,000 (Jan. 1978).
Annual Growth Rate: 3.3%.
Ethnic Groups: 5% descendants of immigrant Negroes, 95% indigenous tribes, the largest of which are Kpelle, Bassa, Gio, Kru, Grebo, and Mano.
Religions: Tribal religions, 75%, Muslim 15%, Christian 10%.
Languages: English (official); over 20 local languages and dialects of the Niger-Congo language group.
Literacy: 24%
Life Expectancy: 46 yrs.

Geography

Area: 111,370 sq.km. (43,000 sq. mi.).
Capital: Monrovia (pop. 210,000).

Government

Type: Military Council.
Date of Independence: 1847.
Constitution: July 26, 1874 (suspended in April 1980).
Branches: People's Redemption Council combines executive, legislative, and judicial functions. Chairman is head of state; cabinet of heads of ministries conducts administration.
Political Parties: None.
Suffrage: Elections suspended under military rule.
Administrative Subdivisions: 9 Counties.
Central Government Budget: $315 million (1979–80 FY).

Economy

GDP: $744 million (1978).
Annual Growth Rate: 5.3%.
Per Capita Income: $433.
Avg. Rate of Inflation 1970–76: 10.3% per year.
Natural Resources: Iron ore, rubber, timber, diamonds.
Agriculture: *Products*—rubber, rice, oil palm, cassava, coffee, cocoa.
Industry: *Types*—iron and diamond mining, rubber processing, food processing, lumber milling.
Trade (1978); *Exports*—$486.4 million. *Imports*—$480.9 million.
Official Exchange Rate: Liberia uses U.S. dollars.
Economic Aid Received: *Total*—$44.4 million from international agencies (FY 78), $23.3 million from other bilateral donors (CY 77). *U.S. aid*—$6.4 million (1978).

For more detailed information on Liberia, see the* Liberia Background Notes *(April 1979).

• Finally, recent events in southwest Asia must renew our commitment to building our nation's basic military and economic strength.

We cannot escape the clear message that we must lessen our dependence on foreign oil.

Furthermore, our overall defense modernization programs will proceed expeditiously, including improvements in our ability to respond swiftly and effectively to military contingencies. We have no desire for military superiority, but we will maintain a military balance.

The Soviet Union has been increasing its defense expenditures by about 4% annually, in real terms, for well over a decade. There has been a substantial increase over this period in Soviet strategic, theater nuclear, and conventional capabilities. For most of that same period, U.S. defense investments, after inflation, were declining. Beginning in 1976, we have reversed the pattern of declining U.S. defense expenditures. We are proceeding with a comprehensive modernization of our strategic, theater nuclear, and conventional forces.

For over a decade, the United States has sought to broaden areas of cooperation with the Soviet Union that could make our relations more reciprocal and productive. Detente, however, must be a two-way street. The Soviet invasion has increased tensions and precluded business as usual with the U.S.S.R.

International Reaction

On January 14, 1980, the U.N. General Assembly condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by a vote of 104 to 18 with 18 abstentions—one of the largest majorities in U.N. history on an issue of this kind. The overwhelming vote stripped away any pretensions the U.S.S.R. may have had that the world community would remain indifferent to its aggression.

Western Europe. European leaders have unambiguously denounced the Soviet invasion and supported efforts to bring about a Soviet withdrawal. In a joint February 5 communique, French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt stated that the invasion "creates serious dangers to stability in the region and to peace." They noted that "in the light of events in Afghanistan detente has become more difficult and uncertain, and that therefore withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan is a necessity."

European political cooperation on Afghanistan has been focused in the European Community (EC). Meeting on January 15, the EC Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their "grave concern" over the Soviet invasion, which "represents a serious violation of the principles . . . of the United Nations," a "flagrant interference in the internal affairs of a nonaligned country," and "a threat to peace, security and stability. . . ." They agreed to cancel the 1979 EC food aid program for Afghanistan and committed themselves to emergency aid for Afghan refugees through the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. The EC adopted the principle that its agricultural supplies should not directly or indirectly substitute for those denied by the United States to the Soviets.

Various European states have taken unilateral economic measures against the Soviet Union. These include reduced diplomatic contacts, cancellation or postponement of exchanges, and concrete economic measures such as the British reduction in export subsidies to the Soviet Union.

Asia. Australia and New Zealand have imposed sanctions on the Soviet Union, reduced contacts with the Soviets, and supported the boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games. Australia is increasing defense expenditures and has ordered its aircraft carrier into the Indian Ocean in support of our presence there.

The Japanese Government has publicly condemned the Soviet invasion. The Japanese are cooperating in the boycott of the export of high technology and new export credits. They have offered to increase aid to Pakistan and they have canceled aid to Afghanistan. The government also supports the Olympic boycott.

South Korean Foreign Minister Pak Tong-chin, in a recent public statement, voiced deep concern over the Soviet Union's growing military profile in the world.

Chinese media and official statements repeatedly have condemned the Soviet invasion, demanded a Soviet withdrawal, and called for a united response to the Soviet action. China has stated that it will join an international boycott of the Moscow Olympics.

ASEAN States. The ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) states have publicly condemned the Soviet invasion, most recently in the March communique issued during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting with the European Community.

India. India favors an early withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Islamic World. On January 27–28, 35 Muslim countries attending the extraordinary ministerial session of the Islamic Conference in Islamabad strongly condemned the "Soviet military aggression against the Afghani people." The conference's final declaration called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet forces, not only from Afghanistan but also from the Horn of Africa.

In a resolution proposed by Saudi Arabia, the conference also:

• Suspended Afghanistan's membership in the Islamic Conference organization;

• Invited member states to withhold recognition of the Babrak Karmal regime and to sever diplomatic relations with Afghanistan until the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops;

• Called on all member states to stop all assistance to the present Afghan regime;

• Called on Islamic member states to support the Islamic countries neighboring Afghanistan and assist their efforts to safeguard their sovereignty, national independence, and territorial integrity; and

• Suggested that member states consider not participating in the Moscow Olympics until the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

The Iranian Government has strongly condemned the Soviet invasion. It has expressed its concern that the U.S.S.R. might some day take the same action against Iran.

Latin America. Almost all Latin American countries have condemned the Soviet intervention. All voted for the January 14 U.N. General Assembly resolution except Cuba and Grenada, which voted against, and Nicaragua, which abstained.

Africa. In the General Assembly, 24 African countries voted for the resolution, 18 abstained or were absent, and 3 voted against (Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia).

Nonaligned Group. The nonaligned countries generally have registered disapproval of the Soviet intervention (roughly two-thirds voted for the General Assembly resolution). The nonaligned group itself, however, has been unable to agree on a censure resolution.

Eastern Europe. Reactions to the invasion range from strong Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and East German support for Soviet actions to criticism of the intervention by Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Hungary and Poland have been more reserved and less vociferous in backing Moscow.

Asian Communist Nations. Vietnam, Mongolia, Laos, and the Heng Samrin government in Kampuchea have publicly supported the Soviets.

North Korean officials have made no public statement. At a conference of parliamentarians from 12 Communist countries in early February, however, the North Korean delegation refused to support a resolution expressing solidarity with the regime in Afghanistan and implicitly backing the Soviet invasion.

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[1] Because there are fixed deadlines in connection with the Olympics for which we must plan now, the President made clear that if the Soviets had not withdrawn by February 20, we would oppose participation in the Olympic Games to be held in Moscow. That date having passed, we will oppose such participation under any circumstances. Similarly, it would be our intention to remove the tighter criteria recently announced governing exceptions from controls on high technology exports to the Soviet Union. But the changes proposed in the overall list of items to be controlled would, if adopted by the Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy, remain in place; such changes were being considered before the invasion of Afghanistan as necessary to reflect the state of Soviet technology. ■

U.S. Perspective of the 34th General Assembly

The 34th session of the U.N. General Assembly, opening on September 18, 1979, and completing all but one item of its work on December 20, made strides in a number of areas important to the United States and the entire world community. To a considerable extent these attainments were made possible by proposals made by Secretary General Waldheim for rationalizing the procedures of the General Assembly and by the increasing efficiency with which the General Assembly operated under the able leadership of the President of this General Assembly, Ambassador Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania.

The international crisis created by the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran by Iranians and the taking of 63 American hostages overshadowed much of this session. Within this atmosphere, the United States directed its efforts in the United Nations toward supporting the work of the Secretary General and the Security Council in peacefully resolving the dispute arising from this breach of international law.

Convention Against the Taking of Hostages

At this trying time, when American officials continue to be held hostage in Iran in clear violation of international law and practice, it is particularly gratifying to take note of one of the outstanding achievements of the 34th General Assembly—the adoption by consensus of the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.

The convention is the result of 3 years of negotiations, initiated by the Federal Republic of Germany. Through the adoption of the hostages convention, the international community affirms that there is no valid excuse for the taking of hostages and no circumstances whatever in which hostage-taking can be condoned. On December 21 the convention was signed by the Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Donald F. McHenry, on behalf of the United States, and it will now be submitted to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent prior to ratification.

Kampuchea

The General Assembly helped to focus world attention on continued Vietnamese military occupation of Kampuchea and on the humanitarian crisis in that country by adopting a resolution proposed by the five member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The resolution appeals for increased international humanitarian assistance, respect for the human rights and political aspirations of the Kampuchean people, the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces and the cessation of hostilities, and calls on states to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of other states. In addition it asks the Secretary General to use his good offices toward a peaceful solution and to explore the possibility of an international conference on Kampuchea.

At the November 5 pledging conference for emergency humanitarian relief to the people of Kampuchea, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance announced U.S. contributions of $60 million for international relief efforts in Kampuchea plus $9 million for Khmer who have fled to Thailand. These funds were in addition to substantial contributions made already to the refugee program and to continuing support for the efforts of the United Nations, UNICEF, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and private voluntary groups.

Moon Treaty

The United States supported the adoption of "The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" (also referred to as the Moon treaty) after 7 years of negotiation. The agreement is concerned with such matters as safeguarding human life on celestial bodies, promotion of scientific investigation and exchange of information, and provides that the Moon (and other celestial bodies) are to be used "exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of military maneuvers on the Moon shall be forbidden."

The United States believes that this agreement provides the best possi-

letters at Washington Mar. 31 and Apr. 1, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1980.

Singapore
Agreement amending the agreement of Sept. 21 and 22, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9214, 9610), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Mar. 20 and 31, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 31, 1980.

Sri Lanka
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Mar. 25, 1975 (TIAS 8107), with agreed minutes. Signed at Colombo Mar. 18, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 18, 1980.

Tanzania
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of June 15, 1976 (TIAS 8310), with minutes of negotiation. Signed at Dar es Salaam Mar. 19, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1980.

Thailand
Agreement amending the agreement of Oct. 4, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9215, 9462, 9643), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and New York Mar. 21 and 27, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 27, 1980.

Togo
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Government and the Export-Import Bank of the U.S., with annexes. Signed at Lome Mar. 28, 1980. Enters into force upon receipt of written notice from the U.S. Government that domestic U.S. laws and regulations covering debt rescheduling concerning this agreement have been complied with.

Turkey
Agreement for cooperation on defense and economy in accordance with articles II and III of the North Atlantic Treaty (TIAS 1964), with supplementary agreements. Signed at Ankara Mar. 29, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 29, 1980.

United Kingdom
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at London Dec. 31, 1975. Entered into force Apr. 25, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Apr. 9, 1980.

Agreement amending the convention of Dec. 31, 1975 for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Effected by exchange of notes at London Apr. 13, 1976. Entered into force Apr. 25, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Apr. 9, 1980.

Protocol amending the convention of Dec. 31, 1975, as amended, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at London Aug. 26, 1976. Entered into force Apr. 25, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Apr. 9, 1980.

Second protocol amending the convention of Dec. 31, 1975, as amended, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at London Mar. 31, 1977. Entered into force Apr. 25, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Apr. 9, 1980.

Third protocol further amending the convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains, signed at London on Dec. 31, 1975. Signed at London Mar. 15, 1979. Entered into force Apr. 25, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Apr. 9, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement of July 3, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4078, 4267, 6659, 6861, 8014), for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. Signed at Washington Dec. 5, 1979.
Entered into force: Mar. 25, 1980.

[1] Not in force.
[2] With a declaration.
[3] With a statement.
[4] Not in force for the U.S.
[5] Applicable to the Bailiwick of Jersey, Bailiwick of Guernsey, Isle of Man, Belize, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands and Dependencies, Hong Kong, Montserrat, Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands, St. Helena and Dependencies, Turks and Caicos Islands, U.K. Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in the Island of Cyprus.
[6] Subject to ratification. ■

April 1980

Events pertaining to Iran can be found on page 51.

April 7
Egyptian President Sadat makes official visit to Washington, D.C., Apr. 7–10.

April 11
The Reverend Canaan Banana, a close ally of Prime Minister-elect Robert Mugabe, is chosen to be first President of Zimbabwe, as Rhodesia will be called when it gains independence from Britain.

April 12
Liberian President Tolbert is killed in a coup and replaced by a 28-year-old Master Sergeant, Samuel K. Doe.

In a closed session, the U.S. Olympic Committee votes 1,604 to 797 on a resolution calling for a boycott of the Moscow Summer Olympics.

In Oslo, the Inter-Parliamentary Union Council adopts a resolution 96 to 25, with 14 abstentions, condemning the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and calls for immediate withdrawal of foreign armed forces from that country.

April 14
As a contribution to the international efforts of five Andean Pact countries seeking a humanitarian solution to the Cuban refugee problem, under the authority of the Refugee Act of 1980 and after consultations with the Congress, President Carter decides to admit 3,500 of those 10,800 Cubans in the Peruvian Embassy who are seeking asylum.

Israeli Prime Minister Begin makes official visit to Washington, D.C., Apr. 14–17.

April 17
By depositing its instrument of ratification at a Department ceremony, Turkey becomes the 115th party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The following newly appointed Ambassadors presented their credentials to President Carter: Dr. Barry Bertrand Lucas Auguste of Saint Lucia, Reginald Lightbourn Wood of the Bahamas, Serge Elie Charles of Haiti, Cecilia Mildred Nana Tau of Lesotho, Francisco AQUINO Herrera of El Salvador, and Yoshio Okawara of Japan.

President Carter submits a report on the first 5 years' operation of the U.S. generalized system of preferences (GSP) to the Congress.

April 18
U.S.-Spanish Council biannual meeting is held in Washington to review committees' reports on economic, cultural, educational, scientific, technological, and politico-military cooperation and to discuss U.S.-Spanish relations in view of the expiration of the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in 1981.

Zimbabwe becomes an independent nation. U.S. establishes diplomatic relations.

April 21
Secretary Vance submits a letter of resignation to President Carter stating that he could not support the President's decision to attempt a rescue mission of the hostages in Iran.

April 22
In Athens, U.S. and Greece sign a bilateral agreement on economic, scientific and technological, and educational and cultural cooperation.

April 23
Secretary Vance makes official visit to Canada to sign an amended Canada-U.S.

nuclear cooperation agreement. *81 4/8

April 24

By a vote of 12–0 with 3 abstentions (U.S., the Soviet Union, and East Germany), the U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution rebuking Israel for its recent armed incursion into southern Lebanon. *82 4/8

April 27

Eighteen hostages, including the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, Diego C. Asencio, who were held at the Dominican Republic Embassy in Bogota for 61 days, are released. *83 4/8

April 28

President Carter accepts Secretary Vance's resignation stating that he "respects the reasons" for Vance's decision. *84 4/8

April 29

President Carter nominates Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine to become Secretary of State. *85 4/8

*86 4/10

*87 4/14

April 30

Queen Juliana of the Netherlands abdicates; Beatrix, her daughter, assumes the throne. *88 4/14

Japanese Prime Minister Ohira makes official vist to Washington, D.C., Apr. 30–May 1. *89 4/14

By a vote of 10–1 (U.S.) with 4 abstentions (France, Britain, Norway, and Portugal) the U.N. Security Council votes on a draft resolution calling for the creation of a Palestinian state. The U.S. vote against the resolution constituted a veto and prevented its adoption. ■ *90 4/15

Department of State

April 7–30

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*75	4/7	Program for Egyptian President Sadat's official visit to Washington, D.C., Apr. 7–10.
*76	4/8	Visa revocation for Iranian officials.
*77	4/8	U.S., Poland sign textile agreement, Mar. 31 and Apr. 1.
*78	4/8	U.S., Haiti amend textile agreement, Jan. 25 and Mar. 3.
*79	4/8	U.S., Singapore amend textile agreement, Mar. 20 and 31.
*80	4/8	U.S., Malaysia amend textile agreement, Jan. 8 and Mar. 27.
*81	4/8	U.S., Thailand amend textile agreement, Mar. 21 and 27.
*82	4/8	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, Apr. 28.
*83	4/8	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on ship design and equipment, May 6.
*84	4/8	U.S. Organization for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), study group 4, May 1.
*85	4/8	SCC, SOLAS, May 7.
*86	4/10	U.S., Colombia amend textile agreement, Jan. 2 and 31.
*87	4/14	Program for Israeli Prime Minister Begin's official visit to Washington, D.C., Apr. 14–17.
*88	4/14	Conference for young political leaders, Apr. 17–18.
*89	4/14	International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), study group A, May 7.
*90	4/15	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, working group on UN/OECD investment undertakings, May 5.
*91	4/15	SCC, SOLAS, May 7.
92	4/17	Vance: statement before Senate Judiciary Committee on the 1980 Refugee Act.
*93	4/21	Vance: statement before foreign policy conference for young political leaders, Apr. 18.
*94	4/21	Julian Nava sworn in as Ambassador to Mexico (biographic data).
*95	4/22	U.S., Greece sign agreement on economic, scientific and technological, and educational and cultural cooperation in Athens.
*96	4/23	Asian-American foreign policy conference, Seattle, May 10.
*97	4/23	Asian-American foreign policy conference, Los Angeles, May 9.
*98	4/23	SCC, SOLAS, panel on bulk cargoes, May 12.
99	4/24	Vance: press conference, Ottawa, Apr. 23.
100	4/28	Vance: statement upon his resignation.
*101	4/28	Program for the official visit of Japanese Prime Minister Ohira, Apr. 30–May 1.
*102	4/29	SCC, National Committee for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, May 28.
*103	4/29	SCC, SOLAS, working
*104	4/29	SCC, SOLAS, working group on radio communications, May 15.
*105	4/29	SCC, SOLAS, working group on lifesaving appliances, May 20.
*106	4/29	U.N. Conference on Restrictive Business Practices concludes, Apr. 22.
*107	4/30	Vance: statement upon departing the State Department.

*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

U.S.U.N.

Press releases may be obtained from the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.

No.	Date	Subject
120	11/14	Coopersmith: UNHCR, Committee III.
*121	11/14	Strasser, Guam, Committee IV.
*122	Not issued.	
123	11/19	Coopersmith: UNHCR, UNGA ad hoc committee.
*124	11/16	Petree: Cyprus, UNGA.
*125	11/19	Morgenthau: world social situation, Committee III.
*126	11/20	Rosenstock: International Law Commission, Committee VI.
127	11/21	Montgomery: 1981 Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, Committee II.
*128	11/23	Petree: Rhodesian activities in Zambia, Security Council.
129	11/27	McHenry: Iran, Security Council.
*130	11/26	Saddler: composition of the Secretariat, Committee V.
*131	11/27	Coopersmith: Decade for Women, Committee III.
*132	11/28	Winn: peaceful settlement of disputes between states, Committee I.
*133	11/29	Petree: explanation of vote on question of Palestine, UNGA.

(White House photo by Karl Schumacher)

"Face the Nation" Interview

Following are excerpts from President Carter's interview on June 1, 1980, with George Herman, CBS News (moderator); Lesley Stahl, CBS News; and Walter Mears, Associated Press.

. . . .

Q. You keep emphasizing social programs lately, and you fought against a proposal in Congress to increase the military budget. You did that even though your Joint Chiefs of Staff took the unusual step of going public in opposition. How can you defend your argument on the defense increases with that kind of opposition? And how can you tolerate the Joint Chiefs exhibiting so much insubordination to you?

A. It's not an unprecedented thing, and it's completely compatible with the duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When they are asked the question, could you use more money for defense, they said yes. If you had called in the leaders responsible for housing, for transportation or education or welfare or health and said you can use more money for those programs, they would naturally have said yes. The best thing to do is to look at the record.

During the 8 years of the Republican Administration before I became President, we had a net reduction in real dollars of 30% expenditures for defense, 30% cut over an 8-year period. I've only been in office now a little over 3 years, and we have had a very good increase—we've had a strong growth in our commitment to defense. In the process, we have made the Defense Department much more efficient. We did cut out literally billions of dollars of waste in the Defense Department under my leadership with the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreeing, and also under the leadership of Harold Brown. So to make the Defense Department more efficient and more carefully attuned to our needs to maintain security is an important responsibility of mine. It can't be done with massive spending one year and then a sharp reduction because of an over-reaction the following year.

We're committed not only to sustain the growth that we've already initiated in the past 3 years for the next 5 years, but I believe the Congress will see the advisability of this, and the future Presidents will also, and will keep that sustained upward growth intact regardless of what the inflation rate is—to give our nation this first priority—that is, an adequate defense to give us security.

Q. But if we save money on the defense budget, considering the way our allies have been cooperating or not cooperating with us, could we save some money on the defense budget by bringing some more troops home from Europe, cutting down our share of the NATO force?

A. No, I would not advocate that. We've got about 300,000 American servicepeople in the Europe area to maintain the defense of our allies and also directly to maintain the defense of our own country against Communist aggression from the Warsaw Pact. I would not advocate the cutting of those troops at all.

What we've done since I've been in office is to set forth a 15-year commitment by the NATO allies for a well-planned improvement in defense expenditures. In accordance with that, we and Germany, Great Britain, and others have agreed to a 3% annual growth, at least, in the defense appropriations and expenditures. Our commitment in this country, in accordance with the balanced budget that I submitted, and the 5-year plan is to have a 4% real growth, above and beyond the inflation rate, in appropriations for defense. This gives us a strong commitment to defense, predictability, good planning, and this defense budget, by the way, was developed by and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and myself.

Q. Could you tell us how the tide is being turned in the case of the American hostages in Tehran?

A. We haven't made adequate p ogress there. What we've done since the very beginning is to try to protect the lives and safety of those hostages from the original threats—that they would be tried and executed—to build up, on a worldwide basis, support for our position: condemnation of Iran and the calling on the Iranian Government to protect those hostages and to release them and to have an adequate commitment in our own nation's military strength, and otherwise—other strength—to protect those hostages and to expedite their release.

If you remember, early we were fearful about their lives because those threats to their safety and to their lives were made open and publicly. We're facing a horrible example of international terrorism—the holding of innocent people as kidnap victims supported by and condoned by the Government of Iran. And not only have our country and our allies condemned this action and are now imposing multilateral economic sanctions against Iran, but the Muslim countries themselves, of whom Iran is a member, have recently called upon Iran to release the hostages and to resolve this crisis.

Q. And, yet, the Iranian Parliament is now saying that it may be late July before they even discuss the fate of the hostages.

A. My hope and my prayer is that they will be released very soon. But I cannot predict that.

Q. Do you still consider it a crisis? I notice, looking through transcripts, that some months ago, everytime you had visitors at the White House, you mentioned the subject and brought it up yourself. Now, it seems to me, you mention it somewhat less or volunteer the subject somewhat less. Is it still a crisis? Should we still be saying on the air everyday day 160 and 200, or whatever it is?

A. Yes.

Q. Should we still be flying flags at halfmast, tying yellow ribbons? Is it still a crisis, in other words?

A. It's still a crisis.

Q. Why don't you talk about it?

A. There is never anytime in my day's work that I am not aware of the fact that 53 American hostages are

A. I've always found it useful for people to think of me as an intimidating sort of fellow. Dick Stewart once said that I would intimidate Mount Rushmore.

Q. Is that how you're going to operate?

A. I'm going to operate being myself, but looking at myself through the media is like looking at one of those rippled mirrors in an amusement park—you recognize yourself, but it doesn't look like the image you see in your morning mirror.

Q. Can I go back to something you said about Iran? You said it would be helpful for the whole crisis, particularly the hostages, if they could become less visible. Assuming that were so, how then can you go about [inaudible]? What would you be able to do if the American popular pressure were off the Administration? What then could you do that you cannot do now?

A. I think it isn't a question of what we could do then that we cannot do now. As the pressures arouse public opinion to do something fast—that's part of the problem. And a lot of initiatives that have to be taken here are not going to be visible to the public, and so it is conceivable in one way or another through the press—the public perception—the Administration may be perceived as sitting on its hands and not making an effort, and in a political year, that is a dangerous perception for the Administration to be subjected to. So that I would hope—I know the word "patience" has been used to the point that people say, "Well, patience isn't a policy." I think one of the candidates said: "Patience is an excuse for lack of a policy." I am determined to press whatever initiatives I finally conclude should be pressed, but they may not be as visible as other kinds of options might be.

Q. I was left with the impression that you made a hint at the possibility of reducing the frozen assets in advance of any commitment to release the hostages.

A. No, I'm not suggesting timing with respect to any of these things because the issue is the release of the hostages. It's the primary issue, and beyond that I don't want to talk about it.

Q. And you're not talking about the President making [inaudible] visibility of the hostages. You don't mean that the President has contributed to the high visibility of the hostages which you are unhappy about?

A. I think all of us have contributed to it. I am not really interested in rewriting the history of the last 6 months or evaluating it or assessing it. If I were to get into that, I would make my views about something that happened 6 weeks ago or 6 months ago the issue rather than what I propose to do now, so I'm not going to indulge in backward looking.

Q. Are you going to tell Mr. Gromyko what you just told us?

A. If I can remember it all.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, BRUSSELS, MAY 13, 1980[3]

May I say, first of all, that it is a pleasure to be back in Brussels. I come here on my first visit to Europe as Secretary of State recognizing that this is the capital of the continent and also the center of the Atlantic community. And I come here to reconfirm strong ties with the community which is the bedrock of American foreign policy.

I come here at the same time to represent the continuity of American foreign policy, and I suspect there may be some questions as to whether my selection represents a change in foreign policy. It does not in any respect with respect to the issues which are most visible and most current in our relationship.

I look forward to the discussions tomorrow involving not only the Defense Ministers but for the first time in a long time, a [joint] meeting with the Foreign Ministers of the alliance as well. This was done at President Carter's initiative in order to indicate the very great importance of the coordination of defense and foreign policy in dealing with such events as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the problems associated with Iran.

The strength of the alliance, I think, is terribly important as our problems with the Soviet Union and insuring the stability of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, as well as the jurisdictional limits of the NATO alliance.

I look forward to meeting with my counterparts, the Foreign Ministers of the alliance, meeting with Mr. Gromyko in Vienna later this week, and hopefully, with some optimism, recognizing the serious current problems which confront the alliance, that together—as we have for 31 years—we can deal with and surmount.

Q. Will you be asking the alliance to live up to their pledge to impose sweeping economic/diplomatic sanctions against Iran? And, what will be the posture you will take in your talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko?

A. With respect to the alliance, I come here in a positive sense to confirm the support which the alliance has already offered with respect to both Iran and Afghanistan—to confirm that support and to develop policies following on that support. I look to the future not to the past, and I trust these commitments in that respect.

With respect to Mr. Gromyko, I would like to make it clear that understanding as I do from my own personal contacts in the past, the nature of diplomacy with the Soviet Union, I do not expect any significant, if any, substantive achievements. What is important, I think, is the continuation of communications and, indeed, since the Afghanistan event, the opening of communications which I think are vital, if we are to avoid developments and accidents which arise out of misperceptions of each other's objectives and intentions. Whether or not this dialogue will lead to anything substantive, we'll have to wait and see. I would expect that both sides will take the opportunity to recite a litany of developments since last December as perceived by each side triggering a reaction on the other side. But when the litanies are complete, each of us will be looking for possible openings in the other side that could lead to a more positive relationship.

Q. The French Government made a decision today of going to the Olympics in Moscow. What do you think about this? Do you agree with it?

A. I am disappointed in that decision. I think it is very important that the West, that the alliance, that NATO indicate to the Soviet Union in the most positive terms that adventurism—or it may be more serious than that—as represented by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is unacceptable to the West and an indication of a turn in Soviet foreign policy that must be deterred. I know that in France the word detente is a popular word. Detente will not

work unless there is deterrence. The two words go together and if that is, indeed, the vote, I am disappointed in it.

NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARIES MUSKIE AND BROWN, BRUSSELS, MAY 14, 1980[4]

Q. Can you tell us to what degree you were able to get the commitment of the allies to live up to their April 22 commitment on the imposition of sanctions against Iran?

Secretary Muskie. This was not a meeting nor the forum to consider sanctions. These involve the European Community which is not involved in these meetings. This was a meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers to consider what actions they would take with respect to Iran, specifically the meeting agreed to a side statement on Iran strongly condemning again the taking of the hostages and demanding their immediate and safe release. That side statement was developed last night and was agreed to without any difficulty.

Q. Can you give us some sense of what the general allied view is now on Afghanistan and, in particular, whether there is any kind of a consensus that emerged that you should discuss with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on Friday? Any Soviet or Afghani ideas or British proposals for neutrality?

Secretary Muskie. My sense of the discussions this morning was that the allies—and they all spoke—shared our concern about the implications and the seriousness of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and, indeed, this meeting of the Defense Ministers was focused largely on that threat as it impacted upon the resources available to the defense of NATO as well as the defense of NATO interests outside NATO territory. So the subject and the purpose of the meeting, to begin with, was related to your question.

With respect to the meeting with Mr. Gromyko, there was, I think, satisfaction that the meeting was going to be held for the purpose of opening and, hopefully, continuing communications. There was really no discussion beyond that, so whether that fact in and of itself was sufficient, I am not clear. I would doubt that anyone looking at that meeting would have high expectations of any substantive achievements at this first meeting. But, I think there is widespread satisfaction that the meeting is taking place and that they will be briefed on the results of that meeting.

Q. In your private bilateral meetings, did you form the view that you and your allies had an identity of view about the nature of the sanctions to be applied to Iran? And secondly, do you have an identity of view on the next way of proceeding with the Middle East problem—the Palestinian negotiations?

Secretary Muskie. I regret to report that because of the length of the meeting this morning, my bilateral meetings haven't started. But, I would hope to have an answer to that question, at least to my satisfaction if not yours, before I return.

Q. The Soviets in the past have turned down NATO overtures to negotiate on TNF modernization. In your meeting with Mr. Gromyko this week are you going to make a new approach on this subject?

Secretary Muskie. I would expect that initially both sides in that meeting will undertake to review the events of the last 6 months from its own perspective, from the posture of being the injured party, and we would have to go through that exercise before we get any feeling for why each is meeting the other. Whether or not it would be possible to give any clues as to the Soviet responsiveness to our demand that Soviet troops be withdrawn from Afghanistan, that will be our question.

And I would suspect that on the Soviet side, since they were interested in the meeting, at least as interested as we were, I suppose they will be probing to see any soft spots in that line because of their interest in the advantages of detente. Obviously detente wouldn't have been engaged in the first instance if both sides did not see advantage in it; and, it's a question of whether or not that mutual advantage is now sufficient to overcome the problem of Afghanistan, overcome the feeling on our side that Afghanistan represents such an apparent change in our relationship as to undermine our perception of any advantage in the detente process.

So it's going to be, I think, a fencing exercise initially. If it goes beyond that, it may be some source of satisfaction, but I think it would be a mistake to raise expectations and I certainly would not want to raise expectations to the point where there is any doubt in their minds on our determination to pursue the goal of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and neutralization of that country.

Q. On sharing the burden, should the United States have to commit forces to the Persian Gulf area, how, for example, would you expect to make up the lack of an aircraft carrier or the lack of forces which are uniquely American?

Secretary Brown. We do not plan to shift our peacetime ground and air forces from Europe in order to fulfill the need for greater U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean, Southwest Asia, Persian Gulf area. We do not need to be able to move forces into that Persian Gulf area and surrounding area quickly, so it does not affect reinforcement plans for Europe.

In the specific case of the carrier battle groups that we now deploy in the Arabian Sea, one happens to come from the Mediterranean, one comes from the Pacific. We have not determined what our long-range level of naval forces will be. It is quite possible that there will be some draw-down on the average of our naval forces in the Mediterranean. To some degree, that can be replaced or substituted for by land-based air, either U.S. or European.

What's important I think—and I think that our European partners understand this and will take action to implement it—is that the Europeans speed up, to the extent they can, and certainly carry out the commitments they have made to strengthen their own military capability in Europe—land and air and, to an extent, also at sea. I believe mention was made by Secretary Luns [NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns] of the proposal to study additional European task forces. Those won't replace carriers in their power projection role; they can substitute to some degree in a sea control role.

Q. President Carter originally called Afghanistan the most serious crisis since World War II, and I think the Europeans generally did not share that assessment. And I wonder now if what's going on here is merely an acceleration of things they would have done anyway, designed to paper over the differences in evaluation while they do not go along with us in such things as economic sanctions and

U.S. Policy Toward South Africa

by Richard M. Moose

Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 30, 1980. Mr. Moose is Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.[1]

I am pleased to appear before this subcommittee today to discuss U.S. policy toward South Africa. It is without any question the single most difficult issue we face in the African Bureau—so I welcome your concern and interest, as manifested by the hearings, and shall look forward to your contribution to the policy process as we move into what could be a decisive decade.

It is a fact of history and geography that how the South African Government conducts itself in coming months and years will, to an unknown but important degree, affect the destiny of the whole southern tier of the continent. The South African Government has a choice: to follow the difficult and courageous course of seeking cooperation with the forces for change, both internally and within the region, or to face the prospect of conflict, disintegration, and violence. How South Africa moves along its chosen path will bear directly on our interests. They are:

- Preserving our national consensus on foreign policy goals relating to human rights and human dignity;
- Assuring long-term access to strategic minerals in South Africa and surrounding countries both for our own and our allies' economies and defense; and
- Foreclosing opportunities for expanded Soviet influence that come with protracted violent conflict.

We simply cannot pursue these interests selectively. Without political change, our humanitarian objectives cannot be fulfilled, the risk of violent conflicts grows, and the possibilities for Soviet meddling increase.

As those who have visited it know, South Africa is a magnificent country, endowed with gifted people of all races and unmatched mineral wealth. South Africa's technologically advanced economy is unusually self-sufficient. It has modern transportation, industrial, and communications sectors, and strong, well-trained armed forces ready for any conventional threat. In terms of wealth and power it dwarfs other African countries.

One group controls this country. It is skilled, generally cohesive, and white. Among whites, the Afrikaners hold a virtual monopoly of political power. They staff a bureaucracy that rules the 85% of the people who are not white. In this land of wealth and promise, the distribution of status, opportunity, and benefits reflects this concentration of political power.

The African, colored, and Asian South Africans, who live in concentrations of urban deprivation and expanses of rural poverty, are increasingly an integral—but not integrated—part of the society and economy. They depend on modern industry and agriculture for jobs. The mines and factories need their labor. Their contributions to South Africa are essential, but still they are denied equal access to housing, education, and social services; they are subject to mass deportations; they are involuntarily stripped of their citizenship; and, the constitution, backed by stern laws, gives them inferior political status. Nevertheless, their numbers alone insure that their desire for change will be equally critical in determining South Africa's future.

Future of Apartheid

We have no doubt that eventually all South Africans must and will share fully in their country—socially, economically, culturally, politically. Whatever we believe, however, is probably less important than the doubts which white South Africans express about apartheid's future. Although they retain confidence in their culture and values, the politically knowledgeable element of the white population is experiencing a rising level of anxiety about the future. With increasing frequency and often with more clarity than outside observers, Afrikaners are analyzing their problems and prescribing solutions. For example, *Die Beeld*, a leading Afrikaans newspaper, said it this way:

> For the umpteenth time, we must say: South Africa's whites must face the unpleasant fact that ours is a besieged land and that it will become even more so unless we work out a political dispensation with Blacks who are ready to talk but who are going to make great demands in any negotiations. We will have to relinquish policy directions which are unacceptable to Blacks. Laws on racial relations, the question of "Bantu" education, the consequences of the homelands, the question of passes and influx and citizenship will all have to be scrutinized closely.
>
> Whites will have to realize those interlocutors around the table cannot be only homeland leaders. Place will have to be made for the Motlanas and the Thozamile Bothas of the Labor fame from Port Elizabeth. They are not just agitators and instigators per se. They are fighting for their rights just as heroic Afrikaners once fought and struggled for our rights against foreign and unsympathetic governments and administrations. Bannings and detentions cannot in the long run further our great political solution; they can only retard it.

The mood among blacks encompasses both hope and frustration. Depending on personal circumstances forced upon them by apartheid, an urban laborer, a student, a rural trader, an unemployed farmworker, or a homeland leader might differ on tactics, but they also share common views. They dismiss present changes as inadequate; they hope for a moderate, open society not stratified on racial lines; they want equality before the law and full participation in all aspects of one South Africa. Despite, or perhaps because of, repression, blacks daily become more politicized.

The divergent thinking of black and white South Africans about their situations is mirrored in their differing reactions to external events. For instance, South Africans see different lessons in the events in Zimbabwe. Some whites conclude from Robert Mugabe's [Prime Minister of Zimbabwe] election that any change is dangerous and uncontrollable and that the status quo must be maintained at all costs. Others, however, have concluded that constructive, negotiated change is possible—and the sooner it begins the more moderate and cooperative it is likely to be. Blacks claim that the lesson to be learned is that political change must be a fundamental part of other reforms.

By several criteria, white South Africans should be at the height of their confidence.

- Gold price rises have brought an unparalleled bonanza, transforming an economy dependent on external financing into an exporter of capital.
- Low reliance on petroleum for energy and technological leadership in conversion of coal to oil enabled South Africa to weather the loss of petroleum supplies from its major source, Iran.
- South Africa has beaten the U.N. arms embargo by building the world's 10th largest arms industry, and other governments rightly or wrongly believe

that South Africa has nuclear weapons.

• Events in Iran and Afghanistan are seen as justification by white South Africans for their view that the West needs to cooperate with South Africa on its own terms. Finally, the apparent trend toward conservatism in the West also reinforces their world view.

Thus, this is a moment when the South African Government should have the confidence and strength to embark fully on the process of reform. Other countries, including the United States, are ready to recognize such an effort, as are many South Africans.

Neither South Africans nor Americans find it easy to agree on how the United States does, and should, relate to South Africa. In approaching this relationship, several questions pose a dilemma for U.S. policy. For example:

• How can we combine a clear stand on principle with practical approaches to encourage change?

• How can we maintain credibility with all parties in a segregated society?

• And how can we communicate approval of individual steps while still calling for other steps as yet untaken?

In attempting to judge the significance of current developments in South Africa, we realize that there are no easy tests to apply, no individual reforms that alone will guarantee a broad process of change. But the following ideas are central in our thinking.

• Even now, a process of peaceful change is still possible because of the extra margin provided by South Africa's human and economic resources.

• Change is a process, not a solution. A continuing refusal to seek peaceful change only makes more likely an eventual tragedy.

• Although we are ready to recognize substantive individual changes as they occur, the process itself must also be comprehensive, eventually including an end to racial discrimination, equal social services for all South Africans, freedom for blacks to participate in all sectors of the economy, and essential steps toward reforms to bring all South Africans into full participation in the political life of the nation.

• White South Africans must recognize that the process of change must go beyond reforming apartheid. Simply "refining" the status quo will not receive the approbation of the United States nor will it be accepted by the world community or the overwhelming majority of South Africans.

Just as we may find it hard to understand South Africa, so South Africans often find it easy to misunderstand our own position. Even those who would promote the most positive view of the actions of the South African Government must recognize that it is contrary to the nature of this society to have any sympathy for such actions as:

• Depriving leading church leaders, like Bishop Tutu, of their passports;

• Forcibly deporting whole, living communities, such as the Batlokwa, to strange, uninhabited areas of the country;

• Banning effective spokesmen, such as David Russell, for opposite points of view;

• Suppressing legitimate constructive black leaders, such as Botha of Port Elizabeth, who are attempting to reform the system and improve the lot of the black people;

• Perpetuating inferior education and housing for blacks by being stingy with government expenditures at a time when the coffers are full; and

• Using the judicial process to prevent legitimate political activity.

In conclusion, I want to make several points about U.S. policy toward South Africa.

First, no U.S. administration can permit itself to follow the policy of neglect that characterized our actions 10 years ago. Such a retreat will be prevented by a growing awareness in this country of what apartheid represents. And I can assure you that this Administration will not retreat from the commitment that Vice President Mondale made 3 years ago in Vienna to the pursuit of change in southern Africa.

Second, the main thrust of our policy must continue to encourage peaceful—but rapid—change. One of the main assets here is the openness of our society and the relevance of our values and experience. We do have a unique opportunity—indeed, obligation—to speak to all South Africans and to help them see the possibilities for a different future. U.S. International Communication Agency programs, by providing for a dialogue and an exchange of persons between our countries, can make a substantial contribution to the ways South Africans view themselves. In his work with U.S. corporations, the Reverend Leon Sullivan has shown a way in which American corporations can have an impact on South African society. Other opportunities may lie in encouraging expanded educational exchange programs and relating in new ways to South Africa's rural population.

Third, and this is sometimes difficult for Americans to accept, our ability to influence events is limited. The future of South Africa will be determined by its own people, as it should be. We cannot afford to let our desire to help obscure other facts—that the South African economy is unusually self-sufficient; that dependencies between Western economies and South Africa's are mutual; and that no amount of political action from overseas can overshadow the solution to be worked out by South Africa's own people. Over the next few years the greatest external influence on political change in South Africa may well be the developments in Zimbabwe and in Namibia, and it is essential that we continue to make our own full contribution to the independent nation of Zimbabwe and to the negotiations for elections and independence in Namibia. It is deeply in our interest to demonstrate that in South Africa, as in Zimbabwe, the West will support peaceful change which protects the rights of all individuals.

Finally, despite the difficulties that lie ahead, it is crucial that we and other Western countries work together to play our part in encouraging South Africa to avoid the tragedy of self-destruction. And it is crucial that we demonstrate to the South African black majority that they have Western support for their aspirations for equal rights and full political participation in the life of their country. Somewhere between self-righteous or indifferent abstention and hubristic intervention, the United States has a role that it can, must, and shall play.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

ble structure for regulating activities which governments may now or in the future engage in on the Moon or elsewhere in space.

Human Rights

In this session the United States worked to support human rights efforts and to strengthen the human rights mechanism of the United Nations. Among the chief accomplishments of the 34th General Assembly in this area are:

- The adoption, after 5 years of negotiations, of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women;
- The establishment of a code of conduct for law enforcement officials;
- The adoption of a resolution promoting *habeas corpus* or similar remedies worldwide;
- The adoption of a Ugandan proposal calling for immediate U.N. action in cases of massive and flagrant violation of human rights;
- The adoption of a Nigerian resolution promoting regional human rights machinery;
- The adoption of a resolution calling upon Chile to improve its observance of and respect for human rights; and
- The adoption of resolutions calling for the review and coordination of the human rights system within the United Nations and the upgrading of the human rights division.

The United States was disappointed that efforts to reach a compromise on a resolution concerning economic human rights failed. As a result the United States voted against the resolution because we considered it heavily weighted against the developed world.

Development Issues

This Assembly inaugurated a period of intense international activity on economic and development issues which will culminate in the 11th Special Session on Development in 1980. The United States was pleased at the renewed commitment by both developed and developing countries to complete, as part of this session, an international development strategy on schedule although much difficult work remains for the objective to be met.

If the preparatory work for the special session proceeds as planned, this important meeting will also launch global negotiations on international economic issues (energy, trade, development, money, and finance).

After vigorous negotiations in the Assembly, two resolutions on global negotiations were adopted by consensus which should give a sound basis for preparations for global negotiations.

The United States will participate in the preparations fully and constructively. All other participants must equally be committed to reconcile their respective interests if the new negotiations are to make a major contribution to improve international economic relations.

In a major step aimed at stimulating the development process in the Third World, the General Assembly established a 2-year, $250 million interim fund for employing science and technology for development, established an intergovernmental committee open to all nations to determine policy for the interim fund, and established a new Center for Science and Technology within the U.N. Secretariat which will coordinate science and technology efforts throughout the U.N. system.

Although the United States believes that the overall record of the 34th U.N. General Assembly on economic issues was commendable, we were disappointed in some aspects of the Assembly's work on economic issues. We saw again the revision of resolutions which had been passed in subsidiary bodies without giving those bodies a reasonable opportunity to act on them. We were also disturbed by the tendency not to preserve the results of negotiations aimed at reaching consensus resolutions but to force the adoption of the originally unacceptable text when a consensus proved not to be possible.

Disarmament

The General Assembly adopted 40 disarmament-related resolutions during this session. Two were offered by the United States; one, jointly sponsored with the U.S.S.R., requesting the Committee on Disarmament to pursue agreement on a radiological weapons convention and one reflecting the U.S. approach to the question of security assurances to non-nuclear states. Of particular concern to the United States were the resolutions on nuclear nonproliferation. Despite often wide differences between the United States and some non-nuclear weapons states critical of the existing nonproliferation regime, most resolutions on this priority issue were negotiated into a form which the United States could support.

Among other actions taken, the General Assembly declared the 1980s a disarmament decade and requested the U.N. Disarmament Commission to prepare a draft resolution on the subject for the 35th General Assembly which would embody "targets during the disarmament decade for accomplishing the major objectives and goals of disarmament. . . ."

In general, the tone of the debates and resolutions offered on disarmament during this session reflected an increasing concern of a growing number of nations over the slowness of such bilateral efforts as the SALT and comprehensive test ban negotiations and an interest in initiating multilateral negotiations.

Middle East

The United States voted against several resolutions adopted under agenda items on "The Question of Palestine" and "The Situation in the Middle East" which we found detrimental to the cause of peace in the Middle East. Ambassador Richard W. Petree explained the U.S. position: The resolutions sought "to undermine the only viable peace framework [Camp David accords] for negotiations which exists today in which Israel and Egypt agreed to enter into negotiations with representatives of the Palestinian people to achieve legitimate Palestinian rights." We remain a full partner in these negotiations.

The United States did support two General Assembly resolutions concerning the applicability of the Geneva convention of 1949 in the territory occupied by Israel as a result of the 1967 war and disapproval of Israeli settlement policies in the occupied territories. These votes reflected longstanding U.S. policy that Israeli settlements on the West Bank are detrimental to the overall peace process underway in the Middle East.

Namibia

The General Assembly adopted seven resolutions on the question of Namibia. The United States, one of the Western five contact group of nations involved in negotiations on Namibian independence, abstained on substantive proposals on this issue. In a statement on behalf of the five nations, the Represen-

tative of Canada explained: "Our governments have undertaken and are firmly committed to pursue our initiative to bring about an internationally recognized independence for Namibia. We do not want it complicated by our taking a position on the substance of the main resolutions before us. Consequently, on purely procedural grounds . . . our delegations . . . abstain."

Decolonization

The United States, while agreeing with the basic goal of the omnibus resolution on decolonization, voted against it. The United States opposed the suggestion in the resolution that terrorism may be a legitimate means of political change and objected to implicit approval of a resolution adopted by the Assembly's decolonization committee that seems to call for "the complete transfer of all powers" in Puerto Rico without any reference to the wishes of the people of Puerto Rico. U.S. policy remains that the people of Puerto Rico are free to decide at any time their relationship to the United States and how they wish to be governed.

Procedural

During the current session of the General Assembly, the United States noted an increase in attempts to appropriate funds for activities that do not appear to be "expenses of the Organization" as defined by Article 17 of the charter. We objected to the funding of U.N. Secretariat activities that benefit one group of members and exclude or ignore others and the funding of units whose purpose is to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states. This General Assembly also witnessed the introduction of several resolutions which would call for what the United States regarded as a too hasty and ill-considered amendment of the Charter.

Security Council Overview

In the Security Council during the September-December 1979 period, the United States demonstrated its continuing support for the U.N. peacekeeping role by voting for resolutions which renewed the mandate of U.N. forces in Cyprus, Lebanon, and the Golan Heights. It also supported the resolution calling for the lifting of U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia.

However, the overwhelming concern of the United States during this period was with U.N. efforts to settle the crisis caused by the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the taking of 63 American hostages on November 4, 1979, 53 of whom still remain in captivity.

On November 25 Secretary General Waldheim, invoking Article 99 of the U.N. Charter declared this crisis a serious threat to international peace and security and requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

On December 1, during the Security Council debate following the Secretary General's call, Ambassador McHenry noted that all governments retain the right to expel foreign diplomats from their territory but that international law and tradition support the principle of diplomatic immunity.

He also stated: "None of us is deaf to the passionate voices that speak of injustice, that cry out against past wrongs, and that ask for understanding. There is not a single grievance alleged or spoken in this situation that could not be heard in an appropriate forum . . . . as we have said from the beginning, the United States remains ready, upon the release of the hostages, to discuss with the Iranian authorities the differences which exist between us and to seek their resolution."[1]

On December 4 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 457 calling upon the Government of Iran to release immediately all the hostages, provide them protection, and allow them to leave Iran safely. The resolution also called upon the Secretary General to use his good offices to seek a resolution of the crisis and upon Iran and the United States to resolve peacefully "the remaining issues" between them.

On December 15 the International Court of Justice issued an order calling for the "immediate release, without any exception," by Iran of all Americans held there and their safe departure from Iran.[2]

On December 22, noting that the efforts of the Secretary General and other international appeals and actions had not met with a "positive response" the United States requested that the Security Council meet again at an "early date" to consider "the measures which should be taken to induce Iran to comply with its international obligations."

On December 31 the Security Council adopted Resolution 461 which reaffirmed Resolution 457, urgently called on the Government of Iran to release all the U.S. citizens being held hostage, requested the Secretary General to intensify his good offices' effort and took note of his willingness to go to Iran (which he subsequently did), and asked for the Secretary General to report back to the Council before it met again on January 7 "to review the situation and in the event of non-compliance with this Resolution, to adopt effective measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter of the United Nations."

On January 7 the Security Council held informal consultations to hear the Secretary General's report on his trip to Tehran. On January 13, the Council then met again to vote on compliance with Security Council Resolution 461. Only a veto by the Soviet Union prevented Security Council approval of economic sanctions. The Secretary General continues his good offices' effort aimed at securing the safe and immediate release of the hostages.

USUN press release 12 of Feb. 8, 1980.

[1] For full text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 1980, p. 50.

[2] For text of Court order, See BULLETIN of Feb. 1980, p. 49. ■

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*153	12/20	Vanden Heuvel: science and technology for development, UNGA.
*154	12/21	Vanden Heuvel: Rhodesia, Security Council.
155	12/29	Vance: Iran, Security Council.

*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

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being held as an act of international terrorism by the people, government, and terrorists in Iran.

We have mounted a military force placement, primarily naval forces, in the Indian Ocean and in the Persian Gulf region. We have made a rescue attempt which unfortunately was not successful, hopefully, to get the hostages out. But in its failure even, it showed the determination that we have to protect those 53 hostages. And, in addition to our own nation's unilateral actions and economic sanctions, we have now induced our allies to impose economic sanctions as well.

I don't believe anyone who's in a responsible position in Iran doesn't agree that Iran is suffering economically and politically and diplomatically by the holding of these hostages. Those pressures, although they have not yet been successful, must be maintained. And one of the ways to maintain that pressure is to let the world be reminded everyday that hostages are being held.

Q. But, haven't you kind of changed the signal yourself by coming out of the White House and starting to campaign after saying, for so long, that you couldn't because of Iran?

A. To some degree the circum stances have changed, and to some degree the emphasis must—the emphasis must be changed. After the unsuccessful rescue operation, it became then better for us to concentrate on a broad-based international economic pressure to be exerted against Iran. As a result of that effort, the European allies have now imposed economic sanctions against Iran.

While I would rather they be much more severe, in their minds they are adequate. We can't control those allies. They're independent nations. But they have taken a major step in additional economic sanctions against Iran above and beyond what Iran has had to experience in the past. We hope that all these efforts, collectively, will be successful in protecting the lives of our hostages and, at the earliest possible moment, I pray that they'll be released, but I cannot predict the date.

Q. Yet they continue to talk of placing the hostages on trial. Will the Administration tolerate those people being put on trial in Iran?

A. The third week in November—I think it was the 20th—we issued a statement that still prevails, in effect, prescribing what actions our nation would reserve as options if the hostages are tried or abused in any way. Those actions would be very severe against Iran. We have not closed any option for our nation to exercise. But for me to spell it in detail what we would do, I think, would be inappropriate.

Q. The Europeans seem to be moving off in a new direction on the Middle East to propose something—perhaps in the United Nations—for Palestinian self-determination. Obviously, we are opposed to that, is that correct?

A. Yes. We're making progress on the Mideast peace if you look at it in a long-term perspective. Two years ago no one would have thought that Israel and Egypt—a major Arab country and Israel—would be engaged in negotiations to resolve the differences between them. No one would have dreamed that the borders would be opened, that diplomatic recognition would have been extended, ambassadors would be exchanged, and the tourists would be flying back and forth between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem on the one side, and Cairo and Alexandria on the other.

At this time, we are still working very closely with the Israelis and Egyptians to resume the formal talks. The basis for these talks and future progress has got to be U.N. Reso'ution 242 and the Camp David accord document, which is almost like a Bible now. Any attempt that might be made by the European allies to circumvent or to replace this Camp David process would be a mistake in my opinion. And any attempt made to fragment or to change U.N. Resolution 242 would be a very serious mistake. We would not permit it. And, if necessary, I would take action within the U.N. Security Council to prevent any damage to U.N. Resolution 242.

Obviously, we can't expect an easy resolution of an important and difficult and ancient division as exists between the Arab countries and Israel. But we've now focused upon the few remaining issues which are very serious but which are clearly defined, affording the self-governing authority within the West Bank-Gaza area—land rights, water rights, these kinds of things. And the Israelis know what they are. The Egyptians know what they are. We know what they are. And others around the world who are interested know what they are. We would try to discourage the European allies from injecting themselves into this process as long as we are still engaged in negotiations which might lead to success.

. . . . ■

EDITOR'S NOTE

As the BULLETIN goes to press, President Carter is in Europe to meet with various officials and to attend the economic summit in Venice with the leaders of Canada, West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, as well as the President of the European Economic Community. The following is a tentative schedule:

June 19–20—Rome
June 21—Vatican
June 22–23—Venice
June 24–25—Belgrade
June 25–26—Madrid
June 26—Lisbon

Documentation on this trip will be published in the August issue. ■

The Middle East: Outlook for Peace

Address before the Washington Press Club in Washington, D.C., on June 9, 1980.[1]

I want to speak today about the outlook for peace in the Middle East.

For 30 years, peace in the Middle East was only a prayer—rejected four times by those who chose war, rejected again in recent weeks by deliberate and brutal acts of violence on the West Bank. I find revolting both the recent attack on Israeli citizens in Hebron and the maiming of two West Bank mayors last week. Again and again, alternating explosions of inhumanity remind us of the agonizing difficulties which frustrate that prayer, which surely must be shared by all those who are so bitterly divided there.

It is against that background that we evaluate the Camp David process, which has brought us closer to a settlement than at any time in the past. No aspect of our foreign policy has commanded more hard work, more patient effort.

We must not let it fail. Why?

First, because endless conflict destroys precious lives. It squanders resources—resources that could be used to improve life for all people in the Middle East. A comprehensive peace could put the vast wealth of the Middle East to work building—not destroying. It could open borders and close the refugee camps where thousands live in desperation.

Peace is a cherished dream and a vital interest for Israel. Through three decades, the United States has been unshakably committed to Israel's security. We played a proud role in the creation of the State of Israel. We have backed that commitment with generous investments in Israel's security and prosperity. President Carter alone has requested from the Congress more than $10 billion in aid to Israel.

Today, he stands where six American Presidents have stood before him—on the rock of support for a strong, secure Israel. The experience of four wars has proved that Israel's security can best be assured by a just and lasting peace between Israel and all its neighbors.

Peace is equally important for the Arab states and for our relations with them. For reasons of geography, history, and global interdependence, we have vital common interests with the Arab nations. The moderate Arab states are a key to stability in the region. Their stability and independence are extremely important to us. Many of them look to us to buttress their security.

A just and genuine peace is also essential to the Palestinian people. Their legitimate interests can be realized only through an end to conflict, not through war or violence. A process that resolves the Palestinian problem in all of its aspects can give the Palestinian people a secure future of purpose and dignity.

The parties have come face-to-face with the central issues. Real progress has been made, and the progress possible in the future justifies persistence. Serious negotiations must continue.

And peace is important for reasons that far transcend the region. Continued strife in the Middle East could erupt, by accident or by escalation, into wider conflict—conflict that could be disastrous. The Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 brought us dangerously close to such a point.

This whole broad region of the globe—the Middle East and Southwest Asia—is a strategic crossroads at which the interests of many nations are vitally engaged. The future of the United States and of our key friends and allies around the globe is now bound up with its fate.

With turmoil in Iran and Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, the strategic concerns of the United States and its allies in that region are more seriously threatened than ever before. If hostile forces should gain control of the Persian Gulf region or if it should lapse into anarchy, the entire world economy would be undermined, and the world strategic balance would be dangerously altered.

Let me emphasize that in this new strategic situation, it is not only the vital interests of the United States, its European allies, and Japan that are at stake. So are the future security and well-being of Israel and the Arab states. If a credible deterrent balance in the area cannot be maintained, the independence of all states in the area will be at risk.

Achieving a Middle East peace would make a vital contribution to the ability of the United States to help provide security and stability in the entire region. Soviet ability to enlarge its influence and to deflect attention from its invasion of Afghanistan would be reduced. All our friends in the region would benefit, and the entire world would be more likely to remain secure and at peace.

For all these reasons, President Carter has given peace in the Middle East a major share of his time and concern. And for all these reasons, I count it high among my priorities as Secretary of State.

Historic Steps

In the long history of the Middle East conflict, we have heard a recurring complaint: that progress is stalled, that peace efforts have run aground. So frequent have been the headlines and forecasts of failure that it is easy to forget the historic steps we have taken. Those who doubt that progress, however, need only contrast where we are in 1980 with where we were in 1977.

In 1977, U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, with its formula of peace for the return of occupied territory, stood as a foundation to build upon. Three limited interim agreements had been signed.

Then in 1977, following President Carter's efforts to breathe new life into the peace process, came a truly historic breakthrough. President Sadat made his momentous trip to Jerusalem. Prime Minister Begin responded with high statesmanship. Negotiations began. And in September 1978, President Carter invited the two leaders to meet at Camp David.

At Camp David, the parties designed a framework for a comprehensive peace. They agreed to begin with a treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel. They agreed next, as a further step toward comprehensive peace in the Middle East, to launch serious negotiations—negotiations aimed at providing full autonomy for the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. There would be a withdrawal and redeployment of Israeli

Olympic boycotts against Afghanistan. In short, do you feel that they are now with us in terms of the seriousness of the situation?

Secretary Muskie. Yes, as long as you don't become preoccupied with adjectives and look at the substance of concern, I have no doubt from my exposure to this meeting this morning and the advance briefings I had on the attitudes of the members of the alliance that they recognize the invasion of Afghanistan as a significant and serious change in the direction of Soviet policy. The crossing of an international border with Soviet troops directly for the first time, they perceive as a threat to their own oil lifeline in the Persian Gulf. I could detect nothing, in speech after speech this morning, but the highest order of concern about that challenge and a recognition of the additional burden it imposes upon the United States and a willingness to consider options for sharing that burden. It was all positive. It was not complaining in any sense whatsoever, not even critical.

Secretary Brown. I would add to that, that I too was struck by the degree to which the allies share the view that the Soviet move into Afghanistan does cast a new light on Soviet willingness to use military force. Moreover, the Europeans also made it clear that they understand, as well as we, that access to Persian Gulf oil is of overwhelming importance to them. It's even more important to them than it is to us. A large part of the reason it's important to us is that it's important to them. They, I think also, recognize that they have to build up their military capability, at least as fast as they had planned. They do not want to abandon, nor does the United States want to abandon, the other part of our policy with respect to the Soviet Union; that is an attempt to reach agreements on arms control and in other areas where there is a community of interest and recognized willingness on the Soviet side to restrain their actions. There was no disagreement on that either among us.

Q. Were you satisfied with the responses, apart from the rhetorical response, the "action responses"?

Secretary Brown. At this stage, we are dealing with two phases, Phase I of the response, in terms of improving military capabilities, including a carrying out and, to the extent possible, an acceleration of some of the items that are already in the Long-Term Defense Plan which was carefully enough thought out so that it turns out that the items in it are the ones that need to be emphasized—things like increasing war reserve stocks, reinforcement capabilities, electronic warfare, and so on. And they have agreed that they will implement the so-called phase I.

Phase II is in another category because it requires an examination of what else needs to be done in the middle and long term. In other words, you always start with rhetoric and then you take the steps. We have had the rhetoric and it has been good. We've had the beginning of the concrete steps and the signs are that the longer term steps will also be forthcoming, but it's too early to tell for sure.

Q. Don't you think that Afghanistan, Iran, and the Middle East are three related subjects and that the Camp David accords are now at an impasse? What will be the consequences of this failure?

Secretary Muskie. Of course, we are in a world in which every part is connected to every other part. Just like that old description of the human anatomy: The thigh bone is connected to the ankle bone—or not the ankle bone but the hip bone—I don't know my human anatomy as well as I should. But you can't really solve all of these problems at once, and they do impact upon each other, especially those problems which are clustered around the Middle East. To try to wrap them all up in a single solution would be impossible.

With respect to the Middle East, the question gives me the opportunity to make this point—especially here in Europe—and that is for the first time Egypt and Israel are coming to grips, have been forced to come to grips, with the six really hard central questions that stand in the way of achieving an autonomy agreement. I don't know of any other process that can get us to that point any faster. I read about all these suggestions for other avenues and other approaches, but if the settlement of the Palestinian question requires an agreement of autonomy for them, at least as a beginning step, then I don't know of any process that will get us to the hard questions any faster. And it's really in a relatively recent period that they have been forced to go through the hard, slogging negotiations and interchange that's necessary to consider those issues. Both sides, both Israel and Egypt, see this as the process which ought to be continued, notwithstanding the discouraging setbacks that they encounter and experience. So my impression of the process is that it's very much alive at the time when it needs to be alive. And I would hope no action is taken that would undercut it or so dilute the concentrated effort that's being applied to it that that effort becomes less effective. And that's a reading of the situation that I've taken for my own use as Secretary of State as I take office.

Q. While asking for allied support on Iran, did you exclude here in the NATO meeting the resort to military action or initiatives from the United States in the near future?

Secretary Muskie. We did not get into that kind of discussion. In my opening statement to the meeting I simply indicated our concern with Iran and hoped that we would get support from the meeting. I have said elsewhere that my view of the way to approach the resolution of the Iranian hostage question is to explore all the nonmilitary avenues that are available, and they are considerable, as well as use our ingenuity and the ingenuity of friends and contacts with the Iranians.

It seems to me that it's important to build on the pressures that are building on the Iranians themselves. They are confronted with a deteriorating economic situation which resulted in their being able to launch a successful revolution which cannot be ignored by any government in place there. They are faced with a fragmented and hostile confrontation of their internal political situation with which they must deal. They are confronted with pressures on their borders that could erupt into an unacceptable kind of challenge for them. The holding of hostages isn't helping them solve any of those problems.

So it seems to me that we ought not to treat the hostage situation as static from the Iranian point of view and dynamic only from ours. There are pressures working on them, and I think that we need to apply our ingenuity and some further patience. Patience is not an old-fashioned way yet for pursuing those avenues to a resolution of the conflict. I don't dismiss options, because I don't think it's useful when we are in the kind of posture we are in with the Iranians and give them the luxury of excluding options; but I tried to indicate where I think the answer lies, and I intend to pursue that avenue.

Q. Would the Administration be

disappointed if the European Economic Community does not decide on May 17 to impose as tough sanctions as they agreed upon as Europeans at the United Nations?

Secretary Muskie. The Administration would be disappointed if the Community does not put in place a sanctions policy that matches the commitment that was made. There are some technicalities involved with respect to old contracts and new contracts, services, and industrial products, and so on that I understand are under discussion, and I would certainly like our involvement to be as constructive as possible. We need a sanctions policy that is meaingful, that will hurt the Iranians, that will make them see that they have got to pay a price for their hostage policy. That's our objective.

Q. Chancellor Schmidt has suggested, I think a number of times in public appearances, that he believes we live in times as dangerous as those weeks prior to World War I. I wonder whether you share that view?

Secretary Muskie. Before I took this job I would not have agreed, but now I'm not so sure. [Laughter]

Secretary Brown. I would offer another analogy for your consideration, and that is the analogy with the 1930's. Those also were very dangerous times, and they went from danger into war through lack of resolve and lack of willingness to face up to a threat.

Secretary Muskie. I'd agree with that. I think of Lord Gray's statement in World War I, and I think of other occasions more recently when I suspect that miscalculations as to the consequences of an action has led to more wars than almost any other single factor. There is so much opportunity for miscalculation that I resolved when I took this office that I would be just as clear as I could be as to my perception of consequences, the price to be paid by us, and of the results that might be achievable. I think that it's the kind of attitude that I developed as a legislator. One of the toughest jobs as a legislator was to try to project the consequences of language that you put down on paper in terms of its impact upon human behavior, and it's just as important when you consider policy-making at the executive level, it seems to me. It's all too easy to react to the immediate idea, to the pressures of an immediate crisis without thinking it through. Thinking it through is a quality that people in this modern world are rapidly losing.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE, MAY 14, 1980

1. The Defence Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Ministerial session in Brussels on 13th and 14th May 1980. Foreign Ministers of countries participating in the integrated military structure of the Alliance took part in the session of 14th May. In appreciation of the important contribution made by the Federal Republic of Germany to Allied defence and cooperation, Ministers drew attention to the 25th anniversary of its accession to NATO on 6th May 1955.

2. Ministers carried out their discussions against a background of the major strategic issues facing the Alliance in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the implications of that action for stability in South West Asia. Foreign Ministers looked forward to a full discussion of the political aspects of these developments at the forthcoming Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ankara.

3. Ministers expressed their concern that for the first time in the post-war era the Soviet Union had used military force to impose its will on a non-aligned country of the Third World and in a way which affected the overall strategic situation. Ministers denounced this use of force which jeopardizes international peace and stability and strikes at the principles of the United Nations' Charter, and called for the total and immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan must be free to shape their future without outside interference.

4. Ministers expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would re-establish the conditions for more positive and productive East-West relations. They stressed their readiness to continue to search for progress in the field of arms control and disarmament on the basis of realistic balanced and verifiable measures. They reaffirmed their support for the SALT II Treaty as a major contribution to detente and to security and looked forward to its early ratification. Ministers recalled the wide range of initiatives particularly in the field of confidence building and arms control contained in the communique of 12th and 14th December 1979 and designed to improve mutual security and cooperation in Europe. They appealed to the members of the Warsaw Pact to make their contribution towards this goal and to respond positively to these Western proposals. At the same time, in the present circumstances, Ministers underlined the continuing need to maintain and strengthen the Alliance's defence posture in the interests of deterrence.

5. Ministers further agreed that the stability of regions outside NATO boundaries, particularly in the South West Asia area, and the secure supply of essential commodities from this area are of crucial importance. Therefore, the current situation has serious implications for the security of member countries. The altered strategic situation in South West Asia warrants full solidarity and the strengthening of Allied cohesion as a response to the new challenges. Ministers recognized that maintenance of the special relationships of Allies with the regional countries are in the interests of the West as well as of the countries of the region.

6. It is in the interests of members of the Alliance that countries which are in a position to do so should use their best efforts to help achieve peace and stability in South West Asia, taking into consideration the interests of the regional countries and the value of their political cooperation. The burden, particularly in so far as defence measures are concerned, falls largely upon the United States, which has already taken steps to enhance its effectiveness. Ministers noted that this commitment, which in certain circumstances might substantially increase, could place additional responsibilities on all Allies for maintaining levels and standards of forces necessary for defence and deterrence in the NATO area. Ministers agreed on the need for ensuring that at the same time as the United States carries out the efforts to strengthen defence capabilities for South West Asia described above, Allied capabilities to deter aggression and to defend NATO Europe are also maintained and strengthened.

7. In discussing the effect of recent events on the NATO area, Ministers agreed that there was no sign of any relaxation in the efforts being undertaken by the Warsaw Pact and, in particular, the Soviet Union to increase substantially the quality and readiness of their forces. Despite a slowdown in economic growth and increasing difficulties in the energy sector, Soviet defence expenditure still amounted to 11 to 13 percent of its GDP, and continued to receive top priority despite the needs of the civil economy.

8. Ministers pledged themselves to increase their efforts to improve the capabilities of the full spectrum of forces committed to the Alliance. They received the assurance of the United States Secretaries of State and Defence that the security of the NATO area remains central to United States policy, and they noted that the United States has no plans to withdraw any United States forces permanently stationed in Europe for use in South West Asia. Ministers of other countries agreed to do their utmost to meet additional burdens for NATO security which could result from the increased United States responsibilities in South West Asia.

9. As an expression of their willingness to respond to the needs of the present situation, Ministers agreed upon a number of

Kampuchean Relief

by Warren Christopher

Statement at the conference on Kampuchean relief in Geneva, Switzerland, May 26, 1980. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.

We are grateful to the nations of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) and the members of ECOSOC (U.N. Economic and Social Council) for initiating the call for this meeting and to the Secretary General for convening it. For the urgent needs of the Kampuchean people continue to require our attention, our commitment, and our resources.

We convened last fall, summoned by a human tragedy of quickly mounting proportions. We saw widening starvation. We saw a rising flood of Kampucheans moving across the country in desperate search of food and safety. We saw survivors too weak even to cry. We saw the future of an entire people imperiled.

The international community responded, through governments and private citizens, individually and through the joint effort of U.N. agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and private voluntary organizations. The work of these groups, and particularly the relief workers on the ground, has been truly heroic. This international relief effort has given sustenance—indeed life itself—to hundreds of thousands of Kampucheans.

This massive program would have been vastly more difficult had the Government of Thailand not provided refuge to the masses of Kampucheans fleeing war and famine. For this compassionate and farsighted policy, the Government and people of Thailand have the profound respect and strong support of my government and, I am certain, of the world community.

A potential human tragedy summons us again. The long, dark night has not ended for the people of Kampuchea.

- The recent harvest, small as it was, is virtually exhausted.
- Death from starvation is mounting again; disease is rampant.
- Growing numbers of Khmer are fleeing to the border.
- The rice planting season for the year-end harvest has begun with limited seed and, therefore, with limited promise.
- The monsoons will soon arrive, bringing with them severe new problems.

For the Kampuchean people, the margin of survival is once again shrinking. If renewed famine is to be avoided, it is clear that a continued heavy flow of supplies—both food and seed—is essential, now and throughout 1980.

We must rededicate ourselves here to new levels of humanitarian support and assistance. And we must address here as well the obstacles that have prevented the international relief effort from being as effective as was intended—as effective as is necessary.

To date, the U.S. Government has committed over $85 million to the Kampuchean relief efforts. In an impressive outpouring of support, the American private sector has contributed more than $40 million.

I am here today on behalf of the President of the United States to place substantial further resources behind this essential humanitarian effort. We are prepared to provide an additional $29.6 million in food and financial resources for the next 4 months, to help meet the urgent needs of the Kampuchean people.

The international community must not turn its back on the plight of a people desperately in need of food, of medical care, of the seed which can bring the Kampuchean harvest back to life. We urge all donors to increase, significantly, their commitment to meeting one of the greatest moral challenges of our lifetime.

There has been some discussion here in Geneva of the possibility of a special fund for Khmer relief, to be administered by the Secretary General and his Special Representative. Such a fund would enable the Secretary General to respond flexibly to emergency relief needs, needs which cannot be predicted in long-term planning.

We fully support this suggestion. We will allocate a portion of our pledges to this special fund if it is established.

Surely no nation on Earth has suffered more in recent years than Kampuchea—ravaged by war, devastated by the unspeakable horrors of the Pol Pot regime, victimized by foreign invasion and occupation, and now tragically short of the necessities for life. Yet the solution is available, if those in control will place human life above political advantage.

I am gravely concerned that unless we overcome the present obstacles to effective relief distribution inside Kampuchea, further widespread suffering and starvation are inevitable despite our efforts. For the fact is that food and supplies are not getting to those who need it most.

The problems inherent in such a massive relief effort are substantial. After long years of civil strife, Kampuchea's infrastructure is largely destroyed. The Khmer people no longer have the strength, the trained personnel, the equipment or facilities to distribute food and rebuild their agricultural economy without outside assistance.

For many months, the international community has stood ready to help overcome these obstacles. But the relief effort has been hobbled by restrictions on access and movement imposed on the international relief workers.

Let me be clear on this point. These obstacles have made it impossible to reach all Kampucheans in need. Only when these obstacles are removed can we hope to break the cycle of famine, disease, and renewed mass migration that threatens the very existence of a people and a nation.

Essential Steps

Specifically, a number of steps are essential.

First, the authorities in Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese must permit the provincial airports to be opened for international and domestic flights carrying relief supplies. These airports are now being used for military purposes. Let them also serve to help bring food to the starving.

Second, international relief flights must be allowed to fly into Phnom Penh along more direct routes less wasteful of precious time and fuel—routes which would permit additional food and medical supplies to be carried on each flight.

Third, those in control must allow greater numbers of international relief workers into Kampuchea. There must be sufficient personnel to help transport, administer, and monitor a broad-scale relief effort.

Fourth, there is a desperate shortage of doctors and other medical personnel in Kampuchea, yet the authorities in Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese have permitted only 29 medical personnel to enter the country. That is one for almost 200,000 people. Hundreds of doctors and other medical personnel stand ready and willing to enter Kampuchea, individually or under the auspices of international relief organizations. They must be permitted to do so.

Fifth, the authorities in Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese must permit relief supplies to move by truck and rail across the Thai-Kampuchean border. That act alone would permit a massive expansion of the amount of relief reaching needy Khmer.

Finally, we appeal to the Soviet Union to join in helping resolve the barriers to an effective relief effort. The United States, as part of its contribution, is prepared to provide funds for trucks and other equipment to transport supplies. We urge the Soviet Union to undertake the helicopter or other airlift of supplies which could overcome the transport problems posed by the coming rainy season.

Without an early breakthrough, Kampuchea could suffer another wave of mass starvation and disease within months, if not weeks.

As, in good faith, we increase our own levels of commitment, we appeal again to the authorities in Phnom Penh, to the Government of Vietnam, to the supporters of Vietnam: Do not preside over the death of a nation and a people; permit an effective relief effort to go forward.

Ultimately, the plight of the Kampuchean people cannot be divorced from its political causes. For the tragedy of Kampuchea will not end until there is an end to the military occupation and a government truly representative of the Kampuchean people, nonaligned and free of foreign interference.

This is not the forum for addressing in detail those critical issues. But let me say this: It is regrettable that some of those who bear such a heavy responsibility for this human crisis have not joined us here as full participants to help fashion the most effective humanitarian response.

Indeed, as we look across the international landscape, we have witnessed in recent months an enormous new flood of humanity—people driven from their homes, from their nations, by aggression in Afghanistan, by externally fueled conflict in the Horn of Africa, by the harsh reality of life in Cuba. The human toll is appalling; the strains on neighboring countries are staggering; the humanitarian demands on the international community are heavy and growing.

The community of nations cannot turn its back on the plight of those in desperate need of help. But neither can we be blind to the fact that the policies of a few are creating suffering for so many and mounting costs for us all.

We cannot escape this broader reality. But the need that calls us here, the plight of the Kampuchean people, is unique. For the future of the Kampuchean people, of their entire culture, hangs in the balance. If conditions there do not change, there will be little left of Kampuchea—its people dispersed, its land inhabited by others.

With sufficient resources, with full cooperation from all the parties concerned, with sustained effort, we can see the Kampuchean people turn the corner away from endless want toward a future of hope and promise. ■

International Contributions for Khmer Relief—U.S. Status

The U.S. Government, as of May 8, 1980, has spent or obligated for Khmer relief $93,876,000. This figure does not include $1,425,000 the U.S. Government spent for the same objective during the previous fiscal year. Grants break down as follows. Figures are rounded to the nearest hundred dollars.

UNICEF

Amount	Reason/Date
$ 2,500,000	Startup costs for Khmer relief program (10/79)
2,000,000	Rice purchases in Thailand for distribution in Kampuchea (11/79)
448,000	(in kind) Airlift of cranes from Japan to Singapore for onward shipment to Kampuchea (11/79)
44,600	(in kind) Incremental air transport cost of Archer, Daniels, Midland donated food (12/79)
6,500,000	Relief of cash shortage (12/79)
2,500,000	Cash for ongoing relief program (5/80)
$13,992,600	

International Committee of the Red Cross

$ 2,500,000	Startup costs for Khmer relief program (10/79)
27,000	(in kind) Two field labs (11/79)
20,000	(in kind) Medical survey team for contingency planning (11/79)
2,500,000	Relief of cash shortage (12/79)
952,400	(in kind) 40-day lease of Hercules for shuttle flights to Phnom Penh (12/79, 1/80)
5,550	(in kind) Airlift of a field hospital donated by SAWS (1/80)
810,000	(in kind) Lease of Hercules for shuttle flights to Phnom Penh (4/80)
1,690,000	Cash for ongoing relief program (5/80)
$ 8,504,900	

World Food Program

$37,634,000	Food for Peace commodities including shipping costs ($28.756 million directly to Kampuchea; $8.878 million in and through Thailand 11/79, 3/80, 5/80)
290,000	Lease of trucks in Thailand (11/79)
150,000	(in kind) Airlift and commodity cost of instant corn soy milk (11/79)
1,026,000	Food processing in Thailand and Singapore (11, 12/79)
891,600	Food management in Thailand (12/79)
3,000,000	Rice purchases in Thailand for border and holding center feeding (12/79)
8,800	(in kind) Air transport cost for soy fortified bulgur (2/80)
4,000,000	Cash for cross border seed rice program (3, 5/80)
$47,000,400	

Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees

$ 450,000	(in kind) Airlift and commodity cost of 800 tents and tent flies (10/79)
9,000,000	Care and maintenance of Khmer in holding centers and center construction (11/79)
5,550,000	Care and maintenance of Khmer in holding centers and center construction (balance of USG pledge to UNHCR) (1/80)
3,000	(in kind) Four hand pumps (5/80)
$15,003,000	

Food and Agriculture Organization

$ 3,000,000	Agricultural rehabilitation program in Kampuchea (3/80)

Thai Red Cross

$ 100,000	Mrs. Carter's presentation for Khmer relief (11/79)

National Council for International Health

$ 87,200	Medical assistance clearing house (12/79, 5/80)

(continued)

Cuban Refugees

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, APR. 14, 1980[1]

The President remains deeply concerned for the safety and freedom of the 10,800 Cubans who are seeking asylum in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana.

In the last year and a half, the Cuban regime has released over 3,900 political prisoners, and President Carter has implemented a program which permitted these prisoners and their families to come to the United States. This program will bring a total of more than 10,000 Cubans to the United States.

In dealing with the immediate problem in Havana, the United States fully supports the efforts of the five countries of the Andean pact to bring about a quick, humanitarian solution. The problem of Cuban refugees is one for all the Americas as well as the world. The President is encouraged by the efforts of several Latin American and European nations to give tangible help to the victims in the crisis. The decision made by Costa Rica to serve as a staging area for the refugees to assure a rapid evacuation is an important one, and we welcome it.

As a contribution to this international effort, under the authority of the Refugee Act of 1980 and after consultations with the Congress, the President has decided to admit from one-quarter to one-third, or up to 3,500, of the Cubans who have sought asylum in the Peruvian Embassy. These people will be admitted according to the requirements of the act.

The United States, moreover, calls on other nations in the region and elsewhere to make their own contributions without delay. This humanitarian crisis requires an immediate international response.

The world also looks to Cuba to assure humanitarian conditions for the refugees pending their evacuation and to cooperate with Peru and international organizations to facilitate the prompt, safe, and peaceful exit of the Cubans from the Embassy.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, APR. 23, 1980[2]

Small craft from Florida are currently proceeding to Cuba to bring to this country a portion of those Cubans who have sought refuge in the Peruvian Embassy from the present Cuban system.

Those boat owners and captains who are taking people out of Cuba and trying to land them in the United States are playing into the hands of the Cuban authorities. The Cuban Government does not permit free emigration from Cuba and arbitrarily determines who may leave the country through issuance of exit permits. It has, furthermore, not held to its earlier agreement to permit those who were in the Peruvian Embassy to proceed to any country willing to receive them.

While we are deeply sympathetic with those in this country who want to expedite the departure from Cuba of those who are seeking freedom from Castro's regime, we cannot condone this procedure.

The transportation of undocumented persons to this country is contrary to U.S. law and policy. It is a felony to bring into the United States any alien not duly admitted by an immigration officer and is punishable by penalties of up to 5 years in prison, fines of $2,000, and the forfeiture of the vessel.

The Governments of Peru and Costa Rica, working with international refugee organizations, have made clear to the Cuban Government their willingness to receive all the persons who sought refuge in the Peruvian Embassy. The United States has agreed to take 3,500 as part of this international effort.

We strongly desire to resolve the question of the Cubans in the Peruvian Embassy in a manner thoroughly consistent with the humanitarian needs and in accordance with U.S. law.

We strongly urge that the illegal transit of undocumented persons by boat from Cuba be suspended and that the Government of Cuba permit the resumption of flights to Costa Rica or other countries immediately.

VICE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, APR. 27, 1980[3]

At the President's request, I chaired a meeting April 26 with the Attorney General, the Secretary of HEW, the Deputy Secretary of State, and heads of other U.S. departments concerned with the very serious humanitarian problem we are confronting with the plight of growing numbers of Cuban refugees. There is no better proof of the failure of Castro's revolution than the dramatic exodus which is currently taking place.

At the same time, we are witnessing a callous, cynical effort by Castro to play on the emotions of the Cuban-American community in the United States to lure members of this community into extraordinarily dangerous and unlawful boat trips, with the very real threat of loss of life at sea. Castro has evaded his responsibility to his citizens and has broken the commitment he made earlier to help with an orderly, prompt, and humane evacuation of refugees.

The President has directed U.S. Navy and Coast Guard units in the region to render all possible assistance to those at sea. We call upon the Cuban-American community, which has contributed so much to our country to respect the law and to avoid these dangerous and illegal boat passages. The world will hold Castro responsible for the safety of these Cubans.

Cuba must agree to a policy that permits the orderly, safe, and humane evacuation of refugees. We have stated before, and I repeat again, that the United States will contribute to this international effort. I would point out that if Castro wants to expel his people, let him begin by releasing the *plantados*—those brave Cubans in Boniato prison. These people have suffered for their freedom. The moment they are released, we will have aircraft standing ready to bring them to freedom.

The Deputy Secretary of State and other Administration officials also met Saturday with leaders of the Cuban-American community to continue our consultations. We will continue to give the highest priority to this humanitarian problem.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, MAY 2, 1980[2]

About a thousand Cubans—former prisoners—who had gathered this morning in the parking lot outside the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to complain about the slowness of processing them for emigration under the new Refugee Act, were set upon by about 300 people with clubs—i.e., two by fours—who had been brought to the scene in Cuban Government buses. The police stood idly by until we protested to the Cuban Foreign Ministry.

As a result of the protest, more police did show up and cordon off the area, but they have not stopped the beatings. Some 400 victims are now inside the Interests Section. Several are injured, some seriously. Doctors in the crowd are caring for the seriously injured.

The Interests Section building has some broken windows but is otherwise intact. U.S. personnel are safe and unharmed.

This is not an attack on the Interests Section; however, it is a demonstration clearly permitted, if not sponsored, by the Cuban Government. First, the demonstrators arrived by government bus from the Cuban Institute for Friendship to Peoples (ICAP). Second, Cuban police have not stopped the beatings, although there are enough of them on the scene to do so.

The head of our Interests Section has protested vigorously to the Cuban Government, asking that Cuban authorities disperse the crowd immediately, guarantee the safety of those who have sought sanctuary inside our mission, and issue an expression of regret for this incident.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, MAY 2, 1980[3]

The White House announced today that the Federal Government is taking additional actions to respond to the current emergency precipitated by the Cuban Government. More than 5,000 Cubans have already arrived in Florida in more than 170 small boats, and the Coast Guard estimates that as many as 2,000 additional boats are either loading passengers in Cuba or are en route to the Florida coast.

The President has directed Jack Watson, his assistant for intergovernmental affairs and secretary to the Cabinet, to work with Ambassador Victor Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, in managing the Federal Government's overall response to the emergency. Watson outlined the following actions.

• A processing and screening center will be established at Eglin Air Force Base in Fort Walton Beach, Florida, to supplement the receiving and processing facilities already located in Key West and Miami. The Eglin facility will accommodate approximately 1,000 persons within 24 hours and will be expanded to accommodate between 5,000 and 10,000 within 10 days. Additional facilities will be added as needed.

• Reception facilities at Key West are being expanded to accommodate daily flows of between 2,500 and 3,000, and other Federal services are being made available there, including those of a Public Health Service medical assistance team.

• Several hundred Federal personnel have been directed to the Miami/Key West area, so that more than 1,000 personnel from eight Federal agencies are now actively engaged with volunteer organizations and State and local governments in receiving, processing, and assisting the arriving Cubans. Tom Casey, deputy associate director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, has been assigned responsibility for on-site coordination of all Federal Government activities.

• The Coast Guard has expanded its capability to provide rescue and assistance missions between the Florida and Cuban coasts and, within the last few days, has performed approximately 300 rescue missions in the area. As announced earlier this week by the Department of Defense, U.S. naval vessels which had been intended for Operation Solid Shield are now being made available to assist the Coast Guard in rescue operations.

• Because the Cuban Government is including individuals with criminal records in the boatloads of departing Cubans, careful screening of all arrivals is being conducted by appropriate Federal officials. Under U.S. immigration laws, individuals with records of criminal activity who represent a threat to the country or whose presence would not be in the best interests of the United States are subject to arrest, detention, and deportation to their countries of origin. The United States will enforce these laws.

• State Department officials will be working with national voluntary organizations to provide additional reception and resettlement assistance to Cuban, Haitian, and other groups seeking political asylum which are so heavily affecting the Miami area.

The President appreciates the extraordinarily effective efforts of the State and local governments in Florida in dealing with this extremely difficult situation.

"The responsiveness, cooperation and diligence demonstrated by Governor Graham, agencies of the State government, and local government leaders in South Florida, especially in Dade County and Miami, have been exemplary," Watson said. "In addition, the round-the-clock efforts of voluntary organizations and members of the Cuban-American community have been invaluable. Without their support and help, the situation could not have been managed."

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, MAY 3, 1980[4]

On Friday, May 2, the U.S. Interests Section in Havana provided sanctuary to over 400 men, women, and children who were being beaten by a mob immediately outside. Some have since left our Interests Section voluntarily, but 385 remain. Since then we have been seeking Cuban Government guarantees for all those in sanctuary.

Meanwhile we have suspended the immigrant visa and refugee program for Cubans at the Interests Section until such time as the Cuban Government can guarantee the safety of people who come to the Interests Section to conduct normal business. Until we have that guarantee, we are withdrawing from Cuba the personnel in the Interests Section working in those programs.

On Sunday, May 4, the Cuban Government-controlled newspaper, *Granma*, reported that the women and children in sanctuary at the U.S. Interests Section would be given safe conduct but that the men would not. The newspaper said that the men had to turn themselves over to Cuban authorities "without any type of condition." Our Interests Section later confirmed that this was the official Cuban Government position.

The United States will continue to seek guarantees for the safety of those who have been given sanctuary at the U.S. Interests Section. Since all of them have been documented by the Interests Section and since most of them already have Cuban exit permits, we are trying to obtain Cuban Government agreement to allow them to depart Cuba.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, MAY 14, 1980[5]

I'd like to make a statement to you and to the nation about the extremely critical problem with the Cuban citizens who are escaping from their country and coming to our shores in a very haphazard and

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forces to specified locations while assuring Israel's security. And they established final objectives: resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and, ultimately, peace treaties between Israel and each of its other neighbors—Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

That is the vision of Camp David. How far have we come toward realizing it?

The treaty between Israel and Egypt was signed a year ago last March—an event of truly historic importance. In recent months, we have been working toward the next objective of the Camp David accords. With the United States as full partner, the two parties to Camp David have been engaged in negotiations—the first negotiations in 30 years in which the concerns of the Palestinian people, along with the security of Israel, are at the top of the agenda. The goal of the first stage of these negotiations is full autonomy for the people in the West Bank and Gaza, under a freely elected self-governing authority which will serve for a transitional period of not more than 5 years.

The Camp David accords recognize that nations and peoples do not easily abandon hostile attitudes built up over more than a generation. Trust and understanding cannot be dictated. They can only come through patient effort, through face-to-face meetings, through time and experience.

The current negotiations are not, therefore, designed to define the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza, nor are they meant to address the eventual status of Jerusalem. The final status of the West Bank and Gaza is reserved for the second stage of negotiations—to begin as soon as possible but not later than 3 years after the self-governing authority is inaugurated. Those negotiations would include elected Palestinian representatives from the West Bank and Gaza.

The issues at stake in the current negotiations are critical to the future shape of life in these territories—and they are highly complicated. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the negotiations have been slow and frustrating, punctuated by pauses and disappointments.

A year ago, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, in a joint letter to President Carter, set the end of May as a goal for completing the negotiations. That goal was not met: The agreement we all hope to achieve has not yet been attained. Of course this is a disappointment. But it is no cause for despair. And it is no cause to abandon a process which has achieved so much. We remain firmly committed, therefore, to the Camp David process.

If hostile forces should gain control of the Persian Gulf region or if it should lapse into anarchy, the entire world economy would be undermined, and the world strategic balance would be dangerously altered.

The parties have come face-to-face with the central issues. Real progress has been made, and the progress possible in the future justifies persistence. Serious negotiations must continue.

And so today, on behalf of the President, I call upon Israel and Egypt to resume the negotiations as soon as possible. The issues both sides want resolved can only be resolved through active negotiations. And with the resumption of negotiations, I also call on each side to do its utmost to create a political climate that will give the negotiations a maximum opportunity to succeed. They cannot succeed if either side persists with unilateral actions that prejudice the final status of the territories, nor can they succeed if one side is insensitive to the concerns of the other.

We believe, furthermore, that the talks must continue to be solidly based on Resolution 242 and the Camp David framework. It would be a mistake to change either of those essential building blocks. Indeed, the United States will not allow that to happen.

We do not object to new initiatives that would further the Camp David process. But we will strongly oppose any efforts that would derail that process.

We take this position for two reasons: First, to alter drastically or to abandon the process would threaten the progress we have already made. And second, it would mean abandoning the most realistic hope yet for real peace.

Consider these concrete achievements of the process—achievements surely worth preserving.

- Peace now exists between Israel and its most powerful Arab neighbor. The danger of war in the Middle East has been reduced. Every Israeli is more secure; every Egyptian has new hope for a better life; every American can take confidence that the dangers to our country and our world have been diminished.
- Peace between Egypt and Israel, moreover, has borne visible fruit. Israel has turned over to Egypt, on or ahead of schedule, much of the Egyptian territory it occupied in 1967, including the major portion of the Sinai and rich oilfields. Egypt and Israel have exchanged ambassadors and begun to normalize relations.
- This peace agreement has created a center of stability in a region of turmoil. Extending that center of stability to include the West Bank and Gaza through the Camp David process will have even greater benefits.
- The two parties remain committed, despite the obstacles, to practical negotiations for a broader peace—ultimately encompassing all the parties in the region.
- Finally, the Camp David process has established the power of negotiations to settle issues once thought to be intractable. Today more people than ever before, in the Middle East and elsewhere, believe that peaceful negotiations can resolve the conflict. In itself, this change of attitude is historic and a basis for further progress.

These accomplishments are significant but fragile. To abandon the current process would be to risk losing these gains. It would also undermine the prospect of further progress toward a wider peace. For the current negotiations, however slow and difficult, hold out real hope of success for the future.

Critical Issues

The negotiators have begun to discuss critical issues—issues which constitute a hard agenda but the right agenda.

Let me describe those issues briefly.

First and most critical is security. Israel must be secure. But to be durable, any agreement must also enable the people in the West Bank and Gaza to help provide for their security. The Israeli de-

fense force must be able to protect Israel from external attack, whether by conventional armed forces or by terrorist groups. At the same time, the "strong local police force" under the self-governing authority—called for at Camp David—must be able to assume its fair share of the burden for internal security and public order.

The second key issue is land. The agreement must assure the sanctity of private property in the West Bank and Gaza. It must also guarantee that the way public land is used during the transition period will not prejudice future negotiations on the final status of these territories.

Third is water—which truly represents life. In the American West, where water is scarce, conflicts over water rights have raged for years between individuals, localities, and even between States. So we can appreciate the situation in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, where scarce water must be shared. This is a strong incentive for cooperation between Israel and the self-governing authority.

A fourth major issue involves the powers of the self-governing authority. Having agreed at Camp David that there should be a self-governing authority for a 5-year transitional period, the negotiators have worked to define its powers. One important principle has already been agreed—that most matters touching the daily lives of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza will be under Palestinian control when the self-governing authority is established. Now the negotiators are grappling with the final details of how to implement this principle.

Finally, there is the issue of how elections for the self-governing authority will be conducted. Here, agreement is nearly complete. But one major issue remains—the question of participation in the election by Arabs who live in the part of Jerusalem captured by Israeli forces in 1967.

These five issues constitute a formidable agenda. But if peace is to result, these are the issues that must be settled—within the framework of a secure Israel and recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to participate in the determination of their own future.

To launch some alternative process will not make these issues go away. Another road will only bring us back, after dangerous delay, to these same central questions. The Camp David process is confronting those questions; it should continue.

Let me make several final points about the negotiations themselves.

First, working within the framework of the Camp David accord and U.N. Resolution 242, the United States is determined that an agreement will be reached as soon as possible. It is incumbent upon Israel and Egypt to continue this process without interruption.

Second, if negotiations are to succeed, no party should take steps on its own that prejudge the outcome. Thus, for Israel unilaterally to place settlements in the West Bank and Gaza while negotiations are in progress runs counter to the very purpose of the negotiations—to achieve an agreement all parties can support.

Third, we support future negotiations on the final status of Jerusalem. We also support the view that the city should remain undivided, with free access to the holy places for people of all faiths.

Fourth, if negotiations are to succeed, all participants must accept the same objectives. Those objectives are expressed in Resolution 242 and in the Camp David accord. Palestinians are urged to join the peace talks. We will, however, stand by a commitment we first made 5 years ago: We will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization—unless the PLO accepts Resolution 242 and the right of Israel to exist.

Fifth, the current negotiations, as I have said, are designed to establish transitional arrangements for a 5-year period. The final status of the West Bank and Gaza will be taken up in future negotiations. The United States, therefore, will oppose any effort to use the current talks to lay the foundation for an independent Palestinian state or to tie the hands of future negotiations in some other way.

One final point about these negotiations—the most important point of all. The negotiations look toward a certain kind of future for Israelis and Palestinians, a future of peace and mutual cooperation. An alternative vision of the future was laid before us all last week. Two elected Palestinian officials were maimed by acts of violence as cowardly as they were reprehensible, and that violence followed the savage murder from ambush of several Jewish religious students a month ago. Now is the time for Israelis and Palestinians alike to choose which future they prefer—for they will surely either harvest the promise of peace together or reap a whirlwind of destruction.

It may be tempting, given the slow and frustrating pace of complicated negotiations, to lose patience, to reject what does not yield instant success as an utter failure, to advocate uncertain new departures instead of relying on patient diplomacy. But we must not lose patience; we must hold to our course.

To those who oppose the process because they oppose peace itself, I say: Let us put history at long last on the side of peace. The disputes have been moved from the battlefield to the bargaining table. And to those who oppose the Camp David process out of frustration and skepticism, I say: Let us persist. Let us not undermine the most hopeful avenue yet found toward peace. Remember that this process had already altered the course of history. Having come so far, let us not turn aside from what we have begun.

To those who oppose the process because they oppose peace itself, I say: Let us put history at long last on the side of peace. The disputes have been moved from the battlefield to the bargaining table.

[1] Press release 144. ■

near-term defence measures to be undertaken by individual countries. Action would represent earlier or augmented implementation of urgently required defence measures designed to improve force capabilities in the NATO area. These measures are derived largely from existing national plans and based on comprehensive Alliance defence planning.

10. Ministers also called for a report, for the December 1980 Defence Planning Committee meeting, establishing again on a country-by-country basis further specific measures for prompt or accelerated implementation. In the main, these would also be selected from current defence programmes; they would take account of the evolution of the international situation in general and of the situation in South West Asia in particular, and of the possible effects of this situation on the reinforcements available for the defence of the NATO area. Areas suitable for consideration would include readiness, reserve mobilization, war reserve munitions and materiel, maritime defence, airlift enhancement, support by nations of reinforcing forces, military assistance to Portugal and Turkey and the NATO infrastructure programme.

11. Ministers agreed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its implications for international stability including in South West Asia made it more than ever necessary to maintain solidarity, cohesion and undiminished strength throughout the Alliance. These developments also brought more sharply into focus the strategic importance of the Mediterranean area and the pressing need for strengthening the economic and defence postures of member countries on the southern flank.

12. Ministers also discussed a number of issues related principally to the continuation and implementation of current NATO defence plans designed to maintain the credibility of the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture.

13. They discussed the status of the Long-Term Defence Programme and approved recommendations designed to ensure steady progress in a number of key areas. These areas included certain readiness and reserve mobilization measures, a number of maritime equipment projects, the provision of electronic warfare units and war reserve stocks.

14. Ministers once more reviewed the serious economic difficulties of Portugal and Turkey. Their effect on the defence capabilities of both nations, but in particular of Turkey, continues to give grave concern. Problems and possible remedies were identified and highlighted. Noting that satisfactory progress has not been made up to now, Ministers agreed that Allied military assistance needs to be intensified and accelerated to meet the critical requirements in a timely way. In this respect they welcomed the decision of Germany further to increase its already substantial aid programme for Turkey. To strengthen the Alliance's maritime posture, particularly in the field of anti-submarine warfare, Ministers also supported the Portuguese Government in its plans to acquire three modern frigates and agreed to consider the best ways to provide assistance for them.

15. Ministers welcomed the evidence of closer collaboration amongst member nations in defence equipment matters as reported by the Conference of National Armaments Directors. They noted with satisfaction that the NATO armaments planning review is already providing a useful means of identifying opportunities for a cooperative development and production of equipment and for improving interoperability, and that the trial of the periodic armaments planning system is proceeding well. They welcomed the progress being made towards ammunition interchangeability and the establishment of several new project groups for future equipment, including air-delivered missiles and a frigate replacement.

16. Ministers noted with interest the greater emphasis being placed on transatlantic cooperation in the development of families of weapons. In this respect they welcomed the progress being made in the field of third generation anti-tank weapons and air-to-air missiles and the prospects for a family of maritime mines. They encouraged the search for greater use of new technology, including that now available in the commercial sphere for application to systems which will enhance the effectiveness of NATO defence including that of members of the Alliance which are less industrialized. To safeguard the military advantages accruing to NATO from the application of advanced technology, Ministers considered that close attention should be given to the implementation of trade control provisions, so that Soviet forces cannot benefit from the transfer of any technology which would enable them to modernize their forces more quickly and at lower cost.

17. Ministers received a statement by Dr. Hans Apel, German Defence Minister and Chairman of the Eurogroup. They reaffirmed their support for the continuing work of the Eurogroup aimed at strengthening the cohesion of the Alliance and at making the European contributions to collective security as effective as possible. They welcomed the determination of Eurogroup members to continue steady and sustained force modernization; and to ensure that resources available for defence are used to maximum advantage through cooperation and collaboration in practical fields of activity. In this connection they noted the continuing progress in the fields of logistics, training, communications, equipment cooperation, force structures and medical cooperation.

18. Ministers noted that the NATO military commanders had presented a case for an augmentation and acceleration of the current five-year 1980–1984 NATO infrastructure programme and agreed to consider a more substantive report at their December 1980 meeting.

19. Ministers endorsed a new procedure to extend NATO's defence planning progressively into a longer timeframe, with the goal of achieving closer coordination at both the national and international level in setting Alliance objectives and in allocating resources for defence.

20. Ministers recalled their decision of 12th December 1979 to pursue the two parallel and complementary approaches on long-range theatre nuclear force (TNF) modernization and on arms control involving TNF, and took note of the progress report on the proceedings of the special consultative group on arms control involving TNF. Ministers expressed support for the repeated efforts of the United States to engage the Soviet Union in serious negotiations aimed at achieving verifiable limitations on Soviet and United States land-based long-range TNF consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. This offer was first made following the December TNF decision and was repeated by the United States Secretary of State on 4th April 1980. Ministers regretted that the Soviet Union has in response reiterated its rejection of the offer to conduct serious negotiations and is instead advancing conditions which would perpetuate inequality. The Soviet Union has until now posed unacceptable pre-conditions for negotiations, and is continuing the process of deploying SS–20 missiles at a rapid pace. Ministers therefore called on the Soviet Union to respond positively and to accept without delay the United States' offer to negotiate.

21. Ministers expressed their concern about the Soviet superiority in long-range TNF systems. They recognized that the continuing deployment of new Soviet long-range TNF systems, particularly of the SS–20 missile, further increased the already existing disparity in long-range TNF in favour of the Soviet Union. They noted that the Alliance's long-range TNF modernization programme, in which an initial operational capability for modern long-range TNF in Europe is anticipated towards the end of 1983, is deliberately restrained one compared with the qualitative and quantative growth in Soviet nuclear capabilities facing the Alliance which has already taken place and is continuing. The Soviet Union is already in the process of deploying for its SS–20s alone more warheads than will be involved in the entire Alliance modernization programme. Ministers reiterated that the scale of NATO's long-range TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results achieved through negotiations.

22. Ministers recalled that it was decided at the December 1979 meeting that 1,000 United States nuclear warheads should be withdrawn from Europe as an integral part of the decision to modernize TNF without increasing NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons, and to pursue arms control involving TNF. They noted that this withdrawal has begun, as has implementation of other parts of the December decision.

23. Ministers took note of the present state of negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions. They urged Eastern participants to make a positive response to the recent Western proposals for an interim Phase I agreement, and for a package of associated measures which forms an integral part of the interim agreement proposal.

24. Ministers concluded their meeting by endorsing NATO force goals for the period 1981–1986 established on their behalf by the Defence Planning Committee in permanent session. There was full recognition that in view of the current imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, implementation of these force goals would represent a major factor in the maintenance of adequate Alliance defence.

25. Accordingly Ministers pledged themselves to preserve and strengthen the military capabilities of the Alliance. They reaffirmed the importance of member countries achieving and sustaining the aim, endorsed by Heads of State and Government, of increases in annual defence expenditures in real terms in the region of 3 percent. They expressed their confidence that those countries who have not yet been able to meet this goal will make every effort to do so.

DECLARATION, MAY 14, 1980

Ministers and representatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States meeting in Brussels on May 14 expressed their continued deep concern over the illegal detention of U.S. diplomatic personnel and property in Iran in flagrant violation of international law. They also noted that this act is further exacerbating instability in the South West Asia region.

The Ministers and representatives therefore called upon the Iranian authorities to release immediately and unharmed the American hostages.

STATEMENT FOLLOWING MEETING WITH EEC PRESIDENT JENKINS, BRUSSELS, MAY 14, 1980[5]

I had a very useful visit. We touched a lot of bases and I've got a lot of impressions. To try to summarize them all and say a lead paragraph in your evening news or your morning papers, it is that, first, I find our friends in the NATO alliance very supportive, very understanding, and very willing to discuss the complexities and many of the problems with which we are confronted, including the Olympic boycott.

I'd like to take this opportunity to emphasize my own view that the Olympic boycott is a significant, an important, and an indispensable message to the Soviet Union if we are to divert the Soviet Union from its present course.

Now I would hope, secondly, that that message will contribute to a forthcoming dialogue in Vienna with Mr. Gromyko which would enable us to proceed in some fashion, as yet undetermined, to a healthier relationship between the Soviet Union and the West and the United States.

Thirdly, I think an important contribution to this result is the Community's implementation of its commitment to sanctions, and my impression is every effort will be made to follow through on that commitment. Speaking generally and summarily I have a feeling that we have friends here in Europe—friends who are willing and determined to be supportive—and the problem that lies ahead of us is the question of agreeing on the definition of the problem. The definition of the approach to those problems will have the effect first, of unifying the West and NATO alliance; secondly, of making an impression upon policies and objectives of the Soviet Union. So, on the whole, as a rookie Secretary of State I've had a day which has been educational, useful, and, on the whole I think, very solid and productive.

Q. What are the definitional differences that you see may be problems?

A. The question of definition covers a lot of problems. The question of sanctions, the question of the Olympic boycott, the question of defense posture and policies which include the contribution of our NATO allies toward its new dimension, a challenge to the United States and to Europe and to NATO—so there are a lot of definitions which in congressional legislation usually the last pages of a 100-page bill.

Q. Are you satisfied with the level of sanctions as you see them coming up, and do you believe that they are going to come into operation on May 17?

A. On the level of sanctions, as a definition of sanctions, I think it is still very fluid and in the definitional stage. I've tried to communicate with Mr. Jenkins my view of what is required in terms of the commitment that was made. He understood that. We did not get into any disagreement about it, but I think we developed an understanding of some of the practical, pragmatic problems that are involved. At this point I would say that we are in the developmental state with respect to that issue.

Q. Do you think that it will be clarified by Sunday, May 17, in Naples? Will there be a common view at that point? Is there a danger that the Europeans will pursue a different policy than the one you would like to see?

A. I think that your question [inaudible] it is impossible to say that when working those problems out is an objective, and not having yet concluded that it is not possible of achievement I would not like to suggest danger.

Q. Do you feel that you have been able to dissuade the Europeans in any way from undertaking a Middle Eastern initiative at this time?

A. As to that I think we have begun the dialogue at a new level—a different level—based upon my appreciation of the value of the Camp David process and the options to it that I would hope they would find use for. We have just begun that dialogue, and I think it will be pretty immature to draw conclusions about the reaction of our European friends or the impact that might have on the process. I would like to say at this point that with respect to the United States and Israel and Egypt that we do not regard May 26 as an obstacle—simply as a target. This is not as important as the quality of the negotiations that may be still under way on the morning of May 27 and the evening of May 26.

Q. Do you agree with the widely held view here that sanctions cannot work?

A. With respect to what?

Q. Iran.

A. If that is a widely held view—and I've heard it expressed as a view but not as a widely held view—let me say this; my own view is that there are pressures building in Iran, on its border, within the country that obviously must be having an effect which may or may not be acknowledged on their own perception of the value of the hostage policy to their own future. I think we ought to be willing to take the time to

C nbodia Crisis Center

$ 80,900 Startup costs for informational clearing house (1/80)

Cl rch World Service

$ 250,000 Emergency delivery of medicines, relief supplies, and seeds for agricultural rehabilitation in Kampuchea (1/80)

W ld Vision Relief Organization

$ 103,300 Rehabilitation of rice culture, small animal breeding, orphanages, and a youth hostel in Kampuchea (3/80)

CA E

$ 55,800 Ocean freight reimbursement for baby food and relief supplies (3/80)

00,000 Cash for cross border seed rice program (3/80)

$ 55,800

An rican Friends Service Committee

$ 58,300 Agricultural rehabilitation in Kampuchea (3/80)

15,900 Ocean freight reimbursement for medical supplies and vegetable seeds (4/80)

$ 74,200

Off e of the U.N. Secretary General's Sp ial Representative for Kampuchean Hu anitarian Relief

$ 50,000 Startup costs of coordinating office (3/80)

Em assy Bangkok

$ 27,500 Emergency funds for Khmer relief at Ambassador's discretion (11/79)

Tas Force 80 (Thai Supreme Command)

$ 10,700 Office supplies for Thai coordinator (3/80)

Una tributed

$ 34,000 Special airlift of medical and other relief supplies in response to the President's 11/13 decision (11/79)

51,500 Travel and administrative expenses of staffing Khmer relief program in Thailand (10/79–9/80)

$ 35,500

$93, 76,000 (Grand Total)

ress Release 111. ■

Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Ohira

Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira of Japan visited Washington, D.C., April 30–May 1, 1980, for meetings with President Carter and other government officials and to sign the U.S.-Japan science and technology agreement. Following are the President's and Prime Minister's remarks at the signing ceremony on May 1, and text of a White House fact sheet issued following the ceremony.[1]

REMARKS AT SIGNING CEREMONY[2]

President Carter

A year ago, the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Ohira, and I met here to agree to a productive partnership for the 1980s. It was a commitment with far-reaching impact and very difficult to achieve. We understood that. But in this last 12 months, both our nations have made remarkable progress toward reaching these very important goals.

Also, in addition to those mutual commitments which we made one to another, the world has been afflicted with fast-changing and very difficult events which have caused the Japanese Government, under Prime Minister Ohira, to have to face decisions which were, again, very difficult. The decisions made in Japan have been the right ones. They have been of major significance and benefit to our own country and the rest of the world, and they have required great exhibitions of courage and leadership.

The people of my nation deeply appreciate this common approach to very difficult problems and the resolve, which we share, to face international terrorism—exemplified in Iran—and aggression—exemplified in Afghanistan—with a mutuality of purpose, with a common commitment, and with national and individual courage. The bonds which bind together the people of Japan and the United States provide the very cornerstone of our policy in Asia, and they also provide the central core of the global policy of the United States of America.

On behalf of all our people, again, I want to express to Prime Minister Ohira and to his distinguished colleagues a heartfelt welcome as they come to our country and our deepest appreciation for their friendship and for their support, for their advice and for their counsel and partnership as we face these difficult issues together.

Prime Minister Ohira

Let me first express my thanks to you for having invited me to Washington for a brief but thorough and very constructive discussion on matters of our mutual concern. I feel a special sense of importance that I have come to talk with you at a very difficult and trying time for all the people in the world. Freedom, democracy, justice, and peace, which we so dearly share among us, can be seriously harmed for long years to come if we now fail to stand together.

All Japanese understand your deep emotion over the fate of the 50 fellow Americans held still captive in Iran. I join in the fervent prayer of our people for their safety. I also admire your patience and restraint, Mr. President, which can be demonstrated only by the brave. The situation is too serious.

I shall not list usual words of sympathy or support today. But let me just assure you that Japan stands ready to demonstrate its solidarity with the United States and will do its utmost, in concert with other friends, to bring about peacefully the earliest release of the hostages.

The same degree of seriousness prevailed in our discussion over the military intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the continued challenge to world peace. The President and I agreed that we must remain very firm in meeting the challenge posed by this Soviet aggression and that we should lend a helping hand to countries in the Middle East and in Asia for their peace and stability. In this context, I told the President my government's position that the participation in the Moscow Olympic games under the present circumstances is not desirable.

We also talked about our bilateral relationship. I'm very much satisfied with the solid friendship now existing between our two countries. Never before has such a close and strong bond existed between two nations with differences in culture, history, and language, as between us.

I should once again like to thank you for warmly receiving me today. As true friends should, we will each air what is on our minds without fear of

breaking the unique bond that exists between us; for in times of need, in times of crisis, we will not fail to extend the help needed by the other. We, the Japanese, may not be the most eloquent, but we remain a determined and one of the most dependable friends of your country. We know you are there in the same way for us.

. . . .

[At this point, the President and the Prime Minister signed the agreement.]

Prime Minister Ohira

It is my great pleasure and honor to have signed with you the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America on Cooperation in Research and Development in Science and Technology.

Japan and the United States already are actively cooperating together in the field of energy, under the energy agreement concluded last year. Now with the signing of the new agreement, which we owe very much to the initative of the President, our two countries are to start cooperating in non-energy fields as well.

By concluding these two agreements, our two countries have established a solid framework for cooperation covering all fields of science and technology. In this sense the new agreement is indeed significant, and Japan will endeavor to strengthen further the cooperative relations with the United States within the aforementioned framework.

I honestly hope that the cooperation under the agreement will make a steady progress and that Japan and the United States will contribute a great deal to the welfare and prosperity of not only our two peoples but also of the entire mankind.

In closing, I wish to express my sincere respect for the insight of the President, who has continuously made tremendous effort for the realization of the agreement.

President Carter

It's obvious that Prime Minister Ohira has already expressed very clearly the significance not only of the energy, scientific, and technology agreement which we signed last year but also this new one, which relates to matters in addition to energy; matters concerning transportation, matters concerning health, environmental quality, the control of disease, space, and many other elements which are now important to American and Japanese people and those of the world, but which will be increasingly important in the future.

(White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)

President Carter and Prime Minister Ohira

This agreement is particularly significant because it is between two nations which individually have led the world in scientific study, research, development, and technology. We will still be competitors in trade and in the development and the production and the distribution and sale of new ideas, new equipment, new services to mankind. But at the same time now, we can combine our efforts and benefit mutually from the exchange of ideas and concepts, particularly in the basic sciences, which are so important to us, and among our studies and the teaching of young and old Japanese, who can make such a tremendous contribution in the future.

It is with a great deal of pleasure and gratitude that I recognize the leadership of Prime Minister Ohira and the tremendous untapped potential that still exists within our two great nations for the service of our own people and a better life for all human beings who live on Earth.

Thank you very much, Mr. Prime Minister, the people of Japan. I believe this is a great day for both our countries.

WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET[3]

President Carter and Japanese Prime Minister Ohira today signed an Agreement on Cooperation in Research and Development in Science and Technology.

The agreement provides the United States and Japan—two of the world's most technologically advanced nations—a framework for jointly conducting research and development programs in a variety of national priority areas. Under the umbrella of the agreement the two countries will pursue research and development programs which rank high in the national priorities of each country. This agreement represents a relatively new mechanism for developed countries to

alteration in our foreign policy structure would confuse foreign governments and complicate our foreign relations.

The simple truth is that the focus of American foreign policy, under the President's direction, must reside in one person—the Secretary of State. As chief officer of the Department which implements foreign policy, he is uniquely situated to comprehend all the interests that must be weighed when national policy is formed.

Nearly 20 years ago similar issues were raised in the exhaustive Senate study of national policy machinery conducted by the Jackson subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee. Faced with the deepening complexity and expanding reach of international issues, the subcommittee noted the belief of some:

> . . . That the remedy lies in some radical organizational change (for example) a super Cabinet First Secretary, or a "super staff" agency in the White House. The appeal of a quick solution is understandable, if one could be found. But such novel additions to the policy process, far from reducing the President's burdens, would in all likelihood increase them. The President's best hope lies along another path—strengthening the traditional means of executive power.

That reasoning remains valid today. I hope the Congress will not mandate that we move the opposite way.

Let me turn now to the final and most compelling reason for opposing Senator Zorinsky's proposal. It would directly impinge upon the Office of the President by limiting his necessary flexibility in foreign policy.

The Constitution confers upon the President broad powers and discretion in the field of foreign policy. The Supreme Court has described the Presidency as the "sole organ of the Federal Government in the field of international relations." It has declared that the President must be afforded:

> A degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved (*United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright*) Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304.

In the post-Vietnam period, the involvement of the Congress in foreign policy decisions has, of course, increased through such steps as the War Powers Act, notifications on executive agreements and intelligence activities, review of confidential arms sales, and others. These initiatives, however, have been designed to help the Congress to perform better its own constitutional duties.

Now, in my view, we are presented with something quite different: a step that bears no strong legislative purpose, but which would inhibit the President in the performance of functions that are clearly assigned to him.

As the Chief Executive of the country, the President should have an opportunity to arrange the flow of information and executive decisions according to his personal preference. The Government Operations Committee put it this way in 1960:

> Each President will have his own style of doing business—the product of his nature and experience. Each President, therefore, needs great freedom to adapt his office and procedures to suit the peculiarities of his style.

As the chief architect of American foreign policy, the President must be able to choose his personal and confidential advisers without the searching inquiry that confirmation hearings entail. It is inappropriate for the Senate to pass on the qualifications of intimate Presidential advisers, for only the President is in a position to adjudge the needs of his immediate office and to decide what, if any, advice he requires and who, if anyone, will provide it. Just as it is unthinkable that the selection of personal aides of Senators would be subject to outside scrutiny, it is equally unthinkable that the appointment of the President's personal advisers should be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.

Paradoxically, the legislation that Senator Zorinsky submitted last year appears to recognize the importance of Presidential discretion in the appointment of his personal staff. By leaving it to the President to determine what, if any, duties shall be assigned to the National Security Adviser, the proposal recognizes that the President must have the freedom to organize his office as he sees fit. It would seem inconsistent to require confirmation of an individual to whom no duties are legislatively assigned.

Moreover, as the nation's chief diplomat, the President should have flexibility to decide the level and formality of our contacts with other countries, including the use of personal emissaries when he deems it appropriate. So long as the Congress is informed and the Administration is answerable for the results, the prerogatives of the Congress are in no way impaired.

Our system provides ample opportunity to question and challenge the President's decisions. But if our government is to operate effectively, it must accord the President breathing space. Some Presidents will organize their office in a highly structured way; others will feel more comfortable with less formal arrangements. The proposal under consideration is an unwarranted intrusion by the Congress that will needlessly hamper future Presidents.

Conclusion

I believe that the Zorinsky proposal is an unwise incursion into an area that has traditionally—and appropriately—been within the President's exclusive control. We oppose the legislation not because we wish to deny Congress the information it needs. The relationship that this Administration has had with Capitol Hill belies that notion. Rather, we oppose it because it would deny the President the flexibility he needs to formulate and execute foreign policy and would compromise the confidential advice of trusted advisers.

Under the President's direction, the current arrangements for the conduct of foreign policy are satisfactory. The Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser have maintained a sound working relationship that allows the President, with congressional consultation, to direct our foreign policy. The present arrangements serve the President well and, I believe, they serve the country well.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Reported Use of Lethal Chemical Weapons In Afghanistan and Indochina

Statements by Jerome J. Shestack, U.S. Representative to the U.N. Human Rights Commission, before the 36th U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva on March 10, 1980, and Matthew Nimetz, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, before the Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific and International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 24, 1980.[1]

AMBASSADOR SHESTACK

The 36th U.N. Human Rights Commission cannot conclude its work without taking cognizance of the repeated and disturbing reports of the use of lethal chemical agents by Communist military forces against both civilians and soldiers in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea.

My delegation already has addressed this topic during this body's consideration of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Commission is aware of refugee accounts and circumstantial evidence that Soviet or cooperating Afghan forces may have used lethal chemical agents in their efforts to suppress continued Afghan nationalist resistance. Some of these accounts describe such effects as including blindness, paralysis, and death. There is additional, clearcut evidence that Soviet troops have brought chemical decontamination equipment to Afghanistan and that Soviet or cooperating Afghan airstrikes have taken place in areas of that country where lethal chemical agents reportedly have been used.

While the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has understandably commanded the world's attention—and this Commission's solemn condemnation—we should not ignore the conflict and human rights deprivations experienced by the people of Indochina. In addition to general human rights abuses on which this body already has expressed concern, there are specific reports that lethal chemical agents are being used against both soldiers and noncombatants in Laos and Kampuchea.

Many of the members of the Hmong (Meo) hilltribes minority arriving in Thailand as refugees from Laos have reported lethal chemical attacks by Vietnamese and Lao forces there. In some cases, they have stated that they were the actual victims of such attacks. Typical is the testimony of a 12-year-old girl, Xe Xiong, who lost both parents and sustained severe injuries associated with chemical warfare when a plane launched rockets on her small village of 50 people.

If these reports are true, a line has been crossed in the nature of modern warfare, into a realm previously considered "out of bounds" under treaty and international law.

There also is a growing number of reports from Kampuchea that chemical warfare is being practiced there by Vietnamese forces, not only in isolated areas in the interior but also in areas along the Khmer-Thai border, not far from huge concentrations of already suffering refugees.

It is in the nature of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Indochina that the world presently does not yet possess conclusive physical evidence of the use of lethal chemical agents. At the same time the insistent accumulation of this increasingly persuasive evidence must cause all civilized nations profound concern. If these reports are true, a line has been crossed in the nature of modern warfare, into a realm previously considered "out of bounds" under treaty and international law. We can only condemn any use of such lethal weapons as outrageous and inhumane and call for its immediate cessation.

We must not turn our eyes from such reports. The members of this Commission have a right—and a duty—to investigate and determine the facts. This would be accomplished most effectively by an independent investigative committee, established by this Commission, and empowered to receive testimony from refugees and to examine the sites of alleged chemical attacks and other relevant evidence.

The United States favors the establishment of such an investigative committee in the interest of getting at the facts. To deter future use of these agents, this Commission needs to make it very clear that the world is watching and monitoring closely the reports of the use of lethal chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Indochina. As the distinguished American jurist, Louis Brandeis, expressed it some 50 years ago in combatting human rights abuses in the United States: "The best disinfectant is sunlight." We intend to keep the full glare of world opinion directed on this issue.

UNDER SECRETARY NIMETZ

I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss two matters of serious concern to the U.S. Government—reports of the use of lethal, incapacitating, and irritant chemicals in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia and an outbreak of illness last April in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk which may have been connected with a biological warfare agent.

Beginning with the issue of the use of chemical weapons, let me give you a brief description of the information at our disposal, the actions we have taken to date both to increase our knowledge and to bring any such use to a stop, and the strategy we now plan to follow.

These reports of possible chemical weapons use are naturally of considerable concern to the United States for a number of reasons.

First, such use of lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons would contradict the civilized practices of all nations.

Second, it would violate the basic and long-established rule of international law prohibiting the first use in war of lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons.

give them audiences, you offer them medical help, and they are, in some ways, related to the PLO; but you are trying to keep the PLO, *per se*, out.

What I'm asking is if you can expect to have your Camp David process succeed with Palestinian support without the Palestinians themselves getting a green light from the PLO. Wouldn't you expect the PLO has to say yes or no at some point, anyhow?

A. I think that one point ought to be very clear: We are not trying to keep the PLO out; but we are trying to make clear to the PLO that until it changes its posture with respect to Resolution 242, which it has never supported, and its recognition of Israel's right to exist, we will not deal with it on these questions. I think that has been a clear-cut, longstanding, and unchanged American position.

With respect to the broader negotiating base, which must include not only representatives of the Palestinian peoples—and we have urged the Palestinian peoples to join the negotiations but also Jordan, Syria, and other countries in the region—that is going to be a very tough problem when we get to that stage of the negotiations.

Obviously, a comprehensive peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved by negotiations which are forever limited to Israel, Egypt, and the United States. The negotiating base must be broadened at the right time, and even when we get to the right time, it is not going to be easy.

Q. In summary, then, do you think the fact of the European statement is going to have positive or negative effects on your process of negotiations, on the process of negotiations which is now underway?

A. I can really answer that question better after I have the benefit of some of the reactions that we unavoidably get to it and after I have had an opportunity to further study the text. The European Community has made clear its purpose, which is to be helpful in moving to a comprehensive peace.

I do not see anything on its face which directly challenges the Camp David process or seeks to divert the effort of the parties to the Camp David process from their work. And that being the case, I see no reason why we should not be able to proceed with the Camp David process.

Q. Could I put it slightly differently? Could it not be that this statement will, in fact, have a beneficial effect on the negotiations by placing some pressure on the Israelis that the United States is either not willing or able to place itself?

A. I think its impacts could be better characterized by those who framed it than by me, especially since I haven't had an opportunity fully to study it. As I indicated following my own speech on Monday [June 9 before the Washington Press Club], in response to questions, you can never be sure when a speech on the Mideast, any aspect of it, will encounter negativism; and it wasn't until 24 hours later that I began to feel that maybe I had made a constructive and positive contribution to the discussion. So for me to make that kind of a judgment without a similar timeframe to this statement, I think would be to assume a capability for omniscience that I don't have.

Q. The King of Jordan is coming here next week. Do you see that as in any way related to the broader Middle East peace efforts? What do you hope to achieve on this visit that might contribute—you just mentioned trying to get Jordan into these talks?

A. I think it is important from time to time—and the President hasn't seen King Hussein since sometime in 1978—for the United States and Jordan to have general discussions about overall interests. I would be surprised if the Middle East questions didn't enter into those discussions, but there is no agenda for dealing specifically with Jordan's participation in the Camp David talks; King Hussein has made his position very clear here.

But at some point, Jordan is going to be impacted by the results—hopefully, the results of Camp David—and ought to be part of the negotiating base for whatever follows on. I think it is important, therefore, to continue a dialogue with King Hussein and the representatives of Jordan with respect to any subjects of mutual interest.

Q. You said you regard the European Community's statement as an effort to be helpful. Yet, the European statement talks about—

A. Could I correct that? I said that they had said it is an effort to be helpful.

Q. "They have said it is an effort to be helpful" because I have my note saying we regard it as a European effort to be helpful. I would like, nevertheless, to say with that single question—

A. I was speaking to their motive.

Q. Yes. They are saying that the PLO would have to be associated with the Middle East negotiations, flat out, without conditions—no 242 and no recognition of Israel.

I wonder if you could address yourself to that specific and highly delicate question.

A. Would you frame it a little more sharply?

Q. That is to say, the European Community is talking about the fact that the PLO would have to be associated without setting forth conditions for PLO association. Do you share that view or not?

A. I think the Palestinian people will have to be. Whether or not we would acquiesce in PLO participation—so long as they continue on the record to be opposed to Israel's survival—is another question.

The European Community doesn't have to be as concerned with that question as we have to be, because we are involved in specific negotiations; they are not. They are talking about a broad framework of policy considerations toward which they would hope the parties would move. And it is much easier to generalize that kind of objective than it is to pass judgment upon the eligibility for specific parties to be involved in specific negotiations.

I mean the ball is in the PLO's court. How do you expect a country in Israel's position to negotiate and reach an agreement with a group which is bent on its destruction and which repeats over and over again that that is its objective, as it did recently, it reaffirmed in effect that longstanding objective?

I think that until the PLO backs off from that long-repeated stand, that it is not, in our judgment, eligible to participate in specific negotiations.

Q. That puts you in a direct clash—that is to say, the United States—with the position taken by the European Community on this question of PLO association.

A. That may be a newsman's way of discussing it. We are involved in a difference of opinion with respect to—but you have got to put that in a timeframe.

What the Europeans are trying to put together is a statement of direction in which they hope that not only Israel, the United States, and Egypt will move

but the Arab countries generally, representatives of the Palestinian peoples, and so on.

In that kind of framework, pointing to the middle term or longer term, however long it may take, what they are saying is that hopefully at some point the PLO having—and this may be implicit—they don't have to address the question specifically—hopefully with the PLO having abandoned some of its policies, ought to be represented.

That is a point of view with respect to the long term that is one thing. But when we, who are asked to exert our influence to bring the parties together to reach an agreement, have to consider the viability of what is proposed, we have to consider what the parties' position is, and the PLO's position is that it is not interested in a negotiated agreement with Israel. It is interested only in Israel's extinction.

That being the case, how do you invite them to join a negotiation aimed at insuring Israel's survival? Before you can negotiate with them, they have got to abandon that point of view.

Q. If I can narrow that down just a little bit, then do you find it helpful that the European Community has now called for the PLO to be associated with the peace process, and do you find it helpful in sustaining the Camp David process?

A. Again, the answer to that is going to depend upon the reaction of the parties to it.

As I said on Monday, the parties are toe-to-toe on tough issues. There is a very human inclination, I suspect, to pull back from that kind of hard negotiation, if there is any reason to do so. And if they see this as a sufficient diversion so that they ought to step back from the negotiations to look at it more carefully, then the effect would be negative.

On the other hand, if they see it as simply an expression of European Community concern about the problem and European suggestions as to ways it might be dealt with that does not interfere with the continuation of the Camp David talks, then it is not negative.

The attitude of the parties is so much a part of the piece here that you can't make judgments anticipating those attitudes as to what its final effect would be.

Q. One of the reasons for this European initiative was their impatience with the slow pace of the Camp David negotiations. You have just now announced the resumption of contacts on July 2d and 3rd. I wonder how long, in your view, this Israeli/Egyptian/American dialogue can or should or will go on.

A. I once conducted a fund-raising drive for a hospital that was about to go out of business, and the question was how much money did we need to raise, and I finally decided on this slogan: "Give enough to save the hospital."

I don't know how you define a timeframe for this sort of thing. Hopefully sooner would be better than later, and there are problems ahead that are obvious to all of us.

We are in an election year here. Both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have internal problems of their own. You have this impatience on the sidelines, which is understandable, both in Europe and among Arab nations; the possibility always of initiatives in the United Nations and the Security Council. We are walking through very crowded waters here, and very unsettled waters, and it is difficult to move in a straight line toward the ultimate objective.

What was put into motion was a process, and a few days may seem a long time, a few weeks may seem a long time, but as I think back to the late 1940s and the fact that over most of that time there were no negotiations at all, nothing but escalating violence and tension and division, then the timeframe within which we have been operating on the Camp David process seems much more reasonable.

Q. Should it then be open-ended?

A. It is open-ended in the sense that nobody is in a position to set a date for final conclusion, and, indeed, there is always the risk that we will not get through to the end. I think the parties ought to recognize that.

Q. You expressed hope recently to obtain the ratification of the SALT II Treaty in the Senate in that year or before the election after rather negative statements of your former colleague, Senator Byrd. I just wonder whether you still hope to obtain that goal of ratification in this year.

A. The fact is, there aren't the votes in the Senate at this point, for understandable reasons. Nevertheless, the objective is still a high priority objective of both the Soviet Union and the United States—arms control, for all of the reasons that have emerged over the years of the debate over arms control. We simply have to restate that commitment from time to time to make sure that we don't lose it. This is a very delicate time with respect to the preservation of the SALT process and movement toward arms control and made so, of course, by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

My impression is that they still place high value on the importance of arms control, from their point of view, and so do we. If we can find a way to move together toward that objective while we resolve the Afghanistan issue, to which there seems to be no present answer, is the challenge that confronts both of us at the present time.

Q. If I could return to the Middle East for a moment, a State Department official yesterday, in talking about the Europeans, said: "Let's find two roads that can intersect rather than two roads that go apart." Then he went on to say: "Let's work on a process that gives the legitimate rights of the Palestinians practical political expression."

My questions is: Is the granting of some of the things you are trying to achieve in the autonomy talks, such as the turning over to the Palestinians the administration of justice, control over health and education facilities, will that give the Palestinians political opportunities that they have not had in the past?

A. A lot of those functions of government with respect to the transfer to the self-governing authority have already been agreed to by the negotiators, conditioned, of course, upon achieving a final agreement.

The five remaining functions—or the five remaining issues, which involve functions of government, are the tough ones: law and order; security—that is tough; land and settlements—that is tough; water—that is tough; voting. These are all rather central and fundamental issues when one considers the structure of a new political entity, which is what the self-governing authority is envisioned as becoming.

That is what it is all about: How far we can move in the direction of creating political rights for the Palestinian people, and what those rights ought to be.

Q. We are hearing a lot these days, but it is hard to make out what it means, from Iran. Both Bani-Sadr and the Ayatollah have talked about difficulties within the country. We have, on the other hand, Mr. Kreisky [Chancellor of Austria] and Mr. Palme [chairman, Social Democratic

observance of those principles in the present case as well as its concern at the dangerous level of tension between Iran and the United States. The Court, at the same time, pointed out that no provision of the Statute or Rules contemplates that the Court should decline to take cognizance of one aspect of a dispute merely because that dispute has other aspects, however important. It further underlined that, if the Iranian Government considered the alleged activities of the United States in Iran legally to have a close connection with the subject-matter of the United States' Application, it was open to that Government to present its own arguments regarding those activities to the Court either by way of defence in a Counter-Memorial or by way of a counter-claim.

37. The Iranian Government, notwithstanding the terms of the Court's Order, did not file any pleadings and did not appear before the Court. By its own choice, therefore, it has foregone the opportunities offered to it under the Statute and Rules of Court to submit evidence and arguments in support of its contention in regard to the "overall problem". Even in its later letter of 16 March 1980, the Government of Iran confined itself to repeating what it had said in its letter of 9 December 1979, without offering any explanations in regard to the points to which the Court had drawn attention in its Order of 15 December 1979. It has provided no explanation of the reasons why it considers that the violations of diplomatic and consular law alleged in the United States' Application cannot be examined by the Court separately from what it describes as the "overall problem" involving "more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran". Nor has it made any attempt to explain, still less define, what connection, legal or factual, there may be between the "overall problem" of its general grievances against the United States and the particular events that gave rise to the United States' claims in the present case which, in its view, precludes the separate examination of those claims by the Court. This was the more necessary because legal disputes between sovereign States by their very nature are likely to occur in political contexts, and often form only one element in a wider and long-standing political dispute between the States concerned. Yet never has the view been put forward before that, because a legal dispute submitted to the Court is only one aspect of a political dispute, the Court should decline to resolve for the parties the legal questions at issue between them. Nor can any basis for such a view of the Court's functions or jurisdiction be found in the Charter or the Statute of the Court; if the Court were, contrary to its settled jurisprudence, to adopt such a view, it would impose a far-reaching and unwarranted restriction upon the role of the Court in the peaceful solution of international disputes.

38. It follows that the considerations and arguments put forward in the Iranian Government's letters of 9 December 1979 and 16 March 1980 do not, in the opinion of the Court, disclose any ground on which it should conclude that it cannot or ought not to take cognizance of the present case.

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39. The Court, however, has also thought it right to examine, *ex officio*, whether its competence to decide the present case, or the admissibility of the present proceedings, might possibly have been affected by the setting up of the Commission announced by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 20 February 1980. As already indicated, the occupation of the Embassy and detention of its diplomatic and consular staff as hostages was referred to the United Nations Security Council by the United States on 9 November 1979 and by the Secretary-General on 25 November. Four days later, while the matter was still before the Security Council, the United States submitted the present Application to the Court together with a request for the indication of provisional measures. On 4 December, the Security Council adopted resolution 457 (1979) (the terms of which have already been indicated in paragraph 28 above), whereby the Council would "remain actively seized of the matter" and the Secretary-General was requested to report to it urgently on developments regarding the efforts he was to make pursuant to the resolution. In announcing the setting up of the Commission on 20 February 1980, the Secretary-General stated its terms of reference to be "to undertake a fact-finding mission to Iran to hear Iran's grievances and to allow for an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the United States"; and he further stated that it was to complete its work as soon as possible and submit its report to him. Subsequently, in a message cabled to the President of the Court on 15 March 1980, the Secretary-General confirmed the mandate of the Commission to be as stated in his announcement of 20 February, adding that the Governments of Iran and the United States had "agreed to the establishment of the Commission on that basis". In this message, the Secretary-General also informed the Court of the decision of the Commission to suspend its activities in Tehran and to return to New York on 11 March 1980 "to confer with the Secretary-General with a view to pursuing its tasks which it regards as indivisible". The message stated that while, in the circumstances, the Commission was not in a position to submit its report, it was prepared to return to Tehran, in accordance with its mandate and the instructions of the Secretary-General, when the situation required. The message further stated that the Secretary-General would continue his efforts, as requested by the Security Council, to search for a peaceful solution of the crisis, and would remain in contact with the parties and the Commission regarding the resumption of its work.

40. Consequently, there can be no doubt at all that the Security Council was "actively seized of the matter" and that the Secretary-General was under an express mandate from the Council to use his good offices in the matter when, on 15 December, the Court decided unanimously that it was competent to entertain the United States' request for an indication of provisional measures, and proceeded to indicate such measures. As already mentioned the Council met again on 31 December 1979 and adopted resolution 461 (1979). In the preamble to this second resolution the Security Council expressly took into account the Court's Order of 15 December 1979 indicating provisional measures; and it does not seem to have occurred to any member of the Council that there was or could be anything irregular in the simultaneous exercise of their respective functions by the Court and the Security Council. Nor is there in this any cause for surprise. Whereas Article 12 of the Charter expressly forbids the General Assembly to make any recommendation with regard to a dispute or situation while the Security Council is exercising its functions in respect of that dispute or situation, no such restriction is placed on the functioning of the Court by any provision of either the Charter of the Statute of the

Court. The reasons are clear. It is for the Court, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, to resolve any legal questions that may be in issue between parties to a dispute; and the resolution of such legal questions by the Court may be an important, and sometimes decisive, factor in promoting the peaceful settlement of the dispute. This is indeed recognized by Article 36 of the Charter, paragraph 3 of which specifically provides that:

"In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court."

41. In the present instance the proceedings before the Court continued in accordance with the Statute and Rules of Court and, on 15 January 1980, the United States filed its Memorial. The time-limit fixed for delivery of Iran's Counter-Memorial then expired on 18 February 1980 without Iran's having filed a Counter-Memorial or having made a request for the extension of the time-limit. Consequently, on the following day the case became ready for hearing and, pursuant to Article 31 of the Rules, the views of the Applicant State were requested regarding the date for the opening of the oral proceedings. On 19 February 1980 the Court was informed by the United States Agent that, owing to the delicate stage of negotiations bearing upon the release of the hostages in the United States Embassy, he would be grateful if the Court for the time being would defer setting a date for the opening of the oral proceedings. On the very next day, 20 February, the Secretary-General announced the establishment of the above-mentioned Commission, which commenced its work in Tehran on 23 February. Asked on 27 February to clarify the position of the United States in regard to the future procedure, the Agent stated that the Commission would not address itself to the claims submitted by the United States to the Court. The United States, he said, continued to be anxious to secure an early judgment on the merits, and he suggested 17 March as a convenient date for the opening of the oral proceedings. At the same time, however, he added that consideration of the well-being of the hostages might lead the United States to suggest a later date. The Iranian Government was then asked, in a telex message of 28 February, for any views it might wish to express as to the date for the opening of the hearings, mention being made of 17 March as one possible date. No reply had been received from the Iranian Government when, on 10 March, the Commission, unable to complete its mission, decided to suspend its activities in Tehran and to return to New York.

42. On 11 March, that is immediately upon the departure of the Commission from Tehran, the United States notified the Court of its readiness to proceed with the hearings, suggesting that they should begin on 17 March. A further telex was accordingly sent to the Iranian Government on 12 March informing it of the United States' request and stating that the Court would meet on 17 March to determine the subsequent procedure. The Iran Government's reply was contained in the letter of 16 March to which the Court has already referred (paragraph 10 above). In that letter, while making no mention of the proposed oral proceedings, the Iranian Government reiterated the reasons advanced in its previous letter of 9 December 1979 for considering that the Court ought not to take cognizance of the case. The letter contained no reference to the Commission, and still less any suggestion that the continuance of the proceedings before the Court might be affected by the existence of the Commission or the mandate given to the Secretary-General by the Security Council. Having regard to the circumstances which the Court has described, it can find no trace of any understanding on the part of either the United States or Iran that the establishment of the Commission might involve a postponement of all proceedings before the Court until the conclusion of the work of the Commission and of the Security Council's consideration of the matter.

43. The Commission, as previously observed, was established to undertake a "fact-finding mission to Iran to hear Iran's grievances and to *allow* for an early solution of the *crisis* between Iran and the United States" (emphasis added). It was not set up by the Secretary-General as a tribunal empowered to decide the matters of fact or of law in dispute between Iran and the United States; nor was its setting up accepted by them on any such basis. On the contrary, he created the Commission rather as an organ or instrument for mediation, conciliation or negotiation to provide a means of easing the situation of crisis existing between the two countries; and this, clearly, was the basis on which Iran and the United States agreed to its being set up. The establishment of the Commission by the Secretary-General with the agreement of the two States cannot, therefore, be considered in itself as in any way incompatible with the continuance of parallel proceedings before the Court. Negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement are enumerated together in Article 33 of the Charter as means for the peaceful settlement of disputes. As was pointed out in the *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf* case, the jurisprudence of the Court provides various examples of cases in which negotiations and recourse to judicial settlement by the Court have been pursued *pari passu*. In that case, in which also the dispute had been referred to the Security Council, the Court held expressly that "the fact that negotiations are being actively pursued during the present proceedings is not, legally, any obstacle to the exercise by the Court of its judicial function" (*I.C.J. Reports 1978*, page 12).

44. It follows that neither the mandate given by the Security Council to the Secretary-General in resolutions 457 and 461 of 1979, nor the setting up of the Commission by the Secretary-General, can be considered as constituting any obstacle to the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction in the present case. It further follows that the Court must now proceed, in accordance with Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Statute, to determine whether it has jurisdiction to decide the present case and whether the United States' claims are well founded in fact and in law.

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45. Article 53 of the Statute requires the Court, before deciding in favour of an Applicant's claim, to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction, in accordance with Articles 36 and 37, empowering it to do so. In the present case the principal claims of the United States relate essentially to alleged violations by Iran of its obligations to the United States under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations and of 1963 on Consular Relations. With regard to these claims the United States has invoked as the basis for the Court's jurisdiction Article I of the Optional Protocols concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes which accompany these Conventions. The United Nations publication *Multilateral Treaties in*

date for the hearings. Subsequently, on 11 March, the Agent informed the Court of the United States Government's anxiety to obtain an early judgment on the merits of the case. The hearings were accordingly held on 18, 19 and 20 March, and the Court was in course of preparing the present judgment adjudicating upon the claims of the United States against Iran when the operation of 24 April 1980 took place. The Court therefore feels bound to observe that an operation undertaken in those circumstances, from whatever motive, is of a kind calculated to undermine respect for the judicial process in international relations; and to recall that in paragraph 47 I.B. of its Order of 15 December 1979 the Court had indicated that no action was to be taken be either party which might aggravate the tension between the two countries.

94. At the same time, however, the Court must point out that neither the question of the legality of the operation of 24 April 1980, under the Charter of the United Nations and under general international law, nor any possible question of responsibility flowing from it, is before the Court. It must also point out that this question can have no bearing on the evaluation of the conduct of the Iranian Government over six months earlier, on 4 November 1979, which is the subject-matter of the United States' Application. It follows that the findings reached by the Court in this Judgment are not affected by that operation.

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95. For these reasons,

THE COURT,

1. By thirteen votes[1] to two [2],

Decides that the Islamic Republic of Iran, by the conduct which the Court has set out in this Judgment, has violated in several respects, and is still violating, obligations owed by it to the United States of America under international conventions in force between the two countries, as well as under long-established rules of general international law,

2. By thirteen votes[1] to two[2],

Decides that the violations of these obligations engage the responsibility of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the United States of America under international law;

3. Unanimously,

Decides that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran must immediately take all steps to redress the situation resulting from the events of 4 November 1979 and what followed from these events, and to that end:

(a) must immediately terminate the unlawful detention of the United States Chargé d' affaires and other diplomatic and consular staff and other United States nationals now held hostage in Iran, and must immediately release each and every one and entrust them to the protecting Power (Article 45 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations);

(b) must ensure that all the said persons have the necessary means of leaving Iranian territory, including means of transport;

(c) must immediately place in the hands of the protecting Power the premises, property, archives and documents of the United States Embassy in Tehran and of its Consulates in Iran;

4. Unanimously,

Decides that no member of the United States diplomatic or consular staff may be kept in Iran to be subjected to any form of judicial proceedings or to participate in them as a witness;

5. By twelve votes[3] to three[4],

Decides that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is under an obligation to make reparation to the Government of the United States of America for the injury caused to the latter by the events of 4 November 1979 and what followed from these events;

6. By fourteen votes[5] to one[6],

Decides that the form and amount of such reparation, failing agreement between the Parties, shall be settled by the Court, and reserves for this purpose the subsequent procedure in the case.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-fourth day of May one thousand nine hundred and eighty, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court, and the others transmitted to the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, respectively.

(Signed) Humphrey WALDOCK
President

(Signed) S. AQUARONE
Registrar.

Judge LACHS appends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the Court.

Judges MOROZOV and TARAZI append dissenting opinions to the Judgment of the Court.

(Initialled) H.W.

(Initialled) S.A.

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE LACHS

I wish to make some comments regarding the Judgment and the solution of the outstanding issues between the two States concerned. First I wish to express some preoccupation over the inclusion of the decision recorded in subparagraph 5 of the operative part.

It is not that there can be any doubt as to the principle involved, for that the breach of an undertaking, resulting in injury, entails an obligation to make reparation is a point which international courts have made on several occasions. Indeed, the point is implicit, it can go without saying. "Reparation", said the Permanent Court of International Justice, "is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself" (*P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9*, p. 21). This dictum did not, as it happens, refer to a judicial decision but to a convention. But the Court's Judgment of 9 April 1949 in the *Corfu Channel* case illustrates the point in a decision of the Court, which then, in the operative paragraph, did not make any statement on the obligation to make reparation.

There was thus no necessity for the operative paragraph of the present Judgment to decide the obligation, when the responsibility from which it might be deduced had been clearly spelled out both in the reasoning and in subparagraph 2. I accordingly felt subparagraph 5 to be redundant. In the circumstances of the case it would, to my mind, have been sound judicial economy to confine the *res judicata* to the first four subparagraphs and to conclude with the reservation for further decision, failing agreement between the Parties, of any subsequent procedure necessitated in respect of a claim to reparation.

By so proceeding the Court would in my opinion have left the ground clear for such subsequent procedure, while not depriving the Applicant of a sufficient response to its present claim under that head.

I wish now to emphasize the value which the present Judgment possesses in my eyes. I consider it to constitute

not only a decision of the instant case but an important confirmation of a body of law which is one of the main pillars of the international community. This body of law has been specifically enshrined in the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963, which in my view constitute, together with the rules of general international law, the basis of the present Judgment. The principles and rules of diplomatic privileges and immunities are not – and this cannot be overstressed – the invention or devise of one group of nations, of one continent or one circle of culture, but have been established for centuries and are shared by nations of all races and all civilizations. Characteristically, the preamble of the 1961 Convention "*Recall[s]* that peoples of all nations from ancient times have recognized the status of diplomatic agents" and concludes with the words: "*Affirming* that the rules of customary international law should continue to govern questions not expressly regulated by the provisions of the present Convention". Moreover, by 31 December 1978 the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations had been ratified or acceded to by 132 States, including 61 from Africa and Asia. In the case of the 1963 Convention on Consular Relations, the figures at the same date were 81, with 45 from those two continents. It is thus clear that these Conventions reflect the law as approved by all regions of the globe, and by peoples belonging to both North and South, East and West alike. The laws in question are the common property of the international community and were confirmed in the interest of all.

It is a matter of particular concern, however, that the Court has again had to make its pronouncements without the assistance of the respondent's defence, apart from the general arguments contained in two letters addressed to it. The Court took note of the claims of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the United States of America and kept the door open for their substantiation before it. But, unfortunately, Iran chose to deprive itself of the available means for developing its contentions. While discharging its obligations under Article 53 of its Statute, the Court could not decide on any claim of the Iranian Government, for no such claim was submitted; thus the responsibility for not doing so cannot be laid at the door of the Court.

In this context I am anxious to recall that the Court was called into being by the Charter of the United Nations as "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations" (Article 92), and is intended to serve all the international community in order to "decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it" (Statute, Article 38, paragraph 1). But to be able to perform this task, the Court needs the assistance of the States concerned. Governments remain, of course, free to act as they wish in this matter, but I think that, having called it into existence, they owe it to the Court to appear before it when so notified – to admit, defend or counter-claim – whichever role they wish to assume. On the other hand, the Applicant, having instituted proceedings, is precluded from taking unilateral action, military or otherwise, as if no case is pending.

The Court having given its ruling on the issues of law placed before it, one should consider whether one can usefully point the way towards the practical solution of the problems between the parties. Here it would not be realistic to ignore the fact that the mandate given by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to his special commission linked the grievances of either side.

The efforts of that commission thus brought the problem into a field of diplomatic negotiation where its solution should have been greatly facilitated. Unfortunately, those efforts failed, while further events contributed to an aggravation of the tension. Nevertheless, now that the Judgment has, with force of law, determined one of the major issues in question, it should in my opinion be possible for negotiations to be resumed with a view to seeking a peaceful solution to the dispute. I can only repeat the deep-rooted conviction I have expressed on other occasions, that, while the Court is not entitled to oblige parties to enter into negotiations, its Judgment should where appropriate encourage them to do so, in consonance with its role as an institution devoted to the cause of peaceful settlement.

Accordingly, both countries, as parties to the Charter and members of the international community, should now engage in negotiations with a view to terminating their disagreement, which with other factors is sustaining the cloud of tension and misunderstanding that now hangs over that part of the world. By taking such account of the grievances of Iran against the United States as it had been enabled to do, the Court gave its attention not only to the immediate question of responsibility for specific acts placed before it, but also to the wider disagreement that has perturbed relations between the two countries. In view of the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran has radically severed its ties with the recent past under the former ruler, it is necessary to adopt a renewed approach to the solution of these problems, and while both parties are not on speaking terms I believe recourse should be had to a third-party initiative. The States concerned must be encouraged to seek a solution in order to avoid a further deterioration of the situation between them. To close the apparent abyss, to dispel the tension and the mistrust, only patient and wise action – mediation, conciliation or good offices – should be resorted to. The role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations may here be the key.

I append these words to the Judgment because I am hopeful that its pronouncements may mark a step towards the resolution of the grave differences which remain in the relations between the two States concerned. The peaceful means which I have enumerated may still appear difficult of application, but our age has shown that, with their aid, progress can be made towards the solution of even more complex problems, while perilous methods tend to render them even more intractable. Past efforts have failed for a variety of reasons, many of them deriving precisely from the lack of direct communication, and the situation being dominated by factors unrelated to the specific nature of the dispute. Against this background, the crucial element of timing went awry.

It will be necessary to seize the propitious moment when a procedure acceptable to both sides can be devised. But the uses of diplomacy which are corroborated on the present occasion will, I am confident, be vindicated in the event.

(Signed) Manfred LACHS

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MOROZOV

I vote against paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 6 and in favour of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the operative part of the Judgment. Furthermore, there were some points in the reasoning which I could not accept, and I would like to explain the reasons for this.

1. I consider that the long-established rules of general international law relating to the privileges, inviolabilities and immunities of diplomatic

work together on solving globally important research and development problems. It allows advanced nations to pool resources rather than duplicate efforts in a variety of areas.

This agreement results from a December 1978 initiative by President Carter to the Japanese Government. At that time, the President proposed that the two countries cooperate on large-scale, expensive research activities in non-energy fields. This American initiative was a natural complement to ongoing cooperative research and development in energy-related fields resulting from a 1978 initiative to the U.S. Government by then-Prime Minister Fukuda. Top-level science officials began the process of developing a new type of meaningful science and technology program at a September 1979 meeting in Tokyo. Some specific agreements were reached at a follow-on meeting in Washington in February 1980. Today's signing of the "umbrella" agreement represents further progress in the process.

The science and technology agreement provides:

- A framework for undertaking significant joint research in non-energy areas which rank high among the national priorities of both countries;
- A "home" for conducting high-level consultations between the two countries on science and technology policies; such consultations are becoming increasingly important in the face of our need for more basic research and innovation in order to sustain the momentum of scientific and technological advances; and
- A mechanism for making more effective the broad range of ongoing scientific and technological cooperation between our two countries.

The most important objective of the science and technology agreement is the promotion of significant joint research in the non-energy area. Policy-level officials on both sides have initiated the identification and, in some cases, the implementation of joint undertakings above and beyond those carried out for some two decades between agencies of the two governments. These undertakings are characterized by one or more of the following.

- They are high technology, high-risk projects. Examples include research related to space, such as geodynamics, the origin of plasmas in Earth's neighborhood program, the comet rendezvous mission, the Saturn orbiter and dual probe mission, and others, such as research on recombinant DNA and the development of antivirals.
- They are projects in high-risk basic research, such as neutron scattering with advanced instrumentation and accelerator research.
- They meet urgent global needs, such as research on alcoholism, cardiovascular disease, environmental diseases, salmonella control, pest control, and the supply of animals including primates for biomedical research.
- They address problems affecting all advanced industrial nations. These projects, which often involve broadscale testing, can be accomplished expeditiously only through the pooling of resources. They include the national toxicology plan (testing of thousands of toxic compounds), resource conservation (including recycling) technology, detoxification and disposal of hazardous materials, study of the effects of carbon dioxide and diesel particulates, and nitrogen oxide control.

As a result of two recent joint meetings of top-level science officials—in Tokyo in September 1979 and in Washington last February—both sides have identified some 40 initial projects, including all of those mentioned above, for implementation under the new program. Most of these projects, because of their complexity, require extensive program definition and project planning work. Contact points on each side have been named for all of the proposed projects, and consultations are currently underway.

Illustrative of the work entailed are the 17 space-related projects on which we have agreed in principle to collaborate. On nine of these on which we have made the most progress, we have signed project agreements. Consultations in the form of exchange of information, visitors, and correspondence are underway—looking toward the conduct of joint and complementary operations, the development of compatible instruments and complementary science payloads, and training of scientists and technicians.

In the areas of high-energy physics and environmental protection research, there have been exchanges of information and numerous visits by scientists to the national laboratories, and we are now in various stages of finalizing agreements on specific projects. Two important joint meetings are scheduled for later this year: in June between the U.S. Department of Energy and counterpart Japanese agencies and in October between [the Environmental Protection Agency and counterpart agencies].

In health and agriculture areas, exchanges of visits by experts have already taken place or will soon take place on virtually all of the projects. The two sides will hold a workshop in Japan this fall on "quality control of laboratory animals."

New projects will be added to the already broad program of science and technology cooperation, as mutually agreed. Both countries expect that the summit meeting between President Carter and Prime Minister Ohira will accelerate the progress on specific joint projects.

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[1] Prior to the signing ceremony, the President and the Prime Minister held a working luncheon in the Cabinet Room.
[2] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 5, 1980.
[3] White House press release. ■

Energy in a Global Perspective: Putting to Rest Three Myths

by Richard N. Cooper

Mr. Cooper is Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

There are three myths which have become widespread in the wake of the energy crisis of the last several years.

- The first myth concerns the role of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in generating and sustaining turbulence in the world oil market.
- The second myth concerns the perception, especially abroad, that Americans have great scope for energy conservation but have done little to conserve.
- The third myth concerns the perception, mainly in the United States, that only the United States is acting to restrain demand for oil and that other countries have undertaken little effort in this regard, relying instead on the United States to bail them out of a situation which admittedly affects them deeply.

OPEC Myth

The first myth is that all of our difficulties are due to OPEC. This is simply not so. Moreover, it is an enervating illusion to seek and find in OPEC a scapegoat for difficulties which are more fundamental in their origin.

It is true that in December 1973 the OPEC countries, led by the Shah of Iran, raised crude oil prices by a factor of four. It will be debated for a long time whether that conscious act was simply willed by the major supplying countries or whether it was the result of the market conditions for oil prevailing at that time, including a sharp inflation in the prices of most other commodities that had already taken place by the end of 1973.

There can be little debate, however, that in 1979 OPEC, far from initiating the doubling of crude oil prices that took place during the year, scrambled to catch up in a turbulent and rising market. Those events were stimulated by the revolution in Iran and a consequent drop in Iranian production—from roughly 5½ million barrels per day to 3½ million barrels per day in late 1978 and to virtually nothing in early 1979—combined with the perception that Iranian production, once it recovered to 3–4 million barrels per day, could drop further at any time.

In these alarming and unforeseen circumstances, many OPEC countries increased their oil production, so that by the spring of 1979 OPEC production actually exceeded what it had been a year earlier by 1 million barrels per day. Unfortunately, the precautionary demand for oil increased even more. As the petroleum market continued under pressure and prices in the spot, or secondary, market for crude oil rose far above the prices posted by producers, several oil-exporting countries (most notably Iran) exploited the turbulent situation by raising their own export prices. OPEC as an organization made several attempts—in March, June, and December—to unify and stabilize the prices for oil, but each of these proved abortive.

Primary oil stocks in the industrialized countries actually rose by about 7% during the course of 1979, far more than would have been justified by normal economic growth. Stocks in Europe grew by 9%, and in individual countries they grew as much as 30%. This precautionary demand for oil was created by fear of further disruption in oil supplies, especially in Iran, reinforced by a change in the marketing practices with respect to world oil supplies.

A relatively small number of major firms have traditionally produced, shipped, refined, and distributed petroleum products in most countries of the world. Government-to-government sales of oil have gradually eroded the dominant position of the major oil firms, and this process accelerated in 1979. The major oil firms—whose share of world shipments of crude oil fell from over 80% in 1973 to less than 45% in 1979—found themselves short of crude oil as more oil was directed into government-to-government transactions, and as a consequence they had to prorate their customers around the world. This process aroused anxiety about the security of future supplies of oil—even when total supplies were sufficient—and many countries scrambled to assure adequate supplies for themselves. Thus the "normal" level of inventories rose as a result of this change in marketing practices.

The fundamental underlying problem is that prospective demand for oil exceeds prospective supply. Under these circumstances, the oil market will continue to be under press

Augmenting these anxieties was the constant threat of a cut in oil production by individual OPEC countries. OPEC as an organization was not involved in these prospective cuts, and in fact they have not to date materialized. But the possibility of such cuts was a further source of uncertainty in 1979.

The fundamental underlying problem is that prospective demand for oil exceeds prospective supply. Under these circumstances, the oil market will continue to be under pressure. OPEC countries contribute to this prospective imbalance by not investing as much as they could to increase supply, although many OPEC countries are, in fact, investing extensively both to maintain production from existing fields and to develop new fields. Each country pursues its conception of its national economic interest in this regard, and we have not yet reached the point in coordination of world economic policy that countries are obliged to make investments for the purpose of satisfying growing demand in other countries. We in the United States, for example, control, in the name of national policy, production of enriched uranium and the harvesting of our forests, to name only two products.

The vital task for us in preventing further turbulence in the oil market is

Third, these reports indicate the possibility that in some cases chemical weapons may have been used against defenseless civilian populations in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. This would be even more inhumane and in itself a violation of the basic international law prohibiting attacks or acts of violence directed against civilians who take no part in hostilities.

Finally, these reports must be viewed seriously by the United States and our allies in terms of what they indicate about Soviet capabilities, doctrine, and intentions in chemical warfare.

I want to emphasize at the same time that we are not in a position either to confirm or disprove, conclusively, reports of the use of chemical weapons in remote areas where the U.S. Government has no presence. But this is not a trial. We are not prosecutors who must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the issue is sufficiently serious and the reports of sufficient significance and credibility to warrant a thorough, impartial international investigation. And it is essential that we maintain relentless international pressure to deter any future use of such weapons.

Reported Use of Chemical Weapons

Evidence at Hand. Let me make some brief comments about the use of chemical weapons in Laos and Kampuchea. We have previously testified before this committee on this subject and have shared with you what information we had available at that time. After discussing with you our most recent information on Southeast Asia, I will go into more detail on reported chemical weapons' use in Afghanistan, where the reports are more recent and on which we have not yet had an opportunity to brief you.

Laos. In the hearing before this committee on December 12, 1979, Deputy Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] Evelyn Colbert informed you that the result of U.S. Government investigations supported the conclusion that some chemical agent or agents had been used against the Hmong people of Laos as part of the Lao Government's efforts to bring the Hmong under its control. She outlined how, beginning in 1974, and with increasing frequency in 1976 and 1977, there were reports of the use of chemical agents delivered by air, causing illness or death among the Hmong tribesmen. She also informed you that, based on our investigations and on refugee reports and other evidence of such chemical weapons' use, we had raised this issue with the Governments of Laos, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union, as well as other governments, and had made several statements in international fora on this issue in Southeast Asia.

Since Ms. Colbert's testimony, there have been additional reports of gas attacks in Laos. A refugee claimed that there had been gas attacks on June 25 and 26, 1979, in Luang Prabang Province and told of an incident in November in which civilians were reportedly killed by chemical agents in Houa Phan Province. Another Hmong said he had talked to an eyewitness of an attack in October 1979 in Ban Pha Koi, Luang Prabang Province.

In late December, a U.S. Army Medical Corps doctor, on a field trip to northern Thailand, interviewed four refugees in Chiang Khan district who claimed to have undergone attacks at various times in Laos. One of the four claimed to have witnessed an attack in September 1979 in Luang Prabang Province. The doctor noted, however, that physicians questioned at the large Ban Vinai camp for Hmong refugees "did not report seeing any patients with signs or symptoms suggesting the use of chemical agents."

Cables in January 1980 from our diplomatic posts in the area noted five reports of chemical weapons attacks in Laos after May 1979. One of the sources claimed to have actually witnessed the attacks; the others were secondhand reports. All but one of the sources were described as present or former resistance members.

The information at our disposal, both from the earlier period and the more recent reports, supports the conclusion that Vietnamese and Lao forces have used chemical agents against the Hmong tribesmen for several years. Our estimates, based on interviews of Hmong refugees, are that approximately 700–1,000 persons may have died as a result of the use of chemical agents and that many times this number may have been made ill.

Various physical symptoms have reportedly resulted from contact with the delivered agents. Symptoms described range from skin pallor, puffy eyes and face, bloodshot eyes, headaches, and poor coordination to severe coughing, uncontrollable vomiting, hemorrhaging from the nose and mouth, blindness, convulsions, and death.

The characteristics of the agents and the physical symptoms described suggest to the U.S. intelligence community that at least three types of chemical warfare agents may have been used. One of these may be a nerve agent; an irritant agent may also have been used. However, U.S. analysis of a few samples of residue from material reportedly used in the aerial attacks was inconclusive.

With regard to the Soviet role in Laos, I would note that the Soviet Union provides substantial military assistance and military advisers to the Vietnamese and Laotian forces. Therefore, they would presumably be in a position at least to be aware that chemical agents had been used. Moreover, since we know of no lethal or incapacitating agents being produced in Southeast Asia, it is also possible that the Soviet Union is supplying any chemical agents, weapons, and training involved. There is a possibility as well, however, that the irritants involved come from captured U.S. stocks.

Kampuchea. The evidence is less substantial in Kampuchea, although there is a possibility that Vietnamese and Heng Samrin forces are using irritant agents against both Pol Pot and Khmer Serei forces, especially along the Thai-Kampuchean border.

Democratic Kampuchean forces are centrally controlled and engage in intensive propaganda campaigns. As a result, we have carefully evaluated refugee reports on this subject. We have been cautious in evaluating their broadcasts and press releases concerning alleged chemical weapons use in Kampuchea. However, there is enough circumstantial evidence to warrant serious concern and a careful investigation and analysis of the possible use of lethal agents.

Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, we regard it as highly likely that the Soviet invasion forces have used irritant

agents in their efforts to suppress the Afghan resistance. And there are a number of refugee reports, which we have not been able to confirm or disprove so far, that the Soviets have also employed lethal and incapacitating chemical agents[2] as well.

These reports from Afghan refugees in Pakistan and nationalist leaders have led us to conclude the chances are about even that lethal agents have or have not been used by Soviet forces in trying to suppress the Afghan resistance.

The Soviets have deployed chemical defense battalions, standard in all Soviet divisions, with three of the operational divisions in Afghanistan. Soviet troops in the Kabul area have been seen carrying what appear to be gas masks in canvas cases. The Soviets may also have established decontamination stations in northeast Afghanistan. The presence of these chemical and defense battalions and stations—which, as I said, are standard features of Soviet military operations—clearly does not confirm the actual use of toxic chemicals. However, such units would be essential for ground force operations on terrain contaminated with toxic agents.

There were unconfirmed reports that Soviet aircraft dropped chemical bombs on resistance strongholds in three eastern provinces even before the invasion. The earliest reports of air attacks were in August and September 1979, in which chemical agents were said to have been used in the Panjshir Valley area—northeast of Kabul—against nationalist forces who were attempting to interdict the Salang highway.

Since the invasion, Afghan nationlist forces and refugees have reported the Soviet use of chemical bombs against their strongholds in Badakhshan and Konarha Provinces and near Feyzabad and Jalalabad. In particular, on December 27, 1979, Soviet MiG-type aircraft reportedly dropped chemical bombs. The location of this attack was not given, but the same report mentioned other chemical attacks in Badakhshan Province.

Another report speaks of chemical bomb attacks during the third week of January against nationalist forces near Feyzabad and Jalalabad, in the Hazarajat area of Bamian Province and in Takhar Province, all in eastern Afghanistan. In the latter case, the bombs reportedly exploded in midair, dispersing a "vapor" that those affected by it said felt damp on the skin. Inhalation of the vapor is said to have caused difficulty in breathing, nasal excretions, vomiting, blindness, paralysis, and death.

Most recently, several Afghan refugees claim to have witnessed air attacks in which gas canisters were used against resistance forces and villages. These attacks, in Badakhshan Province between late January and early February, allegedly caused eyes to tear, coughing, loss of motor control, "senselessness," and, in many instances, death. Earlier attacks in Wardak Province reportedly caused similar effects but no deaths.

Further Evidence Gathered

Laos and Kampuchea. Since late 1978, we have actively sought to bring these reports to the attention of competent authorities and develop information on the continuing reports of poison gas use against the Hmong. In October 1978, we called to the attention of the Lao Charge d'Affaires, in Washington, the first reports we had received alleging use of poison gas in Laos. Later that month, Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] Richard Hol-

Party of Sweden] now talking about the possible plans for getting the hostages out in the near future.

Could you give us an assessment of where we are right now in Iran and your analysis of the internal situation there?

A. These various initiatives—some made wholly independent of us, others made after advising us of the initiative and of the objective of the parties involved—continue and do not seem to diminish. The results are not entirely clear in part because one can't be sure that what people say publicly, especially in Iran, is what they say privately; whether or not what they say publicly is intended to influence the political situation in Iran or to signal an improvement in the situation for the hostages. You get both signals from them, depending upon where they are.

Mr. Ghotbzadeh has been in Oslo and the other countries represented there, or the other parties represented there, are all interested in resolving the hostage issue, and he went there. Now, what signal do you get from that?

He says that he went there in order to make clear to them the nature and the justification for the Iranian grievances. So the two are always linked. The fact is, of course, that authority is not yet concentrated in Iran in such a way as to give anybody, or any group, control over the final decision, except maybe Khomeini himself.

But there seems to be—with the caveats that I have made—a growing awareness and appreciation of the fact that continuing to hold the hostages is more of a problem for Iran than an opportunity.

Secondly, the holding of the hostages seems to be more related to the struggle for power in Iran than anything else.

If we can get to the point where political authority begins to be concentrated in Iran and to the point where Iran begins to perceive that it has other overriding priorities which it ought to be concentrating on and pursuing, I think we may reach the time when appropriate help from appropriate quarters could bring us to our goal.

Q. To go back to the question of the PLO, supposing the question of the European suggestion that they be associated, supposing the Egyptians asked the PLO to sit as advisers to their delegation, how would the United States react to that?

A. With respect to that, I think that we, as you—you are a pretty sharp press in this conference—will be examining words like that and trying to reach conclusions about them and determine whether or not they might be helpful. I am not in a position to say that now.

I sometimes kill time by philosophizing, but I remember when I was in law school, and the professor was giving us some practical advice on how to behave when we became lawyers, and he said: "Assume that a client climbs up your stairs after weeks when nobody comes and presents a set of facts to you and asks you for a legal opinion. Now, having just graduated from law school, you, of course, will have an instant answer but don't yield to the impluse. Tell him to go home and to come back in a couple of days, and you run that set of facts through your law books again and determine whether or not your judgment is good. Then when he comes back, you give him the best advice that you possibly can.

"Now, as soon as he leaves, another client walks in with what seems to be the identical set of facts and asks for your opinion. Don't yield to impulse then either."

Q. I don't want to get you to yield to impulse, but if I am hearing you correctly, you are not really ruling out the possibility that the United States could accept the PLO as sitting as advisers.

A. The difficulty with affirming that kind of a conclusion is that it quickly becomes transformed from not ruling out to ruling in.

Q. But there is a transcript, and there is a specific response you gave that may reflect some of that legal training.

You ruled out their specific participation until they changed their stand on Israel. You did not rule out their association in some way without changing their stand on Israel. Those adjectives, those modifiers, are awfully important around this building.

You said "specific participation." Are you ruling out any participation by the PLO, associated or otherwise?

A. I am not passing any judgment on the word "associated." I am saying our position is still unchanged; that the PLO must support 242 and must abandon its long-held commitment to the extinction of Israel before we would be involved in talks with them. That is clear.

With respect to the word "association," any piece of paper that comes before me that affects any issue or policy, obviously I study it carefully. Maybe I shouldn't speak too openly about the nature of the process, but that certainly is no secret to you. But I do not intend to signal simply because I have said that of course we would study any word, that, therefore, I rule something in or out. That simply is an erroneous conclusion.

Q. On that point, do you mean just a verbal abandonment of their policy? If they verbally say they would abandon their policy to destroy Israel, but if terrorist acts continue, would the United States then consider talking with the PLO?

A. It is always important to evaluate words in the context of actions if you want to get the real meaning of what people say.

Q. After Iran and Nicaragua, it is said that Korea is your own first international crisis. What is your view on Korea on a short-term and long-term basis? Do you think that the Soviet Union will try to fish in these troubled waters of Korea by supporting North Korea politically or militarily?

A. I think my first foreign policy crisis was accepting the appointment as Secretary of State. But in any case, with respect to Korea, the latest—I think over the period of this last month I have expressed my concern with developments in Korea and the consequences of not moving toward political development and democratic processes.

In a calmer period there, I would hope and have been urging the Government of South Korea to resume what was at best a very slow movement, uncertain movement, toward political development.

There was an announcement today of a constitutional referendum in October, of elections, and then of a new administration by next June.

It is good to have that kind of verbalization of the government's objectives, but I think that we will not really be in a position to judge until we see what happens, because we have had that sort of formulation before.

I would take this opportunity, in answer to your question, to urge the Government of Korea to go beyond this articulation of its political objectives with firm and clear progress and finally action of the kind they have described. It is only that that I think will move them into a healthy political future.

Press release 148. ■

World Court Renders Final Judgment on U.S. Case Against Iran

Following are: text of the judgment of the Court in the case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, *the summary of the final judgment released by the Registry of the International Court of Justice, and the Department of State's statement in reaction to the Court's judgment on May 24, 1980.*

FINAL JUDGMENT,
MAY 24, 1980

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1980
24 MAY 1980

CASE CONCERNING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF IN TEHRAN
(UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
IRAN)

Article 53 of the Statute–Proof of Facts–Admissibility of Proceedings–Existence of wider political dispute no bar to legal proceedings–Security Council proceedings no restriction on functioning of the Court–Fact-finding commission established by Secretary-General.

Jurisdiction of the Court–Optional Protocols to Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 on Diplomatic and Consular Relations–1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights (USA/Iran)–Provision for recourse to Court unless parties agree to "settlement by some other pacific means"–Right to file unilateral Application–Whether counter-measures a bar to invoking Treaty of Amity.

State responsibility for violations of Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 on Diplomatic and Consular Relations–Action by persons not acting on behalf of State–Non-imputability thereof to State–Breach by State of obligation of protection–Subsequent decision to maintain situation so created on behalf of State–Use of situation as means of coercion.

Question of special circumstances as possible justification of conduct of State–Remedies provided for by diplomatic law for abuses.

Cumulative effect of successive breaches of international obligations–Fundamental character of international diplomatic and consular law.

JUDGMENT

Present: President Sir Humphrey WALDOCK; *Vice-President* ELIAS; Judges FORSTER, GROS, LACHS, MOROZOV, NAGENDRA, SINGH, RUDA, MOSLER, TARAZI, ODA, AGO, EL-ERIAN, SETTE-CAMARA, BAXTER; *Registrar* AQUARONE

In the case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran,

between

the United States of America,
represented by

The Honorable Roberts B. Owen, Legal Adviser, Department of State, as Agent;

H.E. Mrs. Geri Joseph, Ambassador of the United States of America to the Netherlands, as Deputy Agent;

Mr. Stephen M. Schwebel, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, as Deputy Agent and Counsel;

Mr. Thomas J. Dunnigan, Counsellor, Embassy of the United States of America, as Deputy Agent;

assisted by

Mr. David H. Small, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State,

Mr. Ted. L. Stein, Attorney-Adviser, Department of State,

Mr. Hugh V. Simon, Jr., Second Secretary, Embassy of the United States of America,

as Advisers,

and

the Islamic Republic of Iran,

THE COURT,

composed as above,
delivers the following Judgment:

1. On 29 November 1979, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State of the United States of America handed to the Registrar an Application instituting proceedings against the Islamic Republic of Iran in respect of a dispute concerning the seizure and holding as hostages of members of the United States diplomatic and consular staff and certain other United States nationals.

2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute and Article 38, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, the Application was at once communicated to the Government of Iran. In accordance with Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute and Article 42 of the Rules of Court, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Members of the United Nations, and other States entitled to appear before the Court were notified of the Application.

3. On 29 November 1979, the same day as the Application was filed, the Government of the United States filed in the Registry of the Court a request for the indication of provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute and Article 73 of the Rules of Court. By an Order dated 15 December 1979, and adopted unanimously, the Court indicated provisional measures in the case.

4. By an Order made by the President of the Court dated 24 December 1979, 15 January 1980 was fixed as the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial of the United States, and 18 February 1980 as the time-limit for the Counter-Memorial of Iran, with liberty for Iran, if it appointed an Agent for the purpose of appearing before the Court and presenting its observations on the case, to apply for reconsideration of such time-limit. The Memorial of the United States was filed on 15 January 1980, within the time-limit prescribed, and was communicated to the Government of Iran; no Counter-Memorial was filed by the Government of Iran, nor was any agent appointed or any application made for reconsideration of the time-limit.

5. The case thus became ready for hearing on 19 February 1980, the day following the expiration of the time-limit fixed for the Counter-Memorial of Iran. In circumstances explained in paragraphs 41-42 below, and after due notice to the Parties, 18 March 1980 was fixed as the date for the opening of the oral proceedings; on 18, 19 and 20 March 1980, public hearings were held,

respect of which the Secretary-General Performs Depository Functions lists both Iran and the United States as parties to the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963, as also to their accompanying Protocols concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, and in each case without any reservation to the instrument in question. The Vienna Conventions, which codify the law of diplomatic and consular relations, state principles and rules essential for the maintenance of peaceful relations between States and accepted throughout the world by nations of all creeds, cultures and political complexions. Moreover, the Iranian Government has not maintained in its communications to the Court that the two Vienna Conventions and Protocols are not in force as between Iran and the United States. Accordingly, as indicated in the Court's Order of 15 December 1979, the Optional Protocols manifestly provide a possible basis for the Court's jurisdiction, with respect to the United States' claims under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963. It only remains, therefore, to consider whether the present dispute in fact falls within the scope of their provisions.

46. The terms of Article I, which are the same in the two Protocols, provide:

> "Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.

The United States' claims here in question concern alleged violations by Iran of its obligations under several Articles of the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 with respect to the privileges and immunities of the personnel, the inviolability of the premises and archives, and the provision of facilities for the performance of the functions of the United States Embassy and Consulates in Iran. In so far as its claims relate to two private individuals held hostage in the Embassy, the situation of these individuals falls under the provisions of the Vienna Convention of 1961 guaranteeing the inviolability of the premises of embassies, and of Article 5 of the 1963 Convention concerning the consular functions of assisting nationals and protecting and safeguarding their interests. By their very nature all these claims concern the interpretation or application of one or other of the two Vienna Conventions.

47. The occupation of the United States Embassy by militants on 4 November 1979 and the detention of its personnel as hostages was an event of a kind to provoke an immediate protest from any government, as it did from the United States Government, which despatched a special emissary to Iran to deliver a formal protest. Although the special emissary, denied all contact with Iranian officials, never entered Iran, the Iranian Government was left in no doubt as to the reaction of the United States to the taking over of its Embassy and detention of its diplomatic and consular staff as hostages. Indeed, the Court was informed that the United States was meanwhile making its views known to the Iranian Government through its Chargé d'affaires, who has been kept since 4 November 1979 in the Iranian Foreign Ministry itself, where he happened to be with two other members of his mission during the attack on the Embassy. In any event, by a letter of 9 November 1979, the United States brought the situation in regard to its Embassy before the Security Council. The Iranian Government did not take any part in the debates on the matter in the Council, and it was still refusing to enter into any discussions on the subject when, on 29 November 1979, the United States filed the present Application submitting its claims to the Court. It is clear that on that date there existed a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of the Vienna Conventions and thus one falling within the scope of Article I of the Protocols.

48. Articles II and III of the Protocols, it is true, provide that within a period of two months after one party has notified its opinion to the other that a dispute exists, the parties may agree either: (*a*) "to resort not to the International Court of Justice but to an arbitral tribunal", or (*b*) "to adopt a conciliation procedure before resorting to the International Court of Justice". The terms of Articles II and III however, when read in conjunction with those of Article I and with the Preamble to the Protocols, make it crystal clear that they are not not be understood as laying down a precondition of the applicability of the precise and categorical provision contained in Article I establishing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in respect of disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Vienna Convention in question. Articles II and III provide only that, as a substitute for recourse to the Court, the parties *may agree* upon resort either to arbitration or to conciliation. It follows, first, that Articles II and III have no application unless recourse to arbitration or conciliation has been proposed by one of the parties to the dispute and the other has expressed its readiness to consider the proposal. Secondly, it follows that only then may the provisions in those Articles regarding a two months' period come into play, and function as a time-limit upon the conclusion of the agreement as to the organization of the alternative procedure.

49. In the present instance, neither of the parties to the dispute proposed recourse to either of the two alternatives, before the filing of the Application or at any time afterwards. On the contrary, the Iranian authorities refused to enter into any discussion of the matter with the United States, and this could only be understood by the United States as ruling out, *in limine*, any question of arriving at an agreement to resort to arbitration or conciliation under Article II or Article III of the Protocols, instead of recourse to the Court. Accordingly, when the United States filed its Application on 29 November 1979, it was unquestionably free to have recourse to Article I of the Protocols, and to invoke it as a basis for establishing the Court's jurisdiction with respect to its claims under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963.

50. However, the United States also presents claims in respect of alleged violations by Iran of Articles II, paragraph 4, XIII, XVIII and XIX of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of 1955 between the United States and Iran, which entered into force on 16 June 1957. With regard to these claims the United States has invoked paragraph 2 of Article XXI of the Treaty as the basis for the Court's jurisdiction. The claims of the United States under this Treaty overlap in considerable measure with its claims under the two Vienna Conventions and more especially the Convention of 1963. In this respect, therefore, the dispute between the United States and Iran regarding those claims is at the same time a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of the Vienna Conventions which falls within Article I of their Protocols. It was for this reason that in its Order of 15 December 1979 indicating provisional measures the Court did not find it necessary to enter into the question whether Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty might also have provided a basis for the exercise of its jurisdiction in the present

case. But taking into account that Article II, paragraph 4, of the 1955 Treaty provides that "Nationals of either High Contracting Party shall receive the most constant protection and security within the territories of the other High Contracting Party. . .", the Court considers that at the present stage of the proceedings that Treaty has importance in regard to the claims of the United States in respect of the two private individuals said to be held hostage in Iran. Accordingly, the Court will now consider whether a basis for the exercise of its jurisdiction with respect to the alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty may be found in Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty.

51. Paragraph 2 of that Article reads:

> "Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific means."

As previously pointed out, when the United States filed its Application on 29 November 1979, its attempts to negotiate with Iran in regard to the overrunning of its Embassy and detention of its nationals as hostages had reached a deadlock, owing to the refusal of the Iranian Government to enter into any discussion of the matter. In consequence, there existed at that date not only a dispute but, beyond any doubt, a "dispute . . . not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy" within the meaning of Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty; and this dispute comprised, *inter alia*, the matters that are the subject of the United States' claims under that Treaty.

52. The provision made in the 1955 Treaty for disputes as to its interpretation or application to be referred to the Court is similar to the system adopted in the Optional Protocols to the Vienna Conventions which the Court has already explained. Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty establishes the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory for such disputes, unless the parties *agree* to settlement by some other means. In the present instance, as in the case of the Optional Protocols, the immediate and total refusal of the Iranian authorities to enter into any negotiations with the United States excluded *in limine* any question of an *agreement* to have recourse to "some other pacific means" for the settlement of the dispute. Consequently, under the terms of Article XXI, paragraph 2, the United States was free on 29 November 1979 to invoke its provisions for the purpose of referring its claims against Iran under the 1955 Treaty to the Court. While that Article does not provide in express terms that either party may bring a case to the Court by unilateral application, it is evident, as the United States contended in its Memorial, that this is what the parties intended. Provisions drawn in similar terms are very common in bilateral treaties of amity or of establishment, and the intention of the parties in accepting such clauses is clearly to provide for such a right of unilateral recourse to the Court, in the absence of agreement to employ some other pacific means of settlement.

53. The point has also been raised whether, having regard to certain counter-measures taken by the United States vis-à-vis Iran, it is open to the United States to rely on the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights in the present proceedings. However, all the measures in question were taken by the United States after the seizure of its Embassy by an armed group and subsequent detention of its diplomatic and consular staff as hostages. They were measures taken in response to what the United States believed to be grave and manifest violations of international law by Iran, including violations of the 1955 Treaty itself. In any event, any alleged violation of the Treaty by either party could not have the effect of precluding that party from invoking the provisions of the Treaty concerning pacific settlement of disputes.

54. No suggestion has been made by Iran that the 1955 Treaty was not in force on 4 November 1979 when the United States Embassy was overrun and its nationals taken hostage, or on 29 November when the United States submitted the dispute to the Court. The very purpose of a treaty of amity, and indeed of a treaty of establishment, is to promote friendly relations between the two countries concerned, and between their two peoples, more especially by mutual undertakings to ensure the protection and security of their nationals in each other's territory. It is precisely when difficulties arise that the treaty assumes its greatest importance, and the whole object of Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty was to establish the means for arriving at a friendly settlement of such difficulties by the Court or by other peaceful means. It would, therefore, be incompatible with the whole purpose of the 1955 Treaty if recourse to the Court under Article XXI, paragraph 2, were now to be found not to be open to the parties precisely at the moment when such recourse was most needed. Furthermore, although the machinery for the effective operation of the 1955 Treaty has, no doubt, now been impaired by reason of diplomatic relations between the two countries having been broken off by the United States, its provisions remain part of the corpus of law applicable between the United States and Iran.

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55. The United States has further invoked Article 13 of the Convention of 1973 on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, as a basis for the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction with respect to its claims under that Convention. The Court does not, however, find it necessary in the present Judgment to enter into the question whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, Article 13 of that Convention provides a basis for the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction with respect to those claims.

56. The principal facts material for the Court's decision on the merits of the present case have been set out earlier in this Judgment. Those facts have to be looked at by the Court from two points of view. First, it must determine how far, legally, the acts in question may be regarded as imputable to the Iranian State. Secondly, it must consider their compatibility or incompatibility with the obligations of Iran under treaties in force or under any other rules of international law that may be applicable. The events which are the subject of the United States' claims fall into two phases which it will be convenient to examine separately.

57. The first of these phases covers the armed attack on the United States Embassy by militants on 4 November 1979, the overrunning of its premises, the seizure of its inmates as hostages, the appropriation of its property and archives and the conduct of the Iranian authorities in the face of those occurrences. The attack and the subsequent overrunning, bit by bit, of the whole Embassy premises, was an operation which continued over a period of some three hours without any body of police, any military unit or any Iranian official intervening to try to stop or impede it

and consular personnel are among those which are particularly important for the implementation of such basic principles of contemporary international law as the peaceful coexistence of countries with different political, social and economic structures. These rules are reflected in the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention of 24 April 1963 on Consular Relations.

The obligations laid on the parties to the Conventions should be strictly observed and any violation of their provisions by any country should be immediately terminated.

2. But the Court will be competent to deal with the question of such violations at the request of one party to the dispute only if the *other* party in one or another of the forms provided by Articles 36 or 37 of the Statute has expressed its agreement to refer the case to the Court. For the purposes of this dispute, which has been referred to the Court only by *one* party, it is necessary to notice that the two Optional Protocols to the two Vienna Conventions provide in Article I that:

> "Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court *by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.*" [Emphasis added.]

The Optional Protocols were duly ratified by the United States and Iran.

3. It would therefore not have been necessary to undertake any further examination of the question of jurisdiction if the Court in operative paragraph 1 had limited itself to recognition of the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran had violated several obligations owed by it *under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963.*

Instead, the Court qualified the actions of Iran as violations of its obligations *"under international conventions in force between the two countries."* [Emphasis added.]

The formula adopted by the Court, read in combination with paragraphs 50, 51, 52, 53 and 54 of the Judgment, signifies recognition that the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran of 1955 is an additional source for jurisdiction of the Court in the current case.

If one compares the text of Article I of the two Optional Protocols to the Vienna Conventions with the text of Article XXI (2) of the Treaty of 1955, one finds without difficulty that the latter text (unlike the Optional Protocols) does not provide for unconditional jurisdiction of the Court at the request of *only one party to the dispute.*

In its Memorial (page 41) the Applicant concedes: "It is, of course, true that the text of Article XXI (2) does not provide in express terms that either party to a dispute may bring the case to the Court by unilateral application."

Following passages of the Memorial contain references to the understanding allegedly reached between the United States of America and other countries on some bilateral treaties of the same type. According to the Agent of the United States of America, a number of countries understand that a formula analogous to Article XXI (2) of the Treaty gives to any party the right to submit a dispute to the Court by unilateral application.

But as is correctly said on page 42 of the same Memorial: "Iran is not, of course, bound by any understanding between the United States and third countries." Thus the Applicant itself recognized that, legally speaking, the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of 1955 could not be used as a source of the Court's jurisdiction.

In the light of the actions taken by the Government of the United States of America in November 1979 and further during the period from December 1979 to April 1980 – military invasion of the territory of Iran, a series of economic sanctions and other coercive measures which are, to say the least, incompatible with such notions as amity – it is clear that the United States of America, according to commonly recognized principles of international law, has now deprived itself of any right to refer to the Treaty of 1955 in its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In an endeavour to show that provisions of the Treaty of 1955 may be considered as a source of jurisdiction in this case, the Court, in some of its reasoning, goes so far as to consider the actions of the United States of America as some kind of normal counter-measures, and overlooks the fact that they are incompatible not only with the Treaty of 1955 but with the provisions of general international law, including the Charter of the United Nations.

4. On the other hand, the formula used by the Court in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the Judgment, read in combination with paragraph 55 of the reasoning and operative paragraphs 5 and 6, implies that the Court *only in the present Judgment* has decided not to enter into the question whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, Article 13 of the Convention of 1973 on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents "provides a basis for the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction with respect" to the claims of the United States of America.

Taking into account the fact that in operative paragraph 6 the Court provides for a possible continuation of the case on a question of reparation, this implies that the Court does not exclude the possibility that the claim of the United States of America to found jurisdiction on the 1973 Convention might in future be re-examined. Therefore I am obliged to observe that the Convention of 1973 does not provide for the *unconditional* right of *one* party to a dispute to present an application to the Court. This right arises, according to Article 13 of the Convention, only if the other party in the course of six months has not accepted a request to organize an arbitration. The Memorial of the United States, as well as additional explanations given by Counsel for the United States at the public meeting of the Court on 20 March 1980, provide evidence that the United States Government never suggested to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran the organization of any arbitration as provided for by the Convention of 1973.

It is also necessary to take note that the 1973 Convention is not a substitute for either of the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963; it was drawn up for the purpose of ensuring co-operation among States in their efforts to fight international terrorism.

The formula employed by the Court in operative paragraph 1, when read in combination with paragraph 91, serves also to level at Iran the unfounded allegation that it has violated the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

5. Paragraphs 2, 5 and 6 of the operative part of the Judgment relate to the question of the responsibility of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the United States of America and the obligation of Iran to make reparation to the United States.

It is well known that, in accordance with the provisions of general international law, some violations of freely accepted international obligations may be

followed by a duty to make compensation for the resultant damage.

But taking into account the extraordinary circumstances which occurred during the period of judicial deliberation on the case, when the Applicant itself committed many actions which caused enormous damage to the Islamic Republiic of Iran, the Applicant has forfeited the legal right as well as the moral right to expect the Court to uphold any claim for reparation.

The situation in which the Court has carried on its judicial deliberations in the current case has no precedent in the whole history of the administration of international justice either before this Court, or before any international judicial institution.

While declaring its intention to settle the dispute between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran exclusively by peaceful means, and presenting its Application to the Court, the Applicant in fact simultaneously acted contrary to its own declaration, and committed a series of grave violations of the provisions of general international law and the Charter of the United Nations. Pending the Judgment of the Court these violations included unilateral economic sanctions and many other coercive measures against Iran, and culminated in a military attack on the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

One element of these violations was the decision to freeze Iranian assets in the United States, which, according to press and broadcast reports, amount to some 12 billion dollars. On 7 April 1980 new measures were taken by the President of the United States with the future disposal of the frozen assets by the American authorities in view. In the letter from the Deputy Agent of the United States of 15 April 1980, these actions of the President were explained particularly by the necessity to make an inventory and by the idea that the calculation might "well be useful in further proceedings before the Court as to the amount of reparations owed by Iran". But in this letter the Deputy Agent failed to comment on the *crucial* point of the statement of the President of the United States on 7 April 1980, which undoubtedly shows that the real purpose of his order relating to Iranian frozen assets is to use them in accordance with decisions which would be taken in a domestic framework by the United States itself.

In the statement of the President of the United States of 7 April 1980 we read:

"3. The Secretary of the Treasury will make a formal inventory of the assets of the Iranian Government which were frozen by my previous order and also make a census or inventory of the outstanding claims of American citizens and corporations against the Government of Iran. *This accounting of claims will aid in designing a program against Iran for the hostages, the hostage families and other US claimants. We are now preparing legislation which will be introduced in the Congress to facilitate processing and paying of these claims.*" [Emphasis added.]

In the context of the statement, this implies that the United States is acting as a "judge" in its own cause. It should be noted that, according to a communication published in the *International Herald Tribune* on 19-20 April 1980, the above-mentioned request to the United States Congress included a provision to "*reimburse the United States for military costs because of the hostage crisis.*" [Emphasis added.]

6. Furthermore, despite the fact that the Security Council did not adopt the suggestion of the United States to order sanctions against the Islamic Republic or Iran, the Government of the United States decided not only to undertake unilaterally all these sanctions but also to take some additional coercive measures.

In these completely unusual circumstances, it is not possible to include in the Judgment any provisions establishing the responsibility of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the United States of American and a duty to make reparation, as is done in paragraphs 2, 5 and 6 of the operative part of the Judgment. The Court has disregarded the unlawfulness of the above-mentioned actions of the United States of America and has consequently said nothing about the Applicant's responsibility for those actions to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Operative paragraph 6 of the Judgment, which provides that the "form and amount of such reparation, failing agreement between the Parties, shall be settled by the Court" and "reserves for this purpose the subsequent procedure in the case", does not affect my objection. Even if these provisions are detached from operative paragraph 5, and read only with operative paragraph 2, it is still apparent that the Court has recognized an imperative duty on the part of Iran to make reparation to the United States.

It has been mentioned that the absence of Iran from the judicial proceedings allegedly created an obstacle to considering its possible counter-claims against the United States of America. But the wholly unilateral actions committed by the United States of America against Iran simultaneously with the judicial proceedings were clearly proved by documents presented at the request of the Court by the Applicant itself; there was no legal obstacle to the Court's taking this evidence into account *proprio motu* under Article 53 of the Statute, at least when considering the question of responsibility.

7. Some parts of *the reasoning* of the Judgment described the circumstances of the case in what I find to be an incorrect or one-sided way.

It is not my intention to refer to all those paragraphs in the reasoning which I could not accept. Accordingly, I confine myself to the inclusion in this opinion of the points which, it seems to me, are the most important.

8. I was unable to accept paragraphs 32, 93 and 94. The language used by the Court in those paragraphs does not give a full and correct description of the actions of the United States which took place on the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran on 24-25 April 1980. Some of the wording used by the Court for its description of the events follows uncritically the terminology used in the statement made by the President of the United States on 25 April 1980, in which various attempts were made to justify, from the point of view of international law, the so-called rescue operation. But even when the President's statement is quoted, some parts thereof, which are important for a correct assessment of those events, are omitted.

What happened in reality? During the night of 24-25 April 1980 armed units of the military forces of the United States committed on invasion of the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In accordance with the statement of the President of the United States of 25 April 1980, the planning of this invasion "*began shortly after our Embassy was seized . . . this complex operation had to be the product of intensive training and repeated rehearsal.*" [Emphasis added.] This means, first, that almost simultaneously with its filing of the Application with a view to settling the dispute by peaceful means, the United States started preparing for settlement of the dispute by the use of armed force, and, secondly, that it proceeded to carry out its plan while the Judgment of the Court was still pending.

It is a well-known fact that in the

to reduce our demand for imported oil through conservation of energy, through substitution of other energy sources for oil, and through development of our own oil resources.

U.S. Nonconservation Myth

This brings me to the second myth: Americans are uncontrolled consumers of energy—gas guzzlers for short—with much room for easy conservation; and we have not done anything about it.

The last proposition is clearly not so. Whether measured in actions or in results, much has already been accomplished. Take actions first. Several steps were taken before the current Administration to conserve on oil, of which the most important were mandatory speed limits and mandatory mileage requirements on new automobiles. The International Energy Agency (IEA) was also created, and the U.S. Government committed itself to a strategic petroleum reserve.

The Carter Administration has had three phases to its energy program. Phase I was introduced in April 1977 and finally passed the Congress in October 1978. Its main elements were phased decontrol of natural gas prices, measures to increase greatly the use of coal by industry and electric utilities, loan and tax incentives to encourage energy conservation, and increased government support for energy research and development.

Phase II of the Administration's energy program was announced in April 1979. Its principal element was the phased decontrol of oil prices, combined with a request for an "excess profits" tax, the latter really being a tax on what economists would call the economic rents involved in production of a natural resource—such as oil—whose price has risen rapidly.

Phase III was announced in July 1979 and involved a commitment to impose an annual ceiling of 8.5 million barrels per day on U.S. imports of oil. The Administration also requested Congress to create an Energy Security Corporation to develop commercial scale facilities for producing synthetic liquid fuels and unconventional natural gas and an Energy Mobilization Board to speed the regulatory process governing new investments in oil-saving activities.

Taken all together, these actions involve a combination of market incentives (through higher prices for oil and gas), government stimulants to reinforce market incentives (through loans and tax credits for energy saving activities), and government mandated actions to conserve oil (such as mileage requirements on automobiles and limitations on use of oil by electric utilities). The program has not relied on any single cure-all to the energy problem. Instead, it has recognized that an appropriate solution requires action on a variety of fronts, involving (1) energy conservation, (2) development of such alternative energy sources as coal, nuclear power, and solar and renewable energy, and (3) domestic production of oil and gas. Moreover, the measures range in impact from immediate to long term. Some actions, such as encouragement of the use of gas as a boiler fuel, are clearly not desirable in the long run but have been helpful in reducing immediate pressures in the oil market.

Actions are important only insofar as they lead to results. Results in the energy sector are more difficult to achieve than they are in many other sectors of the economy. Energy consumption is a pervasive feature of our economy, not easily avoidable or set aside even in the short run. Large investments are typically involved in each "energy system," including investments by individuals and households. For both reasons it is not easy to reduce our demand for oil rapidly. But 6 years have gone by since the large OPEC price increase of December 1973, and we can observe substantial responses over this period of time.

For the economy as a whole, energy use has grown about one-third as rapidly as real GNP since 1973, compared with a one-to-one relationship during the preceding two decades.

The most notable response has been a 20% decline between 1973 and 1978 in the use of energy per unit of industrial output. Thus, the "energy productivity" of American industrial output has increased substantially. This increase perhaps offers a partial explanation for the decline in growth of labor productivity, as business expenditure was diverted from the traditional labor-saving investment to energy-saving investment. To the extent this switch has taken place, it should be a cause of joy rather than alarm; but it is another reminder that so long as we import substantial amounts of oil whose price is rising, we must trim increases in our standards of living.

For the economy as a whole, energy use has grown about one-third as rapidly as real GNP since 1973, compared with a one-to-one relationship during the preceding two decades. This represents a remarkable shift in behavior toward energy conservation.

Gasoline consumption in 1979 was 4% lower than it was in 1978. By December 1979, when gasoline was not constrained by shortages, consumption was over 9% below its level for the same period in 1978. Seven percent of homeowners have shifted away from oil for space heating, mainly to gas and wood. Distillate oil sales (mostly heating oil) dropped 10% between December 1978 and December 1979, even though the winter through the end of December was only about 5% less cold than in 1978. (Heating oil sales dropped even more sharply—15%—in early 1980).

Further response is ahead of us. Investments in oil conservation in both the private and public sector continues apace. Moreover, retail prices of petroleum products rose over 50% in 1979, a more rapid increase than in any other major industrial country. Further conservation can be expected as a result. One consequence is already starkly evident: The demand for automobiles has shifted dramatically from large to small cars, such that by early 1980, 63% of all new automobile sales in the Unites States were small cars, compared with 48% in 1978, which was itself higher than in previous years.

These results will perhaps not be impressive for those who believe that Americans guzzle oil incontinently. It is true, as often pointed out, that Americans have the highest per capita consumption of oil, apart from Canada. But it is also true that Americans have the highest real per capita income of any major industrialized country. Our consumption of many goods and services, not merely oil, is higher than that observed elsewhere—telephones, ice cream, pianos, higher education, etc. A

more appropriate comparison would focus on total energy consumption per unit of GNP. The United States is high on this scale as well, though not at the top, and the comparison is not so bad when allowance is made both for the substantial variations in temperature and for the vast distances involved in the United States compared with most other industrialized countries.

It is possible that the high mobility of Americans was encouraged by cheap energy as well as by a continental-sized country, although it should be noted that this high American mobility was already evident in the early 19th century, long before oil and coal came to be used for transportation. (Travel over long distances was presupposed even at the inception of the United States. Legislative representatives were based on geographical constituencies, and Congressmen from Georgia had to travel 600 miles to Philadelphia, the first capital. The distance between Edinburgh and London, by comparison, is about half that. Today, some Congressmen must travel 5,000 miles between their constituencies and Washington.)

The high mobility has become so deeply ingrained in our social and economic structure that it is difficult to reverse. We may now regret the layout of the typical American city, with its hundreds of thousands of single family residences stretching for miles in all directions from the center. Such basic locational dispersion can be altered only over many decades. In most of the country, these millions of buildings must be heated in winter. The system of transportation that serves this system may require a lot of gasoline, but the gasoline is not wantonly wasted as it is sometimes portrayed in Europe. Moreover, urban mass transportation can go only part way in substituting for the automobile or small bus because of the great dispersion of residences. Gasoline can be conserved mainly through the use of smaller, more energy-efficient cars, and, as noted above, the American public is moving strongly in that direction. But, again, we must keep in mind the existing capital stock. There are over 135 million motor vehicles in the United States, and it will take about a decade to change the entire stock.

With higher oil prices, all countries have scope for conservation relative to their previous condition. The American experience since 1973 suggests there is substantial scope for energy conservation even in industry, which is the main user of energy in most countries. (It should be noted here that detailed comparisons of particular industries in various countries suggest that U.S. manufacturing is not notably more prodigal in its use of energy than are corresponding industries in other leading countries.)

"Other Countries" Nonconservation Myth

The third myth, most prevalent in the United States, is that other countries are not doing their share and the United States is bearing the major burden of adjustment to imbalance in the world oil market. In fact, we have had extensive collaboration among the industrialized countries on energy policy and the need for collective action. The Tokyo economic summit was devoted mainly to energy. The 20-nation IEA, in addition to its emergency sharing plan, focuses on the need for action by all members to bring oil demand into balance with supply, both in the short run and by 1985. In March 1979, propelled by the turbulent oil market, the IEA set targets for each of its member countries to reduce imports of oil by 5% of projected oil consumption by the end of the year. True, some countries did not meet their target, but most countries took serious steps to cut back on oil imports, and the oil market would have been considerably tighter if these steps had not been taken.

In recent years France and Japan have raised excise taxes on their already highly taxed sales of gasoline, for example. In countries where gasoline prices are controlled, these controls have been relaxed. Many countries—including Canada, France, Germany, and Japan—have taken steps to encourage electricity generation by coal and to discourage the use of oil as boiler fuel. Many countries have raised insulation standards and have provided financial incentives for improved insulation. And, like the United States and sometimes in collaboration with the United States, several countries have increased sharply their research and development expenditures devoted to the energy field. As in the United States, the growth of energy consumption relative to overall economic growth in the last few years is well below historical trends, although the decline has not always been as dramatic as it has been in the United States.

The Difficult Challenge Ahead

Restoring and maintaining balance in the world oil market is an arena where no one country can solve the problem alone. Actions are economically painful, politically difficult, and involve changes in traditional ways of doing things. Oil price increases provide an incentive for all oil consumers to conserve on oil, and thus, are a necessary element of the solution to the energy problem.

But sharp increases in oil prices are part of the problem as well as being part of the solution. They aggravate inflation, reduce economic growth, and enlarge deficits in international payments.

The publics and officials of most nations can persuade themselves that they are too insignificant to influence events in the world oil market. Due to their size, larger nations have some incentive to act, but even their willingness to take action will be blunted if others do not join in. Hence, there is a strong need for international cooperation and even collective action to reduce the demand for oil during the next decade. If we do not do so, the decade will be plagued by continual oil-price-induced impetus to inflation and by sluggish or even negligible economic growth forced on us by the need to balance demand for oil with available supplies.

It is important that both we Americans and other industrialized countries get on with the pursuit of an active energy policy to head off these threats to our economic welfare and to political stability around the world.■

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brooke traveled to Vientiane and discussed our concern about Hmong human rights and related issues with Lao leaders.

In January 1979, the Department of State again informed the Lao Embassy of its concern about reports that chemical weapons were being used in Laos, coupling this with a similar demarche in Vientiane. The Lao denied the validity of the reports.

We pursued this matter in international fora as well, when in March 1979, the U.S. Representative to the 35th session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission [Jerome J. Shestack] expressed the concern of the United States about the plight of the Hmong, specifically raising the issue of chemical weapons' use.

As part of our efforts to obtain more information, a State Department representative went to refugee camps in Thailand in May 1979 to interview Hmong claiming to be eyewitnesses and/or victims of chemical warfare attacks in Laos. He also visited Vientiane where he discussed the problem with various diplomatic missions and the senior U.N. representative in Laos. During the visit he raised this issue directly with the Lao Foreign Ministry.

In September 1979, a Department of Defense medical team was dispatched to Thailand to interview Hmong who claimed to have knowledge of gas attacks in Laos. The team compiled a report on their findings which is reflected in the assessment I presented earlier.

In late 1979, we raised the issue in demarches to the Vietnam and the Soviet Union Governments requesting that they, too, look into reports that chemical weapons were being used in Indochina and, should the reports prove valid, put an end to the practice. As had the Government of Laos, both governments categorically denied the validity of the reports.

Deputy Assistant Secretary [for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, John D.] Negroponte raised the reports that chemical weapons were being used, during a call on Lao Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials in Vientiane in January 1980. After exchanging views on the reports, Mr. Negroponte asked if the Lao People's Democratic Republic adhered to the 1925 Geneva protocol. The Lao replied that they were not bound by agreements France signed during that period. They did, however, agree to study the question of adherence. The U.S. Embassy in Vientiane then sent the text of the 1925 protocol by diplomatic note to the Lao Ministry of Foreign Affairs later in January, expressing the hope that Laos would "find no difficulty in acceding to it, as have so many other nations in the world." In addition to formal demarches, we have regularly raised the issue on an informal basis with the Lao.

The subject has been discussed with the Vietnamese most recently in a March 26 meeting between Mr. Negroponte and Vietnamese Ambassador to the U.N., Ha Van Lau.

Afghanistan. When we began to receive reports of possible use of lethal chemical weapons in Afghanistan, we intensified all of our efforts on this issue.

On January 24 and March 5 of this year, the Department spokesman [Hodding Carter III] expressed our deep concern. He stated that while we were not able to establish conclusively that lethal chemical agents had been used, if these reports were true, we would regard such use as outrageous and inhumane.

On March 10, at the 36th U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva, the U.S. Representative [Jerome J. Shestack] made a strong statement expressing our alarm at mounting reports of the use of chemical weapons by Communist military forces in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos. Our statement condemned the use of such weapons and urged establishment by the Commission of an independent investigative committee empowered to receive testimony from refugees and to examine the sites of alleged chemical attacks and other relevant data.

While other Commission members were not yet ready to adopt decisions on the subject at the March meeting, the U.S. statement in Geneva served notice of our determination to pursue this issue vigorously and try to focus world opinion on it. We believe it important that, to deter further employment of such chemical agents, the Human Rights Commission and other appropriate international organizations must demonstrate strong international concern over reports of their use.

Last month, the head of the U.S. Mission in Geneva briefed a member of the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) about the use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan and asked to be briefed on any relevant reports by officials of the UNHCR particularly those

operating in the field. We have also met with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to stress our concern and urge the ICRC to share any information they may develop. The ICRC issued a statement on March 18, 1980, condemning the use of lethal chemicals by any state, whether or not a party to the 1925 Geneva protocol, as contrary to customary international law.

On March 18, at the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament meeting in Geneva, our Ambassador made a strong statement pointing out that any use of chemical weapons could threaten the viability of the Geneva protocol and the ongoing efforts to negotiate a complete prohibition of chemical weapons. The following week, after Soviet rebuttal, he renewed the statement.

And this week in Geneva we responded to a totally unfounded charge by the regime installed in Afghanistan that the United States had supplied chemical weapons to the nationalist forces. This report apparently relates to the alleged capture in Afghanistan of a few canisters of U.S.-manufactured tear gas of a type commonly supplied to and used by police forces around the world. We stated that the United States has not supplied chemical weapons of any type to the resistance forces in Afghanistan and that this was an obvious attempt to cover up reports of use by the Soviets and Afghanistan military forces.

Strategy for the Future

The problem raised by these reports is a major concern for the world community as a whole—one which cannot and must not be ignored. Recognizing this, we have developed a strategy for pursuing this problem further, which includes action in a number of specific areas.

- We will be continuing and intensifying our efforts to ascertain the facts and, particularly, to collect further evidence and documentation. We are continuing to interview refugees in both Pakistan and Thailand who may have evidence of such activities or may have witnessed them.
- We are intensifying consultations with other countries. We are approaching our allies and key nonaligned governments to reiterate our concern over these reports, to provide the information we have which leads to our concern, to indicate how we intend to deal with the problem and to urge them to join in publicly expressing concern and in making demarches to the countries involved, and to encourage their support for further investigation into the reports.
- We are consulting with interested states parties to the 1925 Geneva protocol and others about the possibility of convening a meeting in order to look into these reports. It should be noted, however, that Kampuchea, Laos, and Afghanistan are not parties to the protocol and that the Soviet Union adhered with a reservation that would not be bound with regard to states which are not parties. It is clear, though, that the Soviet Union would be prohibited by well-established customary international law from making first use of chemical weapons in war.
- We are pursuing this matter in multilateral fora and are considering whether it will be useful to raise this issue in the U.N. General Assembly session this fall. We will also continue to draw attention to this issue in the U.N. Human Rights Commission, the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, and other appropriate international bodies, encouraging other countries to make statements there as well. We will be careful, of course, not to let our statements exceed the evidence we have at hand.
- We will continue to stay in close touch with the Congress to keep you informed of the steps we are taking to meet this problem. And, needless to say, we will be seeking your continued support for the important work which I have outlined to you.

Biological Weapons

The Biological Weapons Convention, which entered into force in 1975 and to which the United States, the U.S.S.R., and 85 other states are party, provides for consultation and cooperation among the parties for the purpose of solving problems that may arise. As you know, the United States has recently initiated consultations with the Soviet Union as provided for under article V of the convention.

Information which became available to us in February this year about a disease outbreak in Sverdlovsk in the spring of 1979 raises questions as to whether biological agents were present in quantities greater than those permitted by the convention for peaceful purposes. The Soviets responded to our demarche. After studying their response, we have gone back to request further information and consultations. I cannot go further into the nature of our intelligence in open session, however, but I understand that you have access to such material from the intelligence community.

At the Biological Weapons Convention review conference last month, we made a statement noting that this problem had arisen and that we were pursuing it with the Soviet Union under the terms of the convention. With our support, the concluding document of that conference called for the cooperation of all states in resolving any problems which arise and noted the right of any state party to request that a consultative meeting open to all states parties be convened at expert level to address any such problem. In addition, the Biological Weapons Convention itself states that such matters can be brought before the U.N. Security Council for resolution. Thus, the United States has yet a number of multilateral steps that can be taken in pursuit of this matter.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

[2] There is a qualitative difference between incapacitants and what are commonly called riot control agents. Agents CS and CN are irritants commonly used as riot control agents by the police. Their effects wear off quickly once exposure to the agent ceases. Incapacitants tend to have effects that last for hours or days. These effects may be mental, physical, or both. ■

in the course of which the Court heard the oral argument of the Agent and Counsel of the United States; the Government of Iran was not represented at the hearings. Questions were addressed to the Agent of the United States by Members of the Court both during the course of the hearings and subsequently, and replies were given

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Abdullah Ali El-Erian (Egypt)
Hermann Mosler (F.R.G.)
Shigeru Oda (Japan)
Salah El Dine Tarazi (Syria)
Robert Ago (Italy) ■

either orally at the hearings or in writing, in accordance with Article 61, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court.

6. On 6 December 1979, the Registrar addressed the notifications provided for in Article 63 of the Statute of the Court to the States which according to information supplied by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as depositary were parties to one or more of the following Conventions and Protocols:

(a) the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961;

(b) the Optional Protocol to that Convention concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes;

(c) the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963;

(d) the Optional Protocol to that Convention concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes;

(e) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973.

7. The Court, after ascertaining the views of the Government of the United States on the matter, and affording the Government of Iran the opportunity of making its views known, decided pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court that copies of the pleadings and documents annexed should be made accessible to the public with effect from 25 March 1980.

8. In the course of the written proceedings the following submissions were presented on behalf of the Government of the United States of America:

in the Application:

"The United States requests the Court to adjudge and declare as follows:

(a) That the Government of Iran, in tolerating, encouraging, and failing to prevent and punish the conduct described in the preceding Statement of Facts, violated its international legal obligations to the United States as provided by

- Articles 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 37 and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
- Articles 28, 31, 33, 34, 36 and 40 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
- Articles 4 and 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, and
- Articles II (4), XIII, XVIII and XIX of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, and
- Articles 2 (3), 2 (4) and 33 of the Charter of the United Nations

(b) That pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations, the Government of Iran is under a particular obligation immediately to secure the release of all United States nationals currently being detained within the premises of the United States Embassy in Tehran and to assure that all such persons and all other United States nationals in Tehran are allowed to leave Iran safely;

(c) That the Government of Iran shall pay to the United States, in its own right and in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, reparation for the foregoing violations of Iran's international legal obligations to the United States, in a sum to be determined by the Court; and

(d) That the Government of Iran submit to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution those persons responsible for the crimes committed against the premises and staff of the United States Embassy and against the premises of its Consulates";

in the Memorial:

"The Government of the United States respectfully requests that the Court adjudge and declare as follows:

(a) that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in permitting, tolerating, encouraging, adopting, and endeavouring to exploit, as well as in failing to prevent and punish, the conduct described in the Statement of the Facts, violated its international legal obligations to the United States as provided by:

- Articles 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 37, 44 and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;
- Articles 5, 27, 28, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40 and 72 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations;
- Article II (4), XIII, XVIII and XIX of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran; and
- Articles 2, 4 and 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents;

(b) that, pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations:

(i) the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall immediately ensure that the premises at the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulates are restored to the possession of the United States authorities under their exclusive control, and shall ensure their inviolability and effective protection as provided for by the treaties in force between the two States, and by general international law;

(ii) the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall ensure the immediate release, without any exception, of all persons of United States nationality who are or have been held in the Embassy of the United States of America or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran, or who are or have been held as hostages elsewhere, and afford full protection to all such persons, in accordance with the treaties in force between the two States, and with general international law;

(iii) the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall, as from that moment, afford to all the diplomatic and consular personnel of the United States the protection, privileges and immunities to which they are entitled under the treaties in force between the two States, and under general international law, including immunity from any form of criminal jurisdiction and freedom and facilities to leave the territory of Iran;

(iv) the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall, in affording the diplomatic and consular personnel of the United States the protection, privileges and immunities to which they are entitled, including immunity from any form of criminal jurisdiction, ensure that no such personnel shall be obliged to appear on trial or as a witness, deponent, source of information, or in any other role, at any proceedings, whether formal or informal, initiated by or with the acquiescence of the Iranian Government, whether such proceedings be

denominated a 'trial', 'grand jury', 'international commission' or otherwise;

(v) the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall submit to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, or extradite to the United States, those persons responsible for the crimes committed against the personnel and premises of the United States Embassy and Consulates in Iran;

(c) that the United States of America is entitled to the payment to it, in its own right and in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals held hostage, of reparation by the Islamic Republic of Iran for the violations of the above international legal obligations which it owes to the United States, in a sum to be determined by the Court at a subsequent stage of the proceedings."

9. At the close of the oral proceedings, written submissions were filed in the Registry of the Court on behalf of the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 60, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court; a copy thereof was transmitted to the Government of Iran. Those submissions were identical with the submissions presented in the Memorial of the United States.

10. No pleadings were filed by the Government of Iran, which also was not represented at the oral proceedings, and no submissions were therefore presented on its behalf. The position of that Government was, however, defined in two communications addressed to the Court by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran; the first of these was a letter dated 9 December 1979 and transmitted by telegram the same day (the text of which was set out in full in the Court's Order of 15 December 1979, *I.C.J. Reports 1979*, pages 10-11); the second was a letter transmitted by telex dated 16 March 1980 and received on 17 March 1980, the text of which followed closely that of the letter of 9 December 1979 and reads as follows:

[Translation from French]

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the telegram concerning the meeting of the International Court of Justice to be held on 17 March 1980 at the request of the Government of the United States of America, and to set forth for you below, once again, the position of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in that respect:

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran wishes to express its respect for the International Court of Justice, and for its distinguished Members, for what they have achieved in the quest for a just and equitable solution to legal conflicts between States, and respectfully draws the attention of the Court to the deep-rootedness and the essential character of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, a revolution of a whole oppressed nation against its oppressors and their masters, the examination of whose numerous repercussions is essentially and directly a matter within the national sovereignty of Iran.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran considers that the Court cannot and should not take cognizance of the case which the Government of the United States of America has submitted to it, and in the most significant fashion, a case confined to what is called the question of the 'hostages of the American Embassy in Tehran'.

For this question only represents a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem, one such that it cannot be studied separately, and which involves, *inter alia*, more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, the shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict with all international and humanitarian norms.

The problem involved in the conflict between Iran and the United States is thus not one of the interpretation and the application of the treaties upon which the American Application is based, but results from an overall situation containing much more fundamental and more complex elements. Consequently, the Court cannot examine the American Application divorced from its proper context, namely the whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States over the last 25 years.

With regard to the request for provisional measures, as formulated by the United States, it in fact implies that the Court should have passed judgment on the actual substance of the case submitted to it, which the Court cannot do without breach of the norms governing its jurisdiction. Furthermore, since provisional measures are by definition intended to protect the interest of the parties, they cannot be unilateral, as they are in the request submitted by the American Government."

The matters raised in those two communications are considered later in this Judgment (paragraphs 33–38 and 81–82).

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11. The position taken up by the Iranian Government in regard to the present proceedings brings into operation Article 53 of the Statute, under which the Court is required *inter alia* to satisfy itself that the claims of the Applicant are well founded in fact. As to this article the Court pointed out in the *Corfu Channel* case that this requirement is to be understood as applying within certain limits:

"While Article 53 thus obliges the Court to consider the submissions of the Party which appears, it does not compel the Court to examine their accuracy in all their details; for this might in certain unopposed cases prove impossible in practice. It is sufficient for the Court to convince itself by such methods as it considers suitable that the submissions are well founded." (*I.C.J. Reports 1949*, p. 248.)

In the present case, the United States has explained that, owing to the events in Iran of which it complains, it has been unable since then to have access to its diplomatic and consular representatives, premises and archives in Iran; and that in consequence it has been unable to furnish detailed factual evidence on some matters occurring after 4 November 1979. It mentioned in particular the lack of any factual evidence concerning the treatment and conditions of the persons held hostage in Tehran. On this point, however, without giving the names of the persons concerned, it has submitted copies of declarations sworn by six of the 13 hostages who had been released after two weeks of detention and returned to the United States in November 1979.

12. The essential facts of the present case are, for the most part, matters of public knowledge which have received extensive coverage in the world press and in radio and television broadcasts from Iran and other countries. They have been presented to the Court by the United States in its Memorial, in statements of its Agent and Counsel during the oral proceedings, and in written replies to questions put by Members of the Court. Annexed or appended to the Memorial are numerous extracts of statements made by Iranian and United States officials, either at press conferences or on radio or television, and submitted to the Court in support of the request for provisional measures and as a means of demonstrating the truth of the account of the facts stated in the Memorial. Included also in the Memorial is a "Statement of Verification" made by a high official of the United States Department of State having "overall responsibility within the Department for matters relating to the crisis in Iran". While emphasizing that in the circumstances of the case the United States has had to rely on newspaper, radio and television reports for a number of the facts stated in the Memorial, the high official concerned certifies that to the best of his knowledge and belief the facts there stated are true. In addition, after the filing of the Memorial, and by leave of the Court, a large quantity of further documents of a similar kind to those

from being carried through to its completion. The result of the attack was considerable damage to the Embassy premises and property, the forcible opening and seizure of its archives, the confiscation of the archives and other documents found in the Embassy and, most grave of all, the seizure by force of its diplomatic and consular personnel as hostages, together with two United States nationals.

58. No suggestion has been made that the militants, when they executed their attack on the Embassy, had any form of official status as recognized "agents" or organs of the Iranian State. Their conduct in mounting the attack, overrunning the Embassy and seizing its inmates as hostages cannot, therefore, be regarded as imputable to that State on that basis. Their conduct might be considered as itself directly imputable to the Iranian State only if it were established that, in fact, on the occasion in question the militants acted on behalf of the State, having been charged by some competent organ of the Iranian State to carry out a specific operation. The information before the Court does not, however, suffice to establish with the requisite certainty the existence at that time of such a link between the militants and any competent organ of the State.

59. Previously, it is true, the religious leader of the country, the Ayatollah Khomeini, had made several public declarations inveighing against the United States as responsible for all his country's problems. In so doing, it would appear, the Ayatollah Khomeini was giving utterance to the general resentment felt by supporters of the revolution at the admission of the former Shah to the United States. The information before the Court also indicates that a spokesman for the militants, in explaining their action afterwards, did expressly refer to a message issued by the Ayatollah Khomeini, on 1 November 1979. In that message the Ayatollah Khomeini had declared that it was "up to the dear pupils, students and theological students to expand with all their might their attacks against the United States and Israel, so they may force the United States to return the deposed and criminal shah, and to condemn this great plot" (that is, a plot to stir up dissension between the main streams of Islamic thought). In the view of the Court, however, it would be going too far to interpret such general declarations of the Ayatollah Khomeini to the people or students of Iran as amounting to an authorization from the State to undertake the specific operation of invading and seizing the United States Embassy. To do so would, indeed, conflict with the assertions of the militants themselves who are reported to have claimed credit for having devised and carried out the plan to occupy the Embassy. Again, congratulations after the event, such as those reportedly telephoned to the militants by the Ayatollah Khomeini on the actual evening of the attack, and other subsequent statements of official approval, though highly significant in another context shortly to be considered, do not alter the initially independent and unofficial character of the militants' attack on the Embassy.

60. The first phase, here under examination, of the events complained of also includes the attacks on the United States Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz. Like the attack on the Embassy, they appear to have been executed by militants not having an official character, and successful because of lack of sufficient protection.

61. The conclusion just reached by the Court, that the initiation of the attack on the United States Embassy on 4 November 1979, and of the attacks on the Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz the following day, cannot be considered as in itself imputable to the Iranian State does not mean that Iran is, in consequence, free of any responsibility in regard to those attacks; for its own conduct was in conflict with its international obligations. By a number of provisions of the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963, Iran was placed under the most categorical obligations, as a receiving State, to take appropriate steps to ensure the protection of the United States Embassy and Consulates, their staffs, their archives, their means of communication and the freedom of movement of the members of their staffs.

62. Thus, after solemnly proclaiming the inviolability of the premises of a diplomatic mission, Article 22 of the 1961 Convention continues in paragraph 2:

> *"The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any* intrusion or damage and, to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity." [Emphasis added.]

So, too, after proclaiming that the person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable, and that he shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention, Article 29 provides:

> "The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and *shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.*" [Emphasis added.]

The obligation of a receiving State to protect the inviolability of the archives and documents of a diplomatic mission is laid down in Article 24, which specifically provides that they are to be "inviolable at any time and wherever they may be". Under Article 25 it is required to "accord full facilities for the performance of the functions of the mission", under Article 26 to "ensure to all members of the mission freedom of movement and travel in its territory", and under Article 27 to "permit and protect free communication on the part of the mission for all official purposes". Analogous provisions are to be found in the 1963 Convention regarding the privileges and immunities of consular missions and their staffs (Article 31, paragraph 3, Article 40, 33, 28, 34 and 35). In the view of the Court, the obligations of the Iranian Government here in question are not merely contractual obligations established by the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963, but also obligations under general international law.

63. The facts set out in paragraphs 14 to 27 above establish to the satisfaction of the Court that on 4 November 1979 the Iranian Government failed altogether to take any "appropriate steps" to protect the premises, staff and archives of the United States' mission against attack by the militants, and to take any steps either to prevent this attack or to stop it before it reached its completion. They also show that on 5 November 1979 the Iranian Government similarly failed to take appropriate steps for the protection of the United States Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz. In addition they show, in the opinion of the Court, that the failure of the Iranian Government to take such steps was due to more than mere negligence or lack of appropriate means.

64. The total inaction of the Iranian authorities on that date in face of urgent and repeated requests for help contrasts very sharply with its conduct on several other occasions of a similar kind. Some eights months earlier, on 14 February 1979, the United States Embassy in Tehran had itself been subjected to the armed attack mentioned above (paragraph 14), in the course of which the attackers had taken the Ambassador and his staff prisoner. On that occasion, however, a detachment of Revolutionary Guards, sent by the Government, had ar-

rived promptly, together with a Deputy Prime Minister, and had quickly succeeded in freeing the Ambassador and his staff and restoring the Embassy to him. On 1 March 1979, moreover, the Prime Minister of Iran had sent a letter expressing deep regret at the incident, giving an assurance that appropriate arrangements had been made to prevent any repetition of such incidents, and indicating the willingness of his Government to indemnify the United States for the damage. On 1 November 1979, only three days before the events which gave rise to the present case, the Iranian police intervened quickly and effectively to protect the United States Embassy when a large crowd of demonstrators spent several hours marching up and down outside it. Furthermore, on other occasions in November 1979 and January 1980, invasions or attempted invasions of other foreign embassies in Tehran were frustrated or speedily terminated.

65. A similar pattern of facts appears in relation to consulates. In February 1979, at about the same time as the first attack on the United States Embassy, attacks were made by demonstrators on its Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz; but the Iranian authorities then took the necessary steps to clear them of the demonstrators. On the other hand, the Iranian authorities took no action to prevent the attack of 5 November 1979, or to restore the Consulates to the possession of the United States. In contrast, when on the next day militants invaded the Iraqi Consulate in Kermanshah, prompt steps were taken by the Iranian authorities to secure their withdrawal from the Consulate. Thus in this case, the Iranian authorities and police took the necessary steps to prevent and check the attempted invasion or return the premises to their rightful owners.

66. As to the actual conduct of the Iranian authorities when faced with the events of 4 November 1979, the information before the Court establishes that, despite assurances previously given by them to the United States Government and despite repeated and urgent calls for help, they took no apparent steps either to prevent the militants from invading the Embassy or to persuade or to compel them to withdraw. Furthermore, after the militants had forced an entry into the premises of the Embassy, the Iranian authorities made no effort to compel or even to persuade them to withdraw from the Embassy and to free the diplomatic and consular staff whom they had made prisoner.

67. This inaction of the Iranian Government by itself constituted clear and serious violation of Iran's obligations to the United States under the provisions of Article 22, paragraph 2, and Articles 24, 25, 26, 27 and 29 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and Articles 5 and 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Similarly, with respect to the attacks on the Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz, the inaction of the Iranian authorities entailed clear and serious breaches of its obligations under the provisions of several further articles of the 1963 Convention on Consular Relations. So far as concerns the two private United States nationals seized as hostages by the invading militants, that inaction entailed, albeit incidentally, a breach of its obligations under Article II, paragraph 4, of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights which, in addition to the obligations of Iran existing under general international law, requires the parties to ensure "the most constant protection and security" to each other's nationals in their respective territories.

68. The Court is therefore led inevitably to conclude, in regard to the first phase of the events which has so far been considered, that on 4 November 1979 the Iranian authorities:

(a) were fully aware of their obligations under the conventions in force to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the United States Embassy and its diplomatic and consular staff from any attack and from any infringement of their inviolability, and to ensure the security of such other persons as might be present on the said premises;

(b) were fully aware, as a result of the appeals for help made by the United States Embassy, of the urgent need for action on their part;

(c) had the means at their disposal to perform their obligations;

(d) completely failed to comply with these obligations.

Similarly, the Court is led to conclude that the Iranian authorities were equally aware of their obligations to protect the United States Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz, and of the need for action on their part, and similarly failed to use the means which were at their disposal to comply with their obligations.

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69. The second phase of the events which are the subject of the United States' claims comprises the whole series of facts which occurred following the completion of the occupation of the United States Embassy by the militants, and the seizure of the Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz. The occupation having taken place and the diplomatic and consular personnel of the United States' mission having been taken hostage, the action required of the Iranian Government by the Vienna Conventions and by general international law was manifest. Its plain duty was at once to make every effort, and to take every appropriate step, to bring these flagrant infringements of the inviolability of the premises, archives and diplomatic and consular staff of the United States Embassy to a speedy end, to restore the Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz to United States control, and in general to re-establish the status quo and to offer reparation for the damage.

70. No such step was, however, taken by the Iranian authorities. At a press conference on 5 November the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yazdi, conceded that "according to international regulations the Iranian Government is duty-bound to safeguard the life and property of foreign nationals". But he made no mention of Iran's obligation to safeguard the inviolability of foreign embassies and diplomats; and he ended by announcing that the action of the students "enjoys the endorsement and support of the government, because America herself is responsible for this incident". As to the Prime Minister, Mr. Bazargan, he does not appear to have made any statement on the matter before resigning his office on 5 November.

71. In any event expressions of approval of the take-over of the Embassy, and indeed also of the Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz, by militants came immediately from numerous Iranian authorities, including religious, judicial, executive, police and broadcasting authorities. Above all, the Ayatollah Khomeini himself made crystal clear the endorsement by the State both of the take-over of the Embassy and Consulates and of the detention of the Embassy staff as hostages. At a reception in Qom on 5 November, the Ayatollah Khomeini left his audience in no doubt as to his approval of the action of the militants in occupying the Embassy, to which he said they had resorted "because they saw that the shah was allowed in America". Saying that he had been informed that the "centre occupied

course of the period preceding the military invasion, the United States concentrated naval forces near the shore of Iran, including *an aircraft-carrier*, the *Nimitz*. And in the statement of the United States Secretary of Defense on 25 April 1980 we read: "*The second helicopter* [which participated in the invasion] *had difficulties, reversed course, and landed aboard the carrier* Nimitz *in the Arabian Sea.*" [Emphasis added.]

The Court requested the United States Agent to present documents related to the events of 24-25 April, and they were officially transmitted to it. Among them is the text of a report made by the United States to the Security Council on 25 April "pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations." In that report the United States maintained that the "mission" had been carried out "in exercise of its inherent right of self-defense".

The question of a military invasion committed by one Member of the United Nations against another should of course be considered on every occasion by the Security Council of the United Nations, in accordance with its exclusive competence as provided by the Charter of the United Nations.

But, as has been observed, the invasion of the territory of Iran was committed by the United States in a period of judicial deliberation, and was directed (at least according to the explanation given by the United States) not towards the settlement of the dispute in a peaceful way, for example, by negotiations or similar means (which could take place in parallel with judicial proceedings), but *by force*.

In my view, the Court should not, in this completely unusual situation, have limited itself to stating that "an operation undertaken in those circumstances, from whatever motive, is of a kind calculated to undermine respect for the judicial process in international relations" and to "recall[ing] that in paragraph 47 I.B. of its Order of 15 December 1979 the Court had indicated that no action was to be taken by either party which might aggravate the tension between the two countries" (paragraph 93). At the same time the Court said that "the question of the legality of the operation of 24 April 1980, under the Charter of the United Nations and under general international law", is not "before the Court" and that "It follows that the findings reached by the Court in this Judgment are not affected by that operation" (paragraph 94).

I consider that, without any prejudice to the above-mentioned exclusive competence of the Security Council, the Court, from a purely legal point of view, could have drawn attention to the undeniable legal fact that Article 51 of the Charter, establishing the right of self-defence, may be invoked only "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations". It should have added that in the documentation officially presented by the United States to the Court in response to its request relating to the events of 24-25 April 1980 there is no evidence that any armed attack had occurred against the United States.

Furthermore, some indication should have been included in the Judgment that the Court considers that settlement of the dispute between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran should be reached exclusively by peaceful means.

9. Among the paragraphs of the reasoning which I described in point 7 above as incorrect or one-sided is paragraph 88, which deals with the authorization extended to the former Shah to come to New York. This authorization extended to him even though the United States Government was well aware that he was considered by the Government and people of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a person whom the United States has restored to the throne after overthrowing the legitimate government of Dr. Mossadegh, and as a man who had committed the gravest crimes, having been responsible for the torture and execution of thousands of Iranians. His admission to the United States, and the subsequent refusal to extradite him, were thus real provocations and not, as the Judgment suggests, merely ordinary acts which just happened to give rise to a "feeling of offence".

(Signed) P. MOROZOV

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE TARAZI

[Translation]

Having perused the Application instituting proceedings which the Government of the United States of America filed on 29 November 1979, read the Memorial filed by it on 15 January 1980 and listened to the oral arguments during the hearing of 18, 19 and 20 March 1980, the Court had before it a series of facts, historical developments and legal arguments which were to lead to its delivering a Judgment of, in my view, cardinal importance. I concurred in the findings of the Judgment concerning the necessity of compliance by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with the obligations incumbent upon it under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 on, respectively, Diplomatic and Consular Relations. I nevertheless found some difficulty, arising on the one hand from the situation which has developed in Iran since the overthrow of the régime of which the former Shah was the symbol, and on the other hand from the conduct of the applicant State both before and after the events of 4 November 1979, in deciding and declaring only that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran was responsible vis-à-vis that of the United States of America while neglecting to point out at the same time that the latter had also incurred responsibility, to an extent remaining to be determined, vis-à-vis the Government of Iran.

My intention here is to indicate, with as brief explanations as possible, the reasons for my attitude and position. To that end I will have to consider the following points:

1. The principle of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular missions and of the immunity enjoyed by their members,

2. The factors which enter into the assessment in principle of the responsibility incurred by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran;

3. The actions undertaken by the United States Government both before and after the seisin of the Court which were capable of affecting the course of the proceedings.

1. The inviolability of diplomatic and consular missions and the immunity enjoyed by their members

I entirely concurred in the reasoning of the Judgment on this point. I was pleased to note that the Judgment took particular account of the traditions of Islam, which contributed along with others to the elaboration of the rules of contemporary public international law on diplomatic and consular inviolability and immunity.

In a course of lectures which he gave in 1937 at the Hague Academy of International Law on the subject of "Islam and *jus gentium*", Professor Ahmed Rechid of the Istanbul law faculty gave the following account of the inviolability of the envoy in Muslim law:

"In Arabia, the person of the ambassador had always been regarded as sacred. Muham-

mad consecrated this inviolability. Never were ambassadors to Muhammad or to his successors molested. One day, the envoy of a foreign nation, at an audience granted to him by the Prophet, was so bold as to use insulting language. Muhammad said to him: 'If you were not an envoy I would have you put to death.' The author of the 'Siyer' which relates this incident draws from it the conclusion that there is an obligation to respect the person of ambassadors."

Ahmed Rechid adds further on:

"The Prophet always treated the envoys of foreign nations with consideration and great affability. He used to shower gifts upon them and recommended his companions to follow his example, saying: 'Do the same as I'[7]."

In a work entitled *International Law*, published by the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the following is to be read on the conduct in the Middle Ages of the Arabs, the bearers of the Islamic faith:

"The Arab States, which played an important part in international relations in the Middle Ages (from the 7th century) had well-developed conceptions regarding the Law of Nations, closely linked with religious precepts.

The Arabs recognized the inviolability of Ambassadors and the need for the fulfilment of treaty obligations. They resorted to arbitration to settle international disputes and considered the observance of definite rules of law necessary in time of war ('the blood of women, children and old men shall not besmirch your victory')."

2. Factors which enter into the assessment in principle of the responsibility incurred by the Iranian Government

The deductions made by the Court from the fact that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran had violated its binding international obligations to the United States of America with regard to diplomatic inviolability and immunity have led it to declare the former responsible by reason of acts of both omission and commission.

I find this approach inadequate. It is not right to proclaim the responsibility of the Iranian Government unless its examination is first preceded by an appropriate study of the historical facts antedating the seizure by Islamic students of the United States Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979. In that respect, it is a matter for deep regret that the Iranian Government refused to appear before the Court. Nevertheless, it emerges from the two identical communications addressed to the Court by the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs on 9 November 1979 and 16 March 1980 that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran considers that the present proceedings are only a marginal aspect of a wider dispute dividing Iran and the United States since the Shah was in 1953 restored to the throne thanks to the intrigues of the CIA and the United States Government continued to meddle in Iran's internal affairs.

In spite, and perhaps because, of the absence of the Government of Iran from the proceedings, it behoved the Court to elucidate this particular point before pronouncing on the responsibility of the Iranian State. That responsibility ought to have been qualified as relative and not absolute.

I recognize that the Court made a laudable effort in that direction. This, however, remained insufficient. It has been argued that more would mean examining deeds of a political nature which lay outside the framework of the Court's powers. But is it possible to ignore historical developments which have direct repercussions on legal conflicts? The Permanent Court of International Justice well clarified this point when in its Judgment of 7 June 1932 (*Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex*), it stated:

"The era of the Napoleonic Wars preceding the Hundred Days was brought to an end by the treaties concluded at Paris on May 30th, 1814, between France, on the one hand, and Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia respectively, on the other." (*P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 46, p. 113.*)

One could therefore have devoted some attention to the events of 1953 with a view to gauging to what extent the assertion of the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs was plausible. On this essential question, I have been able to glean some impression from a source that does not look with any favourable eye upon the Islamic Revolution of Iran. In his work entitled *The Fall of the Shah*, Mr. Fereydoun Hoveyda, the brother of the ex-sovereign's former Prime Minister, Mr. Abbas Amir Hoveyda, who was condemned to death and executed after the ex-sovereign left Iran, says:

"Some Iranian observers were sceptical, considering that foreign interests were pulling the strings: top-ranking non-British companies on the world market were pushing for a break of the contract with the AIOC [Anglo-Iranian Oil Company]. Be that as it may, when the nationalist uproar grew, the Iranian ruling class and various foreign powers got the wind up and turned to the Shah again. It was then that the CIA floated the idea of a coup d'état, and in 1953 Kermit Roosevelt visited Tehran to examine the possibilities and find a likely candidate. He found his man in General Zahedi, and the plotters staged the departure of the Shah after having him sign a decree naming Zahedi prime minister. He used CIA money to buy the services of Shaban-bi-mokh (literally Shaben the Scatterbrain), the master of a famous 'Zurkane' (a traditional gymnastics club), in order to recruit a commando squad of 'civilians' to act in concert with the army. The operation begun in August 1953 did not take more than a day, and then the Shah made a triumphal return. And the very people who had followed Mossadeq right up to the eleventh hour scurried to the airport and prostrated themselves before the sovereign to kiss his boots!

In spite of the facts, which have been disclosed by the Americans themselves, the Shah was pleased to consider the 1953 coup as a 'popular revolution' which gave him the mandate of the people. And apparently he ended up by believing his own propaganda. Already the sovereign was showing a tendency to bend the truth, it was to intensify to the point of cutting him right off from the realities of the country[8].

Thus, in the eyes of the present Iranian leaders, the power of the Shah had lacked all legitimacy or legality ever since the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh in 1953. This point should have been examined carefully, because these same leaders say that they are firmly convinced that the Shah would not have been able to maintain himself upon the throne without the backing given him by the Government of the United States of America.

This opinion concords with the reflections of Dr. Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State of the United States of America. In his work entitled *The White House Years*, Dr. Kissinger states that:

"Under the Shah's leadership, the land bridge between Asia and Europe, so often the hinge of world history, was pro-American and pro-West beyond any challenge. Alone among the countries of the region – Israel aside – Iran made friendship with the United States the starting point of its foreign policy. That it was based on a cold-eyed assessment that a threat to Iran would most likely come from the Soviet Union, in combination with radical Arab states, is only another way of saying that the Shah's view of the realities of world politics paralleled our own. Iran's influence was always on our side; its resources reinforced ours even in some distant enterprises – in aiding South Vietnam at the time of the 1973 Paris Agreement, helping Western Europe in its economic crisis in the 1970s, supporting moderates in Africa against Soviet-Cuban encroachment . . . In the 1973 Middle East war, for example, Iran was the *only* country bordering the Soviet Union not to permit the Soviets use of its air space – in contrast to several NATO allies. The Shah . . . refueled our fleets without

Moscow Summer Olympic Games

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, MAY 15, 1980[1]

We welcome the courageous decision of the West German Olympic Committee to refuse to participate in the Moscow Olympic Games. The committee, the West German Government, and the people of West Germany deserve the admiration of all those throughout the world who believe in peace and freedom and who recognize that the achievement of these goals sometimes requires painful sacrifices.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a serious blow to peace and freedom. We hope that the other Olympic committees of Western Europe will follow the advice of their own governments and join with the West German Olympic Committee in demonstrating their opposition to Soviet aggression.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, MAY 16, 1980[1]

The President today met with Lord Killanin, the president of the International Olympic Committee, and Mme. Monique Berlioux, its director, at their request. The President reaffirmed that the position of the United States in opposition to sending a team to the 22d Olympic Games in Moscow results solely from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and our belief that it was not appropriate to attend the games in a host nation that was invading its neighbor.

The President made clear that this position does not detract in any way from our support of the international Olympic movement, and that we will welcome athletes from any eligible Olympic nation at the 23d Olympic games in Los Angeles in 1984.

The President reaffirmed that the United States will continue to urge other governments and Olympic committees to oppose participation in the Olympic Games in Moscow this summer. He noted that more than 40 national Olympic committees, including those of the United States, West Germany, Canada, China, Norway, Kenya, Argentina, and numerous Muslim nations, have already decided not to attend the Olympic Games in Moscow. More major national committees are expected to take the same position during the next 2 weeks.

DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS, MAY 21, 1980[2]

The Department of State today issued the following analysis of the success achieved by the boycott of the Moscow Olympics.

Of the national Olympic committees outside the Soviet bloc which have made their decisions, one-half (58 out of 116) have decided not to send teams to Moscow. The decisions of 17 additional committees are not yet known.

A number of the committees which decided to send teams to Moscow had been urged by their governments that it would be inappropriate to do so because of the continuing Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, numerous sports federations in these nations did follow the recommendations of their governments and have decided not to participate in such sports as equestrian events, fencing, yachting, shooting, gymnastics, cycling, boxing, field hockey, and pentathlon.

Those national teams and sports federations not participating in Moscow won 73% (58 out of 80) of all the gold medals won at Montreal in 1976 by athletes from nations outside the Soviet bloc. For all medals—gold, silver, and bronze—the comparable percentage is 71%.

Those national teams and sports federations not participating at Moscow counted for approximately 50% of the athletes from nations outside the Soviet bloc who participated in the 1976 games at Montreal.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, MAY 21, 1980[2]

We are most pleased by the decision this morning of the Japanese Olympic Committee not to send a team to the summer games in Moscow. Both the committee and the Government of Japan deserve to be congratulated by those who cherish freedom and who understand its obligation.

The decision by Japan was not an easy one, because it involved real sacrifice on the part of large numbers of highly qualified athletes. It is particularly noteworthy, therefore, that the decision was taken by such an overwhelming majority of the members of the Japanese Olympic Committee.

This is the last day that national Olympic committees have to respond to invitations from the Moscow Olympic Organizing Committee. There are still more than a dozen Olympic committees that have not yet taken a formal vote. We naturally hope that all of them will join in a boycott effort that has become an international display of solidarity against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Whatever happens today, we are most pleased that a majority of the nations and Olympic committees outside the Soviet bloc have decided to keep their teams home this summer. Some 58 Olympic committees have already reached this decision. They are joined by the governments of 15 countries, who lack formal Olympic committees but which indicated they support the boycott. There are 11 other governments, which publicly support the boycott even though their national Olympic committees have chosen to send teams to Moscow. This makes a total, so far, of 84 governments around the world that support a boycott.

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[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 19, 1980.

[2] Made available to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston. ■

Defense Cooperation With Turkey

Foreign Relations Outline[1]

For over three decades, the United States and Turkey have cooperated in measures for the common defense. A valued and strategically located ally, Turkey forms part of NATO's southeastern flank, helps guard access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea, and faces the Soviet Union across the longest common land border of any NATO nation. Although Turkey has always been important to U.S. and NATO security, this importance has been emphasized most recently by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the unsettled conditions in the Middle East.

Our relationship with Turkey is based on bilateral agreements, our common membership in the North Atlantic alliance, our shared dedication to

democratic forms of government, and the interests of our two peoples in freedom and independence. The United States and Turkey further strengthened their relationship on March 29, 1980, by concluding the Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy.

Purpose of Agreement

In the preamble to the agreement, both nations state their desire to enhance economic, defense, and related scientific and technological cooperation—bilaterally and as members of NATO. The preamble also stresses that the U.S.-Turkish bilateral relationship rests on our adherence to the principles of democracy, human rights, justice, and social progress. The agreement is marked by the following general characteristics.

- It is a 5-year agreement renewable annually thereafter.
- It is a bilateral implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty.
- It is an executive agreement containing no pledge of specific economic or military assistance.
- It has a broad focus covering cooperation in the interrelated economic, military, and defense production areas.
- It provides for the continuation of U.S. military activities in Turkey.

U.S. Assistance

The agreement recognizes the interrelationship between a strong economy and a strong defense, and it is consistent with ongoing efforts by the United States and other nations to help the Government of Turkey stabilize its troubled economy.

Under the agreement, the United States pledges to exert its best efforts to provide mutually agreed financial and technical assistance to Turkey. The agreement specifies that military assistance to Turkey shall be subject to the annual authorization and appropriations contained in U.S. security assistance legislation.

A joint Turkish-U.S. commission, established by the agreement, will complement the existing relationship between the Turkish General Staff and our Military Assistance Advisory Group in Ankara and will assist in determining how to maximize the usefulness of our military assistance to Turkey. Each year the Government of Turkey, based on its assigned NATO missions, will develop a 5-year projection of its force goals. Using estimates of contributions that will be forthcoming from Turkey's own resources and other sources, the commission will make recommendations on how best to realize those goals.

Defense Industrial Cooperation

It is a long-term U.S. policy to encourage our NATO allies to develop and maintain the industrial and technological capability critical to a nation's security. The agreement emphasizes enhanced U.S.-Turkish cooperation in the production of defense material. To facilitate cooperation in defense procurement, the United States and Turkey waive those "buy national" regulations not covered by law, as is the case with other NATO allies.

Military Installations

The agreement authorizes the United States to maintain forces and carry out military activities at specified installations in Turkey. These facilities include a major air force base regularly hosting NATO-committed U.S. aircraft, three intelligence-gathering installations, a long-range navigation station, elements of the U.S. defense communications system, and other important support and logistics units. The following are key provisions of this part of the agreement.

- The installations are designated as Turkish, with a Turkish commander, although the U.S. commander at each installation has full command and control over all U.S. personnel, equipment, and missions.
- The U.S. flag will be flown at the headquarters of the U.S. commander.
- Arrangements for joint use and joint technical operations are specified.
- Each nation pays for the salaries of its personnel and for the maintenance of those facilities provided for their exclusive use.
- The NATO status of forces agreement is applied to all U.S. personnel.
- All ongoing U.S. military activities and missions in Turkey are authorized by the Government of Turkey to continue.
- The extent of defense cooperation under the agreement is limited to obligations arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty.

NATO Support

Other NATO nations are increasingly aware of Turkey's importance. Most of them participated in the April 15, 1980, pledge by the 16 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to provide $1.16 billion in new economic assistance to Turkey in the year ahead. The Federal Republic of Germany will be increasing the amount of its military aid to Turkey this year, and there are efforts within NATO forums to identify equipment not needed by alliance members for transfer to Turkey.

For our part, the new agreement, along with the Administration's FY 1981 request for $452 million in economic and military assistance for Turkey, represents the U.S. response to the manifest needs of our longtime ally and friend.

[1]Taken from a Department of State publication in the GIST series, released in May 1980. This outline is designed to be a quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy statement. The outline was based on a statement by Matthew Nimetz, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 7, 1980. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

18th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, MAR. 27, 1980[1]

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the following report on progress made during the past 60

International Refugee Assistance Programs

by Victor H. Palmieri

Statement before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 21, 1980. Ambassador Palmieri is U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.[1]

As you know, over the past year or so there have been great increases in numbers of refugees worldwide, in the cost of providing relief for their care, and in the cost of resettling them or, where possible, repatriating them to the country from which they came. In Africa, for instance, a veritable explosion of refugees has forced the international community to increase greatly the refugee assistance it provides. Estimates of refugees and displaced persons on the African continent range from 2½ to 4 million. Given the continuing political and military conflicts, the numbers and needs of African refugees are not expected to decline in the foreseeable future. The international community must continue to be prepared to respond both to emergency and long-term situations on that continent, particularly in the light of the poverty of most of the countries providing asylum there.

In Southeast Asia, the number of refugees and displaced persons is over 1 million. There are several hundred thousand displaced Khmer on the Thai-Kampuchean border. We hope that most of them will be able to return to their homeland eventually. There are still 270,000 other Khmer, Vietnamese, Lao, and Hmong in camps throughout Southeast Asia, awaiting resettlement outside the region.

Thanks to a remarkable international effort, particularly since the U.N. meeting in Geneva last July, more than 190,000 Indochinese were resettled in 1979. As a result of accelerated departures and reduced arrivals, first-asylum countries are no longer pushing refugees out to sea or back across national borders. The outflow of refugees from Vietnam has subsided substantially because of Vietnam's agreement at the Geneva meeting to a moratorium on organized expulsion of ethnic Chinese and others whom the Vietnamese consider to be undesirable. There is no way to accurately predict how long the moratorium will last and what the outflow will be in the future.

At the same time, the dimensions of the problem continue to grow in other areas of the world.

- In Pakistan there are more than 500,000 Afghan refugees, and that number may rise dramatically in the spring.
- In Latin America, thousands have been added to the refugee rolls as a result of civil strife in Central America.
- The number of Soviet Jews and others fleeing Eastern Europe exceeded 50,000 last year.
- In the Near East, some 1.8 million Palestine refugees are registered with the U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

These are some of the major highlights of a long litany of refugee problems.

In response to the growth of the worldwide refugee problem, the United States has considerably increased the level of U.S. funding for refugee programs. The Administration has requested $552,298,000 for its FY 1981 international refugee programs, of which $216 million, excluding funds provided to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) for transportation services related to refugee resettlement in the United States, will be contributed to international organizations. This is tangible evidence of our conviction that, for the most part, multilateral efforts are the best approach to refugee assistance. We prefer international assistance for the following reasons.

- It insures that the international community shares both in the financial and moral responsibility for assisting refugees throughout the world.
- It helps reduce potential political problems inherent in funding, implementing, and monitoring refugee assistance.
- It recognizes that no one nation is capable of resolving refugee problems as large and complex as those we face today.

Yet it is the very scope and complexity of current programs that behoove us to maintain a critical watch on their management and the level of our own contributions. Let me review the Administration's proposed voluntary contributions to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNRWA, ICEM, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

UNHCR

The principal organization, both in terms of its mandate and the dollar volume of its assistance program, is the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. For the past 30 years, the UNHCR has been the international community's principal instrument to protect the rights of refugees and others displaced as a result of military conflict and civil strife, in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention on the Status of Refugees. The UNHCR has also been the main international vehicle to provide the material assistance to insure the physical survival of refugees as well as to arrange for their repatriation or permanent settlement in countries of first asylum or elsewhere.

In recent years, UNHCR's material assistance programs have grown dramatically in response to the exponential growth in the size of the worldwide refugee problem. In the last 4 years (1976–79), the dollar volume of UNHCR assistance programs, as measured by contributions received, grew by 320%, to an alltime high of $322 million. In 1980, it is estimated that level may reach $495 million, representing a 544% increase over a 5-year period.

It is fairly obvious that organizations which undergo such massive expansion, whether they are public or private enterprises, are apt to suffer growing pains. Restructuring and improving the administration of organizations to accommodate larger program volume is difficult at best when confronted with the day-to-day need to respond quickly to emerging refugee situations.

Let me illustrate these difficulties in the context of the UNHCR's 1980 program. Last fall, the UNHCR estimated its material assistance program needs to be $234 million. Within 3 months, new demands raised that original estimate by $261 million. This increase reflects the following developments.

• The breakthrough in the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia talks permitted agreement to return some 250,000 refugees from Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique. UNHCR has issued a $22 million special appeal for that purpose, $19 million of which are new requirements.

• The number of refugees in Somalia rapidly reached crisis proportions late last year (currently estimated to be 570,000). The UNHCR estimates it will require an additional $35 million to meet those needs.

• 500,000 Afghan refugees have already fled into Pakistan as a result of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The UNHCR has requested an additional $49 million to provide emergency care and maintenance for them. These numbers may increase to a million this spring.

• The number of Khmer fleeing the ravages of war and starvation increased significantly as a result of continued Vietnamese offensives. Several hundred thousand Khmer are dependent on international relief, and many more may move toward the border in coming months after the present harvest is exhausted. After a preliminary review, the UNHCR estimates that it may need an additional $92 million for Khmer relief.

• An additional $40 million is needed to continue the expansion of the refugee processing centers in the Philippines and Indonesia. These centers are important since they help accelerate the movement of refugees out of the temporary camps in the first-asylum countries of Southeast Asia and provide an opportunity for better orientation and training of refugees prior to their resettlement in the United States and other countries.

• Lastly, an additional $26 million will be needed, according to the UNHCR estimates, to meet new or special requirements to finance refugee education programs and other relief programs, including Nicaragua and Uganda.

These kinds of requirements clearly are difficult to predict or budget. But, given the rapidly growing UNHCR budget and the importance the United States and other nations attach to the UNHCR effort, we have begun discussions with other governments on ways to help UNHCR to improve its planning, budgeting, and operations. The High Commissioner has welcomed this initiative and has indicated his willingness to begin a series of reviews and discussions with an informal group of major donor countries to begin the effort. For our own part, the United States will be reviewing its own programs to arrive at the best possible use of our resources to be helpful to the High Commissioner in the coming weeks and months.

To sum up this review of the UNHCR, I would like to point out that it has been quite successful in spreading the financial burden of refugee programs more equitably among other nations. That success has allowed the United States to reduce its share from 46.7% to 28.2% of total contributions over the 4-year period ending in 1979, even though the UNHCR budget has increased 320% during that period. This is laudable progress. We will continue to encourage UNHCR in its efforts to spread the burden-sharing as broadly as possible. In the final analysis, the problem of refugees is a world problem, and the financial and moral responsibility must be shared by the world community of nations.

UNRWA

In the Near East, there are equally serious and potentially explosive problems. It continues to be in the interest of the United States and the international community to contribute to the stabilization of the region through the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees. The fact that UNRWA is still caring for Palestine refugees 30 years after its creation is a sad commentary on the inability of the world community to resolve the pressing problem of the Palestinians. Until a just and comprehensive solution is reached, UNRWA's humanitarian work for the refugees is essential—as is our continued strong support for UNRWA's efforts.

UNRWA plays the vital role of providing services to the Palestine refugee population that now numbers 1.8 million (up from 750,000 in 1950). They are concentrated in five areas: the Gaza Strip, the West Bank of the Jordan River, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

UNRWA provides virtually all of its services directly to the refugees rather than through the governments controlling their areas. UNRWA has its own school system, clinics, and health units to provide the educational and health services that would normally be provided by national ministries of education, health, and welfare. It is an efficiently run organization that is able to provide services at remarkably low costs: Education costs run about $250 per pupil per year; medical services cost about $12 per patient per year; and total UNRWA assistance averages about $162 per eligible refugee per year.

UNRWA's budget for 1980, as presented in the Commissioner General's report to the General Assembly in September 1979, is $185.3 million. But in February 1980 that figure was revised upward to $210.5 million. For 1981 the budget will be approximately $232 million.

UNRWA's budget increases are based upon three factors: the cost of providing the growing registered refugee population with education, health, and supplemental relief services if necessary; the rate of inflation in the region—over 100% in the occupied territories, 20% in Jordan; and the declining value of the U.S. dollar, on which UNRWA's accounts are based.

For 3 years the United States has virtually straightlined its contribution: We pledged $51.5 million in 1978 and $52 million in both 1979 and 1980. During this period the UNRWA budget has grown from $148 million in 1978 to $151.8 million in 1979 and $210.5 million for 1980. As a result, while the UNRWA budgets were increasing, the U.S. contribution as a percentage of the announced budget was decreasing. The State Department has budgeted $62 million for the 1981 U.S. contribution to UNRWA.

The United States has made it clear that we view the support of UNRWA to be the responsibility of the world community. Only last August the U.S. chairman of the UNRWA Advisory Commission stated in his opening remarks to that 19-nation body: "UNRWA is the responsibility of the world community, which should support the organization to the degree that it will be able to maintain services to the refugees at the required levels."

I am pleased to report that Arab

already presented were submitted by the United States for the purpose of bringing up to date the Court's information concerning the continuing situation in regard to the occupation of the Embassy and detention of the hostages.

13. The result is that the Court has available to it a massive body of information from various sources concerning the facts and circumstances of the present case, including numerous official statements of both Iranian and United States authorities. So far as newspaper, radio and television reports emanating from Iran are concerned, the Court has necessarily in some cases relied on translations into English supplied by the Applicant. The information available, however, is wholly consistent and concordant as to the main facts and circumstances of the case. This information, as well as the United States Memorial and the records of the oral proceedings, has all been communicated by the Court to the Iranian Government without having evoked from that Government any denial or questioning of the facts alleged before the Court by the United States. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that, within the meaning of Article 53 of the Statute, the allegations of fact on which the United States bases its claims in the present case are well founded.

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14. Before examining the events of 4 November 1979, directly complained of by the Government of the United States, it is appropriate to mention certain other incidents which occurred before that date. At about 10:45 a.m. on 14 February 1979, during the unrest in Iran following the fall of the Government of Dr. Bakhtiar, the last Prime Minister appointed by the Shah, an armed group attacked and seized the United States Embassy in Tehran, taking prisoner the 70 persons they found there, including the Ambassador. Two persons associated with the Embassy staff were killed; serious damage was caused to the Embassy and there were some acts of pillaging of the Ambassador's residence. On this occasion, while the Iranian authorities had not been able to prevent the incursion, they acted promptly in response to the urgent appeal for assistance made by the Embassy during the attack. At about 12 noon, Mr. Yazdi, then a Deputy Prime Minister, arrived at the Embassy accompanied by a member of the national police, at least one official and a contingent of Revolutionary Guards; they quelled the disturbance and returned control of the compound to American diplomatic officials. On 11 March 1979 the United States Ambassador received a letter dated 1 March from the Prime Minister, Dr. Bazargan, expressing regrets for the attack on the Embassy, stating that arrangements had been made to prevent any repetition of such incidents, and indicating readiness to make reparation for the damage. Attacks were also made during the same period on the United States Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz.

15. In October 1979, the Government of the United States was contemplating permitting the former Shah of Iran, who was then in Mexico, to enter the United States for medical treatment. Officials of the United States Government feared that, in the political climate prevailing in Iran, the admission of the former Shah might increase the tension already existing between the two States, and *inter alia* result in renewed violence against the United States Embassy in Tehran, and it was decided for this reason to request assurances from the Government of Iran that adequate protection would be provided. On 21 October 1979, at a meeting at which were present the Iranian Prime Minister, Dr. Bazargan, the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Yazdi, and the United States Chargé d' affaires in Tehran, the Government of Iran was informed of the decision to admit the former Shah to the United States, and of the concern felt by the United States Government about the possible public reaction in Tehran. When the United States Chargé d' affaires requested assurances that the Embassy and its personnel would be adequately protected, assurances were given by the Foreign Minister that the Government of Iran would fulfill its interrational obligation to protect the Embassy. The request for such assurances was repeated at a further meeting the following day, 2" October, and the Foreiga Minister renewed his assurances that protection would be provided. The former Shah arrived in the United States on 22 October. On 30 October, the Government of Iran, which had repeatedly expressed its serious opposition to the admission of the former Shah to the United States, and had asked the United States to permit two Iranian physicians to verify the reality and the nature of his illness, requested the United States to bring about his return to Iran. Nevertheless, on 31 October, the Security Officer of the United States Embassy was told by the Commander of the Iranian National Police that the police had been instructed to provide full protection for the personnel of the Embassy.

16. On 1 November 1979, while a very large demonstration was being held elsewhere in Tehran, large numbers of demonstrators marched to and fro in front of the United States Embassy. Under the then existing security arrangements the Iranian authorities normally maintained 10 to 15 uniformed policemen outside the Embassy compound and a contingent of Revolutionary Guards nearby; on this occasion the normal complement of police was stationed outside the compound and the Embassy reported to the State Department that it felt confident that it could get more protection if needed. The Chief of Police came to the Embassy personally and met the Chargé d' affaires, who informed Washington that the Chief was "taking his job of protecting the Embassy very seriously". It was announced on the radio, and by the prayer leader at the main demonstration in another location in the city, that people should not go to the Embassy. During the day, the number of demonstrators at the Embassy was around 5,000, but protection was maintained by Iranian security forces. That evening, as the crowd dispersed, both the Iranian Chief of Protocol and the Chief of Police expressed relief to the Chargé d' affaires that everything had gone well.

17. At approximately 10:30 a.m. on 4 November 1979, during the course of a demonstration of approximately 3,000 persons, the United States Embassy compound in Tehran was overrun by a strong armed group of several hundred people. The Iranian security personnel are reported to have simply disappeared from the scene; at all events it is established that they made no apparent effort to deter or prevent the demonstrators from seizing the Embassy's premises. The invading group (who subsequently described themselves as "Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy", and who will hereafter be referred to as "the militants") gained access by force to the compound and to the ground floor of the Chancery building. Over two hours after the beginning of the attack, and after the militants had attempted to set fire to the Chancery building and to cut through the upstairs steel doors with a torch, they gained entry to the upper floor; one hour later they gained control of the

main vault. The militants also seized the other buildings, including the various residences, on the Embassy compound. In the course of the attack, all the diplomatic and consular personnel and other persons present in the premises were seized as hostages, and detained in the Embassy compound; subsequently other United States personnel and one United States private citizen seized elsewhere in Tehran were brought to the compound and added to the number of hostages.

18. During the three hours or more of the assault, repeated calls for help were made from the Embassy to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and repeated efforts to secure help from the Iranian authorities were also made through direct discussions by the United States Chargé d' affaires, who was at the Foreign Ministry at the time, together with two other members of the mission. From there he made contact with the Prime Minister's Office and with Foreign Ministry officials. A request was also made to the Iranian Chargé d' affaires in Washington for assistance in putting an end to the seizure of the Embassy. Despite these repeated requests, no Iranian security forces were sent in time to provide relief and protection to the Embassy. In fact when Revolutionary Guards ultimately arrived on the scene, despatched by the Government "to prevent clashes", they considered that their task was merely to "protect the safety of both the hostages and the students", according to statements subsequently made by the Iranian Government's spokesman, and by the operations commander of the Guards. No attempt was made by the Iranian Government to clear the Embassy premises, to rescue the persons held hostage, or to persuade the militants to terminate their action against the Embassy.

19. During the morning of 5 November, only hours after the seizure of the Embassy, the United States Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz were also seized; again the Iranian Government took no protective action. The operation of these consulates had been suspended since the attack in February 1979 (paragraph 14 above), and therefore no United States personnel were seized on these premises.

20. The United States' diplomatic mission and consular posts in Iran were not the only ones whose premises were subjected to demonstrations during the revolutionary period in Iran. On 5 November 1979, a group invaded the British Embassy in Tehran but was ejected after a brief occupation. On 6 November 1979 a brief occupation of the Consulate of Iraq at Kermanshah occurred but was brought to an end on instructions of the Ayatollah Khomeini; no damage was done to the Consulate or its contents. On 1 January 1980 an attack was made on the Embassy in Tehran of the USSR by a large mob, but as a result of the protection given by the Iranian authorities to the Embassy, no serious damage was done.

21. The premises of the United States Embassy in Tehran have remained in the hands of militants; and the same appears to be the case with the consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz. Of the total number of United States citizens seized and held as hostages, 13 were released on 18-20 November 1979, but the remainder have continued to be held up to the present time. The release of the 13 hostages was effected pursuant to a decree by the Ayatollah Khomeini addressed to the militants, dated 17 November 1979, in which he called upon the militants to "hand over the blacks and the women, if it is proven they did not spy, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that they may be immediately expelled from Iran".

22. The persons still held hostage in Iran include, according to the information furnished to the Court by the United States, at least 28 persons having the status, duly recognized by the Government of Iran, of "member of the diplomatic staff" within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961; at least 20 persons having the status, similarly recognized, of "member of the administrative and technical staff" within the meaning of that Convention; and two other persons of United States nationality not possessing either diplomatic or consular status. Of the persons with the status of member of the diplomatic staff, four are members of the Consular Section of the Mission.

23. Allegations have been made by the Government of the United States of inhumane treatment of hostages; the militants and Iranian authorities have asserted that the hostages have been well treated, and have allowed special visits to the hostages by religious personalities and by representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The specific allegations of ill-treatment have not however been refuted. Examples of such allegations, which are mentioned in some of the sworn declarations of hostages released in November 1979, are as follows: at the outset of the occupation of the Embassy some were paraded bound and blindfolded before hostile and chanting crowds; at least during the initial period of their captivity, hostages were kept bound, and frequently blindfolded, denied mail or any communication with their government or with each other, subjected to interrogation, threatened with weapons.

24. Those archives and documents of the United States Embassy which were not destroyed by the staff during the attack on 4 November have been ransacked by the militants. Documents purporting to come from this source have been disseminated by the militants and by the Government-controlled media.

25. The United States Chargé d'affaires in Tehran and the two other members of the diplomatic staff of the Embassy who were in the premises of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of the attack have not left the Ministry since; their exact situation there has been the subject of conflicting statements. On 7 November 1979, it was stated in an announcement by the Iranian Foreign Ministry that "as the protection of foreign nationals is the duty of the Iranian Government", the Chargé d' affaires was "staying in" the Ministry. On 1 December 1979, Mr. Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who had become Foreign Minister, stated that

> ". . .it has been announced that, if the U.S. Embassy's chargé d' affaires and his two companions, who have sought asylum in the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, should leave this ministry, the ministry would not accept any responsibility for them".

According to a press report of 4 December, the Foreign Minister amplified this statement by saying that as long as they remained in the ministry he was personally responsible for ensuring that nothing happened to them, but that

> ". . . as soon as they leave the ministry precincts they will fall back into the hands of justice, and then I will be the first to demand that they be arrested and tried".

The militants made it clear that they regarded the Chargé and his two colleagues as hostages also. When in March 1980 the Public Prosecutor of the Islamic Revolution of Iran called for one of the three diplomats to be handed over to him, it was announced by the Foreign Minister that

> "Regarding the fate of the three

by our young men . . . has been a lair of espionage and plotting", he asked how the young people could be expected "simply to remain idle and witness all these things". Furthermore he expressly stigmatized as "rotten roots" those in Iran who were "hoping we would mediate and tell the young people to leave this place". The Ayatollah's refusal to order "the young people" to put an end to their occupation of the Embassy, or the militants in Tabriz and Shiraz to evacuate the United States Consulates there, must have appeared the more significant when, on 6 November, he instructed "the young people" who had occupied the Iraqi Consulate in Kermanshah that they should leave it as soon as possible. The true significance of this was only reinforced when, next day, he expressly forbade members of the Revolutionary Council and all responsible officials to meet the special representatives sent by President Carter to try and obtain the release of the hostages and evacuation of the Embassy.

72. At any rate, thus fortified in their action, the militants at the Embassy at once went one step further. On 6 November they proclaimed that the Embassy, which they too referred to as "the U.S. centre of plots and espionage", would remain under their occupation, and that they were watching "most closely" the members of the diplomatic staff taken hostage whom they called "U.S. mercenaries and spies".

73. The seal of official governmental approval was finally set on this situation by a decree issued on 17 November 1979 by the Ayatollah Khomeini. His decree began with the assertion that the American Embassy was "a centre of espionage and conspiracy" and that "those people who hatched plots against our Islamic movement in that place do not enjoy international diplomatic respect". He went on expressly to declare that the premises of the Embassy and the hostages would remain as they were until the United States had handed over the former Shah for trial and returned his property to Iran. This statement of policy the Ayatollah qualified only to the extent of requesting the militants holding the hostages to "hand over the blacks and the women, if it is proven that they did not spy, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that they may be immediately expelled from Iran". As to the rest of the hostages, he made the Iranian Government's intentions all too clear:

> "The noble Iranian nation will not give permission for the release of the rest of them. Therefore, the rest of them will be under arrest until the American Government acts according to the wish of the nation."

74. The policy thus announced by the Ayatollah Khomeini, of maintaining the occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its inmates as hostages for the purpose of exerting pressure on the United States Government was complied with by other Iranian authorities and endorsed by them repeatedly in statements made in various contexts. The result of that policy was fundamentally to transform the legal nature of the situation created by the occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its diplomatic and consular staff as hostages. The approval given to these facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of the Iranian State, and the decision to perpetuate them, translated the continuing occupation of the Embassy and detention of the hostages into acts of that State. The militants, authors of the invasion and jailors of the hostages, had now become agents of the Iranian State for whose acts the State itself was internationally responsible. On 6 May 1980, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ghotbzadeh, is reported to have said in a television interview that the occupation of the United States Embassy had been "done by our nation". Moreover, in the prevailing circumstances the situation of the hostages was aggravated by the fact that their detention by the militants did not even offer the normal guarantees which might have been afforded by policy and security forces subject to the discipline and the control of official superiors.

75. During the six months which have elapsed since the situation just described was created by the decree of the Ayatollah Khomeini, it has undergone no material change. The Court's Order of 15 December 1979 indicating provisional measures, which called for the immediate restoration of the Embassy to the United States and the release of the hostages, was publicly rejected by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the following day and has been ignored by all Iranian authorities. On two occasions, namely on 23 February and on 7 April 1980, the Ayatollah Khomeini laid it down that the hostages should remain at the United States Embassy under the control of the militants until the new Iranian parliament should have assembled and taken a decision as to their fate. His adherence to that policy also made it impossible to obtain his consent to the transfer of the hostages from the control of the militants to that of the Government or of the Council of the Revolution. In any event, while highly desirable from the humanitarian and safety points of view, such a transfer would not have resulted in any material change in the legal situation, for its sponsors themselves emphasized that it must not be understood as signifying the release of the hostages.

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76. The Iranian authorities' decision to continue the subjection of the premises of the United States Embassy to occupation by militants and of the Embassy staff to detention as hostages, clearly gave rise to repeated and multiple breaches of the applicable provisions of the Vienna Conventions even more serious than those which arose from their failure to take any steps to prevent the attacks on the inviolability of these premises and staff.

77. In the first place, these facts constituted breaches additional to those already committeed of paragraph 2 of Article 22 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which requires Iran to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent and disturbance of its peace or impairment of its dignity. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of that Article have also been infringed, and continue to be infringed, since they forbid agents of the receiving State to enter the premises of a mission without consent or to undertake any search, requisition, attachment or like measure on the premises. Secondly, they constitute continuing breaches of Article 29 of the same Convention which forbids any arrest or detention of a diplomatic agent and any attack on his person, freedom or dignity. Thirdly, the Iranian authorities are without doubt in continuing breach of the provisions of Articles 25, 26 and 27 of the 1961 Vienna Convention and of pertinent provisions of the 1963 Vienna Convention concerning facilities for the performance of functions, freedom of movement and communications for diplomatic and consular staff, as well as of Article 24 of the former Convention and Article 33 of the latter, which provide for the absolute inviolability of the archives and documents of diplomatic missions and consulates. This particular violation has been made manifest to the world by repeated statements by the militants occupying the Embassy, who claim to be in possession of documents from the archives, and by various

government authorities, purporting to specify the contents thereof. Finally, the continued detention as hostages of the two private individuals of United States nationality entails a renewed breach of the obligations of Iran under Article II, paragraph 4, of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights.

78. Inevitably, in considering the compatibility or otherwise of the conduct of the Iranian authorities with the requirements of the Vienna Conventions, the Court has focussed its attention primarily on the occupation of the Embassy and the treatment of the United States diplomatic and consular personnel within the Embassy. It is however evident that the question of the compatibility of their conduct with the Vienna Conventions also arises in connection with the treatment of the United States Chargé d' affaires and two members of his staff in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 4 November 1979 and since that date. The facts of this case establish to the satisfaction of the Court that on 4 November 1979 and thereafter the Iranian authorities have withheld from the Chargé d'affaires and the two members of his staff the necessary protection and facilities to permit them to leave the Ministry in safety. Accordingly it appears to the Court that with respect to these three members of the United States' mission the Iranian authorities have committed a continuing breach of their obligations under Articles 26 and 29 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It further appears to the Court that the continuation of that situation over a long period has, in the circumstances, amounted to detention in the Ministry.

79. The Court moreover cannot conclude its observations on the series of acts which it has found to be imputable to the Iranian State and to be patently inconsistent with its international obligations under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 without mention also of another fact. This is that judicial authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have frequently voiced or associated themselves with, a threat first announced by the militants, of having some of the hostages submitted to trial before a court or some other body. These threats may at present merely be acts in contemplation. But the Court considers it necessary here and now to stress that, if the intention to submit the hostages to any form of criminal trial or investigation were to be put into effect, that would constitute a grave breach by Iran of its obligations under Article 31, paragraph 1, of the 1961 Vienna Convention. This paragraph states in the most express terms:

> "A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State." Again, if there were an attempt to compel the hostages to bear witness, a suggestion renewed at the time of the visit to Iran of the Secretary-General's Commission, Iran would without question be violating paragraph 2 of that same Article of the 1961 Vienna Convention which provides that "A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness".

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80. The facts of the present case, viewed in the light of the applicable rules of law, thus speak loudly and clearly of successive and still continuing breaches by Iran of its obligations to the United States under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963, as well as under the Treaty of 1955. Before drawing from this finding the conclusions which flow from it, in terms of the international responsibility of the Iranian State vis-à-vis the United States of America, the Court considers that it should examine one further point. The Court cannot overlook the fact that on the Iranian side, in often imprecise terms, the idea has been put forward that the conduct of the Iranian Government, at the time of the events of 4 November 1979 and subsequently, might be justified by the existence of special circumstances.

81. In his letters of 9 December 1979 and 16 March 1980, as previously recalled, Iran's Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to the present case as only "a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem". This problem, he maintained, "involves, *inter alia*, more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, the shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict with all international and humanitarian norms". In the first of the two letters he indeed singled out amongst the "crimes" which he attributed to the United States an alleged complicity on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency in the coup d'état of 1953 and in the restoration of the Shah to the throne of Iran. Invoking these alleged crimes of the United States, the Iranian Foreign Minister took the position that the United States' Application could not be examined by the Court divorced from its proper context, which he insisted was "the whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States over the last 25 years".

82. The Court must however observe, first of all, that the matters alleged in the Iranian Foreign Minister's letters of 9 December 1979 and 16 March 1980 are of a kind which, if invoked in legal proceedings, must clearly be established to the satisfaction of the tribunal with all the requisite proof. The Court, in its Order of 15 December 1979, pointed out that if the Iranian Government considered the alleged activities of the United States in Iran legally to have a close connection with the subject-matter of the Application it was open to Iran to present its own case regarding those activities to the Court by way of defence to the United States' claims. The Iranian Government, however, did not appear before the Court. Moreover, even in his letter of 16 March 1980, transmitted to the Court some three months after the issue of that Order, the Iranian Foreign Minister did not furnish the Court with any further information regarding the alleged criminal activities of the United States in Iran, or explain on what legal basis he considered these allegations to constitute a relevant answer to the United States' claims. The large body of information submitted by the United States itself to the Court includes, it is true, some statements emanating from Iranian authorities or from the militants in which reference is made to alleged espionage and interference in Iran by the United States centred upon its Embassy in Tehran. These statements are, however, of the same general character as the assertions of alleged criminal activities of the United States contained in the Foreign Minister's letters, and are unsupported by evidence furnished by Iran before the Court. Hence they do not provide a basis on which the Court could form a judicial opinion on the truth or otherwise of the matters there alleged.

83. In any case, even if the alleged criminal activities of the United States in Iran could be considered as having been established, the question would remain whether they could be regarded by the Court as constituting a justification of Iran's conduct and thus a defence to the United States' claims in the present case. The Court, however, is unable to accept that they can be so regarded. This is because diplomatic law itself provides the necessary means of defence against, and sanction for, illicit activities

question. He never used his control of oil to bring political pressure; he never joined any oil embargo against the West or Israel. Iran under the Shah, in short, was one of America's best, most important, and most loyal friends in the world. The least we owe him is not retrospectively to vilify the actions that eight American Presidents – including the present incumbent – gratefully welcomed [9]."

It is in these words that Dr. Kissinger himself describes the links which existed between the presence of the Shah at the head of the Iranian State and the exigencies of American worldwide and Middle East strategy. These links do not in any way justify the occupation of the Embassy. But they should be placed in the balance when the responsibility incurred by the Iranian Government falls to be weighed.

Furthermore, the ex-Shah, when in Mexico, was authorized to enter United States territory. The United States authorities were perfectly aware that this authorization might have untoward consequences. They nevertheless granted it, thus committing a serious fault which the Court could have taken into consideration. In what has become a classic work, entitled *Traité théorique et pratique de la responsabilité civile délictuelle et contractuelle*, the brothers Henri, Léon and Jean Mazeaud write:

"If the sole cause of the injury is an act of the complainant, the defendant should always be absolved, for it was not his fault if harm was done. He is thus entitled to rely on the complainant's act, whatever it be. Here it should be pointed out that the question whether the complainant's act contained an element of fault does not even arise. The defendant is absolved because it was not *his* act which was held to be the cause of the injury. In reality, he relies on the complainant's act solely in order to establish the absence of any causal connection between his own act and the harm done [10]."

Similarly, before reaching the point of declaring the Iranian State responsible, one should take into consideration the circumstances in which the facts complained of occurred. In doing so, one must bear in mind the essential point that Iran is at present traversing a period of revolution. It is no longer valid to assess the obligations of the Iranian State in accordance with the criteria which were current before the departure of the Shah. This corresponds to the essence of the theory recognized in French administrative law with regard to the influence of war on the obligations of the State and public bodies. In its Judgment of 30 March 1916 (*Compagnie du gaz de Bordeaux*) the French Conseil d'Etat confirmed the principle of the collapse of the economy of contracts on account of war [11]. This principle was endorsed by the great French jurist Maurice Hauriou, in his theory of the unforeseen [12].

With this essential factor added to those already mentioned, the responsibility of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran ought to have been envisaged in the context of the revolution which took place in that country and brought about, as it were, a break with a past condemned as oppressive. Thus it would in my view be unjust to lay all the facts complained of at the door of the Iranian Government without subjecting the circumstances in which those acts took place to the least preliminary examination.

3. The actions undertaken before and after the seisin of the Court which were capable of affecting the course of the proceedings

The Government of the United States of America referred its dispute with Iran to the Court on 29 November 1979. It is certain that the Court's jurisdiction is not automatic. The Court possesses only such jurisdiction as is conferred upon it. Two essential consequences flow from this:

(a) any State is free to ignore the possibility of the judicial solution of a dispute, either by omitting to refer it to the International Court of Justice, or by refusing to submit to the Court's jurisdiction, to the extent that the circumstances of the case enable it so to refuse;

(b) however, once a State presents itself before the Court as an applicant and requests it to direct the respondent State to submit to the law, the option it possessed before the institution of proceedings disappears. The whole dossier of the dispute at issue is taken in hand by the Court. The applicant State must refrain from taking any decisions on the planes of either domestic or international law which could have the effect of impeding the proper administration of justice.

Yet, even before turning to the Court, the Government of the United States of America had already decided to freeze the Iranian assets in United States dollars lodged in United States banks or their branches abroad.

Subsequently, just when the Court was embarking upon its deliberation prior to the Judgment it was to adopt, the President of the United States of America, on 7 April 1980, announced a series of measures he had decided to take which were closely connected with the case before the Court. Having regard to the normal exercise of the Court's powers, the most important of these measures was unquestionably the third, whereby he ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to:

"make a formal inventory of the assets of the Iranian Government which were frozen by my previous order and also make a census or inventory of the outstanding claims of American citizens and corporations against the Government of Iran. This accounting of claims will aid in designing a program against Iran for the hostages, the hostage families and other United States claimants."

The President added: "We are now preparing legislation which will be introduced in the Congress to facilitate processing and paying of these claims."

This, in my view, constituted an encroachment on the functions of the Court, for until the Court has ruled upon the principle of reparation the applicant State is not entitled to consider that its submissions, or part of them, have already been accepted and recognized as well founded. What is more, the decision of the United States President to propose the adoption by Congress of legislation granting victims the possibility of receiving compensation out of the Iranian assets frozen in the United States, when the action before the Court has not yet been exhausted, raises the problem of a conflict between the rules of municipal law and those of international law. Were the legislation contemplated to be passed, the conflict would be settled to the detriment of the latter.

However, it was the military operation of 24 April 1980 which was the gravest encroachment upon the Court's exercise of its power to declare the law in respect of the dispute laid before it. This operation was called off by the President of the United States for technical reasons. It is not my intention to characterize that operation or to make any legal value-judgment in its respect, but only to allude to it in connection with the case before the Court. I must say that it was not conducive to facilitating the judicial settlement of the dispute.

In his report to the Security Council of 25 April 1980, Mr. Donald McHenry, the Permanent Representative of the United States of America, stated that the military operation of 24 April 1980 had been undertaken pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Yet Article 51 provides for the eventuality of that kind of operation only "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations". One can only wonder, therefore, whether an

armed attack attributable to the Iranian Government has been committed against the territory of the United States, apart from its Embassy and Consulates in Iran.

To sum up my position, I would like to mention the following points:

(a) I consider that the Court has jurisdiction to decide the present case only under the provisions of the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 on, respectively, Diplomatic and Consular Relations. Any direct or indirect reference to the 1955 Treaty between the United States and Iran or to the 1973 Convention is, from my point of view, unacceptable.

(b) I consider that the Iranian Government has violated its obligations under the two Vienna Conventions mentioned above. I concur in those parts of the operative paragraph which deal with this question.

(c) On the other hand, I could not support the idea that the Iranian Government should be declared responsible unless the Court also found:

(i) that the responsibility in question is relative and not absolute, that it must straightway be qualified in accordance with the criteria which I have put forward and others which may be envisaged;

(ii) that the Government of the United States of America, by reason of its conduct both before and after the institution of proceedings, has equally incurred responsibility.

(Signed) S. TARAZI ■

COURT'S SUMMARY
MAY 24, 1980

Today, 24 May 1980, the International Court of Justice delivered its judgment in the case concerning U.S. diplomatic and consular staff in Tehran. The Court decided:

(1) That Iran has violated and is still violating obligations owed by it to the United States;

(2) That these violations engage Iran's responsibility;

(3) That the Government of Iran must immediately release the U.S. nationals held as hostages and place the premises of the Embassy in the hands of the protecting power;

(4) That no member of the U.S. diplomatic or consular staff may be kept in Iran to be subjected to any form of judicial proceedings or to participate in them as a witness;

(5) That Iran is under an obligation to make reparation for the injury caused to the United States; and

(6) That the form and amount of such reparation, failing agreement between the parties, shall be settled by the Court.

These decisions were adopted by large majorities: (1) and (2)–13 votes to 2; (3) and (4)–unanimously; (5)–12 votes to 3; (6)–14 votes to 1.

A separate opinion has been appended to the judgment by Judge Lachs, who voted against operative paragraph 5. Dissenting opinions have been appended by Judge Morozov, who voted against paragraphs 1, 2, 5, and 6, and by Judge Tarazi, who voted against paragraphs 1, 2, and 5.

Analysis of the Judgment

Procedure before the Court. In its judgment, the Court recalls that on 29 November 1979 the United States of America had instituted proceedings against Iran in a case arising out of the situation at its Embassy in Tehran and consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz, and the seizure and detention as hostages of its diplomatic and consular staff in Tehran and two more citizens of the United States. The United States having at the same time requested the indication of provisional measures, the Court, by a unanimous order of 15 December 1979, indicated, pending final judgment, that the Embassy should immediately be given back and the hostages released.

The procedure then continued in accordance with the statute and rules of court. The United States filed a memorial, and on 18, 19, and 20 March 1980 the Court held a public hearing at the close of which the United States, in its final submissions, requested it to adjudge and declare, *inter alia*, that the Iranian Government had violated its international legal obligations to the United States and must:

- Insure the immediate release of the hostages;
- Afford the U.S. diplomatic and consular personnel the protection and immunities to which they were entitled (including immunity from criminal jurisdiction) and provide them with facilities to leave Iran;
- Submit the persons responsible for the crimes committed to the competent Iranian authorities for prosecution or extradite them to the United States; and
- Pay the United States reparation, in a sum to be subsequently determined by the Court.

Iran took no part in the proceedings. It neither filed pleadings nor was represented at the hearing, and no submissions were therefore presented on its behalf. Its position was however defined in two letters addressed to the Court by its Minister for Foreign Affairs on 9 December 1979 and 16 March 1980 respectively. In these the Minister maintained *inter alia* that the Court could not and should not take cognizance of the case.

The Facts. The Court expresses regret that Iran did not appear before it to put forward its arguments. The absence of Iran from the proceedings brought into operation article 53 of the statute, under which the Court is required, before finding in the applicant's favor, to satisfy itself that the allegations of fact on which the claim is based are well founded.

In that respect the Court observes that it has had available to it, in the documents presented by the United States, a massive body of information from various sources, including numerous official statements of both Iranian and U.S. authorities. This information, the Court notes, is wholly consistent as to the main facts and has all been communicated to Iran without evoking any denial. The Court is accordingly satisfied that the allegations of fact on which the United States based its claim were well founded.

Admissibility. Under the settled jurisprudence of the Court, it is bound, in applying article 53 of its statute, to investigate, on its own initiative, any preliminary question of admissibility or jurisdiction that may arise.

On the subject of admissibility, the Court, after examining the considerations put forward in the two letters from Iran, finds that they do not disclose any ground for concluding that it could not or should not deal with the case. Neither does it find any incompatibility with the continuance of judicial proceedings before the Court in the establishment by the Secretary General of the United Nations, with the agreement of both states, of a commission given a mandate to undertake a fact finding mission to Iran, hear Iran's grievances, and facilitate the solution of the crisis between the two countries.

Jurisdiction. Four instruments having been cited by the United States

days toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.

Unfortunately, the intercommunal talks remain in recess. I am, however, hopeful that the recent intensive effort of the Secretary General of the United Nations will bring both parties on Cyprus back to the negotiating table. Through his representatives on Cyprus, Secretary General Waldheim has suggested a specific format under which both sides might be able to resume talks. While there has not yet been agreement on the suggested format, I believe the Secretary General has proposed a reasonable program that will enable the two sides to begin to discuss their concerns and to face the issues of substance that divide the island.

The Foreign Minister of Cyprus was in Washington February 5–7 for meetings with Secretary Vance and other State Department officials. In these discussions, we made clear our continuing support for Secretary General Waldheim's efforts to resume the intercommunal talks. We told the Foreign Minister that we believe both sides to the Cyprus dispute should concentrate on issues where there is some measure of agreement and begin to build a settlement on that common ground.

For years, the people of Cyprus have been unable to reach a political accommodation that satisfies both communities. The Secretary General of the United Nations is offering them a way to sit down together and search for understanding. Achieving a settlement at the negotiating table will not be easy. But achieving a settlement will be impossible unless both sides are willing to engage in meaningful discussions. The United States is firmly committed to the early resumption of the intercommunal talks and will continue to support the Secretary General's efforts. We are convinced that only face-to-face negotiations between the communities will lead to a just and lasting peace.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

[1] Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Mar. 31, 1980). ■

Role of the President's National Security Affairs Assistant

by Warren Christopher

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 17, 1980. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.[1]

I have brought with me a number of documents which I offer for your hearing record. They include Presidential Directives NSC–1 and NSC–2 of January 20, 1977, concerning the National Security Council (NSC) system; a brief description of the council, its membership, and its operations; an organizational chart of the National Security Council staff; and a June 4, 1979, letter from President Carter to Senator [Frank] Church regarding the [Senator Edward] Zorinsky amendment.

As part of these hearings, I understand that the committee is once again considering whether the positions of Assistant and Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.

Let me state our position at the outset. As the President indicated in his letter to Senator Church last year, the Administration opposes this proposal. We believe it would intrude upon the authority of the President in international affairs and complicate the conduct of our foreign relations. It would do so without significant compensating value to the Congress.

National Security Adviser, NSC Relationship

As members of the committee know, the National Security Council was created in 1947 as an element of the sweeping National Security Act, which redefined the entire national security and foreign policy apparatus. The purpose underlying the creation of the NSC was to coordinate the many strands of national policy set by various departments, all of which bore upon our global posture.

The act specified statutory members of the National Security Council, including the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense, and it provided for a civilian staff headed by an executive secretary. There was no mention of an Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. That position was created by a Presidential statement in 1953.

I do not propose to trace the intervening history in any depth. From it, however, some broad observations emerge.

First, the function of the NSC and its staff has varied widely, depending primarily on the needs and preferences of the President in office. During the Eisenhower Administration, for example, the council structure was highly developed and extensively used. President Kennedy, by contrast, preferred a less formal approach.

Second, the requirement which inspired the creation of the National Security Council—for interdepartmental coordination on foreign affairs—remains its most important role. Indeed, the breadth of today's foreign policy concerns—reaching from such traditional areas as defense and trade to newer concerns such as communications and energy—could not have been foreseen 30 years ago.

Third, the search for effective ways to coordinate and integrate America's wide-ranging international interests is a ceaseless process and an endless challenge. It has been the subject of a series of careful studies—the Hoover Commission, the Government Operations Committee studies in 1960, the Murphy Commission, and most recently, the Odeen report, which deals with the security aspect of the council's work. The need for efficient decisionmaking is paramount. The means of coordination, in the White House and directly between the Departments and Agencies, are indispensable.

Current Role of the NSC

The current role of the National Security Council and that of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs were set forth on January 20, 1977, when President Carter issued Presidential Directives NSC–1 and NSC–2 providing for the reorganization of the National Security Council sys-

tem. The intent, in the President's words, was to:

> . . . place more responsibility in the Departments and Agencies while insuring that the NSC, with my Assistant for National Security Affairs, continues to integrate and facilitate foreign and defense policy decisions.

These directives provided that the work of the NSC system would be carried out by two subordinate committees.

The **Policy Review Committee** develops policies for the President in areas where the basic responsibilities fall within one Department but where the decision will have important implications for other Departments. It is usually chaired by the Secretary of State. Interdepartmental groups are formed and operate under the direction of the committee.

The **Special Coordination Committee** deals with issues that require interdepartmental coordination. Examples include arms control and intelligence activities. As defined in Presidential Directive 2, the committee has also been used to develop the U.S. response to crises. It is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Within the NSC system, the National Security Adviser has a dual responsibility. First, at the President's request, he provides advice on foreign and defense policy. He also directs the system in order to bring options to the President's attention and to assure that the President's decisions are appropriately followed.

Finally, like all Presidential advisers, the National Security Adviser performs additional duties, such as conducting factfinding missions, on behalf of the President and at his direction.

Zorinsky Proposal

Against this background, I would like now to turn to Senator Zorinsky's proposal. There is, I believe, general agreement on three propositions.

First, there is complete agreement with the principle that the Congress has a vital role in American foreign policy, both in helping to guide its direction and in monitoring its implementation. Those responsibilities have taken on new meaning in recent years as we have worked to build a post-Vietnam consensus on our international priorities. The Administration recognizes that the United States can have an effective and durable foreign policy only if the Congress is fully informed and involved.

Second, a proposition which I take to be common ground is that, except for the President himself, the principal executive authority for American foreign policy must reside in one person—the Secretary of State. The self-evident nature of this proposition is reflected in congressional enactments which have conferred upon the Secretary of State the responsibility for implementing our international policy and for assuring that American interests are properly represented in the world.

Third, we also believe there is agreement that the President of the United States requires a personal and confidential staff of his own choosing. He must be able to draw upon advisers who, within the law, answer only to him. He must be able to hear a wide range of views and consider all possible options when he makes his decisions. The availability of the unfettered advice of persons the President trusts serves not just the convenience of the President, but the interests of the country as well.

In outlining the agreement on these three central propositions, I have defined the three interests that are most directly touched by the proposal before this committee: the oversight interest of the Congress; the national interest in a sound structure for conducting our international relations; and the Presidential interest in managing his own office and responsibilities.

In our judgment, the proposed legislation is not necessary for achieving the first of these interests, and it would tend to be inconsistent with the other two.

As I believe this committee recognizes, the Carter Administration has demonstrated a sustained commitment to a fully informed Congress. Administration witnesses from the Secretary of State on down are routinely available to discuss every aspect of our international policy.

The recent events in Iran and Afghanistan offer apt examples. Secretary Vance and I have provided regular briefings to both the Senate and House leadership—sometimes daily, regularly twice weekly—and we have provided many briefings to the committee and to all the members.

On these and on a wide range of other issues, State Department officials have been readily available for formal testimony and have conducted countless informal briefings and consultations. You hear regularly from the Secretary as well as from me, from the Under Secretaries, from the Assistant Secretaries and their deputies, from the directors of offices and the administrators of Agencies, and from our ambassadorial nominees.

This access reaches two of the four statutory members of the National Security Council—the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense—and all its statutory advisers and their principal assistants.

These are the officials with direct responsibility for our policy and our programs in the world. Either through designation by statute, or through delegation from the President or Secretary of State, they have the direct authority to shape and implement our policy and the specific obligation to account for public funds.

By contrast, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs does not administer statutory programs. He does not expend public funds. Rather, the principal roles of the National Security Adviser are to provide confidential advice to the President and to coordinate foreign policy. His appearance to testify on the Hill would impinge upon the President's right to obtain confidential advice from individuals responsible only to him.

Opposition to the Proposal

Thus, the Zorinsky proposal would provide the Congress with, at most, a redundant source of information. At the same time, the proposal would compromise crucial interests by hindering the capacity of the executive branch to represent effectively the Nation's interests in the world.

First, the proposal would inevitably, if unintentionally, diminish the authority of the Secretary of State. If our own Congress were to look explicitly to another source for authoritative descriptions of American policy, then governments elsewhere would be inspired to do the same. This

members of the United Nations are beginning to share this view. Heretofore they maintained that since the United States and other Western states created the Palestine refugee problem they should be solely responsible for the financial costs of UNRWA. But that attitude is changing. At the last U.N. General Assembly, Arab representatives spoke of world community and their responsibility toward UNRWA. More important, Arab countries have begun to increase their contributions.

ICEM

Next, I would like to discuss our contributions to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. ICEM plays a major role in the moving of refugees for permanent resettlement throughout the world. Since 1952, some 2.6 million refugees and migrants have been relocated under their auspices. Last year, ICEM moved 248,000 persons, of whom 160,000 were Indochinese refugees and 59,000 were Eastern Europeans and Soviet Jews. ICEM estimates that it will move 263,000 people in 1980. This is not only a remarkable logistical achievement but a humanitarian undertaking which deserves our support.

Of the estimated 263,000 to be moved in 1980, 168,000 will be Indochinese refugees coming to the United States. ICEM will arrange for documentation, medical screening, transportation and, if necessary, care in transit facilities at the decommissioned Hamilton Air Force Base near San Francisco for refugees awaiting onward movement. These costs will total $121.8 million. An additional $11.25 million will be provided to ICEM for transportation services for Soviet, Eastern European, and other refugees.

Our proposed contribution to ICEM for its overall operations in 1981 is $5 million of which $2.58 million is for the administrative budget and $2.42 million for the operational budget.

ICEM's administrative budget is financed by mandatory contributions from member governments in accordance with the scale of assessment adopted by the ICEM council and agreed to by each member government. Our assessed contribution for 1981 is $2.58 million, or one-third of the administrative budget of $7.2 million. This is an increase of $214,000 over our 1980 assessment. The administrative budget provides for the basic administrative staff in Geneva headquarters to supervise ICEM's operational program, including 30 field offices.

In 1981, we propose to make a voluntary contribution of $2.42 million to the operational budget, which represents 25% of ICEM's estimated budget and an increase of $666,000 over our voluntary contributions last year. These funds support ICEM's migration program for Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

ICEM also plays an important role in encouraging the migration, either from Europe to Latin America or within Latin America, of skilled workers and professionals requested by Latin American governments. We are exploring the possibility that ICEM could apply its experience and contacts in Latin America to play an even greater role in the resettlement of Indochinese refugees.

At present, ICEM has two special appeals outstanding—for Nicaragua and Uganda. After the civil war ended, the Government of Nicaragua asked ICEM to assist in the return of its skilled workers, technicians, and experts who had fled the country for political or other reasons. Some people have already been assisted in returning. Several hundred others already registered with ICEM will be similarly assisted. In addition, the Government of Nicaragua requested ICEM to recruit technicians from the industrialized countries to fill vacant posts in the country. Denmark, Germany, and Italy have contributed a total of $420,000 to the program.

ICRC

Finally, let me comment on our contributions to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Although it is not specifically a refugee organization, it is unique in that it can act decisively to provide relief to victims of armed conflict or internal strife. It is not restricted by political considerations as are other international organizations.

The United States proposes to continue to support the ICRC in its humanitarian task by again contributing $1 million to the general budget in 1981. We will also continue to provide special contributions for ICRC programs in specific areas.

To date in FY 1980, we have made contributions to the ICRC of $2.5 million for Kampuchean relief programs. These funds were made available primarily to provide food for those in need and to recruit doctors and medical teams to assist refugees on the Thai-Kampuchean border.

For ICRC's African programs, we propose to contribute $5 million for 1980 and $7 million for 1981. These programs will provide food, shelter, and medical care to 13 African nations. The major programs are in the Horn and in southern Africa.

We are confronted by a refugee problem for which financial and moral responsibility must be shared by the international community. To this end, the United States this year and next year will continue to provide the maximum support to international refugee organizations consistent with our fair share of the burden.

In summary, it is vital to U.S. interests that we continue to approach refugee problems through international organizations wherever possible. By so doing, we demonstrate our commitment to resolve refugee problems collectively. Our continued participation in these international organizations enhances our influence in solving global problems. It permits us to achieve through international cooperation what we cannot achieve alone.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Secretary Muskie's News Conference of June 13

It has been agreed that the meeting Ambassador Linowitz [Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations] will hold with the Israeli and Egyptian heads of delegations, Dr. [Yosef] Burg and Foreign Minister [Hassan] Ali, will take place in Washington on July 2 and 3. I am very pleased at this further development in our joint efforts to pursue the autonomy talks, and, hopefully, we will now build some momentum in moving forward.

The second subject I would like to touch upon, with a sense of real urgency, is the FY 1980 foreign assistance appropriations bill. I would hope that I might be able to make a case sufficiently here that it gets the kind of visibility to which the Congress might pay attention.

We have been operating in this fiscal year—nearly two-thirds over now—on a continuing resolution. This is the only appropriations bill which has not been cleared for 1980, and the terms of the continuing resolution were such that we must operate at the lower of either the 1979 figures or the 1980 figures, which leaves us about one-third below our program estimates and needs.

And the result of this jam is that we have to find room under the third concurrent resolution for 1980 to do some things that the Congress itself has said are very important, but the supplemental appropriations bill, reported by the House committee this week, would use up all that room, leaving none for such items as these.

- Nicaragua aid, which the House last week approved for FY 1981, and an authorization bill with a margin of 74 votes. The case has been made that that is an important foreign policy priority, and there is no room for that $75 million in the 1980 continuing resolution, and so we are on the threshold of a foreign policy failure in a very sensitive area because of the failure of the Congress to provide the resources.
- Cambodia refugee assistance—$30 million. The Congress has evidenced strong support for this objective and for this program and for this policy, but now when it comes to providing the money to follow through, there is danger that we will not have it.
- Disaster relief—we are entirely out of disaster relief funds for FY 1980.
- The Congress has indicated strong support for $20 million of assistance in connection with the Caribbean hurricane, and the $20 million isn't available.
- The World Bank--our contributions to the World Bank risk being defaulted, and as a result, we could lose our veto and, indeed, lose our right to choose an American successor to Mr. McNamara, as president of the World Bank.
- The African Development Bank—we could lose our right to participate in that important foreign policy objective.

I really don't urge a different posture with respect to these programs than I have for 22 years as a Senator. I find it ironic that it is so easy to make the case for greater defense spending on the Hill, and those numbers have risen by tens of billions of dollars in the last year. Yet, in these situations around the globe, which the Soviet Union regards as doors of opportunity to spread their influence and to have their way, we somehow can't find our way to produce the relatively few dollars, compared to defense spending, to take advantage of those doors of opportunity ourselves.

I think we are tremendously short-sighted in not recognizing the importance of those kinds of investments. Each day, as Secretary of State, I hear of situations here, there, or elsewhere around this planet where a little assistance—often a few hundred thousand dollars or a couple of million dollars—could be very visible evidence that the United States of America cares about dealing with these problems which create instability—thrusts for change which can be exploited around the planet.

And so, I take this opportunity to convey this sense of urgency to the Congress. I have talked to Members of the Congress, in both Houses, and they all point to the parliamentary difficulties which they face. I have faced those for 22 years, and I found that there is a way to pierce and to penetrate them, get around them, if there is a will to do so, so I don't buy that as an unavoidable excuse.

Q. Perhaps someone will return to one or both of those questions or issues, but I would like to ask you about a third thing, which is of some urgency. The European allies have just approved a resolution saying the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] will have to be associated—that's their word "associated"—with peace negotiations, with any negotiations. They also support self-determination, which is a phrase we've heard before, for the Palestinians.

"Associated" is what I would like to concentrate on. It is ambiguous and perhaps a word of some compromise. Did the United States have anything to do with the selection of that word or that approach which seems to be a moderation of calling for participation right now in the peace process?

Secondly, from a U.S. viewpoint, does the United States—can it imagine the Palestinians, the Arab Palestinians, agreeing to a settlement without approval of the PLO?

A. With respect to your first question, the U.S. Government was not involved in the shaping of this European Community statement. We were not consulted about—and did not wish to be consulted about—what we regarded as a European effort to be helpful in the Middle East situation, so whatever words were chosen were words chosen by them.

They may or may not have been influenced by the discussions that I have had with the various members of the NATO governments as to the importance of not undercutting the Camp David process, supporting it—not diverting it. So to the extent they felt a sense of restraint, that might have produced some of the language—and I agree with you that it is interesting—that is found in the text.

I don't want to comment upon the text. The rough draft of the text came in only a few moments ago, and I would not want to try to definitively analyze it. But I was particularly pleased with the statement of Mr. Cossiga [Prime Minister of Italy] at the press conference in which he emphasized that it is the intent of the European Community not to undermine the Camp David process but to support it. And that is the signal that we have been getting, of course, for the last week.

Q. Now on the second part, to an extent—I don't think we do it completely—the United States tries to dissociate the PLO from its efforts, sometimes you are at the fringes of that. You invite mayors here, you

Americans in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the decision rests first with the imam of the nation [i.e., the Ayatollah Khomeini]; in case there is no clear decision by the imam of the nation, the Revolution Council will make a decision on this matter."

26. From the outset of the attack upon its Embassy in Tehran, the United States protested to the Government of Iran both at the attack and at the seizure and detention of the hostages. On 7 November a former Attorney-General of the United States, Mr. Ramsey Clark, was instructed to go with an assistant to Iran to deliver a message from the President of the United States to the Ayatollah Khomeini. The text of that message has not been made available to the Court by the Applicant, but the United States Government has informed the Court that it thereby protested at the conduct of the Government of Iran and called for release of the hostages, and that Mr. Clark was also authorized to discuss all avenues for resolution of the crisis. While he was en route, Tehran radio broadcast a message from the Ayatollah Khomeini dated 7 November, solemnly forbidding members of the Revolutionary Council and all the responsible officials to meet the United States representatives. In that message it was asserted that "the U.S. Embassy in Iran is our enemies' centre of espionage against our sacred Islamic movement", and the message continued:

> "Should the United States hand over to Iran the deposed shah . . . and give up espionage against our movement, the way to talks would be opened on the issue of certain relations which are in the interest of the nation".

Subsequently, despite the efforts of the United States Government to open negotiations, it became clear that the Iranian authorities would have no direct contact with representatives of the United States Government concerning the holding of the hostages.

27. During the period which has elapsed since the seizure of the Embassy a number of statements have been made by various governmental authorities in Iran which are relevant to the Court's examination of the responsibility attributed to the Government of Iran in the submissions of the United States. These statements will be examined by the Court in considering these submissions (paragraphs 59 and 70–74 below).

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28. On 9 November, 1979, the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council, requesting urgent consideration of what might be done to secure the release of the hostages and to restore the "sanctity of diplomatic personnel and establishments". The same day, the President of the Security Council made a public statement urging the release of the hostages, and the President of the General Assembly announced that he was sending a personal message to the Ayatollah Khomeini appealing for their release. On 25 November 1979, the Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council referring to the seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran and the detention of its diplomatic personnel, and requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council "in an effort to seek a peaceful solution to the problem". The Security Council met on 27 November and 4 December 1979; on the latter occasion, no representative of Iran was present, but the Council took note of a letter of 13 November 1979 from the Supervisor of the Iranian Foreign Ministry to the Secretary-General. The Security Council then adopted resolution 457 (1979), calling on Iran to release the personnel of the Embassy immediately, to provide them with protection and to allow them to leave the country. The resolution also called on the two Governments to take steps to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them, and requested the Secretary-General to lend his good offices for the immediate implementation of the resolution, and to take all appropriate measures to that end. It further stated that the Council would "remain actively seized of the matter" and requested the Secretary-General to report to it urgently on any developments with regard to his efforts.

29. On 31 December 1979, the Security Council met again and adopted resolution 461 (1979), in which it reiterated both its calls to the Iranian Government and its request to the Secretary-General to lend his good offices for achieving the object of the Council's resolution. The Secretary-General visited Tehran on 1-3 January 1980, and reported to the Security Council on 6 January. On 20 February 1980, the Secretary-General announced the setting up of a commission to undertake a fact-finding mission to Iran. The Court will revert to the terms of reference of this commission and the progress of its work in connection with a question of admissibility of the proceedings (paragraphs 39-40 below).

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30. Prior to the institution of the present proceedings, in addition to the approach made by the Government of the United States to the United Nations Security Council, that Government also took certain unilateral action in response to the actions for which it holds the Government of Iran responsible. On 10 November 1979, steps were taken to identify all Iranian students in the United States who were not in compliance with the terms of their entry visas, and to commence deportation proceedings against those who were in violation of applicable immigration laws and regulations. On 12 November 1979, the President of the United States ordered the discontinuation of all oil purchases from Iran for delivery to the United States. Believing that the Government of Iran was about to withdraw all Iranian funds from United States banks and to refuse to accept payment in dollars for oil, and to repudiate obligations owed to the United States and to United States nationals, the President on 14 November 1979 acted to block the very large official Iranian assets in the United States or in United States control, including deposits both in banks in the United States and in foreign branches and subsidiaries of United States banks. On 12 December 1979, after the institution of the present proceedings, the United States informed the Iranian Chargé d' affaires in Washington that the number of personnel assigned to the Iranian Embassy and consular posts in the United States was to be restricted.

31. Subsequently to the indication by the Court of provisional measures, and during the present proceedings, the United States Government took other action. A draft resolution was introduced into the United Nations Security Council calling for economic sanctions against Iran. When it was put to the vote on 13 January 1980, the result was 10 votes in favour, 2 against, and 2 abstentions (one member not having participated in the voting); as a permanent member of the Council cast a negative vote, the draft resolution was not adopted. On 7 April 1980 the United States Government broke off diplomatic relations with the Government of Iran. At the same time, the United States Government prohibited exports from the United States to Iran – one of the sanctions previously proposed by it to the

Security Council. Steps were taken to prepare an inventory of the assets of the Government of Iran frozen on 14 November 1979, and to make a census of outstanding claims of American nationals against the Government of Iran, with a view to "designing a program against Iran for the hostages, the hostage families and other U.S. claimants" involving the preparation of legislation "to facilitate processing and paying of these claims" and all visas issued to Iranian citizens for future entry into the United States were cancelled. On 17 April 1980, the United States Government announced further economic measures directed against Iran, prohibited travel there by United States citizens, and made further plans for reparations to be paid to the hostages and their families out of frozen Iranian assets.

32. During the night of 24-25 April 1980 the President of the United States set in motion, and subsequently terminated for technical reasons, an operation within Iranian territory designed to effect the rescue of the hostages by United States military units. In an announcement made on 25 April, President Carter explained that the operation had been planned over a long period as a humanitarian mission to rescue the hostages, and had finally been set in motion by him in the belief that the situation in Iran posed mounting dangers to the safety of the hostages and that their early release was highly unlikely. He stated that the operation had been under way in Iran when equipment failure compelled its termination; and that in the course of the withdrawal of the rescue forces two United States aircraft had collided in a remote desert location in Iran. He further stated that preparations for the rescue operations had been ordered for humanitarian reasons, to protect the national interests of the United States, and to alleviate international tensions. At the same time, he emphasized that the operation had not been motivated by hostility towards Iran or the Iranian people. The texts of President Carter's announcement and of certain other official documents relating to the operation have been transmitted to the Court by the United States Agent in response to a request made by the President of the Court on 25 April. Amongst these documents is the text of a report made by the United States to the Security Council on 25 April, "pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations". In that report, the United States maintained that the mission had been carried out by it "in exercise of its inherent right of self-defence with the aim of extricating American nationals who have been and remain the victims of the Iranian armed attack on our Embassy". The Court will refer further to this operation later in the present Judgment (paragraphs 93 and 94 below).

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33. It is to be regretted that the Iranian Government has not appeared before the Court in order to put forward its arguments on the questions of law and of fact which arise in the present case; and that, in consequence, the Court has not had the assistance it might have derived from such arguments or from any evidence adduced in support of them. Nevertheless, in accordance with its settled jurisprudence, the Court, in applying Article 53 of its Statute, must first take up, *proprio motu*, any preliminary question, whether of admissibility or of jurisdiction, that appears from the information before it to arise in the case and the decision of which might constitute a bar to any further examination of the merits of the Applicant's case. The Court will, therefore, first address itself to the considerations put forward by the Iranian Government in its letters of 9 December 1979 and 16 March 1980, on the basis of which it maintains that the Court ought not to take cognizance of the present case.

34. The Iranian Government in its letter of 9 December 1979 drew attention to what it referred to as the "deep-rootedness and the essential character of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, a revolution of a whole oppressed nation against its oppressors and their masters". The examination of the "numerous repercussions" of the revolution, it added, is "a matter essentially and directly within the national sovereignty of Iran". However, as the Court pointed out in its Order of 15 December 1979,

> ". . . a dispute which concerns diplomatic and consular premises and the detention of internationally protected persons, and involves the interpretation or application of multilateral conventions codifying the international law governing diplomatic and consular relations, is one which by its very nature falls within international jurisdiction" (*I.C.J. Reports 1979*, page 16, paragraph 25).

In its later letter of 16 March 1980 the Government of Iran confined itself to repeating the observations on this point which it had made in its letter of 9 December 1979, without putting forward any additional arguments or explanations. In these circumstances, the Court finds it sufficient here to recall and confirm its previous statement on the matter in its Order of 15 December 1979.

35. In its letter of 9 December 1979 the Government of Iran maintained that the Court could not and should not take cognizance of the present case for another reason, namely that the case submitted to the Court by the United States, is "confined to what is called the question of the 'hostages of the American Embassy in Tehran' ". It then went on to explain why it considered this to preclude the Court from taking cognizance of the case:

> "For this question only represents a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem, one such that it cannot be studied separately, and which involves, *inter alia*, more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, the shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict with all international and humanitarian norms.
>
> The problem involved in the conflict between Iran and the United States is thus not one of the interpretation and the application of the treaties upon which the American Application is based, but results from an overall situation containing much more fundamental and more complex elements. Consequently, the Court cannot examine the American Application divorced from its proper context, namely the whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States over the last 25 years. This dossier includes, *inter alia*, all the crimes perpetrated in Iran by the American Government, in particular the *coup d'état* of 1953 stirred up and carried out by the CIA, the overthrow of the lawful national government of Dr. Mossadegh, the restoration of the Shah and of his régime which was under the control of American interests, and all the social, economic, cultural and political consequences of the direct interventions in our internal affairs, as well as grave, flagrant and continuous violations of all international norms, committed by the United States in Iran."

36. The Court, however, in its Order of 15 December 1979, made it clear that the seizure of the United States Embassy and Consulates and the detention of internationally protected persons as hostages cannot be considered as something "secondary" or "marginal", having regard to the importance of the legal principles involved. It also referred to a statement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to Security Council resolution 457 (1979), as evidencing the importance attached by the international community as a whole to the

by members of diplomatic or consular missions.

84. The Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 contain express provisions to meet the case when members of an embassy staff, under the cover of diplomatic privileges and immunities, engage in such abuses of their functions as espionage or interference in the internal affairs of the receiving State. It is precisely with the possibility of such abuses in contemplation that Article 41, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and Article 55, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, provide

> "Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State."

Paragraph 3 of Article 41 of the 1961 Convention further states "The premises of the mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of the mission. . ."; an analogous provision, with respect to consular premises is to be found in Article 55, paragraph 2 of the 1963 Convention.

85. Thus, it is for the very purpose of providing a remedy for such possible abuses of diplomatic functions that Article 9 of the 1961 Convention on Diplomatic Relations stipulates:

> "1. The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain its decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or any member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is *persona non grata* or that any other member of the staff of the mission is not acceptable. In any such case, the sending State shall, as appropriate, either recall the person concerned or terminate his functions with the mission. A person may be declared *non grata* or not acceptable before arriving in the territory of the receiving State.
>
> 2. If the sending State refuses or fails within a reasonable period to carry out its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article, the receiving State may refuse to recognize the person concerned as a member of the mission."

The 1963 Convention contains, in Article 23, paragraphs 1 and 4, analogous provisions in respect of consular officers and consular staff. Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the 1961 Conventions, and paragraph 4 of Article 23 of the 1963 Convention, take account of the difficulty that may be experienced in practice of proving such abuses in every case or, indeed, of determining exactly when exercise of the diplomatic function, expressly recognized in Article 3 (1) (*d*) of the 1961 Convention, of "ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State" may be considered as involving such acts as "espionage" or "interference in internal affairs". The way in which Article 9, paragraph 1, takes account of any such difficulty is by providing expressly in its opening sentence that the receiving State may "at any time and without having to explain its decision" notify the sending State that any particular member of its diplomatic mission is "*persona non grata*" or "not acceptable" (and similarly Article 23, paragraph 4, of the 1963 Convention provides that "the receiving State is not obliged to give to the sending State reasons for its decision"). Beyond that remedy for dealing with abuses of the diplomatic function by individual members of a mission, a receiving State has in its hands a more radical remedy if abuses of their functions by members of a mission reach serious proportions. This is the power which every receiving State has, at its own discretion, to break off diplomatic relations with a sending State and to call for the immediate closure of the offending mission.

86. The rules of diplomatic law, in short, constitute a self-contained régime which, on the one hand, lays down the receiving State's obligations regarding the facilities, privileges and immunities to be accorded to diplomatic missions and, on the other, foresees their possible abuse by members of the mission and specifies the means at the disposal of the receiving State to counter any such abuse. These means are, by their nature, entirely efficacious, for unless the sending State recalls the member of the mission objected to forthwith, the prospect of the almost immediate loss of his privileges and immunities, because of the withdrawal by the receiving State of his recognition as a member of the mission, will in practice compel that person, in his own interest, to depart at once. But the principle of the inviolability of the persons of diplomatic agents and the premises of diplomatic missions is one of the very foundations of this long-established régime, to the evolution of which the traditions of Islam made a substantial contribution. The fundamental character of the principle of inviolability is, moreover, strongly underlined by the provisions of Articles 44 and 45 of the Convention of 1961 (cf. also Articles 26 and 27 of the Convention of 1963). Even in the case of armed conflict or in the case of a breach in diplomatic relations those provisions require that both the inviolability of the members of a diplomatic mission and of the premises, property and archives of the mission must be respected by the receiving State. Naturally, the observance of this principle does not mean – and this the Applicant Government expressly acknowledges – that a diplomatic agent caught in the act of committing an assault or other offence may not, on occasion, be briefly arrested by the police of the receiving State in order to prevent the commission of the particular crime. But such eventualities bear no relation at all to what occurred in the present case.

87. In the present case, the Iranian Government did not break off diplomatic relations with the United States; and in response to a question put to him by a Member of the Court, the United States Agent informed the Court that at no time before the events of 4 November 1979 had the Iranian Government declared, or indicated any intention to declare, any member of the United States diplomatic or consular staff in Tehran *persona non grata*. The Iranian Government did not, therefore, employ the remedies placed at its disposal by diplomatic law specifically for dealing with activities of the kind of which it now complains. Instead, it allowed a group of militants to attack and occupy the United States Embassy by force, and to seize the diplomatic and consular staff as hostages; instead, it has endorsed that action of those militants and has deliberately maintained their occupation of the Embassy and detention of its staff as a means of coercing the sending State. It has, at the same time, refused altogether to discuss this situation with representatives of the United States. The Court, therefore, can only conclude that Iran did not have recourse to the normal and efficacious means at its disposal, but resorted to coercive action against the United States Embassy and its staff.

88. In an address given on 5 November 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini traced the origin of the operation carried out by the Islamic militants on the previous day to the news of the arrival of the former Shah of Iran in the United States. That fact may no doubt have been the ultimate catalyst of the resentment felt in certain circles in Iran and among the Iranian population against the former Shah for his alleged misdeeds, and also against the United States Government which was being publicly accused of having restored him to the throne, of having supported him for many years and of planning to go on doing so. But whatever be the truth in

regard to those matters, they could hardly be considered as having provided a justification for the attack on the United States Embassy and its diplomatic mission. Whatever extenuation of the responsibility to be attached to the conduct of the Iranian authorities may be found in the offence felt by them because of the admission of the Shah to the United States, that feeling of offence could not affect the imperative character of the legal obligations incumbent upon the Iranian Government which is not altered by a state of diplomatic tension between the two countries. Still less could a mere refusal or failure on the part of the United States to extradite the Shah to Iran be considered to modify the obligations of the Iranian authorities, quite apart from any legal difficulties, in internal or international law, there might be in acceding to such a request for extradition.

89. Accordingly, the Court finds that no circumstances exist in the present case which are capable of negativing the fundamentally unlawful character of the conduct pursued by the Iranian State on 4 November 1979 and thereafter. This finding does not however exclude the possibility that some of the circumstances alleged, if duly established, may later be found to have some relevance in determining the consequences of the responsibility incurred by the Iranian State with respect to that conduct, although they could not be considered to alter its unlawful character.

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90. On the basis of the foregoing detailed examination of the merits of the case, the Court finds that Iran, by committing successive and continuing breaches of the obligations laid upon it by the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of 1955, and the applicable rules of general international law, has incurred responsibility towards the United States. As to the consequences of this finding, it clearly entails an obligation on the part of the Iranian State to make reparation for the injury thereby caused to the United States. Since however Iran's breaches of its obligations are still continuing, the form and amount of such reparation cannot be determined at the present date.

91. At the same time the Court finds itself obliged to stress the cumulative effect of Iran's breaches of its obligations when taken together. A marked escalation of these breaches can be seen to have occurred in the transition from the failure on the part of the Iranian authorities to oppose the armed attack by the militants on 4 November 1979 and their seizure of the Embassy premises and staff, to the almost immediate endorsement by those authorities of the situation thus created, and then to their maintaining deliberately for many months the occupation of the Embassy and detention of its staff by a group of armed militants acting on behalf of the State for the purpose of forcing the United States to bow to certain demands. Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as with the fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But what has above all to be emphasized is the extent and seriousness of the conflict between the conduct of the Iranian State and its obligations under the whole corpus of the international rules of which diplomatic and consular law is comprised, rules of fundamental character of which the Court must here again strongly affirm. In its Order of 15 December 1979, the Court made a point of stressing that the obligations laid on States by the two Vienna Conventions are of cardinal importance for the maintenance of good relations between States in the interdependent world of today. "There is no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of relations between States", the Court there said, "than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies, so that throughout history nations of all creeds and cultures have observed reciprocal obligations for that purpose". The institution of diplomacy, the Court continued, has proved to be "an instrument essential for effective cooperation in the international community, and for enabling States, irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems, to achieve mutual understanding and to resolve their differences by peaceful means" (*I.C.J. Reports 1979*, page 19).

92. It is a matter of deep regret that the situation which occasioned those observations has not been rectified since they were made. Having regard to their importance the Court considers it essential to reiterate them in the present Judgment. The frequency with which at the present time the principles of international law governing diplomatic and consular relations are set at naught by individuals or groups of individuals is already deplorable. But this case is unique and of very particular gravity because here it is not only private individuals or groups of individuals that have disregarded and set at naught the inviolability of a foreign embassy, but the government of the receiving State itself. Therefore in recalling yet again the extreme importance of the principles of law which it is called upon to apply in the present case, the Court considers it to be its duty to draw the attention of the entire international community, of which Iran itself has been a member since time immemorial, to the irreparable harm that may be caused by events of the kind now before the Court. Such events cannot fail to undermine the edifice of law carefully constructed by mankind over a period of centuries, the maintenance of which is vital for the security and well-being of the complex international community of the present day, to which it is more essential than ever that the rules developed to ensure the ordered progress of relations between its members should be constantly and scrupulously respected.

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93. Before drawing the appropriate conclusions from its findings on the merits in this case, the Court considers that it cannot let pass without comment the incursion into the territory of Iran made by United States military units on 24-25 April 1980, an account of which has been given earlier in this Judgment (paragraph 32). No doubt the United States Government may have had understandable preoccupations with respect to the well-being of its nationals held hostage in its Embassy for over five months. No doubt also the United States Government may have had understandable feelings of frustration at Iran's long-continued detention of the hostages, notwithstanding two resolutions of the Security Council as well as the Court's own Order of 15 December 1979 calling expressly for their immediate release. Nevertheless, in the circumstances of the present proceedings, the Court cannot fail to express its concern in regard to the United States' incursion into Iran. When, as previously recalled, this case had become ready for hearing on 19 February 1980, the United States Agent requested the Court, owing to the delicate stage of certain negotiations, to defer setting a

as bases for the Court's jurisdiction to deal with its claims, the Court finds that three, namely the optional protocols to the two Vienna conventions of 1961 and 1963 on, respectively, diplomatic and consular relations, and the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Between the United States and Iran, do in fact provide such foundations.

The Court, however, does not find it necessary in the present judgment to enter into the question whether article 13 of the fourth instrument so cited, namely the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents, provides a basis for the exercise of its jurisdiction with respect to the U.S. claims thereunder.

Merits—Attributability to the Iranian State of the Acts Complained of, and Violation by Iran of Certain Obligations. The Court has also, under article 53 of its statute, to satisfy itself that the claims of the applicant are well founded in law. To this end, it considers the acts complained of in order to determine how far, legally, they may be attributed to the Iranian state (as distinct from the occupiers of the Embassy) and whether they are compatible or incompatible with Iran's obligations under treaties in force or other applicable rules of international law.

The Events of 4 November 1979. The first phase of the events underlying the applicant's claims covers the armed attack on the U.S. Embassy carried out on 4 November 1979 by Muslim student followers of the Imam's policy (further referred to as "the militants" in the judgment), the overrunning of its premises, the seizure of its inmates as hostages, the appropriation of its property and archives, and the conduct of the Iranian authorities in the face of these occurrences.

The Court points out that the conduct of the militants on that occasion could be directly attributed to the Iranian state only if it were established that they were in fact acting on its behalf. The information before the Court did not suffice to establish this with due certainty. However, the Iranian state—which, as the state to which the misison was accredited, was under obligation to take appropriate steps to protect the U.S. Embassy—did nothing to prevent the attack, stop it before it reached its completion, or oblige the militants to withdraw from the premises and release the hostages. This inaction was in contrast with the conduct of the Iranian authorities on several similar occasions at the same period, when they had taken appropriate steps. It constituted, the Court finds, a clear and serious violation of Iran's obligations to the United States under articles 22 (2), 24, 25, 26, 27, and 29 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; of Articles 5 and 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; of article 11 (4) of the 1955 treaty. Further breaches of the 1963 convention have been involved in failure to protect the consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz.

The Court is therefore led to conclude that on 4 November 1979 the Iranian authorities were fully aware of their obligations under the conventions in force and also of the urgent need for action on their part, that they had the means at their disposal to perform their obligations, but that they completely failed to do so.

Events Since 4 November 1979. The second phase of the events underlying the U.S. claims comprises the whole series of facts which occurred following the occupation of the Embassy by the militants. Though it was the duty of the Iranian Government to take every appropriate step to end the infringement of the inviolability of the Embassy premises and staff and to offer reparation for the damage, it did nothing of the kind. Instead, expressions of approval were immediately heard from numerous Iranian authorities. Ayatoliah Khomeini himself proclaimed the Iranian state's endorsement of both the seizure of the premises and the detention of the hostages. He described the Embassy as a "center of espionage," declared that the hostages would (with some exceptions) remain "under arrest" until the United States had returned the former Shah and his property to Iran, and forbade all negotiations with the United States on the subject.

Once organs of the Iranian state had thus given approval to the acts complained of and decided to perpetuate them as a means of pressure on the United States, those acts were transformed into acts of the Iranian state: The militants became agents of that state, which itself became internationally responsible for their acts. During the 6 months which ensued, the situation underwent no material change; the Court's order of 15 December 1979 was publicly rejected by Iran, while the Ayatollah declared that the detention of the hostages would continue until the new Iranian Parliament had taken a decision as to their fate.

The Iranian authorities' decision to continue the subjection of the Embassy to occupation, and of its staff to detention as hostages, gave rise to repeated and multiple breaches of Iran's treaty obligations, additional to those already committed at the time of the seizure of the Embassy (1961 convention: articles 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 29; 1963 convention: *inter alia*, article 33; 1955 treaty, article 11 (4)).

With regard to the Chargé d' Affaires and the two other members of the U.S. mission who have been in the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 4 November 1979, the Court finds that the Iranian authorities have withheld from them the protection and facilities necessary to allow them to leave the Ministry in safety. Accordingly, it appears to the Court that in their respect there have been breaches of articles 26 and 29 of the 1961 Vienna convention.

Taking note, furthermore, that various Iranian authorities have threatened to have some of the hostages submitted to trial before a court, or to compel them to bear witness, the Court considers that, if put into effect, that intention would constitute a breach of article 31 of the same convention.

Possible Existence of Special Circumstances. The Court considers that it should examine the question whether the conduct of the Iranian Government might be justified by the existence of special circumstances, for the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs had alleged in his two letters to the Court that the United States had carried out criminal activities in Iran. The Court considers that, even if these alleged activities could be considered as proven, they would not constitute a defense to the U.S. claims, since diplomatic law provides the possibility of breaking off diplomatic relations or of declaring *persona non grata* members of diplomatic or consular missions who may be carrying on illicit activities. The Court concludes that the Government of Iran had recourse to coercion against the U.S. Embassy and its staff instead of making use of the normal means at its disposal.

International Responsibility. The Court finds that Iran, by committing successive and continuing breaches of the obligations laid upon it by the Vienna conventions of 1961 and 1963, the 1955 treaty, and the applicable rules of general international law, has incurred responsibility toward the United States.

As a consequence, there is an obligation on the part of the Iranian state to make reparation for the injury caused to the United States. Since, however, the breaches are still continuing, the form and amount of such reparation cannot yet be determined.

At the same time the Court considers it essential to reiterate the observations it made in its order of 15 December 1979 on the importance of the principles of international law governing diplomatic and consular relations. After stressing the particular gravity of the case, arising out of the fact that it is not any private individuals or groups that have set at naught the inviolability of an Embassy, but the very government of the state to which the mission is accredited, the Court draws the attention of the entire international community to the irreparable harm that may be caused by events of the kind before the Court. Such events cannot fail to undermine a carefully constructed edifice of law, the maintenance of which is vital for the security and well-being of the international community.

U.S. Operation in Iran of 24–25 April 1980. With regard to the operation undertaken in Iran by the U.S. military units on 24–25 April 1980, the Court says that it cannot fail to express its concern. It feels bound to observe that an operation undertaken in those circumstances, from whatever motive, is of a kind calculated to undermine respect for the judicial process in international relations. Nevertheless, the question of the legality of that operation can have no bearing on the evaluation of Iran's conduct on 4 November 1979. The findings reached by the Court are therefore not affected by that operation.

Operative Part of Judgment

The Court by 13 votes to 2, decides that the Islamic Republic of Iran, by the conduct which the Court has set out in this judgment, has violated in several respects, and is still violating, obligations owed by it to the United States of America under international conventions in force between the two countries, as well as under long-established rules of general international law;

By 13 votes to 2, decides that the violations of these obligations engage the responsibility of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the United States of America under international law;

Unanimously, decides that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran must immediately take all steps to redress the situation resulting from the events of 4 November 1979 and what followed from these events, and to that end:

- Must immediately terminate the unlawful detention of the U.S. Chargé d' Affaires and other diplomatic and consular staff and other U.S. nationals now held hostage in Iran, and must immediately release each and every one and entrust them to the protecting power (Article 45 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations);
- Must insure that all the said persons have the necessary means of leaving Iranian territory, including means of transport;
- Must immediately place in the hands of the protecting power the premises, property, archives, and documents of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and of its consulates in Iran;

Unanimously, decides that no member of the U.S. diplomatic or consular staff may be kept in Iran to be subjected to any form of judicial proceedings or to participate in them as a witness;

By 12 votes to 3, decides that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is under an obligation to make reparation to the Government of the United States of America for the injury caused to the latter by the events of 4 November 1979 and what followed from these events;

By 14 votes to 1, decides that the form and amount of such reparation, failing agreement between the parties, shall be settled by the Court, and reserves for this purpose the subsequent procedure in the case.

Summary of Opinions Appended to the Judgment

Judge Lachs. Judge Lachs indicated that he voted against the first part of operative paragraph 5, as he found it redundant. The responsibility having been established, the whole question of reparations should have been left to the subsequent procedure, including the question of form and amount as provided by the judgment.

The opinion stresses the importance of the judgment for diplomatic law, and the major part of it is devoted to the question of the practical solution by diplomatic means of the dispute between the parties. Once the legal issues have been clarified by the judgment, the parties should take speedy action and make maximum efforts to dispel tension and mistrust, and in this a third-party initiative may be important. Judge Lachs visualizes a particular role for the Secretary General of the United Nations in this respect and the work of a special commission or mediating body. In view of the gravity of the situation, the need for a resolution is urgent.

Judge Morozov. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Morozov indicates that operative paragraph 1 of the judgment is drafted in such a way that it is not

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DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, MAY 24, 1980

We are deeply gratified by the favorable decision of the International Court of Justice in our case against Iran. It is particularly striking that all 15 judges of the Court have agreed that Iran has plainly violated international law (including two specific treaties) in its seizure and detention of the hostages. The Court has therefore unanimously held that the hostages must be immediately released and allowed to leave Iran, that none of them may be subjected to any kind of trial, and that the Embassy must be immediately turned over to the Swiss Government, which now represents our interests in Iran.

The Court's judgment confirms that Iran's conduct with respect to the hostages and the Embassy is totally inadmissable in a civilized international order and cannot be excused or justified by past grievances, whether real or imagined. In its summary of its opinion the Court has said,

> . . . the Court draws the attention of the entire international community to the irreparable harm that may be caused by events of the kind before the Court. Such events cannot fail to undermine a carefully constructed edifice of law, the maintenance of which is vital for the security and well-being of the international community.

Under the U.N. Charter, Iran is bound to obey the Court's judgment, and the United States urges it to do so, in order that Iran will then be free to pursue its international interests as a law-abiding member of the international community, entitled to the respect and cooperation of other nations.

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*Made available to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston. ■

followed a two-pronged approach toward Latin America. It has shifted emphasis to strengthening its relations with nonrightist governments, attempting to push them leftward, while still maintaining ties to leftist revolutionaries in those countries with governments it considers to be reactionary. During the 1970s, Cuba's approach has been cautious, flexible, and sophisticated. The Cubans now demonstrate a capacity to tailor their activities to local political realities and to make allowances for national and regional differences. This approach has paid some dividends for Cuba in the Caribbean basin, where many states have entered a difficult period of economic and political transition.

In Nicaragua, the Cubans had long maintained ties with the Sandinista movement, but until the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) offensive of last year, they had generally limited their support to training, asylum, and money. During 1979, however, as the Sandinistas' prospects for success brightened, Cuba stepped up its support by clandestinely sending arms. Despite this support, the Sandinista movement was and is basically an indigenous movement with historical roots in Nicaragua. While Cuban support was important to the FSLN, it was but one element in the equation which produced Somoza's downfall.

Since the Sandinista victory, Cuba has moved quickly to assist the new Nicaraguan Government, building on existing ties to key Sandinista leaders. The total Cuban presence in Nicaragua is now at least 2,000 and includes:

- About 200 military and security advisers;
- At least 1,200 teachers, who began arriving in late October 1979; and
- Several hundred medical specialists, construction personnel, and advisers on agrarian reform, the media, labor, and cultural instruments.

In addition, some 600 Nicaraguan students are studying at a Cuban secondary school at the Isle of Pines.

In Grenada, the Cubans may well have had foreknowledge of the coup that brought Maurice Bishop and the New JEWEL Movement to power, but there is no evidence they engineered it. After the coup, however, the Cubans moved quickly to offer assistance, which the Bishop government has been all too eager to accept. Cuba has provided arms and sent military advisers—most of whom have since departed—to train the new Grenadian Army. It has also sent a few civilian technicians. Recently 250 Cuban construction workers began arriving to build a new airport, for which Cuba will provide much of the material. Havana may well have in mind making Grenada a showcase of Cuban-aided development in the region, but it is doubtful the Cubans have the wherewithal to succeed alone in this effort.

Elsewhere in the region, the Cubans probably see El Salvador as the most promising target for further revolutionary gains. They have counseled the Salvadoran leftists to seek unity before provoking a direct confrontation with the junta. It appears, however, that the leftists have not followed this advice. Cuba's principal contribution so far has been training and advice.

Cuba also maintains ties to leftists in Guatemala and Honduras but apparently believes the prospects for radical change there are less promising.

Cuba still has good relations with the two countries which until last year were its closest friends in the Caribbean basin—Jamaica and Guyana. Since 1975 Cuba has provided Jamaica with assistance in improving Kingston's water supply, constructing housing and schools, and modernizing agricultural and fisheries techniques. Cuba has sent doctors and other medical personnel to staff Jamaican hospitals and has trained several hundred Jamaican youths in Cuba to become construction workers. There are also reports that Cuba is providing training to some Jamaican security officials.

Cuban assistance to Guyana has been of a similar nature, although smaller in scale. However, Cuba's relations with the Burnham government are complicated by its desire to maintain influence with the major opposition to Burnham, Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party. In late 1979, Cuba and Guyana terminated their fisheries agreement, reportedly because the Guyanese believed Cuba had failed to live up to its end of the agreement.

In the eastern Caribbean, Cuba has balanced low-key encouragement of legitimate leftist groups with open cooperation with established governments. There is little doubt that the political climate offers opportunities Havana may be able to exploit to increase its influence at the expense of the United States. However, Cuba's official presence in the eastern Caribbean—excluding Grenada—is still limited to several Prensa Latina and Cubana airline representatives.

The Soviets have also increased their involvement in this hemisphere, expanding their trade, technical assistance, and diplomatic presence. The Soviets have been particularly interested in South America, although they have recently added Embassies in Nicaragua and Grenada. Both Jamaica and Nicaragua have expressed interest in receiving Soviet economic and technical assistance. So far the Soviets have provided little, although there is a possibility the recent Nicaraguan mission to Moscow may change this.

Soviet-Cuban Relationship

Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union has several facets. Havana depends on Moscow for about two-thirds of its total trade. Soviet economic support to Cuba exceeded $3 billion in 1979, a two-fold increase from 2 years ago. The bulk of this assistance consists of subsidies on sugar, petroleum, and nickel. As President Castro explained in an unusually candid speech to the National People's Assembly on December 27, 1979, the price paid by the Soviets for Cuban sugar is on a sliding scale. In 1979 they bought Cuban sugar at the equivalent of 44¢, as compared to the world market price of about 10¢.

Similarly, the Soviets sell Cuba petroleum at about half the market price. Since Cuba exports 3–4 million tons of sugar to the Soviet Union each year and receives nearly all its petroleum from the Soviets, these price differentials are crucial to the Cuban economy. The need to maintain this enormous subsidy, without which Cuba would be forced to reduce sharply its already austere standard of living, remains a constant concern to the Castro regime.

For the past several years, the Soviet Union has been helping upgrade the Cuban Armed Forces by delivering modern military equipment to Cuba. Unlike other Soviet military clients, Cuba pays nothing for this equipment. This armed forces modernization program strikes a tender nerve in the United States, even though most of the types of equipment Cuba has received so far were provided earlier to other Soviet clients. Given the experience of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, we monitor arms deliveries to Cuba closely to insure that they represent no threat to the United States.

Several developments have aroused particular interest. In 1978 the

Soviets delivered MiG-23s, more sophisticated aircraft than Cuba had previously received. Since certain versions of the MiG-23 are configured to carry nuclear weapons, we carefully studied the aircrafts' characteristics and raised the transfer directly with the Soviets before concluding that they did not constitute an offensive threat to the United States.

Similarly, we have been monitoring for some time the construction of a new naval facility at Cienfuegos consisting of deep-water piers and naval support-type buildings. We have no evidence the Soviets are involved in the construction or will be ultimately operating the facility. So far it has been used by the conventional, non-nuclear submarines delivered by the Soviets to Cuba. It would not be suprising, however, for Soviet naval vessels to make a port call at the new facility during future deployments to the Caribbean.

Another facet of the Soviet-Cuban relationship is the presence in Cuba of a Soviet combat brigade. The unit, which consists of 2,600–3,000 men, may have been in Cuba for some time, but we were unable to confirm its presence until last fall. Here again we were confronted with something which, while not a security threat to the United States, was a cause of serious concern.

More recently, the costs to Cuba of its dependence on the Soviet Union have come into sharper focus. Castro had hoped to use Cuba's 3-year term as president of the nonaligned movement to project himself as leader of the Third World. Havana spent lavishly in playing host to the September 1979 nonaligned summit. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan not only ended Cuba's bid for a seat on the U.N. Security Council but also has undermined Cuba's ability to exert influence within the nonaligned movement. Cuba was placed in such an uncomfortable position by the intervention that when Cuba's Ambassador to the United Nations finally spoke out on the subject, he was careful to couch his support for the Soviets not as a defense of the invasion but as an attack on the United States and "imperialism."

Economic Problems

Cuba's deepening economic problems have shown the Cuban people and the world that the Cuban economic model, which resembles some aspects of the Soviet model, offers few solutions to the problems of underdevelopment. The Soviet economic subsidy to Cuba exceeds U.S. assistance to all of Latin America, while Cuba's population is less than one-twentieth of Latin America's. Despite this huge subsidy, the Cuban standard of living, as mentioned before, is austere and deteriorating.

Massive infusions of Soviet aid have kept the economy afloat, but just barely. Sugarcane rust has hurt the 1979–80 sugar crop. The tobacco industry has been severely damaged by blue mold. Castro admitted in his December 27 speech that the Soviets delivered only 28% of the lumber they had agreed to supply to Cuba in 1979. This has brought construction to a standstill, exacerbating the already extremely tight housing situation. Virtually all basic consumer necessities are strictly rationed, and rations for some items were cut back in 1979. The thousands of Cubans who have crowded into the Peruvian Embassy in Havana in a desperate attempt to leave the island provide a graphic illustration of popular discontent with the dismal failure of the Cuban economy.

In light of Cuba's current economic difficulties, the Castro government will probably go to great lengths to maintain Soviet assistance at least at the present level. Beyond this, the Cubans are beginning to introduce material incentives in an attempt to increase labor productivity and are continuing to seek increased trade with the West. The Castro regime's prospects for earning hard currency to finance purchases from the West are extremely limited, however. This is one reason the Cubans continue to be interested in improving relations with the United States. They see a lifting of the trade embargo as one means of easing their economic squeeze. It also explains their interest in more tourism from the United States, even at the risk of increased domestic discontent arising from greater exposure to the West.

Still, Cuba has proven unwilling to sacrifice its aggressive foreign policy to improve relations with us. It wants better relations but apparently not at the cost of abandoning its position at the forefront of those seeking revolutionary change.

U.S.-Cuban Relations

Over the past 3 years, we have taken a number of steps to open constructive lines of communication between Cuba and the United States. We negotiated the opening of Interests Sections in Washington and Havana and have lifted the ban on U.S. travel to Cuba, granted visas to selected Cuban citizens to visit the United States, and permitted the resumption of charter flights between the two countries. We have also signed fishing rights and provisional maritime boundary agreements and held two rounds of Coast Guard talks in Havana and Washington.

The Cubans, for their part, have taken some encouraging steps, particularly in the human rights field. But this has not been matched by any change in Cuba's foreign policy. As a result, we have emphasized to the Cubans that there can be no sigificant progress toward normalization until we see convincing evidence of a Cuban turnaround in Africa, including troop reductions. At the same time, we have also taken steps to protect our security interests closer to home.

This does not mean that our policy of seeking to open constructive lines of communication was mistaken. On the contrary, we continue to believe that there is no possibility of resolving our differences unless we are at least willing to talk.

Our dialogue with Cuba has cost us little and has yielded some significant benefits. For example, the Cubans are cooperating with us in search-and-rescue operations and drug traffic interdiction in the heavily traveled waters between Cuba and Florida. We have had greater success in securing the release of American small craft and their crews that stray into Cuban waters. (Between November 1979 and March 1980, 46 American citizens inadvertently entered Cuban territory without authorization—32 were released fairly promptly after questioning; 14 were arrested.)

Our consular officers at the U.S. Interests Section are able to provide assistance to Americans in Cuban jails. This has become increasingly important, because there are now more than 40 Americans in Cuban jails. The Cuban Government has permitted all single-source Americans and dual nationals to depart Cuba with all members of their households, even those of Cuban citizenship. The Cubans have also released most American political prisoners. Indeed, one of the members of this subcommittee, Congressman Ben Gilman, contributed a great deal of time and effort toward securing the release

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

PRESIDENT'S TRIP

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and protectionism to defend ourselves from each other, and that, too, seems to have been satisfactorily overcome, or at least held in abeyance. And I remember also we talked on one occasion of our slow growth and the danger that might create cynicism and perhaps a measure of revolt amongst, particularly, of the young in our populations, and that, too, seems to have been averted for the time being.

And I think we must say that to the worries that might have existed as to the possibility for industrialized democracies to come to grips with these very intractable problems, that worry is somewhat in abeyance in the sense that we have managed, not to overcome all the crises, but we have managed to manage them in a certain sense. We have remained in a reasonable measure of control of our domestic economic environment.

There is one problem which was intractable and which for the time being remains so; that is the problem of North-South relations. And we did discuss that again at this summit. I suppose it's fair to say that that is one problem that is not, of course, wholly within our control, since we must seek a measure of agreement with those countries of the Third World. I believe there were new steps taken at this summit toward a solution of those problems. Some of us, certainly myself, indicated an interest, if invited, in participating in the Brandt minisummit.

We, as my colleagues have indicated, have called upon the oil-rich countries to help solve this problem with us, and we've called upon, also, the Soviet bloc to do something to bear a part of this burden, which it certainly is not doing now. But perhaps more important, we discussed among ourselves the fact that we hadn't really broken the back of this problem, and we were determined—you will see some words in the communique to that effect—to make sure that at next year's summit we would expend every effort to come to grips with that problem, hopefully with a beginning of success.

I would not wish to finish without making some reference to the political dimensions of our discussions, to which reference has indeed already been made. We mentioned the four communiques of a political nature, or semipolitical nature, of the refugees, hijacking, the taking of hostages, and above all, on Afghanistan.

I think it is important to underline that our summits are, first of all and above all, of an economic nature and should remain such. But we have had to become aware of this reality that the industrialized democracies, those represented at the summit, could not avoid realizing that in the political field, where there's been rather more disarray, rather less unity than in the economic field, and the political crises still seem to be somewhat more intractable, rather more insoluable than the economic crises or the economic challenges we've had to face. But there, too, a climate of moderate optimism is justified.

On Afghanistan, we made a declaration saying that as to the essentials we share the same view on the basis, the foundation of the problem, the main positions to be taken for the future. I think we shall also have to face these responsibilities. But as far as I'm concerned, I realize that we must do it marginally to the economic discussions, which are essential to the summit. We merely envisage the possibility of translating in the political domain this sort of political unity or this democratic approach which we've achieved in the economic field.

We could hope that this may pass over into the political field. This remains to be seen, and this no doubt remains to be seen at the Canadian summit next year, since we have agreed at this summit in Venice to meet next year in 1981 at the Canadian summit.

I must say, indeed I must warn my colleagues and those of you who will be there that we shall not be able to compete with the splendor of Venice and the hospitality of the Italian people, nor even the excellence of the masterly way in which our chairman has conducted the proceedings during the past 2 days. But I can tell you that you will all be welcome. And we think, all together, we shall be able to contribute further to the solutions of some of our serious problems.

Foreign Minister Okita

On behalf of the Government and people of Japan, I wish to take this opportunity to express our deep sense of gratitude and appreciation to the condolence expressed to the sudden demise of our late Prime Minister, Mr. Ohira, by the heads of government and state.

Prime Minister Ohira had a particularly high valuation of the role of the summit in these difficult times of the world, and he had great expectations upon his participation. I truly regret that and miss his presence, but Prime Minister Cossiga and heads of state and government have given very kind and courteous attention to us so that the Japanese delegation has been able to participate in this meeting very productively.

Yesterday, by the way, we had general elections in Japan. The results have come to be known to us by now. The party of which Prime Minister Ohira was representative enjoyed a landslide victory, increasing the number of seats of the Liberal Democratic Party from 258 to 284. I might take this opportunity to report that to you.

This summit in Venice I believe has accomplished a result that truly befits the first such summit in this decade of the eighties.

First, on the political question: Initially the summits were for economic discussions, but as other heads of government and state have commented, in these new, changing environments we have discussed political points, matters, particularly with regard to our position as regards Afghanistan. You all heard Prime Minister Cossiga yesterday in his press briefing.

The Government of Japan, since the outset of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan—the Government of Japan has persistently taken the view that Japan cannot tolerate such military intervention in that nation, and Japan shall continue to maintain this same attitude. I am gratified and find it very significant that among the heads of state and government in Venice, a common perception has been confirmed about this question.

As regards economic questions, Japan came to Venice looking forward to fruitful and substantive discussions on inflation and energy and the so-called North-South situation, including the question of recycling of oil money. We are satisfied that we have seen long-term strategic discussion. First, in next year's Canada summit, further discussions we look forward to take place on North-South relations. We strongly support this forthcoming agenda item.

On energy, our view is that among the seven nations here, on the supply side—in other words, not only on demand side, on the supply side—our efforts must be further redoubled. This is the question that affects the oil-market economies. We must demonstrate our resiliency and strength of market economies to the rest of the world. To that end, through investment, productivity must be increased, and through savings, inflation must be curtailed.

In other matters, that may involve political difficulties domestically, but for us industrialized nations to overcome the difficulty of paying such prices would be an essential condition for strengthening our democracies.

This summit meeting has dealt with such a long-term question fully and squarely, and we find it very significant that we have done so.

Next, on the matter of relations with the developing nations, our present summit has paid greater attention than before to that matter; in this, it has been very meaningful. At the present, because of the sharp rise of the prices of oil, many non-oil-producing developing nations have met difficul-

Summit Statements June 22, 1980*

Afghanistan

In seeking here in Venice to define a global economic strategy and to show our united determination to make it a reality, we are consciously accepting the responsibility that falls to the three great industrialized areas of the world—North America, Western Europe, and Japan—to help create the conditions for harmonious and sustained economic growth. But we cannot do this alone; others too have a part to play.

However, present circumstances oblige us to emphasize that our efforts will only bear fruit if we can at the same time preserve a world in which the rule of law is universally obeyed, national independence is respected, and world peace is kept. We call on all countries to join us in working for such a world and we welcome the readiness of nonaligned countries and regional groups to accept the responsibilities which this involves.

We, therefore, reaffirm hereby that the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan is unacceptable now and that we are determined not to accept it in the future. It is incompatible with the will of the Afghan people for national independence, as demonstrated by their courageous resistance, and with the security of the states of the region. It is also incompatible with the principles of the U.N. Charter and with efforts to maintain genuine detente. It undermines the very foundations of peace, both in the region and in the world at large.

We fully endorse in this respect the views already expressed by the overwhelming majority of the international community, as set out by the U.N. General Assembly in Resolution No. ES–6/2 of 14th January 1980 and by the Islamic conference at both its recent sessions.

Afghanistan should be enabled to regain the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and nonaligned character it once enjoyed. We, therefore, call for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops and for the Afghan people to be left free again to determine their own future.

We have taken note of today's announcement of the withdrawal of some Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In order to make a useful contribution to the solution of the Afghan crisis, this withdrawal, if confirmed, will have to be permanent and continue until the complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Only thus will it be possible to reestablish a situation compatible with peace and the rule of law and thereby with the interests of all nations.

We are resolved to do everything in our power to achieve this objective. We are also ready to support any initiative to this end, such as that of the Islamic conference. And we shall support every effort designed to contribute to the political independence and to the security of the states of the region.

Those governments represented at this meeting which have taken a position against attendance at the Olympic Games vigorously reaffirm their positions.

Taking of Diplomatic Hostages

Gravely concerned by recent incidents of terrorism involving the taking of hostages and attacks on diplomatic and consular premises and personnel, the heads of state and government reaffirm their determination to deter and combat such acts. They note the completion of work on the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages and call on all states to consider becoming parties to it as well as to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons of 1973.

The heads of state and government vigorously condemn the taking of hostages and the seizure of diplomatic and consular premises and personnel in contravention of the basic norms of international law and practice. The heads of state and government consider necessary that all governments should adopt policies which will contribute to the attainment of this goal and to take appropriate measures to deny terrorists any benefits from such criminal acts. They also resolve to provide to one another's diplomatic and consular missions support and assistance in situations involving the seizure of diplomatic and consular establishments or personnel.

The heads of state and government recall that every state has the duty under international law to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed toward the commission of such acts and deplore in the strongest terms any breach of this duty.

Refugees

The heads of state and government are deeply concerned at the plight of the ever-increasing number of refugees throughout the world. Hundreds of thousands have already left the Indochinese Peninsula and Cuba, many of them taking the risk of fleeing across the open seas. Pakistan and Iran have received almost 1 million refugees from Afghanistan. In Africa refugees number several millions.

The heads of state and government note with great regret that the refugee population continues to grow and that, despite major international relief efforts, their suffering continues. They pay tribute to the generosity and forebearance with which countries in the regions affected have received refugees. For their part, the countries represented at this summit have already responded substantially to appeals for assistance to and resettlement of refugees. They will continue to do so, but their resources are not unlimited. They appeal to others to join with them in helping to relieve this suffering.

But however great the effort of the international community, it will be difficult to sustain it indefinitely. The problem of refugees has to be attacked at its root.

The heads of state and government, therefore, make a vigorous appeal to the Governments responsible for it to remove the causes of this widespread human tragedy and not to pursue policies which drive large numbers of their people from their own countries.

Hijacking

The heads of state and government expressed their satisfaction at the broad support of the international community for the principles set out in the Bonn declaration of July 1978 as well as in the international conventions dealing with unlawful interference with civil aviation. The increasing adherence to these conventions and the responsible attitude taken by states with respect to air-hijacking reflect the fact that these principles are being accepted by the international community as a whole.

The heads of state and government emphasize that hijacking remains a threat to international civil aviation and that there can be no relaxation of efforts to combat this threat. To this end they look forward to continuing cooperation with all other governments.

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*Prime Minister Cossiga of Italy, chairman of the conference, issued these statements to the press on behalf of the conference participants. As printed here, they follow the text of the English translation made available by the White House; they were not issued as White House press releases.

der to uncertainty about where we stand and in what we believe; only if we forget that each nation and each individual share a responsibility to pull together and defend those common beliefs which unite us—and I am convinced that none of us will ever surrender nor forget.

Just as within each democracy we must work to nourish the spirit of community which alone can make the whole of a nation larger than the sum of its parts, so within the alliance of free nations it is equally true that unless we work together we shall surely be vulnerable separately.

I pledge America's own unswerving commitment to our common interest of security and peace, and we depend on our European friends and allies to join us in that effort. Together we can and will defend the values and interests of our society. Historical experience counsels such a course. Present circumstances compel it.

It is in this spirit of alliance and partnership that I ask you to join me in a toast. If you would please rise. To President Pertini, to the traditions of two great nations that are at once parallel and intertwined, and to the unbreakable spirit of freedom, friendship, and the love of human life that will forever join our countries and our people.

JOINT PRESS STATEMENT, JUNE 20, 1980

At the invitation of the President of the Italian Republic Sandro Pertini, the President of the United States of America, Jimmy Carter, paid a state visit to Rome June 19–21. The visit provided an opportunity for the two Presidents to have a productive exchange of views. Constructive meetings were also held between President Carter and the President of the Council of Ministers, Francesco Cossiga. The meetings were also attended by Minister of Foreign Affairs Emilio Colombo and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie.

The two sides noted with satisfaction the extremely close relations between the United States and Italy which are based on longstanding ties of friendship and kinship, a common commitment to democratic values, and on ties which derive from the membership of the two countries in the Atlantic alliance. In the course of the discussions, an exchange of views was held on key international issues of particular concern to both governments; these included the crisis in Afghanistan, the Middle East situation, the grave problem of the illegal detention of the hostages in Iran, and U.S.-Italian cooperation for the promotion of security and peace. President Carter expressed appreciation for the constructive role played by Prime Minister Cossiga, in his capacity as President of the European Community for the current term.

The international situation created by the Soviet Union's armed intervention and continuing occupation of Afghanistan was examined in depth. It was agreed that this Soviet action, taken in flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter, constitutes a threat to peace, poses a grave challenge to the West and to its interests in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf, and that it has created a serious obstacle to the continuation of the process of detente.

As a result of this assessment, both sides view as indispensable a comprehensive Western political strategy designed to make clear to the Soviet Union by the application of tangible measures the necessity of a prompt and complete withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan.

In line with that view, the two sides welcomed the concerted steps which NATO is now pursuing in order to strengthen the common defense in response to the strategic challenge faced by all the Western allies. The two governments confirmed their commitment to the earliest possible fulfillment of the goals embodied in NATO's Long-Term Defense Program. Both sides recognized that increased European attention to security requirements within the NATO treaty area assumes even greater urgency because of U.S. commitment of resources toward building a security framework in the region of Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf.

President Carter and Prime Minister Cossiga expressed their satisfaction with the NATO decision to pursue the complementary objectives of arms control and the deployment of theater nuclear forces. President Carter reiterated his admiration for Prime Minister Cossiga's leadership in this effort. Prime Minister Cossiga reaffirmed Italy's active support to implement the NATO offer of December 12, 1979, inviting the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on the limitation of long-range theater nuclear weapons systems.

President Carter expressed his own appreciation and that of the entire American people for Italy's support of the international effort to secure the release of the American hostages held by Iran in violation of international law and universally accepted standards of decency. It was stressed that the principle of the rule of law, vital to the health and stability of the world community, is at stake in this crisis. The conviction was also expressed that the release of the hostages constitutes a precondition for reestablishing the international prestige of Iran and for the resumption of mutually beneficial relations with its government, including the revocation of economic sanctions.

Turning to other questions of common interest, President Carter reiterated the U.S. commitment for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, including the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. He reaffirmed his belief that the Camp David accords continue to provide the soundest framework for building on the significant progress which has already been achieved toward ending the decades of bitterness and conflict in the Middle East.

President Cossiga expressed Italy's full agreement with the objective of a comprehensive and durable peace with justice for all, for Israel as well as for the Arab countries and for the Palestinian people. This objective is shared by the United States. It is also endorsed by the countries of the European Community and was reconfirmed in the June 13 declaration of the European Council in Venice.

In the context of the efforts designed to achieve this objective he expressed the hope that significant progress could be made in the implementation of all aspects of the agreement reached at Camp David, thanks to the personal and courageous commitment of President Carter.

Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to work toward detente, based on principles of reciprocity and mutual restraint. They agreed that detente can be achieved only on condition that its comprehensive and indivisible character is acknowledged as indispensable.

An exchange of views on the agenda of the Venice summit to be held June 22–23 followed. President Carter expressed his appreciation for the extensive preparations which Italy, as host, has made on behalf of the seven industrialized democracies which will participate in the summit

The two sides agreed on the need for closer consultations among the industrialized democracies to formulate a comprehensive strategy based on

mutual security to meet the challenges of the 1980s, the crises, the instability and conflicts in the world frequently caused by poverty, underdevelopment, and injustice.

To further the close bilateral relations between Italy and the United States it was agreed to intensify mutually advantageous cooperation in a variety of fields. The two governments announced their decision to cooperate in the design of the world's largest installation for the direct conversion of sunlight into electricity; a one megawatt photovoltaic plant to be located in Puglia. They agreed to carry forward other projects for research and information exchange in the solar field and in coal technologies, geothermal energy, nuclear safety, and energy conservation.

In the social sector, it was agreed to continue cooperation to combat unemployment, particularly among the young. Satisfaction was also expressed for the positive impact of the Social Security Agreement. The two governments will continue to cooperate on both a bilateral and multilateral basis for the suppression of international narcotics traffic, together with the prevention and treatment of drug abuse.

Expanding knowledge of the languages of the two countries was considered. Having noted with satisfaction the results of the memorandum of agreement signed in Rome on May 4, 1978, both sides agreed to work together to produce television programs for the teaching of their respective languages. The Italian Government announced its intention to increase its financial contribution to the Fulbright program to match the U.S. contribution in the next years.

The decision recently announced by the Cini Foundation in Venice and by the Guggenheim Foundation in New York to collaborate on the establishment of a major cultural center in Venice was cited with satisfaction as a concrete and valid example of the contribution which the private sector offers to the development of bilateral relations between the United States and Italy.

[1]Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 30, 1980, which also includes the President's remarks to U.S. Embassy employees and members of the American community in Rome on June 21.

[2]Made in the Salon delle Feste at the Quirinale Palace. President Pertini spoke in Italian, and the translation of his remarks follows the White House press release. ■

Meeting With His Holiness, Pope John Paul II

While in Rome President Carter paid a courtesy call on His Holiness, Pope John Paul II, at the Vatican on June 21, 1980. Following is an exchange of remarks they made on that occasion.[1]

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS, JUNE 21, 1980[2]

President Carter

Your Holiness, as happy as I was to welcome you as the first Pope to visit in the White House, I'm equally happy today to be welcomed by you to your ancient and holy city.

Like millions before me, I'm moved by the beautiful works of Michelangelo, of Raphael, or Bernini, and many other great artists. They've left us proof that when our energies are expended away from destruction and toward creation, that we are able to do the work of the divine in the service of mankind. Today, as perhaps never before, heads of nations and leaders of religious faith as well stand in need of a shared commitment to serve humanity.

In the midst of a trip which I'm presently taking, whose objective is to promote peace and cooperation and common purpose with the close partners of my country, it has been a privilege today to meet with a man passionately dedicated to these same ideals.

I'm gratified that we share a belief that the struggle to enhance the dignity and decency of individual human lives gives meaning to history; that through our actions our beliefs are given life; that the role of a state is not to crush, but to free the spirit of its people; and that it is the duty of leaders to join together with all who would walk in the ways of peace.

Our common pilgrimage is more urgent than ever before. The world's

The President with His Holiness, Pope John Paul II, in the Clementine Room at the Vatican.

(White House photo by Mary Anne Fackelman)

limited to the question of the violation of the Vienna conventions of 1961 and 1963, but also covers, if read with some paragraphs of the reasoning, the question of alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights Between Iran and the United States; this treaty, he believes, does not provide the parties with an unconditional right to invoke the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and in the circumstances, the Court has in fact no competence to consider the alleged violations.

Furthermore, Judge Morozov observes, the United States committed during the period of the judicial deliberations, many unlawful actions, culminating in the military invasion of the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and has, therefore, lost the legal right to refer to the treaty in its relations with Iran.

Judge Morozov voted against operative paragraphs 2, 5, and 6 because he had noted that a series of actions was undertaken by the United States of America against Iran in the course of the judicial deliberations, in particular, the freezing by the United States of very considerable Iranian assets, combined with the intention, clearly expressed in a statement made by the President of the United States on 7 April 1980, to make use of these assets, if need be, in accordance with decisions that would be taken in the domestic framework of the United States; that meant that the United States was acting as a "judge" in its own cause.

In Judge Morozov's view, the situation, created by actions of the United States, in which the Court carried on its judicial deliberations in the case had no precedent in the whole history of the administration of international justice either before the Court or before any other international judicial institution. The United States, having caused severe damage to Iran, had lost the legal as well as the moral right to reparations from Iran, as mentioned in operative paragraphs 2, 5, and 6.

Judge Morozov also finds that some paragraphs of the reasoning part of the judgment describe the circumstances of the case in an incorrect or one-sided way. He considers that, without any prejudice to the exclusive competence of the Security Council, the Court, from a purely legal point of view, could have drawn attention to the undeniable fact that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, establishing the right of self-defense to which the United States of America referred in connection with the events of 24-25 April, may be invoked only "if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations," and that there is no evidence of any armed attack having occurred against the United States.

Judge Morozov also stresses that some indication should have been included in the judgment to the effect that the Court considered that settlement of the dispute between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran should be reached exclusively by peaceful means.

Judge Tarazi. Judge Tarazi voted in favor of operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the judgment, because he considered that the seizure of the Embassy, and the detention as hostages of those present in it, constituted an act in breach of the provisions of the 1961 and 1963 Vienna conventions on diplomatic and consular relations.

On the other hand Judge Tarazi felt impelled to vote against operative paragraph 1, because he considered that only the 1961 and 1963 Vienna conventions conferred jurisdiction on the Court in the present case.

He also voted against paragraphs 2 and 5, because, in his view, the Court, at the present stage of the proceedings and considering the concomitant circumstances, could not make any ruling as to the responsibility of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

On the other hand, Judge Tarazi voted in favor of paragraph 6, because he considered that, in the event of any reparations being owed, they should be determined and assessed by the International Court of Justice; it was not admissible for them to be the subject of proceedings in courts of domestic jurisdiction.

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[1] *President* Sir Humphrey Waldock; *Vice-President* Elias; *Judges* Forster, Gros, Lachs, Nagendra Singh, Ruda, Mosler, Oda, Ago, El-Erian, Sette-Camara and Baxter.

[2] *Judges* Morozov and Tarazi.

[3] *President* Sir Humphrey Waldock; *Vice-President* Elias; *Judges* Forster, Gros, Nagendra Singh, Ruda, Mosler, Oda, Ago, El-Erian, Sette-Camara and Baxter.

[4] *Judges* Lachs, Morozov and Tarazi.

[5] *President* Sir Humphrey Waldock; *Vice-President* Elias; *Judges* Forster, Gros, Lachs, Nagendra Singh, Ruda, Mosler, Tarazi, Oda, Ago, El-Erian, Sette-Camara and Baxter.

[6] *Judge* Morozov.

[7] Ahmed Rechid, "L'Islam et le droit des gens", 60 *Recueil des Cours ADI*, 1937–II, pp. 421 f.

[8] Fereydoun Hoveyda (trans. Roger Liddell), *The Fall of the Shah*, London 1979, pp. 92 f.

[9] H. Kissinger, *The White House Years*, London 1979, p. 1262.

[10] H., L. and J., Mazeaud, *Traite theorique et pratique de la responsabilite civile delictuelle et contractuelle*, Tome II, 6th ed., Paris 1970, p. 552.

[11] Counseil d'Etat, 30 March 1916, *Recueil Sirey*, 1916, Part III, p. 17 ff

[12] Maurice Hauriou, note to Judgment in question *(ibid)*. ■

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U.S. Measures to Isolate Iran

by Peter Constable

Statement before the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 8, 1980. Mr. Constable is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.[1]

I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you the measures we have taken under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Let me begin by setting the crisis—and our efforts to resolve it—in perspective.

As you know, on November 4, 1979, a mob overran our Embassy compound in Tehran. Militant students occupied the Embassy and announced that our personnel would be held until we returned the Shah to Iran. We had early assurances from officials of Prime Minister Bazargan's government that the hostages would be released. But Ayatollah Khomeini and prominent clerical leaders announced shortly thereafter their support for the student militants. Our Charge in Tehran, Bruce Laingen, who was at the Foreign Ministry when the takeover occurred, was not permitted to discuss the release of our people with Prime Minister Bazargan. Then, on November 6, Bazargan himself resigned—apparently in protest against the militants' actions.

A presidential mission headed by former Attorney General Ramsey Clark was sent to Iran, but before the delegation could reach Tehran, Ayatollah Khomeini forbade any Iranian contact with it. Then the newly appointed "overseer" at the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Abdol Bani-Sadr, announced on November 12 that before the hostages could be released the United States would have to:

- Admit that the property and the fortune of the Shah were stolen;
- Promise to refrain from further intervention in Iranian affairs; and
- Extradite the Shah to Iran for trial.

Four early developments in the crisis—Khomeini's support for the terrorism of the militant students, the collapse of the relatively moderate Bazargan government, the unacceptable conditions announced by Bani-Sadr, and Khomeini's orders against any Iranian contact with the U.S. Government—provided convincing evidence that the Iranian authorities had, in effect, assumed responsibility for the seizure of the Embassy and the hostages and were unwilling or unable to bring about their immediate release.

In view of these conclusions the President undertook a series of actions to demonstrate that the Iranian actions were unacceptable and that we were determined to press Iran for the early release of the hostages. A number of these steps involved diplomatic initiatives worldwide through bilateral contacts with other governments and multilaterally in the United Nations. The President also ordered a series of unilateral economic actions which are detailed below.

On November 12 the President directed a ban on U.S. purchases of Iranian oil under provisions of the Trade Expansion Act. He did so to make clear that our energy needs would not influence our response to the hostage crisis and that the United States would not be blackmailed on the basis of our oil import requirements. The United States then learned that Iran was about to order all Iranian funds moved out of the United States. This jeopardized billions of dollars in potential U.S. claims—both public and private—against those assets and threatened disruption of the international financial system.

The President moved quickly to respond to Iran's violation of international law and to protect the interests of U.S. citizens by preventing the movement of the Iranian funds. In order to do so, the President invoked the provisions of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. His decision reflected a finding that the situation in Iran then—as now—constitutes "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States." The act permits the President under certain circumstances to:

> . . . investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.

By Executive order 12170 of November 14, 1979, which declared a national emergency with respect to Iran, the President ordered the blocking of Iranian Government assets, and delegated the power to implement the order to the Secretary of the Treasury. This order blocked in excess of $8 billion in this country and abroad.

These presidential actions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act—and others that followed—have been implemented by the Department of the Treasury through the adoption and amendment of Iranian assets control regulations. Treasury adopted the initial Iranian assets control regulations on November 14, 1979, to implement Executive order 12170 by blocking Iranian assets, and it has amended those regulations from time to time since then.

We will continue to hold the Iranian authorities fully responsible for the safety and well-being of our people. If our people have indeed been dispersed from the Embassy compound, the responsibility the Iranian authorities have assumed for their safety becomes all the more important.

Our intent was to impress on the Iranians that by continuing to hold the hostages they risked increasing international pressure and increasing direct costs to Iran. At the same time, we continued to pursue every peaceful means available to us to bring this ordeal to an honorable conclusion. Through our efforts in the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, and elsewhere, we aimed at underscoring the growing isolation Iran faces in the international community by its continued gross violation of international law and conduct between civilized nations.

As you will recall, the U.N. Security Council on December 4 called unanimously for the release of the hostages, and on January 13 ten members approved economic sanctions against Iran in a resolution which was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The International Court of Justice

of four American political prisoners last fall.

The Cuban Government has taken other unilateral steps which probably would have been impossible before we opened lines of communication to Cuba. In late 1979, President Castro announced that he would release almost all Cuban political prisoners and allow them to leave the island with their families. So far about 3,900 political prisoners have been released. And for the first time since the early 1960s, the Castro government now allows Cuban-Americans to return to the island for family visits. Tens of thousands of Americans of Cuban extraction have benefited from these steps.

Meeting the Challenge

The past 2 years have shown that the Cubans and the Soviets remain ready to exploit targets of opportunity in this hemisphere. They see any erosion of U.S. influence as a net gain for themselves. So far, however, they have avoided taking too many risks, probably out of fear of provoking a strong U.S. reaction. The Soviets have traditionally focused their attention on South America. The Cubans, however, see the Caribbean basin as an area ripe with opportunities for extending their influence. They are becoming more active in the region now that their African involvement has leveled off.

Cuba's success in exploiting any emerging opportunities will depend in large measure on our response and that of others in the hemisphere. Our most effective response to Cuba's attempts to extend its influence in the Caribbean basin would be to increase our own efforts of assistance. Most countries in the region badly need economic and technical assistance of one form or another. We have the capability to meet at least some of their needs. Cuba, by contrast, has very little to give. It is worthwhile to keep in mind that even those states which are friendliest to Cuba—Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Guyana—have carefully kept the door open to the West. They may admire certain aspects of the Cuban model but pragmatism and nationalism dictate against replicating it.

Our policies are designed to address critical short-range economic problems in the region. We are encouraging greater cooperation and interdependence among the island-states of the Caribbean. In Central America, we recognize that change is inevitable where traditional patterns are, in many respects, both unjust and unsuitable. We are adapting our policies and using our many links to these societies to help the processes of change already underway take less violent and more democratic forms than they would otherwise.

In addition, we have made clear to all parties that we take our security interests in the Caribbean basin most seriously. The President has already announced concrete steps in this regard, including increased surveillance of Cuba, expanded military maneuvers in the region, and the establishment of a full-time Caribbean joint task force headquarters at Key West.

Cuba has shown it can move quickly to take advantage of targets of opportunity. Nevertheless, the United States has the resources and the determination to meet the challenge. The poignant picture of thousands of Cubans jammed shoulder-to-shoulder inside the Peruvian Embassy in a desperate attempt to flee their homeland is a vivid reminder that the future does not belong to Castro's Cuba.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Exodus From Cuba

Foreign Relations Outline[1]

Since 1959 over 800,000 Cubans have fled to the United States. The current massive defection from Cuba is rooted in several years of deepening economic and political frustration. Severe problems in sugar and tobacco production—Cuba's two major agricultural industries—have contributed to the difficulties of providing adequate economic and educational opportunities for a young and rapidly growing labor force. The result is a rising tide of restlessness and disaffection, particularly among those Cubans with relatives in the United States.

Recent Developments

Since 1979 many Cubans have sought political asylum at the Peruvian and Venezuelan Embassies in Havana; some have used trucks or buses to crash into the Embassy grounds. On April 4, 1980, Cuban guards posted outside the Peruvian Embassy were withdrawn in reaction to the death of a Cuban guard shot during an attempt by Cubans to crash into the Embassy compound. The Cuban Government then announced that all those who wished to seek Peruvian visas would be free to leave Cuba.

Within days over 10,000 people were camped within the Peruvian Embassy compound and surrounding lots. On April 14 President Carter signed an authorization to admit up to 3,500 Cuban refugees from the Peruvian Embassy. Our policy was based on the fact that we would be cooperating in an international effort with adequate opportunity for prescreening to insure compliance with U.S. immigration laws.

From April 14 to April 18, flights from Havana to Costa Rica carried some 1,000 refugees, about half of whom subsequently were taken to Peru. On April 18, Castro suspended the airlift, declaring that henceforth only refugee flights to countries of final destination would be permitted. Costa Rica offered to accept all the remaining refugees in the Peruvian Embassy compound, after receiving U.S. Government assurance that we would continue to use our best efforts to secure additional resettlement offers from other countries. The Castro regime then announced, on April 20, that all Cubans wishing to emigrate to the United States were free to board boats at the port of Mariel, 20 miles from Havana.

Boat Exodus

Within 24 hours of Castro's announcement, flotillas of small boats moved from the United States to pick up relatives of Cuban-Americans as well as others at Mariel. From the start, it was evident that the Cuban authorities were following a deliberate policy of forcing acceptance of several nonrelatives as well as relatives on each boat. These nonrelatives included persons released from a variety of institutions, many with criminal records, and individuals claiming to have taken refuge in the Peruvian Embassy. The number of U.S. arrivals climbed steadily to more than 80,000 by the end of May.

Federal Actions

The U.S. Coast Guard was quickly deployed to provide search and rescue, surveillance missions, and safety inspection and has since been involved in

over 600 search-and-rescue operations.

On April 27 the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) established a coordinating team in Miami to deal with the crisis. Processing centers were established with capacity for 10,000 Cubans at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; for 20,000 persons at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; for 20,000 at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; and for 15,000 at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.

President Carter declared a state of emergency for south Florida on May 6 and approved the use of $10 million in refugee emergency funds to reimburse voluntary organizations for their overhead expenses at the processing centers and for costs of transporting the Cuban exiles from the centers to their final destinations.

Processing Procedures

Undocumented Cubans arriving at Key West are given preliminary screening by an interagency group, representing the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the FBI, and other agencies, in accordance with requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act. If information is obtained indicating that a person was convicted of a serious nonpolitical crime or may be a threat to the community, he is detained pending a more thorough investigation.

After initial screening, persons with relatives in the Miami area are transferred to Miami for final processing and placement. Others are transferred to one of the other processing centers for additional processing and placement. Those with relatives or sponsors are then released on their own recognizance until inspection is completed by the INS and their claims for asylum are reviewed by the Departments of State and Justice. During this period they are authorized to work but have only limited access to Federal benefits, mainly food stamps.

All arrivals are medically screened as required by law under the general direction of the Public Health Service. Those found to have a medical condition requiring treatment are provided that treatment. If needed, hospitalization is arranged.

The Future

The United States will continue to welcome Cubans seeking freedom, in accordance with our laws. However, law enforcement agencies will take steps as necessary to discourage the unlawful and dangerous boat traffic to Cuba.

We have made clear to the Cuban Government our desire to negotiate a legal and orderly process for those wishing to leave Cuba. Under such a process, all people would have to be screened before departure from Cuba. Priority for acceptance to the United States will be given to close relatives of U.S. permanent residents, political prisoners, and persons who sought freedom in the Peruvian Embassy or in our Interests Section.

On May 15 a family registration office was established to receive the names of close Cuban relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent residents. We are prepared to start an immediate airlift or sealift as soon as President Castro accepts this offer. We have called for other governments to honor their previous pledges to resettle Cuban refugees and to take into account the larger international problem that has now developed.

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[1] Taken from a Department of State publication in the GIST series, released May 1980. This outline is designed to be a quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy statement. ■

El Salvador

***Foreign Relations Outline*[1]**

Background

For decades, El Salvador's people suffered under the dictatorship of a tiny oligarchy that monopolized land, credit, and trade. On October 15, 1979, a watershed date in Salvadoran history, young military officers broke with the old repressive order and joined with moderate civilian leaders to undertake a peaceful and democratic revolution. The young officers and their new revolutionary junta of government immediately amnestied political prisoners and committed themselves to a platform of far-reaching social and economic reforms, respect for human rights, and democratic elections.

Reform Program

Since January 1980, when the Christian Democratic Party joined the government, the revolutionary junta has begun implementing a series of structural reforms.

- An agrarian reform decree issued March 6 authorizes expropriation of some 2 million acres of El Salvador's best farmland. The reform initially affects estates larger than 1,250 acres but in time is to extend to all holdings of prime land over 250 acres and of secondary land over 375 acres. These properties will be given to landless peasants as small private farms or larger cooperatives. The government estimates that two-thirds of the rural population will benefit. Compensation will be primarily in interest-bearing government bonds and will include up to 25% in cash for smaller holdings.
- Financial reforms announced March 7 give the government 51% of the stock of local banks and savings and loan institutions and require that remaining shares be sold within 1 year to bank employees and to the public, with no individual or family allowed to hold more than 1% of the total. These reforms end the monopoly power of the oligarchy and facilitate the allocation of credit to the new producers created by the agrarian reform.

Obstacles to Reform

Implementation of the reforms has gone remarkably well. Nevertheless, serious problems remain.

- The agrarian reform and other structural changes are technically complex and would be difficult to implement even under ideal circumstances. The suspicions and hatreds engendered by years of repression and violence add greatly to the difficulties.
- Extremists at both left and right are attempting to bring down the government. Rightist groups opposed to all reforms are engaging in indiscriminate assassinations and hope to instigate a reactionary coutercoup. Leftist *cadres* see power slipping from their grasp and are provoking confrontations in hopes of stimulating a violent revolution.
- To proceed with the reforms in the face of these special interests, the government has been forced to institute a limited state of siege, suspending

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Honor guard at the Quirinale Palace, Rome.
(White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)

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Secretary of State

WILLIAM J. DYESS
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor

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ties, and we must, of course, step up our cooperation with these nations.

In our relationship with the developing nations, we need long-term basic strategy; that is, we in the West need it. For Japan, we have, for some time, been emphasizing increased food production and building of better human resources for improving human skills and also development of energy resources in developing nations. On these matters, too, I'm glad we have had good discussions in the present summit.

For some time to come, in all of our respective nations, we will, I expect, continue to have difficult domestic economic situations, particularly on unemployment and recession respects. Nevertheless, we must resist any protectionistic pressure resolutely and squarely. And on that, too, we have seen convergence of opinion and consensus. Not only for this present generation but for our future generations, we must prove that our free democratic economies are, indeed, viable and strong. We must make every effort to demonstrate that, I believe.

Finally, may I say that we are very favorably impressed by this city of Venice. We regret our stay has been too short—only for 2 days—and too full of meetings, leaving us very little time to enjoy the beautiful sights of Venice. We think we have to come back in a more leisurely way if possible. I personally hope to bring my wife to Venice.

To the government of Italy and the municipal authorities of Venice and to all the citizens of Venice and to the entire population, friendly people of Italy, and to the host government which has been most courteous, warm, and considerate for successful management of the meeting, and to the most smooth chairmanship of Prime Minister Cossiga, I would like to express our deep appreciation.

Finally, for the end of my statement, I would like to say that at the beginning of yesterday's session, I mentioned that our seven nations are fellow passengers in the same gondola, we are riding in the same gondola. And this is the feeling that I have, once again, most strongly as I leave here.

President Jenkins

The central message of this summit meeting, in my view, has been that the stability of the world economy depends on all countries recognizing their mutual needs and accepting their mutual responsibilities.

The problem faced by the seven major industrial countries and the European Community, as such, cannot be separated from those of the world as a whole. For this reason, I greatly welcome the way in which at this summit we looked beyond the frontiers of the industrial countries and our own difficulties to the problems which concern the greater part of mankind.

No outside industrial country is so closely linked to the developing world as is the European Community. Our interest is closely joined to theirs. The disequilibrium between rich and poor is tolerable to neither; both are deeply vulnerable. The devastating impact of oil price rises on developing countries without oil of their own causes deficits which could not only deepen and prolong the existing recession but could touch the very vitals of our economic and monetary system.

On trade, the Tokyo Round has been a battle won, but not the war. We still face a protectionist threat which could cause major and lasting damage to the trading system on which our jobs and our standard of living depend.

Here at Venice we have looked realistically at these problems. We tried to see our way forward into the somber decade of the 1980s. We isolated some of the policies which should guide us and looked, as has been rightly said by Prime Minister Trudeau, with cautious optimism at the major changes which will be necessary. Above all, we recognized the common dangers and the common interests which should bind the world together.

Mr. President of the Council, I thank you for your outstanding chairmanship, and I thank the Italian Government and the people of Venice for their unforgettable hospitality.

Energy Consumption Trends

Energy consumption (thousand b/d oil equivalent)	1970–73	1974–75	1976	1977	1978	1979
United States	34,291	34,970	36,323	37,240	38,098	38,034
Japan	6,340	7,029	7,080	7,205	7,300	7,754
West Germany	5,028	5,092	5,329	5,295	5,533	5,860
France	3,363	3,550	3,645	3,677	3,690	3,790
United Kingdom	4,417	4,211	4,200	4,286	4,334	4,500
Italy	2,601	2,728	2,840	2,875	2,858	NA
Canada	3,496	3,867	3,930	4,067	4,196	4,315
Energy consumption per capita (gallons per year oil equivalent)						
United States	2,530	2,520	2,588	2,633	2,674	2,647
Japan	913	972	962	970	974	1,025
West Germany	1,255	1,260	1,328	1,322	1,383	1,468
France	1,002	1,034	1,056	1,062	1,062	1,086
United Kingdom	1,216	1,155	1,152	1,176	1,189	1,236
Italy	735	752	775	781	773	NA
Canada	2,469	2,627	2,619	2,678	2,737	2,789

NA—not available.

DECLARATION, JUNE 23, 1980

I. Introduction

1. In this, our first meeting of the 1980's the economic issues that have dominated our thoughts are the price and supply of energy and the implications for inflation and the level of economic activity in our own countries and for the world as a whole. Unless we can deal with the problems of energy, we cannot cope with other problems.

2. Successive large increases in the price of oil, bearing no relation to market conditions and culminating in the recent decisions by some members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) at Algiers, have produced the reality of even higher inflation and the imminent threat of severe recession and unemployment in the industrialised countries. At the same time they have undermined and in some cases virtually destroyed the prospects for growth in the developing countries. We believe that these consequences are increasingly coming to be appreciated by some of the oil exporting countries. The fact is that the industrialised countries of the free world, the oil producing countries, and the non-oil developing countries depend upon each other for the realisation of their potential for economic development and prosperity. Each can overcome the obstacles to that

development, but only if all work together, and with the interests of all in mind.

3. In this spirit we have discussed the main problems that confront us in the coming decade. We are confident in the ability of our democratic societies, based on individual freedom and social solidarity, to meet these challenges. There are no quick or easy solutions; sustained efforts are needed to achieve a better future.

II. Inflation

4. The reduction of inflation is our immediate top priority and will benefit all nations. Inflation retards growth and harms all sectors of our societies. Determined fiscal and monetary restraint is required to break inflationary expectations. Continuing dialogue among the social partners is also needed for this purpose. We must retain effective international coordination to carry out this policy of restraint, and also to guard against the threat of growing unemployment and worldwide recession.

5. We are also committed to encouraging investment and innovation, so as to increase productivity, to fostering the movement of resources from declining into expanding sectors so as to provide new job opportunities, and to promoting the most effective use of resources within and among countries. This will require shifting resources from government spending to the private sector and from consumption to investment, and avoiding or carefully limiting actions that shelter particular industries or sectors from the rigors of adjustment. Measures of this kind may be economically and politically difficult in the short term, but they are essential to sustained non-inflationary growth and to increasing employment which is our major goal.

6. In shaping economic policy, we need a better understanding of the long-term effects of global population growth, industrial expansion and economic development generally. A study of trends in these areas is in hand, and our representatives will keep these matters under review.

III. Energy

7. We must break the existing link between economic growth and consumption of oil, and we mean to do so in this decade. This strategy requires conserving oil and substantially increasing production and use of alternative energy sources. To this end, maximum reliance should be placed on the price mechanism, and domestic prices for oil should take into account representative world prices. Market forces should be supplemented, where appropriate, by effective fiscal incentives and administrative measures. Energy investment will contribute substantially to economic growth and employment.

8. We welcome the recent decisions of the European Community (EC), the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) regarding the need for long term structural changes to reduce oil consumption, continuing procedures to monitor progress, the possible use of oil ceilings to deal with tight market conditions and coordination of stock policies to mitigate the effect of market disruption. We note that the member countries of the IEA have agreed that their energy policies should result in their collective 1985 net oil imports being substantially less than their existing 1985 group objective, and that they will quantify the reduction as part of their continuing monitoring efforts. The potential for reduction has been estimated by the IEA Secretariat, given existing uncertainties, at around 4 million barrels a day (MBD).

9. To conserve oil in our countries:

- We are agreed that no new base-load, oil-fired generating capacity should be constructed, save in exceptional circumstances, and that the conversion of oil-fired capacity to other fuels should be accelerated.
- We will increase efforts, including fiscal incentives where necessary, to accelerate the substitution of oil in industry.
- We will encourage oil saving investments in residential and commercial buildings, where necessary by financial incentives and by establishing insulation standards. We look to the public sector to set an example.
- In transportation, our objective is the introduction of increasingly fuel efficient vehicles. The demand of consumers and competition among manufacturers are already leading in this direction. We will accelerate this progress, where appropriate, by arrangements or standards for improved automobile fuel efficiency, by gasoline pricing and taxation decisions, by research and development and by making public transport more attractive.

10. We must rely on fuels other than oil to meet the energy needs of future economic growth. This will require early, resolute, and wide-ranging actions. Our potential to increase the supply and use of energy sources other than oil over the next

Selected Domestic Economic Trends

	1970–73	1974–75	1976	1977	1978	1979
Real GNP growth (average annual rate, %)						
United States	3.5	−1.4	5.9	5.3	4.4	2.3
Japan	9.1	0.6	6.5	5.4	6.0	5.9
West Germany	4.4	−0.7	5.3	2.6	3.5	4.4
France	4.8	1.8	5.2	2.8	3.6	3.2
United Kingdom	3.7	−1.2	3.6	0.9	3.1	0.6
Italy	4.1	0.5	5.9	2.0	2.6	5.0
Canada	5.7	2.4	5.4	2.4	3.4	2.9
Industrial production growth (average annual rate, %)						
United States	4.0	−4.6	10.7	5.9	5.8	4.1
Japan	9.5	−7.6	11.1	4.1	6.3	8.3
West Germany	4.5	−4.2	7.3	2.6	2.7	5.3
France	5.8	−2.0	8.0	1.9	0.9	4.5
United Kingdom	2.4	−4.4	2.2	3.8	3.7	2.7
Italy	5.0	−2.6	12.4	1.1	2.0	6.5
Canada	5.9	−1.4	5.6	3.3	5.7	4.2
Consumer price inflation (average annual rate, %)						
United States	4.9	10.1	5.7	6.5	7.7	11.3
Japan	6.9	16.1	8.4	7.3	4.2	3.2
West Germany	5.3	6.5	4.5	3.7	2.7	4.1
France	6.1	12.6	9.6	9.5	9.3	10.8
United Kingdom	8.0	20.0	16.6	15.8	8.3	13.4
Italy	6.5	18.1	16.7	18.4	12.1	15.7
Canada	4.6	10.8	7.5	8.0	8.9	9.2
Unemployment rate (annual average % of labor force)						
United States	5.3	7.0	7.7	7.0	6.0	5.8
Japan	1.3	1.6	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.1
West Germany	0.8	3.2	4.0	4.0	3.8	3.3
France	1.6	3.0	4.2	4.7	5.2	6.0
United Kingdom	2.8	3.0	4.9	5.3	5.2	5.0
Italy	4.8	4.5	5.1	7.2	7.2	7.7
Canada	5.9	6.1	7.1	8.1	8.4	7.5

resources, meant by God for the use of all, are diverted on a grand scale to finance means of destruction. Homeless people by the millions, often driven from their lands by violence and subjected to hunger and disease, wander the world in search of elemental dignity which has been denied to them.

We all share the responsibility for bringing these tragedies to an end. In the current world situation, we know it is fraught with conflicting interests that threaten bloodshed. It is also alive with possibilities for reconciliation, and we must seize these initiatives and use them.

Nations can begin by heeding a universal moral and political imperative that the protection of the human rights of each person is the premise and the purpose of governments. They can also respect as sacrosanct the sovereignty of other nations.

America's settlers were drawn to our own shores by the promise of freedom and of a better life. Over our long history, now more than 200 years, America has been guided by the traditions of that continuing quest, not only for ourselves but for all peoples. That's why the pursuit of individual freedom, the security of nations, and the peace of the world are basic principles of American foreign policy. And that is why Americans feel such deep admiration and so much love for Pope John Paul II.

Americans of all faiths rejoiced in his visit to our country last year. It was one of the most remarkable events in the history of our nation. And we have watched with respect and with gratitude as he's touched millions of lives in his further travels. His moral and spiritual leadership has focused the attention of the world upon those suffering from hunger, from poverty and disease; upon refugees in every corner of the Earth; and upon those laboring under political repression.

The United States shares these concerns of His Holiness. They are our unfinished tasks as well. America has responded generously to the men, women, and children of Kampuchea, and we are acting with justice and with charity toward those people escaping from intolerable conditions in the Caribbean. And we work with the international relief agencies, such as the Catholic Relief Services, in providing food and shelter for those who are displaced by warfare in Indochina, the Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan.

In addition, the United States is trying to provide new leadership toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. We are pleased to champion the cause of democracy and human development in Latin America, and we will continue to make the United States more worthy as a nation committed to social justice, to economic opportunity, and to religious freedom.

One thing more, and this is deeply important to me. On behalf of the American people, Your Holiness, I would like personally to thank you for your efforts toward the release of the 53 American hostages being held in Iran, victims of terrorism who are being held in continued defiance of international law and universally accepted standards of decency.

We do have many unfinished tasks, but we have many resources—of courage, patience, faith, strength, and love. We've renewed these sources in our meeting today. Together we are working toward a day when human beings shall not make others go homeless and hungry, when all people will have a voice in deciding their own destiny, when we will at last lift the terrible fear of nuclear destruction from our children and from their children, when the values and ideals of freedom are respected by all governments, and when humility and the service of the human spirit and the human condition is the high honor of every human state.

Your Holiness, it's been an honor and a pleasure for me to be with you, and I go with the hope that your prayers will be with me.

Vatican City—A Profile

Area: 109 acres.
Population: 1,000.
Ethnic Groups: Italian, Swiss.
Languages: Italian, Latin.
Literacy: 100%
Official Name: State of the Vatican City.
Type: Papacy; administrative and spiritual capital of the Roman Catholic Church.
Independence: Lateran Agreements regulating independence and sovereignty of the Holy See signed with Italy on Feb. 11, 1929.
Suffrage: College of Cardinals elects Pope for life.
Membership in International Organizations: UPU, ITU, and permanent observer status at the U.N., FAO, UNESCO, OAS.
Officials: Pope John Paul II; Secretary of State—Agostino Cardinal CASAROLI. President Carter's Envoy to the Vatican is Robert F. Wagner.

His Holiness,
Pope John Paul II

Mr. President, it is a great pleasure for me to welcome you today. I am very happy to be able to reciprocate the warm welcome I received from you in Washington. The memories of my visit to the White House and of all my other contacts with the people of the United States are stored in my heart. They are recalled with joy and are frequently expressed in my prayers for America.

Your visit today to the Vatican as President of the United States is greatly appreciated. I am pleased to see in it an indication of your country's profound respect and esteem for ethical and religious values, a respect and esteem which are so characteristic of millions and millions of Americans of different faiths.

During my visit last October, I was a personal witness to the way these spiritual values find expression in the lives of your people, how they form the moral fabric of your nation, how they constitute the strength of the civil state which does not forget that it was founded on sound moral principles and which wishes to preserve its heritage as one nation under God.

All fields of human endeavor are enriched by true ethical values. During my pastoral journey I had occasion to speak of these values and to profess my own profound esteem for all who embrace them in national life. There is no sphere of activity that does not benefit when religious values are actively pursued. The political, social, and economic domains are authenticated and reinforced by the application of those moral standards that must be irrevocably incorporated into the tradition of every state.

The same principles that guide the internal destinies of a people should direct their relationships with other nations. I desire to express my esteem for all those who, at the national and international level, have exemplified the values of compassion and justice, of personal concern for others, and fraternal sharing in an effort to promote ever greater freedom, ever more authentic equality, and an ever more stable peace for a world craving for truth, unity, and love.

At the center of all sublime spiritual values is the worth of every human person worthy of respect, from the first moment of existence, endowed with dignity and rights, and called to share responsibility for every brother and sister in need. In the cause of dignity and human rights the church is in-

tent on offering to the world the contribution of the Gospel of Christ, proclaiming that man is created in the image and likeness of God and destined for life everlasting.

Although, as the Second Vatican Council emphasizes, the church is not a political entity, she still serves together with the political community, but by a separate title, the personal and social evocation of the same human beings. And, while distinct from the socioeconomic realm, the church is called to serve it by proclaiming that man is the source and center and purpose of all socioeconomic life.

In this area, as in so many others, the church is happy to speak out in favor of the human person and for everything that is advantageous to humanity. Moreover, she gives the assurance of her support for all that is done for the good of mankind according to the distinctive contribution of each one. In this sense, church and state are called to collaborate in the cause of man and in the promotion of sacred human dignity.

This collaboration is eminently useful, and it corresponds to the truth about man. Through the ethical formation of true citizens who work side by side with their fellow citizens, the church fulfills another aspect of her collaboration with the political community.

And today, in this context, I wish to assure you of my deep interest in every effort aimed at the betterment of humanity and devoted to world peace, and particularly the Middle East and neighboring regions occupy our common attention because of the immense importance they hold for international well-being. I offer my prayers that all worthy endeavors at reconciliation and cooperation may be crowned with success.

The question of Jerusalem, which during these very days attracts the attention of the world in a special way, is pivotal to a just peace in those parts of the world, since this holy city embodies interests and aspirations that are shared by different peoples in different ways. It is my hope that a common monotheistic tradition of faith will help to promote harmony among all those who call upon God. I would renew my earnest plea that just attention be given to the issues affecting Lebanon and the whole Palestinian problem.

The Holy See is aware of the worldwide aspect of the responsibility that falls to the United States. It is likewise conscious of the risks involved in facing this responsibility. But despite all inconveniences and problems, despite human limitations, governments of good will must continue to work for peace and for international understanding in the control and reduction of armaments, in the promotion of the North-South dialogue, and in furthering advancement of developing nations.

Just recently, on my visit to Africa, I was able to perceive personally the importance of that continent and the contribution it is called to make to the good of the world. But all this, in turn, requires the interests, support, and fraternal assistance of other peoples so that African stability, independence, and rightul autonomy will be safeguarded and reinforced.

The question of human dignity is particularly linked with efforts on behalf of justice. Any violation of justice anywhere is an affront to human dignity, and all effective contributions to justice are truly worthy of the greatest praise.

The purification of structures in the political, social, and economic fields cannot help but yield salutary results. I know of the interest of the United States in the situation in Central America, especially at this time. Persevering efforts are required and must be sustained until every brother and sister in that part of the world and elsewhere is secure in his or her dignity and free from manipulation by any power, overt or subtle, anywhere on Earth.

I hope that the United States will lend its powerful support to efforts which effectively uplift the human level of peoples in need.

As I mentioned, my contacts with the people of the United States are vivid in my memory. Enthusiasm and generosity, the will not to fall into enslaving materialism, in the pursuit of the common good at home and in the international field, and for Christians, the need to communicate justice and the peace of Christ—these are the forces that the Holy See encourages for the benefit of humanity.

My words today are meant to be an expression of appreciation for what has been done, an echo of the persistent needs of the world, a challenge of hope and confidence to the American people, whom I have known and loved so much. May God sustain you and bless the nation which you represent.

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[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 30, 1980, which also includes their exchange of remarks to Americans attending the ceremony on the beatification of Kateri Takakwitha, an American Mohawk Indian.

[2] Made in the Papal Study at the Vatican. ■

Visit to Belgrade

At the conclusion of the seven-nation economic summit in Venice, Italy, President Carter made an official visit to Belgrade June 24–25, 1980.

Following are President Carter's remarks upon arrival, his toast at a state dinner, and the text of a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the visit.[1]

ARRIVAL REMARKS, JUNE 24, 1980[2]

I've looked forward to this day since March of 1978, when President Tito invited me to come to Yugoslavia. I'm very grateful to the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for renewing that invitation.

My pleasure in visiting this proud and beautiful land is tempered by the sorrow we all feel at the passing of President Tito. He was a great man, one of the greatest of the 20th century. He was one of a small handful of statesmen who can truly be said to have shaped the modern world and one of an even smaller handful who have shaped it for the better.

He was a man of extraordinary courage—physical, moral, and political courage. He was also a man of imagination and of a rare kind of practical vision, the kind of vision that sees not only what a better world might be like but also how the imperfect tools that we have can be used to help build a better world. President Tito's contribution to the development of a strong, independent, and nonaligned Yugoslavia was, of course, unparalleled, but his contribution to international peace and stability was no less important.

It was my privilege to have worked with President Tito. I've greatly valued his counsel, which was the product of so much wisdom and experience. He shared this wisdom with me very generously, both face-to-face and through the many letters that we exchanged.

I share your grief at his passing and your admiration for what he accomplished. President Tito left a precious legacy—a strong, independent, and nonaligned Yugoslavia. I have come to Belgrade to assure you of the friendship and support of the United States as you build on that legacy.

President Tito devoted a great deal of effort to forging good relation-

also ruled unanimously that Iran must release the hostages and declared the inviolability of diplomatic envoys a fundamental basis of relations between states.

Despite our approaches and those of other nations, divisions within Iran prevented any real progress at this time toward a resolution of the crisis or indeed any dialogue with Iranian authorities.

Later, however, after Bani-Sadr was elected President on January 28—though not permitted to form a government pending election of a new parliament—opportunities appeared to open for diplomacy. We pursued them seriously through the U.N. Secretary General and a variety of intermediaries. We held back temporarily our efforts to press for further international sanctions to give these prospects every opportunity to succeed. But these efforts finally broke down because differences between secular and clerical factions in Iran prevented the Iranian authorities from honoring their promises. The President then moved promptly on April 7 to impose new measures to increase the price the Iranians will pay so long as they deny our people their freedom. Additional unilateral sanctions were also announced on April 17.

- Executive order 12205 of April 7, 1980, prohibited most exports to Iran and imposed prohibitions on financial dealings with Iran.
- Executive order 12211 of April 17, 1980, imposed additional prohibitions on financial transfers to persons or entities in Iran, imports from Iran, and transactions relating to travel to Iran. It also ordered restrictions on travel to Iran under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

As we consider the present situation in Iran, we should have no illusions about the difficulties ahead. We are dealing with a government in Iran that has few of the attributes we expect of national authorities. Iran is a country torn apart by continuing revolutionary turmoil. Our people are hostage not only to the militants but to internal power struggles and rivalries. And we are dealing with a nation that faces not only the threat of internal disintegration but external threats to its independence and territorial integrity from nations on its borders.

We will continue to take such steps as may be necessary and feasible to secure the safe release of the hostages. We will continue to move forward with strong and collective economic and political sanctions to convince the Iranians that it is in their own self-interest to bring an end to the hostage situation. The nine members of the European Community, and other friends and allies, have reaffirmed their support for severe sanctions against Iran. The sanctions contemplated accord, in most cases, with the U.N. Security Council resolution of January 13. Some governments are now seeking legislation to enable them to join this effort. I am confident that the measures they have agreed to as necessary—political steps followed by economic sanctions—will be put into effect as promised.

However, these measures will take time to have an effect. We must have patience as well as determination. It was and is a reality that these pressures are not likely to produce a quick result. Nonetheless, strong, clear, effective international pressures are more important now than ever before to drive home to the Iranians that their present course can only bring growing hardship for their people and continuing damage to their hopes to consolidate their revolution by building a strong, stable, unified, and independent Iran.

We will continue to hold the Iranian authorities fully responsible for the safety and well-being of our people. If our people have indeed been dispersed from the Embassy compound, the responsibility the Iranian authorities have assumed for their safety becomes all the more important.

We will also make every effort to bring home to the Iranian people that the threat to their revolution does not come from the United States; it comes from this crisis. We would like to see a stable and prosperous Iran. If this matter is resolved shortly and without harm to our people, the way will be open to develop a relationship that serves our mutual interests. Clearly, it is not possible to do so as long as our people are endangered and imprisoned illegally.

The measures we have taken under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act were clearly necessary to respond to an "unusual and extraordinary threat." Any decisions which the President may take on additional steps in the months ahead will also be made in conformity with the authority granted by this act.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Iran Chronology, May 1980

May 5

In London, British commandos and policemen storm the Iranian Embassy and rescue 19 of the hostages who had been held for 5½ days.

Cynthia B. Dwyer, an American freelance writer, is taken into custody by Iranian authorities and accused of being a CIA agent.

May 6

Bodies of the eight U.S. servicemen who died in the attempted rescue mission arrive in the U.S. President Carter proclaims 3 days of mourning.

May 7

Iran dampens British hopes that its freeing of the hostages held in Iran's Embassy in London might help gain freedom for the 53 U.S. hostages held in Iran.

Tehran *Times* reports total crude production drop from 2.7 million barrels a day to 2.0 million a day.

May 8

An Iranian woman, Farrokhrou Parsa, who served as Education Minister under the Shah's regime, is executed.

May 9

In an effort to gain control over Iran'a divided political scene, Bani-Sadr wins Khomeini's support by listing the following three demands:

- Appointment of a Prime Minister to be ratified by the Imam;
- Placing the armed forces under the control of the President; and
- Assurance that the state radio and television would serve the Islamic Republic.

Second round of balloting for the new Parliament is held.

May 12

Bani-Sadr's latest efforts to gain control of the government is blocked when the Revolutionary Council fails to name a Prime Minister.

May 13

Voting in parliamentary elections runoff was reported as follows: 229 of 247 seats were filled, and, of the 247 seats, the Islamic Republican Party won 118.

May 14

Ministers of the NATO nations, except France and Greece, condemn Iran and urge it "to release immediately unharmed" the U.S. hostages.

May 16

Bani-Sadr urges Foreign Ministers of the nine Common Market countries meeting in Naples, to withhold sanctions until the newly elected Parliament convenes.

May 18

Common Market Foreign Ministers state they will impose limited sanctions against Iran on May 22. Rather than halting all sales except for food and medical supplies, the Ministers decide to ban only those covered by contracts signed since November 4, when the U.S. Embassy was seized.

May 20

British Government softens trade sanctions against Iran when it fails to win the support of Parliament.

Australian Cabinet announces its decision to introduce an embargo on trade with Iran which would include all items, commodities, and products except food, medicine, and supplies intended for strictly medical purposes.

May 21

West German and French Cabinets approve trade sanctions against Iran.

Mansoor Farhang, Iran's U.N. Ambassador was quoted in Tehran as stating it is not in his country's best interest to continue holding the hostages.

May 22

Japan freezes all exports, except food and medicine, to Iran.

May 24

International Court of Justice rules that Iran must immediately release all U.S. hostages; that none of them may be subjected to any kind of trial; that the Embassy must be immediately turned over to the Swiss Government now representing U.S. interests in Iran; and that Iran is obliged to make reparations to the U.S., and the reparations would be established by the Court if the two countries did not come to an agreement.

May 25

In an effort to resolve the hostage crisis, three European Socialist leaders begin a fact-finding mission in Iran. Austrian Chancellor Kreisky leads the party and is accompanied by Olof Palme, Chairman, Social Democratic Party of Sweden, and Filipe Gonzales, leader of the Spanish Socialist Party.

May 28

New Parliament convenes.

May 29

Britain imposes limited economic sanctions against Iran forbidding the signing of new trade contracts from May 30. ■

Political Feuding in Afghanistan: A Dilemma for the Soviets

by Eliza Van Hollen

The following report was released by the Department of State in June 1980. Mrs. Van Hollen is the analyst for Afghanistan in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Intensifying infighting between the Khalq and Parcham factions of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) is significantly complicating efforts to legitimize and popularize the Soviet puppet Babrak Karmal regime. The struggle has its roots in early personal and ideological differences, greatly exacerbated by the events of the 2 years since the April 1978 coup, which brought the PDPA to power in Afghanistan. Should the present uneasy truce continue to erode, there could be another major upheaval in the Afghan political scene. Already, reports abound that each group is plotting to unseat the other.

The situation presents the Soviets with a dilemma. The continuing feud is paralyzing government operations and strengthening the ranks of the countrywide resistance. But if the Soviets should espouse the cause of one faction to the exclusion of the other, they could further undermine their own base of support. While neither faction could remain in power without Soviet backing, keeping the peace between them may prove to be a goal beyond the Soviet reach.

Importance of a United PDPA

The government installed by the Soviets after their December 27 invasion signaled a reuniting of Khalqis and Parchamis under the leadership of long-time Parcham head, now President, Prime Minister, and Secretary General of the PDPA, Babrak Karmal. The government is a carefully contrived mix of Khalqis and Parchamis. There are two Deputy Prime Ministers—one a Khalqi, Assadullah Sarwari, and the other a Parchami, Sultan Ali Keshtmand. The dominant Parcham faction outnumbers the Khalq in all the government and party organizations—but only by a margin of four to three in the important politiburo.

Collaboration between the two groups, functioning as a united PDPA, is important from the Soviet viewpoint for two reasons. First, it confers legitimacy on Babrak Karmal, the Soviet puppet, as a natural successor to the previous Khalq regimes of Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin and supports the claim that this is merely a new phase in the natural evolution of the Saur (April) revolution. Second, it helps establish as broad-based a political appeal as possible. The Soviet Union gambled that Babrak would appear more politically attractive than his predecessors and that it could effect a reconciliation between the estranged Khalqis and Parchamis which would provide a base on which to build a broader national front. The building of such a front is considered essential for overcoming the present widespread hostility to the succession of Marxist governments.

The Soviets also apparently believed that the 85,000 troops they brought into Afghanistan to support Babrak would quickly discourage the countrywide opposition to the government, thus giving it time and breathing space to become established and to win support with conciliatory programs. To date, most of the Soviets' original judgments appear to have been in error. The overwhelming popular resistance, which has grown appreciably since the December invasion and is now directed primarily against the Soviets themselves, makes a mockery of any claim to legitimacy. Likewise, the deep-seated hostility between the Parcham and Khalq factions is proving to be irreconcilable.

Early Stages of Rivalry

The rivalry between the Khalqis and the Parchamis has its roots in an early split in the Communist-styled People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan when Babrak led a splinter group out of the party in 1967, 2 years after it was founded by Taraki. The present organization was then known popularly as the Kalq party after the name of its short-lived publication *Kalq* ("The Masses" or "The People") and the Babrak group became known as the Parcham ("Banner") party from the name of its paper.

The reasons for the original split

temporarily certain constitutional guarantees.

U.S. Policy

We welcome and support the government's efforts. We believe that its October 15 program offers the best chance for evolutionary reform, political liberalization, and respect for human rights in El Salvador. We are supporting the reform process through the following measures:

- Diplomatic cooperation with democratic governments in Latin America and Europe in support of the revolutionary junta;
- Economic assistance of about $50 million for FY 1980 to support the agrarian reform and other programs of direct benefit to the poor; and
- Military assistance of $5.7 million in FY 1980 foreign military sales credits to enable the Salvadoran Armed Forces to purchase communication and transportation equipment, which will help them protect implementation of the reform program against violence from both right and left.

We would promptly reassess our policy if there were evidence that our assistance was not being used to enhance human rights in El Salvador. As former Secretary of State Vance stated in response to a letter from Salvadoran Archbishop Romero to President Carter: "The advancement of human rights . . . underlies every aspect of U.S. policy toward El Salvador."

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[1] Taken from the Department of State publication in the GIST series, released Mar. 1980. This outline is designed to be a quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy statement. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation
Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.
Applied to Greenland: May 7, 1980, effective June 1, 1980.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Applied to Greenland: May 7, 1980, effective June 1, 1980.

Judicial Procedure
Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 7, 1972. TIAS 7444.
Extended to: The Isle of Man, Apr. 16, 1980.[1]

Maritime Matters
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Guyana, May 13, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606) on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 14, 1975.[2]
Acceptances deposited: Bahrain, Apr. 25, 1980; Cape Verde, Apr. 23, 1980; Guyana, May 13, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606) on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 17, 1977.[2]
Acceptances deposited: Bahrain, Apr. 25, 1980; Cape Verde, Apr. 23, 1980; Guyana, May 13, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606) on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 15, 1979.[2]
Acceptances deposited: Bahrain, Apr. 25, 1980; India, May 5, 1980; Jamaica, Apr. 30, 1980.

Narcotic Drugs
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980.
Accession deposited: Grenada, Apr. 25, 1980.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva Mar. 25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.
Accession deposited: Bangladesh, May 9, 1980.

Patents
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978; except for chapter II. Chapter II entered into force Mar. 29, 1978.[3] TIAS 8733.
Accession deposited: Korea, Apr. 8, 1980.

Pollution
International convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973.[2]
Accession deposited: Peru, Apr. 25, 1980.

Protocol relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of pollution by substances other than oil. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973.[2]
Ratification deposited: U.K., Nov. 5, 1979.
Accession deposited: Mexico, Apr. 14, 1980.

Property—Industrial
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Article 1–12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. Articles 13–30 entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Sept. 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited: Philippines, Apr. 16, 1980.[4]

Property—Intellectual
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Ratification deposited: Philippines, Apr. 14, 1980.

Refugees
Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.
Accessions deposited: Bolivia, May 5, 1980; Seychelles, Apr. 23, 1980.

Rubber
International natural rubber agreement, 1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979.[2]
Signature: Denmark, May 12, 1980.

Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700.
Ratification deposited: Chile, Mar. 28, 1980.

Accession deposited: Dominican Republic, Apr. 10, 1980.

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 (TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.[2]
Ratification deposited: Sweden, Dec. 21, 1979.
Approval deposited: France, Dec. 21, 1979.
Accession deposited: Spain, Apr. 30, 1980.

Satellite Communications System
Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Accession deposited: Honduras, May 6, 1980.

Operating agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Signature: Empresa Hondurena de Telecommunicaciones HONDUTEL, for Honduras, May 6, 1980.

Telecommunications
Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as amended, to establish a new frequency allotment plan for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976; for the U.S. Apr. 21, 1976. TIAS 8599.
Approval deposited: Greece, Mar. 3, 1980.

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as revised, relating to aeronautical mobile (R) service, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva Mar. 5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1979, except for the frequency allotment plan for the aeronautical mobile (R) service which shall come into force on Feb. 1, 1983.[5]
Approval deposited: Ireland, Feb. 28, 1980.

Terrorism
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532.
Accession deposited: Mexico, Apr. 22, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Norway, Apr. 28, 1980.

International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17, 1979.[2]
Signatures: Guatemala, Apr. 30, 1980; Philippines, May 2, 1980.

Tonnage Measurement
International convention on tonnage measurement of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 1969.[2]
Accession deposited: China, Apr. 8, 1980.

U.N. Industrial Development Organization
Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.[2]
Signatures: Guinea-Bissau, May 1, 1980; Saint-Lucia, May 8, 1980; Tanzania, May 12, 1980; Uruguay, May 5, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, May 2, 1980.

World Health Organization
Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the U.S. June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808.
Acceptances deposited: Equatorial Guinea, May 5, 1980; San Marino, May 12, 1980; Zimbabwe, May 16, 1980.

World Heritage
Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226.
Ratification deposited: Chile, Feb. 20, 1980.

BILATERAL

Barbados
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Bridgetown Mar. 6 and Apr. 3, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 3, 1980.

Botswana
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Gaborone Feb. 26 and Mar. 21, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 21, 1980.

Bulgaria
Agreement extending the agreement of June 13, 1977 (TIAS 9020) on exchanges and cooperation in cultural, scientific, educational, technological, and other fields. Effected by exchange of notes at Sofia Mar. 21 and Apr. 9, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 9, 1980.

Canada
Protocol amending the agreement of June 15, 1955, as amended and supplemented (TIAS 3304, 3771, 4518, 5102, 6649, 8287, 8782), concerning civil uses of atomic energy, with agreed minute. Signed at Ottawa Apr. 23, 1980. Enters into force on the date upon which the parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that they have complied with all applicable requirements for its entry into force.

Agreement extending the agreement of May 8, 1975, (TIAS 8085) relating to the organization and operation of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 12, 1980. Entered into force May 12, 1980.

Federal Republic of Germany
Agreement for application to Land Berlin of agreement of Mar. 12 and May 31, 1974, relating to the reciprocal acceptance of airworthiness certifications (TIAS 7965). Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn and Bonn-Bad Godesberg Nov. 3, 1976 and Mar. 18, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 18, 1980.

Ghana
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with related letter and agreed minutes. Signed at Accra Apr. 14, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 14, 1980.

Greece
Agreement for cooperation in the economic, scientific and technological, and educational and cultural fields. Signed at Athens Apr. 22, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 22, 1980.

Guyana
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Jan. 27, 1978 (TIAS 9145). Signed at Georgetown Apr. 23, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 23, 1980.

Honduras
Agreement establishing a cooperative program for the operation and maintenance of the meteorological observation and telecommunications facility on the Swan Islands, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa Nov. 22, 1971. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1972. TIAS 7455.
Notice of termination: U.S., Jan. 29, 1980; effective Mar. 29, 1980.

Agreement relating to the making available of electric power to the radio air navigational facility and dock and landing strip lighting systems on the Swan Islands. Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa Nov. 22, 1971. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1972. TIAS 7455.
Notice of termination: U.S. Jan. 29, 1980; effective Mar. 29, 1980.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Agreement amending the agreement of May 11, 1959, as amended and extended (TIAS 4291, 7852), for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy, with annex. Signed at Vienna Jan. 14, 1980.
Entered into force: May 6, 1980.

(White House photo by Karl Schumacher)

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(White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)

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1. President Carter breakfasts with Father Gilles Zaramella at the Church of San Giorgio Maggiore in Venice.
2. The Carters tour the ruins of the Roman Forum with Professor John D'Arms, Director of the American Academy in Rome.
3. National Security Adviser Brzezinski and Secretary Muskie confer aboard Air Force One en route to Europe.
4. The President with Chancellor Schmidt following their meeting at the Cipriani Hotel in Venice.
5. One of the dancers who entertained the Presidential party in Kalemegdan Park in Belgrade.

(White House photo by Karl Schumacher)

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(White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)

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(White House photo by Karl Schumacher)

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President Carter Attends Economic Summit in Venice

President Carter departed Washington, D.C., June 19, 1980, for a trip to Italy, the Vatican, Yugoslavia, Spain, and Portugal. He returned to the United States on June 26. After state visits to Italy (see page 12) and the Vatican (see page 17), he participated in an economic summit meeting in Venice June 22–23 with the leaders of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom and the President of the European Commission. From Venice President Carter went to Yugoslavia (see page 19), Spain (see page 23), and Portugal (see page 26).

Following are the concluding statements of the eight summit participants; the declaration issued at the conclusion of the summit; and statements released to the press on Afghanistan, the taking of diplomatic hostages, refugees, and hijacking.[1]

CONCLUDING STATEMENTS, JUNE 23, 1980[2]

Prime Minister Cossiga

May I thank, on behalf of all the heads of government—I thank all of you not only for being here but also for your collaboration in this summit through the information that you, the press, have provided. This is the final press conference, the traditional press conference we have after a summit, and it is up to me as chairman, president of this summit of the seven industrialized countries of the West.

The message, I think, emerging from this Venice summit, at the beginning of the 1980s—the beginning of a difficult decade—is a message of unity, solidarity, and cooperation.

You have before you the text of the final communique, or if not, it will be distributed to you. And yesterday you received the text on consultation that was taking place on the political themes. The problems that we've had to deal with in these 2 days, as you already understand, were numerous and by no means easy and nobody, I think, would have maintained that we could give an immediate response or reply or final reply, because, of course, this is never reality, either in history or in politics.

The truth emerging from this summit is that the seven major industrialized countries are agreed on the strategy which should guide us in facing the challenges that we have before us. We also agree that our unity and solidarity is not enough in a world which is increasingly interdependent. We are all responsible for the fate of this world—industrialized countries and developing countries, oil-producing countries and oil-consuming countries. In the communique, I think you will find an appeal to this general sense of a joint responsibility.

As you already know, the central problem that we discussed was that of energy, and we have set out a strategy which involves specific actions to save oil but also an accelerated or speedy effort to produce alternative sources of energy—alternative to oil—including nuclear energy, whose contribution is essential for a better balance between supply and demand in the energy field. We've decided on the general lines for the decade and how we are to monitor the execution of this program.

We have decided on the need to fight inflation, but we've also agreed that we will help investment to create more jobs, improving the economic structures in our countries. In particular, in the energy field, there will be new investments which can create new jobs, which is very important to solve what is a human, social, political problem; one of the most important, that of youth.

We also discussed in depth the problems of the less rich countries. And it is our intention to confirm our commitment, but at the same time, we wish to make aware of this commitment—what should be a general opinion, a general commitment, a general responsibility—the other industrialized countries, all of them, including the Communist industrialized countries and the oil-producer countries.

The increasing cost of oil doesn't only harm the industrialized countries but creates situations which sometimes are unbearable, especially in developing countries. And the problem cannot be solved merely through the recycling undertaken by private banks. In the final communique, you will find what other measures we intend to adopt in this field.

Venice has been the host in the past 10 days of two summit meetings, two important meetings at the highest political level. In the first, that of the nine heads of state, heads of government of the European Community, we found, in spite of the fears of many, the confirmation of the real vital unity of the Community. In this second meeting at the highest political level, which is drawing to an end today, we've taken economic and political decisions and indicated lines of action to reinforce international cooperation in the decade which is only now opened.

From Venice, then, we leave with a new spirit. We thank this marvelous city for its hospitality, with a spirit and a sense of openness to the world which has characterized the history of this beautiful city.

President Giscard d'Estaing

This meeting of the seven major industrialized nations here in Venice, of the summit—there are three things that I shall particularly bear in mind.

First of all, this summit has enabled us to issue joint statements on subjects as important as Afghanistan, the attitude to be adopted with regard to refugees throughout the world, and the problem of the holding of hostages. Also, this summit has clearly shown that there is agreement, converging views, with regard to not just the analysis, which is important, but particularly the measures that should be taken in order to resolve the economic difficulties with which we are currently faced.

And the third point is that this summit has been chaired so excellently by Italy, and we have enjoyed the finest Italian hospitality. And, Mr. President, Mr. Chairman, we thank you for both.

In the very short time available to us, there are two things to which I would like to refer: energy and development aid.

ten years is estimated at the equivalent of 15–20 MBD of oil. We intend to make a coordinated and vigorous effort to realise this potential. To this end, we will seek a large increase in the use of coal and enhanced use of nuclear power in the medium-term, and a substantial increase in production of synthetic fuels, in solar energy and other sources of renewable energy over the longer term.

11. We shall encourage the exploration and development of our indigenous hydrocarbon resources in order to secure maximum production on a long term basis.

12. Together we intend to double coal production and use by early 1990. We will encourage long term commitments by coal producers and consumers. It will be necessary to improve infrastructures in both exporting and importing countries, as far as is economically justified, to ensure the required supply and use of coal. We look forward to the recommendations of the International Coal Industry Advisory Board. They will be considered promptly. We are conscious of the environmental risks associated with increased coal production and combustion. We will do everything in our power to ensure that increased use of fossil fuels, especially coal, does not damage the environment.

13. We underline the vital contribution of nuclear power to a more secure energy supply. The role of nuclear energy has to be increased if world energy needs are to be met. We shall therefore have to expand our nuclear generating capacity. We will continue to give the highest priority to ensuring the health and safety of the public and to perfecting methods for dealing with spent fuels and disposal of nuclear waste. We reaffirm the importance of ensuring the reliable supply of nuclear fuel and minimizing the risk of nuclear proliferation.

14. The studies made by the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Group, launched at the London Summit in 1977, are a significant contribution to the use of nuclear energy. We welcome their findings with respect to: increasing predictable supplies; the most effectve utilization of uranium sources, including the development of advanced technologies; and the minimization of proliferation risks, including support of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. We urge all countries to take these findings into account when developing policies and programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

15. We will actively support the recommendations of the International Energy Technology Group, proposed at the Tokyo Summit last year, for bringing new energy technologies into commercial use at the earliest feasible time. As far as national programmes are concerned, we will by mid-1981 adopt a two-phased approach; first, listing the numbers and types of commercial scale plants to be constructed in each of our countries by the mid-1980s, and, second, indicating quantitative projections for expanding production by 1990, 1995 and 2000, as a basis for future actions. As far as international programmes are concerned, we will join others in creating an international team to promote collaboration among interested nations on specific projects.

16. A high level group of representatives of our countries and of the EEC Commission will review periodically the results achieved in these fields.

17. Our comprehensive energy strategy is designed to meet the requirements of the coming decade. We are convinced that it can reduce the demand for energy, particularly oil, without hampering economic growth. By carrying out this strategy we expect that, over the coming decade, the ratio between increases in collective energy consumption and economic growth of our countries will be reduced to about 0.6, that the share of oil in our total energy demand will be reduced from 53 percent now to about 40 percent by 1990, and that our collective consumption of oil in 1990 will be significantly below present levels so as to permit a balance between supply and demand at tolerable prices.

18. We continue to believe that international cooperation in energy is essential. All countries have a vital interest in a stable equilibrium between energy supply and demand. We would welcome a constructive dialogue on energy and related issues between energy producers and consumers in order to improve the coherence of their policies.

IV. Relations With Developing Countries

19. We are deeply concerned about the impact of the oil price increases on the developing countries that have to import oil. The increase in oil prices in the last two years has more than doubled the oil bill of these countries, which now amounts to over $50 billion. This will drive them into ever increasing indebtedness, and put at risk the whole basis of their economic growth and social progress, unless something can be done to help them.

20. We approach in a positive spirit the prospect of global negotiations in the framework of the United Nations and the formulation of a new International Development Strategy. In particular, our object is to cooperate with the developing countries in energy conservation and development, expansion of exports, enhancement of human skills and the tackling of underlying food and population problems.

Oil Import Trends

	1970–73	1974–75	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980[1]
Net oil imports (thousand b/d)							
United States	4,351	5,857	7,072	8,565	8,002	7,939	8,900[2]
Japan	4,763	5,190	5,229	5,446	5,331	5,625	5,400
West Germany	2,707	2,488	2,675	2,639	2,724	2,837	2,850
France	2,241	2,284	2,349	2,219	2,206	2,410	2,330
United Kingdom	2,108	2,015	1,660	1,093	872	436	240
Italy	2,147	1,962	1,963	1,936	1,980	2,014	2,060
Canada	(3)	(3)	110	188	199	224	150
Net oil imports (billion U.S. $)							
United States[4]	4.5	24.9	32.2	42.4	39.5	56.7	
Japan	4.4	20.8	23.2	25.7	25.5	38.0	
West Germany	3.2	11.0	12.9	13.6	14.7	24.5	
France	2.4	9.5	11.2	11.2	11.5	16.2	
United Kingdom	2.5	8.4	7.8	5.4	4.4	2.3	
Italy	1.8	7.7	8.0	8.4	8.7	11.9	
Canada	(3)	(3)	1.0	1.4	1.6	1.9	
Net oil imports as a share of energy consumption (%)							
United States	12.7	16.7	19.5	23.0	21.0	20.9	
Japan	75.1	73.8	73.6	75.0	73.0	72.5	
West Germany	53.8	48.9	50.2	49.8	49.2	48.4	
France	66.6	64.3	64.4	60.3	58.0	61.7	
United Kingdom	47.7	47.9	39.5	25.5	20.3	9.7	
Italy	82.5	71.9	69.1	67.3	66.8	NA	
Canada	(3)	(3)	2.8	4.6	4.7	5.2	

NA—not available.
[1] Net oil import target pledge.
[2] Includes territories.
[3] Net exporter.
[4] Gross oil import bill.

21. A major international effort to help these countries increase their energy production is required. We believe that this view is gaining ground among oil-exporting countries. We ask the World Bank to examine the adequacy of the resources and the mechanisms now in place for the exploration, development and production of conventional and renewable energy sources in oil importing developing countries, to consider means, including the possibility of establishing a new affiliate or facility by which it might improve and increase its lending programmes for energy assistance, and to explore its findings with both oil-exporting and industrial countries.

22. We are deeply conscious that extreme poverty and chronic malnutrition afflict hundreds of millions of people of developing countries. The first requirement in these countries is to improve their ability to feed themselves and reduce their dependence on food imports. We are ready to join with them and the International Agencies concerned in their comprehensive long term strategies to increase food production, and to help improve national as well as international research services. We will support and, where appropriate, supplement initiatives of the World Bank and of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and to improve grain storage and food handling facilities. We underline the importance of wider membership of the new Food Aid Convention so as to secure at least 10 million tons of food aid annually and of an equitable replenishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

23. High priority should be given to efforts to cope with population growth and to existing United Nations and other programmes for supporting these efforts.

24. We strongly support the general capital increase of the World Bank, increases in the funding of the regional development banks, and the sixth replenishment of the International Development Association. We would welcome an increase in the rate of lending of these institutions, within the limits of their present replenishments, as needed to fulfill the programmes described above. It is essential that all members, especially the major donors, provide their full contributions on the agreed schedule.

25. We welcome the report of the Brandt Commission. We shall carefully consider its recommendations.

26. The democratic industrialised countries cannot alone carry the responsibility of aid and other different contributions to developing countries: it must be equitably shared by the oil-exporting countries and the industrialised Communist countries. The Personal Representatives are instructed to review aid policies and procedures and other contributions to developing countries and to report back their conclusions to the next Summit.

V. Monetary Problems

27. The situation created by large oil-generated payments imbalances, in particular those of oil-importing developing countries, requires a combination of determined actions by all countries to promote external adjustment and effective mechanisms for balance of payments financing. We look to the international capital market to continue to play the primary role in rechanneling the substantial oil surplus funds on the basis of sound lending standards. We support the work in progress by our monetary authorities and the Bank for International Settlements designed to improve the supervision and security of the international banking system. The private banks could usefully supplement these efforts.

28. Private lending will need to be supplemented by an expanded role for international institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We are committed to implementing the agreed increase in the IMF quotas, and to supporting appropriate borrowing by the Fund, if needed to meet financing requirements of its members. We encourage the IMF to seek ways in which it could, within its guidelines on conditionality, make it more attractive for countries with financing problems to use its resources. In particular, we support the IMF's examination of possible ways to reduce charges on credits to low-income developing countries. The IMF and the World Bank should work closely together in responding to these problems. We welcome the Bank's innovative lending scheme for structural adjustment. We urge oil-exporting countries to increase their direct lending to countries with financial problems thus reducing the strain on other recycling mechanisms.

29. We reaffirm our commitment to stability in the foreign exchange markets. We note that the European Monetary System (EMS) has contributed to this end. We will continue close cooperation in exchange market policies so as to avoid disorderly exchange rate fluctuations. We will also cooperate with the IMF to achieve more effective surveillance. We support continuing examination by the IMF of arrangements to provide for a more balanced evolution of the world reserve system.

VI. Trade

30. We are resolved further to strengthen the open world trading system. We will resist pressures for protectionist actions, which can only be self-defeating and aggravate inflation.

31. We endorse the positive conclusion of the multilateral trade negotiations, and commit ourselves to early and effective implementation. We welcome the participation of some of our developing partners in the new non-tariff codes and call upon others to participate. We also call for the full participation of as many countries as possible in strengthening the system of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. We urge the more advanced of our developing partners gradually to open their markets over the coming decade.

32. We reaffirm our determination to avoid a harmful export credit race. To this end we shall work with the other participants to strengthen the International Arrangement on Export Credits, with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution covering all aspects of the Arrangement by 1 December 1980. In particular, we shall seek to bring its terms closer to current market conditions and reduce distortions in export competition, recognising the differentiated treatment of developing countries in the Arrangement.

33. As a further step in strengthening the international trading system, we commit our governments to work in the United Nations toward an agreement to prohibit illicit payments to foreign government officials in international business transactions. If that effort falters, we will seek to conclude an agreement among our countries, but open to all, with the same objective.

VII. Conclusions

34. The economic message from this Venice Summit is clear. The key to success in resolving the major economic challenges which the world faces is to achieve and maintain a balance between energy supply and demand at reasonable levels and at tolerable prices. The stability of the world economy, on which the prosperity of every individual country relies, depends upon all of the countries concerned, recognising their mutual needs and accepting their mutual responsibilities. Those among us whose countries are members of the European Community intend to make their efforts within this framework. We, who represent seven large industrialised countries of the free world, are ready to tackle our own problems with determination and to work with others to meet the challenges of the coming decade, to our own advantage and to the benefit of the whole world.

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[1] Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 30, 1980, which also includes the President's and Chancellor Schmidt's exchange with reporters in Venice on June 21, the President's exchange with reporters following the first two summit sessions on June 22, and the President's interview with reporters at the conclusion of the summit on June 23. The text of President Carter's remarks on departure from the United States on June 19 are printed in the Weekly Compilation of June 23.

[2] Made at the Sala Degli Arazzi at the Cini Foundation. Prime Minister Cossiga, President Giscard d'Estaing, Chancellor Schmidt, and Foreign Minister Okita spoke in their native languages, and their remarks were translated by interpreters. The other participants spoke in English.

[3] Due to a failure in transmission, this transcript does not include the first portion of Prime Minister Thatcher's statement. ■

tween our two countries. Today the foundation of those relations is firm and durable. In the past 3 years, moreover, the bonds between our two countries have grown visibly stronger, and I am eager to work with you to make them stronger still.

In this connection, I want to reaffirm to you today the basic continuity of American policy toward Yugoslavia. The United States supports and will continue to support the independence, territorial integrity, and the unity of Yugoslavia. The United States wishes to see an economically prosperous and politically strong Yugoslavia. The United States respects Yugoslavia's nonalignment and admires Yugoslavia's constructive international role.

We stand ready to work closely with you to insure the continued development of an independent Yugoslavia. But we know that your independence is a creation not of any outside force but of the courage and sacrifice of the people of Yugoslavia. And we also know that the greatest bulwark of your independence is your own fierce determination to defend it. That determination is perhaps the key to the special role Yugoslavia plays in the world.

Yugoslavia was a pioneer of nonalignment and a founder of the nonaligned movement. Yugoslavia remains an important leader of that movement today—militarily, economically, and politically. Yugoslavia has pursued a policy of authentic nonalignment that has won the respect of the entire world. Especially now, at a time when the principles of equality, noninterference, and territorial inviolability are threatened, Yugoslavia's steadfast defense of the principles of the United Nations and of the nonaligned movement takes on new importance.

We know that Yugoslavia can make a significant contribution to the solution of international problems and to the further development of detente between East and West. The United States also wants to strengthen detente, and we will work hard toward that end. But detente must be based on reciprocity. It must be based on mutual restraint. It must be based on respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference in the affairs of other nations. These are the principles of international life for which Yugoslavia has always struggled.

At the same time, the United States strongly believes that efforts to reduce the chances of nuclear war must continue; so must the efforts to build an international system that helps to reduce tensions and to foster peace, security, freedom, and economic well-being.

Despite the crises that beset the world today, the United States remains committed to preserving the framework of detente and to maintaining a dialogue between the nations of the world. Specifically, we support arms control and disarmament talks and negotiations wherever they can contribute to mutual security and to international stability. We also support the Madrid review conference of the Helsinki Final Act, which we feel can contribute to the full and frank review of progress to date and to balanced steps forward in all areas of the Final Act.

I'm looking forward to our discussions on these and other matters. We are eager to hear your ideas for ways in which Yugoslavia and the nonaligned movement can contribute to solving the many difficult problems the world faces. Our time here is short and we have much to discuss, but we will be building on a foundation of mutual purpose. I'm very pleased to be here. I bring to you and to all the people of Yugoslavia the warmest good wishes of the people of the United States.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S DINNER TOAST, JUNE 24, 1980[3]

Although this is my first visit to your great country, Yugoslavia, the special relationship between our two countries has involved seven American Presidents, beginning with President Harry Truman. I'm here to confirm the continuity of that relationship. I'm here to reiterate our firm support of Yugoslavia's independence, territorial integrity, and unity and our respect for Yugoslavia's nonaligned position.

These are the principles which President Tito and I emphasized during his visit to the United States a little more than 2 years ago. I want you to know that they are just as central to American policy now as they were then, when our country was honored by the presence of this great leader.

It is with great sadness that I pay here tonight a personal tribute to President Tito. I regarded him as a friend, as well as a statesman of uncommon vision. I valued his counsel, his wisdom, and his perspective. I gained many insights from our personal correspondence, which continued even during the final months of his illness.

Great men of history sometimes leave the nations they have led ill-equipped to face the world without them. What has impressed me in my brief visit here is how smoothly you have met the challenge of transition. That is a great tribute not only to the foresight of President Tito but also to the dedication and the patriotism of his political heirs.

A man like President Tito cannot be replaced. It is the nature of such men to be irreplaceable, but the courage and the creativity of the Yugoslav people guarantee that President Tito's life's work of building a strong, independent Yugoslavia will go forward in the years ahead.

Yugoslavia's unswerving defense of the principles of true nonalignment and nonintervention in the internal affairs of foreign states is particularly important in today's unstable and troubled world. The United States respects such a policy.

It has always been my hope as President that we could move on in many areas of the world from conflict to peace. I did look forward to significant contributions in arms control when the SALT II Treaty was signed. Ratification of this treaty has been temporarily frustrated but not abandoned.

We are deeply concerned that an unjustifiable act of armed aggression continues in Afghanistan, a founding member with you of the nonaligned movement, a small country, which, as you well know, constituted no threat to anyone. The vast majority of the countries of the world, in an extraordinary vote by the General Assembly of the United Nations, have called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. We want to see the restoration of an independent and nonaligned Afghanistan, which can live in peace with all its neighbors and contribute to the stability of the region.

With the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan, we would be prepared to join in assurances and arrangements to establish a truly independent, a truly nonaligned Afghanistan with a government acceptable to the Afghan people. We would be prepared to explore a transitional arrangement, to be implemented along with the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan, for the purpose of restoring peace and tranquillity in that suffering country.

Our talks today have also touched on the grave consequences of politically motivated terrorism. I speak for every

American citizen when I say how much we appreciate Yugoslavia's forthright support for the release of the American diplomatic personnel who at this moment are held hostage in Iran, in violation of every tenet not only of international law but of simple decency.

For my part, I want to reiterate that my government will not tolerate terrorist acts against Yugoslav officials and establishments in the United States and that we strongly oppose political efforts aimed at undermining Yugoslavia's unity and territorial integrity.

Our talks today have confirmed my view that Yugoslavia's concept of nonalignment is not a passive or quiescent thing but a bold, creative, imaginative approach to the problems of the world, particularly the problems of the developing nations. And our talks have confirmed something else—that both Yugoslavia and the United States want to strengthen the bilateral relationships that exist between us and that we want to do so on the basis of independence, equality, and mutual respect.

I would like to thank you, on behalf of my family and my colleagues, for your generous hospitality and friendship. I look forward to a continuing exchange with you on international issues, on which we share so many compatible views, and also on bilateral issues, on which we've made such great progress in recent years.

I would like to ask everyone to join me as I raise my glass in a toast: To the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to its President, his Excellency President Mijatovic; to a strong and prosperous Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; to the peoples of Yugoslavia, whose love of independence we admire and support; and to the furthering, strengthening of American-Yugoslav friendship in the cause of peace and stability throughout the world.

(White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)

President Carter and President Mijatovic exchange toasts in the Federal Hall at the Palace of the Federation.

JOINT STATEMENT, JUNE 25, 1980

At the invitation of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, President of the United States Jimmy Carter and Mrs. Carter paid an official visit to Yugoslavia June 24-25, 1980. During the visit, President Carter and President of the Presidency of the SFRY, Cvijetin Mijatovic, held cordial and constructive talks in an atmosphere of mutual respect, understanding, candor, and friendship.[4]

President Carter expressed the profound sorrow of the American people at the death of President Tito, who was greatly admired and respected in the United States. President and Mrs. Carter on this occasion again expressed regret at the loss of a great statesman who, as one of the most prominent leaders of the nonaligned movement, devoted his entire life's work to building a strong and independent Yugoslavia and to securing peace and progress in the world.

President Carter and the Presidency of Yugoslavia noted with satisfaction the very successful development of relations and cooperation between Yugoslavia and the United States. They agreed that the meeting held in Washington in March 1978 between Presidents Carter and Tito and the document signed on that occasion represents a durable and stable basis for further strengthening of the cooperation between the two countries. Based firmly on the positions and principles set forth in that document, as well as the documents signed by the Presidents of the two countries in 1971 and 1975, the United States and Yugoslavia have made great progress in recent years in broadening and deepening their relations in all areas.

Both sides affirmed that in recent years significant expansion of the dialogue and consultations between the two countries has occurred, in which a special role was played by the regular exchange of letters between Presidents Tito and Carter. There have also been frequent exchanges of visits at all levels, including productive contacts between members of the U.S. Congress and of the Federal Assembly of the SFRY as well as other mutually useful visits and exchanges. The United States and Yugoslavia affirmed their readiness to continue this useful practice, which has proven to be in the interests of both countries and of greater international understanding generally.

The two sides noted the importance of historical and cultural ties between the two peoples and the special role in strengthening the bonds of friendship and understanding played by Americans of Yugoslav descent. They also confirmed their mutual interest in facilitating the free flow of information and people between the two countries, endorsed governmental and nongovernmental exchanges in the fields of science and technology, culture, and information, and agreed that even more can be done in these areas.

Turning to the increasingly important economic relations between the United States and Yugoslavia, President Carter and the Presidency of the SFRY noted with satisfaction the growth in trade and economic cooperation between Yugoslav and American enterprises and financial institutions. They stressed their mutual interest in further expansion of economic relations and agreed to intensify efforts to increase trade, while recognizing that the growth of Yugoslavia's exports will be an important factor in the satisfactory development of two-way trade. They also agreed that more should be done to promote other forms of economic cooperation including joint ventures and long-term cooperation. The American side expressed understanding for and a

appear to have been more personal than ideological as both groups were dedicated to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. However, certain philosophical and policy differences separated them from the beginning and are important factors in the current struggle. The Parchamis have always been considered closer to Moscow than the more independent Khalqis. This is currently symbolized by the Parchamis' blatant status as a Soviet puppet. Also, the Parchamis have consistently been more pragmatic and have favored temporary alliances with progressive movements as an intermediate step on the path to socialism, whereas the Khalqis have favored class struggle and a hard line. This approach led the Parchamis to team up with Mohammad Daoud for the coup against his cousin, King Zahir, in July 1973 and for the early stages of his presidency. Currently, it means that the Parchamis are advocating a gradual approach to political, social, and economic change in order to appease the inflamed populace. This policy appears to have the full support of the Soviets.

Recruitment and organization patterns also differed from the beginning of the Afghan leftist movement and are important factors in the present conflict. The Parchamis, although more in the public eye because of the dynamism of Babrak, were a relatively small and loosely organized group. They were intellectuals drawing their support from the urban middle class, professionals, and students and have been described as Afghanistan's "Communist aristocracy."

The Khalq group stayed more in the background but eventually came to be much larger and much better organized than the Parchamis. It recruited primarily among the civil service, the military establishment, and in the countryside. It was also considered to be more Pushtun-dominated than the Parcham party, which, although smaller, reputedly had a broader ethnic base. One member of the Khalq inner circle who was a particularly effective organizer and had special responsibility for recruiting in the military was Amin.

No official current membership figures are available. According to a recent Reuter article from Kabul, there are an estimated 25,000-50,000 Khalqis, while it is believed there were fewer than 10,000 Parchamis at the time of the December coup. These figures give a sense of relative size. They may have been valid for an earlier period, but in light of overwhelming current alienation, they are probably highly inflated.

Feuding Intensified After Successful 1978 Coup

The predominant cause for the current hostility lies in the events of the past 2 years after the Khalq and Parcham groups, having reunited in 1977 following 10 years of estrangement, jointly overthrew President Mohammad Daoud in April 1978.

The unity which brought them to power proved to be short-lived. The Khalqis quickly outmaneuvered the Parcham group and forced Babrak and his closest associates first into diplomatic exile as ambassadors in July 1978 and later into real exile, when they were dismissed from their posts. Other high-ranking Parchamis suffered an even more disagreeable fate in the summer of 1978 when they were accused of plotting against the government, imprisoned, and tortured. During the course of the Taraki and Amin regimes, most of the Parcham leadership and hundreds of lower-ranking members were imprisoned.

When the Soviets invaded in December 1979 and overthrew Amin, who had won out in a power struggle with the subsequently murdered Taraki, they brought the exiled Parcham leadership group with them and reinstated it as the dominant element in the new government. All other Parchamis were subsequently released from imprisonment.

Against this background, it is understandable that the current attempts to reconcile past differences are not succeeding. Parchamis *who suffered* torture from their current Khalq colleagues cannot forget and forgive. One of the most hated figures is Khalqi Deputy Prime Minister Assadullah Sarwari, who was head of the secret police during the Taraki presidency and who is held personally responsible for the torture of some of the Parcham political prisoners, including the other Deputy Prime Minister, Sultan Ali Keshtmand.

Current reports indicate a good deal of maneuvering by each group to discredit and hopefully eliminate the other. The differences are now becoming so acute that they are breaking out into the open and are being reported in the press with increasing frequency. Recently a prominent Parchami newspaper editor, who is a younger brother of Parchami Deputy Prime Minister Keshtmand, was arrested after his paper ran an article and a cartoon critical of former President Taraki. While former President Amin is now treated as an aberrant and responsible for all the mistakes and suppression of the past 2 years, Taraki is still honored and the Khalqis in the present government are loyal to him.

The Khalq faction is apparently opposed to the current Parcham policy, which emphasizes moderation and a respect for Islam designed to placate the hostile populace. The Khalqis reportedly were particularly opposed to issuing the new, less inflammatory flag.

Most important of all, it has been reported by the Press Trust of India correspondent in Kabul that the recently signed Afghan-Soviet treaty covering the status of Soviet troops in Afghanistan has caused sharp divisions within the government and the party. Khalqis are now said to be increasingly opposed to the continued presence of Soviet troops.

On the surface it might appear to be in the Soviets' interests to dispense with the Khalq faction altogether and rely solely on the more amenable and beholden Parchamis. However, Babrak Karmal has failed to win popular support and strongman Khalqi Assadullah Sarwari is said to be a Soviet favorite. Even more important, the superior numerical strength of the Khalq group, and particularly its strength in the military, makes this a less appealing option. If the Khalqis were to go over to the resistance *en masse*, it would make the Soviets' job of pacification even more difficult than it already is.

Some lower-ranking Khalqis may already be joining the resistance ranks, however, and it certainly appears that the Soviets will find it increasingly difficult to keep the lid on the explosive feuding. ■

U.S. Antiterrorism Program

by Anthony C. E. Quainton

Statement before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee held in Newark, New Jersey, on May 19, 1980. Ambassador Quainton is Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism.[1]

Thank you for the opportunity to testify again before your committee concerning the continuing threat of international terrorism. I am pleased to be able to discuss the U.S. Government's antiterrorism program as it has developed over the last year.

Let me first give you some idea of the seriousness of the worldwide threat of terrorism. Over the last 12 years we have recorded over 3,300 acts of international terrorism. Approximately 6,000 innocent people have been injured; 2,700 have been killed. The victims have been Prime Ministers and Ambassadors, school children and teachers, businessmen and farmers. No group has been immune; no continent has been untouched; no country has gone unscathed. Terrorism has undermined and threatened the international order built on a common committment to peace, security, and the rule of law.

Terrorism is a major issue for the United States. There were 293 acts of terrorism last year—77 directed against Americans. Over the last 18 months one U.S. Ambassador has been killed in Afghanistan, another taken hostage in Colombia; our diplomats seized in Tehran, a Peace Corps Volunteer held captive in El Salvador, U.S. businessmen kidnapped in Honduras and El Salvador; seven U.S. soldiers murdered in Turkey. Terrorist violence has become a part of our daily lives.

Internationally we have been working to build upon the widespread agreement that terrorist acts are inadmissible irrespective of the causes in which they are used. Adherences to the key antiterrorist conventions continue to increase. There are now 108 parties to The Hague convention against aircraft piracy, 105 to the Montreal convention against aircraft sabotage, and 44 to the New York convention on the protection of dipiomats. Last December the United Nations, by consensus, opened for signature a convention outlawing the taking of hostages under all circumstances. We were among the first to sign this convention and are actively urging others to do the same.

Here in the United States since 1972 we have had an active program of counterterrorism. Because we have been so frequently the target of terror violence, we have had to respond. We have not stood silently by while terrorists have attempted to disrupt economic and social activity. We have not complacently allowed terrorists to sow the seeds of distrust and fear. We have had a program of action which has concentrated on prevention and deterrence as well as effective crisis management. We have defined a policy which makes clear our opposition to terrorism and our determination to combat it.

At the heart of our policy is the commitment to oppose terrorist blackmail. We will not pay ransom. We care, of course, about the lives which are at stake in a particular incident. But we also must care about the risk to others in the future.

Were the United States to pay ransom, thousands of other Americans around the globe would be at risk. We have conveyed to other governments our hope that they will adopt similar policy stances. Only when all governments come to this same conclusion will the terrorists know that they cannot hope to gain from their violent acts. Unfortunately in the last decade, more often than not the terrorist has won; each victory has provided a new incentive for future acts.

It is not, however, sufficient to have a vigorous policy. It must be backed up by concrete actions. We must have good intelligence; we must have sound physical security; we must have the ability to respond quickly and effectively in a crisis.

A critical element of any counterterrorist program is intelligence. If we can be forewarned of terrorist plans, we can take measures to thwart those plans. When a terrorist act takes place, we need to know as much as possible about his *modus operandi*, his personality, his propensity to kill. With that knowledge we can begin to resolve the incident. We are giving high priority to the intelligence needs of our counterterrorist program. However, we will never have all the information we would like, for terrorist groups are hard to penetrate, and our resources are limited.

Because we will not always know

International Terrorist Attacks on US Citizens or Property, 1968-79, by Category of Target

Target	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total[1]
Diplomatic officials or property	12	17	52	51	22	19	12	12	12	21	22	21	**273 (20.3)**
Military officials or property	4	2	38	36	11	12	12	9	33	40	30	7	**204 (15.1)**
Other Government officials or property	26	32	57	21	20	10	16	14	2	7	2	10	**217 (16.1)**
Business facilities or executives	6	35	24	40	44	51	86	42	52	33	47	27	**487 (36.2)**
Private citizens	3	7	17	5	12	10	13	27	26	13	21	12	**166 (12.3)**
Total	**51**	**93**	**188**	**153**	**109**	**102**	**139**	**104**	**125**	**84**	**122**	**77**	**1,347**

[1] Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of target.

International Coffee Organization
Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S. income tax reimbursement. Effected by exchange of letters at London Mar. 20 and 25, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 31, 1980; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Japan
Agreement on cooperation in research and development in science and technology. Signed at Washington May 1, 1980. Entered into force May 1, 1980.

Malawi
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Lilongwe Mar. 20 and May 1, 1980. Entered into force May 1, 1980.

Mexico
Agreement amending the agreement of Apr. 18, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5043, 8185, 9641), relating to the assignment and use of television channels along the U.S.-Mexican border. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico and Tlatelolco Jan. 22 and Apr. 7, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1980.

Agreement relating to additional cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at México Apr. 7, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 7. 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement of June 2, 1977, (TIAS 8952), as amended (TIAS 9251, 9637, 9695), relating to additional cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 11, 1980.

Netherlands
Agreement relating to cooperation between the U.S. and the Netherlands Antilles regarding a hurricane monitoring and forecasting program for the Caribbean, with memorandum of arrangement. Effected by exchange of notes at The Hague July 26, 1979.
Entered into force: May 8, 1980.

Panama
Agreement concerning air traffic control and related services, with annexes. Signed at Panama Jan. 8, 1979.
Entered into force: Apr. 23, 1980.

Interim agreement relating to continued use of lands and installations for purposes of air traffic control and related services, with related note. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.
Terminated: Apr. 23, 1980.

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over vessels utilizing the Louisiana offshore oil port. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Mar. 21 and 24, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 24, 1980.

Rwanda
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Kigali Mar. 6 and 11, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 11, 1980.

Togo
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Government and the Export-Import Bank of the U.S., with annexes. Signed at Lome Mar. 28, 1980.
Entered into force: May 2, 1980.

Tunisia
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of June 7, 1976, (TIAS 8506), with minutes of negotiation. Signed at Tunis Apr. 17, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 17, 1980.

Turkey
Implementing agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to the Agency for International Development. Signed at Ankara Apr. 22, 1980. Enters into force upon receipt by Turkey of written notice that domestic U.S. laws and regulations covering debt rescheduling concerning the Dec. 11, 1979, rescheduling agreement have been complied with.

Tuvalu
Agreement relating to treaty obligations assumed by Tuvalu upon its independence. Effected by exchange of notes at Suva and Funafuti Jan. 29 and Apr. 25, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 25, 1980.

United Kingdom
Agreement amending the agreement of July 23, 1977, as amended, (TIAS 8641, 8811, 8965) concerning air services. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Dec. 27, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1979.

Yugoslavia
Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation. Signed at Belgrade Apr. 2, 1980. Enters into force upon notification to the Government of the U.S. by the Government of Yugoslavia that it has fulfilled all necessary legal requirements for concluding this agreement.

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[1] With reservation, designations, and declarations.
[2] Not in force.
[3] Chapter II not in force for the U.S.
[4] For articles 13 through 30.
[5] Not in force for the U.S. ■

May 1980

Events pertaining to Iran may be found on page 72.

May 1
U.S.-Japan sign 5-year agreement for cooperation in scientific and technological research and development.

May 2
U.S. declares four Libyan diplomats "not acceptable" for conduct inconsistent with the normal role of a diplomat and gives them 72 hours to leave the U.S. State Department instructs its two diplomats in Tripoli to leave Libya temporarily.

May 3
To save the Moscow summer games, Olympic committees of most West European countries issue the following eight-point proposal to eliminate politics from the Olympics:

- Athletes would not march in the opening parade; each national delegation would be represented by a flag bearer and a name board;
- Instead of its nation's flag, each team would use the Olympic flag;
- Olympic hymn would replace the national anthems;
- Olympic flag and hymn would be used at the opening and closing ceremonies and at the presentations of medals;
- Atheletes' clothes would display only the badge of their national Olypmic committee and an identification badge;
- Political speeches would be barred from opening ceremony;
- Each delegation would confine its activities to sporting events; and
- National committees would not participate in the international youth camp organized by the Russians in connection with the Olympics.

May 4
Yugoslav President Tito dies.
NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns makes official visit to Washington, D.C. May 4–6.

May 5
Four Libyan diplomats fail to depart the U.S. in compliance with the May 2 order and take refuge in the Libyan People's Bureau (embassy).
Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis is elected President of Greece.
U.S. suspends immigrant visa and refugee program for Cubans at the Interests Section in Havana until the Cuban Government guarantees the safety of people who come to the Interests Section to conduct normal business.

May 6

President Carter announces his intention to appoint Griffin Bell, former Attorney General, and Max M. Kampelman, Washington Attorney and Chairman of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, to serve as Chairman and Cochairman, respectively, of the U.S. delegation to the review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be held in Madrid in November 1980.

May 7

By a vote of 94 to 2, the Senate confirms the appointment of Senator Edmond S. Muskie as Secretary of State.

White House announces that Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, will be used as an additional temporary site to house Cuban refugees awaiting resettlement. Fort Chaffee was used in 1975 as a temporary housing facility for Indochina refugees.

May 8

Senator Muskie is sworn in as Secretary of State.

By a vote of 14–0, with 1 abstention (U.S.), the U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 468 which calls on Israel to rescind the "illegal" deportation of three West Bank Arab leaders.

President Sadat calls for a postponement of the Palestinian autonomy talks so that he can review their status with his senior advisers.

Conference on the humanitarian aspects of the Cuban refugee problem is held in San Jose. The following countries participate: Brazil, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Australia, U.K., Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, Italy, Uruguay, Venezuela, Colombia, Spain, the Netherlands, Canada, F.R.G., Switzerland, Costa Rica, and the United States. U.S. delegation is headed by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, William G. Bowdler, and Ambassador Frank E. Loy, Deputy Coordinator of Refugee Programs. Other participants include the Vatican, OAS, ICEM, representatives from the Office of the UNHCR, Inter-American Human Rights Commission, Inter-American Human Rights Court, EEC, and the ICRC.

Conference representatives agree on five major objectives:

- Recognition of the international character of the problem;
- Need for all governments, including those not represented in San Jose, to establish a program for resettlement for those wishing to leave Cuba and for financial relief. The UNHCR and the ICEM are asked to make an emergency plea for an offer of assistance;
- Prompt commitment by a number of countries, at the conference itself, of resettlement and financial resources;
- Formation of a group of countries, including the U.S., which will jointly and individually seek the Cuban Government's cooperation in finding a mutually satisfactory solution to this urgent problem; and
- Agreement to maintain awareness of the problem and to meet, in the near future, to review progress made and to consider any additional measures which could bring about a solution.

Official U.S. delegation to Tito's funeral, headed by Vice President Mondale, arrives in Belgrade.

May 9

Libyan Government agrees to recall four diplomats who had taken refuge in the People's Bureau.

May 10

Secretary Muskie recalls U.S. Ambassadors to Egypt and Israel to review with them and Ambassador Linowitz the Palestinian autonomy talks.

May 11

Four Libyan diplomats depart U.S.

May 12

U.S.-Canada agree to extend the current North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) agreement for 1 year.

May 13

Secretary Muskie makes official visit to Brussels to attend a joint ministerial session (Defense and Foreign Ministers) of the NATO Defense Planning Committee, May 13–15. He also visits Vienna, May 15–16, to represent the U.S. at the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Austrian State Treaty. While in Vienna, he confers with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, the first meeting of high-level officials of the Soviet Union and the U.S. in 8 months.

May 14

Members of NATO's Defense Planning Committee rebuke Moscow for its invasion of Afghanistan and agree on military measures to strengthen Western defenses because of that action.

Saudi Arabian Government increases its crude oil prices by $2 a barrel, to $28, retroactive to April 1.

Yugoslav Cvijetin Mijatovic is elected President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the system of rotation planned by Tito.

President Sadat, in a speech to his National Assembly on reorganization of his government, says that he is ready to resume the autonomy negotiations at President Carter's request.

May 15

President Sadat states through Boutros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, that Egypt's plans to resume the autonomy negotiations are again in abeyance due to Egypt's understanding that the Israeli Knesset has passed a bill giving Israel sovereignty over Jerusalem. Despite clarification, i.e., that no such bill was passed although draft legislation proposed on the issue by opposition members was referred to the committee, the negotiations remain in suspension.

May 16

Governing Liberal Democratic Party of Japanese Prime Minister Ohira gets a vote of "no confidence" in Parliament.

May 17

Eleventh Islamic Foreign Ministers conference convenes in Pakistan for a 5-day session. Thirty-nine delegations, including 27 foreign ministers attend. Of the countries expected to attend, only Chad's representative does not arrive. Egypt and Afghanistan are suspended from the group.

May 18

After 12 years of military rule, Peruvians vote for a President and a Congress.

Rudolf Kirchschlager is re-elected to a second 6-year term as President of Austria.

May 20

By a vote of 14–0, with 1 abstention (U.S.), U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 469 which "strongly deplores" Israel's failure to abide by Resolution 468, approved on May 8.

May 22

Eleventh Islamic conference ends, having discussed Soviet intervention into Afghanistan, Iran, the Middle East, and Indian Ocean issues.

May 25

Chinese Vice Premier Geng Biao makes official visit to U.S., May 25–June 5.

May 26

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher heads U.S. delegation to the U.N. Geneva Conference on Kampuchean Relief, May 26–27.

Goal passes for completing the negotiations for West Bank/Gaza autonomy with the talks not in session, but with all three parties stating their intentions to continue them through to success.

May 28

Thailand Foreign Minister Siddhi Savelsila makes official visit to Washington, D.C., May 28–June 4.

May 29

Senior business executives of the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council meet in Washington, D.C. ■

Last year in Tokyo our decisions aimed at establishing a ceiling and at reducing our oil imports. These were decisions that it was necessary for us to take but which were of a defensive, negative nature.

In Venice we have taken a different decision, and I invite you to understand the importance of this. It's expressed by a sentence in our communique, and it is our decision to break the link between oil imports and economic growth. We have set ourselves a limit of 10 years in which to break this link and, in particular, in order to efface in public opinion the feeling of anxiety, the feeling of uncertainty about the economic growth of our countries, given a high level of oil imports.

We could have confined ourselves to expressing this in very general terms. And our communique, which I think will be distributed to you shortly, contains, in fact, quite specific indications with regard to energy savings. We have decided that we shall build no new generating stations which are oil fired. We have taken measures with regard to savings to be made in the heating of dwellings and public buildings, with regard to the consumption of petrol by automobiles and other motor vehicles.

We have also taken decisions with regard to the development of alternative energy sources. As you know, there are three main sources: coal, nuclear electricity, and new energy sources. And here the target that we have set ourselves is to effect a saving by 1990 of between 15 and 20 million barrels a day of oil by using these new energy sources.

The Latin countries, that are more familiar with units expressed in millions of tons of petrol—this means that by 1990 our seven countries will, together, be producing the equivalent of 1 billion tons of oil in all equivalents—1 billion tons.

This means that between 1980 and 1990 we shall be doubling our coal production. It means that we shall be carrying forward our efforts to develop nuclear powerplants. As you know, France is making a major effort in this respect, and we shall maintain these efforts. And lastly, it means that we shall develop alternative energy sources: biomass, geothermal energy, and solar energy. And lastly, we shall be lending assistance to new producer countries, developing countries that could develop new oil resources.

If we manage to achieve all of this, we shall, in fact, reduce the link that exists between oil imports and economic growth to the following extent. Up until the 1974 crisis, when we underwent the economic growth of 100, oil imports went up by 100. At the present time, subsequent to our initial efforts, when economic growth goes up by 100, our oil imports go up by 90 or even 80. And in 1990, when our economic growth goes up by 100, our oil imports will be going up by only 60. Thus, we shall have broken the link that exists between economic growth and oil imports.

We shall be reducing our oil share, that's currently at 53% of our imports down to 40% by 1990. And as far as France is concerned, this figure will be substantially less. The goal we set ourselves is to bring the oil share in our energy consumption down to a figure of between 28% and 33% by 1990; in other words, far beyond the common goals that we have set ourselves.

A second point is aid to development.

We've said, first of all, that aid to development in the world is a responsibility that we all must share, a responsibility that is shared by all countries. And we have decided to devote thought to the mechanisms which are appropriate to the development of states in the decade 1980 to 1990. And the conclusions of the thinking that we have devoted to this, indeed, will be at the forefront of our next summit, that is to say in 1981.

And then lastly, we have emphasized that fact that we shall be making an active contribution to the very necessary dialogue that must be established between North and South.

Here you have the main features of what I have noted from our work. And now, as I'm here with Helmut Schmidt and we are two of the founding fathers of these summit meetings, because we participated at the first in Rambouillet and each summit since, I would just like to say, by way of conclusion, that the Venice summit represents a very marked progress in this institution in the way in which it functions and in its usefulness.

And then, last of all, if you would allow me, I would like to say that I shall leave Venice in a short time with great regret, and it is with great joy and pleasure that one day I shall return.

President Carter

Our meeting is ending in a spirit of gratifying concord and mutual confidence. We have joined in unity to prepare an agenda for both individual and common action.

From the history of this beautiful city, we have drawn an important lesson, that even the most secure political powers must act in time in order to shape great changes. The republic of Venice left us with incomparable beauty, which we have observed to our great pleasure. Yet in the end, its leaders failed to meet the threats of change pressing in from the east and failed to seize the opportunities for change which were opening then in the west. We are determined not to repeat these same errors.

All of us who served in positions of leadership recognize that the decade of the 1970s was a period of great difficulty and great challenge, of struggle against unpredictable and uncontrollable change. Yet we all recognize that the 1980s might very well be much more difficult, much more challenging, and much more unpredictable.

Free peoples face hard choices. The freedoms that make our nations strong are at risk in the decade of the 1980s. And we have pledged ourselves here, during this Venice conference, to secure those freedoms for the 1990s and even to the end of this century. The challenges are both political and economic in nature.

We've committed our combined strength and our influence and our voices against a ruthless power's invasion of its nearby defenseless neighbor, which threatens the stability of a crucial area of the world for us all. The Soviet aggression in Afghanistan is a profound assault against the laws of nations and a grave threat to the stability of that vital region.

We've pledged to oppose this Soviet invasion with the means at our disposal, and do this because it is a moral imperative and also a strategic imperative. We also know that by resisting Soviet militarism and aggression in the present that we can reopen the paths of peace, detente, accommodation in the future.

We've demonstrated our almost unique unity in our opposition to terrorism, hijacking, to the attacks on innocent diplomatic personnel, and toward the alleviation of the suffering of many millions of refugees around the world.

We are also committed to the same unity of purpose in overcoming our

common economic challenges. We continue to battle the inflationary forces that poison the confidence on which our economic systems are built. That battle, as we all know too well, is far from won. It compels us to a greater common effort.

Our own nation has been effective, since the convention of this summit in Tokyo, in reducing oil imports, reversing a longstanding upward trend. I just received the figures today that the first months of this year our nation's oil imports are down 13.4% below the same months last year, an indication not particularly of our own achievement but of the results of these summits, which have been felt so tangibly on the lives of our people in the past.

We are resolved, as the President of France has said, to break the link between our economic growth and our oil consumption. We have set ambitious goals for alternative energy sources to replace oil with coal, shale, energy deduced from the Sun, energy reduced from growing crops and trees, equivalent to between 15 and 20 million barrels of oil per day by the end of this decade. And we've agreed on concrete, definite actions with which to achieve this goal. It is a figure not idly given to the public. We feel this commitment binding on all of us.

Here, both in oil consumption and in the exploration and development of alternative energy sources, including our enormous coal reserves—six or seven times greater than all the known oil reserves in the world—is an adventure, an exciting opportunity for us, of our imagination and of our skill.

And finally, another challenge confronts us in the poor nations of the world, those nations which have been especially crippled by the unwarranted and excessive increases in the price of oil set by the OPEC nations [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries]. Here, again, we must match our concern with concrete action, for without such action, we will face an accelerating cycle of alienation and despair and disorder. We will study this question of aid, assistance, trade in great depth between now and next year when this summit conference is convened again.

We share responsibility with each other and with those developing nations to achieve a better life for all. We know that the hunger that afflicts many of these people is not only for food, which our nation, thank God, has in abundance, but it's a hunger also for mutual respect, for mutual understanding, and for mutual support, which we are dedicated freely to give to one another. We recognize that hunger for equality of treatment and concern, and we've resolved to do everything we can do to alleviate it with dignity and with equal treatment.

(White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)

The participants in the Venice economic summit (left to right): Japanese Foreign Minister Okita, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau, West German Chancellor Schmidt, French President Giscard d'Estaing, Italian Prime Minister Cossiga, President Carter, British Prime Minister Thatcher, and EC Commission President Jenkins.

What we do in facing these dangers and opportunities is a measure of our will to survive as free societies. There's no longer much real distinction that can be drawn between domestic affairs and foreign affairs, between military strength and energy or economic strength, between economic health and political vitality. These factors and the characteristics of a life in a nation are intimately entwined and inseparable. All these elements must be fused together to provide the basis for genuine security—security for the future as well as for the present.

Here in Venice, we have confronted this broad range of challenges together, and together we have fashioned our responses. Our hosts, by their gift of hospitality, have opened this path and opportunity of harmony and tangible cooperation to us.

We owe our thanks to the authorities of the Italian Republic for preparing and coordinating our work, and particularly for our chairman—Prime Minister Cossiga—for the people of Venice who have made our stay here so pleasant. We leave this meeting thankful for their help, inspired by their example in solving problems for themselves, and committed to show in our common work how much we honor the sacrifices they have made for our own convenience.

We will now return to our own countries to ask more sacrifices of ourselves. There will undoubtedly be some who will oppose the pledges of action we've taken and given each other here. Some will seek to delay the implementation of our action. But I'm confident that our democratic societies will assume these burdens of freedom in freedom, rather than subsequently, if we

Visit to Rome

President Carter left Washington, D.C., June 19, 1980, for a state visit to Rome June 19–21, before participating in the seven-nation economic summit meeting in Venice (see page 1).

Following are the toasts exchanged at a state dinner and the text of the joint press statement.[1]

DINNER TOASTS, JUNE 20, 1980[2]

President Pertini

I am particularly happy to welcome you, Mrs. Carter, and your entourage on your first visit to Italy, which falls at a particularly delicate and difficult moment in international affairs and on the eve of the Venice summit. Public opinion in our countries looks to this opportunity for obtaining an unambiguous and reassuring answer to the problems and uncertainties which lie before us.

Although at many similar occasions and meetings in the past we have sought to emphasize how numerous and how close are the traditional ties which unite our two peoples and nations, permit me to once again recall our substantial convergence of views.

The ties of friendship between Italy and the United States are deep-rooted and immutable and extend back through history to one of my fellow countrymen who opened up the frontier with the New World. This long history tells of the irresistible passage of men and ideas across the vastness of the ocean.

I am thinking now of the influence that the American Revolution had on movements for Italian unification and independence, the political and cultural interaction between Italy and the United States in the first half of the 19th century, which witnessed the first mass emigration of Italian labor to the United States, particularly from the most depressed areas of the Italian south. From that emigration a whole group of your countrymen originated, those of Italian extraction who made their mark through their hard work, tenacity, patience, and affection, both for their country of adoption and their distant motherland in the Old World.

Nor can we Italians forget that at the darkest hour in our national history—and not ours alone—there came from the United States the decisive intervention against fascism and nazism, the moral support and the economic aid which permitted our ravaged and exhausted country to rebuild and regain its place within the international community.

Casting my mind back to our struggle, I am bound to recall that noble message which Franklin Delano Roosevelt delivered to the U.S. Congress in the wartime winter of 1944. His conception of liberty was the same for which we were fighting—we Italian patriots in the mountains, towns, and cities—and it was for this same liberty that the European resistance and the Allies fought. It was a total political and social conception of liberty which remains today the fundamental value for which we and our two countries are still fighting today.

I want now to take two quotations from that Roosevelt speech on which we all should meditate.

> This Republic had its beginning, and grew to its present strength, under the protection of certain inalienable political rights—among them the right of free speech, free press, free worship, trial by jury, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. They were our rights to life and liberty.

This great President then finalized this idea with these words.

> We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. Necessitous men are not free men. People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made. In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident. We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all—regardless of station, race or creed.

This conception of liberty should be championed and consistently safeguarded in the international order also, in relations between all peoples, with the developing countries and with the Third World, which has so great a need for help from the industrialized nations to resolve the frequently life-and-death alternatives which encroach on all sides.

While I speak, millions of human beings are fighting against hunger. In 1979, 18 million children in the world died of malnutrition. This slaughter of the innocents is a condemnation which weighs heavily on the consciences of every statesman—and I am no exception. To resolve these agonizing problems means to strengthen that liberty proclaimed in the noble words of President Roosevelt.

To defend this liberty intact and indivisible, the United States has twice set foot on the old continent; these two memorable landings I myself lived through during the First and Second World Wars. And the gravestones recalling those American soldiers who laid down their lives that Europe might be free remain an everlasting monument to the defense of liberty.

These men, indeed, died for Europe's freedom, since the United States was not drawn to Europe by desire for conquest but only the firm resolution to stem the rising tide of authoritarian regimes. These men—I repeat—came to defend our liberty.

Italy is committed to a policy of dialogue and detente in its awareness of the need for contacts which foster an understanding of the stances adopted by others and make its own position understood; this in the conviction that detente is the only possible way forward if a dangerous and complex spiral is to be avoided in international relations. Only an overall climate able to contribute to the maintenance of relations of friendship and confidence and effectively place relations between states in a framework within which elements of opposition and controversy can be settled and their causes progressively reduced.

This is the spirit which inspires our participation in the Atlantic alliance, just as this is also the spirit which guides our staunch commitment to the creation of a politically unified Europe. Both these undertakings seem the surest means of removing the threats to peace, reducing tension, and achieving all those essential conditions for the peaceful and harmonious development of our peoples.

It is, nevertheless, necessary, particularly at a time when the future is so overshadowed with uncertainties, to succeed in expressing that Western solidarity to which we refer. This solidarity must, therefore, be translated into concerted and united positions on the major problems which confront us. If, indeed, a lesson can be learned from the analysis of the present political situation and outlook, it is surely the need—or urgency, rather—to strengthen ties, to create new forms of consultation and cooperation, in common recognition of the commitment which makes all of us equally indispensable to collective security.

It is for these reasons that we feel profound solidarity and sympathy with the feelings of the people of the United States and for the stand taken by the U.S. Government over the distressing issue of the Tehran hostages. I personally understand the agony of your thoughts: to be forced to adopt embittered caution to avoid a global conflict. I have often asked myself what would have happened if the hostages had been of some other nationality. I am proud to have been the first to express full solidarity with you and to dispatch a firm protest to the Tehran authorities.

Our support of a friendly nation and ally is at this time inspired above all by concern for what is needed to restore as quickly as possible a situation of legality which has been so brutally overthrown. These events risk involving that overall climate of international relations in the overthrow of rules which traditionally govern relations between states, when it is that climate which is the cornerstone of the very existence of states founded on the rule of law.

For these same reasons, Italy is opposed to any depature from the principle of constantly striving to safeguard detente. In particular, Italy deplores that most serious departure currently perpetrated in Afghanistan. This, indeed, jeopardizes not only local equilibria but also the general principles governing coexistence between peoples.

Yet again, therefore, we voice our firm protest against the brutal invasion of that country. With our own memories of the struggle against foreign powers which occupied and oppressed our country, we send out from this place, which is today honored by your presence, a message of brotherly solidarity to the Afghan partriots who are heroically pursuing their struggle against the invader. It would be cowardice to resign ourselves to the criminal act which has been committed, and cowardice is the main enemy not only of peace but also of democracy.

The task of defending peace and democracy in the world must be a common task. Europe must take its own responsibility for this onerous task if it is to survive; this responsibility can validly be undertaken by Europe to the degree to which the continent can succeed in achieving its unity. But this unity will never be obtained unless we learn to put aside our egotism and individual interests and permit the admission of nations such as Spain and Portugal to the European Community.

(White House photo by Karl Schumacher)

President and Mrs. Carter with President Pertini in the Sala D'Ercola in Quirinale Palace in Rome. The interpreter is between the two Presidents.

I still vividly recall my recent visit to Spain. This nation, which has without bloodshed made the transition from a long dictatorship to democracy, is today totally committed to its social and economic rebirth under the guidance of a young and wise sovereign.

A truly united Europe will never come into being while we continue to create restricted "executive boards," or worse, even more limited bodies. The nations of democratic Europe—all nations, without discriminations of any sort—must take their place with equal rights and equal obligations. Italy has shown that it can fulfull its obligation, but it intends to see its rights and, above all, its national dignity, properly safeguarded.

You are familiar with discriminations which have been practiced or attempted toward Italy. The United States has supported us, and for this we are grateful. Yet permit me, nevertheless, as a representative of Italy—this country to which I have dedicated my whole life—to lodge my protest.

These discriminations are senseless, because they do not take into consideration the strategic importance derived from the nation's geographical position. Italy is a democratic bridge uniting Europe with Africa and the Middle East, and in the alarming event that this bridge should be destroyed, not only would the Mediterranean area be destabilized but world peace itself placed in jeopardy. Moreover, the terrorism in our country is probably aimed at just this objective.

With equal rights and equal obligations for each member and without these absurd discriminations, European unity can be truly created. Then, and only then, Europe, which has been a battlefield for centuries, can become through its human, cultural, technological, and industrial potential a land of solidarity. A Europe on these lines could truly contribute to the strengthening and defense of world peace.

With these intentions and these remarks, I propose this toast to ever closer ties between Italy and the United States, to your own personal well-being and that of Mrs. Carter and all those present.

President Carter

It's a great honor for me to be here on a trip of great economic importance to our nation and also one of political and diplomatic significance to our two nations and also to the world.

My entire family has been here before me, and I have to admit that the best diplomat is not the one speaking to you. I remember when my mother arrived in Italy without any instructions from the diplomatic corps, she made three statements: First of all, she said she had always, through her entire life, wanted to meet the Pope; secondly, she congratulated Italy on choosing such a young President; and third she says, "I have never met an ugly Italian man." [Laughter.]

I learn a lot from these visits. One piece of advice that I've gotten from the President is that when I go to Spain, I

readiness to support the efforts of Yugoslavia toward stabilization and further development of its economy. Appreciation was expressed for the contribution already being made to strengthening U.S.-Yugoslav economic relations by the U.S.-Yugoslav Economic Council, the Yugoslav Chamber for Promotion of Economic Cooperation with the U.S., and the U.S.-Yugoslav economic working groups.

The two sides favorably noted the measures taken to prevent acts of violence against Yugoslavia and its diplomatic, consular, and other representatives in the United States and in prosecuting the perpetrators. President Carter reiterated the commitment of the U.S. Government not to tolerate such terrorist activities, which are against the interests of the United States and are also against the good relations between the two countries.

President Carter and the President of the SFRY Presidency expressed great concern over the serious deterioration in the international situation which represents a threat to world peace. With the objective of halting the current dangerous trend in international relations, and of renewing the disrupted process of detente, they affirmed the need for strict respect for the spirit and principles of the U.N. Charter, especially those which refer to the inadmissibility of the application of force, of intervention and interference in the affairs of other countries, of the imposition of alien will on sovereign states, whatever the form or justification, and of the blocking of their independent internal development.

On these bases the two sides emphasized the importance of broadening the process of negotiations and cooperation in the world, as well as the need for a comprehensive process of detente which should include the largest possible number of countries, and be based on strict respect for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all states. This was judged to be all the more significant as the world is undergoing great change requiring reciprocal restraint on the part of all countries from actions which disrupt world peace and stability. They reaffirmed the role of the United Nations as an essential instrument for preserving peace, for the peaceful settlement of disputes, and for strengthening cooperation in the world.

The discussion also encompassed general questions of security and cooperation in Europe. Both sides affirmed the obligation to implement all provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and stressed their determination to strengthen the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] process and to work for balanced progress in all areas at the Madrid meeting, in the conviction that doing so would improve security and cooperation among all signatories of the Final Act, and would have broader significance.

The two sides exchanged views on the consequences of further arms competition from the standpoint of preserving peace and security, the current worsening international situation, and the need for general economic development. They agreed on the need resolutely to pursue effective, equitable, and verifiable arms limitation, arms reduction, and disarmament agreements based on the principles of undiminished security of all states. The objective should be gradual reduction of armaments to the lowest possible level consistent with the security and stability of all nations, with the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The two sides took note of the significance of the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. They also agreed upon the urgent need for further progress through negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral, toward the limitation and reduction of nuclear and conventional armaments.

Special attention was devoted in the discussions to the worsening situation of developing countries and of the international economic situation as a whole. Proceeding from the growing interdependence of all nations, it was mutually affirmed that there is an urgent need to seek solutions to unresolved questions and to seek the equitable harmonization of the economic interests of all countries. The two sides agreed on the far-reaching political im-

Yugoslavia—A Profile

Geography

Area: 99,000 sq. mi. (about two-thirds the size of California). **Capital:** Belgrade (pop. 1.3 million). **Other Cities:** Zagreb (700,000), Skopje (440,000), Sarajevo (400,000), Ljubljana (300,000).

People

Population: 22 million (1980 est.). **Density:** 20 per sq. mi. **Annual Growth Rate:** 1%. **Ethnic Groups:** 40% Serbs, 22% Croats, 8% Slovenes, 8% Bosnian Muslims, 6% Macedonians, 6% Albanians, 2% Montenegrin Serbs, 2% Hungarians, 1% Turks. **Religions:** Eastern Orthodox (Serbian and Macedonian), Roman Catholic, Islam. **Languages:** Serbo-Croatian, Slovene, Macedonian, Albanian, Hungarian. **Literacy:** 85%. **Life Expectancy:** 68 yrs.

Government

Official Name: Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). **Type:** Federal Republic. **Independence:** Dec. 1, 1918. **Date of Constitution:** February 1974. **Branches:** *Executive*—Presidency of the SFRY (Chief of State, President of the Presidency of the SFRY, 1-yr. term), Prime Minister (Head of Government and President of the Federal Executive Council), Cabinet (Federal Executive Council). *Legislative*—bicameral SFRY Assembly (Federal Council of 220 delegates and Council of the Republics and Provinces of 58 delegates). *Judicial*—Constitutional Court. **Political Party:** League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). **Suffrage:** Universal over 18. **Subdivisions:** 6 Republics, 2 autonomous provinces.

Economy

GNP: $69 billion (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 7.5%. **Per Capita GNP:** $3,109. **Natural Resources:** Bauxite, timber, antimony, chromium, lead, zinc, asbestos, mercury, cadmium. **Agriculture:** *Land*—33% arable. *Products*—corn, wheat, tobacco, sugarbeets. *Work force*—48%. **Industries:** Wood, processed food, nonferrous metals, machinery, textiles. **Trade (1979):** *Exports*—$6.5 billion: nonferrous metals, machinery and metal products, wood products, textiles, food, tobacco. *Imports*—$12.9 billion: machinery and metal products, fuels, chemicals, iron and steel, food products. *Partners*—F.R.G., U.S.S.R., Italy, U.S. **Official Exchange Rate:** 27.3 dinars = US$1.00. **U.S. Economic Assistance:** $2.9 billion (1951–67), including $700 million in grant military assistance (1951–59). U.S. economic development ceased Jan. 1, 1967; $10 million in earthquake reconstruction assistance in 1979.

Membership in International Organizations

U.N. and its specialized agencies, GATT, IBRD, IMF, IAEA, CEMA (observer status), OECD, INTELSAT.

Principal Government Officials

Yugoslavia: President of the SFRY Presidency—Cvijetin Mijatovic (until May 1981); President of the Federal Executive Council (Prime Minister)—Veselin Djuranovic (until May 1982); Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs—Josip Vrhovec; Ambassador to the U.S.—Budomir Loncar; Ambassador to the U.N.—Miljan Komatina. **United States:** Ambassador to Yugoslavia—Lawrence S. Eagleburger.

portance of the continuation of a constructive dialogue between industrial and developing countries and on the furthering of international economic cooperation on a more stable and just basis. They especially emphasized the importance of greater support of the industrially developed countries for the more rapid development of developing countries and of the importance of the global negotiations on these questions. They expressed the hope that these negotiations will achieve productive results for the benefit of all, and particularly for developing countries, which would be in the interest of the more efficient functioning of the entire world economy.

Considering the various aspects of human rights, the two sides also agreed that efforts to enhance respect for human rights in all countries should proceed in accord with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act.

Agreeing upon the need to invest decisive effort toward the equitable solution of both previously existing and new crises in the world, the U.S. and the Yugoslav sides assessed current developments in the Near East, South Africa, Southwest and Southeast Asia, and other areas.

The two sides expressed their special concern about the situation in the Middle East, which remains a source of great tension in international affairs. They agreed on the urgent need to find a comprehensive, just, and lasting solution to the problems of the Middle East and explained in detail their respective views on the current situation.

Turning to southern Africa, the American and Yugoslav sides condemned racism in all forms and the South African system of apartheid. They expressed their support for efforts directed at the achievement of majority rule and national independence in Namibia. They welcomed recent developments in Zimbabwe.

Both sides emphasized the need to respect the right of Iran to independence and to nonalignment, as well as its right to determine its own internal development and orientation in international affairs without outside interference and pressure. They agreed that the release of the U.S. diplomats held hostage in Iran and the peaceful resolution by the U.S. and Iran of the issues between them, on the basis of principles of the U.N. Charter, would greatly contribute to peace and stability in this region.

The two sides called for an end to military intervention and all other forms of interference in the internal affairs of independent countries. Both sides emphasized the need for the foreign troops involved to be withdrawn and an end put to all causes of suffering and sacrifice in such countries. They also called for further humanitarian efforts by the international community to resolve the problems of refugees.

In this connection, each side elaborated its viewpoint on ways to resolve the situations which have arisen in Afghanistan and Kampuchea, emphasizing the need to respect the rights of all peoples to determine their own destiny.

President Carter and the President of the Presidency of SFRY emphasized the significance of nonalignment as an independent factor in international affairs. President Carter affirmed that the United States respects the desire of the nonaligned states to determine their own internal development and orientation in international affairs.

President Carter reiterated the continuing respect and support of the United States for the independence, territorial integrity, and unity of Yugoslavia. The United States considers an independent and nonaligned Yugoslavia an important factor for balance, peace, and stability in Europe and the world.

The two sides emphasized their determination to further expand and to enrich qualitatively the current successful development of friendly relations between the SFRY and the U.S.A., on the basis of equality and with full mutual respect for the differences in each other's social system and international position.

President Carter extended an invitation to the President of the Presidency of the SFRY to visit the United States and the invitation was accepted with pleasure.

[1] Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June, 30, 1980, which also includes a White House statement and the President's exchange with reporters during a tour of Kalemegdan Park on June 24 and the President's departure statement on June 25.

[2] Made at the welcoming ceremony at Surcin Airport.

[3] Made in response to a toast by President Mijatovic in the Federal Hall of the Palace of the Federation.

[4] The list of participants in the talks is not printed here. ■

Visit to Madrid

From Belgrade President Carter traveled to Madrid for an official visit June 25–26, 1980.

Following are President Carter's toast at a state luncheon and the text of a press statement issued at the conclusion of the visit.[1]

PRESIDENT CARTER'S LUNCHEON TOAST, JUNE 25, 1980[2]

This is a great moment for me to be here and to bring you and your people the warm good wishes of the Government and people of the United States of America. It is a special pleasure, because of my great personal interest in your language and culture.

Four hundred years ago, Spain was the superpower of the Western World, and the Spanish of that day left a legend of vision and courage that has never been forgotten. During that golden age, painters like El Greco and Velasquez and writers like Cervantes and Lope de Vega taught the world new ways to see and to feel. The Spanish explorers were the astronauts of their day, bravely probing new worlds with unforeseen dangers and difficulties. All of us have benefited from this greatness of Spain.

My own State of Georgia began as a very small outpost of the Spanish Empire. The first European to set foot there was Hernando de Soto in 1540. Georgia was a Spanish colony for a much longer time than it was an English colony.

I speak of the historic influence of Spain because it is so obvious that Spain's courage and greatness prevail today. In little more than 4 years, you have created a vigorous, thriving democracy, with respect for human rights, individual liberties, and freedom of expression. The task has not been easy. You have had to contend with worldwide recession, with enormous increases in energy costs, and with ancient and sometimes divisive internal challenges. Yet you have succeeded brilliantly in rebuilding old institutions and creating new ones.

The growth of Spanish democracy has been a tonic for the entire Western World. Spain refutes the false contention that the sweep of history is invari-

International Terrorist Attack on US Citizens or Property, 1968-79, by Category of Attack

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total[1]
Kidnaping	1	2	17	9	2	20	8	20	7	4	5	5	**100 (7.4)**
Barricade-hostage	0	0	3	0	1	2	2	1	1	3	0	3	**16 (1.2)**
Letter bombing	2	1	2	0	3	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	**12 (0.9)**
Incendiary bombing	12	18	40	26	13	19	25	4	36	24	49	39	**275 (20.4)**
Explosive bombing	30	58	77	93	73	52	90	63	44	35	40	38	**693 (51.4)**
Armed attack	1	4	3	4	6	6	5	3	8	3	11	7	**61 (4.5)**
Hijacking[2]	0	4	12	3	4	0	0	2	5	4	0	1	**35 (2.6)**
Assassination	3	2	9	2	2	3	2	7	13	5	6	9	**63 (4.7)**
Theft, break-in	0	3	15	8	0	0	3	3	1	0	8	0	**41 (3.0)**
Sniping	2	1	5	2	2	0	3	1	5	4	3	3	**31 (2.3)**
Other actions[3]	0	0	5	6	3	0	0	0	3	1	1	2	**21 (1.6)**
Total	**51**	**93**	**188**	**153**	**109**	**102**	**139**	**104**	**125**	**84**	**123**	**77**	**1,348**

[1] Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of attack.
[2] Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings, many of which involved U.S aircraft.
[3] Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

when a terrorist will strike, we have also had to take defensive measures. We are all accustomed to the screening required before boarding an aircraft. The purpose is to deter and to apprehend potential hijackers. In very large part we have succeeded. In the last 6 years, we have seized over 19,000 weapons at U.S. airports. Perhaps a hundred hijackings have been averted.

Similarly, we have improved security at our embassies abroad. Bullet-proof glass, closed circuit television, and armored vehicles have become standard. It is not easy for terrorists to seize one of our missions. Obviously, a mob of thousands as in Tehran or Islamabad can overcome an embassy. But not since 1976 has a small terrorist group taken one of our missions.

Other countries are only just coming to realize that they too must take the same measures. Since the beginning of this year in Latin America alone, eight embassies have been seized or assaulted in six different countries. None of those embassies was American. Our security has paid off.

We have learned not to be complacent. Even with good intelligence and solid security, the terrorists will sometimes succeed. We must be ready when they do. Effective contingency planning and crisis management are essential.

To maximize the U.S. Government's response to terrorism, the State Department's Office for Combatting Terrorism has become the focal point for coordinating the interagency structures established in September 1977 to cope with the problem of both domestic and international terrorism. During the last 3 years the Working Group on Terrorism—composed of 28 Federal Government agencies, the National Governor's Association, the National League of Cities, and the Washington Metropolitan Police—and the Executive Committee on Terrorism composed of 10 key agencies have made tremendous progress. In August 1978, the Working Group on Terrorism established several subcommittees to focus attention on the major issues relating to terrorist activity. Most of the working group's activities are now carried out at the committee level, while the working group as a whole meets periodically to coordinate progress. Individual committees have active work programs. They have assessed physical security at U.S. Government installations both at home and abroad and have updated contingency plans. They have also evaluated and proposed new international initiatives, reviewed proposals for research and development, and developed guidelines for a coordinated public affairs response by Federal and local agencies during a terrorist incident.

During 1979, the Executive Committee concentrated its attention on interagency policy issues and the Federal Government's crisis management capabilities. It has, for example, inventoried Federal antiterrorism training capabilities and is studying broader policy questions relating to the provision of such training. It has reviewed the U.S. Government's handling of specific terrorist incidents in the last year, including several hijackings. It has taken an active role in the security preparations for the Pan American Games and the Lake Placid Olympics.

We have also taken an interest in the broader questions of vulnerability. A joint FBI/Coast Guard study is now looking at the vulnerability of the maritime environment to terrorist attack. Other agencies are assessing threats to energy-related installations. The threat credibility assessment system for handling nuclear extortion has been refined.

In sum we are not merely content to deal with the conventional terrorism of the past—hijackings, kidnappings,

and hostage barricade incidents—we are also looking to the future to insure that we are prepared should the terrorist change his tactics or his targets.

When we are faced with an actual terrorist incident, it is obviously not possible for 31 agencies to manage the conduct of events. Neither the working group nor the Executive Committee is charged with the management of specific terrorist incidents. Instead there are three lead agencies with special responsibilities—the Department of State for foreign incidents, including international hijackings; the Department of Justice for domestic incidents; and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for hijacking incidents taking place in American jurisdiction. When crisis decisions are needed, the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) of the National Security Council is convened. It is the designated group in the executive branch to which the President has given the responsibility for dealing with crisis situations, including the management of terrorist incidents. While lead agencies carry out operational requirements, the coordination of policy decisions is handled by the SCC.

Here in America typical terrorist acts have been bombings, hijackings, and extortion. In major incidents of a terrorist nature the FBI is always involved. The FBI routinely deploys special weapons and tactics teams and other special capabilities. The same is true in hijackings. Our experience has been positive. The FBI and the FAA have demonstrated on numerous occasions their ability to manage incidents quickly, quietly, and effectively. More terrorists than ever before are behind bars; investigations are continuing in many other cases.

Notwithstanding the existing cooperation of law enforcement agencies at the Federal level, we need and are building closer liaison and exchange of information between Federal and local governments. The participation of the National League of Cities and the National Governors Association on the Working Group on Terrorism demonstrates their interest and concern about the emergency response capabilities of our cities and states. At the present time, 14 states are reviewing the vulnerabilities of key economic facilities, such as pipelines, transformers, and power generator plants. A manual on domestic terrorism has been prepared by the National Governors Association.

In Washington we are committed to the principle that the Federal, State, and local governments must work together. The ultimate objective in this cooperative effort between Federal and local agencies is a partnership based on better understanding of each other's problems and a mutual respect for each other's capabilities.

In sum while the problem of dealing with terror remains a serious and difficult one, antiterrorism initiatives are being taken by law enforcement and operational agencies at all levels of government. We are working to bring about an even greater capability to predict, prevent, deter, and respond to any terrorist attack. We have made progress using the existing coordinating structures. We intend to continue to refine them and to seek new ways to combat terrorism.

Cuban-Soviet Impact on the Western Hemisphere

by Myles R. R. Frechette

Statement submitted to the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 17, 1980. Mr. Frechette is Director of the Office of Cuban Affairs.[1]

I welcome this opportunity to review with you the impact of Cuban-Soviet ties on the Western Hemisphere. When my predecessor, Wayne Smith, testified before this subcommittee in April 1978, he concluded:

- That while Cuba's hands were not altogether clean in the hemisphere, its clandestine activities within neighboring states had declined markedly since the 1960s;
- That both Cuba and the Soviet Union seemed content to play a waiting game in the hemisphere; but
- That we could not be complacent about Cuba's future role, because, should significant opportunities present themselves, Cuba could move back toward a more aggressive posture.

Since that testimony 2 years ago, there have been several noteworthy developments, some favorable to U.S. interests, others unfavorable. I would like to review these briefly before responding to any questions you might have.

Two years ago our major concern with respect to Cuba was the presence of Cuban expeditionary forces in Angola and Ethiopia. That concern has not diminished; Cuba still has about 20,000 troops in Angola and 12,000–15,000 in Ethiopia. To this have been added two concerns closer to home: growing Cuban willingness to become involved in the Caribbean and Central America and Cuba's increasingly close relationship with the Soviet Union. The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and the New JEWEL [Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation] Movement coup in Grenada have brought into power in the Caribbean basin two new governments favorably disposed toward Cuba.

It is doubtful that the Cubans anticipated the speed with which these changes took place. But there are signs that Cuba has been reassessing the prospects for revolutionary change elsewhere in the hemisphere and that, after several years of Cuban preoccupation with Africa, we are seeing a resurgence of interest in Latin America. Cuba has also grown increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance; there has been no significant divergence of interests between the two.

At the same time, the Cuban economy has experienced severe setbacks, calling more sharply into question Cuba's viability as a development model for the rest of the Third World and stimulating increased emigration from Cuba to the West. Cuba's drive for Third World leadership and bid for a seat on the U.N. Security Council have been sidetracked by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While there has been some limited progress in our bilateral relations, Cuba's aggressive foreign policy has prevented any significant progress toward normalization.

Involvement in the Caribbean and Central America

Since the failure of its attempts to export revolution in the 1960s, Cuba has

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*108	5/5	Public session discussion of U.S. policy toward the Helsinki agreement, Pittsburgh, May 14.
*109	5/5	Public session discussion of U.S. policy toward the Helsinki agreement, New York, May 13.
*110	5/6	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, May 30.
111	5/8	Status of U.S. contribution to international efforts for Khmer relief.
*112	5/9	Overseas Schools Advisory Council, June 17.
*113	5/9	Fine Arts Committee, June 9.
*114	5/9	Muskie: statement before Department of State employees.
*115	5/9	Muskie: conference before Department of State employees.
*116	5/12	U.S.-Canada extend NORAD agreement.
117	5/14	Muskie: press briefing en route to Brussels, May 13.
118	5/13	Muskie: arrival statement, Brussels.
119	5/16	Muskie, Brown: news conference, Brussels, May 14.
*120	5/21	Muskie: departure statement, Brussels, May 15.
*121	5/16	U.S. Organization for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), study group 8, June 17.
*122	5/16	Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Advisory Committee, June 2.
123	5/19	Muskie: statement following meeting with EEC President Jenkins, Brussels, May 14.
124	5/19	Muskie: arrival statement, Vienna, May 15.
125	5/19	Muskie: statement following meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, Vienna, May 16.
126	5/20	Muskie: statement at the 25th anniversary ceremony of the Austrian State Treaty, Vienna, May 16.
*127	5/18	Muskie: statement at the Hubert H. Humphrey memorial ceremony, Worcester, Mass., May 18.
128	5/15	Biographic data on Secretary Muskie.
129	5/20	Muskie: News conference.
*130	5/20	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Committee on Ocean Dumping, June 12.
*131	5/20	Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea, June 30 (closed), July 1 (open and closed).
*132	5/27	Public session discussion of U.S. policy toward the Helsinki agreement, Detroit, June 25.
*133	5/27	Public session discussion of U.S. policy toward the Helsinki agreement, Chicago, June 26.
*134	5/27	Gordon R. Beyer sworn in as Ambassador to Uganda (biographic data).
*135	5/29	Robert V. Keeley sworn in as Ambassador to Zimbabwe (biographic data).

*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

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fail, to have more crushing burdens imposed on us from outside.

We've reached our conclusions freely as befits an association of free peoples. We've agreed on the ways to insure the security of our free world, now and urgently. We shall show that we can employ the tools of democracy in order to build a future of freedom.

This has been a very gratifying experience for me and one of great profit to our nation. The association with these other leaders, representing their great countries, is indeed an important element in the future development of the lives of the people of the United States of America. I'm indebted to them and, particularly, Mr. Chairman, to you and the people of Italy and the people of this beautiful community.

Chancellor Schmidt

First of all, I would like to support the excellent appreciation of President Giscard d'Estaing on this year's summit meeting. I think it is in the very nature of a meeting such as this with the press that we can't go over all the ground that the previous speakers have covered. But I would expressly like to support everything that has been said by the three previous speakers about the nature of our discussions.

And for me, there is another point, which is particularly relevant, in what President Carter said—the very great value we place upon our exchange of views.

Obviously, with regard to a series—given the current range of problems—the international links, the international political links played a perhaps greater role than in the past, took up a very great deal of our time, rather more than has been the case in earlier meetings. And in this respect, I have had an opportunity, after lengthy consultation with our Minister of Foreign Affairs, our diplomats, I have been able to report on the forthcoming visit of the Foreign Minister and myself to Moscow, the points that we shall be discussing.

We didn't ask for any mandate. We shall be speaking for our own country, but we have proceeded to a far-reaching consultation on all the areas that we wish to discuss, and we shall certainly inform ourselves in our discussions. These discussions will be informed by the points that we have covered with our colleagues. And we would like to thank our colleagues for their support.

There is one point in the comments made by President Giscard d'Estaing that I would like to highlight—indeed, this was also raised by President Carter—this is our determination, our joint determination, to break the link between economic growth on the one hand and growth in oil imports on the other hand. It's a very ambitious goal that we have set ourselves, but I am quite convinced it's a very realistic goal. And my country, like France, like the United States of America, like Italy, will be making the utmost efforts to achieve this goal, and we think that we have very good chances of achieving the goals we have set ourselves for 1990.

Energy problems, oil problems, oil price problems perhaps are of particular importance in the world at the present time. The balance of payments of oil-exporting countries and non-oil-producing countries, the industrialized countries, price rises, inflation. We have emphasized the necessity of carrying forward an anti-inflationary policy. This is very much in keeping with the policies that we pursue in my own country.

We have never before, at such a meeting, gone in such detail into the possibilities of economic relations with the developing countries, and we have set ourselves a target of doing this even more exhaustively next year. And I would very much like to emphasize the fact that we are convinced, as we have said in the communique, that the oil-exporting countries that currently have very high surpluses must directly participate in aid programs, in transfers to the non-oil-producing, developing countries.

Here, too, I would like to say that we looked at the possibility of a North-South summit with limited participation. And I'd like to say here what I said in our discussions. I certainly would intend to participate at such a meeting and would expect the oil-producing, exporting countries to do likewise.

Now, if I'm going to confine myself to the 5 minutes allowed to me, I must bring my remarks to a close. But I would very much like to thank our colleague, Francesco Cossiga. He has chaired brilliantly and most successfully two very important international meetings here in Venice within 10 days. And at this meeting—the meeting of the seven most important democratic, industrialized states in the world—we have had an extremely positive atmosphere, one of collaboration and cooperation. I am most grateful and appreciative of this.

And I would like to say to the ladies and gentlemen of the press, of the mass media that, of course, only part of the things that we have discussed have been able to go into the communique, but I certainly feel greatly enriched by the far-ranging discusions we have been able to have among ourselves.

I'd also like to express my thanks for the warm hospitality of Venice. Those of us who aren't Italians are very, very much impressed by the few days we've had the opportunity of spending here in Venice, in this remarkable city which is of importance to the culture of the whole world.

Prime Minister Thatcher

[Inaudible] I'd like to undertake four points. The first one is this: If you look back to Tokyo last year and think what has happened there, you'll see that the events since that time illustrate very vividly the kind of problems that we have to tackle. Those of you [inaudible] Tokyo will remember that we were then discussing the oil problem, which [inaudible]. Then the price of a barrel of oil was $20; now it's $30 a barrel. We were worried then; we're much, much more worried now. That illustrates one of the continuing problems which we've had to tackle.[3]

Another one of these is the taking of hostages in Iran, a new one which came upon us suddenly and which we're doing all we can to assist President Carter to secure their release.

The one continuing problem, one new one, and the third one, which was also discussed—for the invasion of Afghanistan, which many of us would call a continuing manifestation of an old problem and the fundamental divisions between East, West, and their political philosophies.

I mention these things as my first point to illustrate that in politics we're constantly having to deal both with short-term and long-term problems, but we try to deal with the short-term ones in a way that will contribute to the solution of the longer term problems. And we've discussed them all at this conference.

The second point will take up one of the first ones. How are we going to continue to deal with the oil problem? You've heard my colleagues give details of some of the things which we have agreed. Really, they all have this in

common: From whatever countries we come, we're trying to reduce our dependence on oil and, therefore, make ourselves less vulnerable to the oil-producing countries being able to suddenly reduce their production and leave both our economies and our politics highly vulnerable.

Everything we're doing is trying to reduce the dependence of our countries on oil and leave us less vulnerable to the acts of others. You will find them all detailed, but by and large, they boil down to that simple proposition. That means, of course, that we have to find other sources of energy. It means that in order to find the resources for developing other sources of energy, we shall have to let the price rise of the energy we're using now, and we shall have to have massive investment into alternative supplies, such as nuclear, among other things, and such as opening up new coal fields.

Now the third point I want to make is this: If we in the Western industrialized countries have found it difficult to rise to the problems of the increasing price of oil and if it's reduced our ability to help others, then the poorer countries have had the worst problem of the lot. We talk about recycling; we talk about aid. The fact is that some of the poorer countries just plain can't afford the oil they're having to import now. And if you look at the relationship of aid to the increasing prices of oil that they've had put upon them, you'll find the astonishing thing is that the aid that we all give them together from the whole of the Western world is not sufficient to match the increasing price of oil since 1978.

Everything we can do in aid isn't enough to meet their very real problems. And that is why I think, instead of just talking about North-South dialogue, I think most of us are very conscious that as well as involving the countries of the North in solving the problems of the countries of the South, we also have to involve the oil-rich countries, the oil-producing countries, because we really feel that it's not only a question of recycling money, it's also a question of giving new sources of aid to those poor countries.

And the fourth point is this: We have great ambitions; we have great wishes to help others, though we're only able to do so if each of us puts our own economies really in order.

For many of us, we have a very considerable inflation problem. Indeed, I think over the past 2 years, inflation has been a very much larger part of the problems, economical problems of Western societies. Indeed, some 2 years ago, the average of OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] inflation was 8%; now it's some 14%. And we're not going to be able to help other countries, let alone ourselves, as much as we would wish unless we tackle that problem.

You will find quite a considerable portion of the communique taken up with the old recipes for tackling inflation. They are the old ones; there aren't any new ones. It's just sometimes that the old ones haven't been tried for long enough to produce sound money and a basis for stable growth, except perhaps in the economy of Germany, which we all admire for its tenacity in holding to sound financial principles. We recognize that we will have to do that if we really intend to be in a position to help others.

I think that our success in tackling the problems of the coming year will depend upon whether in our own countries we can raise our economic efficiency sufficiently to match the level of our international ideals. That will be the test that we have to undergo during the coming year, and doubtless you'll be keeping us up to it as to how well we're doing.

I would like to join my colleagues in saying thank you. We've had a wonderful Chairman, who's presided over our proceedings with very, very great ability. We've been visitors in a most beautiful city, and we've had a valuable and very rewarding conference.

We, all of us, talked about difficulties. I wouldn't like the message to go out of this conference just to be one of difficulties and problems. I think the result is that we believe the Western free societies can cope with those difficulties and that we'll all be back next year—perhaps with a new set of problems, perhaps with the same—but we believe we'll have made some progress in meeting them. And I'm sure we'll all meet together, I believe, next year in Canada. We look forward to it.

Economic Summits

The Venice summit was the sixth in a series of such meetings of the leaders of the major industrialized democracies.

The summits have addressed the interrelated problems of the world economy—abrupt increases in the price of oil, persistent inflation, slow economic growth, and imbalances in international payments. They underscore the interdependence of our economies and the need to find mutually reinforcing solutions to our common problems.

The principal result of the Bonn summit, for example, was an agreement on the coordination of macroeconomic policies, which achieved a balance between measures to fight inflation and those to stimulate growth. The principal outcome of the Tokyo summit was an agreement on targets for oil imports and consumption as part of a shared response to a tight oil market and sharply rising prices.

Nov. 15–17, 1975 Rambouillet, France	France, F.R.G., Italy, Japan, U.K., U.S.
June 27–28, 1976 Puerto Rico	Canada, France, F.R.G., Italy, Japan, U.K., U.S.
May 7–8, 1977 London, England	France, F.R.G., U.K., U.S.
July 16–17, 1978 Bonn, Germany	Canada, France, F.R.G., Italy, Japan, U.K., U.S.
June 28–29, 1979 Toyko, Japan	Canada, France, F.R.G., Italy, Japan, U.K., U.S.
June 22–23, 1980 Venice, Italy	Canada, France, F.R.G., Italy, Japan, U.K., U.S.

Prime Minister Trudeau

In facts and figures and conclusions, there is very little I can add, if anything, to the forceful and lucid statements which my colleagues have just made, indeed add to the very detailed communique which you will have before you. I thought, for those few of you who might be interested in mood pieces, that I would say a word about the mood of cautious optimism which, in my judgment, seems to have been present among us.

I notice that Prime Minister Thatcher just used words to that effect by saying that there is a belief that we can cope with our problems. And that seemed to me to be the mood which prevails here today—not a mood of wild enthusiasm or of great self-congratulation but feeling that the industrialized democracies, challenged as they have been over the years with what seemed at each summit an intractable problem, has begun to find a way toward a solution.

One year it was the problem of recycling petrodollars, and that seems to have been solved, at least until now, and we see the great danger for the future. There was also, another year, the discussion of the impending trade wars

should not go to bed too early but be sure to see the flamenco dancers, and I intend to take your advice, Mr. President.

You have a text before you, but I would like to say these words to you, because they are so important to us. We have a lot in common. In each of our lands, a democracy has been born. Each has struggled to achieve the balance of unity and liberty that lead free societies to the highest form of human government—self-government.

Freedom and human rights have no firmer friend in thought and action than President Pertini. For personal liberty and democracy in this country—his country—he paid the price through years of cruel imprisonment. In fact, I understand that in 1940 he was not released from prison as he legally had a right to be, because he was considered especially dangerous. And so he remains today: dangerous to anyone who would threaten to destroy or to diminish the liberty of an individual, the rights of a group, or the life or livelihood of free people.

As chief of state, he was foremost in his appeal to Iranian authorities—the first of all—to release our diplomatic personnel from terrorists, and it gives me great pleasure on this personal occasion to express the gratitude which the American people and I feel for his unswerving support.

This morning, President Pertini and I discussed some of the central issues that are troubling world peace. Later I was able to discuss these questions with Prime Minister Cossiga, whose visit to Washington in January and whose presidency of the European Community have so deeply impressed us all.

Three basic ideas ran through our discussions today. The first is that the best possible policy for our countries, as we face a time of danger, change, and testing in the 1980s, is a policy that seeks both strong defense of national security and lasting world peace, for the plain truth is that the one is necessary to the other.

In decades past the West successfully resisted Soviet expansionism, both eastward and westward. Today we see the Soviet Union thrusting southward directly into Afghanistan and indirectly through Vietnam and Cambodia. This represents a strategic challenge to the vital interests of the West and to the industrial democracies. We must face it together. If we are firm in our resolve, we will define a position from which we can encourage detente. If we fail, we will have allowed the strategic, political, and economic balance to be gravely altered in favor of totalitarianism.

A second belief we share is that we cannot defend our common heritage of freedom by arms alone. Our future—the future of our way of life—is equally dependent upon our ability to provide economic opportunity and social justice for all our citizens and to create a decent world environment in which freedom can survive and prosper. We must be careful thinkers and practical politicians in our approach to energy independence, inflation, developing nations, arms control, and peace in troubled regions, such as the Middle East.

The third basic idea that ran through our discussions today is that national security and world peace can only be achieved by maintaining a strong and united Atlantic alliance. Just as the best form of government is self-government, so the strongest cement of any alliance is free will. Ours is an alliance of independent democracies. We draw strength both from our common traditions and our individual differences.

Let us not be afraid to confront directly and in full public view the most fundamental challenges of our alliance today. We've heard a great deal recently about the differences and the disagreements among the Western democracies. Some voices in my country and in Europe talk about disarray. Some pessimists view debate among democratic nations as a signal of fatal weakness. They predict the decline of Western civilization, spreading pessimism, materialism, softness of will, and diminishing confidence in ourselves and in our institutions.

Our experience and reality itself shows clearly that these self-styled realists are wrong. Our open and public grappling with economic and social problems cannot obscure the extraordinary achievements of our society as a whole. The democratic nations are magnets for young students from all over the world. The democratic world is a center of intellectual and technological invention. It's a great focus of cultural creativity. It's undergoing a major resurgence of religious belief, and our political institutions establish and exhibit a resilience unmatched by any society in the totalitarian world.

Italy—A Profile

Geography

Area: 116,303 sq. mi. (about the size of Georgia and Florida). **Capital:** Rome (pop. 2.6 million). **Other Cities:** Milan, Naples, Florence.

People

Population: 56.9 million (1979). **Annual Growth Rate:** 0.5% (1979). **Ethnic Groups:** Primarily Italian but small groups of German-, French-, Slovene-, and Albanian-Italians. **Religion:** Roman Catholic. **Language:** Italian. **Literacy:** 93% **Life Expectancy:** 70 yrs.

Government

Official Name: Italian Republic. **Type:** Republic. **Independence:** June 2, 1946. **Date of Constitution:** Jan. 1, 1948. **Branches:** *Executive*—President (Chief of State), Council of Ministers (Cabinet) headed by the President of the Council (Prime Minister). *Legislative*—bicameral Parliament (630-member Chamber of Deputies and 322-member Senate). *Judicial*—Constitutional Court. **Political Parties:** Christian Democratic, Italian Communist, Italian Socialist, Italian Social Movement, Social Democratic, Republican, Liberal, Radical. **Suffrage:** Universal over 18. **Subdivisions:** 93 Provinces, 20 regions.

Economy

GDP: $266 billion (1978). **Annual Growth Rate:** 2.6%. **Per Capita GNP:** $5,620 (1979). **Inflation Rate Last 4 Yrs.:** 15.3%. **Natural Resources:** Fish, dwindling natural gas reserves. **Agriculture:** *Products*—wheat, rice, grapes, olives, citrus fruits. *Work Force*—15%. **Industries:** Automobiles, machinery, chemicals, textiles, shoes. **Trade:** *Exports*—$72.2 billion (1979): machinery and transport equipment, textiles, foodstuffs, chemicals, footwear. *Imports*—$47.6 billion (1977): machinery and transport equipment, foodstuffs, ferrous and nonferrous metals, wool, cotton, petroleum. *Partners*—F.R.G. (20%), France (16%), U.K. (5%), Benelux countries (7%), U.S. (7%), U.S.S.R. (3%). **Official Exchange Rate:** 830 lire = US$1.00 (June 1980).

Membership in International Organizations

U.N. and its specialized agencies, NATO, OECD, EC, Western European Union, Council of Europe, INTELSAT.

Principal Government Officials

Italy: President—Alessandro PERTINI, Prime Minister—Francesco COSSIGA, Minister of Foreign Affairs—Emilio COLOMBO, Ambassador to the U.S.—Paolo PANSA CEDRONIO, Ambassador to the U.N.—Umberto LA ROCCA. **United States:** Ambassador to Italy—Richard N. Gardner.

It is not from democracy that millions of refugees have fled since 1945. It is not to escape democracy that people have risked their lives in small boats in the high seas during recent weeks. It is not from democracy that nearly 10% of the people of an entire Asian nation have left their ancient homeland. And it is certainly not from democracy, but from foreign oppression, that hundreds of thousands—almost a million—of men, women, and children have now fled Afghanistan. These votes of fleeting millions are being cast—as the voices of millions more are being raised—for the deeply rooted faith that gives democracy its unique dynamism: our underlying belief in the inalienable rights and dignity of human beings.

Material accomplishments and cultural vitality alone cannot express the power of our spiritual heritage. Nor is the spirit of our society found simply in the enterprise, the skills, or success of our people. The fundamental desire for democracy rises from the very center of the human heart and the human soul. That's why the echo of the unsilenceable call for liberty is heard throughout the world. That call finds its voice in the nations assembling in Venice tomorrow.

Our faith in human rights—the freedom, the dignity, and the value of every individual—is the most compelling revolutionary concept of our times. It has produced a level of economic progress and intellectual creativity unmatched by any other political philosophy or idea. We have no reason to fear change, new ideas, or new problems. We do not rely on military invasions by so-called friendly neighbors, much less on terrorism, to sustain the idea of liberty. It stands on its own merit.

The search for freedom and democracy has spread throughout recent years—in Spain, in Portugal, in Greece, in Africa, in Latin America. Today the genuine human voice of democracy rings far more clearly than the rasping loudspeakers of authoritarian regimes.

But while liberty need not be imposed by force, we know all too well that once won, it must be defended. To quote from your statement, Mr. President: ". . . cowardice is the main enemy not only of peace but also of democracy." The search for peace demands strength, not weakness; firmness, not vacillation; pride, not arrogance. We do not seek to remake the world on the model of America or the West. We want the peoples of the world to decide their own destiny and to make their own choices. We are confident, because history is on the side of freedom. Let there be no mistake about this: The West is not motivated by relentless hostility nor by a desire for indiscriminate confrontation nor a return to the cold war.

But for the Western alliance simply to accept foreign occupation and domination of Afghanistan as an accomplished fact would be a cynical signal to the world that could only encourage further aggression, further tension, and further danger to world peace. It is our responsibility to register in concrete terms our condemnation of the Soviet invasion for as long as that invasion continues.

We cannot know with certainty the motivations of the latest Soviet move, whether Afghanistan is the purpose or the prelude, but there can be no doubt that this invasion poses an increased threat to the independence of nations in the region and to the world's access to vital resources and to vital sealanes. The fact is that our democracies are dependent on oil supplies from a volatile region whose own security from internal divisions and from external threat is now in question. Unresolved, that security problem could change the way we live. Already it does touch directly or drastically the lives of all.

President Carter reads the bronze plaque commemorating former Italian Prime Minister Moro at the location in Rome where the Prime Minister's body was found in 1978 after he was assassinated.

(White House photo by Karl Schumacher)

But our interest in peace and stability in the region goes far beyond economics. In this ever more interdependent world, to assume that aggression need be met only when it occurs at one's own doorstep is to tempt new and very serious adventures.

Detente with the Soviets remains our goal, but detente must be built on a firm foundation of deterring aggression. The Soviets must understand that they cannot recklessly threaten world peace or still enjoy the benefits of cooperation while pursuing a policy of armed intervention. Above all, everyone must know that efforts cannot succeed to divide our alliance nor to lull us into a false belief that somehow America or Europe can be an island of detente while aggression is carried out elsewhere.

We recognize that our policy toward those who might threaten peace must be clear, it must be consistent, it must be comprehensible. There must be no room for any miscalculation. But let me be equally clear that the way to improved relations is open, and that is the path we prefer.

I'm confident that just as the American people want to sustain strong policies against Soviet aggression, they also want our strong efforts to continue at arms control. We know that the SALT II agreement can contribute directly to the security not only of the United States but of Europe and, indeed, of the entire world. It can help to restrain future arms competition, continue the historically important direction of nuclear arms limitation, and keep our faith that even the most dangerous differences can be resolved in a framework of cooperation. Especially now in this time of tension, observing the mutual constraints imposed by the treaty is in the best interest of every nation on Earth.

Therefore, I intend to honor the object and purpose of the treaty as long as the Soviet Union, as observed by us, does the same. I will remain in close consultation with our Congress with the goal of seeking the ratification of SALT II at the earliest opportune time.

Further, if the decade of the 1980s is not to become the decade of violence, we must work with our friends on renewed efforts to stabilize all aspects of arms competition and to widen the scope of arms control agreements.

In sum, I do not accept forecasts of weakness or failure for democracy in the world. Our societies, our values, our freedoms will decline only if we allow them to do so; only if we surren-

ably toward authoritarianism. Spain is a source of hope and inspiration to democrats everywhere. Spain's experience holds lessons about resolution, moderation, and self-control—lessons for other democracies and for new countries in the Third World which have found freedom and now are searching for models to follow in shaping their own societies.

In the past 4 years, Spain has also moved toward a new place of leadership in the world. Your ministers have repeatedly made it clear that Spain stands side-by-side with the other Western democracies, as a full member-to-be of the European and Atlantic Communities. We are pleased that you have begun negotiations for entry into the European Communities, because we believe that Spain's accession will strengthen the Community, just as the Community strengthens Europe.

Similarly, we hope that Spain will see its own interests served by participating in the collective defense of the West. However, we fully recognize that this is a decision to be taken solely and exclusively by Spain, in its own time and in its own way. Our nation will give full support to your decision once it has been made.

In addition, our two countries share a bilateral security partnership based on important common interests. We will begin a review this year of the security relationship that has well served the interests of both our countries and that will continue to serve our joint interests for many years to come.

Our significant economic relationship also links our peoples. American business leaders have demonstrated their faith in Spain's future by their high level of investments here in recent years. Exporters in each country have looked to the other as an important market for their products. What is absolutely clear is that the growing economic relationship is of very great benefit to both countries.

Spain's concern about energy supplies is fully shared in the United States. As you know, I took office as President at a time when the American people still largely believed that oil was an infinite resource. The central drama of American public life during the last 4 years has been the struggle to change that attitude and then to build a viable energy policy. The struggle goes on, but the foundations for such an energy policy are now nearly complete. This is crucial not only to the future of my own country but to the broader web of relationships of which both our countries are a part.

(White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)

King Juan Carlos I accompanies President Carter on an inspection of the honor guard at Barajas Airport.

Our two countries also share a strong interest in democratic evolution and respect for human rights in other parts of the world. In Latin America we both have special ties. I appreciate the support and wise counsel we have often received from Spain with respect to difficult, frequently critical situations in Latin America and the Caribbean. We also appreciate the close consultations we have had and the assistance you have given us on the hostage crisis in Iran and other aspects of that delicate situation. In the Middle East and parts of Africa, we can look forward to further cooperation, especially valuable because of your historical knowledge of the Muslim world.

The United States has special reason to applaud Spain's emergence as a major partner in the unfinished tasks of peace. Its cultural and historical ties in so many areas of the world enable it to be a bridge between the Third World and the West. This is especially relevant as we take up the problems of the new decade, which in many ways will be more difficult and dangerous than any we have surmounted before.

Today the West confronts a strategic challenge of historic magnitude. From 1945 through the mid-1950s, we successfully resisted Soviet expansionary power westward and eastward. Today the Soviet Union is thrusting southward directly in Afghanistan, indirectly through Vietnam and Cambodia, and elsewhere by means of foreign proxies. The challenge is clear, and so is the question it poses for our democratic institutions: Do we permit aggression to proceed with impunity, or do we resist encroachment which affects our common vital interests? There is no doubt in my mind where both our countries stand on this issue.

The gratifying resurgence of Spanish influence throughout the world is an important source of confidence with which the West can approach the difficult decade of the 1980s. That confidence is fully justified. The vitality I have witnessed here attests to Spain's own sure sense of its future and the direction it has freely taken toward democracy, diversity, and the unfettered exercise of the human spirit.

Your Majesty, I would like to raise my glass: To you, to your lovely queen, to your President and all the leaders of the government and of the democratic opposition who have helped build Spanish democracy, and above all to the Spanish people, to whose spirit goes the bulk of the credit for the successes of the past several years. *Viva España!*

PRESS STATEMENT, JUNE 26, 1980[3]

At the invitation of His Majesty King Juan Carlos, the President of the United States Jimmy Carter paid an official visit to Spain on June 25–26.

During the visit the President of the United States held conversations with His Majesty the King. President Carter also had meetings with the President of the Government, Mr. Suarez, and with members of the Spanish Government.

President Carter's visit is the first by a President of the United States to democratic Spain. Accepting the Spanish King's invitation, the President is returning visits to his country by His Majesty and by the President of the Spanish Government.

During the conversations between President Carter and His Majesty, the excellent level of the close and friendly relations between the two countries was noted with satisfaction as were the harmonious points of view on various foreign policy subjects.

The two chiefs of state expressed their concern with regard to the tensions existing in various parts of the world and set forth their desire and their intention to contribute in all ap-

propriate ways to the reestablishment of peace and stability in those regions.

President Carter congratulated His Majesty on the favorable evolution of the Spanish democratic process which has earned the sincere support of the entire free world and for Spain's return to its proper place in the concert of nations. For its part the Spanish side expressed its appreciation for the work carried out by the United States in support of human rights and the cause of peace.

The international scene, with particular reference to the crises in Iran and Afghanistan and the situation in the Middle East, and bilateral relations were examined in Presient Carter's meeting with the President of the Spanish Government, Mr. Suarez. During these conversations, which were held within the framework of the consultations and contacts taking place among Western leaders, it became evident once again that Western solidarity constitutes one of the main principles of democratic Spain's foreign policy and that Spain will join its efforts with those of the other Western countries in the pursuit of peace and stability for all peoples.

In these contacts President Carter said he was pleased at progress toward Spain's entry into the European Community, which will reinforce Western solidarity and will complete the construction of a stronger and more united Europe.

Both leaders expressed the hope that the balanced development of the Madrid conference would permit the creation of a climate favorable to dialogue and cooperation, that it would favor the reestablishment of mutual confidence and make it possible to advance on the road toward detente and peace.

President Carter expressed his satisfaction for the important work that Spain is carrying out as host to the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] meeting in Madrid.

(White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)

The President with Prime Minister Suarez.

Both statesmen examined ways to strengthen Western solidarity in the face of the serious threat represented by Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. They examined the significance of the Soviet announcement of the withdrawal of some forces from Afghanistan and reaffirmed that only the total withdrawal of Soviet troops and guarantees for nonalignment and respect for the freedom of the Afghan people to express their political desires constitute the necessary elements for a definitive solution to the conflict.

President Carter expressed his understanding of Spain's role in its relations with the Arab world and of President Suarez' efforts in his international contacts and his trips to the Middle East. The two leaders expressed their common desire to contribute to a just and peaceful solution to the problems of the region.

President Carter expressed his appreciation and that of all the American people for Spain's support and activities on behalf of the prompt liberation of the American hostages being illegally held in Iran.

The President of the Spanish Government stated that Spain will continue its actions to support the international effort for the favorable solution of the problem.

The two Presidents agreed that respect for international law is indispensable for the proper conduct of international relations and for the solution of the present crisis.

President Carter described the results achieved in the recent Venice summit. In view of the concern shared by both governments regarding the world energy crisis and its negative economic and social effects, President Carter showed his willingness that Spain cooperate in and benefit from research and development into alternate energy sources in which the United States is making an important effort.

Spain—A Profile

Geography

Area: 195,988 sq. mi., including the Balearic and Canary Islands (about the size of Arizona and Utah). **Capital:** Madrid (pop. 3.5 million). **Other Cities:** Barcelona (2 million), Valencia (700,000), Seville (560,000), Zaragoza (500,000), Bilbao (450,000), Malaga (400,000).

People

Population: 37.8 million (1979). **Annual Growth Rate:** 1.2%. **Density:** 193 per sq. mi. **Ethnic Group:** Mediterranean and Nordic composite. **Religion:** Roman Catholic. **Languages:** Spanish (official), Catalan, Basque. **Literacy:** 97%.

Government

Official Name: Spanish State. **Type:** Monarchy. **Branches:** *Executive*—Prime Minister. *Legislative*—bicameral Cortes (350-member Congress of Deputies and 248-member Senate). *Judicial*—Supreme Court. **Political Parties:** Union of the Democratic Center, Socialist Workers Party, Popular Alliance, Communist Party, regional parties. **Suffrage:** Universal over 21. **Subdivisions:** 50 metropolitan Provinces, 2 presidios, 3 enclaves.

Economy

GDP: $201 billion (1979). **Annual Growth Rate:** 1.5%. **Per Capita GDP:** $5,300 (1979). **Natural Resources:** Coal, lignite, iron ore, uranium, mercury, pyrites, fluorspar, gypsum, zinc, lead, tungsten, copper, kaolin, hydroelectric power. **Agriculture:** *Products*—cereals and feedgrains, vegetables, citrus fruits, wine, olives and olive oil, livestock. *Work force*—19%. **Industries:** Processed foods, textiles, footwear, petrochemicals, steel, automobiles, consumer goods, ships. **Trade:** *Exports*—$18.2 billion (1979): fresh and canned fruits, automobiles, iron and steel products, footwear, textiles. *Partners*—EC (46%), U.S. (9%). *Imports*—$18.7 billion (1978): oil seeds, grains, oil, machinery and transportation equipment. *Partners*—EC (35%), U.S. (13%). **Official Exchange Rate:** 69 pesetas=US$1.00.

Membership in International Organizations

U.N. and its specialized agencies, OECD, IEA, INTELSAT, IAEA, World Tourism Organization.

Principal Government Officials

Spain: Chief of State, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces—King Juan Carlos I, Prime Minister—Adolfo SUAREZ Gonzalez, Minister of Foreign Affairs—Marcelino OREJA Aguirre, Ambassador to the U.S.—Jose LLADO, Ambassador to the U.N.—Jaime de PINIES. **United States:** Ambassador to Spain—Terence A. Todman.

On the hostage situation in Iran, I discussed that with the Prime Minister. As a matter of fact, I think he raised that subject first. He expressed his concern, number one, at the gross violation of international law, and they have been as outspoken as any country on that point, though they are in a difficult position to get involved in sanctions. But I think that, nevertheless, the hostage situation inhibits the relationships of all countries with Iran in this area and in Europe, and that is bound to have a negative effect on Iran's prospects for using its relationship with potential or actual trading partners to improve the lot of its people. That really is what we're trying to focus on, and I suggested to the Prime Minister that he might find an opportunity, given the fact that Turkey is a neighbor of Iran, to use his influence in a way that would be helpful in achieving our goal.

With respect to the bilateral with the Greek Foreign Minister, we spent, I think, all of our time on the three subjects I've already mentioned. It was a good talk, very positive talk, on reintegration, on Cyprus, and on the American bases in Greece. Incidentally, on that agreement—on the new base agreement—although obviously that subject is tied to reintegration, they are agreeable to moving forward on both lines, so that hopefully both could be concluded at the same time and go into effect at the same time.

Q. How do you expect the question of reintegration to come up here in NATO in the next couple of days? Will you simply discuss it? Will you give us some plans [inaudible]?

A. I think it is important to discuss it, but I think that really, although it has political overtones it is better to emphasize the military nature of the problems in order to minimize others.

Q. It's a technical point, but do the differences really come down to what degree of control Greece and Turkey would have over the Aegean Sea area?

A. I don't like to answer any questions like that. It's not altogether control. I don't like to characterize it at all. But obviously NATO defense forces have to move through the air space and in the Aegean and defense forces involve forces of each of these two countries. It gets to be a sticky matter to try to identify the areas in a way which avoids political implications—if I make myself reasonably unclear.

Q. What can NATO, as an alliance or even the NATO countries as individuals, do about Afghanistan that they are not already doing?

A. The defense buildup, which certainly isn't completed—it's a commitment at 3% real growth. In addition, in phase II of the agreement that was worked out in Brussels in May, there will be identified additional initiatives that the alliance can take to make, in effect, the American response to any additional, any other Soviet move, more flexible—in other words a shifting of resources.

Q. I was going to ask you about where we stood on the military facilities in that area. We announced a tentative agreement with Oman. I gather with Kenya we never really had any real problem, but what's going to happen with Somalia? The last I heard was that they were asking for a lot of military aid without giving any guarantees it wouldn't be used against Ethiopia. Are we going to drop that one?

A. In the first place, we never set a target with three bases.

Q. Three? The President made—

A. No. If I may state it as I understand it, I was not involved in that. There are three countries with which we explored the possibilities of using three bases. I don't think the strategic judgment was made in advance that we needed three bases or these three bases nor was there any judgment as to how many we might be able to negotiate. What was undertaken was the talks with all three. We've signed an agreement with Oman, we've signed the one with Kenya, so now there is the question of whether or not we need a third, and whether or not, if we do, the terms that are under discussion with Somalia—and there is not agreement on them—are adequate. Third, there is, of course, the political situation in the area which is something less than trouble free.

All those questions are being examined. [After the press briefing the following clarification was issued: It should be stressed that negotiations with Somalia are continuing. As to Kenya we have made good progress, but a formal agreement has not yet been concluded.]

Q. The President said yesterday that he wouldn't be going to east Jerusalem if Mr. Begin moves his offices there. Will the American Ambassador be permitted to call on the Prime Minister in east Jerusalem?

A. It's a very hypothetical question that you're asking.

Q. If they move, it's not hypothetical; it's very real.

A. I know, but isn't the word "if" hypothetical?

Q. Not from what they're saying.

A. I haven't seen anything in any of the cable traffic. I can't even characterize it. I haven't seen a statement in the cable traffic which quotes Mr. Begin as saying: "I'm going to move my offices to east Jerusalem next week." I haven't seen anything like that.

Q. Have you asked him if he is going to?

A. He hasn't been on the trip. No. I made the speech in Washington—how long ago is it, 6 months?—that unilateral acts on the part of either party are not useful. I would hope that both sides have taken note of that. Sometimes you find Mr. Begin restating some goal which he has stated in the past in a way which makes it sound like a new one but which necessarily isn't accompanied by action. So I like to be perfectly clear in what he has said—and if it suggests action and precisely what action and when—before I comment. If I prejudge him on something that's less than that, then I get telephone calls. I like to be very careful and precise in my reaction to these things.

Q. Should we take this as an indication that you have some indication that perhaps this is not going to happen or just that you want to wait and see?

A. We simply see nothing in the cable traffic that confirms or explains or describes what is reported to have been said by Mr. Begin. I have been trying to find out. We just haven't found anything.

Q. Actually the stories don't quote Begin on this subject. It just says that he has gone ahead with the building, and it might be completed in about 3 months.

A. I'd have to have more facts. It's just not useful to comment or characterize these things until I have the facts.

Q. Just so we can triangulate backward, if he were, that would be a unilateral act as defined in your speech?

A. You guys are pretty good with intepretations.

Q. Now that you've had a few days to mull it over and get the Venice matters all over, and you start again with NATO, do you have any more of an assessment as to what the impact is going to be of this Russian partial withdrawal, or announced partial withdrawal, from Afghanistan? How is he going to play it from here?

A. I think, first of all, you have to get the facts as to whether or not there has been a net reduction of troops, and I want to shift your attention away from the word "withdrawal." There's evidence that there was a troop buildup. It's not hard evidence yet—within the last 2 weeks—and now the announcement by the Russians of a withdrawal is really the movement of something less than the number that they're talking about—according to our best estimate—just across the border, where there have been 40,000 Russian troops all along, that could be moved in at any time. So that the question is not whether or not there's been this movement but whether this movement represents a net reduction in Russian forces in the area. We don't have any evidence to suggest that there is. I don't want to discourage the possibility, as I said this morning, because if that's the way their thinking is tending I wouldn't want to throw cold water on it, but I just don't think you've got very much to go on as yet. What I said in what I thought was a guarded moment about don't believe what you don't see [laughter].

Q. What would be your reasoning here? Why would you judge the Soviets went through the routine this week with Giscard [President Giscard d'Estaing of France], if they did not intend to do [inaudible]?

A. It would have been a good time for them if they could make it credible to influence the attendance at the Olympic Games, which aren't too far off. It might be a good time to throw the allies into confusion at the Venice summit. It may be the best card they had to play. Their instincts would be to try to throw a curve ball into the summit or to improve attendance at the Olympics. I'd have no real way of reading what was on their minds. It may be that they've tried to characterize a routine movement of troops, that didn't seem to be relevant to the kind of fighting that they're doing in Afghanistan, into a withdrawal that would tend to promote divisiveness among the allies. It didn't have that effect, even for a moment, so if that's what they meant to do, that's one thing.

But the second question really is, whatever the facts are as to troop reduction rather than troop movement or withdrawal, what would really be significant is whether this was followed by something further by way of troop reduction. And assume that this were a reduction of 5,000 men, if that's what it was, or 10,000, if that's it, and the remaining numbers—which would then be about 120,000 troops—remained in the area, it wouldn't have much significance.

Q. You said something else at the airport this morning. You said that there's no prospects of further disarmament—I'm paraphrasing but I think it's accurate—agreements as long as the Soviet troops are in Afghanistan. Does that mean there is now a de facto freeze on MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions] and the Geneva talks and all the rest of it?

A. Then that was a slip of the tongue. Did I say that?

Q. I'm going to go look. [Laughter] I thought the words you used were set back or slow or delay.

A. Whatever I may have said—check that—diminished.

Q. That's a fair difference between them going to end.

A. Yes, obviously they have diminished.

Q. Does it mean, in effect, that there is no real chance of any advance?

A. That's hard to say. I'd have to say as of the situation at the moment, because if arms control agreements depend on ratification of SALT II, the simple fact is that at this moment the votes aren't there in the Senate.

Q. How do you see it as a politician and as a presidential issue? I mean, will it be in Carter's interest to campaign on a ratification issue, saying, if he were reelected, he would push for it after the election?

A. I know he believes very deeply about pursuing it.

Q. What do you think the votes are on it?

A. I don't recall the last poll I saw on arms control but I think there continues to be a strong impulse for moving in that direction that could be developed and built up into support of arms control. My own personal view is that it should be.

That doesn't necessarily mean that by the time you generate the public support necessary to put the votes together in the Senate that SALT II would necessarily be relevant. You all are familiar with the time constraints that press on SALT II. If you couldn't get ratification by next spring then the calendar would be close to having run out on SALT II. And so it would be a question of whether you renegotiate SALT II or whether you proceed to SALT III, taking into account the failure to ratify SALT II. Whether you could persuade the Russians to do that is a very iffy question, so you get off into a wildly speculative area. I would say that it is important and in the public interest to underline and to emphasize the importance of achieving arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. I think that that point should be made independently of how it's to be implemented, strongly enough so that people don't lose sight of the importance of the goal.

On a parallel track, obviously you've got to talk about the SALT II agreement, the SALT process, the SALT III, but you ought not to get so confused that if the calendar runs out on you with respect to SALT II that people throw up their hands on arms control. I just think arms control is critical, especially when we find ourselves in a posture of confrontation with the Soviet Union, uncertain as to what their ultimate intentions are, uncertain as to where they're likely to go next. It's in the interest of both countries. After all, we reached an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union when we were up to our necks in Vietnam and having just mined Haiphong Harbor. Mr. Nixon was welcomed in Moscow in order to pursue arms control in the interest of both sides. If we're going to fight each other, we ought to do so with something less than nuclear weapons.

That's oversimplifying the thing, but nevertheless I think the President believes this deeply about it, and I'd be surprised if the issue doesn't emerge in the campaign, but maybe in two forms—one, the importance of arms control, two, what you do about SALT II as the immediate item on the agenda.

more generous terms. And we will provide immediate assistance to the Government of Thailand to help relieve the suffering of those who have been victims of the recent fighting. We are hopeful that others will join in support for the independence and security of Thailand.

Second, we strongly support the ASEAN resolution adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in November calling for withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea and the establishment of a representative and neutral government. We shall continue to pursue a political settlement, together with our ASEAN colleagues, that would restore the sovereignty of Kampuchea and bring peace and hope to its beleaguered people.

Third, the United States is committed to the resettlement of Indochinese who seek refuge from conflict and deprivation. The nations of first asylum, and those in the immediate area who have opened processing centers, command the admiration and respect of the entire world community. But we all recognize that the refugee dilemma is an international problem. It requires an international commitment. Over the past several years, the United States has opened its doors to more than 360,000 Indochinese refugees. I can assure you today that our commitment is undiminished. President Carter has requested from our Congress funds to finance resettlement of 168,000 Indochinese refugees over the next fiscal year. And we shall continue to press others in the international community to do their full and fair share in the resettlement effort.

Fourth, we shall continue to participate fully in the international effort to provide desperately needed food and seed to the people of Kampuchea. To date, the United States has committed some $160 million in public and private funds for this pressing international humanitarian enterprise. What the world confronts in Kampuchea is the chilling prospect of an entire people destroyed by a cruel combination of natural and political forces. The international lifeline to the Kampuchean people must be continued. The Vietnamese and the authorities in Phnom Penh must permit those supplies to reach all Kampucheans in need. History will judge harshly those who fail to respond to this staggering human tragedy.

Fifth, we shall persist in our resolute opposition to the violation of national independence and self-determination taking place in Afghanistan. The demonstrated willingness of the Soviet Union to use brute military force to impose its will on a sovereign nation has strained international peace. It has posed new risks to stability in that vital region. It has damaged the fabric of East-West relations. A firm international response—a sustained international response—is required to register our condemnation of this attack on the Afghan people so long as it continues and to deter further adventures that could create new crises. The ASEAN nations have demonstrated, again here in Kuala Lumpur, their own firm response. The enhanced strategic position of the United States in East Asia is vital to our ability to respond in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Asia. In turn, our strengthened presence there has served the interest of our Pacific allies and friends, for we share an interest in peace and stability in that critical region of the world.

As we address common challenges to peace, we are also determined to expand the range of our economic, cultural, and educational cooperation.

The progress we have made over the past year in concluding multilateral trade negotiations agreements with all of the nations of ASEAN has contributed to a 30% increase in our two-way trade. American businessmen are increasingly recognizing the importance of the ASEAN nations in their export and investment decisions. We shall continue to support and encourage this growth.

A second area of economic cooperation is commodities. We are delighted with the news from Geneva that there has been agreement on the common fund. This achievement, which was given particular impetus by the 1978 U.S.-ASEAN meeting and has been advanced by strong ASEAN leadership, will serve our shared interests in stability and growth in raw material markets.

The U.S.-ASEAN dialogue also contributed importantly to the successful negotiation of a rubber price stabilization agreement. I am pleased to announce today the United States will support ASEAN's position that Kuala Lumpur should be the site for the new international rubber agreement headquarters.

We were not able to conclude negotiations of the international tin agreement during the recent tin conference. However, we remain committed to working with the producer nations to shape a tin agreement that serves our common interest in a healthy tin market.

Finally, we hope to expand our cooperation in the critical area of energy. The leaders at the Venice summit committed themselves to a far-reaching effort to expand the production and use of alternative energy sources. In particular, they called upon the World Bank to reexamine the adequacy of existing resources for assisting developing countries in their energy production and to consider the advisability of a new lending facility for this purpose. As part of this expanded international effort, we hope to increase our energy cooperation with ASEAN. We hope that the recent tour of the United States by ASEAN energy experts will generate new projects for cooperation, particularly in the area of nonconventional energy sources.

As we confront the challenges we face together, as we seize the opportunities we share together, our individual judgments will be enriched by our continuing dialogue. I have learned a good deal about this area in the past several days. I hope I have contributed to your understanding of American intentions and purposes—in this region and the world. I look forward to continuing those discussions this afternoon, in the spirit of trust and cooperation that has come to characterize this relationship of growing importance to us all.

PRESS BRIEFING, KUALA LUMPUR, JUNE 28, 1980[6]

Q. In his opening remarks at the last session, Mr. Tomamtino spoke very strongly about the need to recognize Democratic Kampuchea at the United Nations. In your remarks, you endorsed the ASEAN position on Cambodia quite fully but you said nothing on that issue. Would you be good enough to comment on that?

A. We discussed that issue very thoroughly this afternoon, and the ASEAN Foreign Ministers understand that it's a decision that's under consideration in the United States, that I came here to listen to the issues as they understood it, and I will report back to my government.

Q. Chancellor Schmidt is going to Moscow next week. Do you expect that he should have talks on the Vietnamese aggression to Thailand, because as I understand from your delegation, we feel that the pressure has to be put on the Soviet Union in order to get Hanoi to its senses?

A. I would not presume from this distance to offer advice to Chancellor Schmidt as to what he should discuss in Moscow. I think that's for him to say. He outlined to us pretty thoroughly in advance what he expected to say to the Chancellor [sic] with respect to Afghanistan and NATO issues. Whether or not he has in mind discussing this one too, especially in light of this latest incident on that Thai border which has occurred since I last saw him, I have no way of knowing. It would be an appropriate thing for him to say.

I intend to communicate to my own government and to those of my colleagues among the Foreign Ministries of Europe my deep concern about the situation on the Thai border, the incident there, and the possible implications for the future, as well as the possibility that in the next few days the problem of feeding people may escalate dramatically and even in dangerous ways. We fully support the ASEAN ministers in their call for U.N. action and for the full weight, indeed, and resources of the United Nations in dealing with this problem and avoiding a disruption of what are already inadequate means for distributing food, not only on the Thai border but within Cambodia itself. I think it is a potentially explosive situation, and I would not doubt that Chancellor Schmidt or others were to get the same impression of the situation that we've gotten here that they would speak out on it.

Q. I understand there has been some discussion as to whether the situation in Kampuchea and the Thai border is now worthy of the same attention by the world that has been given to Afghanistan. Has agreement been reached on that issue and, if not, what is the nature of the disagreement?

A. This dog is just about to be beaten to death I think, but I would call attention to President Carter's theme throughout his 8 days in Europe this past week when he started out with his toast—which proved to be more of a speech than a toast—in Rome in which he identified these two aggressions as being strategically connected and strategically related and that they should be of concern to the entire world.

Russian expansionism can best be fully evaluated and its implications understood if one looks at the total, and these two are the two thrusts that confront the world both in the East and in the West with the problem of deterring and the resisting and defeating of Soviet expansionism.

Q. While we welcome your assurance and support for Kuala Lumpur as the rubber headquarters, we would like to know if there is any change in the U.S. attitude on the tin agreement negotiations, particularly with regard to the export control which the producing countries would like to maintain and also U.S. insistance that the stockpile should be doubled. Is there any chance that you will be prepared to consider or review the objections that the U.S. delegations have been making all this time in the Geneva meeting?

A. I did not conduct the negotiations of the administration of the rubber agreement. We participated in the development of the agreement, and I think we were the first country to rectify it. We are a consuming country, and we have agreed to the location of the headquarters here in Kuala Lumpur. That doesn't mean that there won't be different points of view between producing states and consuming states as the agreement is implemented. I did not regard it as my function here today to discuss or negotiate those issues.

Q. How do you interpret the constant call from Phnom Penh for talks with Thailand?

A. I can make a generalized observation that politicians always find it difficult to sustain taxpayers interest in particular projects, whether domestic or foreign. So to try to answer a question about patience is a difficult one to answer.

What the central question that's involved here was that the refugee problem is the question for providing for the feeding, the resettlement, and humanitarian needs of people who have been driven out of their homelands by conditions politically who are fleeing oppression. That sort of problem has always, I think, attracted the compassion of the American people and, indeed, the peoples in the free world everywhere.

The interesting thing about the refugee movements that plague the planet at the present time is that they involve millions of people who are walking away from the Soviet Union and Soviet-sponsored regimes, and they're walking toward the free democratic societies. That's a very clear message that ought to have great appeal for the free peoples of this planet who are concerned about the expansionism and aggression of the closed totalitarian society. I think that beyond the humanitarian appeal these refugees generate in so many countries that are supporting them, including these ASEAN countries, beyond that is that central question which it seems to me would appeal to people in terms of justifying the political systems in which they are free to live.

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[1] Press releases issued concerning the Secretary's visit to Ankara and Kuala Lumpur but which are not printed here are 165, 167, and 171 of June 30, 1980, and 193 of July 17.

[2] Press release 166 of June 30.

[3] Press release 168 of June 30.

[4] Press release 169 of June 30.

[5] Press release 181 of July 8.

[6] Press release 178 of July 8. ■

slightly less than the $2.6 billion in 1978. The implications of a downturn in the world economy can be seen in the worldwide recession in 1974–75: Taiwan's real growth plunged to 1.1% in 1974 from 13% in 1973, and reached only 3.1% in 1975.

Taiwan's GNP grew at an annual rate of 6.2% in real terms in the first quarter of 1980, low by Taiwan standards but remarkable by world standards. It reflects mainly soaring costs of the 380,000 barrels of oil imported each day. At present prices the year's oil bill will total $3.8 billion—74% higher than in 1979. Taiwan's growth, however, is based not only on a vibrant export sector but also on strong consumer demand; booming housing and industrial construction; and progress on a number of railway, harbor, highway, nuclear power, and other infrastructure projects. Inflation in 1980 will be about 15%. Wages will probably increase an average of 20%.

Prospects. Despite worldwide stagflation at present, the long-term prospects for Taiwan's economy are excellent. Exports and markets are being expanded and diversified, and economic policies remain conducive to investment and development.

Domestic Politics

Although there has been some intermarriage since 1949, the population of Taiwan can be roughly described as 85% Taiwanese—the descendants of pre-1949 Chinese inhabitants of the island. The other 15% are mainlanders who crossed over to Taiwan in 1949 and their descendants. Chiang Ching-kuo appears to perceive a need to bring more Taiwanese into the political process. In the past several years, he has implemented policies designed to increase Taiwanese representation in the central elective bodies and has appointed Taiwanese to major cabinet positions.

Most of the membership of the Kuomintang (KMT)—the ruling nationalist party—is now Taiwanese, and roughly 70% of the local-level party organization is Taiwanese. One-third of the members of the KMT Central Standing Committee are also Taiwanese. Nevertheless, party leadership remains heavily dominated by mainlanders, and there is no indication that they are giving serious thought to relinquishing control. This appears to have frustrated some of the party's Taiwanese membership.

Defections from the KMT of a number of promising young Taiwanese members who later formed the core of the independent opposition have highlighted the need for party reform, and such reform has been seriously debated during the past year. Indeed, party modernization was named as one of the major policies of the KMT during the 11th plenum of the KMT Central Committee in December 1979. However, previous efforts to reform and modernize the party have met with the stiff opposition of old-line party stalwarts.

Trends toward general political liberalization have been set back, at least temporarily, by the December 10, 1979, Kaohsiung incident—a demonstration organized by political oppositionists which erupted in violence resulting in several police injuries and the subsequent arrests and trials. The demonstration had been billed as a human rights rally. However, a number of the rally organizers were charged during the subsequent trial with having promoted the idea of "Taiwan independence" and with seeking to overthrow the authorities by illegal means. Several of the defendants responded that what they had advocated was really "Republic of China independence," which they said would simply be acknowledgment of the separation of the "Republic of China on Taiwan" from the mainland for over 30 years.

Given the unshakable position that theirs is the legitimate government of all of China, including Taiwan, the idea of a Taiwan separate from the mainland *(de jure* as well as *de facto)* is totally unacceptable to the KMT leadership. Eight of the demonstration organizers (all Taiwanese) were tried and convicted of sedition and given prison terms ranging from 12 years to life. Thirty-two others have been tried and convicted of lesser charges stemming from their involvement in the demonstration.

In a separate development, Kao Chun-ming, Secretary General of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church, and nine others were arrested on charges of harboring or failing to report one of the rally's organizers who temporarily eluded arrest. The military court, which conducted a public trial last month, sentenced Kao to 7-years imprisonment. Four received suspended sentences and the other sentences ranged from 2 to 7 years. Although the authorities have stated that Kao's was purely a legal matter, concerns have been voiced in the United States and in Taiwan that his arrest and trial may have been prompted by a desire of the authorities to tighten control over the Presbyterian Church.

We have watched these developments closely, and have been mindful of the human rights interests embodied in the Taiwan Relations Act. AIT has kept CCNAA informed of our views, and how seriously these developments have disturbed church and other groups in the United States.

Looking ahead, it should be noted that the KMT Central Standing Committee presided over by Chiang Ching-kuo, as well as the Executive Yuan, decided on June 5 to hold by the end of this year the supplemental central parliamentarian elections suspended in December 1978. High officials have recently stated in public that the number of seats to be contested in these elections—seats in the Legislative Yuan, Control Yuan, and National Assembly—will be increased, and a decision on the size of the increase is expected to be announced soon.

Over the long term, stability on Taiwan will depend on several interrelated factors: the strength of the economy and its growth rate, confidence in the new relationship with the United States, Taiwan's overall defense posture, and the level of tension in the Taiwan Strait area. We believe that, in spite of occasional setbacks, the long-term trend continues to be toward broader and more genuine participation of all elements of Taiwan society in the political process, and we see this as a healthy development.

The AIT-CCNAA Relationship

The formula for nongovernmental relations with the people of Taiwan, established in the Taiwan Relations Act, has afforded us the flexibility to deal with problems cooperatively and imaginatively. The American Institute in Taiwan has proved its effectiveness over this past year. Through AIT:

- Americans and the people of Taiwan continue to enjoy access to travel services which allow them to travel between the United States and Taiwan to conduct business, pursue academic work, and engage in other fields of mutually beneficial cooperation;
- Businessmen of both sides continue to receive assistance, advice, and facilitation;
- Americans are able to maintain mutually beneficial relations with Taiwan on an unofficial basis in such fields as nuclear energy development, scientific cooperation, and air transport;
- Sales of defensive equipment are arranged; and
- Our views and concerns on human rights, as well as those of Members of Congress and the American public, are transmitted to the authorities on Taiwan.

It is essential, in terms of our overall China policy, that we protect the basic understanding which made normalization possible. To that end, we have striven to maintain both the fact and the appearance of unofficiality in U.S.-Taiwan relations. This had led to restrictions on travel and access to officials and administrative procedures which some find cumbersome and inefficient. I would prefer to describe our attitude on such matters as pragmatic; we look at each case on its merits.

When we normalized relations with the People's Republic of China, we believed it essential that our existing agreements with Taiwan continue to be respected in Taiwan and to have validity under the law of the United States, despite the withdrawal of recognition. Therefore, as you know, a presidential memorandum was issued on December 30, 1978, which stated that: "Existing international agreements and arrangements in force between the United States and Taiwan shall continue in force. . . ." The Administration welcomed the addition of Section 4(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act, which approved the continuation in force of such agreements "unless and until terminated in accordance with law," because that provision further removed any doubt about their continuing validity. This treatment of existing agreements by the Administration and Congress stands in contrast to that of most other nations, which considered all their agreements with Taiwan to have lapsed upon recognizing the P.R.C.

Nonetheless, our relationship with Taiwan is not static. As Assistant Secretary [for Congressional Relations] Atwood said to Chairman [of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs] Zablocki in his letter of October 30, 1979, some of our agreements with Taiwan will expire, perhaps calling for replacement with new agreements; some will require changes or updating; and others, having completed their purposes, will become obsolete. As circumstances change, agreements on subjects not now covered by agreements may be required. I want to emphasize that we do not have a policy to replace or terminate all of the treaties and agreements we maintain with Taiwan. Each agreement, as the circumstances require, will be considered on its own merits, on a case-by-case basis.

As to the question of privileges and immunities, AIT gave CCNAA a draft agreement in September last year, and the subject has been under consideration by the two sides since then. CCNAA responded in November and again, with a new draft, in April of this year. AIT proposed slight modifications in a meeting with CCNAA on May 22. CCNAA has not yet responded to the latest proposals. If any differences remain, they should be very minor; we believe that agreement will be reached soon. In the meantime, the two sides have extended functional privileges to allow for effective operation of the two organizations.

All of those who have been concerned with our relations with Taiwan—including both members of this subcommittee and people in the Administration—can, I believe, derive much satisfaction from the experience of the first year of the new relationship. The first year should also provide reassurance to the people on Taiwan that they will not suffer from the new arrangements. This is a most successful beginning to an important new chapter in our overall China policy; we can all be justifiably proud. I appreciate the interest this subcommittee has shown in Taiwan affairs this past year, and I look forward to working with you on this and other subjects over the coming year.

[1]The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

OECD Ministerial Meeting Held in Paris

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher represented the Secretary of State in Paris June 3–4, 1980, at the meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Council at ministerial level. Following is his statement made before the Council on June 3.

I am pleased to participate once again in the annual meeting of the OECD ministerial council. I bring you the greetings and best wishes of our Secretary of State, who very much regrets that the press of new responsibilities prevents his attendance. Secretary Muskie is keenly aware of the urgency of economic issues in current international relations—issues which directly affect the lives of all our peoples. He strongly supports the efforts of the OECD to develop a coordinated response to our common economic problems.

Although the OECD has always served a helpful role in the exchange of information and the coordination of policy, its importance in recent years has grown enormously. For events of the last few years have shown beyond all doubt that the economic problems we all face defy parochial, national solutions. It is only through cooperation that we can avoid destructive, beggar-thy-neighbor policies and sustain the economic policies that have so handsomely rewarded our nations.

Interdependence of Problems

Economic theory stresses the interdependence of the problems we face and the absolute necessity of dealing with them in a coherent, mutually consistent manner. I think it is important, however, to stress two different kinds of interdependence. One is quite obvious and has become virtually a cliche: the interdependence of our national economies. Although obvious, it is important to emphasize this fact. The apparent intractability of such problems as energy, inflation, and unemployment has encouraged us to search for cooperative solutions. International cooperation can yield especially large benefits now, paradoxically, when there is increased pressure to adopt actions that would inevitably prove to be mutually destructive.

Unprecedented changes have taken place recently in key economic variables. Consequently, we find it particularly difficult to chart the future impact of those changes and their implications for our economic policies. Cooperation through the OECD will, at a minimum, allow us when making policy to share a mutually consistent view of the world.

Moreover, in all our economies we face an enormous task of adjusting to higher energy prices—not only in the energy sector but throughout the economy. In making this adjustment there will be steps we can take together that will have much greater benefit than actions any of us could take singly and in an uncoordinated way. These steps will include the sharing of burdens and moving toward common goals. Cooperation can insure that actions we take to strengthen our own domestic economies are not at the expense of the economic performance of other countries.

port the nonaligned positions against bases. Any suggestion of outside military intervention against their wishes brings strong and instant negative reaction.

At the same time, many of their leaders recognize that they cannot defend their region without the support of the Western powers, including the United States. They want that support to be, first, in the form of the provision of military equipment for their own forces. Beyond that, so long as the Soviet Union represents a potential threat, they are not averse to having the forces of the United States "over the horizon." That force must be there for the global balance essential to maintaining a broader peace in the world.

Today that "over the horizon" force has been increased and discussions are under way with one of the gulf states, Oman, for possible cooperation in the use of shore facilities. The use of such facilities would make easier the supply and communication with the fleet and the support of the reconnaissance essential to the fleet's role.

The U.S. military response to the new situation in the area has been gradual but progressive. We have had, since 1949, a small naval presence consisting of three ships in the gulf. In September 1979, President Carter announced a small addition—of two ships customarily in the Indian Ocean—to the strength of that unit, as well as more frequent deployment of larger battle groups in the Indian Ocean. An increase in the facilities at Diego Garcia was authorized to support this increased deployment. Today, the U.S. naval presence in the western Indian Ocean area consists of two carrier battle groups and four ships carrying a Marine amphibious unit.

Let me say a few words about that presence. It is there to provide a prudent deterrent against any efforts to interfere with the independence of the states of the region or restrict the free access of others to this vital region. It is not there to intervene in the affairs of the states of the region.

Our presence there is in full recognition that the resources of the area are not "ours." They belong to the independent states of the area. Our presence is part of a general effort, in which our allies will also play a part. The area is as important to them as it is to us, perhaps more so. Our diplomacy will continue to urge a meaningful joint response to regional security.

The security relationship of the United States to the area must be based on a relationship between sovereign, independent nations. The day of the client state has gone. Such cooperation will, therefore, inevitably be affected by issues in which differences exist between the United States and the nations of the area.

Palestinian Issue

Foremost among such issues is that of our approach to ending the 30-year-old Arab-Israeli conflict. We all recognize that at the core of that conflict is the issue of the Palestinians. All who deal with this area are aware of the significance of this issue. The Palestinian yearning for political expression is supported by all Arab states and has also captured the imagination of many non-Arab Islamic and Third World countries. There are also large numbers of Palestinians who occupy important positions in the states of the gulf and the peninsula.

Among the Arab and Muslim states of the area, the Palestinian cause and the related question of Jerusalem are seen both as political and religious issues. The moderate states feel the pressures of the more militant countries, pressures embodied in the results of the Baghdad summit of November 2, 1978.

The tragedy of the issue is that so much of the criticism of the United States is based on unrealistic premises. No nation, however strong, can "pressure" another, sensitive to its security, into making politically unacceptable sacrifices. Conferences and resolutions can set the path to solutions; the solutions themselves can only come through difficult, prolonged, and serious negotiations. If such negotiations are to succeed, they must be carried forward in a negotiating format in which both sides —let me emphasize, both sides—have confidence.

All of the gains toward an ultimate comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli issue have come through that process. So it was that Ralph Bunche brought about the armistice agreements at Rhodes in February 1949. So it was that the Golan Heights and Sinai disengagements were arranged in May 1974 and September 1975, respectively.

The Camp David process has chosen that path. No clear alternative has been proposed that would lead in the same direction—to a genuine settlement. We are convinced that it provides a sound negotiating format that can steadily make progress toward the twin objective of providing security for Israel and giving the Palestinians a real means of self-expression and of control over their own affairs.

Many now, among our allies and among our friends in the area, are skeptical that the Camp David process can achieve results. We believe it can. We are seeking peace, not just rhetorical positions that will lessen the pressures on us.

Success in the autonomy negotiations now taking place is essential if the parties are to remain engaged in the negotiations, and a way is to be opened for participation by the Palestinians in the subsequent stages of the negotiation. We are deeply conscious of the fact that the Palestinians must ultimately speak and negotiate for themselves.

Ambassador Linowitz [Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations], who has just returned from the area, has worked hard and ably to focus and accelerate the talks. The discussions have now begun to center on the substantive issues which lie at the very heart of the negotiations—issues like security, water, and land. There are no illusions about the complexity and sensitivity of the problems that remain; there is, equally, no doubt that they must be tackled. Both sides are determined to do their best to reach agreement by May 26.

President Sadat has been in Washington this week [April 7–10] for further discussions of the peace process. Prime Minister Begin will be here next week [April 14–17]. They both know, as we do, that this process provides the best opportunity to take the next step forward toward a comprehensive peace which can ultimately bring the security of peace to the Middle East.

It is difficult to see any other process by which we can resolve the issue which continues to be of such paramount importance to the nations of the gulf region. Peace in the Middle East area is not only important for the stability of the world. It is also important in order to continue to assure sufficient stability in the gulf area to permit our overall relationships to continue. Political wisdom must continue to accompany economic access.

We have a significant and complex relationship with the nations of the gulf region. As long as we need the energy resources, as long as the nations of the area need our technology, as long as those nations face Soviet-backed threats to their independence, that relationship will continue to be a central preoccupation of U.S. foreign policy. ■

Secretary Meets With Australian Foreign Minister

Australian Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock met with Secretary Muskie at the Department of State on June 6, 1980. Following is the text of a question-and-answer session they held with reporters after their meeting.[1]

Secretary Muskie. It's a pleasure to welcome to our country the Foreign Minister of Australia, Andrew Peacock, representing a country with whom we have had longstanding ties of friendship and mutual support, going back even to the days of my youth, which is a long time—almost ancient history.

But in more recent times, we have appreciated the support that Australia has given us in connection with our problems in Iran, our response to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and, equally important, the role that Australia is playing in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] conference, and in the development of mutual interests by the countries of that fastest growing area of the planet.

I look forward to meeting him again in Kuala Lumpur—that poetic sounding city on the other side of the planet—but in the meantime to welcome him here in much less glamorous circumstances.

Foreign Minister Peacock. I found our meeting very successful indeed. I am very grateful to the Secretary of State. We have a complementarity of interests in the world, as you well know. We are part of an alliance, which has worked particularly effectively, not simply as a military alliance but in forging our close political links.

Our part of the world, Southeast Asia, is undergoing rapid transformation as it moves into a fast-growing economy, and the need for coordination of policies between a great power, such as the United States, and an influential power, but smaller, such as Australia, which, of course, is a great influence to them.

We discussed today matters alluded to by the Secretary of State, and I am extremely grateful for this exchange of views. And I look forward, as he said, to seeing him in a couple of weeks' time in Malaysia when we and the Foreign Ministers of a number of other countries meet with the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN.

Q. Despite recent trends, do you ever foresee a time that the entire Australian Olympic Committee would reverse itself on attending the Moscow boycott? [sic] And do you ever see a time when Australia would ever cut its huge exports of food to Iran?

Foreign Minister Peacock. On the first question, that's a question not for the entire federation but for the executive of the federation. And the President [of the Australian Olympic Federation] has indicated that whilst he thought it unlikely that the executive would reconsider the matter, this, nevertheless, remains possible. There are an increasing number of people associated with the Olympic Games in Australia—like individual athletes, sporting federations, and those officials in management—who are withdrawing from the games. So it may well be that the federation will agree with the government, which is strongly and emphatically in favor of a boycott, and I would certainly hope that reconsideration would occur.

On public opinion—the Secretary of State rightly alludes to public opinion in Australia. The last Gallup poll has it at approximately 60% in support of a boycott, 30% opposed to a boycott, and 10% undecided, which is an extraordinarily high figure. As I said to Mr. Muskie, I would like a return of 60/30 if I were advocating any position.

The second question I was asked, I will do it as succinctly as possible. We have implemented, as requested, the U.N. resolution. It has been very costly to do so, but we have been prepared to do so as a strong ally of the United States. As far as Iran is concerned, the U.N. resolution did not name a particular date for the ending of contracts, but we have placed an embargo on all contracts, excepting food and medicine, because the U.N. resolution itself excludes food and medicine. U.N. resolutions traditionally do in the sanctions area. So I think we are probably the only country that has implemented the full spirit and letter of the resolution.

Q. Could I ask you a question about the speech yesterday by former Secretary Vance? He proposed that the SALT II process go forward this year. Do you think there is any prospect of that happening?

Secretary Muskie. The President, as you know, is committed to the SALT process, and we have under active consideration, and do on an almost constant basis, strategies for pursuing that objective, which remains his objective and that of this Administration.

It is not easy to devise the strategies, given the fluid situation in the Senate, with which I think you are all familiar, and also the importance of highlighting our objection to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But we have the question under review and, in due course, hope to develop a strategy.

Q. As long as the Soviet troops are in Afghanistan, is there any prospect that the SALT Treaty would go forward?

Secretary Muskie. I think the two issues are separable. As a matter of fact, the fact that we are engaged in this kind of confrontation in Afghanistan to me elevates the question of arms control as an important security issue. If we were in total peace with the Soviet Union, arms control would not be as important a national security issue. It is because we understand that, and that's our view of it, that we are considering strategies for dealing with both objectives.

Q. Is the Administration planning to press charges against Ramsey Clark and his colleagues when they return?

Secretary Muskie. That is a question that is under consideration in the Justice Department. I am not on top of their investigation.

Q. It is believed that Secretary Vance feels that it would be important enough to call a special session of Congress after the election to try to deal with SALT. Do you think that the political climate at that time might be such that people would not have to worry about getting elected, that you might be able to move then when you couldn't now?

Secretary Muskie. I think there are a number of options of that kind that we have under consideration. If I were in Mr. Vance's position at the present time—which I am not anxious to at this time—I would be in a better position to have made a personal decision. At the moment, I think the question of timing, the question of separability of the issues from the public perception, as well as the perception of others who are influenced by our policies, I think all of those have to be carefully evaluated and balanced, and we are undertaking to try to do so.

The two statesmen agreed in the opinion on the threat which terrorism constitutes for the peace, stability, and progress of today's world.

In the field of bilateral matters the two Presidents expressed pleasure at the state of our relations and set forth their satisfaction at the favorable attitude of both parties toward the search for a contractual framework for future relations between both countries, which will take account of Spain's new political circumstances.

The two sides examined the state of economic relations between the two countries and expressed their intention to maintain this trend, while, at the same time, striving to end the present imbalance in their commercial exchanges.

[1] Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 30, 1980, which also includes a White House statement of June 25 and the President's remarks to U.S. Embassy employees and members of the American community in Madrid on June 26.

[2] Made in response to a toast by King Juan Carlos I in the State Dining Room of the Royal Palace. President Carter delivered his response in Spanish, and the text here follows the advance release issued by the White House.

[3] As printed here, this item follows the text of the Spanish press statement as translated by the U.S. International Communication Agency. The statement was agreed to by the U.S. Government but was not issued as a White House press release. ■

Visit to Lisbon

President Carter's last stop on his European trip was in Lisbon June 26, 1980.

Following are the President's toast at a state luncheon and the text of a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the visit.[1]

PRESIDENT CARTER'S LUNCHEON TOAST, JUNE 26, 1980[2]

Mr. President, let me thank you and Mrs. Eanes for this lovely luncheon in this most magnificent setting. Rosalynn and I have long looked forward to a chance to visit Portugal. The excitement of the visit started even before our plane landed as we came in over Lisbon and the Tagus River. As I looked down on this beautiful city and its monuments, I was vividly reminded of Portugal's rich history.

Just a few hours ago, I had a chance to visit the monastery which honors two of Portugal's greatest heroes—the poet Camoes and the explorer Vasco da Gama. These men and others, like Ferdinand Magellan, are properly honored in our country as well as yours. Their courage and their vision paved a way for the extension of a great cultural heritage across the seas to other continents.

Portugal has reason for pride in these men. Now, 500 years later, we may have run out of seas never before navigated, as Camoes said, but I have seen that Portugal continues to be served by dedicated men. While their task is different from that of the discoverers, it is no less difficult. It's to build a strong and a new permanent democracy.

Portugal's democratic leaders had the courage of the explorers in the years after the 1974 revolution. Your nation's perseverance and your capacity have been severely tested by the stresses of the last 6 years—economic crises, the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of refugees, forging new ties with your former colonies, and challenges to democracy itself. But you have prevailed. You've built healthy and vigorous democratic parties. You've defended freedom to debate and to differ one from another, and you've conducted fair and free elections.

Many of you in this room have helped lay the foundations of a lasting democracy in Portugal. You, the democratic leaders, have personally borne the burdens of office. You've played the role of responsible opposition. You've organized, inspired, and led your people. Because of your personal involvement in creating democracy, you know better than most how precious it is. It's no wonder that Portugal was among the first of the world's nations to recognize and to respond to the threat which was posed to democratic societies everywhere by aggression in Afghanistan and official terrorism in Iran.

Your actions and your words demonstrated that people who value freedom cannot stand idly by while others' rights are ruthlessly suppressed and while a system of international order so dearly won and so delicately maintained is so callously attacked. It is at times such as these that friends and allies must stand together.

The alliance has served us well, but it's now being tested by new challenges—a challenge to its most vital economic interests and a challenge to the principle that free people in independent nations should have the right to decide their future without outside interference. Will we be able to meet such threats? Do we have the will, the capacity, the resolve to make a common stand? I am confident that we can, and my confidence has been bolstered by the talks that I have had here today.

Consultations such as these and others that I've had with other nations on this trip are essential for us to maintain the strength and unity of our associations, for we are members of a voluntary association—the association of democratic nations. It's a source of great satisfaction to me and to my fellow Americans to know that democracy is succeeding in Portugal and that Portugal is a steadfast member of the Atlantic alliance.

Mr. President, I ask everyone to join me as I raise my glass to you and to Portugal's democratic leaders of all parties. You've set an example in your achievements at home and in your leadership abroad. I thank you for your hospitality. I wish you every success, and I look forward to our continued and close collaboration. Mr. President, to you, to your lovely wife, and to the brave and courageous people of Portugal.

JOINT STATEMENT, JUNE 26, 1980

President Jimmy Carter of the United States visited Lisbon on June 26 at the invitation of the President of Portugal, Antonio Ramalho Eanes. The visit provided an opportunity for meetings between the two Presidents and between President Carter and Prime Minister Francisco Sa Carneiro.

President Carter and his hosts noted with satisfaction the close relations between the United States and Portugal, based on longstanding ties of friendship, common commitment to democratic values, and partnership in the NATO alliance. They discussed international issues, including the situation in Afghanistan, in Iran, and in the Middle East; new forms of coordination and consultation among the Western countries; and U.S.-Portuguese cooperation in enhancing Western security, including development and conservation of energy resources.

In emphasizing Portugal's very positive contributions to the Western alliance, President Carter congratulated both the President and the Prime Minister for their vigorous leadership in the evolution of Portuguese democracy. He expressed particular appreciation for the prompt response of the Portuguese Government to the Soviet armed invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. The leaders agreed that this Soviet action, in flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter, seriously threatens international peace and poses a major strategic challenge affecting vital Western interests in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf region.

In accord with that shared strategic assessment, the leaders view as indispensable the application of concrete political, economic, and commercial measures to impress upon the Soviet Union the necessity of a prompt and complete withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan.

In line with that view, the leaders welcomed the concerted steps which NATO is now pursuing in order to strengthen the common defense in response to the strategic challenge faced by all the Western allies, and they pledged their commitment to the earliest possible fulfillment of the goals embodied in NATO's long-term defense program. Bearing in mind the U.S. commitment of resources toward building a security framework in the region of Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf, they further recognized the usefulness of adequate consultation among the Western allies regarding security requirements within the NATO area.

President Carter also reiterated his appreciation and that of the entire American people for the forthright support given by Portugal to the international effort to secure release of American hostages held by Iran in defiance of international law and universally accepted standards of decency. The leaders stressed that the principle of the rule of law, vital to the health and stability of the world community, is at stake in this crisis. They agreed that continued detention of the hostages will further undermine Iran's international standing, and they concurred in the necessity of maintaining economic sanctions on Iran as well as the efforts being pursued by international bodies as a way of convincing the Iranian authorities to release all the hostages unharmed.

(White House photo by Karl Schumacher)

President Carter and President Eanes exchange toasts at Ajuda Palace.

Turning to other aspects of mutual interest, both sides recognized the importance of achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East which takes into consideration the interests of all the parties involved.

President Carter welcomed the constructive insights and suggestions which President Eanes and Prime Minister Sa Carneiro offered regarding critical issues affecting East-West and North-South relationships. In particular, President Carter praised Portugal's efforts to strengthen ties with Africa, and especially with the Lusophone African states. They agreed that it would be useful to intensify U.S.-Portuguese consultations on ways in which both countries can work for greater peace, freedom, and prosperity.

[1] Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 30, 1980, which also includes remarks made by Presidents Eanes and Carter at the arrival ceremony, a White House statement, and the President's remarks made on his return to the United States on June 26.

[2] Made in response to a toast by President Eanes in the State Dining Room of the Ajuda Palace. ■

Portugal—A Profile

Geography

Area: 93,000 sq. mi., including the Azores and Madeira Islands. **Capital:** Lisbon (pop. 1.1 million). **Other Cities:** Oporto (350,000).

People

Population: 9.8 million. **Ethnic Make-Up:** Homogeneous Mediterranean stock with small black African minority. **Religion:** 97% Roman Catholic. **Language:** Portuguese. **Literacy:** 70%. **Life Expectancy:** 69 yrs.

Government

Official Name: Republic of Portugal. **Type:** Parliamentary democracy. **Constitution:** April 25, 1976. **Branches:** *Executive*—President (Chief of State), Council of the Revolution (advisory body), Prime Minister (Head of Government), Cabinet. *Legislative*—unicameral Assembly of the Republic (263 members). *Judicial*—Supreme Court. **Political Parties:** Socialist, Center Democratic, Social Democratic, Communist, 10 minor parties. **Suffrage:** Universal over 18. **Subdivisions:** 18 Provinces, 2 autonomous administrative districts (Azores, Madeira), 2 dependencies (East Timor, Macao).

Economy

GDP: $16.6 billion (1977). **Annual Growth Rate:** 5.6% (1977 at constant prices). **Per Capita GNP:** $2,010 (1979). **Inflation Rate:** 23% (1976–78). **Natural Resources:** Fish, cork, tungsten ore. **Agriculture:** *Products*—grains, potatoes, olives, wine-grapes, rice, tomatoes. *Work force*—33%. **Industries:** Textiles and clothing, footwear, wood and pulp, paper, cork, metalworking, ore processing, chemicals, fish canning, wine. **Trade:** *Exports*—$3.5 billion (1979): textiles and clothing, wood and wood products, cork and cork products, electrical machinery, wine. *Imports*—$4.5 billion (1977): petroleum, cotton, agricultural products, industrial machinery, iron and steel, chemicals. *Major trading partners*—EC (36%), EFTA (12%), U.S. (8%). **Official Exchange Rate:** 49 escudos = US$1.00. **U.S. Economic Assistance:** $442 million (FY 1975–78).

Membership in International Organizations

U.N., Council of Europe, EFTA, GATT, NATO, OECD.

Principal Government Officials

Portugal: President—Antonio dos Santos Ramalho EANES, Prime Minister— Francisco SA CARNEIRO, Minister for Foreign Affairs—Diogo FREITAS DO AMARAL, Ambassador to the U.S.—Joao Hall THEMIDO, Ambassador to the U.N.—M. Vasco FUTSCHER PEREIRA. **United States:** Ambassador to Portugal—Richard J. Bloomfield.

Q. On that second point, what about a lame duck session of Congress—post-November?

A. It all depends on whether public opinion, public support, for an arms control agreement has intensified sufficiently to influence Members of the Senate, and also the environment as between us and the Soviet Union, what it then is. I think we've got to keep looking for an opening, keep searching for it, keep probing for it, keep selling the idea, keep promoting it, and we just can't stop where we are.

Q. How active would you become if this becomes a presidential issue between Mr. Carter and Mr. Reagan? How much of your duties and time would be devoted to making speeches in favor of SALT, possibly addressing a Democratic convention on that issue?

A. I have no political calendar. I think that it's important for me to talk about SALT and these other issues. That, as you all know, is one of the reasons that the President selected me to discuss foreign policy as Secretary of State, not as a campaigner.

Q. One parallel with the arms control thing, would we be prepared to enter into discussions on a neutralization formula for Afghanistan before withdrawal or as a withdrawal precondition?

A. I think that withdrawal is a precondition to any political settlement. Otherwise—to use the Afghan proposal as a specific example—there the Russian proposal is that we reach a political settlement and then talk about withdrawal, which puts withdrawal entirely in the hands of the Russians, as it is now. Whether or not there is some way of accommodating the two so that both objectives can be achieved at the same time is a legitimate question. I don't have any formula in mind for that. I think you have to stress the importance of withdrawal—total withdrawal—as essential to any resolution of the problem.

Q. Nothing emerges yet of the Giscard or anybody else's two-way track discussions leading to withdrawal and the settlement?

A. No evidence of that. Giscard's discussions with Brezhnev by and large were an opportunity for him, which he asserted, to indicate to Brezhnev that the invasion of Afghanistan was completely unacceptable to the French and that relationships between the two would be impacted until it was reversed.

Q. Do you expect the French to be pushing for some sort of endorsement of their proposal for a security conference in Europe? What kind of a reaction would you give that?

A. I don't know whether they put it on the table for the Madrid meeting or not, but we expect it to be discussed in Madrid. I mean, the invasion of Afghanistan took place after that, so just what the relationship of the two may be, we may get some clues as to that at this meeting.

Q. You don't know whether they're still pressing that actively?

A. They have not withdrawn it, but they expect to take it up, I think, at Madrid and in that sense, they may be pressing it actively. But it has not been raised in any discussion I've had with the French Foreign Minister.

Q. Would the United States be willing to favor that?

A. We've got it under consideration, and we have not turned it down. We have some reservations about creating another security forum. On the other hand, we like to be forthcoming with our allies. There is nothing more divisive than to totally reject the viability of a difference of opinion in NATO relations.

Q. Are you expecting any specific problems with the allies at this meeting, such as second thoughts on stationing nuclear missiles in certain countries?

A. I expect problems wherever I go as Secretary of State, but nothing special.

Q. The President and the Chancellor [Schmidt of West Germany] told us vigorously on Sunday night [in Venice] that they had identical views now on theater nuclear forces, but it is not entirely clear to me what the identical view is. I wonder if you could [inaudible]?

A. We are all committed to the decision of last December to deploy the Pershing missile in accordance with the schedule agreed upon at that time—the construction to begin or the selection of sites to begin as soon thereafter as possible. Now this is what I understand to be the agreement last December, and it is still the agreement.

Q. Does that exclude feeling out some sort of—

A. You remember that as part of that same announcement, the allies suggested the possibility of negotiations on theater nuclear weapons, and that's still on the table and the Russians have rejected it.

Q. The site selection and site construction, is that part of deployment? Is that including deployment?

A. No, that's where the whole idea of a freeze gets caught up. It's easy to monitor construction. It's not easy to monitor deployment. In other words, if the sites have already been built, it's not easy to monitor the placing of missiles in them. So that what you have is the possibility of an asymmetrical result which puts us at a disadvantage. That's what that talk of a freeze was all about, unless the talk was about a unilateral freeze by the Soviets.

What do we freeze, if we freeze something? The question obviously arises that the Russians would do something, I suppose. But you might be put in the position of talking about freezing construction. We'd have to wait 3 years before we could begin site selection construction, and this is where the confusion arose. Now if the Russians would freeze deployment of their missiles—and one problem there is that if they did so in response to a request by us, that would have the effect of placing an imprimatur on the number they've already got, and that would put us in an asymmetrical disadvantage. It was a very confusing kind of dialogue that went on there that is now, as I understand it, clarified and straightened out.

STATEMENT BEFORE THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, ANKARA, JUNE 25, 1980[3]

I am privileged as honorary President of the North Atlantic Council to open our discussions with some remarks. It is a privilege that, notwithstanding my Senate background, I will not abuse with a long speech.

Let me first express our deep gratitude to the Government and people of Turkey for so graciously hosting these discussions. Turkey is a vital ally. It is a valued friend. It is confronting its serious economic and social challenges with courage and a devotion to democracy. For this it has not

only the admiration but the willing cooperation and strong support of its NATO allies.

These meetings continue the process of charting the long-term course for our alliance. The challenges we face today are demanding, as they have been repeatedly since the beginning of this great partnership. There will be differences among us, as there have always been. But let no one mistake our essential unity. We shall meet new challenges together as we have for more than 30 years.

The rapid growth of Soviet military forces for well over a decade and their demonstrated willingness to violate the sovereignty and assault the independence of another nation require an effective allied response—a concerted and sustained allied response.

- We must preserve the military balance in Europe, through full implementation of the defense decisions we have made.
- We must make unmistakably clear that aggression will be firmly opposed.
- We must continue our individual efforts to strengthen stability in the vital region of the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia and to support the independence of nations in the region.
- And together we must continue to reinforce the strength of one another so that every member can play its full role and make its own strong contributions to our collective security.

Our purpose is not confrontation; it is to diminish the danger of a global conflict. Our purpose is to strengthen the only basis on which detente can be sustained—deterrence of aggression and mutual restraint.

- With the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet forces, we are prepared to support a truly independent and nonaligned Afghanistan, administered by a government acceptable to the Afghan people.
- The West is prepared to seek continued progress in limiting the deadly arsenals on both sides, through arms control based on equality. The United States will seek ratification of the SALT II Treaty when that objective is achievable, and we will abide by its terms so long as that practice is mutual. The Western side remains committed to progress in the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations in Vienna. And the allies are ready to negotiate equal limits on long-range theater nuclear forces as we proceed with the modernization steps we embarked upon in December. We cannot, however, accept the proposition that negotiations are possible only if NATO countries reverse their commitment to achieve a safer and more secure balance of these forces.
- Moreover, the allies are prepared to pursue a balanced and forthright dialogue at the CSCE meeting in Madrid. Madrid offers an important opportunity to review how well all of the 35 participating states have done in fulfilling commitments freely made in Helsinki 5 years ago. It offers an opportunity to consider new proposals for advancing the entire range of CSCE goals and to expand and strengthen confidence-building measures that are militarily significant, verifiable, and cover all of the European continent. Ultimately our efforts in Madrid must be measured by their tangible meaning for the daily lives of people throughout Europe—on their security, their freedom, and their ability to work with one another.
- And finally, let me reaffirm that the path to broader cooperation with the Soviet Union, to a lessening of tensions in Europe and elsewhere, is open when Soviet actions allow. The West is committed to a realistic search for common ground. But we all recognize that cooperation can be sustained only in an atmosphere of restraint, on a foundation of respect for the sovereignty and independence of others. We shall keep open our channels of communication with the Soviet Union—to make our own resolve absolutely clear and to pursue efforts that can genuinely contribute to stability.

This is a time of new testing of our alliance, as the West is confronted by new challenges to our security beyond our alliance boundaries, by new pressures on our political cohesion, by the continuing imperative of developing our defenses and maintaining the military balance.

For 30 years the history of our alliance has been a history of progress—progress in adjusting our thinking and our actions to meeting new challenges to our security. We have successfully reconciled the requirements of security and cohesion; for we are all democracies. Within our alliances, no less than within our nations, we are strengthened by free discussion in a framework of shared values and unshakeable trust. Today, as in previous meetings of this Council, we celebrate those values and that trust as we draw the benefits of our consultations.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL FINAL COMMUNIQUE, JUNE 26, 1980

I.

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session at Ankara on the 25th and 26th June 1980.

2. In reviewing the international situation, Ministers noted with concern that the past six months have been overshadowed by developments which challenge the foundations of stability in the world. The rules which govern relations between states are defined in the United Nations Charter: the violations of these rules have led to tensions which are prejudicial to the understanding and trust which ought to govern relations between states. Ministers underlined the opposition of their governments to threat or use of force and they reaffirmed their commitment to the peaceful settlement of international disputes. They considered it particularly important in present circumstances to reaffirm their determination to work together for the achievement of the fundamental ideals and aims of the Atlantic Alliance; national independence, security, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. In this connection they underlined the importance of close political consultation within the Alliance.

3. Ministers expressed their deep concern at the continued occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet armed forces. This occupation of a traditionally neutral and non-aligned country of the Third World has aroused the resistance of the Afghan people, led to the flight of about a million refugees and has been condemned by the overwhelming majority of the international community in resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the UN Human Rights Commission, the Islamic Conference and other bodies. They regard as unacceptable this armed intervention and the attempt to crush the national resistance of the Afghan people by massive military force, and they note that the arguments used by the Soviet Government to justify its actions are totally unconvincing. Reaffirming the words of the UN General Assembly Resolution of 14th January 1980, adopted by 104 votes, Ministers stressed the need for "immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan" and urged the Soviet Government to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country and the rights of the Afghan people freely to determine their future.

Ministers noted that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan carried with it very serious implications for the general strategic situation. By using its own military forces directly to impose its will, this time on a non-aligned country, the Soviet Government has clearly demonstrated its readiness to exploit opportunities to shift the balance of forces in its favour. It has thus given rise to grave concerns about its

U.S. Policy Toward Zaire

by Lannon Walker

Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 5, 1980. Ambassador Walker is Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.[1]

I welcome the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to discuss with you the Administration's policy toward Zaire. I recently returned from a visit to Kinshasa where I had the chance to meet with President Mobutu, Prime Minister Bo-Boliko, Foreign Minister Nguza, and other Zairian leaders, as well as to consult in detail with members of the U.S. Mission.

Before reviewing with you the ways in which the political, economic, and security situation in Zaire has evolved over the past year, I want to outline the strategic, political, and economic realities that underpin our policy toward Zaire.

First, let there be no mistake that our interests in Zaire are long term in nature. As Assistant Secretary [for African Affairs Richard M.] Moose stated before this subcommittee last year: "Zaire's geopolitical and economic weight in African scales of power is significant." With its population of 27 million, it is the third largest sub-Saharan African state. In terms of land area, it ranks second in size and it borders on nine other states in central and southern Africa. It is a fact that Zaire's sheer size and economic potential make it critical to regional stability. And it is a fact that Zaire's moderate foreign policy orientation and close relations with the West stand in marked contrast to several countries in the area which favor more radical policies and have turned to the U.S.S.R., East Germany, and Cuba for military and economic support.

Zaire is also the world's leading producer of both cobalt and industrial diamonds and the seventh largest producer of copper. It has consistently supplied Western markets over the past two decades and intends to continue this policy in the future. The United States imports over 60% of its cobalt from Zaire. The mining sector in Zaire, in turn, is an important market for U.S. equipment and technology. U.S. interest in the hotel industry, tire and battery manufacturing, flour milling, and vehicle assembly plant and other U.S. investments are all commercially important in this, black Africa's third largest market.

Furthermore, Zaire's political support continues to be important to our interests in Africa and elsewhere. Zaire is pro-Western in its foreign policy and in the positions it takes in international organizations. It has been a consistent voice of reason in the councils of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the nonaligned movement, and the United Nations. Zaire has strongly encouraged efforts to find peaceful solutions to regional disputes, including support for the Camp David accords. It has opposed efforts by radicals such as Cuba and Vietnam to dominate the nonaligned movement, instead aligning itself with other moderates such as Yugoslavia, Egypt, Bangladesh, and Singapore.

President Mobutu was among the first to call for the immediate release of the American hostages in Iran and has steadfastly supported us on this issue in the United Nations and other public fora. Zaire condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and supported the U.N. General Assembly resolution calling for immediate Soviet withdrawal. Zaire was the first African state to announce that it would not participate in the Moscow Olympic Games. In regional affairs, Zaire—though not one of the frontline states—has consistently and actively supported combined Western and African efforts to find peaceful solutions in Namibia and Rhodesia.

In sum, I submit that Zaire has historically been a good friend of the United States; that its minerals production is vital to us and the West; and that its stability and economic potential are important to a region of the world that has become a major focus of U.S. and Western attention and efforts over the past 3 years of this Administration. In addition, given the serious crisis which has persisted in Zaire for the last 5 years, and the consequent negative effects on the standard of living and the health of the Zairian people, we have a major humanitarian interest in this important country.

The facts that the United States has significant interest in Zaire, that Zaire has been a friend, and that the friend is now in trouble do not mean that this Administration's policy is one of blind or massive support. As Assistant Secretary Moose told this subcommittee on February 7, our position is that, together with our allies and the international financial institutions, we shall continue to assist Zaire's efforts to correct these problems as long as sustained progress is also made by the Government of Zaire in these same areas. We have explicitly and publicly stated that if our interests and the interests of the Zairian people are to be protected and prosper, major reforms must take place in the political, economic, and military systems of Zaire, and there must be a significant improvement in the overall human rights situation in that country.

These reform goals have been spelled out in detail by President Mobutu and endorsed by the major Western powers, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. The Western assistance programs to Zaire are linked in various degrees to achievement of these goals, with the United States taking the lead. These combined efforts are finally beginning to show progress, although it has been a slow and painful process for all concerned, and it is far from being over.

It was in recognition of the failure of the government to implement adequately the reform program that President Mobutu and Prime Minister Bo-Boliko drastically changed the membership of the cabinet [Executive Council] and the directors of state enterprises in January; that President Mobutu ordered the new cabinet at its first meeting to concentrate upon efficient, honest administration of their departments, or else; and that the new cabinet worked very hard during the month of February under the leadership of the Prime Minister to produce precise programs for each department to execute during 1980. The Prime Minister explained these programs for 4 hours February 25 on nationwide TV, responding to questions from the press and the public. He, too, stressed the necessity for good management in order to start Zaire again on the upward path. And he expressed his and the President's determination to apply sanctions against those who fail to follow the new approach.

Let me, in this context, review with you progress in major areas of reform over the past year. I will not address myself specifically to U.S. economic assistance programs for Zaire, a subject covered by AID [Agency for In-

ternational Development] Deputy Assistant Administrator Haven North in his February 28 statement.

Human Rights

Last year at this time, only 10 months had gone by since the traumatic attack on Kolwezi by the ex-Katangan gendarmes. The attitude of the central government was defensive, and there was a real question as to whether there could be reconciliation between Shaba and Kinshasa. Nevertheless, President Mobutu had announced an amnesty program designed to welcome back into Zaire the exiles who had left Shaba after the 1977 and 1978 invasions. By early 1979, thousands of exiles had returned, and a number of political prisoners had been released. Some said these actions were purely cosmetic and easily reversed.

The fact of the matter is that, up to now, some 150,009 returnees, mainly from Angola, have been resettled in Zaire. Though the massive influx appears to have ended, Zaire continues to work with the U.N. High Commission for Refugees to receive and help resettle former exiles from Angola, Congo, and Sudan who continue to return, albeit in smaller numbers. Although the amnesty officially expired in mid-1979, the Zairian Government continues to honor its terms and to actively seek the return of other expatriated Zairians, some of them formerly prominent in the political and economic life of the country, and some active political opponents of the Mobutu government.

At the same time, Zaire continues to play host to some 650–700,000 refugees, primarily Angolans but also including some 50,000 Ugandans, 33,000 Burundians and Rwandans, and 40,000 Cabindans forced from their homes by political upheaval. Zaire, Somalia, Sudan, and Thailand support the largest refugee populations in the world, except for the United States.

Zaire also now affords to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to most prisons as part of the committee's efforts to help improve the lot of individual prisoners and to monitor prison conditions in Shaba, Kinshasa, and other regions of Zaire.

Most recently, President Mobutu dissolved the Judicial Council which had extended tight control over the bar, the courts, and almost all aspects of the judicial system, replacing it with an independent bar and courts and curbing such abuses by security agencies as arbitrary arrest. Measures are also underway to reduce the size, increase the discipline, and generally bring under control the gendarmes, including creation of a separate civilian police force. This reform, a return to an earlier system, was in response to criticism and advice from within and without. It is acknowledgment of a mistake.

I submit that these actions represent real progress toward respect for the rights of the individual.

Political Reform

In the area of political reform, progress—while not spectacular—is being sustained. Last year we told you that we perceived the beginnings of decentralization of political authority and responsibility and that the Legislative Council was showing encouraging signs of activity. I continue to be impressed by the candor and the skill exhibited by members of the Legislative Council in taking advantage—as they did again just last December—of the budgetary process to question government policies, suggest alternatives, and to interpellate individual cabinet members.

I am equally encouraged by the new responsibility being accorded to Prime Minister Bo-Boliko and his cabinet. The January 1980 cabinet reshuffle brings into the government a number of persons formerly considered as critics of the regime and outspoken advocates for honest, effective administration. Among the ministers, secretaries of state, and heads of state enterprises replaced—not simply shifted to other positions—were those most criticized by the legislature for gross mismanagement and abuse of the public trust. Some of them are under investigation, charged with misappropriating large amounts of government funds. The interaction among the Legislative Council, the Executive Council, and the President has increased encouragingly in the past year.

I might also point out that in a February 25 TV interview, Prime Minister Bo-Boliko stated that the regional economic and social councils nominated late last year will soon begin operating.

Military Reform

Last year, we told you it was too early to say when Zairian armed forces would replace the foreign troops in Shaba. Today, I can state that substantial progress is being made in the area of reforming and retraining those key elements of the Zairian armed forces charged with maintaining security in Shaba, the mining region vital to Zaire's economic recovery. The 2,500-man inter-African force that maintained security in Shaba for more than a year following the 1978 invasion was withdrawn over a period of some 6 weeks during the summer of 1979. It was replaced by newly trained Zairian troops of the 3,000-man 21st Infantry Brigade. The Belgian Army advisers who trained this unit remain with the troops in Shaba and are now beginning a battallion-by-battallion retraining of the Kamanyola division.

Relations between the Shaban civilian population and these units continue to be much improved over relations before Shaba II, and the security situation remains calm. Discipline and *esprit de corps* have been maintained. And, the new units—though still hampered by long and badly organized supply lines—are at last being regularly paid, properly fed, adequately housed, and well led. French advisers are training the 31st Parachute Brigade, while the P.R.C. is training a commando brigade. Other units, such as the Kamanyola division and the gendarmerie, will take time to reach similar levels of discipline and performance, but programs to bring this about have begun.

Peace and security in Shaba bodes well both for Zaire's economic health and for renewed confidence among foreign lenders and investors. The recent World Bank-organized consortium loan to Zaire's state-owned mining firm—GECAMINES—is one evidence of renewed confidence. Another is the return of the expatriate technicians and managers still vital to the operation of the copper and cobalt mines and processing facilities. Contrary to recent published reports, expatriate employees of GECAMINES now number some 750, as opposed to some 200 only a year ago.

Our foreign military sales (FMS) credit and international military and education training (IMET) programs continue to make an important contribution, I believe, to the international effort to assist Zaire in reforming and reequipping its armed forces. The recent General Accounting Office (GAO) audit of our FMS programs underlined the need for basic improvements in the logistical management of Zaire's Army (FAZ), a task that is even now being undertaken by our Belgian allies. Sixteen Belgian officers are assuming key

The second kind of interdependence I would stress is the relationship among all the major economic problems we face. High energy prices, inflation, slow economic growth, protectionism, and recycling are all interrelated. We can deal sensibly with none of them in isolation.

For example, energy is a problem in its own right. But the price and supply of energy over the next decade will strongly influence all aspects of our macroeconomic performance—inflation, productivity, and unemployment. At the same time, the dramatic change this year in the current account positions of the less developed countries (LDCs), caused by the increase in the price of energy, will create difficulties for these countries. Our macroeconomic performance, in turn, will determine whether the LDCs are able to sustain their growth and avoid aggravating problems of indebtedness. Finally, all these problems will influence our trade and international financial relationships.

As our economies face large, oil-induced balance-of-payments deficits and slower real economic growth, pressures for protectionism will certainly rise.

The OECD provides us with a long record of useful cooperation on these problems of interdependence, and its present work continues to offer a full agenda. Let me review briefly what I think are the main points on that agenda.

Areas for Cooperation

Energy. This is the area in which the scope for cooperation is greatest and perhaps most vital. We stand to gain not only by avoiding a destructive scramble for scarce supplies in periods of temporary shortfall but also by a joint effort of adjustment to higher energy prices. Two weeks ago at the International Energy Agency (IEA) ministerial meeting, our colleagues addressed themselves to improving our coordination on these crucial issues. I urge all governments represented here today to support the conclusions of that meeting and to use the appropriate policy measures to reduce our dependence on imported oil and to develop alternative sources of energy.

Inflation. The most important task we face in running our macroeconomic policies is to come to grips with inflation. To do so will not be easy. But we cannot expect to return to high and sustained growth until we bring inflation under control. I would emphasize an important aspect of the OECD's role in this. The restrained policies that are so necessary to deal with inflation pose their own risks as we enter a slow-down in world economic growth. Since no country's economic growth is independent of its trade with others, the regular cooperation within the OECD in discussing and analyzing macroeconomic policies will become even more important to insure that the downturn in economic activity does not become more severe than we now anticipate.

Developing Countries. Joint action will also assist in our relationships with developing countries. Higher energy costs and the slower growth in our economies will reduce economic growth in the developing nations. We can and must respond to their problems in a number of ways.

- We must assist in their adjustment to higher oil costs. We should encourage energy conservation, energy efficiency, and the development of conventional and alternative sources of energy. We must also assure the LDCs that, despite our own slower growth, our markets will remain open to their exports.
- We must assist the LDCs in their balance-of-payments financing during the period of adjustment. Here our responsibility lies in supporting the reforms of the international financial institutions now underway, which are designed to insure that sufficient financing under reasonable terms will be available in the medium term.
- We must recognize that aid as well as financing will be required for the poorest of the developing countries. We must avoid the temptation to use our own economic problems as an excuse for lower levels of assistance to developing nations. The oil-exporting countries and centrally planned economies also have a responsibility in this area. We would hope that the major surplus countries would play a significant role, both through aid flows and through financing arrangements, in insuring the recycling of their surpluses to developing countries in deficit.

World Environment Day

SECRETARY MUSKIE,
JUNE 5, 1980[1]

Earlier this year concerned citizens across America marked the 10th anniversary of Earth Day. We used that anniversary to measure our progress as a society toward the bold environmental goals we set. As we gather on World Environment Day, I hope each of us is looking forward to making the next decade of the environmental movement a global revolution.

A growing world population, increasing pressure on the world's natural resource base, and the spread of environmental pollution must become a fundamental concern of the world community. In my new position as Secretary of State, I intend to continue my commitment to improving and protecting the environment. I will do everything I can consistent with overall U.S. policies and priorities to pursue U.S. environmental interests and responsibilities. I view those interests as an important and necessary aspect of U.S. foreign policy.

The 4 billion people on this planet need food, energy, shelter, and living space. They all seek improvements in their quality of life and greater social opportunity. Competition for the world's limited resources of the air, water, and land is inevitable. The community of nations must find ways to manage these resources which will allow us to meet people's needs as well as protect the environment.

Deterioration of the global resource base—air, water, forests, arable lands—threatens to undercut international development goals and objectives and sow the seeds for increased social, economic, and political instability. When one considers traditional U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as economic growth, political stability, sustained supply of raw materials at acceptable prices, and meeting basic human needs, it should be apparent why the issues associated with resources, environment, and population are being referred to as the "new dimension of national security."

Recognizing the importance of these concerns, I will support efforts in the United Nations and elsewhere to deal with them. World Environment Day provides us with an opportunity to redouble our efforts to improve the quality of life for people all over the world.

[1] Press release 147 of June 10, 1980. ■

Trade. Although cooperation through the OECD will assist us in dealing with the energy shortage and with the problems of developing nations, it is in the area of trade that the temptation for us to go our separate, national ways is strongest. There are, of course, always pressures to solve our domestic economic problems by protecting industries that are vulnerable to imports. These pressures will intensify during the period of slow growth that faces us. However, we must be aware that the solution of increased protection is an illusion. As a group we can become only worse off, not better off, by trade restrictions. While this has always been true, open trading is taking on more importance as the need to resist inflation has increased.

We must also resist the temptation to compete through the subsidization of export credits, which distorts market forces. To that end we must bring our agreement on export credits into line with current credit market realities.

The variety and complexity of economic issues that confront us require us to establish priorities, to concentrate our attention. I have outlined the four issues that, to the United States, appear most urgent. Nevertheless, the OECD and its Secretariat have provided invaluable assistance on other topics that will engage our longrun attention.

Other Topics for Attention

For example, we must be concerned about the increase in the use of narcotic drugs. Heroin addiction has spread alarmingly throughout Europe and is now increasing in the United States. For the first time, the Development Assistance Committee in several informal meetings has considered the impact of bilateral aid programs on illicit narcotics production, the source of our heroin problem. The OECD has also undertaken the development of statistically comparable data bases on drug abuse so that member nations can share information on drug abuse more effectively.

The OECD has also shown itself highly responsive to changing conditions and changing requirements in other "nontraditional" areas of growing importance to member countries. The personal role of the Secretary General in organizing assistance for Turkey to which our members responded is indicative of the OECD's ability to act quickly to meet serious problems.

The high-level conference on the Employment of Women last April, much as the similar 1978 meeting on youth unemployment, contributed substantially to our understanding of changes in our domestic labor markets and to our governments' ability to deal with them.

The new OECD Steel Committee has provided an invaluable mechanism to help member nations cope with sectoral and trade problems that transcend national frontiers.

Similar examples can be cited in the fields of toxic chemicals, transborder data flows, urban problems, and environmental protection.

This impressive record of adaptability, relevance, and vigor is largely due to the creative leadership of our Secretary General. I want to express my Government's sincere appreciation for Mr. Van Lennep's personal contributions to this Organization and, through it, to the countries we represent.

Meetings such as this demonstrate that there is a large core of common understanding and agreement on the economic problems that vex us. Economic theory shows us that narrow, national solutions provide only a temporary respite from the economic problems that we all share; that only through international cooperation can long-term relief be assured. The OECD has proven its value as a forum for us to exchange information, to share our national problems and experiences, and to coordinate our efforts at resolution. It is up to us to muster the political will to turn our common economic understandings into political policy. ■

U.S. Policy and Eastern Europe

by Robert L. Barry

Address before the World Affairs Council of Cleveland on April 22, 1980. Mr. Barry is Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.

When I heard from Coby Swank last fall that the Cleveland Council planned a session on Eastern Europe and that I would have an opportunity to speak, I was delighted. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the chance to say something about our policy toward Eastern Europe is all the more welcome. Many legitimate questions and doubts have been raised since last December as to whether we can—or should—continue our present policies toward Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies in the wake of Soviet aggression against Afghanistan. I will try to deal with that question this evening and also to analyze the trends which we expect will affect Eastern Europe in the 1980s.

I would also like to say something about the future of Yugoslavia, a country of central importance to the United States and Western Europe. Although this independent and nonaligned country has little in common with Moscow's Eastern European allies, Belgrade's policies impact importantly on Warsaw Pact capitals and vice versa.

Finally, I intend to say a word about Albania, another "special case" country on the margins of the region.

I will not focus on the three Baltic States in these remarks. I want to emphasize, however, that our policy of not recognizing the forcible and illegal incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union in 1940 remains unchanged.

Before I begin to speak in generalities, let me warn you against them. Even in the early days of the cold war and regimes freshly imported from Moscow, Eastern Europe was not a monolith. It is far less so today. Each country has its own historic personality, its own religious, historical, cultural, and political traditions. Even within each country there are important national and regional differences of continuing—and sometimes growing—importance. The last decade has seen nationalism play an increasingly important role worldwide, from Quebec to southern Africa. During the 1980s we expect—and welcome—growing diversity in Eastern Europe as governments are forced to cope with the differing historical and economic factors at play in each country.

We made steady progress in our relations with most of the countries of Eastern Europe in the 1970s, particularly during the latter half of the decade. As we enter the 1980s our policy remains, as Secretary Vance said on March 3 in Chicago, one of continuing to "build stronger relations with the nations of Eastern Europe."

Q. It looks as though the Europeans are again going to press their pro-PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] initiative in the United Nations despite President Carter's warnings. Do you think that they can be dissuaded from that?

Secretary Muskie. I don't read their position as being that clear-cut or definite. I don't read their position as having been set in concrete as yet. They are still talking about an initiative. My impression is that they have not yet agreed on form or the approach or the shape of that initiative. And I know that they are sensitive to our view that any initiative that had the effect of undermining the Camp David process would be negative in its impact at the present time.

Q. Speaking of the Olympics, is Australia thinking about providing any of the sites for the alternate games or subsequent games being organized in countries which boycott the Olympics?

Foreign Minister Peacock. A number of discussions have been held between officials on this question, and there has been no resolution at this juncture. There are sites available. In certain circumstances, some teams I know would have wished to have held competitions and, in fact, have only recently done so on a worldwide or a very large scale. But the matter is still under review.

Q. On this New Hebrides situation, how deeply is Australia likely to become involved?

Foreign Minister Peacock. That's a question for the administering authorities at the present moment. There has been a secessionist movement on one island. I have already discussed with the French authorities—I came from France yesterday—the fact that the administering authorities—mainly Britain and France—must exert their authority to restore law and order. The two ministers met on Monday of this week and agreed on a joint approach of restoring law and order, and as long as those moves continue, and we have a smooth and orderly transition to independence, then together with the negotiations commencing between the duly elected government and the alleged secessionists, then I would be satisfied with that movement.

Q. Could they use bases or facilities in Australia if they need them?

Foreign Minister Peacock. That's totally speculative. I mean, if the British and the French are prepared to restore law and order, then, there's no need to even bring that into question.

Q. In the future, if Iran does not move, are you prepared to end food and medicine? I understand you are a very large supplier of food to Iran.

Foreign Minister Peacock. As you would be aware, any foreign minister who speculated on something that has not even occurred would be a most delinquent one. When the question arises, we will give every consideration to it, because we have met the concerns of the United States on their requests to date. It is not before us now, so I don't need to walk down that path just yet.

President Approves Export of Nuclear Material to India

Following are the President's message to the Congress and a Department of State fact sheet of June 19, 1980, and a statement by Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher before the House Foreign Affairs Committee of June 26.

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, JUNE 19, 1980[1]

I am transmitting with this message, pursuant to Section 126b. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, an Executive Order [12218] authorizing the export of 39,718 kgs. of low-enriched uranium to India for use in fueling its Tarapur Atomic Power Station and authorizing the export of replacement parts for this station.

Two applications for licenses to export the fuel were submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in September 1978 and August 1979, respectively. After a careful review of these applications, and the applications for replacement parts for the Tarapur reactors, the Executive Branch concluded that the proposed exports would not be inimical to the common defense and security, that they met all applicable statutory criteria under the Atomic Energy Act, and that the licenses should be issued. The Commission was notified of these Executive Branch findings and recommendations on March 28, 1979, and on May 7, 1980.

On May 16, 1980, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission decided that it could not find that the criteria for issuing the licenses had been met. Pursuant to the law, the Commission then referred these applications to me.

In reaching its decision, the Commission argued that the full-scope safeguards export criterion of Section 128a of the Atomic Energy Act applies to these applications because they do not fall within the grace period provided in the law. The Department of State, on the other hand, concludes that this statutory criterion does not apply to these two applications because they were submitted before September 10, 1979, the cutoff date specified in the law, because the first shipment under each was reasonably planned to occur before March 10, 1980, and because there is no reason to believe that the applications were filed early as a way of circumventing the September 10, 1979, deadline.

In any event, the license criteria specified by statute, of which Section 128a is one, are not the same as the export criteria on the basis of which I must determine whether to issue an Executive Order. As the Commission noted, its inability to issue the licenses "should not be read as a recommendation one way or the other on the proposed exports." As the Commission noted further, in such cases the law provides that the President may authorize such exports by Executive Order if he determines that withholding them would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of the United States non-proliferation objectives or would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.

I have determined that to withhold these exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives and would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security. I have made this determination for the policy reasons discussed below. However, I want to make it clear that I do in fact regard these export applications as having fallen within the statutory grace period before the full-scope safeguards requirement of action 128a takes effect. Thus, my authorization of these exports does not constitute a precedent for an exception to the full-scope safeguards criterion. Further, this action in no way indicates a change in the high priority I attach to preventing the spread of nuclear explosives. On the contrary, this action reflects my judgment that non-proliferation would be set back, not advanced, by withholding these exports, and that our failure to supply this fuel could seriously jeopardize other important U.S. interests.

India's failure to accept international safeguards on all its peaceful nuclear activities and its failure to commit itself not to conduct further nuclear explosions are of serious concern to me. These exports will

[1] Press release 150. ■

help us to maintain a dialogue with India in which we try to narrow our differences on these issues.

The exports will avoid the risk of a claim by India that the United States has broken an existing agreement between the two governments and has thereby relieved India of its obligation to refrain from reprocessing the fuel previously supplied by the United States.

Supply of this fuel will also ensure the continuation of safeguards and other U.S. controls on disposition of U.S.-origin fuel that has been supplied to India.

Approval of these exports will help strengthen ties with a key South Asian democracy at a time when it is particularly important for us to do so. Insecurity in South and Southwest Asia has been greatly heightened by the crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We must do all we reasonably can to promote stability in the area and to bolster our relations with states there, particularly those that can play a role in checking Soviet expansionism.

When I signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, I expressed reservations about the constitutionality of provisions of law which purport to allow the Congress to overturn my decisions by actions not subject to my veto power. In transmitting this Executive Order, I also want to make it clear that I am not departing from those reservations.

JIMMY CARTER

STATE DEPARTMENT FACT SHEET, JUNE 19, 1980

Summary

The President has approved the export of certain nuclear fuel and components to India. To withhold these exports would jeopardize U.S. interests in the region and would be harmful to U.S. nonproliferation objectives there. This paper provides background on the issues and addresses questions which have arisen.

Nonproliferation Considerations. Our fundamental nonproliferation policy objectives, consistent with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), are to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and sensitive nuclear facilities which could contribute to nuclear explosive capabilities. Approval of the proposed exports for the Tarapur power reactors supports these nonproliferation policy objectives.

To withhold these exports would adversely affect several key nonproliferation policies.

- India has indicated that the refusal of the United States to provide fuel needed for the Tarapur facility will relieve it of its corresponding obligations under the relevant agreements. In that event,

(1) India might reprocess U.S.-supplied spent fuel for recycle of plutonium in the reactors—a step which would undercut our worldwide effort to hold back reprocessing and discourage such use of plutonium in present day reactors;

(2) It might also remove the Tarapur facility from its present coverage under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—a precedential step with ominous implications for the entire structure of IAEA safeguards; this would be the first case anywhere in which IAEA safeguards were withdrawn;

(3) India might also decide to end the present U.S. veto over any use of material already supplied other than to fuel Tarapur, e.g., our veto over use of this material for nuclear explosions. It also could end the present U.S. veto over any retransfer to another country of this material. It could terminate the present U.S. right to buy any derived plutonium in excess of India's civil needs as well as end the present Indian commitment not to use Tarapur to irradiate any non-U.S. fuel.

- A cut-off will make a continuing nonproliferation dialogue with India impossible at a time when we need more than ever to sustain our discussions on this concern in the subcontinent and when India itself is becoming a nuclear supplier. A cut-off of U.S.-supplied fuel for Tarapur at this time would deprive the United States of the opportunity to discuss its differences with India on nuclear issues in an atmosphere conducive to progress. Constructive talks would not be likely after a cut-off.
- A cut-off will not advance the objectives of the NNPA and our nonproliferation interests in India; it would simply result in the Indians obtaining fuel from other sources and/or recycling plutonium.
- While some may view continued Tarapur supply as a weakening of U.S. nonproliferation policy, there is a greater risk that a cut-off could reinforce the perceptions of many countries of the unilateralism of U.S. nonproliferation policy and that the United States cannot be counted on as a reliable supplier.
- A cut-off will only encourage those in India and in other countries who argue the need for a full fuel cycle independent of outside suppliers and international safeguards.

Other Foreign Policy Considerations. The crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have profoundly affected U.S. security interests in South and Southwest Asia. We consider it vitally important to support stability and systematically bolster our relations with this region.

- We have sought in this context to maintain and strengthen constructive relations with India. It is the largest, strongest, and one of the most stable countries in the area. The policies it adopts on such issues of concern to the United States as relations with Pakistan and China, Afghanistan, Kampuchean recognition, U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and international economic affairs are important and influential.
- Indo-U.S. relations have not always been smooth. Our policy perceptions and interests do not always coincide. We believe, however, that the best way to influence India to adopt policies beneficial to U.S. interests is to try to build a reliable and mature bilateral relationship.
- Tarapur has become a crucial indicator to the Indians of the seriousness with which we view our relationship with them. A positive decision on Tarapur will help allay apprehensions about U.S. constancy and U.S. policies on issues sensitive to India, such as our relations with China and Pakistan.
- A break in our fuel supply would damage our broader relationship with India without any commensurate gains—and with potential losses—on the nonproliferation side. Moreover, the Soviets would seek to take further political advantage by supplying India with any needed fuel. We have just seen in the $1.6 billion arms deal the use they make of their resources to influence India. We can't afford at this critical time to deal ourselves out of the game by reducing our links with this key South Asian player.

Background

The Tarapur Agreement and the NNPA. Under a 1963 agreement with India, the United States agreed to supply India, in accordance with the terms of a supply contract which was subsequently concluded, with all of the en-

The Costs of Leadership

Address by Secretary Muskie before the Foreign Policy Association in New York on July 7, 1980.[1]

I welcome this opportunity to address the Foreign Policy Association and to raise with you an issue of fundamental and long-term importance to our nation. It is a matter that cuts across all aspects of our foreign policy. It will decide whether the United States can have an effective, affirmative foreign policy in the years ahead—or be left simply to wring our hands and react to crises.

The issue is this: Are we willing to commit sufficient resources to the defense of our interests and the promotion of our ideals abroad? The issue was raised again by the decision last week on Capitol Hill to lop off still more of the funds we budget to help other countries bolster their security, develop their economies, and help their people to survive. In less than 90 days, FY 1980 will be over. We've gone all this time with no aid appropriation for 1980. We've limped along at last year's spending levels. The practical effect has been deep cuts in critical programs and projects. Now we have a supplemental appropriation. It belatedly funds a few of the most urgent activities—but then excludes all the others. This is not a solution. It has simply prolonged much of the problem.

Consider just a few examples of what we are forced to neglect because of the delay and the deletions I have mentioned.

- There is currently a serious shortage in Export-Import Bank lending authority, a vehicle to promote American trade. That means fewer American jobs and reduced American profits.
- Foreign military credit sales are curtailed—credits that could have been used in areas of the world important to our security. Can anyone look at Soviet activism in the world and conclude that this is the time to neglect the security needs of our friends?
- The international military education and training program—a program that increases the professionalism of military officers in developing countries—has been cut by 25%.
- We are funding international narcotics control efforts at 20% below the amount approved earlier by a conference of the House and Senate. This is not a large program, but it serves our interests by attacking the drug problem that costs the American people billions each year in crime, in lost health, and in ravaged lives.
- We have to absorb serious cuts in the Agency for International Development's (AID) programs to promote food production, rural development, and nutrition. Projects in the Caribbean, in Kenya, and in North Yemen are among those in jeopardy.
- The multilateral programs are especially hard hit. Only 16% of what we owe the World Bank has been approved. Funding for the African Development Fund would drop 40% from the budgeted amount—inviting interpretations that America's concern for this important African institution is waning and reversing the steady improvement in our relations with Africa under President Carter. There is also a serious deficiency in funds for the Asian Development Bank.

When we fall short in our contributions to these banks, development—and people—suffer. Our influence in the banks suffers. Our ability to get others to contribute suffers. Ultimately, our diplomacy suffers. Our contributions to the banks are not simply invented by the Administration; they are negotiated. The Carter Administration has been scrupulous about consulting the Congress at every stage of those negotiations. When the funds are then cut, developing countries lose help they desperately need. And in the process, other contributors—our allies and friends—lose confidence in America's word.

. . . if we are to continue to lead, then we must be prepared to pay the costs that leadership requires.

I am not here simply to mourn the fate of a single aid bill, though in these times that would be cause enough for concern. What concerns me even more is a pattern. There is no lack of rhetoric calling for more American leadership in the world—leadership we must continue to provide. But if we are to continue to lead, then we must be prepared to pay the costs that leadership requires.

Humanitarian Concerns

If this declining trend in foreign assistance persists, we will contribute to a human tragedy of massive proportions. For we should always keep in mind that these programs work to help people. Let me cite just a few examples.

- Between 1966 and 1972, AID helped design 250 clean water systems in rural villages in Thailand. The program was successful and continued by the Thai Government. Now 800 villages are served. As a result, water-borne disease—a major Third World killer—has declined. At the same time, incomes have climbed and village life is more stable.
- In another case, AID started a credit system in Colombia enabling small farmers to take advantage of land reform. In a 15-year span, almost 35,000 small farms in Colombia have been financed. AID has sponsored similar programs throughout the Third World.
- An AID program in rural Guatemala has stressed improved teacher training and better school equipment. Through this program, the dropout rate in participating rural schools has been cut by over 30%.

Viewed from a distance no single project is dramatic. But for the people helped, even small projects are transforming lives. And the cumulative global impact is profound.

Impact on U.S. Interests

Let me emphasize that these programs involve far more than our humanitarian instincts. They bear strongly on our national interests. For the fact is that we have a deep and growing stake in developing countries. We cannot get along without them—as trading partners and markets; as sources of essential materials; as necessary partners in efforts to address pollution and population, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and countless other issues touching all of our lives. We want them to progress because we care about people. We also want them to succeed because our own economic health is bound up with theirs.

Our economic support funds—a central element in our security assistance—have been essential to our efforts to help strengthen the economies of such friends as Israel, Egypt, and Turkey. These funds also have provided major support for our effort to help bring stability and peaceful change to southern Africa.

There is nothing mysterious about the purpose of our international programs. It is an approach that makes sense in the world just as it does in our

businesses, our families, or in any other aspect of our lives. Anticipating a problem and dealing with it is invariably safer and cheaper than waiting for crisis to erupt.

It is in our interest to do all we can now to counter the conditions that are likely to drive people to desperation later. It costs less to invest now in clean water systems than to work later at curing the diseases caused by foul water. It is prudent to help people toward agricultural self-sufficiency, instead of offering later the emergency programs needed to sustain life against drought and famine. We would rather send technicians abroad to help grow crops than send soldiers to fight the wars that can result when people are hungry and susceptible to exploitation by others. So let there be no mistake. By slashing these international programs we are not saving money. We are merely postponing and dramatically raising the costs that one day will come due.

These programs are important for another reason. With them, we have an opportunity to influence events in crucial areas of the world. Without them, our power to shape events is drastically diminished. All of us are concerned—and rightly so—that we not slip into military weakness. We are steadily modernizing our military posture. Yet cutting back our other international programs contributes to another kind of weakness, every bit as dangerous. It cuts back our arsenal of influence. Our support for liberty in the world—our defense of American and Western interests—cannot be mounted with military weapons alone. The battle for American influence in the world requires more than rockets, certainly more than rhetoric. It requires the resources that make our diplomacy effective.

Consequences

What are the likely consequences for America if we lack those resources? The first consequence is American isolation. We need healthy trading partners. We need access to facilities and resources. We need the support of others in helping to achieve peaceful alternatives to regional conflicts. We need political support—whether it be in resisting terrorism in Iran or aggression in Afghanistan. But we cannot expect the cooperation and support of others on issues of importance to us if we are unprepared to offer concrete support on matters of importance to them—particularly their own economic development and social progress.

Isolation would be only one consequence. Declining American aid, and declining American influence, would also help the Soviets exploit internal instability—in Nicaragua, in El Salvador, and in many other places where the Soviets are prepared to exploit tensions to expand their power and to limit Western influence. Nothing that I know of the American people suggests to me that they want to give the Soviets this kind of free ride. I believe the American people want their nation to resist Soviet expansionism—not only militarily but by helping other nations defend their freedom and feed their people. I believe the American people want their nation to be actively involved in the world.

All of us are concerned—and rightly so—that we not slip into military weakness. . . . Yet cutting back our other international programs contributes to another kind of weakness, every bit as dangerous. It cuts back our arsenal of influence.

Finally, the decline of American aid and influence would hamper our efforts to settle dangerous disputes and build peaceful, democratic solutions.

Let me give you an example. Over the past 3 years, many in the Congress fought bitterly against President Carter's Rhodesian policy. President Carter—courageously and almost alone—insisted that the United States actively support Britain's effort to bring a democratically elected government to Rhodesia. Fortunately President Carter prevailed against bitter opposition. In fact, his refusal to compromise prematurely on Rhodesia helped bring to an end a bloody civil war in that country. The result has been good for the people of Zimbabwe and bad for the Soviets, who sought to exploit turmoil there.

Consider another case. We have been trying for a year and more to strengthen the center in Nicaragua to help moderates there resist extremist solutions. Every time we tried to appropriate the funds necessary to support our efforts in Nicaragua, the effort was defeated. Finally, Congress has acted to make possible $75 million needed to fulfill our commitment. But in the delay, we suffered a loss of credibility. The willingness of the United States to work for democracy was called into question throughout the region.

The point is this: Those most concerned about Soviet and Cuban activism in the world should be the strongest supporters of our efforts to support the moderate transition from repressive tyranny to democratic development. For by failing to support the alternatives to radicalism, we help radicalism to breed.

This continuing assault on foreign assistance is not only short sighted; it is dangerous to American interests. For it threatens the capacity of the United States to play a positive role in the world, to compete effectively with the Soviets, to encourage emerging—and threatened—democracies. It threatens to strip America of all its instruments except the instruments of destruction.

I believe that the American people, if they have the facts, will understand what is at stake. I believe they will understand that a generous investment in security assistance and economic development abroad is necessary to a strong America.

I am not new to this issue. Twenty-two years ago I made my support for international assistance a centerpiece of my first Senate campaign. And I am fully prepared to press the message until it gets through.

I think it is time for a healthy national debate on this subject. And I invite you, as citizens vitally concerned with America's role in the world, to contribute to that debate. The price of silence could be growing isolation and even irrelevance for America. That is a price no American should want us to pay.

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[1] Press release 175 (opening paragraphs omitted). ■

future intentions and is threatening the security of a region which is vital for world peace and stability. While recognizing that the security of the region is primarily the concern of the countries there, Ministers welcomed the fact that members of the Alliance are, by reason of their relations with those countries, in a position to make a contribution to peace and stability in the region.

Ministers agreed that the international crisis caused by the Soviet intervention calls for a resolute, constant and concerted response on the part of the Allies. It is vital that the Soviet Government should be left in no doubt as to the extremely grave view which the Allies take of this situation which jeopardizes world peace. Ministers reaffirmed that there could be no question of accepting a *fait accompli* resulting from the use of force. Afghanistan should be neither a pawn nor a threat for anyone. They stressed the need for a political settlement which must necessarily provide for the total and immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces so as to enable the Afghan people to decide on its future peacefully with complete freedom and without any outside pressure. The recent announcement that some Soviet troops are being withdrawn from Afghanistan would only be of interest if it were the beginning of a total withdrawal. Ministers welcomed the important role which the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement have assumed in the search for a political solution. Ministers noted that while there had been various proposals formulated or inspired by the Soviet Union, including the ideals advanced in the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact states of 15th May 1980, none of them had addressed the basic issues and all would subject the national independence and right of self-determination of the Afghan people to restrictions unacceptable in international law.

Ministers noted that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had done serious damage to detente, to which they reaffirmed their attachment. They restated their willingness to work for the improvement of East-West relations and their wish to keep open the channels of communication between the countries of East and West, so as to make their views clear, to prevent misunderstandings, to facilitate a resolution of the present crisis and to foster constructive co-operation, as circumstances permit. They reaffirmed, however, that detente cannot be pursued in one region of the world regardless of developments in another.

Moreover, they agreed that restoration of a co-operative relationship must be based on a foundation of mutual confidence, and this has been shaken by recent Soviet actions. It will need to be rebuilt by positive action on the part of the Soviet Government to live up to the peaceful intentions which it professes.

4. In addition to the concern created by the invasion of Afghanistan, Ministers noted that, despite Warsaw Pact statements that they did not seek military superiority, there was no sign of any slackening of the substantial rate of growth in the quality, readiness and strength of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces which threaten to increase the present military disparities, particularly in Europe. Ministers, therefore, re-emphasized their governments' resolve to take all necessary steps individually or collectively to maintain an adequate level of deterrence and defence across the full spectrum.

They reaffirmed that more effective use of resources through co-operative equipment programmes and increased standardization and interoperability of weapons systems was a key element in conventional force modernization and they noted with satisfaction further progress in this respect. They reaffirmed too that they would continue to work through the transatlantic dialogue toward more balanced relations among the European and North American Allies in armaments development and production and toward heightened availability and quality of new defence equipment. In this connection Ministers welcomed the work of the Conference of National Armaments Directors. They also commented on the importance of the work of the independent European programme group and the progress they expected of it.

They re-emphasized the need to bear in mind the interests of the less industrialized members of the Alliance in the course of improving armaments co-operation. Ministers also stressed the significance of maintaining the technological advantages which NATO Members possess.

5. In parallel with the efforts of their governments to maintain and strengthen their defence capabilities, Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the pursuit of effective, balanced and verifiable measures of disarmament and arms control. They nonetheless noted that the prospects for success will depend on the restoration of international confidence and stability. Ministers emphasised that their governments wished to avoid a competitive arms race. But the substantial reductions in the level of forces which they seek will only be possible if negotiations are based on a genuine willingness to achieve undiminished security for all participants and if the Warsaw Pact countries are convinced of the determination of the Allies to maintain an adequate level of defence capabilities. They devoted particular attention to the various initiatives of members of the Alliance in the area of arms control. They noted that these proposals had not met with a positive response. Ministers reaffirmed the determination of their governments to play their full part in the current disarmament work of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva as well as of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and other United Nations bodies. They underlined the importance they attach to the frequent and active consultations which take place on arms control and disarmament questions within the context of the permanent machinery of the Alliance.

6. Ministers reaffirmed their support for the SALT II Treaty which represents a significant contribution towards curbing the arms race and to ensuring the security of the Alliance and the stability of East-West relations. They expressed regret that the current international crisis had delayed until now the process of ratification of the Treaty. Ministers expressed the hope that circumstances would make possible its ratification by both sides at the earliest opportunity. They hoped that the continuation of the SALT process on the basis of further close consultations within the Alliance would make possible further reductions and qualitative limitations in the nuclear field between the United States and the USSR and create a favourable climate for progress in other fields of arms control.

7. The Ministers of the countries participating in the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions affirmed the continued importance of progress in those negotiations as a means of achieving a more stable force relationship in Central Europe on the basis of genuine parity in military manpower in the form of a common collective ceiling on ground force manpower and a combined common collective ceiling on ground and air force manpower for each side. The determination of Western participants in those talks to achieve progress and to come to early results was demonstrated by their presentation in Vienna in December 1979 of important new proposals for an interim Phase I agreement and associated measures as part of the programme of arms control initiatives approved by those Ministers earlier in December 1979. These proposals, which thus far remain unanswered by the East, are the most recent substantive proposals advanced in the Vienna talks. They provide a realistic framework for achieving a first negotiated result, including the reduction and limitation of United States and Soviet ground force manpower in the area on the basis of agreed data on these personnel, and associated measures which would aid verification of reductions and limitations, increase military stability, enhance mutual understanding of the military posture and activities of the other side and diminish the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation.

These Ministers noted the expression, in the recent Declaration of the Warsaw Pact states, of a desire for more rapid progress in the Vienna talks. They called on the Warsaw Pact states to give concrete expression to this statement through practical movement on the data issue and through an early, constructive and substantive Eastern response to the Western proposals of December 1979.

8. Turning to the process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ministers noted that, in this field also, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan had seriously affected the confidence necessary for progress. They recalled that in the CSCE Final Act, the participating states had declared

their intention to conduct their relations with all other states in the spirit of the principles guiding relations between themselves. It was therefore a matter of particular concern that the Soviet Union had acted and was still acting in Afghanistan in a manner violating the principles to which it had committed itself at Helsinki at the highest level. Ministers also deplored the increased suppression in certain countries of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the harassment, imprisonment, internal exile and banishment of those who strive for implementation of the Final Act. They expressed their concern that despite some positive developments, implementation in the field of human contacts remained uneven. They also noted with regret the lack of progress towards the freer flow of information.

Against this background Ministers considered the approach to the forthcoming CSCE follow-up meeting at Madrid. They stressed the importance of maintaining the integrity of the Final Act. They agreed that the emphasis must be placed on full implementation of its principles and provisions. Therefore, Allied representatives at Madrid will engage in a thorough, frank and measured review of implementation with a view to stimulating improvement.

Ministers noted that the prospects for progress at Madrid, and in particular for the consideration of new proposals, would be influenced by the course of this review and would depend on the international situation at that time. With this in mind, and recognizing the importance of the CSCE process for promoting contacts and negotiations between participating states, Ministers agreed to continue to develop a balanced group of proposals and remain prepared to discuss and to take account of concrete proposals for balanced and significant progress in all fields of the Final Act which may be advanced by other participants.

Ministers reviewed the various proposals that have been developed so far in the field of CBMs [confidence-building measures] and of certain aspects of security and disarmament. In this connection, Ministers recalled their agreement at the North Atlantic Council meeting of December 1979, to work towards the adoption during the Madrid CSCE meeting, as part of a balanced outcome, of a mandate for further negotiations under the aegis of the CSCE, as proposed by the Government of France, on militarily significant and verifiable CBMs, applicable to the entire continent of Europe, this means including the whole of the European part of the Soviet Union. They expressed the hope that circumstances noted above would permit concrete results in this regard at the Madrid meeting. They noted that work was continuing in the Alliance on CBMs related to military activities which would accord with these prerequisites. They agreed to continue their common efforts in this area, while recognizing that present circumstances required the Council in permanent session to evaluate developments on a constant basis.

9. Ministers examined developments with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole since their last meeting in December 1979. They expressed satisfaction with the working of the Quadripartite Agreement of 3rd September 1971 and agreed that the situation in and around Berlin has continued relatively quiet. They underlined the fundamental importance of an undisturbed climate in Berlin and on the access routes for the maintenance of security and stability in Europe.

Ministers noted with satisfaction the conclusion of the agreements and arrangements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on 30th April 1980. They welcomed the favourable effects which these will have, particularly for Berlin.

In connection with the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the Bonn and Paris Conventions, Ministers recalled that these Conventions enabled the Federal Republic of Germany to become an equal member of the North Atlantic Alliance, laid the foundations for its close co-operation, based on mutual trust, with the partners in the Alliance and contributed thereby to the strength of the Alliance and to the preservation of peace and security in Europe. They took this opportunity to recall also the importance for the improvement of the situation in Europe of the treaties of the Federal Republic of Germany with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia as well as with the German Democratic Republic. Recalling that these treaties did not affect the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole, they reaffirmed their support for the political objective of the Federal Republic of Germany to work towards a state of peace in Europe in which the German people regains its unity through free self-determination.

10. Ministers noted the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions and underlined again the necessity of maintaining the balance of forces in the whole area. They requested the Council in permanent session to continue its consultations on this subject and report to them at their next meeting.

Ministers noted that the recent developments in South-West Asia have brought even more sharply into focus the great strategic importance of the South-Eastern flank for the security of the Alliance and for the overall balance of power in the region, the maintenance of which is essential for international stability. Ministers therefore stated that the urgency of strengthening the economic and defence postures of these member countries has further increased. In addition Ministers stressed, in the interests of the Alliance's collective defence, the importance of the initiatives undertaken to strengthen the cohesion of the South-Eastern flank. In this connection, Ministers also stressed that in the interests of the Alliance's collective defence, the restoration of full and undiminished solidarity between the member countries concerned takes on a special significance.

11. The Ministers welcomed the continuation of the dialogue between Greece and Turkey and expressed the hope that they would pursue their joint efforts for a peaceful solution to the differences between the two countries.

12. Ministers reviewed the particular problems faced by the economically less advanced member countries in the light of a report by the Secretary-General. Noting that in the present circumstances the need for a clear demonstration of Allied solidarity is even more important, Ministers reaffirmed their attachment to the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty and their continued political support for the process of enhancing the economies of those countries. In this context they reiterated the urgent need for an increase in financial assistance and economic co-operation from the Allies which are in a position to do so, through the appropriate bilateral and multilateral channels. They welcomed the efforts being made to find a solution to Turkey's economic problems, recognizing time was necessary for the current efforts to become fully effective and that they would need to continue over a number of years.

13. Ministers recalled the welcome they gave at their spring session in 1979 to the intensified consideration being given by the Science Committee to the possibilities of reducing scientific and technological disparities between member countries

NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' DECLARATION, JUNE 26, 1980

Gravely concerned by incidents of terrorism involving the taking of hostages and attacks on the personnel of diplomatic missions and their premises, the Foreign Ministers and representatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America, reaffirm their determination to deter and combat such acts. They consider it necessary that all governments should adopt policies which will deny terrorists any benefits from such criminal acts. They vigorously condemn the attacks against the lives of the personnel of diplomatic and consular missions, the seizure of diplomatic and consular premises and personnel and the taking and holding of hostages and property in contravention of fundamental human rights and of international law.

With particular reference to Iran, they expressed their continued deep concern over the flagrantly illegal holding of United States diplomatic personnel and property and reiterated their call upon the Iranian authorities to release immediately and unharmed the American hostages.

positions in the logistics system at FAZ headquarters and in the field. There is an immense task to be accomplished in this area. But, once again, effective action has begun and promises to continue.

The success of the programs begun to improve the Zairian military performance depends in large measure upon a close working relationship among the various foreign advisers, and between them and the FAZ. I can say confidently that this has been the case to date. Success also depends upon a coordinated approach to meeting the material needs, including the kinds of transport and communications equipment, spare parts, small arms and ammunition, uniforms, etc., that our FMS program has made available to Zaire during recent years. While there have been some difficulties with this program, the GAO report concludes that there was no evidence of systematic diversions of equipment supplied through FMS, and the improved logistics system should remedy the problems discussed in the GAO report. Thus, there is every reason for the United States to continue to play its part in a cooperative effort to improve Zaire's armed forces.

Reconciliation

Also important to Zaire's security and to its economic recovery are relations with its closest neighbors, particularly Angola, Zambia, and the Congo. Since 1978 President Mobutu has worked hard and effectively to secure his frontiers through reconciliation and establishment of normal diplomatic relations with Angola. The 1979 mutual nonaggression pact signed by the Presidents of Zaire, Angola, and Zambia, coupled with their efforts to increase trade and economic cooperation, is an important psychological and political milestone for Zaire and the region.

Economic Reforms

Though military reform and secure frontiers are important, the key to Zaire's future stability and the welfare of its people is continued progress on economic reforms. Central to this has been the effort to apply rational economic criteria to the control and allocation of Zaire's foreign exchange receipts. This is being undertaken with assistance from the IMF and the U.N. Development Program, whose experts in the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance are for the most part now in place. The new team at the Ministry of Finance was chosen particularly for its reputation of toughness in insuring that the budget is respected and taxes are collected. Improvements in customs collection and accounting procedures under the aegis of a recently reorganized customs office staffed by a 35-member Belgian team should further tighten financial management and improve the recapture of government revenues. The road back is long, but the journey has begun and there are solid grounds to believe it will continue.

I would also underline the importance of recent major agreements on rescheduling of debts owed by Zaire to foreign banks and governments. These were difficult negotiations, but with good will on the part of all, they resulted in agreements which should provide Zaire with the breathing space necessary to reestablish its credit worthiness with both private and public lenders. The successful conclusion of these negotiations is one more indication that Zaire's creditors, including the U.S. Government and major American banks, recognize that the economic reforms now underway are having a positive impact. It also speaks for the determination of the Zairian leadership to come to grips with past commitments despite the heavy financial burden and sacrifice these agreements entail for the people of Zaire.

What Remains to be Done?

Though we continue to be encouraged by progress across the board toward achieving basic reform in Zaire, it is obvious that there remains much to be done by way of implementing the program outlined by President Mobutu in 1977 and 1978. President Mobutu and Prime Minister Bo-Boliko both made this point forcefully during television appearances in February. For example, there is a continuing concern about Zaire's ability to keep on the course of budgetary retrenchment and economic reform it has charted with its friends.

As you know, the key element in Zaire's economic recovery program and in its efforts to regain investor and lender confidence is the IMF stabilization program agreed to in August 1979. At the moment, the agreement between the IMF and the Government of Zaire is being renegotiated. This has not been a particularly easy set of negotiations, and Zaire's performance under the first 4 months of the program was less than satisfactory. We do not have a formal report from the IMF at this tims and, therefore, I will not be able to go into detail on precisely what the Zairians have and have not done. But, let me make it clear that we have already conveyed our concerns in this regard to President Mobutu and other ranking Zairian officials.

When I was in Kinshasa last month, we stressed that the crucial question is the economic reform effort and that the linchpin of all other reform efforts is the issue of budgetary discipline. I also emphasized that the test of Zaire's willingness and ability in this regard will be the results of the current negotiations with the IMF and Zaire's performance in the next 6 months. If Zaire does not pass this test, then we and others will find our ability to aid Zaire blocked and our desire to do so severely reduced.

We and Zaire's other friends will also be watching for further moves on judicial and legal reforms and a thoroughgoing overhaul of the law enforcement agencies, most particularly the gendarmes, as promised by President Mobutu on February 4. In addition, we will be looking for indications that continued collaboration with the ICRC is resulting in improved conditions of confinement for both convicts and those awaiting trial. In terms of military reform, we expect to see steady progress toward retraining the Kamanyola division and other units of a leaner, more professional armed forces whose discipline, pay, housing, and logistical support are assured. Finally, on the political side, we look forward to continued progress toward decentralization as represented by a strong and responsive cabinet, unfettered debate in a representative Legislative Council, and the creation of regional consultative bodies.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

China and the United States: Into the 1980s

by Richard C. Holbrooke

Address before the National Council for U.S.-China Trade on June 4, 1980. Mr. Holbrooke is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Less than a decade ago, after 20 years of doubt, hesitation, and often savage debate in this country, we began to move toward "normalizing" relations with the People's Republic of China. A little more than 500 days ago, we reached that historic goal.

It is difficult today to recall the controversy that surrounded the normalization process. The latest national polls show that two-thirds of Americans have favorable impressions of China, a stunning reversal of similar polls taken as recently as 1977. There is clearly a national consensus to continue to develop the close, friendly, and cooperative relationships we have already established with the Chinese people and their government.

The speed with which we have been able to develop our bilateral relations with China since January 1, 1979, has astonished the world. There is no need for me to detail the remarkable pace of developments in U.S.-China relations for this knowledgeable audience. In every area, we have established or are on the verge of establishing much the same framework for our relations that might have developed had recognition not been delayed for 30 years.

The fears and doubts that were expressed by opponents at the time of normalization have proven ill-founded. The high hopes that we held have been realized or surpassed. Let me briefly review for you what we have hoped to achieve by "normalization" and measure what has occurred against these objectives.

Objectives and Achievements

Recall the China we observed in the 1960s—a nation in self-inflicted chaos, proclaiming its hope to extend revolutionary turmoil throughout the globe, actively supporting insurgencies in many areas, armed with primitive nuclear weapons, vulnerable to outside intervention, isolated and enraged by international denial of its legitimacy. It seemed then that China's inevitable entry onto the world stage could only be profoundly disruptive of world peace and threatening to our security and that of our friends and allies.

The objectives of this Administration have been clear from the outset, although they must have seemed to many to be overly ambitious. We wished:

- To facilitate China's full entry into the international community in a way that would contribute to world peace and stability, not threaten it;
- To acknowledge our national interest in the development of a strong, secure, prosperous, and friendly China that could play a legitimate and constructive role in the Asia-Pacific region and ultimately in the world;
- To defuse contentious issues dividing ourselves from China, such as the Taiwan issue, and eliminate the danger of possibly catastrophic miscalculation by an emerging nuclear and major regional power; and
- To develop constructive patterns of consultation with the Chinese on international issues and build the friendly and cooperative economic, commercial, cultural, and other relationships with the Chinese necessary to sustain these ends.

These objectives have been or are being achieved under this Administration.

As for China itself, that nation is now beginning to enjoy the international status that long eluded it. The 1 billion people of China have begun to play a role in the maintenance of global peace and stability. The arc from Korea through Taiwan and the Philippines, at the very center of great power rivalry and instability for much of this century, is less subject to these strains today than at any time in well over 40 years. Longstanding tensions between China, Japan, and the United States have been replaced with true dialogue and consultation. For the first time in a century, our three countries enjoy close and cooperative relations and share an interest in the independence, peace, and stability of the Korean Peninsula.

On the Southeast Asian mainland, the focus of bitter mutual hostility less than a decade ago, we now share many objectives in common with China, even though we sometimes still differ on the appropriate means by which they should be pursued. In Southwest Asia, we stand together in demanding Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and a halt to Soviet southward expansion. We each place emphasis on bolstering the security of Pakistan and other neighboring states, while seeking to improve our respective relations with India.

Our own relations with China are good and steadily improving. Widespread fears about the implications of "normalization" for Taiwan and our flourishing private relationships with the people of that island have proven groundless. Although we no longer recognize the Taiwan authorities or maintain official relations with the island, nongovernmental relationships with Taiwan's dynamic society and people continue to prosper, as does Taiwan itself, despite some internal difficulties. Beijing's threats to "liberate" the island by force have been replaced with moderate policies that respect current realities in Taiwan. Beijing now seeks the reestablishment of economic, cultural, and other links between Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Tensions in the area are demonstrably at an historic 30-year low.

Our bilateral relations with the Chinese have been rapidly consolidated and—most important in our system of government—institutionalized so that they are no longer dependent on a few individuals operating in secrecy, as was the case until the beginning of last year. Broad American interests are engaged; it would be difficult for any future Administration to reverse the trend.

By the end of this year we will have completed the construction of the basic legal and institutional framework within which economic, cultural, scientific, and technological relationships between the American and Chinese peoples can develop their full potential. That potential is already being realized. As many as 100 Chinese delegations now visit our shores each month. More than 60,000 Americans will visit China this year. Our trade—which doubled last year over the previous year, reaching $2.3 billion—is continuing its rapid growth and should exceed $3 billion this year. This first joint ventures are being concluded between American and Chinese businessmen.

Finally—and of vital importance to the prospects for world peace and stability—we have established a pattern of frequent and extremely useful consultation between our highest leaders and diplomats. A serious dialogue on international security matters is now taking place in an atmosphere of friendship and candor. This pattern was set in last year's historic visits of Vice Premier Deng

U.S. Interests

U.S. interests in Eastern Europe remain consistent and constant, and they provide a framework for our policies in the decade ahead.

- We have a strong and legitimate security interest in a region which was the birthplace of two World Wars. A prosperous and diverse Eastern Europe which plays an independent and constructive role in the world can only be a factor for international stability.
- As the homeland of so many millions of Americans, we have a special humanitarian interest in the peoples of the area. American Presidents from Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt to Jimmy Carter have paid particular attention to the aspirations of Eastern European peoples, and American Presidents in the decade ahead will surely do the same.
- We have an interest in expanding economic ties with these countries which are becoming increasingly important trading partners. Since 1970, our trade with the region has increased eightfold and we had a favorable trade balance of $1 billion in 1979.
- While trade will not be a predominant U.S. interest in the area in the 1980s, we favor its expansion because of the direct benefit it brings to the American economy and because of its political contribution to diversity in the region.

Economic Factors

Economic factors are virtually certain to reinforce the trend toward diversity in Eastern Europe in the decade ahead. The troubled economies of the countries are a challenge to the ability of the regimes of the region to govern. Rising energy prices, declining productivity, falling growth rates, imported inflation, poor agricultural performance, and rising hard currency indebtedness add up to a picture which is gloomy, even in today's terms.

These problems will probably get worse. Given the prospect of declining Soviet oil production, Moscow may be forced to supply a smaller percentage of Eastern Europe's energy needs in the next decade. In any event, Eastern European countries will probably be paying OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] prices for their Soviet oil within a couple of years, and nuclear power will not be a significant substitute until at least the 1990s. The energy crunch alone, on top of the endemic inefficiencies of the Soviet-model command economies of the region, will lead to marginal and even negative growth rates in some of the countries of the region in the 1980s.

At the same time, Soviet demands for Warsaw Pact military expenditures continue to grow, and there is increasing evidence of consumer discontent. In Poland, for example, there are indications that consumer dissatisfaction over shortages of meat and certain other food products is a major source of government concern. This could be an explosive mixture, especially since economic growth is the leading "success indicator" for the political elites of Eastern Europe.

The same factors, of course, are a stimulus to reform and diversification of economic and financial ties. Moscow's answer—increased integration of the economies of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—is unlikely to make much headway without the cement of energy dependence and hidden subsidies to hold it together.

The economic challenge of the 1980s demands new responses in Eastern Europe, responses which should contribute to decentralization and political trends we would welcome. Hungary has already taken a series of additional measures aimed at further rationalization of its economy.

Following its recent party congress and a series of top-level changes in government, Poland appears to be starting slowly down the path of reform. The Polish Government, for example, is instituting a new wage incentive system in some enterprises. The new system is aimed at stimulating exports through higher productivity and better quality control.

Czechoslovakia, too, has embarked, albeit cautiously, on a limited economic reform program. Bulgaria has just announced a new law permitting mixed-capital joint ventures with the West for the first time. Romania has been a member of the International Monetary Fund since 1973, and other Eastern European countries are interested in following suit. All the countries of the region want to strengthen their trade and financial ties with the West. While protecting both our strategic and financial interests, this is a trend we want to encourage.

Political Change

There is also some political change afoot. In an increasingly multipolar world, most Eastern European governments want to carve out a role of their own rather than be perceived as Moscow's shadow. Romania, for example, is strengthening its ties with the nonaligned as an extension of its independent foreign policy. Poland would like to use its unique historical and geographical position to assume a role as a "bridge" between East and West. Hungary seeks a similar economic role for itself. Bulgaria seeks improved bilateral relations with the United States and other Western countries as the catalyst for enhanced economic ties. These are trends we welcome, and to the degree that the countries involved are prepared to take our concerns into account and truly act as sovereign entities on the international scene, we are fully prepared to expand our relations with them.

Finally, in the past few years there has been movement, albeit often hesitant, toward recognition of the fact that human rights has a legitimate place on the bilateral agenda. We shall continue to point out to the governments of the region that human rights is an important subject to us, that it goes considerably beyond divided family or visa questions, and that it is a matter which they should take increasingly into account if they wish to create favorable conditions for mutually beneficial cooperation.

The 35 governments which signed the Helsinki Final Act committed themselves to be guided in their relations by the principle of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They promised progress in a number of areas, including the specific basket 3 matters of family reunification; freer international travel; greater access to printed, broadcast, and filmed information; and increased educational and cultural exchanges.

As we prepare for the Madrid followup meeting this fall, we have been holding bilateral consultations with Eastern European countries on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and prospects for further cooperation. These consultations have dealt with the full range of human rights questions as well as military security and economic subjects. While results have been disappointing when weighed against the commitments made by governments at Helsinki 5 years ago, some progress has been made.

The situation varies from country to country. In general there is more willingness to permit divided families to be reunited and to allow greater movement of people. Some governments, such as Poland's, recognize the need to

respect the role played by religion in the society and have a higher relative degree of toleration for intellectual diversity. The Romanians have been prepared to discuss bilaterally issues they consider highly sensitive, including treatment of Romania's ethnic Hungarians.

Many of the promises made at Helsinki have not been kept—particularly by the Governments of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic—but this should not cause us to lose hope or abandon our efforts.

U.S. Relations

In the last 3 years, this Administration has achieved a great deal in our bilateral relations with Eastern Europe.

- The return of the crown of St. Stephen to the Hungarian people and the reciprocal granting of most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment in 1978 contributed to a much improved political and economic relationship. More importantly, the crown, as the most important symbol of Hungarian national identity, is on public display in Budapest where it has been viewed by thousands of Hungarians.
- President Carter's 1977 visit to Warsaw improved our political, economic, and cultural relationship with Poland, a critically important country of Eastern Europe with which so many Americans have personal ties.
- President Ceausescu's visit to the United States in 1978 gave new impetus to U.S.-Romanian relations, which are important to both countries because of Romania's independent stance on a range of important international issues. The granting of MFN status to Romania in 1975 has strengthened the economic dimension of this relationship, with bilateral trade more than doubling in the past 5 years.
- With the German Democratic Republic we have signed a landmark consular agreement which deals satisfactorily with the troublesome issue of "German" nationality in a way which meets our concerns, and we are negotiating a cultural and scientific exchange agreement which will give our professors, scientists, artists, and specialists greater access to East German society.

We have welcomed Bulgarian interest in improved political and economic ties, as well as the modest but real moves to reunite divided families and to settle claims of American holders of Kingdom of Bulgaria dollar bonds.

We have made less progress with Czechoslovakia, partially in reaction to the Czechoslovak Government's harsh repressive measures against human rights activists. But we are prepared to negotiate a fair settlement of the longstanding issues of compensation of U.S. claims for nationalized property and the return of Czechoslovak gold held by the tripartite U.S.-French-British commission since the end of World War II. Such a settlement could pave the way to improved economic and cultural relations provided that the climate of our relations is not again worsened by new acts of repression in Czechoslovakia.

That we and the countries of Eastern Eruope have made progress in our dealings with one another is not really in question. The question is whether this progress can be maintained following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the consequent worsening of relations between the West and Moscow. It is clear that Eastern European countries are freer to pursue their own interests with the West in a period of detente. It is also evident that Soviet pressure on Eastern Europe for foreign policy unity and domestic orthodoxy has heightened in the face of the international outcry against Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. What remains to be seen is whether U.S. relations with Eastern Europe are doomed to decline in step with U.S.-Soviet relations.

From our perspective, the answer is clearly "no." Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies neither participated in the invasion of Afghanistan nor apparently were consulted about it in advance. Some, at least, were not even advised of the Soviet rationale until well after we were. The initial responses of Eastern European governments to the event were varied—from Romania's implicit public condemnation of the act to the prompt endorsement of the East German leadership, with a wide range in between. Although Moscow has since enforced a degree of public support—with the continuing exception of Romania—we continue to hear convincing private disclaimers.

19th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, MAY 20, 1980[1]

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the following report on progress made during the past 60 days toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.

The intercommunal talks have not yet resumed. In order to circumvent the difficulties that caused the breakdown of the talks last June, Secretary General Waldheim suggested to the two Cypriot communities a formula under which both sides might return to the intercommunal table and begin concrete negotiations on the substantive aspects of the Cyprus problem. Neither community was able to accept all elements of the Secretary General's proposals. Despite intensive efforts, the Secretary General and his representative have, so far, been unable to achieve agreement on a compromise formula.

However, in a report to the General Assembly on the Cyprus question dated April 2, 1980, Mr. Waldheim states that he continues "to hold to the opinion that the intercommunal talks, if properly used, represent the best available method for negotiating a just and lasting political settlement of the Cyprus problem based on the legitimate rights of the two communities." A copy of the Secretary General's report is attached.

Both communities on Cyprus have welcomed the news that the Secretary General plans to continue his efforts, and both have reaffirmed their belief that the intercommunal talks are the best means of negotiating a fair and permanent solution to the Cyprus problem. I, too, am pleased that the Secretary General plans to continue his search for a Cyprus settlement. The United States fully supports his pursuit of a solution.

While Secretary General Waldheim's proposal for resuming the talks has not yet met with success, his proposal contains a sound basis for achieving a resumption of negotiations. Both communities must make renewed and sincere efforts to cooperate with the Secretary General as he endeavors to bridge the remaining differences.

During the past 60 days, there have been a number of informal contacts between various groups of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus. It is heartening that some lines of communication are being reestablished between the two communities; these may help establish an atmosphere more conducive to reaching a permanent solution to the island's problems.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

[1] Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 26, 1980). ■

riched uranium needed to operate two U.S.-supplied nuclear power reactors located at Tarapur during their 30-year life span. In return India agreed, among other things, to use only U.S.-supplied fuel, to allow the application of IAEA safeguards to this material, not to use it for any nuclear weapons or other military purpose, and not to retransfer or reprocess the fuel without U.S. consent.

In 1974 India exploded a nuclear device using plutonium produced from a Canadian-supplied research reactor and most likely some U.S.-supplied heavy water. Both were supplied without safeguards arrangements but with the understanding that they would be used only for peaceful purposes. The Indians claimed that their explosion did not violate this understanding since it was a "peaceful nuclear explosion." As a result, the United States sought and obtained clarification from India concerning the Tarapur agreement that U.S.-supplied fuel would be used only at the Tarapur nuclear power station and thus not for any nuclear explosive device.

In 1978 the Congress passed and the President signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. Among its provisions is a requirement that a non-nuclear-weapons state such as India have all of its nuclear facilities under international safeguards (full-scope safeguards) in order to receive U.S. nuclear fuel unless the President, subject to congressional veto, waives this requirement. The NNPA, however, delays the application of this criterion. Specifically, the law provides that the full-scope safeguard provision in the law (Section 128 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended) will not apply to export applications filed prior to September 10, 1979, for exports which "would" begin prior to March 10, 1980.

Although India has accepted international safeguards on the U.S. material supplied to Tarapur and other material supplied from aboard, it also has a number of indigenously developed nuclear facilities which are not subject to safeguards. Over the last 2 years we have urged India to agree to place these facilities under safeguards, but it has refused.

There are two pending applications for nuclear fuel for Tarapur, both of which were filed before the relevant deadline in the law. The executive branch recommended to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in March 1979 that the first license be issued.

Subsequently the executive branch in May 1980 recommended to the NRC that the two fuel licenses, as well as licenses for replacement parts for the reactors, be issued. In its recommendations the executive branch stated that the staturory export criteria had been met, that the full-scope safeguard requirement did not apply to these licenses, and that withholding the exports would not be supportive of U.S. nonproliferation objectives and would jeopardize broader U.S. interests in the region.

On May 16, 1980, the NRC decided that it was unable to determine that these export licenses, as well as the licenses for replacement parts for the Tarapur reactors, meet the statutory export criteria. The NRC, therefore, referred all of these applications to the President for decision pursuant to Section 126b(2) of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended.

The NRC maintained that the full-scope safeguard criterion does apply to the two fuel licenses since, in the view of the NRC, this requirement is absolute with respect to any export made after March 10, 1980, irrespective of the date of the license application, the scheduled export date, or any other considerations.

The NRC noted, however, that its inability to issue these licenses should not be read as a recommendation one way or the other on the proposed exports and that the President may in such cases authorize the export by Executive order if he finds "that withholding the proposed export would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security."

In making a decision to move forward with the exports, the executive branch has taken the following factors into consideration.

Nonproliferation Aspects. The continuation of U.S. supply of nuclear fuel to India has been interpreted by some in the United States and abroad as an indication that the United States is backing away from its commitment to nonproliferation. This is not the case. The Administration remains firmly committed to preventing the spread of nuclear explosives and to the universal acceptance of safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities.

Terminating nuclear supply to India at this time would *not* promote achievement of these objectives, and there would be substantial nonproliferation costs involved. India has stated its view that the end of U.S. supply under the 1963 agreement would constitute grounds for India to renounce its obligations under this agreement. Continuation of controls on the U.S.-supplied fuel now in India would, therefore, be placed in jeopardy. In such an eventuality, the Indians would almost certainly reprocess the U.S.-origin spent fuel in India and use the plutonium as further fuel for the Tarapur reactors. Such a consequence of a cut-off would be damaging to our worldwide efforts to hold back reprocessing and prevent recycling. If the existing safeguards on the Tarapur reactors and fuel are lost, it would be the first such instance and a serious blow to the international safeguards regime.

In addition, the end of nuclear supply would make a dialogue with India on nonproliferation issues impossible and eliminate whatever influence we have on India's nuclear program. The continuation of this dialogue does not, of course, promise that we will be successful in reconciling our differences, but an end to these discussions would insure that no progress would be made.

It is also important that the United States meet nuclear supply commitments that are consistent with U.S. law and policy in order to avoid damage to our reputation as a reliable supplier. As noted above, the executive branch believes that these exports are not affected by the full scope safeguard criterion and meet the other U.S. nuclear export criteria; their approval would enhance our reputation in this regard.

India is one of the "second generation" supplier countries and will have the capability to become a significant exporter of nuclear technology and components during the next 10–15 years. So far the Indians have taken a thoroughly responsible stance in international nuclear commerce. India's continuing association with us and other supplier countries in a cooperative atmosphere will affect the future climate in which Indian supplier policies evolve.

Regional Political Considerations. The virtual collapse of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have profoundly affected U.S. security interests in South and Southwest Asia. We consider it vitally important to promote stability and systematically bolster our relations with this region, particularly with those countries which can play a role in checking any future Soviet expansion.

Constructive and useful relations with any country depend on a web of ties which taken together form the fabric of a total relationship. Particularly at this time of crisis in the region, it is not in U.S. interests to deal ourselves out of the game by reducing our links to important countries. We risk being viewed as irrelevant to the needs and concerns of the region.

The maintenance and strengthening of good, cooperative relations between the United States and India is clearly in our interest. India is the largest, strongest, and one of the most stable countries in the South Asian area. It shares with us important democratic values. It is a leader of the moderate group in the nonaligned movement and plays a significant role in international forums. The policies it adopts on issues of concern to the United States, such as relations with Pakistan and China, Afghanistan, Kampuchean recognition, U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and international economic affairs, can be important and influential.

Indo-U.S. relations have not always been smooth. Our policy perceptions and interests do not always coincide. There have been many times when we would have preferred that India take positions closer to ours. At the same time, we should recognize that in pursuing its independent role, Prime Minister Gandhi's government has taken positions on several important matters which we can welcome and has signaled to us that it wants a constructive relationship. It has moved from a pro-Soviet view of Afghanistan to oppose the Soviet invasion and call for prompt Soviet withdrawal. Mrs. Gandhi has personally spoken out against critics of the Iran rescue operation. In sharp contrast to earlier negative Indian positions, her government has had little comment on the U.S. buildup in the Indian Ocean. Despite campaign pledges, it has not yet recognized the Vietnamese-installed regime in Kampuchea.

We believe that the best way to influence India to adopt policies most beneficial to U.S. interests is to build a reliable and multifaceted bilateral relationship. The Tarapur issue is highly important in this regard. Affecting the supply of electricity to the industrialized area of western India, it has taken on perhaps exaggerated significance in Indo-U.S. relations. Many in India see it as a litmus test of U.S. interest in maintaining good relations and of our recognition of the importance of constructive Indo-U.S. ties to our broader foreign policy concerns in South and Southwest Asia.

A positive decision on Tarapur will help to encourage India to act in ways favorable to us in the longer run as it faces up to the new situation posed for South Asia by the likelihood of a long-term Soviet presence in Afghanistan. It will also help allay Indian apprehensions about U.S. policies in areas sensitive to India. For example, Indian perceptions of our relations with China and Pakistan are likely to be influenced by the conclusions the Indians draw regarding our interests in India, as demonstrated by our handling of the Tarapur issue.

A cut-off of nuclear fuel would have the reverse impact. Moreover, the setback to U.S. interests which disapproval of the exports would bring about will be made more serious by the probability that the Soviet Union will move promptly to reap benefits from our negative action. They have already offered to supply the Indians with enriched uranium for Tarapur if we fail to do so. We have just seen in the $1.6 billion cut-rate arms deal the use they make of their resources to influence India. We can't afford to deal ourselves out of India just as the Soviets are demonstrating the importance they attach to this key South Asian player.

Considerations Related to the Applicability of the Full-Scope Safeguard Provision. The President's decision to authorize these exports is based on his determination that withholding these exports "would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives and would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security." This action does not require a determination that the full-scope safeguard criterion of Section 128 of the Atomic Energy Act or other requirements of that act or the NNPA are met. Nevertheless, the executive branch disagrees with the NRC's view that the full-scope safeguard criterion of the law applied to the two fuel applications and that, in effect, a waiver of Section 128 is, therefore, involved in approving these exports. In the view of the executive branch, the legislative history of this section of the NNPA supports the view that the September 10, 1979, deadline in the law concerning filing of export license applications is the date certain for application of the Section 128 criterion and is not meant to apply to applications under which the first shipment was reasonably planned to occur prior to March 10, 1980, absent some indication of circumvention of the September 10, 1979, filing deadline. In these cases, the exports in question were reasonably planned to occur before March 10, 1980, and the failure of the shipments to be made in this time period was due to delays on the processing of these applications within the U.S. Government.

DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER, JUNE 26, 1980[2]

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss the proposed export of fuel to India for the Tarapur atomic power station. The President's decision to approve the two fuel shipments has generated some differences of opinion, as I found in my two prior appearances before Congress on this issue. It is obvious from the questions that I have received and from the public discussion of this issue that there are some fundamental misunderstandings on the issues involved.

I believe, therefore, that after briefly recounting the history of our nuclear relationship with India, it would be useful if I devoted the bulk of my remarks to responding to some of the questions that have arisen on this subject.

In 1963 the United States and India entered into an agreement for nuclear cooperation. Under this agreement, the United States agreed to supply all of the enriched uranium needed to fuel the reactors at the Tarapur atomic power station during their estimated 30-year lifetime. In return India agreed that it would use only U.S. supplied fuel at Tarapur, that safeguards would be maintained on the fuel, that it would not be reprocessed without U.S. agreement, and that the supplied material and equipment would be used only for peaceful purposes and not for "atomic weapons or for any other military purpose." In 1974 the United States obtained from India an explicit commitment that U.S. fuel supplied to Tarapur would be used at Tarapur for the needs of the power station and, thus, not for any nuclear explosive device.

Thus far, the United States has supplied under the agreement more than 200 tons of low enriched uranium to fuel the Tarapur reactors. The fuel is under safeguards and has not been reprocessed; and India has met all of its other obligations under the 1963 agreement.

Question-and-Answer Session Following Foreign Policy Association Address

At the conclusion of the Secretary's address before the Foreign Policy Association on July 7, 1980 (see previous article), he answered the following questions which had been earlier given to a moderator to ask at this time.[1]

Q. To what extent do you favor American aid being channeled through multinational organizations, thereby diffusing or obscuring our specific contributions?

And secondly, what is your position on aiding countries whose regimes either on the right or on the left fail to meet our particular standards of human rights or decent policies?

A. With respect to the first question, I think that a mixture of multinational aid/bilateral aid is probably the most realistic approach to the aid problem. I have seen a number of instances in which bilateral aid is the only realistic alternative—both because of the size of the program that is involved and because of the nature of our relationship with the client country.

But I must say this about the multinational programs: When those developed—and I've been in the Senate long enough to remember that early birth and development—they were regarded as possibly an easy way for Members of Congress to support aid programs and also divorce them from the political maneuvering that it was always assumed took place between us and the recipient countries. Well, it hasn't worked that way.

As I have observed, these multinational programs in the congressional budget process, because they are sort of depersonalized, disassociated from the recipient countries—disassociated on the record from the positive benefits that our money is desired to achieve—they tend to have less support rather than more. I gave you the figures on the World Bank—it's down to 16%. We're way behind on our contributions and our commitments.

I would hope that we can somehow—maybe not beginning with this speech, the inadequacy of which I'm only too aware—you know, I'd like to get out on the stump and speak as a politician about these aid programs. I think that the people at the grassroots of America don't understand them. The multinational programs are important, I think, as a way of combining the resources of all of the member countries to do a more effective job, but I don't think they are a complete substitute for the obligation of each country, with the wealth and the resources available to it, of undertaking an additional share of the burden.

[As to your second question] it is not always easy to make a judgment as to whether the right or the left is in control in a particular country—and, indeed, the situation may be a slippery one, as in the case of Central America at the present time.

One needs only to read the transcripts of the debates in the Senate to get the impression that from one group of Senators, opposition to the AID [Agency for International Development] program will have the effect of undermining and undercutting democratic impulses in the country, and on the other side you'll get the opposite argument.

When you have countries like Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala undertaking to struggle from the present into the future and you have pressures from both the right and the left, it is never clear at any given moment which may be in the ascendancy. And what I'm pleading for here, really, in those kinds of situations is the authority and the resources necessary to try to influence situations of that kind so that the result will be a moderate, hopefully increasingly democratic and open, society. But it won't come overnight, and we've got to be willing to make the investment—and we're going to lose some and we're going to win some; but if we're not in the game, we're going to lose them all.

Q. Do you foresee any possibility that arms limitations talks with the Soviet Union could be resumed while Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan?

And do you foresee a particular formula for a compromise on that issue; for example, in return for a U.S.-Chinese commitment not to supply arms to rebels, would the Soviets be willing, in your view, to at least begin moving out seriously from Afghanistan?

A. As to the first question, I don't like to use the word "linkage" or the word "connection," but there is, obviously, a relationship between the two national objectives; one to achieve a reversal of Soviet policy in Afghanistan, and two, to achieve arms control—hopefully, the ratification of SALT II, but the calendar is running out on us there.

The simple fact is that the votes for ratification are not present in the Senate at the present time. I think we had a fighting chance of getting ratification before the invasion of Afghanistan, but that chance disappeared, and it is not existent at the moment, so that I can't conceive of being able to rally the necessary support of the Senate to achieve ratification of SALT II unless there is a significant change in Soviet behavior. Even then, one would need time in order to feel the impact of that development politically.

Does that mean then that we should abandon the SALT process in arms control? Not at all. I think we need to press for that goal, which is even more important given the invasion of Afghanistan, in a sense, than it was before. The Soviets revealed that inclination to cross borders directly with their own troops.

The effect of Afghanistan, of course, is to escalate the possibility of confrontation between our two countries, and in that kind of an environment, the limitation of arms, especially nuclear arms, is an important objective for each country. The difficulty is, how do we achieve it? While we are butting heads on the Afghanistan issue, how do we achieve, at the same time, a viable and credible negotiating posture on SALT? No one, to my knowledge, has come up with a solution to that problem. But I think we need to press and continually make clear that both are important national objectives and that one does not yield to the other at this point.

Whether or not there is in process politics at the international level is a dynamic force just as it is at the domestic level, and there are just the slightest kinds of signs that there may be movement. Whether the movement will occur within any particular timeframe, I don't think can be said. But there is dialogue going on; it's very tentative at the present time.

Mr. Schmidt [Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany] brought back a Soviet reaction on theater nuclear weapons connected to the SALT process that we are studying—and these are

complex questions. The SALT process is a complex process; but nevertheless, the Soviets changed their position, which was that the West must agree to reverse its decision to deploy the Pershing missile before they would consider talks. Now they have dropped that precondition, and who knows?

We may have something underway, but I do not mean—and would not want—to raise expectations about that possibility with this answer. It's simply that there has been a change. What it forecasts is very difficult at the moment to judge.

Q. There is much disillusionment, as you know of course, with the current grain embargo—it doesn't seem to be doing much good. Would you foresee an early lifting of that embargo, and in general, how do you feel, as a matter of principle and philosophy, about using trade as a weapon in our relations with the Soviets?

A. Trade is less lethal than other options that might be available to us.

With respect to the effectiveness of the embargo, it was effective in the current harvest year, which is about to end. I think we denied the Soviets at least 10 million metric tons of grain that they otherwise would have used to improve their peoples' diets and also to get the meat cycle geared up in order to increase the meat share of the Soviet diet. We deprived them of 10 million metric tons.

Obviously, the effectiveness of an embargo can be influenced by the harvest. We have very good ways of measuring the projected harvests worldwide, and we will continue to monitor. I think it would not be useful to try to prejudge what the final answer would be.

Our view is that the policy ought to be retained. Its effectiveness would be affected by the harvest, but the policy, as a demonstration of our disapproval of Soviet policy in Afghanistan, I think, is an important part of the total. Whether or not it will yield under the pressures of the farmers of the Midwest—if the harvest proved, as suggested, would not be effective—I'm not prepared to answer at the present time.

With respect to the appropriateness of particular responses to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, obviously, given the geography of the situation and the gravity of the problem, the logistical problems that are posed, the options are not all that many. The grain embargo happened to be a very useful and available weapon, or tool, because the Soviet harvest last year was about 178 million metric tons compared to their need for about 210, so it was, obviously, a very useful instrument for us to express our disapproval and make the Soviets pay some price for their action.

The Olympic boycott I thought, and still think, was a very useful way for the West to indicate to the Soviets that their behavior was unacceptable. But the Olympics will come and go and we'll forget about that in a couple of months.

The other areas in which we can impose a cost upon the Soviets are, one, technology transfers—and that to me is very important and it is an area in which there will be disagreement probably among our alliance associates, but nevertheless, we've held the line pretty well with them up to now, and I hope we can continue to do so—and secondly, the alliance—both our NATO allies in Europe and ourselves—is "beefing up" our defenses in response to Afghanistan. That surely must impact on the Soviets and their planning.

They don't have an economy as large as ours. They are having economic problems, as we are. And the prospect of an arms race—if that is, indeed, what is triggered by the present situation—can't be too welcome in Soviet leadership circles.

In addition to that, they have run into some very sticky problems in trying to pacify Afghanistan, so they are paying some costs, and very serious and heavy costs. There is some indication that they are looking for a way to relieve the burden of those costs and at the same time perhaps back off from their policy, while at the same time saving face. And again, I don't raise expectations about that.

Q. Having recently been in Venice, I wonder whether you could give us your view of the current situation, current condition, of the alliance, specifically whether you feel that the unity, or at least the appearance of unity, that was achieved in Venice would require us to give a bit more than the Europeans.

A. With respect to NATO issues as such—and by that I mean the purposes for which NATO was created, the defense of Western Europe and the Atlantic community—the alliance, I think, has rarely, if ever, been stronger, and there is very little disagreement.

It is with respect to issues that lie outside the NATO territory that one begins to find differences of opinion—Iran, Afghanistan, Persian Gulf policy, and so on. These are the issues that create differences of opinion, but I don't think necessarily that they are destructive of unity.

One sees differences of agreement. I have met several times now in 60 days with the four Foreign Ministers. Germany, France, Britain, and the United States have met with the other three at the summit. I met with the 16 at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting at Ankara; I met with the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] Foreign Ministers at Kuala Lumpur. And of course, there are differences of opinion, differences of perspective.

I like it when the discussions are healthy and vigorous, not when they are meekly submissive. I find that that is the inclination on the part of others as well. I know of two or three instances in which our allies have backed off positions about which they felt strongly in order to support our position.

That doesn't happen for any reason but that the feeling that this was a time for the alliance to be solid, to be united whenever possible, and they are all, of course, very much concerned to deal with this image of alliance disarray that one reads about in the press all the time. I don't find that kind of disarray. I mean, I come from the Senate, of course, which sets benchmarks of disarray. [Laughter]

And there is nothing in the alliance which measures up to disarray in the U.S. Senate, so if I have a gentler view about this picture of alliance disarray, you may understand. But even the Senate agrees from time to time: They agree to adjourn [laughter] and they agree to come back again after the conventions.

You know, there are a lot of tough questions that you can agree about. It's the easy ones that create disarray.

Q. You are about to go to Japan—and, of course, the occasion is purely ceremonial. Nonetheless, it has happened in the past that a certain amount of business will be discussed at funerals or after funerals. Do you intend to raise any substantive matters with the Japanese, especially I would ask you in relation to the automobile trade issue?

A. There are ongoing discussions with respect to issues such as that, and they should continue. I would be hesitant to make the ceremonial occasion a special focus on specific issues of that kind, especially with the Japanese.

through co-operative activities. They endorsed the establishment of a special five-year programme, "Science for Stability," proposed by the Science Committee, to strengthen the scientific and technological capabilities of Greece, Portugal and Turkey by means of co-operation with scientific institutions in other countries of the Alliance and thereby contribute to the economic development of these three countries. The modalities of implementation of this programme will be decided by the Council in permanent session.

14. With respect to the Middle East, Ministers reaffirmed the importance of a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They reviewed the situation in the area including the progress achieved by Egypt and Israel in developing their mutual relations. Ministers believed that such a settlement should ensure the right of all states in the area, including Israel, to live within secure, recognized and guaranteed boundaries, as well as the achievement of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Ministers affirmed that all the parties concerned, including representatives of the Palestinian people, should participate in a negotiated settlement. Ministers considered that Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, together with the principles stated above, should form the framework for such a settlement. They deemed it essential that this framework should be accepted by all the parties concerned.

15. Within the context of their discussion of the need for enhancing global stability and security, Ministers called upon all countries to assume their share of the responsibility for seeking solutions to world economic problems and for contributing to the economic and social progress of the developing countries in order to bring about a more equitable international economic system. They observed that positive results from the proposed global round of negotiations within the United Nations concerning raw materials, energy, trade, development and monetary and financial questions would serve the interests of developing as well as developed countries.

II.

16. Ministers of countries who participated in the decision of 12th December 1979 to pursue the two parallel and complementary approaches on long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) modernization and on arms control involving TNF [theatre nuclear forces], having receive a report on progress on TNF arms control discussions, welcomed the repeated efforts of the United States, based on full consultations among the Allies concerned, to engage the Soviet Union in serious negotiations in the SALT III framework aimed at achieving verifiable limitations on Soviet and United States land-based LRTNF consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. In particular, these Ministers supported the United States readiness to engage in preliminary exchanges on such limitations without precondition or delay, as a useful starting point for negotiating on TNF in the SALT III framework. These Ministers regretted that the Soviet responses do not contain anything which would constitute practical measures designed to restore a balanced situation. Neither has the Soviet Union so far shown any willingness to enter into serious negotiations or even to engage in preliminary exchanges. They noted that although there have been some indications that the Soviet Union recognizes that SALT III could be the appropriate forum for negotiations involving TNF, the Soviet Union continues to repeat, most recently in the Warsaw Pact Declaration, unrealistic and unacceptable preconditions which would perpetuate inequality.

These Ministers therefore once again called on the Soviet Union to respond promptly and positively to the United States offers to negotiate and to enter into preliminary exchanges without any preconditions before the ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

These Ministers expressed their concern about Soviet preponderance in LRTNF systems deployed to date, and noted that the systems deployed have already reached a dangerously high level. In addition to its existing force of 450 SS–4 and SS–5 LRTNF, the Soviet Union has at present deployed approximately 450 warheads on 150 SS–20 launchers. The SS–20 deployments are continuing at a rapid pace. The Soviet Union is in the process of deploying for its SS–20 force alone more warheads than are planned for the entire modernization programme agreed to in December 1979. By contrast, deployments in Allied countries will not begin until late in 1983.

These Ministers pointed out that it was the need to preserve the Alliance's deterrent capability against the background of existing disparity in LRTNF in favour of the Soviet Union which gave rise to the decision of their governments to modernize LRTNF, and that the continuing Soviet deployments of new SS–20 missiles will further increase that disparity.

These Ministers further noted that the modernization programme was deliberately restrained as compared with the qualitative and quantitative growth in Soviet nuclear capabilities. In this regard, they also noted that the withdrawal of 1,000 United States nuclear warheads from Europe as an integral part of the LRTNF modernization and arms control decision has begun; they recalled that the new LRTNF warheads decided upon on 12th December, 1979, would be accommodated within the reduced level.

These Ministers recalled their statement of 12th December, 1979, that arms control, by constraining the Soviet build-up, can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's long-range TNF requirements and promote stability and detente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defence and detente. Ministers reiterated that the scale of NATO's long-range TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results achieved through negotiations.

NEWS CONFERENCE, ANKARA, JUNE 26, 1980[4]

It has been a pleasure and a privilege to be here at my first North Atlantic Council meeting. I thought the discussions were very comprehensive, very relevent, and, I think, very successful. The communique, I think, reflected very well the discussions which took place yesterday and this morning; covered subjects which I am sure were no surprise to any of us, ranging from Afghanistan to Iran to the Middle East, East-West subjects, CSCE, arms control. On the whole I thought it was a very strong communique especially as it dealt with Afghanistan and the response to the Russian invasion—the unanimity on the requirements for the complete withdrawal of forces, the failure to be seduced by the announced or alleged withdrawal of Russian forces. On the whole I thought it was a communique which reflects a basic solidarity and, indeed, continuity of NATO policy in the areas which I've mentioned and others. It's a pleasure to be here; it's been a successful conference. I think there is a greater feeling of unity and solidarity than appeared publicly 2 or 3 weeks ago. For that I'm gratified and pleased.

Q. Was anything discussed about giving specific aid—backing up the words in the communique—or any other sort of support for the Afghan rebels who are actually fighting the Soviets?

A. It was not discussed at the conference, in the corridors, at the bilaterals, trilaterals, nor did I hear any rumors or speculation on that subject.

Q. Why did you object to the reference to Palestinian self-determination in the final communique, and is it, indeed, true that you were alone in objecting to a wording which made such a reference?

A. It was interesting that a closed session is so quickly open, but I'll be glad to state my position which has been stated publicly many times.

The question of the legitimate rights of Palestinians appears in the communique, and we supported that fully. It appears in the Camp David ac-

cords, and it appears there fully. The issue of self-determination will be a subject for negotiation in the Camp David process, and there are differing views as to how self-determination ought to be defined or what the final result ought to be. I did not think it appropriate to put in words—which were subject to differing interpretations, differing definitions, and which were included in the process in which my country is already involved with a commitment to negotiate self-determination—to include it in a communique which was in that context ambiguous on the issue. And may I say I was not alone on my position.

Q. Can you tell us what your expectations are on the talks which are to be held between the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece on Saturday?

A. I think the fact that they are meeting is a source of great satisfaction to me. Secondly, it is clear to me from bilateral talks I've had with each of them that they probably will discuss issues which are quite evident—the question of Greek reintegration into the NATO military structure and other questions. I would not try to presume to suggest an agenda for them; I would assume they will discuss matters of mutual interest, and we all know what they are, don't we.

Q. Did you discuss here a plan for some transitional arrangements regarding Afghanistan as has been mentioned publicly by the President in Belgrade and, I guess, elsewhere? And could you explain how it ties in with what NATO is trying to do with its attitude toward the Soviet invasion there?

A. There was no discussion here of any transitional plans and, indeed, the phrase is as old as the Presidential press conference in February of this year, and the phrase has been repeated on occasion since. Obviously it is a phrase that needs definition, and if there is a response to our policy objectives including that phrase, then I would assume the process of definition would take place. Obviously with a situation in which probably 120,000 troops are involved and the question of the legitimacy and the stability of the government in place in question, that to move from the present situation to a more satisfactory one from the present time would take more than 5 minutes—it would take some time—and the assumption is that some arrangements to move through the transition period would have to be made. But, that pragmatic fact ought not to obscure the central point of our objective and our policy; that is, the total and complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Q. Six months have gone by since the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. There have been many analyses, many statements, in fact, the Olympic Games boycott has divided the West. The grain embargo and the technological embargo at COCOM [Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy] has largely failed. You're not discussing any military aid or other sort of aid to the Afghan peoples. What forms of pressure do you propose in any field on Russia to bring about the total withdrawal of Russian troops?

A. I'd be glad to review the policies and pressures we've undertaken to put in place. I'm sure you are familiar with them but I'll be glad to repeat them. They are still in place, still working, I would assume.

First of all, I would think the Soviets would be sensitive to the fact that the entire West has responded in military terms; that is, in the sense of strengthening their defense establishments, increasing defense expenditures, and in the United States, as measured over a 5-year timeframe which is our present projection in the Congress, it amounts to hundreds of billions of dollars.

In addition to that, the United States has been moving to establish a military presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas at a cost of some billion dollars. In order to maintain that presence, we are undertaking to negotiate facilities' rights in the area. So all of this certainly should mean to a Soviet Union, which has been interested in arms control in order to reduce the burden of arms on themselves and on mankind, that what they've triggered is the possibility of enormously increased defense expenditure by those potentially threatened by their action.

In addition to this, they have succeeded—again stressing the military—in persuading the NATO allies to increase their defense expenditures beyond what had already been planned and to identify areas and ways in which NATO defenses can be coordinated with American needs to respond to additional threats in the Persian Gulf area. That decision was taken in Brussels in May. This surely must impact upon the thinking of Russian planners. If the Russians are really intent upon triggering another arms race, they have got to take into account that their economy is smaller than ours, that if we really are convinced that that is the road we must travel, that it would be costly to the Soviet Union, costly to us also.

But when they undertake to establish a strategic threat, represented by the geography of Afghanistan, they've got to expect that the West will respond, and the West has responded and is responding.

Now with respect to other kinds of pressures, we have committed ourselves to limiting the transfer of high technology to the Soviet Union, and the acquisition of Western technology has been a high priority of Soviet planning over the last few decades and continues to be. We are going to continue to limit that transfer, and that's repeated in this communique. So that as opportunities to isolate the Soviet Union because of this action, to bring economic pressures, bring political pressures on them appear, we will do so. They certainly are not insensitive to the fact that they've been condemned by the Islamic nations where they had placed very high importance on establishing their credibility and their leadership. They've been roundly condemned twice by the Islamic conference. So there are all sorts of ways which we have taken to apply pressure, to isolate them, to make them realize that there is a cost to what they've done.

How long that might take to result in a reversal of their policy in Afghanistan, one can't say, but at the very least I would hope that the cost has been one that will discourage them from trying to repeat the exercise. An additional cost is, of course, the trouble they are running into in Afghanistan. They have run into a very considerable military problem that has tied down 120,000 troops, and there has been evidence in the last few weeks of an increase as compared with the alleged withdrawal to which they've been speaking in the last few days.

Q. Greek Government officials during the last 4 or 5 years have been referring to a concept of power in the area. When Washington refers to the concept of balance of power in the area, do you mean the overall balance of power between NATO and Warsaw Pact or between Greece and Turkey?

Xiaoping and Vice President Mondale, whose personal direction and prodding of our respective bureaucracies have played such an essential role in the extraordinary growth in our relations. It was advanced with Secretary of Defense Brown's trip to China in January, in last week's visit to Washington by Vice Premier Geng Biao, and in the regular cycle of diplomatic consultation initiated with the visit of Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin in March. Several of my colleagues and I will visit Beijing this summer to continue the dialogue.

The agenda for this period of reconstruction that is now nearing completion has been simple, virtually self-evident. We had to sweep aside the misunderstandings and debris of the past and to fill in the gaps in our relationships caused by the 30-year absence of normal ties. We are doing so to our mutual satisfaction.

The Future

But what of the future? Having laid in the 1970s the groundwork for a normal relationship, we now must ask ourselves what our hopes and objectives should be in the 1980s. We have only just begun to address this momentous issue. Let me share with you today some of our preliminary thinking.

Over the 80 years of this century there has been endless speculation about China's future. But virtually every prediction has been confounded by events, thus suggesting extreme caution to anyone making predictions even 5—still less 20—years ahead. Nevertheless, most of the best China experts I have consulted in the past year feel that China's leaders have some reason to be hopeful about their country's future.

It does not appear impossible that Chinese growth rates through the rest of this century will continue at 6% or perhaps even 7% annually. China's GNP is now about the size of ours as it was in the 1920s. Should growth continue at recent rates, by the year 2000 China's GNP will —in real terms—approach the size of U.S. GNP in the late 1970s. Given China's enormous population, this would, of course, translate into a standard of living more like America's in the early 20th century. Even so, this would be an impressive achievement.

Moreover, national power and influence are determined not by per capita GNP comparisons but by industrial, scientific, and technological prowess in the aggregate. A China with a GNP in the area of $1.5–2 trillion will have a weight and presence in world affairs far beyond that at present. And, if China can overcome the bureaucratic inertia and difficulties inherent in managing the destinies of a billion or more people—admittedly a very big "if"—it will have achieved a degree of security and capacity for independent action that it lacks today.

The United States, our allies, and China's neighbors all have a vital interest in how China may choose to use its regained power and influence. For over a century, the world has speculated—sometimes hopefully, sometimes fearfully—about what the achievement of Chinese potential might portend. For over a century, the questions have been the same.

- Will the Chinese be comfortable with a world of independent, sovereign, equal nation-states, or will they revert to the view that others should bow to their centrality and superiority in a hierarchy of nations?
- Will China prove able to absorb the foreign ideas and techniques essential to its modernization without relapsing into xenophobia?
- And, will a wealthy and powerful China direct its immense energies within itself, or will it prove expansionist?

We cannot predict with certainly the answers to these difficult questions, any more than we can predict with certainty the outcome of the great effort now underway in China to make up for lost time. Some of the answers China's current leaders give are encouraging. China, they say, is devoted to a world of independent nation-states coexisting peacefully on terms of sovereign equality. China, they say, will modernize both by drawing on its own traditions and on foreign ideas. It will deal with foreigners—and with its neighbors—on the basis of friendship, equality, and mutual benefit.

Such policies would obviously be in our national interest as well as China's. It is important that we encourage those trends that deepen China's involvement with the West and Japan. In short, our policies should seek to insure that China's answers to these questions continue to coincide with our own interests, preferences, and practices and with those of our friends and allies.

U.S. Principles

The principles that will govern our China policy for the decades to come are therefore already clear.

First. We will develop our relations with China on their own merits. It is the business of diplomacy not only to gauge the reactions of our potential adversaries but also to measure policy with respect to the interests of our allies. We will enhance our nation's prosperity and security and that of our allies by developing our relations with China in a way that takes full and adequate account of all the external factors that are affected by them. While strategic factors remain a central consideration in our relations, the famous triangular diplomacy of the early 1970s is no longer an adequate conceptual framework in which to view relations with China. Broad American interests are engaged, as are those of allies and friends in a world of increasingly complex interplay among power centers such as Japan, the Association of South East Asian Nations, India, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, and Western Europe.

We welcome the emergence of China on the world scene as an active participant in global and regional affairs, thus ending China's long isolation and relative noninvolvement in the international arena and multilateral diplomacy. China is beginning to play an important role in more and more issues—many completely unrelated to security and strategic considerations.

In short, relations with China are not a simple function of our relations with the Soviet Union, although the pace of their advance has been and will continue to be influenced by changes in the international environment. As Chairman Mao told us privately as early as 1973, the United States must not attempt to stand on China's shoulders to strike at the Soviet Union. His statement is true notwithstanding the fact that for China, as for ourselves, the question of how to deal with growing Soviet power and assertiveness in the world is, and will remain, a central issue of foreign policy. Each of us has other interests and is concerned with other issues as well. Our perspectives and our policies may be parallel from time to time; but they will rarely be identical. Our societies rest on quite different philosophic assumptions and our values and institutions diverge in many ways. In the absence of frontal assaults on our common interests, we will remain —as at present—friends, rather than allies.

Second. Our new friendship with China need not and will not be pursued at the expense of our relationships with others. On the contrary, the effectiveness

of our China policy depends in part upon the enhancement of our role in the Asia-Pacific region, and that role is in turn strengthened by our growing, constructive ties with China.

Our recognition of China's importance in the Asia-Pacific region does not mean that we intend to default on our own role or to entrust it to the Chinese. There will be no "division of labor" with China in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. Each of us has our own interests, as do Japan and other countries of the region. Our relations with China are founded on respect for this fact.

The United States will remain a major Pacific power, vitally interested in the stability of the western Pacific, of Northeast and Southeast Asia, and of other areas on the rim of China. We will maintain and enhance our already strong military, political, economic, and cultural presence in the area. Doing so is important to our Asian friends and allies and should be welcome to the Chinese as evidence of our intention neither to pursue hegemony nor to permit others to pursue it in the Asia-Pacific region.

Third. We will continue to recognize our national interest in a friendly and successfully modernizing China. Our policies on technology transfer are evolving to reflect this interest.

China and the United States are both continental societies whose foreign policies are decisively influenced by our domestic political and economic situations. Should China relapse into economic stagnation, xenophobia, or ideological frenzy borne of frustration, the consequences for world order would be profound. Should China be unable to maintain peaceful relationships of equality and mutual benefit with the nations of the region, its domestic aspirations could prove unattainable. Should China fall still further behind its more advanced neighbors, its role in the maintenance of global balance would be eroded, to the profound disadvantage not only of China but of the United States and our allies as well. An economic or political vacuum in China has not served the interests of stability in the world in the past; it would not do so in future.

More positively, we—and the world—have much to gain from a revitalized China, not only in terms of trade and economic exchange but also in terms of scientific and technological interchange. The Chinese are a talented people who, in the broad sweep of world history, have often in the past led the advance in human knowledge and the quality of life—and can do so again.

The very size of China makes its experiment in modernization unique and gives us all a special interest in the character of its success. To illustrate: Imagine the consequences for the quality of the environment in the northern hemisphere if a billion or more Chinese were to fail to learn from our mistakes and to industrialize to our levels without imposing pollution controls. Imagine the consequences for world energy supplies should a modernized China be forced to turn to massive imports to sustain its agriculture, industry, and commerce. Clearly, we have a stake not only in China's successful modernization but also in how it modernizes. Our rapidly developing scientific and technological exchanges with the Chinese reflect this interest. It should be a source of some satisfaction that China, in pursuing modernization, has asked us to play such an important supporting role.

Fourth. We will continue to pursue our interest in a strong, peaceful, and secure China. A China confident in its ability to defend its borders against foreign aggression enhances stability in the Pacific and on the Eurasian landmass and, therefore, contributes to our own security and that of our allies.

We do not sell arms to China or engage in joint military planning arrangements with the Chinese. The current international situation does not justify our doing so. Neither we nor the Chinese seek such an alliance relationship. Nevertheless, we can and will assist China's drive to improve its security by permitting appropriate technology transfer, including the sale of carefully selected items of dual use technology and defensive military support equipment. We have begun to do so.

We will continue to consider such transactions individually on their merits as they arise, taking into account our own security interests and those of others in the region. Vice Premier Geng Biao's visit to the United States this week and last has marked another step forward in this policy. His discussions with Defense Secretary Brown, with the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of State have played a key role in defining what is now desirable and possible in terms of a modest American contribution to China's massive modernization needs.

Secretary Brown's and Vice Premier Geng's visits have also initiated a process of regular contact and dialogue between our respective defense establishments. We expect these useful exchanges to broaden and grow in the years to come.

Fifth. we will continue to adhere scrupulously to our normalization understandings with respect to Taiwan. The past 18 months have shown that the full range of private American relationships with the people of Taiwan can prosper in the absence of any official U.S. relations with the island. The Taiwan Relations Act provides a firm grounding in our domestic law under which such unofficial relationships continue to flourish.

The act also establishes our concern for the continued peace and security of the Taiwan area. Our policy will remain consistent with the act and with our abiding interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue by the parties directly concerned.

Within this context, the nature and form of Taiwan's ultimate relationships with the mainland of China are for the Chinese on both sides of the strait to determine. It would be presumptuous for Americans to attempt to do so. Nor would we impede the process of their reconciliation.

Sixth. We will actively pursue our efforts to enlist the energies and talents of the Chinese people in global efforts to address the common problems of humankind. It is obvious that no such problem—whether of the environment, of food and population, of global energy and resource management, of economic development, technology transfer or arms control—can be successfully addressed without the positive participation and contribution of China. We are encouraged by Chinese interest and cooperation with us on these vital issues in this initial period. We hope to work closely with the Chinese Government and people in the United Nations and in other international organizations and fora to insure continued progress toward a better quality of life for all on this planet.

In sum, the 1980s begin with Sino-American relations entering the stage of maturity. They are firmly grounded on both sides in enlightened self-interest and mutual respect. Sino-American normalization has worked. Its immense promise is now being realized. ■

We are determined that the Soviets must pay a real and lasting cost for their brutal aggression in Afghanistan, and since we see no sign of their withdrawal, the prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations are poor for the foreseeable future. But it would make little sense for us to apply the same measures to the countries of Eastern Europe, as this would give them no incentive to conduct policies reflecting their own national interests. Indeed, in the wake of Afghanistan we should—and will—try harder to maintain and build on the progress we have made with the countries of the region, confident that this is in our best interest and theirs.

We, of course, expect the nations of Eastern Europe to recognize that our relations must be built on reciprocity. We expect them to take our concerns into account, despite the limitations Soviet military and political power place on their freedom of maneuver. Diversion of U.S. grain or controlled technology to the U.S.S.R., should it occur through Eastern Europe, would inevitably make it impossible for us to differentiate between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in our trade controls. Direct participation in the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan would certainly cause us to reevaluate our policies. Overt pressure on Yugoslavia would cause us great concern. Domestic repression, as always, would affect the climate of our relations. But such steps would also be contrary to the interests of the governments concerned, and it is our devout hope that this—rather than the threat of a U.S. reaction—will be the deciding factor.

Yugoslavia

Our efforts to improve relations with Moscow's Eastern European allies will continue to be important to us in the decade ahead. But Yugoslavia will be much more central to our foreign policy. Events in post-Tito Yugoslavia will have a major impact on both Eastern and Western Europe and, indeed, the entire international system. An independent, united, and nonaligned Yugoslavia is crucial to the stability of Europe and the world, and support for that country's territorial integrity, independence, and unity is central to U.S. policy.

Much is being said and written these days about the potential challenges to a Yugoslavia without Tito at the helm. As someone whose exposure to Yugoslavia began 17 years ago with my first Foreign Service assignment, I confess to skepticism when I hear predictions of radical change in Yugoslavia's position in the world.

In 1963, the conventional wisdom in this country was that Tito was about to lead Yugoslavia into the Warsaw Pact, or that he had never really been apart from it at heart. The U.S. Congress had just acted to end all assistance to Yugoslavia and to withdraw normal trade privileges—MFN treatment. Wisely, we never actually withdrew MFN. We underestimated Yugoslavia's determination and ability to defend its independence then, and many in the United States and elsewhere are making the same mistake today.

Yugoslavia, indeed, faces difficult problems in the decade ahead. Historically rooted animosities among Yugoslavia's peoples have not been entirely overcome, although considerable progress has been made. Yugoslavia's economy is overheated and the economic decentralization of the past decade has made it more difficult for the central government to deal with pressing problems of inflation and balance of payments. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea challenge the principle of nonintervention with Yugoslavia and the other members of the nonaligned movement regard as fundamental. Recent public attacks on Yugoslav policies by the Soviet Union, some of its Warsaw Pact allies, and Vietnam seem to promise further pressure on Belgrade's independent line. A few anti-Yugoslav emigre organizations abroad—including, regrettably, in the United States—harbor individuals who advocate and employ violence in pursuit of their political goals.

Yet Yugoslavia without Tito is already working, and working well. During the 3 months of the President's illness, the country has drawn together behind a collective leadership selected in accordance with procedures established before Tito's illness. A stringent austerity program is already having its effect on the economy. Yugoslavia's able diplomatic corps and principled opposition to Soviet efforts to manipulate the nonaligned movement should assure it a continued leadership role there. And the country's territorial defense force, which is capable of mobilizing 3 million men and women in short order, and the Yugoslavs' tradition of determined resistance to outside intervention indicate that any attempt to use military force against Yugoslavia would face very formidable opposition.

But what is the United States prepared to do to assist a Yugoslav Government facing challenges from within or without?

We have no security commitment to Yugoslavia nor does Yugoslavia want one. An overeager embrace from the United States and its allies would discomfort Tito's successors more than it would reassure them. As President Carter has said, we are prepared to consider seriously doing whatever the Yugoslavs may ask us to do. This obviously includes diplomatic and economic support and continuation of the military supply relationship we have maintained for many years.

For the past 3 years we have been strengthening our relations with Yugoslavia across the board in preparation for Tito's inevitable departure from the scene. Our bilateral relations have never been better. President Carter expects to carry on the same high-level dialogue with Tito's successors as he did with Tito himself. We strongly encourage the continued interest of U.S. companies in doing business in Yugoslavia. The new agreement between the European Economic Community and Yugoslavia should give a further boost to Yugoslav exports, increasing Western confidence in the long-term prospects for the Yugoslav economy.

To Moscow and its allies, it should be clear that attempts to undermine Yugoslavia's unity, territorial integrity, and independence would be a matter of grave concern to the United States and the nations of Western Europe. It should also be clear to emigre groups which favor the breakup of Yugoslavia that their aims totally contradict U.S. policy and that we will not tolerate illegal or terrorist acts against the Yugoslav Government on U.S. soil. Federal and local law enforcement authorities are alert to the possibility of an outbreak of illegal actions following President Tito's death and will prosecute crimes to the full extent of the law.

I believe, then, that we can look to Yugoslavia's future with confidence as a prosperous and independent state fully capable of managing its own internal affairs and defending itself against outside aggression. We will do what we can to contribute to this end.

Albania

In closing, let me say a word about Albania with which we have not had diplomatic relations since World War II. Concerned about its political and eco-

omic isolation, the Albanian Government has moved hesitantly of late to improve its economic and political ties to Greece, Yugoslavia, and Western Europe. We welcome this trend in the belief that it will contribute to stability and peaceful progress in the Balkans and Europe as a whole. The Albanian leadership has made it plain in its public statements that it does not presently seek such an improvement in relations with the United States. However, I would like to reiterate the statement by Deputy Secretary of State Rush in an address at the Naval Academy in April 1973: "If and when Albania wishes to resume relations with us, it will find us prepared to respond." ■

100th Anniversary of U.S.-Romania Relations

On June 13, 1980, the United States and Romania celebrated the 100th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. On that occasion President Carter and President Ceausescu exchanged the following messages.[1]

Dear Mr. President:

It is a pleasure to extend to you, and through you to the people of Romania, the best wishes of the American people on the 100th anniversary of diplomatic relations between our countries.

During the first century of Romanian-American relations, the American people came to experience firsthand—and to admire—Romania's contributions to civilization. More recently, as a result of our cultural, scientific and educational exchange programs, interaction between Romania and the United States has intensified, and our citizens have learned more about each other's achievements. Many Americans have visited Romania and have returned with a deepened awareness of your rich cultural traditions and modern development.

Although 100 years old, U.S.-Romanian relations have never been more intense than in the past 15 years. The importance which the U.S. attaches to its ties with Romania is underscored by the fact that Romania was the first Eastern European country to be visited by an American President. Since then, Presidential visits—including our meeting in 1978—have become a permanent part of the U.S.-Romanian dialogue, and high-level exchanges have become a normal aspect of our relationship. U.S.-Romanian trade has become increasingly dynamic, providing a strong underpinning for our cultural and political relations. These achievements illustrate convincingly the high degree of mutually beneficial cooperation we have attained.

I look forward to continuing to work closely with you and your government to find ways to reduce the tension in the present international environment and to foster stability and cooperation in Europe and other areas of the world.

I trust that our second century of diplomatic relations will further strengthen cooperation between our countries and peoples.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

Dear Mr. President:

The celebration of the centennial of the diplomatic relations between Romania and the United States of America offers me the pleasant opportunity to convey to you and to the American people, on behalf of the Romanian people and of my own, cordial greetings and warmest congratulations.

The establishment of diplomatic relations—as a result and on the basis of the United States' recognition of Romania's state independence—marked an important step, which has contributed to the development of the Romanian-American relations, as our peoples cooperated under many particular circumstances.

I would like to particularly emphasize that during the last 15 years a fruitful dialogue at the highest level has been initiated and developed, that, generally, the Romanian-American contacts and meetings have been intensified, the economic exchanges, cooperation in various fields of mutual interest have been expanded and the overall relations between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the United States of America have witnessed a strong development based upon equality of rights, observance of national independence and sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs.

The meetings and discussions we had together during the visit I paid to the United States of America in April, 1978, and the Joint Declaration signed on that occasion, have given a new impetus to the relations between our peoples, to the cooperation of our two states in international life, to the benefit of peace and cooperation among nations.

Celebrating the centennial of the diplomatic relations, may I express my conviction that we would continue to act jointly with a view to giving a new impetus and new dimensions to the relations between Romania and the United States, for the intensification of our contacts, for the growth of the commercial exchanges and economic industrial cooperation, for the expansion of the exchanges in the fields of science, technology, education, culture as well as in other fields of mutual interest.

At the same time, I would like to express my hope that our countries would cooperate in order to arrest the present trend towards the worsening of the international situation, for the resumption of the policy of peace, detente and independence, for the settlement of disputes among states, of the states of tension and conflict existing in different areas of the world exclusively by political means, through negotiations, with a view to strengthening the international security, the cooperation and understanding among all peoples.

May I wish you good health and personal happiness, prosperity and peace to the American people.

With friendly sentiments,

NICOLAE CEAUSESCU,
President of the Socialist
Republic of Romania

[1] Press release 185 of July 11, 1980. ■

As you all know, in 1978 Congress enacted the NNPA which provides that, after a grace period, a recipient of U.S. nuclear exports must have all of its nuclear activities under international safeguards as a condition of continued export. India has accepted safeguards on Tarapur and other facilities that contain material supplied from abroad, but it has a number of indigenously developed facilities that are not under international safeguards. India takes the position that it will accept safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities only when all other states, including the nuclear-weapon states, do the same.

During the grace period provided in the 1978 act, two shipments of enriched uranium have been made to India. Two additional export license applications were filed during the grace period: one in September 1978 and one in August 1979. The shipments requested in those applications are the ones that are, in effect, before this committee today.

The new Indian Government under Mrs. Gandhi came into office early this year. Based on a series of discussions, we have concluded that the Indian Government will not go beyond Mrs. Gandhi's statement that India intends to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. This formulation does not exclude the possibility of so-called peaceful nuclear experiments India has reiterated that so long as the United States meets its supply obligations under the Tarapur agreement, India will consider itself bound to the reciprocal obligations under the 1963 agreement.

We must now decide whether to terminate our nuclear supply relationship with India or to approve these exports for Tarapur. Both geopolitical and nonproliferation concerns have led the Administration to conclude that the exports should be approved.

It is simply not true, as some have stated, that the President's decision represents an abandoning of our nonproliferation goals in favor of improving our relations with India. The President's decision will not weaken our nonproliferation policy. To the contrary, the best way that we can advance that policy is to continue our supply relationship. Those who, in the name of nonproliferation, oppose these shipments have failed, in my view, to contemplate the possible repercussions should their view prevail.

If we disapprove these shipments, India is very likely to consider itself free of its obligations under the 1963 agreement. In that event, India might reprocess the U.S.-origin fuel in India and use the plutonium in the Tarapur reactors. This would be an unfortunate precedent, because it would be seen by some as a demonstration that thermal recycle is a practical alternative, at least as an interim measure, to avoid dependence on external supply.

If we disapprove these shipments, India might also withdraw the U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel from safeguards. This would be the first time this has occurred and could seriously undermine the whole nonproliferation regime. In addition, India might decide to disregard our veto over any other use of the material already supplied beyond its use as fuel for Tarapur. It also could end the present U.S. veto over any retransfer to another country of this material.

On the other hand, if these shipments are approved, we will have preserved India's obligations under the existing agreements. It is in our interest to be able to hold India to these commitments.

I am persuaded that opponents have failed to come to grips with the geopolitical implications of the decline in Indo-U.S. relations that termination of the supply agreement would inevitably cause. India is the largest democracy in the world. Its government, like ours, rests on the consent of the governed, expressed again in January in the most massive popular election the world has ever seen. We share with India a faith in human rights, a belief in the rule of law, and a pride in strong democratic institutions.

The turmoil in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have heightened U.S. security concerns in South and Southwest Asia. We consider it vital to bolster our relations with this region, particularly with those countries, such as India, which can promote security and stability in South Asia.

U.S.-India relations have not always been smooth. Our policy perceptions and interests do not always coincide. At the same time, we should recognize that in pursuing its independent course, Mrs. Gandhi's government has taken positions on several important matters which we welcome and has signaled to us that it wants a constructive relationship.

- India has moved from an uncritical view of recent events in Afghanistan to one opposing the Soviet invasion and calling for prompt withdrawal.
- India has sought to improve relations with Pakistan and has sent two high level emissaries to Islamabad to discuss regional problems with the Pakistan Government.
- It has continued to play a moderate role in the nonaligned movement.
- India has signaled that it wants to develop a closer relationship with the U.S. Clark Clifford and Averell Harriman have had candid and useful sessions with Mrs. Gandhi, and, as you know, she has warmly welcomed several of your congressional colleagues to India.

We believe that the best way to encourage India to pursue policies harmonious with U.S. interests is to build a framework of constructive bilateral relations which underscores U.S. constancy and reliability. The Tarapur issue is highly important in this regard. Many in India see it as an index of U.S. interest in maintaining good relations and of our recognition of the importance of constructive U.S.-India ties to our broader foreign policy concerns in South and Southwest Asia. A positive decision on Tarapur now will encourage India in the long term to act in ways consistent with our interests as it faces up to the new situation posed for South Asia by the prospect of a prolonged Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the Soviets would undoubtedly exploit a refusal by us to supply fuel to India, and they may very well supplant us as the source of Tarapur fuel. We have just seen, in the generous terms of the $1.6 billion arms deal, the use the Soviets make of their resources to influence India. We simply cannot afford to complicate our relations with India just as the Soviets are demonstrating the importance they attach to this key South Asian nation.

Some opponents of the President's decision have expressed the view that the Administration is "caving in" to unreasonable demands by India. This contention is not justified by the facts. The short of it is that the United States and India entered into a fuel supply agreement in 1963. India, to the best of our knowledge, has abided by its obligations under the Tarapur agreement.

We would like, of course, to see India accept full-scope safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, the conditions that the United States would like to see India accept were imposed by U.S. law in 1978—15 years after our international obligation was entered into. If we were to cut off our fuel shipments, India could plausibly ask whether the United States is a nation that abides by its commitments.

When Congress passed the NNPA in 1978, it recognized that by effectively changing the ground rules of our nuclear supply policy, the act would create problems for some countries. That is why the legislation has a grace period to allow time to negotiate with countries, such as India, to which we supplied nuclear fuel, but which had not adopted a full-scope safeguards regime. Thus, the legislative underpinning of our nonproliferation policy itself recognizes that there is no contradiction between nonproliferation and the shipment of these exports to India.

Some critics have charged that, whatever the merits of the fuel shipments, they violate the spirit of the NNPA, because the proposed shipments do not fall within the grace period of the act. This assertion, we believe, is incorrect.

The two current applications filed by India were for fuel that it needs for the efficient operation of the Tarapur power station. No one claims that India failed to file the two applications well before the September 10, 1979, deadline. Delay by the U.S. Government, for which India can hardly be held responsible, is the only reason that the fuel was not shipped before March 10, 1980.

The administration, therefore, believes the two license applications in this case fall within that grace period. In any event, I can assure you that the Administration will regard these two shipments as within the grace period and not as a precedent for any other license applications. Therefore, approval of these exports will not prejudice the future application of the full-scope safeguards requirements.

In conclusion, the Administration recognizes that there are plausible arguments on both sides of this issue. But I am convinced that, upon close examination, the weight of these arguments lies decisively on the side of going forward.

If we do not proceed, we could close the door on any opportunity for influencing India's future nuclear activities. We would risk losing our veto over India's use of spent fuel from the reactors we have provided. We would jeopardize the prospects for strengthening our relations with India—an influential democracy in a critical region at a crucial time. If we do not go forward, it would benefit not ourselves but those who would move into the breach. We hope we will have your support on this matter of real importance to American interests.

[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 23, 1980.

[2]The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.■

Afghanistan Briefing

by Secretary Muskie

The following are excerpts from a briefing by Secretary Muskie before the National Association of Broadcasters at the White House on June 5, 1980.

. . . .

I'd like to take this opportunity to raise with you who represent an important segment of communications media in our country a topic of profound global importance and insufficient global attention, and I refer to the continuing brutal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The challenges that that grim enterprise pose to governments are obvious. It also poses challenges to you in your continuing efforts to keep the trivial from overwhelming the fundamental and in your endless quest for access to important news.

In other wars of our time—in Nigeria, in Vietnam, in Bangladesh, in Nicaragua, in the Middle East, in Zimbabwe—American and other Western media have usually had extensive access. The nature of those struggles and the magnitude of the suffering have been witnessed and understood around the world. Diplomacy, inevitably, has been affected.

Afghanistan is different. This is a Soviet war. Censorship is rigidly imposed. Only a few non-Communist correspondents are still allowed in Afghanistan, and they stay in Kabul. Events within the mountains, the valleys, cliffs, and deserts of Afghanistan's 700,000 square miles are almost never viewed or recorded by any objective outside observer.

But we should not let this matter slip from the world's consciousness. The wretched reality of what the Soviets are doing needs continuous exposure. It cannot be censored out of existence, and it must never be excused by inattention.

As we meet here, a major war of national independence is under way in Afghanistan—a war of global strategic significance. The cities and other major towns are armed camps. Demonstrations, merchant strikes, besieged government buildings, and guerrilla attacks on Soviet personnel are commonplace. Soviet army and air force units try every conceivable means to root out the nationalist insurgents. As these Soviet tactics destroy entire villages and kill and wound people by the thousands, great streams of refugees—now approaching a total of 1 million—pour across the borders to safety in Pakistan and Iran.

This is a large-scale conflict. Soviet armed forces inside Afghanistan number over 85,000 men. As many as 40,000 more in the Soviet Union just across the border are committed to the operation—many poised on the border, others launching bombing sorties from Soviet airfields. This heavy Soviet effort is supplemented by perhaps 15,000 remaining effective troops of the Afghan puppet regime from an army that once numbered 90,000. On the other side, maybe hundreds of thousands of irregular forces are fighting the invaders in small, separate guerrilla bands.

On paper it seems an unequal struggle, but on the ground the resistance is growing. Since Christmas, when Moscow sent in its troops, the situation has worsened for the Communist side. They occupy Kabul in sufficient force to maintain the facade of the Babrak Karmal regime. But outside of it, the Afghan Government and its Soviet backers are encountering fierce opposition.

In rural areas, Soviet military convoys are still regularly blown up. Most of the country is out of government control. Almost everywhere public administration has come to a halt. Many schools are closed. Fields are left unplowed. Food production is sinking.

The conflict has grave implications outside of Afghanistan. It is the first direct intrusion of Soviet forces into combat outside of the countries Soviet forces occupied when World War II ended. It poses a threat in a region of vital importance and thus a threat to the wider balance. It sets a precedent we cannot accept.

In response, our position is clear. We have taken a series of steps—on grain sales, on technology, on fishing rights, on exchanges, on the Olympics—to demonstrate that aggression bears a price and to deter any further adventures in the region or elsewhere. President Carter has declared that any assault on our vital interests in the Persian Gulf area will be met by any means necessary—and our capacity to respond is growing.

Over the period since the invasion, our allies have come to a similar perception of Soviet behavior as a serious threat

I believe strongly that the President should go to Japan for this occasion. Japan is a very strong ally—one of our strongest—and it is disposed to be cooperative. It is for the purpose of indicating his appreciation for Mr. Ohira's cooperation as an ally and indicating our friendship toward the Japanese people and our desire to reach common ground wherever we can that the President has done this.

His strongest impulse was one of friendship. Mr. Ohira had struck up a very close personal friendship, and these other plusses, reasons for making the trip are secondary. But I would not consider it a time to get involved in—as a matter of fact, there won't be the time. We'll be there 1 day. There will be several meetings connected with the funeral, and then we're going to meet with the Chinese Premier, and then we have to get back home.

Q. Turning for a moment to the Middle East, has anything changed in the situation since the visit of King Hussein to Washington? And are we any closer to recognizing, or feeling the need to recognize, the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]?

A. What we must do at some point, of course, is to broaden the negotiating base to include representatives of the Palestinian people and the other countries in the area. For the moment, that broadening doesn't seem to be possible. We continue to have dialogue, of course, with countries such as Jordan, and we find that useful so that we can, from time to time, make clear to each other precisely what our attitudes and perceptions of the moment may be. I thought his visit here was useful in that respect. It did not produce a formula for broadening negotiations or for reaching the final agreement in the Camp David process.

These meetings also are useful to us, I think, in making it clear, not only to Israel, Egypt, and the American public but to other countries—those in the area and so on—that we are going to persist in the Camp David process.

One point that strikes me about it all more than anything else is that this is the only time in the whole history of the Middle East that Palestinian rights and Israeli security have been on the agenda of the negotiating process. I hear all these complaints from Arab countries, from the left to the right, from European friends, and from others that we're not getting anywhere. This is the only process that has gotten anywhere.

We are now head-to-head on the toughest issues—those dealing with autonomy—and any diversionary tactics that tend to pull the parties back from that confrontation sets back the time of the possibility of reaching agreement. Not that it is going to be easy to reach decisions with respect to autonomy, the rights of Palestinians, and the security of the Israelis, but that process has got to continue. And at some point, if the parties manage to press that process to an agreement, then the challenge will be to broaden the negotiating base to bring in others. You can't really settle Palestinian rights altogether in a negotiating process which does not include them—although I hasten to add that they have been invited, and the Camp David process certainly provides for their inclusion.

But I think we are going to have to achieve something more by way of agreement—especially with respect to autonomy—before we can have any prospect of broadening the base. And it is for the purpose of improving the possibilities of broadening the base at some point that it is important that we meet with King Hussein and others in the area from time to time.

It is a very tough, frustrating experience, but when I think of all that has happened since President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, all the progress that has been made, I find it difficult to understand why all that should be thrown away for some ambiguous, unstructured alternative that is usually offered for the purpose of diverting attention from the process, rather than supporting its objectives.

[1] Press release 175A. ■

The 58th Secretary

In the July BULLETIN, we published a brief biographic sketch of Secretary Muskie which stated that he was the 57th Secretary of State. That was an error—Secretary Muskie is the 58th Secretary. We neglected to count James G. Blaine twice; he served two nonconsecutive terms. ■

Secretary Attends NATO Meeting in Turkey; Consults With ASEAN in Malaysia

After accompanying President Carter on his state visit to Italy and the economic summit in Venice, Secretary Muskie attended the regular semiannual session of the North Atlantic Council in Ankara June 25–26, 1980. From Ankara he traveled to Kuala Lumpur to consult with the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) June 27–29 before returning to Washington on June 29.

Following are the Secretary's arrival statement in Ankara, a briefing for American press, a statement at the opening of the North Atlantic Council meeting, a statement at a meeting with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, and the questions the Secretary answered at a joint ASEAN news conference, as well as the North Atlantic Council final communique and NATO Foreign Ministers' declaration of June 26.[1]

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, ANKARA, JUNE 21, 1980

May I say that I am delighted to be here in Ankara for the spring meeting of the North Atlantic Council, and I am particularly pleased to be in Turkey, a longtime ally and a valued friend whose dedication to democracy and courage in dealing with the real challenge has commanded the admiration and support of us all.

NATO is an alliance of democratic nations with common values and shared purposes, and we find ourselves working together at a time when East-West relations are under severe strain. The unified declaration yesterday, out of the Venice summit, with respect to Afghanistan—the restatement of the complete unacceptability of that invasion and the requirement that there be complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan before normal relations with the Soviet Union can be continued—I think is a significant demonstration of allied unity and solidarity with respect to that issue. We will, of course, discuss the NATO response to that invasion in the course of these discussions here in Ankara.

In addition to that, we will discuss the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] meeting in Madrid, which involves the Soviet Union as well as ourselves, demonstrating our commitment to continuing the basic framework of our relationships with the Soviet Union, in dealing with areas in which we have a common interest.

In addition to that, here in Ankara, we will discuss the prospects for arms control which, of course, have been diminished by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. So I look forward to these meetings with my colleagues in the North Atlantic Council, as well as to bilateral meetings with several of them on subjects of mutual interest.

BRIEFING FOR AMERICAN PRESS, ANKARA, JUNE 21, 1980[2]

With respect to the Turkish bilateral, as you know both Prime Minister Demirel and Foreign Minister Erkmen participated. Among other things, I got an interesting look at Turkish politics and votes of censure and a Turkish form of filibuster. Anyway we thought the vote was going to take place this afternoon at 3 o'clock—it's going to take place in 2 or 3 days after Demirel is reasonably assured that he has got the votes, and I got the feeling that he probably already has them.

We covered the usual issues including the state of the NATO alliance, and especially after the eastern flank, got into the question of Greek reintegration into the military structure of NATO which both Greece and Turkey now support. A few details have to be worked out on the military side which are Gen. Rogers' [Gen. Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe] responsibility. I would expect, therefore, that there will be an intensified effort to resolve those issues in order to promote reintegration. That, of course, will also involve a new agreement with Greece on our bases in Greece. We have already negotiated a defense and economic agreement with Turkey which Mr. Demirel told me the Turkish Parliament is certain to ratify, so we are all set on that end. The reintegration of Greece is not without its problems. But both sides seem to be very positive and completely supportive of the goal of reintegration as essential to reordering and strengthening the eastern flank of the NATO defense structure. So I thought that was very useful and constructive.

With respect to Turkey, of course, there are other problems—the Turkish economy—and I think you are all familiar with the effort being made by the European allies, under the leadership of Chancellor Schmidt, to put together an economic package of grants and loans and credits of one kind or another on the order of $1.1 billion I think the first year, $1.1 billion the second year, and I think the third year and fourth year about half a billion apiece. It is a rather substantial package. It has been carefully integrated. It also includes International Monetary Fund standards that Turkey is asked to meet with respect to its economic plan. As the Prime Minister told me, their objective is to create a strong Turkey—strong economically and strong militarily—as the eastern flank of NATO. Of course, in the light of developments in Afghanistan, that's an important goal and an objective which we thoroughly share.

I raised the Cyprus question with the Prime Minister. I share the frustration of others that the communal talks, which were initiated under Waldheim's direction in the United Nations, do not seem to be moving. You can drop the "seem;" they are not moving. I was interested in getting the perspectives of both Turkey and Greece on why they are not meeting, and they are doing what so often happens—arguing about not literally the shape of the table but the agenda and how they get to the agenda and whether agreeing to the agenda prejudices their positions on substance. It's one of those frustrating games that I've played for so many years in House/Senate conferences.

I thought it was a good discussion in each case and maybe we opened up some possibilities for movement that will be productive, but I don't like to raise expectations in that connection. It was a good opportunity for me to get a good feel for the difficulties that are involved in getting these two countries to talk about almost any subject. At least we do have that NATO reintegration about which they are in agreement, and perhaps if we can make progress on that in the reasonably near future that might open the prospects of dealing with other problems.

And are there any agreements that call for aid to Greece and Turkey on a proportional basis?

A. In this communique? No.

Q. No, Greek Government officials have been demanding aid on a 10–7 basis to Greece and Turkey. Did Washington and Athens ever sign any kind of agreement whatsoever? Where do these proportions come from?

A. We have not begun the negotiation or the renegotiation of the defense agreement with Greece. We've signed one with Turkey, I think on March 29th which I'm told is before the Parliament, expected to be ratified, so I don't think there is any basis for making a mathematical calculation of the kind you suggest. We did not discuss the issue in the bilaterals I held with either the Greek Minister or the Turkish Minister. We're hoping that before the end of this year, we will have defense agreements with both countries and that, of course, will be in the context of the NATO alliance. The NATO alliance is the structure for NATO defense and that means the entire NATO territory.

Q. I would like to return to the question of Afghanistan. Whereas quite a number of the NATO allies call those people who are fighting against the Soviet Union—Soviet invasion—"freedom fighters," the United States seems to choose the word "rebels" instead. Does this have a special connotation?

A. I don't call them rebels; I call them freedom fighters. Either that or a national liberation force. That's the way I regard them. I don't see how people who are fighting for their own country can be considered rebels. They're fighting for their freedom and liberation.

Q. I understand you made the observation that declarations do not really achieve the sort of purpose of Palestinian aspirations. What makes you think that the declaration on Afghanistan will achieve anything more, particularly when I understand [British Foreign Secretary] Lord Carrington said that the Soviet Union cannot appear to be wilting under the international condemnation of their action?

A. I don't know what you mean by "wilting." If I wanted to be legalistic I'd ask you to define that so I could answer your question.

But isn't it interesting that they moved the date for acceptance of invitations to the Olympics? They must have done so, it seems to me, because they felt that our effort to boycott the Olympics had been sufficiently successful to tarnish their Olympic Games. So now they've opened it without, I think, a deadline. Why do you suppose they throw up these red herrings in advance of summits, in advance of talks in Vienna, if they weren't feeling the pressure?

They are constantly undertaking to initiate diplomatic efforts and other efforts to divide the allies, to raise doubts about our interpretation of their action. I think they're feeling the pressure, and it's obvious that on the ground they are now hunkering down for perhaps a 2- or 3-year stay in their effort to pacify the country. I don't know if the word "wilting" is the one that applies to all this but that they are feeling the impact and the cost I think is evident.

Our grain embargo denied them at least 10 million metric tons of grain this year. That has forced them to revise their meat-growing program. It has forced them to revise the targets for supplying their consumers. That certainly is impacting. Now if by wilting you mean what happens to an orchid in midday on a hot Turkish afternoon, well, I guess they haven't wilted to that extent.

Q. If the Soviets are, as you say, hunkering down for a 2–3 year stay in Afghanistan, what does that really say about the possibility for any SALT agreement or any other kind of arms control arrangement that would require Senate confirmation? Do you think it's possible the Senate would vote in favor of any arms control measure after the election while the Soviets are still in Afghanistan?

A. The fact that the Soviet Union is building permanent structures in Afghanistan, which suggests that they are preparing for a long haul, doesn't necessarily mean that they may not be persuaded, for other reasons, to change their behavior, to shorten their timetable, or even to reverse their decision. The fact that bridges are in place of a permanent nature across streams to accommodate their military plans, however long they may have to stay there, doesn't make the diplomatic judgments that presumably they'll be making parallel with their military judgments. So they prepare for the long haul but that doesn't mean they may necessarily stay there.

With respect to the prospects of arms control, we've got to assume, and I do assume, that arms control is an important Soviet objective as well as an important objective for us. They know as well as we know that if SALT II is not ratified by next spring that the calendar will have run against some of the provisions in the SALT II Treaty, necessitating some accommodation by negotiation or otherwise or moving into the next step in the SALT process or some other alternative that may develop. If that is as important to them as it is to us, they may consider altering their behavior in Afghanistan so that we can both move the SALT process along. It is a dynamic situation, hopefully in which they can be influenced by events, by the cost of what they're doing within Afghanistan and outside, and, hopefully, we will get back on track.

But there is no way of guaranteeing a timetable or guaranteeing a final result.

Q. You said earlier this morning that the subject of aid to the freedom fighters in Afghanistan had not been the subject of the conference, it had not been discussed as rumors, it had not been discussed in the corridors. I'm wondering why it was not discussed. Is it because it is already in place and doesn't have to be discussed or it's because the United States does not think it's a worthy cause?

A. It was not discussed because it was not raised.

Q. Let me pursue it in a different way then. Why does the United States not believe that it would be a policy at least worth exploring?

A. A subject of that kind is not a subject that can be discussed in all of its aspects in a public meeting at this time, and it was certainly not raised in this conference. I'm not in a position to say anything more.

Q. Yesterday you urged your NATO allies that we must continue our individual effort to strengthen its stability in the vital region of the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia and to support the independence of nations in the region. Do you have a definite plan to strengthen position in the Persian Gulf and to support the independence of nations of the region as a whole?

A. Let me say, first of all, that Southwest Asia nor any other similarly remote area of the globe can be brought

under our defense umbrella [inaudible] is to deter expansion on the part of the Soviet Union. Detente and deterrence are two sides of the same coin, and that is what we are undertaking to do.

Q. In your opinion, do the developments in the region—in the Middle East, in the Indian Ocean, and in the gulf area—call for a reorientation of NATO military planning?

A. I don't believe it does, except to the extent that NATO recognizes that if there are threats in the Persian Gulf region and the Middle East region, which could require the deployment of U.S. forces, that they would be willing to move into whatever gap was left in NATO defenses in Europe. That's all that's involved. To the extent that that's involved, that requires some planning which is going to take place in the next 6 months to identify steps that must be taken which will be considered in December. That decision was taken in Brussels in May.

Q. As you're leaving for Kuala Lumpur, how serious does this Vietnam-Cambodian situation appear to be?

A. In and of itself it's serious in that it involves—I can't quantify but my impression is that it involves serious military forces that did considerable damage. Whether it is serious in terms of their ultimate objective I don't think has yet been determined. There's been a national outcry against it. The ASEAN nations are meeting in Kuala Lumpur, and they have denounced the action. I have directly [see page 53]. Lord Carrington has this morning. I think there is rather a worldwide reaction to the possibility that this is the first step in aggression against Thailand. It is timely from my point of view that I'm going to Kuala Lumpur, and I hope to have better perspective on it when I get there.

Q. You said you predicted that by the end of this year both Turkey and Greece will have signed a defense agreement with the United States. Could you tell me what/where do you base this prediction? Have you, for instance, seen Gen. Rogers' new suggestions or gotten assurances from the Turkish Government that they will observe the law—the international law—governing the Aegean status.

A. No, it was none of those things. I used the word "hope"—I hoped that it would be [inaudible] the willingness of the parties to begin talking about it. That's all.

Q. [Inaudible]

A. They obviously have a serious problem, part of which is the fact that it has been difficult for Greece and Turkey to talk directly to each other. They're now beginning that process, and they both agree on the objective—the reintegration of Greece into the military structure of NATO. Given those two facts that gives me hope that they will reach an agreement. There's nothing else in my mind on the subject.

Q. [Inaudible]

A. If they were willing to do anything, the first people they ought to inform should be Greece, not the U.S. Secretary of State.

STATEMENT AT MEETING WITH ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS, KUALA LUMPUR, JUNE 28, 1980[5]

I am delighted that my first visit to Asia as U.S. Secretary of State brings me to this meeting of ASEAN ministers. This is the third leg of a journey of some 25,000 miles. It began with a highly productive meeting among the leaders of the industrial democracies in Venice. It continued in Ankara with consultations among the NATO Foreign Ministers. It concludes with this opportunity to meet and talk with our ASEAN friends in Kuala Lumpur.

The 11-year history of ASEAN has been a remarkable demonstration of the strength that comes from unity in the pursuit of common purposes. As like-minded countries oriented toward democracy and free market economies, ASEAN has contributed to the rapid growth of its member states and to the tangible progress of their people. As an association of countries dedicated to the principle that nations should define their destinies free from outside interference and dominations, ASEAN has been an important force for stability and peace—in this region and throughout the world. With clarity of purpose and a strong, unified political will, ASEAN has drawn the respect and admiration of all who seek a more peaceful and equitable world order.

Let me take this occasion to reaffirm, clearly and unequivocally, that the United States deeply values it growing ties to ASEAN, that it is a fundamental goal of American foreign policy to broaden those ties, and that we shall continue to shape our policies and actions in this region in full consultation with our ASEAN colleagues and with full regard for your interests and concerns.

We meet at a time of stern challenges to the stability of this region and to peace.

- We have seen new assaults on the territorial integrity of Thailand by a government in Vietnam that has demonstrated again disregard for the most basic tenet of international life—respect for the sovereignty of other nations.
- The Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea continues, denying the long-suffering Khmer people an opportunity to escape the dark shadow of national annihilation.
- Strife and conflict in Indochina have a human face of haunting and dangerous proportions. Thousands, perhaps millions, of Kampucheans once again face starvation. New waves of the desperately hungry are making their way across the Kampuchean countryside in search of food and safety, placing new demands on neighboring nations.
- And the aggression of the Soviet Union against the people of Afghanistan continues, adding a serious new threat to peace and stability—in Asia and in the world.

These challenges confront us all. We must meet them together. This is a time that requires clarity in our intentions and unity in our actions. Let me make the position of my government clear.

First, we stand behind the independence, security, and territorial integrity of Thailand. That support is based upon our historic friendship and our conviction that a secure Thailand is a force for regional peace and cohesion. Over the past year, we have increased our security assistance in Thailand. We have accelerated the delivery of equipment urgently needed to deal with the volatile situation Thailand faces on its border. Let me assure you today that in light of the recent developments on the Thai-Kampuchea border, we intend to step up our assistance to Thailand. We will further accelerate the immediate delivery of urgently needed military equipment. We will help Thailand reduce the economic burden of its military requirements through additional credits and

Review of Relations With Taiwan

by Richard C. Holbrooke

Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 11, 1980. Mr. Holbrooke is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.[1]

I appreciate your inviting me today to review the state of relations with Taiwan 1 year after enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act. In establishing American relations with the people on Taiwan on an unofficial basis last year, those of us who were concerned with Taiwan, both in the Administration and in the Congress, knew that we were breaking entirely new ground—that we were establishing a unique relationship in response to the requirements of our foreign policy as it relates to China. We could not be certain, of course, exactly how it would turn out—indeed, the purpose of these hearings is to address that very question.

We can look back with considerable pride and satisfaction at the developments of the past year as have such detached observers as the General Accounting Office staff team, which agreed that the unofficial system through which relations have been maintained with the people of Taiwan is working very well. We successfully accomplished the important policy objective of transferring our diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing—a step clearly in our interest and long overdue—without jeopardizing the security and well-being of the people on Taiwan. Even the Taiwan authorities have acknowledged that in the months since derecognition, substantive relationships between the United States and the people on Taiwan have not suffered.

There is abundant evidence that this policy has worked effectively.

- Taiwan's overall foreign trade last year increased by 31% over 1978 levels, while U.S. investment and two-way U.S. trade increased by 15% and 23% respectively.
- Tensions are markedly down in the Taiwan Strait area.
- Travel to the United States from Taiwan increased nearly 60% during 1979.
- Five agreements have been negotiated and concluded between the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA).

Now I would like to address myself to the four major areas of interest indicated by the subcommittee.

Security

The security of the people on Taiwan continues to be of concern to the United States. The Administration has affirmed this on many occasions. So, too, has the Congress—most notably in the Taiwan Relations Act. I can report to you today that a variety of political and military factors continues to render unlikely any P.R.C. [People's Republic of China] action against Taiwan.

- Chinese military action against Taiwan would severely damage or destroy prospects for cooperation with the United States in pursuit of our larger common interests.
- The P.R.C.'s concerns with military challenges on its northern and southern borders continue to exert priority claims on its limited defense resources.
- The Chinese do not have the capability to mount a successful amphibious invasion of Taiwan.
- Beijing now talks in terms of peaceful reunification.
- Foreign investment and trade are now being encouraged in Fujian Province (opposite Taiwan), previously closed to foreign visitors.
- We continue to provide Taiwan access to selected defensive weapons and follow-on support.

In short, tensions in the Taiwan Strait area are at a 30-year low. We believe that much of the impetus for this comes from our recognition of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. As our relations with China continue to improve, the likelihood of conflict in the Taiwan Strait area should continue to recede. Nevertheless, we shall continue to monitor closely the situation with regard to current capabilities and intentions on both sides of the strait, as well as projected future capabilities.

Arms Sales. During 1979 we continued to honor previous commitments by delivering to Taiwan military equipment in the pipeline as well as spare parts and follow-on support for items previously supplied. These items included additional F-5E interceptors with improved weaponry such as precision-guided munitions and Maverick missiles. Total U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in 1979—foreign military sales (FMS) and commercial—were valued at approximately $800 million.

In light of our normalization understanding that there would be a moratorium on new arms sales commitments to Taiwan during 1979, we deferred consideration of new arms requests. In anticipating resumption of sales in 1980, however, discussions were held under the auspices of AIT and CCNAA toward the end of last year to review Taiwan's priority defense equipment needs. Taiwan's requests predictably focused on air and sea defense, particularly the need for a follow-on aircraft to the F-5.

On January 2, we sent prenotifications to Congress for several major items in the package. The equipment approved, worth about $280 million, included:

- An additional battalion of I-Hawk antiaircraft missiles;
- An improved version of the Sea Chaparral ship antiaircraft missile;
- TOW antitank missiles;
- A shipboard weapons-fire control system along with 76 mm rapid-firing guns; and
- An improved electronic identification system to safeguard fighter aircraft against friendly antiaircraft fire.

With the exception of certain high-performance aircraft, which were disapproved on the grounds of the President's arms transfer policy, none of the remaining items on the list was rejected. Taiwan has been informed that we expect to address all other items on the list during this calendar year and that decisions on them will be announced as they are made. (Beijing has registered continuing objections to this aspect of our relationship with Taiwan, but despite our disagreement on this point, we have been able to continue to normalize U.S.-P.R.C. relations.)

As you are aware, on January 4, 1980, the President decided that in certain cases the sale to foreign countries of intermediate fighter aircraft developed or modified for export would serve the national interest and would be consistent with the objectives of the arms transfer policy. Interested companies were authorized to proceed with the development of such aircraft, on the understanding that they would receive no U.S. Government funding for their development, but that the U.S. Government would not disapprove their sale on

grounds that they were developed or modified solely for export. All other arms transfer policy criteria were to be applied on a case-by-case basis to proposed sales in order to insure consistency with our foreign policy, national security, and arms control interests.

Two companies subsequently submitted munitions control requests to begin discussing an FX fighter with various potential customers, including Taiwan. Decisions on those requests were deferred, however, pending completion by the Defense Department of an analysis of the effect of the FX program on U.S. military procurement plans.

We expect very soon to reach a decision, in concert with Defense and the NSC [National Security Council] staff, concerning preliminary discussions on the FX aircraft between the contractors and potential foreign customers including Taiwan.

P.R.C.-Taiwan Relations. The nature and form of Taiwan's ultimate relationships with the mainland of China are for the Chinese on both sides of the strait to determine. It would be presumptuous for Americans to attempt to do so. Nor would we impede the process of their reconciliation.

P.R.C. leaders have made several statements about resolving the Taiwan question peacefully. They have reiterated—most explicitly in an interview Deng Xiaoping gave to a Japanese journalist October 18, 1979—that if Taiwan were to be reunited with the P.R.C. it could maintain virtual autonomy, keeping its own currency and commercial ties, its own armed forces, and its own provincial government. P.R.C. statements in recent months have been consistent with this approach.

The P.R.C. has also removed barriers to trade and communications between Taiwan and the mainland and proposed that such ties be developed to bring about reconciliation. The Taiwan authorities have rejected these proposals, which they characterize as merely a tactical ploy. Nevertheless, there is, in fact, a rapidly growing indirect trade between Taiwan and the mainland, mostly through middlemen in Hong Kong and Japan, and some travel is also taking place via circuitous routes. Taiwan's *de facto* policy toward trade with the mainland has not been clear but in general has been increasingly permissive. Other indirect contacts take place occasionally at international conferences, sport meets, and between Taiwan and P.R.C. students at American universities. Casual meetings abroad of Chinese from Taiwan and the P.R.C. are increasingly frequent, whereas a few years ago they would have been avoided.

The Economy: Performance Since Normalization

Taiwan's gross national product advanced 20.3% in current prices in 1979 to $32 billion. Total trade with 120 partners increased 31% to nearly $31 billion, and U.S. and other foreign investment reached a record $329 million as compared to $213 million in 1978.

In the first quarter of this year the total value of Taiwan's imports increased 44% to $4.5 billion, of which 21%—nearly $1 billion—was crude oil. Imports from the United States during the quarter—mainly farm products, fertilizer, and machinery—were up 65% over the same period in 1979 to $1.1 billion.

The value of Taiwan's exports in the first quarter reached almost $4.5 billion, an increase of 34% over January-March 1979. The United States absorbed $1.5 billion of the total, mainly textiles, footwear, and electronic items and electrical machinery. Globally, Taiwan had a trade deficit (rare for Taiwan) of about $64 million in the first quarter. It is now too early to predict whether or not the traditional trade surplus will emerge by year's end.

Special Factors Underpinning the Economy. Taiwan's broad-based economic development rests on a strong private sector and enlightened economic policies hospitable to foreign as well as domestic private investment and designed to foster high levels of savings, employment, and vital public services. The services include universal education designed to meet the needs of the economy. Budget surpluses and favorable trade balances are the rule rather than the exception in Taiwan. As a result, over the last two decades Taiwan has become a stable industrial economy. Per capita income has grown from subsistence level in the 1950s to nearly $1,900 in 1980.

Taiwan's Role in the World Economy. Taiwan's economy is heavily export oriented and is overly dependent on the U.S. and Japanese markets, which together absorb about 50% of Taiwan's exports. The United States took 39% of Taiwan's exports in 1970 and 35% in 1979, but the value rose in 9 years to $5.65 billion from $567 million. The U.S. trade deficit was $2.3 billion in 1979,

Vietnamese Attack Into Thailand

SECRETARY MUSKIE, JUNE 25, 1980[1]

The United States strongly condemns Vietnam's military attack on Thai territory beginning June 23. The attack produced a significant number of civilian casualties. Vietnam's actions severely disrupted humanitarian operations undertaken by the United Nations and other international relief agencies along the Thai-Khmer border aimed at alleviating the tragedy imposed on the Khmer people.

Vietnam's violation of Thai territorial integrity, despite its repeated pledges to the contrary, also threatens the peace, security, and stability in the entire region. As we did on January 26 of this year, we call upon Vietnam to refrain from any further aggressive actions threatening Thailand's security and integrity or endangering the well-being and safety of the noncombatants in the refugee concentrations along the border. We call upon the Soviet Union, without whose support these actions would not be possible, to use its influence to bring an end to the present conflict. Moreover, we urge them to join in efforts to reach a peaceful solution on the basis of the U.N. General Assembly resolution of November 1979 which called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the creation of a genuinely independent and representative Khmer government.

The United States firmly supports the international effort to minister to the desperate needs of the Khmer people and applauds the cooperation of the Thai Government in this effort. I call upon all parties to the conflict to respect these international humanitarian efforts.

The United States is in close consultation with the Thai Government. As I told Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi during his recent visit to Washington, we will stand by our commitments to Thailand.

[1] Read to news correspondents on the Secretary's behalf by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III and issued as press release 164 of June 30, 1980. ■

U.S.-Persian Gulf Relationship

by David D. Newsom

Address at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., on April 11, 1980. Ambassador Newsom is Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

If the world were a flat circle and one were looking for its center, a good argument could be made that it would lie in the gulf—Arabian or Persian, depending on your perspective. Nowhere in the world today is there quite such a convergence of global interests. No area is quite as central to the continued economic health and stability of the world.

The question is not only one of energy. The area embraces the center of the Islamic world. Its influences, both cultural and financial, extend westward to Morocco and eastward to Indonesia. The border of the Soviet Union lies only a few hundred miles away. The presence of peoples from the Levant, from Palestine, from Egypt, from Pakistan and India means that what happens in the region affects those nations as well, and vice versa. Laborers and contractors came from as far away as Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

Europe receives more than two-thirds of its energy from the gulf region. Exports to the region are significant to the health of the European economies. Britain, once the custodian of the gulf, still retains important links with the nations and the peoples there. France's interest has recently been demonstrated by President Giscard d'Estaing's visit to the region. The European Community, as a whole, continues to discuss a possible dialogue with the states of the area.

To Japan, the region is equally vital. Three-fourths of Japan's energy comes from this area. Japan, too, is an active and aggressive exporter. Last year, the Japanese Prime Minister visited the gulf. Recently, the former Foreign Minister, Mr. Sonoda, made a trip through the area.

The presence of Mecca symbolizes the centrality of this region to the Islamic world. Kerbela and Najaf, just to the north of the gulf, in Iraq, have a special significance to the Shi'a.

The region has become a financial power, able to influence the world's economy and the trends and policies of a wide region. Direct financial help from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait benefits other Arab and Muslim states less well endowed. We count on the willingness of states of the area to help other nations as a parallel effort to our own. In some cases, as in Yemen, it has become an indispensable part of a joint effort. Remittances from the area generated by the employment of large numbers of expatriate workers have become major sources of revenue for Egypt, Pakistan, India, and other nations.

One must assume a strong Soviet interest in the region. No one outside the Politburo really knows why the Soviet Union made the decision to invade Afghanistan. The real reason is, perhaps, not as important as the fact that they are there. Traditionally, since imperial times, the Russians have spoken of their need and desire for an outlet to the Indian Ocean. The thrust into Afghanistan brings them nearer to that goal than ever before.

The present Soviet posture is one of recognizing European interests in the gulf and holding out the hope of Soviet cooperation in insuring access for the Europeans. On February 29, TASS spoke of the possibility of a conference on the security of the oil of the Persian Gulf area. The Soviet Union's interest is also manifested by its strong presence in Aden in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. That presence remains a clear and immediate threat to North Yemen with the obvious additional consequences it would have for the stability of the peninsula as a whole. The Soviet fleet presence in the Indian Ocean is also formidable. Today it consists of some 30 ships.

If your conference here today has run true to form in discussing American policy in the gulf, at least three issues were covered.

- What is the attitude of the United States toward the nations of this region?
- What are the intentions of the United States strategically?
- Does the United States recognize the importance of the issue of Palestine in this area?

U.S. Interests

The interest and relationship of the United States in this area goes back to the early part of the 19th century when in 1832 we signed a treaty of commerce and navigation with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman.

The modern relationship began in 1932 when Americans began the exploration for petroleum in the island of Bahrain. Those who went out at that time looked across at salt domes in Saudi Arabia and concluded that even greater resources lay in that country. The Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) was born and through wise cooperation with the Saudis has become one of the great producers of world energy. That phase of America's relationship will end shortly when the Saudi Arabian Government assumes full ownership of ARAMCO. They will continue, however, the relationship with the Americans through consulting and operating contracts.

The centerpiece of American interest is, of course, Saudi Arabia. In the aftermath of the revolution in Iran there has been a tendency to predict similar developments in other states, including Saudi Arabia. We feel such dire predictions are unwarranted. While Saudi Arabia faces many of the same problems of adapting modernization to a traditional society, its leadership is firmly based in the family which helped create the country. One might also note: Saudi Arabia, with only one-tenth the population of Iran, has many times the wealth and resources of Iran. The two situations are vastly different. The U.S. Government is confident that Saudi leadership will be able to meet satisfactorily challenges which currently face it.

In each of the states of the gulf—Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman—U.S. citizens have played important roles in the development of the resources.

Iraq, at the north end of the gulf, presents a special problem. Long among the most militant of the Arab states on the subject of Israel, Iraq broke diplomatic relations with the United States following the 1967 war. It is the only state which broke at that time which has not resumed relations. Interests sections under foreign flags take care of our bilateral relationship.

The United States is prepared, on our part, to resume diplomatic relations with Iraq at any time. With the growing role of our country in the area, we feel it is important that we have normal relations with every country. Our approaches to Iraq, however, have not met with success.

There are other important economic elements present in our relations with all of these states. Not only do we look to them for continued access to their resources but they look to us for wise policies which will reduce our dependence upon their resources. It may sound strange that these nations which have helped create the energy problem are as keenly interested in sound energy policies as we are. They recognize that their resources are not infinite. They recognize also that the continued strength and health of the Western economies is essential to the health of their own.

The relationship between these countries and the United States will also continue to be based heavily on their access to our technical know-how and to our citizens who can assist them in their strong desire to rapidly modernize their societies and their countries. The 35,000 American citizens in Saudi Arabia testify to the extent of this relationship.

Two events in the last years have shaken this area: the revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Iranian revolution introduced into this area both the turmoil of a troubled country and the impact of politicized, militant Islam. In Afghanistan the brutal Soviet actions to suppress a popular Islamic uprising belie Soviet pretensions to pose as the friend of the Muslim world.

Both events had an impact on the gulf. The Iranian military umbrella had disappeared. The Afghan invasion added to concerns already present about the long-range intentions of the Soviet Union. The apparent willingness of the Soviets to ignore opinion in the Muslim and Third World countries in order to pursue its own ends was not expected by most in the gulf.

Except in Iran and Iraq, the United States has maintained close relations with all the nations of the gulf. The events, however, have raised questions about future attitudes of the United States. Some wondered whether the Iranian situation said anything about the ability of the United States to protect and preserve its friends. Still others expressed apprehension at what might appear to be the beginning of the spread of militant Islamic and anti-Western movements.

Whatever our presence in a country, our ability to stem the tide of a genuinely popular revolution is limited. Iran is a case in point. We do not believe this fact should carry any suggestion of a lessening of American willingness and a capacity to help those nations in the area which are clearly prepared to help themselves maintain stability and growth.

Given the strength of the traditional societies of the gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, we do not see that the happenings in Iran need be a precursor to similar events elsewhere in the region. The Iranian revolution has focused new attention on the Islamic movement, but differences in the nature of Islam give us mixed signals in predicting any wider Islamic revolution in this region. The Afghan events have also had their effect in reducing complacency about the ultimate intentions of the U.S.S.R. in the area.

U.S. Role

All of this has posed anew the question of the role of the United States in the gulf region. We have two immediate issues: Iran and Afghanistan.

Our ability to renew normal relationships with Iran rests on a solution to the hostage question. We cannot consider normal relations with that country until the cruel and illegal holding of the hostages is ended. We accept Iran's revolution as a fact; we do not question the right of the Iranian people to determine their own future; we do not reject Iran's desire to bring its grievances to the attention of the world. But Iran must first live up to its fundamental responsibilities for the safety, well-being, and release of the hostages.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated that the Soviets, despite world opprobrium, are prepared to use their military forces against an independent nonaligned country if they believe their interests are at stake. The invasion also brings Soviet forces closer than ever before to the gulf region.

The United States cannot afford to ignore either fact. Our vital interests are involved. As President Carter said in his State of the Union address:

> Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

Our readiness to support those interests raises the question of the relationship of the gulf states to our own readiness. These recently independent states have made it clear that they do not wish to see the return of outside military forces to the area. They sup-

Iran Chronology, June 1980

June 2
Despite President Carter's ban on travel to Iran, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark leads a 10-member group to an Iranian sponsored conference on U.S. "intervention in Iran." The purpose of the 4-day international meeting, called by Bani-Sadr, was to air Iran's grievances against the U.S. role in Iran in recent years.

June 3
As a possible solution to end the crisis, Clark offers to exchange places with any of the hostages.

June 4
Clark agrees to a request by President Bani-Sadr that he form a commission in the United States to investigate U.S. involvement in Iran during the deposed Shah's reign.

June 5
Four-day conference ends with a 12-point declaration denouncing the U.S. for its continued 27-year interference in Iran and the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan. No mention is made of the hostages.

June 7
Five members of the Clark party meet with militants holding hostages, three return to U.S., and one flies to London because of illness. Clark remains in Iran.

June 10
Khomeini warns that Iran is in a state of "chaos" and tells Bani-Sadr and the majority party in Parliament to mend their differences to avoid destruction of the Islamic Republic.

June 16
Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh states the only way the hostage crisis can be solved would be a "comprehensive settlement of Iran-U.S. problems." He also states that U.N. efforts to solve the crisis would be unsuccessful.

June 23
Ghotbzadeh states that the hostage crisis could be settled within 4 or 5 weeks after a new government and prime minister are installed by the Parliament.

June 28
Shah's condition worsens, and he is readmitted to an Egyptian military hospital. ■

to our common interests. At the NATO meeting in Brussels last month, Secretary [of Defense Harold] Brown and I underscored the importance of a coordinated allied response. This month, President Carter will bring a similar message to the seven-nation summit in Vienna.

Our first mutual obligation is one of understanding. Americans must understand the particular economic and political vulnerability of our allies. At the same time, our allies must understand that burdens must be shared equitably. Detente cannot be sustained unless there is also effective deterrence.

Let me concentrate briefly on one specific aspect of the American response—the boycott of the Moscow games which are scheduled to begin in July. President Carter's original decision to oppose American participation in the Moscow Olympics was founded upon a simple fundamental principle that we could not join in Olympic Games—a festival of peace—in a country that was making this kind of aggressive war.

Even if the United States were the only country to withdraw, that would have been the proper decision. You don't abandon your principles just because not everyone will join you in upholding them. And the impact of our initial decision has been multiplied many times over by the similar judgment of other countries' Olympic committees and individual sports federations.

Some 60 countries, including almost the entire Far East and half of the Near East, Latin America, and Africa, will not be represented in Moscow. More than 50% of the athletes from outside the Soviet bloc will not attend. And in cases where national Olympic committees did not go along with the boycott, more than 30 individual sports federations have decided not to send teams against the decision of their parent Olympic committees. In total, these decisions represent a stinging international rebuke to the Soviets.

The British publication, *The Economist*, has correctly observed that the contests in Moscow will be called, but will not be, Olympics. In the absence of the countries which will not be there, a gold medal surely will not be a symbol of global superiority over all conceivable competition.

It is fundamentally important to recognize that neither this nor any other elements of our response has been based on a desire to dismantle the framework for, the potential for, cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the contrary, we do have legally binding agreements with the Soviets, and we have held to our obligations under the law. The suspension of progress has been dictated not by American preference but by Soviet behavior.

I can only hope that the Soviet stake in detente will not fall victim to Soviet censorship. That can be the result if they believe their own interpretations—if they mislead themselves into a conviction that by restricting the flow of news, they can somehow dispel the effects of their deeds. We must not let that happen.

Beyond that, I am concerned that if the Soviet struggle in Afghanistan continues for the 2–3 year period for which they now seem to be preparing their people, and with as little attention paid in our media for the reasons that I have outlined, the public perception of the significance, gravity, and importance of the Soviet invasion will fade here, in Europe, and elsewhere around the globe, and our efforts to continue pressure on the Soviets—to continue to exact a price from them—may well begin to fade because of the lack of will.

. . . .

I could wish that the conflict were more visible on our television screens. I don't know what the answer to it is. Surely, the print media could do more to tell the story of what is going on in Afghanistan from the human rights point of view, the human values point of view, from a compassionate point of view—also from the point of view of the difficulties that the Soviet military machine is having with respect to a conflict on their own borders, which they obviously regard as of overriding national significance for them. It is one thing to be bogged down in Vietnam, 10,000 miles away from home; the Soviets, at this time, are bogged down next door.

That story ought to be told. It ought to be understood that the Soviets are feeling the pinch of world disapproval. You may have noted that in the Tehran conference yesterday, convened for the purpose of putting the United States in the dock, the Soviet spokesman, undertaking to explain his country's action in Afghanistan, was heckled and jeered—so there are these kinds of pressures that ought to be brought to the Soviet Union.

. . . . ■

Afghanistan Relief Week

A PROCLAMATION[1]

From the beginning, the United States has been a shining symbol of hope to the oppressed and the destitute of the world. The lamp held high by the Statue of Liberty still sheds its light into the darkness of tyranny, poverty and war.

In the years since World War II, America has given substance to that symbol time after time. Our country has provided food, clothing, shelter and medicine to millions of people from Greece, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Kampuchea, Bangladesh, Chile, Guatemala and many other places.

Last December, the non-aligned Moslem nation of Afghanistan was suddenly and brutally invaded by almost a hundred thousand Soviet troops. Because of this act of aggression, which has earned the condemnation of the world, hundreds of thousands of Afghans have been forced to flee their country.

They have fled because their homes have been bombed, their crops and flocks have been destroyed and their villages have been attacked with rockets, napalm and other modern weaponry. Facing starvation, shelterless against the bitter cold of the mountain winter, some one million men, women and children have crossed the high passes to seek shelter in Pakistan, or have fled to Iran. Children and the old often die on the way. But despite the hardships, thousands more arrive each week.

The Afghans now constitute one of the largest concentrations of refugees in the world today. Most of them are destitute. They have been able to bring with them only their proud, resilient spirit of independence. They desperately need shelter. And they need clothing, blankets, fuel and urgent medical care, especially for the women and children.

Americans can help—and Americans must help. I call upon all Americans to help the Afghan refugees through contributions to agencies involved in the relief efforts, both the UN High Commission for Refugees and the dedicated private voluntary agencies.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JIMMY CARTER, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week of July 21 through July 27, 1980, as Afghanistan Relief Week and urge my fellow citizens to join with international relief agencies in assisting and helping the Afghan refugees in their struggle for survival.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this nineteenth day of June, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and fourth.

JIMMY CARTER

[1] No. 4765 of June 23, 1980 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 23). ■

Cuban Refugees

Following is a statement by Victor H. Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Judiciary Committee, a statement by President Carter, and a statement issued by the White House.

AMBASSADOR PALMIERI, JUNE 1, 1980[1]

I appreciate the opportunity to bring you up to date on the processing and resettlement of recently arrived Cubans. The sudden influx of these exiles presents us with unprecedented humanitarian, political, budgetary, and legal challenges. The Administration is committed to keeping the Congress informed on the evolution of the situation and ways to resolve it.

On May 13, I presented to the full Judiciary Committee three principles on which we have based our response to the sudden influx of Cubans.

- We are offering temporary asylum to arriving Cubans while we consider their claims for permanent asylum.
- We are seeking ways to make the flow from Cuba safe, orderly, and in accordance with our own immigration laws.
- We are contacting other nations and international agencies and encouraging their participation in the solution of this problem.

These principles remain the basis of our approach today, although the magnitude of the exodus has changed considerably.

Total Number of Arrivals

Yesterday the cumulative total of Cuban arrivals in the United States since April 14 reached 103,238. This includes 6,258 passengers who arrived on 53 vessels yesterday at Key West. Almost 800 vessels have been seized by the U.S. Customs Service.

Of the total Cuban arrivals, 48,914 have already been resettled, leaving 54,324 in the processing pipeline. Over 18,000 remain at Fort Chaffee, almost 19,000 at Indiantown Gap, some 6,300 at Eglin Air Force Base, about 6,000 at Fort McCoy, and 1,525 in Miami.

At Eglin Air Force Base last Sunday, over 100 of the 430 who were released for resettlement were "walkouts," i.e., arrivals who were screened and immediately released to relatives. This new "walkout" program appears to be working well and is being used to hasten early release to relatives.

Resettlement Problems

Undocumented Cubans who arrive at Key West are given preliminary screening by an interagency group which includes representatives from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other agencies in accordance with the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

All arrivals are medically screened, as required by law, under the general direction of the Public Health Service. Medical treatment or hospitalization is available for those who need it. Arrivals found to have been convicted of a serious nonpolitical crime or who otherwise constitute a threat to the community have been detained in Federal facilities. A total of 681 persons, or 1%, are currently being detained by INS for convictions of serious crimes.

I returned from Fort Chaffee late Monday where a small group of recently arrived Cubans had caused considerable property damage. We are mounting a strong effort to convince the Cubans of the advantages of law and order in camps until orderly resettlement can be provided. Thirty-six of the participants have been arrested and placed in the post stockade. The trouble was started by a small but tough, hardcore group who took this opportunity to demonstrate their strength and ability to dominate others in the camp. They constitute a small number of approximately 19,000 arrivals at Fort Chaffee. An interesting sidelight to this event is that a number of Cubans at Fort Chaffee wore white arm bands during the melee in an attempt to identify themselves with those who wanted to stop the demonstration.

The recent Cuban influx and resettlement efforts on their behalf present a different set of circumstances from that of the Indochinese program in 1975. At that time, the wide sympathy and acceptance of the refugees translated into appropriations of over $400 million. The caseload consisted largely of families and individuals of special concern. There was no question about their status as political refugees. Full reimbursement was provided to the States for all costs associated with the program. The voluntary resettlement agencies received $500 per person in reception and placement grants. With these advantages, some 125,000 persons were resettled from the camps in 8 months with a peak rate of about 25,000 per month. The average resettlement time was 3 months.

The present situation is quite different from 1975.

First, we are dealing with a different kind of population. Of those remaining in the processing centers, a large percentage consists of single males and others who may be more difficult to resettle than families.

Second, there are significant, well-established Cuban communities in the United States.

Third, the resettlement structures of the voluntary agencies are much stronger and better organized than they were at the onset of the 1975 crisis.

Resettlement Resources

Our major resettlement resources are the voluntary resettlement agencies. While we are considering other ways to tap into the resettlement potential of the American community, we are supporting the voluntary agencies and helping them to get into high gear. Their task is a difficult one, and although their major concern is to arrange for sponsorship, they have contributed greatly in assisting in out-processing procedures.

The pressures for rapid resettlement continue to exist, however, and in addition to humanitarian and financial considerations, include the urgent need to reduce in-camp tensions by showing substantial out-movement.

Since to date the Cubans and Haitians have not been determined to be refugees as a group, they are, therefore, not eligible for the full range of benefits authorized by the Refugee Act of 1980.

With respect to the second principle I mentioned earlier, we have taken measures to make the flow from Cuba safe, orderly, and in accordance with our own immigration laws.

Since the President's announcement on May 14, the INS, Coast Guard, and Customs have collaborated to halt the flow of boats to Cuba. The Coast Guard has successfully persuaded vessels heading south to return to Florida.

civil or criminal prosecution in accordance with the President's declaration of May 14, 1980. Persons who arrive illegally after June 19, 1980, will not be eligible for the program and will be subject to exclusion or deportation in accordance with U.S. immigration laws.

[1] Text from White House press release. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture
Convention on the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at Washington Mar. 6, 1979.[1]
Ratifications deposited: Guatemala, May 8, 1980; Jamaica, May 13, 1980; Paraguay, May 12, 1980.

Conservation
Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 1973 on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249). Adopted at Bonn June 22, 1979.[1]
Acceptances deposited: Canada, Jan. 30, 1980; India, Feb. 5, 1980; Norway, Dec. 18, 1979; Sweden, Feb. 25, 1980.

Containers
International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037.
Accession deposited: Chile, Mar. 28, 1980.[2]

Customs
Customs convention on the international transport of goods under cover of TIR carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20, 1978.[3]
Ratification deposited: Greece, May 15, 1980.

Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) formulated at the Bretton Woods conference July 1–22, 1944. Open for signature at Washington Dec. 27, 1945. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and acceptance: St. Lucia, June 27, 1980.

Human Rights
International convenant on civil and political rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.[3]
Accession deposited: Sri Lanka, June 11, 1980.

International convenant on economic, social, and cultural rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.[3]
Accession deposited: Sri Lanka, June 11, 1980.

Maritime Matters
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Yemen (Aden), June 2, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606) on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 14, 1975.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Australia, June 10, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606) on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 17, 1977.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Australia, June 10, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606) on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 15, 1979.[1]
Acceptances deposited: Bahamas and Canada, May 23, 1980; German Democratic Republic, June 10, 1980; Suriname, May 28, 1980.

Narcotic Drugs
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: May 12, 1980.

Patents, Microorganisms
Budapest treaty on the international recognition of the deposit of microorganisms for the purposes of patent procedure, with regulations. Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977.
Accession deposited: Japan, May 19, 1980.
Enters into force: Aug. 19, 1980.

Pollution
International convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973.[1]
Ratification deposited: U.K., May 22, 1980.[4]

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.[1]
Ratification deposited: U.K., May 22, 1980.[4]
Accession deposited: Peru, Apr. 25, 1980.

Convention on long-range transboundary air pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979.[1]
Ratifications deposited: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, June 5, 1980; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, May 22, 1980.

Property, Intellectual
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Ratification deposited: Peru, June 4, 1980.

Red Cross
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (protocol I), with annexes. Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.[3]
Accessions deposited: Bahamas, Apr. 10, 1980; Gabon, Apr. 8, 1980; Mauritania, Mar. 14, 1980.

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of noninternational armed conflicts (protocol II). Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.[3]
Accessions deposited: Bahamas, Apr. 10, 1980; Gabon, Apr. 8, 1980; Mauritania, Mar. 14, 1980.

Rubber
International natural rubber agreement, 1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 22, 1980.
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: June 6, 1980.
Signature: European Economic Community, May 30, 1980.

Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700.
Acceptance deposited: Greece, May 12, 1980.
Accessions deposited: Brazil, May 22, 1980; Japan, May 15, 1980; South Africa, May 23, 1980.

Terrorism
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532.
Accession deposited: Seychelles, May 29, 1980.

International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17, 1979.[1]
Signatures: El Salvador, June 10, 1980; Honduras, June 11, 1980; Senegal, June 2, 1980.

Trade
Arrangement regarding bovine meat. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9701.
Ratification deposited: Finland, Mar. 13, 1980.
Notification of provisional application deposited: Tunisia, Feb. 18, 1980.

Agreement on trade in civil aircraft. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9620.
Acceptance: Austria, Mar. 17, 1980.[5]
Approval deposited: U.K., Feb. 19, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, Apr. 2, 1980.

International dairy arrangement. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9623.
Ratification deposited: Finland, Mar. 13, 1980.

Agreement on technical barriers to trade. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9616.
Approval deposited: U.K., Feb. 19, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Finland, Mar. 13, 1980.

Geneva (1979) protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 30, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9629.
Ratifications deposited: Finland, Mar. 13, 1980; Yugolsavia, Mar. 19, 1980.[6]
Approval deposited: U.K., Feb. 19, 1980.

U.N. convention on contracts for the international sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Enters into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of 12 months after the date of deposit of the 10th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession, subject to the provisions relating to denunciation of the 1964 Hague Formation Convention or the 1964 Hague Sales Convention.

Protocol amending the convention on the limitation period in the international sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Enters into force on the first day of the sixth month following the deposit of the second instrument of accession, provided that on that date (a) the 1974 limitation convention is itself in force; and (b) the 1980 sales convention is also in force.

Transportation
Agreement on the international carriage of perishable foodstuffs and on the special equipment to be used for such carriage (ATP), with annexes. Done at Geneva Sept. 1, 1970. Entered into force Nov. 21, 1976.[3]
Accession deposited: Finland, May 15, 1980.

U.N. Industrial Development Organization Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.[1]
Signatures: Barbados, May 30, 1980; Mali, May 23, 1980.
Ratifications deposited: Barbados, Malawi, May 30, 1980; Laos, June 3, 1980.
Acceptance deposited: Japan, June 3, 1980.

Whaling
International whaling convention and schedule of whaling regulations. Done at Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849.
Notification of adherence: Switzerland, May 29, 1980.

Wheat
Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.
Accession deposited: Algeria, June 6, 1980.

World Heritage
Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226.
Acceptance deposited: Seychelles, Apr. 9, 1980.

BILATERAL

Algeria
Agreement for mutual assistance in connection with the investigation of activities of International Systems and Controls Corporation and International Telephone and Telegraph Company, their affiliates and subsidiaries. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington May 22, 1980. Entered into force May 22, 1980.

Bolivia
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of May 31, 1978 (TIAS 9518). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz May 19, 1980. Entered into force May 19, 1980.

Burma
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Rangoon Apr. 8 and May 27, 1980. Entered into force May 27, 1980.

Canada
Arrangement relating to the employment of dependents of government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 4 and 12, 1980. Entered into force June 12, 1980.

Denmark
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington June 17, 1980. Enters into force upon receipt of the latter notification by one contracting state from the other that the constitutional requirements for entry into force of the convention have been satisfied.

Dominican Republic
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Jan. 3, 1980 (TIAS 9730). Effected by exchange of notes at Santo Domingo Apr. 9 and 11, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 11, 1980.

Egypt
Project grant agreement relating to educational assistance for graduate level fellowships at U.S. institutions of higher education. Signed at Cairo May 13, 1980. Entered into force May 13, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Oct. 4, 1979. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo May 22, 1980. Entered into force May 22, 1980.

Finland
Protocol relating to the air transport agreement of Mar. 29, 1949 (TIAS 1945). Signed at Washington May 12, 1980. Enters into force on the 30th day following the exchange of notes through diplomatic channels confirming that the constitutional requirements for the entry into force have been complied with.

Federal Republic of Germany
Memorandum of understanding for cooperation within the area of army tactical data systems for the purpose of standardization and interoperability. Signed at Washington and Bonn Jan. 6 and Apr. 14, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 14, 1980.

Guinea
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Apr. 21, 1976 (TIAS 8378), with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Conakry May 22, 1980. Entered into force May 22, 1980.

India
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036, 9232, 9578, 9663), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 6, 1980. Entered into force June 6, 1980.

Israel
Protocol amending the convention with respect to taxes on income signed at Washington on Nov. 20, 1975, with exchanges of notes. Signed at Washington May 30, 1980. Enters into force immediately after the expiration of 30 days following the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged and shall thereupon have effect in accordance with article 31 of the convention.

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Hostages' Families *(Secretary Muskie)*

GREAT SEAL TODAY

Sealing of Documents

In the Department of State the term "Great Seal" has come to include not just the die, but the counter-die, the press, and the cover, or cabinet in which it is housed, as well. These stand in the Exhibit Hall of the Department, inside a wood and glass enclosure which is kept locked at all times, even during the sealing of a document. The mahogany cabinet's doors are also kept locked and the press is bolted and padlocked in position except when in use.[5] When there are documents ready for sealing, one of the officers carries them to the enclosure where the Great Seal is kept and prepares them for impressing. First, a 3¾-inch, scalloped, blank paper wafer of off-white linen stock is glued in the space provided for it to the left of the document's dating clause. If ribbons are used in binding the document, they are run under the paper wafer and glued fast. Second, the document is inserted between the counter-die and the die, with the wafer carefully lined up between them. Third, the document is held in place with the left hand and the weighted arm of the press is pulled sharply forward with the right hand, from right to left. This drives the die down onto the wafer, document, and counter-die, which impresses the seal in relief. The die is then raised, releasing the document and allowing for its removal. When an envelope containing letters of credence or recall is to be sealed, the wafer is impressed first, and then glued to the sealed envelope, leaving the envelope itself unmarked.



Great Seal of 1904 and its press in mahogany cabinet are located in Exhibit Hall of Department of State. Seal is engraved on steel die, cost $600 with press, cabinet, and two copper counter-dies.

The Great Seal is no longer portable as it was in Charles Thomson's day. Although the five Great Seals have had many homes and have been in the custody of 56 Secretaries of State since Thomas Jefferson first took the responsibility, only the 1904 seal seems to have found more or less permanent quarters.

In 1955, it was put on public display for the first time during a ceremony in the Department of State lobby opening an exhibit on the history of the Great Seal, after which it was returned to the mezzanine where the public could view it.

On September 16, 1957, the 175th anniversary of the earliest known use of the seal, another public ceremony took place and four documents were sealed by the then Acting Secretary of State, before television and movie cameras.

It was not until March 1961 that the Great Seal was placed in what everyone considered its first appropriate location—the Exhibit Hall of the Department. This hall is on the first floor, centered between the north and south open-air courts which lie straight ahead of the diplomatic entrance at 2201 C Street, Northwest. There the Great Seal, the press, and the cabinet are on display today.

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[1]The eagle on the Great Seal has always faced to its own right. The eagle that faced to its own left (toward the arrows) was in the Presidential seal and this was the design President Truman altered in 1945 when he ordered the eagle's head turned toward the olive branch.

[2]This innovation has been carried from die to die through the one now in use.

[3]Charles Thomson's written description, as adopted by the Continental Congress, provided for the reverse in case it was decided to impress the back of pendant seals. It was never intended that it be used apart from the obverse. A design was drawn in 1786, another in 1856, but no die was produced and pendant seals carried only the obverse of the seal.

[4]Actual delivery was delayed until January 1904, although the press is engraved "June 15, 1903." The die has been referred to as the die of 1903 because of this, but the 1904 date is more customary.

[5]Only three people are authorized to affix the Seal: Mrs. Bernice Renn, Chief of the Presidential Appointments Staff, and her two assistants, Sandra Sheskin and Josephine Weare. ■

Copies of The Great Seal of the United States *may be purchased for $2.00 from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.*

Visit to Tokyo

President Carter was in Tokyo July 9–10, 1980, to attend a memorial service for former Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira at the Budokan on July 9. Following the service, he met with Emperor Hirohito at the Imperial Palace and, later, with Acting Prime Minister Masayoshi Ito at the Akasaka Palace. On July 10 the President met with Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng at the Okura Hotel.

Following are President Carter's remarks upon arrival in Tokyo and the text of an interview he held with Japanese reporters.[1]



White House photo by Karl Schumacher

Memorial Service for former Prime Minister Ohira.

ARRIVAL REMARKS, TOKYO, JULY 9, 1980[2]

As President of the United States, I am both honored and saddened to return to Japan on this solemn occasion. Prime Minister Ohira was a good friend and a wise counselor. I valued his advice, and I admired his statesmanship. All Americans deeply appreciated his cooperation, and particularly in recent months as we have worked together to meet difficult challenges to world stability and peace.

I have come to Japan to convey my personal condolences to Mrs. Ohira and her family, to the Prime Minister's friends and colleagues, and to the people of Japan. I hope that my visit will also be understood as an expression of the deep friendship and respect felt by the American people for your great nation.

Prime Minister Ohira and I always believed that our personal friendship was a symbol of the firm bonds between our two nations. We worked together to strengthen our peoples' enduring ties of mutual respect, common interests throughout the world, and of shared values of democracy and freedom for individuals and for nations. Prime Minister Ohira's leadership will be sorely missed, but because of his many contributions, the relationship between the United States and Japan will continue to grow.

When Prime Minister Ohira visited the United States last year [April 30–May 6, 1979] he said, and I quote his words, "I am eager to work to make the American-Japanese partnership a more powerful and productive force for the progress of the world community toward a more stable peace and a more widely shared prosperity for all." With these words, he spoke for both of us and for both our peoples.

In this spirit, I bring to Japan today my personal condolences and the sincere respect of the United States of America.

INTERVIEW, TOKYO, JULY 10, 1980[3]

Q. Let me begin by asking your impressions of the memorial service for the late Prime Minister Ohira yesterday. What were the thoughts which came across your mind while attending the service?

A. The most profound thoughts that I had were of my personal friendship with Prime Minister Ohira and the closeness that had developed between my family and his. We had been together often in some historic moments.

And I thought the funeral service—the commemorative service—was very impressive, very solemn, but it expressed the genuine outpouring of respect that was felt for Prime Minister Ohira from throughout the world. Someone told me that 108 nations were represented there at the services. And this is not only a sign of respect for him and his leadership during troubled times but also a respect for the greatness of Japan and its growing leadership throughout the world, not only economically but also politically and diplomatically.

And finally, I was reminded of the closeness of our two countries, which I think is unprecedented and which was exemplified by my closeness to him personally.

Q. In a relationship so broad and complex like the relationship between Japan and the United States, there are bound to be some problems from time to time. How do you see the United States dealing with current issues, including trade and defense?

A. All nations in this modern world have problems, and particularly those that are in the role of a leader, as is the case with both Japan and the United States. With the skyrocketing price of

corporations have stood aside, that breach of confidence and cooperation will undermine here the public support on which a strong alliance is based.

Sustained as well as strong allied actions are necessary to gain Soviet restraint. And that restraint is necessary to progress in East-West relations. Thus, detente and deterrence are inseparable parts of the same parcel.

For that reason, progress on another front is also critically important to allied cohesion. Along with sustained firmness, a common allied strategy toward the Soviet Union depends upon our genuine willingness to seek concrete agreements that serve Western interests—particularly sensible restraints on the arms race.

If we—and here I speak primarily of the United States—turn away from our commitment to steady arms control progress, the strength and unity of our alliances genuinely will be shaken. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of a more serious blow.

Let us have no illusions: The key to future arms control is ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

Under that treaty all of the strategic programs we have planned can go forward. But without it, by 1985 we could face 700–800 more Soviet missiles and bombers than we would if the treaty were in force.

Without it, there would be nothing to stop the Soviets from placing 20 or 30 more nuclear warheads on each of their heavy missiles instead of 10 under the treaty.

Without it, the Soviets would be free to conceal their strategic programs from observation by our satellites and other monitoring devices. We would know less about the future threats we might face.

Of course, we would do whatever was necessary to meet an increased threat. But the arms race will not stand still during more prolonged talks to control it. It never has and never will. And anyone who claims we can negotiate a better agreement without first nailing down SALT II is selling a bill of goods.

Afghanistan unquestionably has made the task of ratification harder. It has not made it one iota less important to our national interests, not one iota less crucial to maintaining a common strategy of East-West relations with our allies.

Economic Issues

A second and related area in which U.S.-allied cooperation must grow is in our overall approach to the developing world.

I am not suggesting some conspiracy of industrial nations where the strong impose their will upon the rest of the world. Those days are over. They shouldn't be mourned. But it is in our common interest to work together to address the root causes of instability and conflict before they explode.

It is in our interest to help Third World governments fight poverty and disease and hopelessness before frustrations build to the boiling point. It is in our interest to provide sensible levels of security assistance where that will help them to defend their independence from outside threats. And it is in our interest to work in harmony as we seek practical, negotiated solutions to disputes in troubled regions of the world such as the Middle East.

Finally, our relationship with our allies will increasingly be shaped by economic issues. For the economic currents that shape our daily lives flow throughout the industrial world.

On energy, will we act as cutthroat competitors for scarce oil—or will we act together, as fellow consumers, to reduce our dependence and foster stability and restraint in the market?

On trading, will we slide into a new protectionist spiral—or will we continue to build patterns of trade that are both free and fair?

On economic policy, will each of us simply pursue temporary advantage—or will we coordinate our domestic economic actions to serve our overall, long-term interests?

The future of allied relationships will be determined as much by how these questions are answered—by the degree of our economic cooperation—as by the shape of our military cooperation.

That we need to do all these things is clear; that we will do them, however, is by no means ordained.

It could be that the industrial democracies will allow our divergent interests and our individual problems to drive us apart. Or we can build on the new patterns of cooperation that are taking shape.

- To a greater extent than before, the industrial nations are coordinating their domestic as well as their international energy and economic policies.
- The NATO allies have stood firm against extraordinary Soviet pressure to reverse our course on theater nuclear modernization.
- Over the past few years, the Western democracies have shown an unprecedented degree of cooperation toward resolving dangerous regional disputes, in Rhodesia and Namibia.
- The industrial democracies have joined together in a massive aid program for Turkey.
- While we sought broader measures, the fact is that our allies have joined us in imposing economic sanctions on Iran for holding Americans hostage.
- And the Venice summit and the NATO meeting in Ankara demonstrated the essential unity of the allies in insisting on a total—not cosmetic—Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Soviets should not mistake that resolve.

New allied patterns of cooperation are still emerging. More—much more—clearly must be done. We must avoid backsliding on the gains we have made in recent months.

I have no doubt that there will continue to be differences and disagreements among us in the months and years ahead. The United States will vigorously pursue its point of view at such times. But we all should bring to such moments a sense of the larger progress to be made.

Those who doubt that this progress is possible should contrast the present with past moments—moments when the noise the world heard was not the noise of construction underway but the gears of allied cooperation grinding to a halt. Consider the Suez Crisis of 1956, when the United States found itself in opposition to its principal allies, Britain and France—or the Vietnam period.

We should also recall some fundamental realities.

The great industrial nations, for all their economic problems, are the wellsprings of the world's prosperity. They are the source of the ideas, the technical genius, and the organizing ability that not only provide much of the world's goods but also hold the greatest hope for humanity's progress.

And with all their imperfections, our nations are the principal guardians of the democratic heritage. Ours are systems which believe in and seek to promote the dignity of the individual, the independence of nations, and the consent of the governed.

Possessing such assets and such values, we and our allies need fear neither our current differences, nor for our common future.

Q. Begin's hard line with regard to Jerusalem threatens to scuttle the Camp David talks and to alienate the United States from Arab friends on which we are critically dependent. Why doesn't the United States more effectively use its considerable economic leverage over Israel to temper Begin's demands and force resolution of this issue?

A. The course of action suggested by that question would undoubtedly abort the Camp David process. There is a tendency, when countries are divided by deeply emotional issues as Egypt and Israel obviously are, to act unilaterally, to speak unilaterally, to respond to the emotional pressures of their constituencies, and to complicate the environment in which difficult negotiations are being conducted. But I think that dealing with a complicated negotiating process of this kind is something like playing golf: You've got to keep your head down, concentrate on the ball, and slow down your backswing. I guess there are no golfers in the audience. [Laughter] And perhaps it's not an apt analogy.

There is a temptation, not only with respect to this international problem but others, that because the United States is a superpower, it can, by the application of its power in one form or another, impose settlements, solutions, or policies upon those who are less strong or who are dependent upon us in one way or another. That would not work. There are all sorts of efforts to divert the world's attention from the Camp David process and the autonomy negotiations that are under way in accordance with that process.

I regret the unilateral actions that are taken by both sides as these negotiations go forward, and the United States has indicated its concern when such unilateral actions are taken, whether on the Egyptian side or the Israeli side. In recent days, the increasing escalation of such actions creates danger for the process—and we've said that to both sides privately, and we've said it publicly.

I'm also asked from time to time, "Why doesn't the United States, in the negotiations, develop its own plan and impose it on the parties?" Well, there are a number of problems with that—in the first place, summoning up the wisdom to see what that plan should be. In considering that, considering the associated question, how can we be sure that our plan, however wisely perceived and with whatever clarity our crystal ball gives us, will be acceptable not only by the two parties immediately involved in the negotiations but others who must, at some point, be brought into the negotiations because their rights are also the subject of the negotiation?

I think the problems associated with that approach are obvious. So, what we have tried to do with this negotiating process is to develop the process to the point where the parties are forced to consider the fundamental and difficult issues that must be resolved if an agreement on Palestinian autonomy is to be reached. They are at that point. They have discussed all of the other authorities that a self-governing authority, as it is referred to in the Camp David process, would have to have in dealing with the day-to-day lives of those who are subject to its writ.

With respect to the issues—such as the nature of the self-governing authority; its powers; the question of how internal as well as external security in the area is to be handled and how the responsibility for it is to be divided; how the relatively scarce water resources of the area are to be shared; what will be the franchise of Arabs living in East Jerusalem, which Arabs regard as being part of the West Bank, and Israelis regard, as is obvious from recent events, as an integral part of the territory of Israel; what is the political status of Arabs living in East Jerusalem—these very difficult questions, these and one or two others, are the questions that are being considered.

When the talks resumed following the last pause, which you will remember was triggered by Israeli actions bearing upon the status of Jerusalem, both parties returned to the talks with a very constructive and positive attitude. There was great hope on the part of Ambassador Linowitz, [Personal Representative of the President to the Middle East Peace Negotiations] who is conducting the negotiations on our side—great hope that, finally, progress was being made.

Whether or not there will be another pause, and if so, how long it may continue, and what the impact upon the viability of the Camp David process may be are all appropriate subjects for speculation. And I don't have the answers for that.

But if the talks should collapse, if these negotiations should collapse, then what will we turn to? There is the pre-Sadat Jerusalem visit, with unpredictable impacts upon the treaty already signed by Egypt and Israel, with unpredictable questions about the relationships between Egypt and Israel as well as the rest of the Arab world.

Can one expect that if the Camp David talks collapse the level of violence on the West Bank will be reduced or enhanced? Will mischiefmaking with respect to the security rights of Israel and the rights of Palestinians be enhanced in the United Nations?

Is it likely that another formula designed in such a way that it will implement itself without negotiations can be devised? Or isn't it a fact, whether or not these negotiations succeed, that negotiations at some point will be essential to resolve the questions raised by this age-old enmity?

We think our best chance is these autonomy talks, and we don't think they can succeed if we use them as a way to impose our notion of what the settlement ought to be. That we ought to contribute to the development of ideas that are considered in the negotiating talks I think goes without saying, and that has happened. But it is not in the form of an imposition of an American view or plan upon the negotiating parties.

Q. Is the locating of medium-range ballistic missiles in NATO countries mute confirmation that the United States is no longer committed to respond to a Soviet conventional assault in Europe with its nuclear ICBMs?

A. No, I would not think that is the case. We always, in our defense arrangements with our NATO allies, included tactical nuclear weapons of one kind or another, theater nuclear weapons of one kind or another. But the Soviets have been in the process now of deploying a modern and very effective theater nuclear weapon aimed at Europe, the SS-20, and that program of deployment is well on its way and will be completed in late 1982 if present trends continue. So the question that confronted NATO was whether or not, in the absence of an agreement on the limitation of such theater nuclear weapons, to modernize its own theater nuclear resources.

The allies concluded in December of last year that that was essential, that the growth of the Soviet threat to them, the nuclear threat in that theater, required—and common sense required—that we modernize. That decision was taken, but it was in two parts: first, the decision to deploy; and second, the offer to negotiate with the Russians controls on such theater nuclear weapons in order to stabilize the nuclear side of the East-West military confrontation in Europe.

The Russians' insistence that the European decision to deploy such weapons must be reversed before they would

The estimate of southbound vessels has dwindled to a trickle of three or four a day, from an average of 70 before May 14. The INS has issued over 1,500 notices of intent to issue fines, and hundreds of vessels have been seized and are awaiting further legal action. All seized vessels are prohibited from leaving Florida and are subject to criminal action and fines up to $50,000 if they are apprehended transporting illegal aliens.

In accordance with principle three, we are continuing to work toward internationalization of the Cuban exile problem. As I testified before the Senate on May 13, we participated at a high level in the international conference called by President Carazo of Costa Rica, held in San Jose on May 8 and 9. At the conclusion of the conference, which was attended by representatives of 22 nations, the Holy See and several international organizations, the Government of Costa Rica issued a final communique stating the "need . . . for all governments and international relief organizations to join their efforts in an international program for resettlement of those wishing to leave Cuba and to offer material and financial support for the effort, including resettlement opportunities, commensurate with their resources."

The various representatives outlined the contributions their nations could make, including offers of resettlement for Cubans who had sought refuge in the Peruvian Embassy.

As a result of this conference, a trilateral group composed of the United States, Great Britain, and Costa Rica agreed to negotiate with Cuba an orderly program for the departure of the Cubans who wish to leave Cuba. The group presented a diplomatic note to the Cuban Government requesting opening discussions on this matter. Although the Cuban Government did not accept the proposal set forth in the note, we do not believe that the concept of an orderly departure has been rejected. In consultation with Great Britain and Costa Rica, we will continue our efforts to establish a productive dialogue with Cuba. Whether or not Cuba is willing to meet with us in a constructive manner is for them to decide. But given that all governments are influenced by international opinion, we intend to pursue these efforts even though they may be rebuffed initially.

In the event that an orderly departure program can be negotiated with Castro, a list of persons eligible for consideration to come into the United States will be drawn in part from among those who have filed immigrant visa petitions or registered with the Family Registration Center in Miami. The center has received numerous applications, which the Department of Health and Human Services will be processing in the near future.

In addition, we are continuing our efforts to internationalize the resettlement of Cubans who have sought asylum in the United States. Argentina has sent a representative to Eglin Air Force Base to select Cubans for resettlement. Australia plans to send an immigration officer to the centers shortly to recruit up to 200 Cubans. These are important initiatives that we hope will be duplicated by other countries.

We have already consulted with the Governments of Ecuador, Spain, Peru, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, Austria, Venezuela, Brazil, France, and Costa Rica. We have asked these nations to confirm to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or to the Intergovernmental Commission for European Migration (ICEM) their pledges made at the San Jose conference to accept Cubans. And we have asked UNHCR and ICEM to arrange for the screening and transportation of the Cubans willing to resettle elsewhere. Furthermore, last week in Geneva, I met with the ICEM and UNHCR executive committees, and they have agreed to our requests to seek additional offers of resettlement for Cubans.

Voluntary Repatriation

Regarding the matter of voluntary repatriation to Cuba, there are at least seven persons who have requested to return. Four of them are detained at the Federal correctional institute in Talladega, Alabama. The other three are located at Eglin Air Force Base. Because of the nature of the exodus from Mariel—where many Cubans were crammed on departing vessels, possibly not all of them willingly—we expect there will be more people expressing a desire to return to Cuba. As part of our agreement with the UNHCR, that organization will negotiate with the Cuban Government on arrangements for their voluntary repatriation, including appropriate guarantees for their safety and well-being in Cuba.

Caribbean Nations

I would like to conclude my testimony this afternoon by sharing with you some of my concerns about conditions in the Caribbean and their implications for our refugee programs in the future.

As you well know, political, social, and economic crises have been brewing in the Caribbean for decades. Political systems range from various kinds of representative democracy to authoritarian governments of the left and of the right. Throughout the region, economic pressures for emigration are intense. The stark contrast between economic prospects at home and those in the United States is an important factor motivating emigration to this country. The resulting brain drain deprives developing Caribbean nations not only of professional people but of artisans and technicians without whom there can be no meaningful development program.

At the same time, this situation presents the United States with the dilemma of trying to allocate admissions numbers among the literally millions of people who would like to come to this country.

We will continue to work with the Congress to find solutions to this problem and, specifically, to resolve the remaining issues with regard to the current influx of Cubans.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT JUNE 5, 1980[2]

On Tuesday, June 3, a freighter of recent Panamanian registry landed at Key West, Florida, with 731 Cuban refugees on board. This boat was chartered by Cuban Americans apparently in direct violation of my order that the private boat flotilla from Cuba cease.

Any person who attempts to circumvent this order will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.

Any shipowner, captain, or crewmember agreeing to travel from U.S. or foreign ports to Cuba to take refugees to the United States in violation of American immigration law will face the most severe penalties under the law. Ships engaged in such efforts will be seized regardless of the nation of registry. Ship captains will face criminal prosecutions and maximum civil fines. Those who charter boats for these purposes will also face criminal prosecution.

The penalties for aiding and abetting a conspiracy to smuggle aliens into the United States include prison sen-

tences of up to 5 years and fines up to $2,000 per alien brought to the United States.

The captain of the freighter, the *Red Diamond*, and those responsible for chartering her services have been charged under these statutes. I have instructed the Justice Department to prosecute these cases vigorously.

There should be no misunderstanding of my intention. Illegal boat traffic in refugees is unacceptable to the United States. It will be stopped. Those who attempt to evade this order will pay very severe penalties under our laws.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT JUNE 7, 1980[3]

Among the tens of thousands of people fleeing oppression in Cuba and seeking to reunite with their families and to seek freedom in the United States, Fidel Castro has very cynically thrown in several hundred hardened criminals from Cuban jails. These criminals will not be resettled or relocated in American communities under any circumstances. The administration will take the legal and necessary steps to make sure that this will not happen.

There is evidence that the Cuban Government exported these undesirable elements to the United States in a calculated effort to disguise the fact that the vast majority of those Cubans who have come to this country were and are lawabiding citizens whose only purpose was to seek freedom and to seek reunification with their families.

This action by the Cuban Government, in addition to its cynical and inhumane characteristics, is a direct and serious violation of international law. It would be an equally serious violation if the Cuban Government should refuse to perform its obligations under international law to accept the return of these criminals. The President has directed the Secretary of State to press this issue urgently through diplomatic channels and in the appropriate international forum.

Unfortunately, a few of those who came to the United States seeking the right to live here in this country, to join a democratic and law-abiding society, have created disturbances and have violated the laws of the country in which they seek to live. These individuals will be dealt with in strict accordance with those laws.

The President has directed the Attorney General to take the following actions.

First, Cubans identified as having committed serious crimes in Cuba are to be securely confined. Exclusion proceedings will be expedited to the maximum extent consistent with constitutional requirements for due process of law.

Second, exclusion proceedings will also be started against those who have violated American law while waiting to be reprocessed or relocated. The Justice Department will investigate all serious violations of the law, and the Justice Department will bring prosecutions where justified. Those responsible for the disturbances at Fort Chaffee are confined and will be confined until fair decisions can be made on criminal prosecution or exclusion from this country or both. Similar measures will be taken in the event of any future disturbances.

[3] Read to news correspondents by White House press secretary Jody Powell. A question-and-answer session followed the statement and is included in the press release (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 16, 1980). ■

Haitian Migration to the U.S.

Statements before the Subcommittee on Immigration of the House Judiciary Committee on June 17, 1980, by John A. Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and Stephen E. Palmer, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.[1]

MR. BUSHNELL

I am pleased to exchange ideas on some aspects of one of the major concerns in our hemisphere—the migration of people. Today we are focusing on Haitian migration; but that is only one part of a much larger issue.

Haitian migration, not only to the United States, but throughout the Caribbean, is now receiving a great deal of attention and is a matter of concern in several countries. In the United States, there is particular concern about the Haitian "boat people" in Florida, especially in the context of the recent wave of uncontrolled and undocumented immigration from Cuba. There are important distinctions between the Haitian and Cuban cases, however. I would like to put the phenomenon of Haitian migration into some perspective.

The island of Hispaniola, shared by Haiti and the Dominican Republic, is the most populous in the Caribbean with over 11 million people. Haiti's 6 million are crowded into the poorest third of the island. Only about one-seventh of Haiti's land surface is flat or sloped at less than 10° and thus suitable for intense cultivation with the primitive farming techniques traditional in the country. Average rural per capita income is around $100 per year. Nowhere in this hemisphere are economic and demographic pressures so intense. Survival is a struggle. There is often little hope or expectation that one's condition will improve; and many expect the lives of their children to be even more difficult than their own. The stark contrast between living conditions and economic prospects in Haiti and the United States is the principal factor motivating emigration to this country.

Aside from Mexico, with its much larger population and its common border with the United States, this island of Hispaniola probably has been the source of most illegal immigration into the United States over a period of several decades. Informed estimates place the number of Haitians in the United States at between 300,000 and 400,000, a large proportion illegally.

Haitians have been the migrants of the Caribbean basin throughout this century. They traditionally have migrated to the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, Canada, the French West Indies, and Cuba. Cuba ceased to be an attractive destination after Castro came to power. The Bahamas, since independence in the early 1970s, have been more sensitive to illegal immigration.

Unlike Cuba, the Haitian Government has permitted emigration—documented or not—to proceed freely. Haitians travel back and forth from neighboring countries and islands. Emigration has reduced somewhat the population pressure on Haiti's limited resources, but the population continues to grow at 2% per year—perhaps a million people in the last decade. Emigration is also a foreign exchange earner as many Haitians remit wages earned abroad to their families in Haiti.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

[2] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 9, 1980.

Treaties

Jamaica
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with exchange of notes. Signed at Kingston May 21, 1980. Enters into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Japan
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Feb. 23, 1976, (TIAS 8246) on research participation and technical exchange in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LOFT research program, with memorandum of understanding. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Tokyo Mar. 18 and 21, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 21, 1980; effective Feb. 23, 1980.

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Mar. 9, 1976, (TIAS 8616) on research participation and technical exchange in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission power burst facility (PBF) research and Japanese Atomic Energy Research Institute nuclear safety research reactor (NSRR) program. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Tokyo Mar. 18 and 25, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 25, 1980; effective Mar. 9, 1980.

Agreement extending the agreement of May 2, 1975, as extended (TIAS 8088, 8399, 8874, 9204), concerning an international observer scheme for whaling operations from land stations in the North Pacific Ocean. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo May 27, 1980. Entered into force May 27, 1980.

Jordan
Agreement relating to the provision of technical assistance and services to the Civil Aviation Department of Jordan. Signed at Amman and Washington Mar. 5 and Apr. 1, 1980. Entered into force June 1, 1980.

Air transport agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Amman Apr. 8 and June 8, 1980. Entered into force June 8, 1980.

Republic of Korea
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 23, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9039, 9350, 9566), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Apr. 14 and May 20, 1980. Entered into force May 20, 1980.

Mexico
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 3, 1979 (TIAS 9696) relating to additional cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico Apr. 25, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 25, 1980.

Morocco
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of May 17, 1976 (TIAS 8309). Signed at Rabat May 21, 1980. Entered into force May 21, 1980.

Agreement for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with annex and agreed minute. Signed at Washington May 30, 1980. Enters into force on the date on which the parties notify each other by exchange of notes that they have satisfied their legal requirements.

Nicaragua
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Aug. 31, 1979. Effected by exchange of notes at Managua Mar. 20 and 25, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 25, 1980.

Panama
Agreement relating to payment to be made by Panama to the Panama Canal Company and the Canal Zone Government for goods and services, with agreed minute. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Mar. 25, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 25, 1980.

Agreement relating to payments to be made by the Panama Canal Commission to Panama pursuant to Articles III(5) and XIII(4) of the Panama Canal Treaty, with agreed minute. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Mar. 25, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 25, 1980.

Poland
Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 9 and 12, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9064, 9213, 9640), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington May 5 and June 3, 1980. Entered into force June 3, 1980.

Philippines
Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters, with addenda. Signed at Bethesda and Manila Mar. 28 and Apr. 28, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 28, 1980.

Senegal
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with annexes and memorandum of understanding. Signed at Dakar May 16, 1980. Entered into force May 16, 1980.

Singapore
Agreement amending the agreement of Sept. 21 and 22, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9214, 9610, 9719), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington May 27 and June 2, 1980. Entered into force June 2, 1980.

South Pacific Commission
Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S. income tax reimbursement. Effected by exchange of letters at Suva and Noumea Mar. 31 and Apr. 15, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 15, 1980; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Sri Lanka
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Mar. 18, 1980, (TIAS 9737) with related letter. Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo May 21, 1980. Entered into force May 21, 1980.

Sudan
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Khartoum May 17, 1980. Enters into force for 1979/80 debt, upon receipt by Sudan of written notice that domestic U.S. laws and regulations covering debt rescheduling concerning this agreement have been complied with; for 1980/81 debt, upon receipt by Sudan of written notice from the U.S. Government that the U.S. considers Sudan in compliance with the condition stated in article III, paragraph 1, of the agreement.

Tanzania
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Mar. 19, 1980. Effected by exchange of notes at Dar es Salaam June 9, 1980. Entered into force June 9, 1980.

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[1] Not in force.
[2] With reservation.
[3] Not in force for the U.S.
[4] With reservation and declaration.
[5] Subject to ratification and with a declaration.
[6] Subject to approval. ■

June 1980

Events pertaining to Iran may be found on page 63.

June 5

By a vote of 14–0 with 1 abstention (U.S.), the U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution "rebuking" Israel for failing to protect Arab lives in the occupied West Bank.

June 6

The following newly appointed Ambassadors present their credentials to President Carter: Sherif Fawaz Sharaf of Jordan, Jorge Pacheco Areco of Uruguay, Tamaiti Willie Star of Nauru, and Jacques Topande-Makombo of the Central African Republic.

June 11

Japanese Prime Minister Ohira dies.

June 12

The 40-nation Disarmament Conference begins the second half of its 1980 session in Geneva.

June 13

European Common Market leaders, meeting in Venice, unanimously adopt a declaration supporting full self-determination for the Palestinian people, stating that the PLO "will have to be associated with" negotiations for a Middle East peace settlement, calling for an end to Israeli "territorial occupation" of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, denouncing the settlements as "a serious obstacle to the peace process," and calling the expropriation of Arab-owned land "illegal under international law."

June 16

Jordanian King Hussein I makes official visit to Washington, D.C., June 16–21.

June 19

President Carter makes official visit to Europe June 19–26 with stops in Rome and the Vatican, June 19–21; Venice to attend the Sixth Economic Summit, June 22–23; Yugoslavia, June 24–25; Spain, June 25–26; and Portugal, June 26. Secretary Muskie accompanies the President through the Venice portion of the trip.

June 20

Eighth semiannual report on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act—December 1, 1979 through May 31, 1980—is submitted to Chairman Dante Fascell of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

June 22

Japan holds parliamentary elections. Governing Liberal Democratic Party wins 284 votes in the lower chamber of the House of Representatives and 135 votes in the House of Councilors.

June 25–26

Secretary Muskie attends NATO's 1980 spring North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting in Turkey.

June 27

Secretary Muskie arrives in Kuala Lumpur for consultations with ASEAN members, June 27–29.

June 30

A 2-day followup international conference on humanitarian aspects of the Cuban exodus begins in San Jose. U.S. delegation is headed by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, William G. Bowdler and the Deputy Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Ambassador Frank E. Loy.

By a vote of 14–0 with 1 abstention (U.S.), the U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution deploring Israel's persistence in "changing the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure, and status" of Jerusalem. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*136	6/3	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on subdivision, stability, and load lines, June 17.
*137	6/3	SCC, SOLAS, working group on radiocommunications, June 19.
*138	6/3	U.S. Organization for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), national committee, July 1.
*139	6/3	Muskie: statement on Arturo Cruz, newly appointed member of the governing junta of Nicaragua.
*140	6/4	Secretary's advisory committee on private international law, study group on leasing of movable property, June 25.
*141	6/9	Muskie: interview on "Meet the Press," June 8.
*142	6/10	Richard L. McCall, Jr. sworn in as Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs (biographic data).
*143	6/6	C. William Kontos sworn in as Ambassador to Sudan (biographic data).
144	6/9	Muskie: address before Washington Press Club.
*144A	6/10	Muskie: question-and-answer session following address before Washington Press Club, June 9.
*145	6/9	Copenhagen '80: The Washington Conference for Women; Dept. of State conference, June 12–13.
*146	6/10	U.S., Singapore amend textile agreement, May 27 and June 2.
147	6/10	Muskie: statement for World Environment Day, June 5.
148	6/13	Muskie: news conference.
*149	6/11	Reallocation of fishery resources withheld from the U.S.S.R.
150	6/11	Muskie, Australian Foreign Minister Peacock: press statements.
*151	6/16	Program for the official visit of King Hussein I of Jordan to Washington, June 16–21.
*152	6/26	U.S. delegation to the World Conference of the U.N. Decade for Women (biographic data).
*153	6/17	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, July 9.
*154	6/17	SCC, SOLAS, working group on standards of training and watchkeeping, July 9.
*155	6/17	U.S., Korea amend textile agreement, Apr. 14 and May 20.
*156	6/17	U.S., India amend textile agreement, June 6.
*157	6/17	National Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, Dept. of State, June 26–27.
*158	6/12	John H. Trattner named Dept. of State spokesman (biographic data).
*159	6/19	Muskie: statement reaffirming his determination to affirmative action and employment at the Dept. of State.
*160	6/17	William C. Harrop sworn in as Ambassador to Kenya (biographic data).
*161	[Not issued]	
*162	6/24	U.S., Jordan air transport comes into force, June 8.
*163	6/26	Marvin Weissman sworn in as Ambassador to Bolivia, Mar. 19 (biographic data).
164	6/30	Muskie: statement on Vietnam's military attack on Thai territory, June 23.

IN CONGRESS, JULY 4, 1776.

Resolved, *that*

Dr. Franklin, Mr. J. Adams and

Mr. Jefferson, be a committee,

to bring in a device for a seal

for the United States of America.

The Great Seal of the United States

Before it adjourned on July 4, 1776, the Continental Congress of the newly independent United States passed a resolution appointing a committee of three of the five men who had drafted the Declaration of Independence "to bring in a device for a seal for the United States of America."

The revolutionaries needed an emblem and national coat of arms to give visible evidence of a sovereign nation and a free people with high aspirations and grand hopes for the future. The task proved far more difficult than anticipated; it took 6 years, two more committees, and the combined efforts of 14 men before the Great Seal of the United States became a reality on June 20, 1782.

This year marks the 198th anniversary of the first use of the Great Seal on a document giving full power to General Washington to negotiate and sign with the British an agreement for the exchange, subsistence, and better treatment of prisoners of war.

Following is a reprint of a publication on the history of the Seal prepared by Harriet P. Culley, senior writer/editor in the Department of State's Bureau of Public Affairs.

DESIGNING A SEAL

The First Committee

The challenge facing the committee was to translate intangible principles and ideals into graphic symbols. Three of the best minds of the Age of Enlightenment —Franklin, Adams, and Jefferson— struggled unsuccessfully with Biblical and classical themes, including the Children of Israel in the Wilderness and the Judgment of Hercules. Finally they sought the help of a talented "drawer" and portrait artist, Pierre Eugene du Simitiere. To the post of consultant, Du Simitiere brought some knowledge of heraldry— the art of describing coats of arms—and also experience in designing seals.

Four features recommended by the first committee and its consultant were later adopted in the final seal: the Eye of Providence and the date of independence (MDCCLXXVI), both of which appeared on the final reverse side of the seal, and the shield and Latin motto, *E Pluribus Unum* (Out of many, one), on the obverse side.

The first committee submitted its design on August 20, 1776, but the Congress ordered the report "to lie on the table," indicating lack of approval.



Portrait artist Du Simitiere's design for Franklin, Adams, and Jefferson suggested shield, Eye of Providence in radiant triangle, and motto, E Pluribus Unum, all used in final design. Drawn from original in Thomas Jefferson papers.

Great Seal Origins

Great seals have their origins in the royal seals of the 7th, 8th, and 9th centuries, but the first seal to be called "great" was that of England's King John (1199–1216). The King's Chamber acquired a smaller seal of its own, called the "privy seal," for use in the sovereign's private business, and thereafter the King's seal became known as the "Great Seal." Our seal is called "Great Seal" although no "lesser" seal exists.

Opposite page: Artist — Linda Gould of William E. Tolley, Inc.

White House photo by Jack Kightlinger

President Carter and Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng with Chinese interpreter (center).

energy, economic problems are a responsibility for all leaders now, but the thing to remember is not those problems but the resolution that we have to resolve the problems, working together.

We have so much in common in the challenges and the approach to them that these common approaches and common commitments far outweigh any differences that might exist between us. We both represent dynamic, aggressive societies where people are very confident about the future, where we set the pace for other nations, and where we have never feared the meeting of a challenge with courage and conviction.

Economically, in trade, we have unprecedented benefits to both our nations from the rapidly growing volume of trade. And of course, on defense our mutual security treaty is a foundation for our own ability and commitment in the western Pacific to maintain stability and to maintain peace for all people.

We believe that this good relationship between our two countries in a competitive spirit is going to grow and that the 1980s will show even greater progress than we've seen in the 1970s because of the common purpose of our countries, in progress and also in freedom, and our commitment to democracy and to peace. We believe, finally, that the good relationship between our two countries is very beneficial to other nations and that we have set an example of the kind of growth that can benefit both peoples in a rapidly changing technological world if those peoples share those common commitments, which I've already mentioned.

Q. What kind of contribution would you like to have from the Japanese side to strengthen the tie of both countries?

A. I don't have any fear of Japan pursuing its own goals and the United States pursuing its independent goals, because we have so much in common that this pursuit is mutually supportive and not contradictory. We want stability and peace throughout Asia, and our commitment to a strong defense, at some sacrifice to us, is supportive of the Japanese commitment to defend your own area and your own people. There is no problem between us in that respect.

Similarly, in the development of technology, science, research, development, education, dealing with the energy problem, meeting the challenges of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, international terrorism exemplified by the holding of American hostages in Iran, the growth of the strength of the ASEAN group [Association of South East Asian Nations], which is a very encouraging development, the opening up of China, a vast country very important to us both, with new opportunities for trade and exchange of ideas and a common purpose, the sharing of strategic matters—all of these elements of the life of Americans is identical with the importance in the life of Japanese.

As we pursue our own individual goals, sharing all these problems and all these opportunities for the future, I have great confidence that the relationship between our people will be better, even, in the future than it has been in the past and that we can solve these problems together with gratification to the people of both nations.

Q. Now you are about to have talks with Premier Hua Guofeng of the People's Republic of China. Can you tell us at this time what you expect out of this meeting and, also, how the closer relations between the United States and China would affect Japan and the rest of the world, specifically the Soviet Union?

A. I don't think it would be appropriate to outline all of the subjects that we're going to discuss with Premier Hua, but I'll be seeing him in just a few minutes, as you know, across the street.

In the first place, this last 18 months since I decided to normalize relations between our country and the People's Republic of China has been one of exciting progress between our two great nations, and, of course, this is a similar experience to what has been the case between Japan and the People's Republic of China.

We believe that this new development is conducive to peace and stability and progress throughout the Asian region of the world. We also see it as a means by which we can share our long-range strategic concerns to minimize the threat of the Soviet military build-up, which is exemplified most vividly by their unwarranted invasion of Afghanistan and their support of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea.

We believe that this new relationship, however, should not be used by either our country or Japan, with China, against the Soviet Union. We should not combine our efforts against another nation, but we should combine our efforts to maintain peace and the freedom of each country to make its own decisions free of outside interference and certainly free of an invasion.

I believe in every respect the new peaceful relationship between our two countries on the one hand and China on the other is better for us all, in the matter of peace and trade and an improved, better life for our people. My guess is that 50 or 100 years from now, as historians look back on this last few years, the turning of China outward to friendship with Japan and the United States will be a major development in the lives of all people.

[1] Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 21, 1980.

[2] Made at Haneda International Airport.

[3] Held in the Okura Hotel and broadcast live on Japanese television. ■

Visit to West Africa

Vice President Mondale visited Senegal July 17–19, 1980, Niger July 19–20, Nigeria July 20–23, and Cape Verde July 23. Following are the Vice President's address at a dinner in Lagos, Nigeria, hosted by Vice President Alex I. Ekwueme on July 22 and the text of a joint U.S.-Nigeria communique of July 23.[1]

ADDRESS

I am told that the best-selling book in Nigeria today is the Nigerian constitution—and that proves something that I've always believed. Freedom may be a burden, but it is a glorious burden, and there are no people on Earth who would refuse to shoulder it. Democracy may be noisy, but it is the sound of the human spirit, and there is no nation on Earth which would suffer from its liberation. Development may be difficult, but it is a human task, and there is no society on Earth whose human rights would not hasten it.

And so let me begin by saluting Nigeria's transition to democracy and the wisdom of all Nigerians who achieved it. Let me celebrate not only your return to civil government but also the process by which you achieved it.

Our joy in Nigeria's new democracy underscores the fundamental change in America's relations with Africa. When President Carter and I were inaugurated in early 1977, we were determined to build a new foreign policy on the foundation of American democratic values.

We value justice. And so we committed our nation to an Africa free from racism and oppression.

We value personal dignity. And so we committed our nation to an Africa free from want and suffering.

We value peace. And so we committed our nation to an Africa free from war and from foreign domination.

These three goals—human rights, economic progress, and peace—were underlined by President Carter here in Lagos 2 years ago, in the first state visit by any American President to Africa. And when he did, he was greeted by words both friendly and direct. "The Nigerian public," he was told, "has learned to measure policy pronouncements by results—and not expectations."

It was an appropriate point. And tonight is an appropriate moment to assess those results and to survey the work ahead.

Human Rights

First, human rights. For the United States, the question is not whether we should work to advance justice in Africa but rather how to do so.

Tonight, as your Vice President pointed out, we celebrate a historic step forward—majority rule and independence for the people of Zimbawe. It was an achievement of which Nigeria can be proud—most African governments, the British Government, and especially all Zimbabweans should be proud. And I am proud that my own country stood firm with yours and with others, for today, the people of Zimbabwe control their own future, free from outside interference, whether from their neighbors or from other continents.

Throughout the years of effort to find a solution, the United States held to a policy of support for free and fair elections, open to all parties; for a democratic and fair constitution; and for a negotiated settlement based on these principles.

The President insisted on maintaining American sanctions against Rhodesia until an impartial election process had begun. There was intense pressure to abandon this course—to drop our principles and take a short-sighted view of our interests. But our President and our Congress refused.

We know that it is in our national interest to support further progress for Zimbabwe. We have pledged substantial assistance to Zimbabwe—because we believe that its future will help decide the future of southern Africa.

One of our partners in the search for peace in Zimbabwe was President Khama of Botswana. He was a gifted, gentle leader of modern Africa—the father of a state both nonracial and democratic, in a turbulent region that has known too little of either quality. And we will all mourn his passing.

But we also celebrate a cause that he nurtured—democratic government in Africa. We welcome the return to civilian rule in Nigeria, Ghana, and Upper Volta, and the movement toward democracy in other nations in this region. We applaud the heightened emphasis on human rights in many African nations and in OAU (Organization of African Unity) councils. We offer our support for the future of Zimbabwe. But we also address those areas where human rights are trampled.

Injustice based on racial discrimination is abhorrent to men and women everywhere. That is why the problems of southern Africa have been of special concern.

We believe that an agreement on a plan for peace and justice in Namibia, based on fair and open elections, is within reach. The plan proposed by the U.N. Secretary General has received strong African support and the agreement of the South West Africa People's Organization. South Africa has accepted the plan but does not yet agree on how to carry it out.

Now is the time for South Africa to put its faith in the plan it has accepted. If it does not, if instead it insists on its own formulas and carries the conflict further afield into neighboring states, the opportunity for peace could be lost, and the conflict will continue. We urge South Africa to build on the experience of Zimbabwe and to move forward—not backward—on the issue of Namibia, while there is still time.

Events within South Africa concern us as well. In May of 1977, I met in Vienna with the then Prime Minister Vorster. I impressed upon him, in the clearest terms, that relations between our two countries would depend upon progress toward full human rights and full political participation for all the people of his country. I expressed our strong hope that the South African Government would meet soon with representative leaders from across South African society to determine that country's future.

And I repeat that appeal that again tonight—for the clock is ticking in South Africa.

We advocate no simple formula. We know there is no simple answer. We see the need to solve a problem. And we believe that only blacks and whites, talking and reasoning together, can find its solution.

A great African poet once wrote: "Who would bring life's memory back to the men of gutted hopes?" We believe there is still hope for the men and women of South Africa. And there is still time—for reconciliation, for progress, for reason. But time is running out.

Economic Progress

Our second goal in Africa is economic progress; freedom from want and suffering.

Since we've come to office, American

be willing to engage in talks has been dropped, and we are on the verge of beginning preliminary exchanges with the Russians on talks dealing with theater nuclear weapons which may conceivably broaden in the other areas.

Q. In Los Angeles yesterday you stated that we won't get into an arms race but we will have a defensive capability second to none. Isn't the commitment to the MX missile a new step in the arms race?

A. As I said in my comments today, the buildup of arms continues even in the course of talks designed to stablize the arms race, and that has been the history of the last 10 years or more during which the SALT process has been under way. Until we reach agreements, neither side has been willing to suspend the development of its own technology to put in place in the event the talks should fail. So the momentum that is generated by that ongoing arms competition is a serious block because, as the technology race proceeds, the technology of nuclear weapons becomes more complicated and more difficult to reach agreement for stabilizing.

I can remember, for example, in my Senate career, the debate over whether or not we ought to MIRV our missiles. As you know, MIRVing added multiple, independently targetable warheads on single missiles. That was a breakthrough, and with our decision to deploy it—which I opposed at the time because I thought that once we deployed it, the Russians would find it necessary then to develop their own MIRVs, which of course they have done—the arms race escalated, as a result, to a higher level to which we now have to seek stabilization before we can even talk about reduction. So the time it takes to reach agreement and the events which delay implementation of agreements provide time for a continuation of the arms competition.

The arms race I referred to yesterday was that this arms competition—and I've used that word today—that is ongoing now will be escalated into an all-out arms race if the objective of each side is to achieve nuclear superiority over the other—because obviously neither of the superpowers is going to be willing to be frozen into a position of nuclear inferiority in some SALT treaty of the future.

Only an agreement that is based upon essential equivalence has any chance of being agreed to by both parties, and only such agreement will avoid the prospect of the kind of unrestrained arms race to which I was referring yesterday.

Q. How are you and Dr. Brzezinski [Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs] getting along? [Laughter]

A. Well, as someone said earlier in our relationship, we have a fine bipolar relationship. [Laughter] We have no difficulties. I have none, and I'm not aware that he does. Foreign policy making is not a one-person process in this or any other Administration. There are other agencies which impact upon our relationships with other nations, the Department of Defense more than any of them. The press and public don't focus on that very much. But we have ongoing discussions between the defense ministries of the West that have obvious implications for foreign policy in ways that may not be anticipated when discussions are going on at the defense ministerial level.

The Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, our Trade Representative—there are a number of agencies and persons who are involved in affecting foreign policy in one way or another, and I think we need to better coordinate all of that. I have that as a very strong impression after 90 days.

My concern with coordinating foreign policy and identifying the principal figures responsible for it has broadened far beyond Dr. Brzezinski and the National Security Council. We've had no confrontations up to this point. It is conceivable that we might because we are both strong-minded individuals; we both have definite ideas; we both seek access to the President; and it's my job to make sure that the Secretary of State doesn't take second place, that's all. It's that simple.

Q. Now that you are viewing the process from the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, do you believe that intense congressional scrutiny is a constructive factor in the development of foreign policy? [Laughter]

A. I think it can be if their constituents are intensely scrutinizing their decisions on foreign policy. That is one of the reasons that I have engaged on this nationwide campaign to discuss foreign policy with constituents. Not that I want to end-run Congress, but because I think, as in the case of domestic policy, our policy is more likely to be wise, perceptive, and supported by our people if our people understand it. If you understand it, I'm sure from my 22 years of experience in the Senate, Congressmen will find a way to understand it.

[1] Press releases 213 and 213A. ■

Review of Discussions Abroad

Secretary Muskie's statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 30, 1980.[1]

I find myself coming before you with the chronic complaint of a Secretary of State: a great deal of territory to cover in a very short time. In fact, that has been the story of my life over the past 2½ months. Today I want to bring you up to date on my activities—particularly my recent discussions abroad.

Before I turn to those travels, however, let me say a few words about three matters which shaped those discussions: the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; the holding of American hostages in Iran; and the negotiating process in the Middle East.

Afghanistan

First, Afghanistan. I need not dwell on the history. The President and others have made our view clear: The Soviet invasion is not only an assault on the people of Afghanistan; it also assaults fundamental principles of international order and decency. It raises serious potential threats to world peace and to vital Western interests in the Persian Gulf area.

For all these reasons, the United States has reacted firmly. We imposed restrictions on grain, high technology, and phosphate exports to the Soviet Union. We boycotted the Moscow Olympics and helped persuade 59 other countries to do likewise. We have encouraged and joined the widespread condemnation of the Soviet invasion by the international community. We have called for a complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and for a political solution to the crisis.

What should be the elements of such a political settlement? In our view, four are essential:

- A prompt and complete withdrawal of all Soviet forces;
- Nonintervention in Afghan internal affairs by any outside state;
- A government acceptable to the Afghan people; and finally,
- An independent and nonaligned Afghanistan.

We are prepared to explore transitional arrangements aimed at restoring

peace to Afghanistan. Such arrangements could be implemented along with the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops.

But we see no indication that the Soviet Union is interested in anything other than imposing its military grip upon that country. Our judgment is that the "withdrawal" announced last month is only a partial redeployment of troops—mostly of units not suitable to this kind of war. The Soviet announcement has not been followed by any steps which indicate that the Soviets are prepared to discuss a political solution. Indeed, if anything, fighting appears to have intensified in recent days. The resistance of the Afghan people continues to grow.

So we believe it is essential to keep up the pressure; to maintain the sanctions; to impose continuing costs upon the Soviet Union for its aggression. We will continue to urge other nations to stand firm. And we will continue to draw attention and seek support for the plight of more than 1 million Afghan refugees now homeless in Pakistan and Iran.

Iran

In Iran the continued holding of American hostages and continuing revolutionary chaos contribute further to instability in the region and prolong the crisis between our two countries. Iran's leadership is diverted by this manufactured crisis from dealing with the real threats to its independence and security.

At this point, we simply cannot say what, if any, effect the recent death of the Shah might have on the situation. Key Iranian leaders, however, say that this will have no impact on their decision to release the hostages. We continue to press, through every avenue open to us, for an early release of the hostages. And we continue to impose economic sanctions designed to impress upon Iran's leaders the costs of the crisis to their own interests. Most of Iran's major trading partners have broadly supported a policy of isolating Iran.

At the same time, we have made it clear that once our hostages are free, we and the world stand ready to deal with Iran on a basis of mutual respect. It is the holding of hostages that keeps Iran from enjoying better relations in the world.

The new Iranian Parliament is organizing. We can have some hope that if the internal power struggle within Iran can be resolved somewhat, the outlook for release of the hostages will improve. Now and in the weeks ahead, we will use every diplomatic source to urge Iranian leaders to end the crisis.

I wish I could report that the recent release of Richard Queen has hopeful implications for the other 52 hostages. In fact, however, we simply can't speculate. We are encouraged that the Iranian authorities looked with compassion on the plight of one hostage; we hope that they will see the fundamental human dimension of the entire situation and move quickly to release the remaining 52.

Iranian leaders have said they have no quarrel with the *people* of America. But they must realize that as long as the hostages are held, it is the people of America who demand their release. It is people like Richard Queen and his family who have suffered and who will rejoice when the crisis has ended.

Middle East

A third area of continuing concern is the Middle East. The Camp David accords of 1978 represent an historic step toward peace. The treaty between Egypt and Israel continues to bear fruit; it has diminished the danger of war in the Middle East.

As we expected, the negotiations concerning autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza have proved difficult and complex. But there are hopeful signs. Our negotiating team has been in the region, engaged with the Israelis and the Egyptians in intensive discussions of legal, economic, and security issues as well as the broad outlines of an agreement. In these talks, both sides have demonstrated a new seriousness of purpose and a willingness to consider fresh approaches to the difficult issues that remain.

If the talks continue in this positive way, we expect that the heads of delegation will meet again with Ambassador Linowitz [Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations] toward the middle of August. We will continue to do all in our power in the months ahead to bring about an agreement on autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza: an agreement which must take full account of Israel's security concerns and which must also lead to a significant and genuine change in the situation of the Palestinians.

In seeking to advance real negotiating opportunities, we will be firm in our stand against one-sided resolutions on the Middle East at the United Nations, such as the one just put forward at the special session of the General Assembly. That resolution was totally unbalanced. It did not acknowledge Resolution 242 as the basis for a peace settlement. It did not recognize Israel's right to exist. We voted against it and were pleased that a substantial number of other members felt they could not support the resolution. Such efforts will not bring us any closer to peace.

Another principle clearly applies to our negotiating effort. It is this: While negotiations are being pursued, all of the parties must avoid unilateral actions designed to prejudge the outcome of the negotiations or that would have the effect of worsening the atmosphere for successful negotiations. No negotiations can succeed if one of the parties at the table attempts simultaneously to gain unilateral advantage on the ground.

If the parties should fail, or if the Camp David process should be derailed by misguided interventions, the consequences could be serious, indeed, for the interests of the entire world are deeply engaged in the Middle East. Continuing conflict in the region threatens those interests; threatens the future of our friends in the region; threatens intervention by outside powers—and threatens the peace of the world.

Recent Discussions

I begin by mentioning these three serious situations because they have formed the backdrop for many of my recent foreign policy discussions—and those of the President—here and abroad.

Venice. Afghanistan, for example, was clearly the most urgent political topic on the agenda at the recent summit meeting in Venice. I want to report briefly on the Venice meeting and on subsequent discussions in Ankara, where the NATO ministers gathered; in Kuala Lumpur, where I met with the foreign ministers of the Association of South East Asian Nations; and in Tokyo, where President Carter paid his respects to the late Prime Minister Ohira and met with Premier Hua Guofeng of China.

The most publicized results of the Venice summit were the joint economic and energy declarations made by the chiefs of state; indeed, economic and energy issues took up two of the three summit discussion periods. Energy, in fact, occupied more than 75% of the economic agenda. The result of the discussion was a strong, forthright, unambiguous agreement by the major industrial nations to pursue certain goals individually and in concert. The chiefs of state

Migration Pattern

The traditional route into the United States for undocumented Haitian immigrants has been through Canada, which has no nonimmigrant visa requirement. This pattern has been supplemented in recent years, however, as entry into southern Florida has become relatively easy and attractive. A primary factor has been the knowledge, now widespread in Haiti, that Haitians entering the United States illegally and applying for asylum will not be excluded or deported. This has been the case for several years as restraining orders in connection with a series of class action suits against the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) have prevented such repatriation for most of the period since 1976. This changes the economics of emigration, since even the poorest of Haitians can borrow money from families and friends with a future job in the United States as excellent collateral. Whereas travel in small boats between Haiti and the Bahamas has been common for decades, for many Florida has now become the ultimate destination, and a smuggling industry has emerged to meet that demand.

We possess little data on which projections of the volume of potential emigration to the United States from Haiti could be based. The chief variable affecting the emigration rate, in our view, is the Haitian emigrant's assessment of his or her chances of being able to stay in the United States and find work here. In the absence of some natural catastrophe, it is not so much conditions in Haiti that determine the flow over the short term, but rather the emigrant's expectations of the prospects for success. If it were widely known that Haitians were expeditiously returned without being permitted to hold jobs, illegal immigration from Haiti would not cease, but the traffic in small boats would be greatly diminished.

Illegal immigration from other Caribbean countries, mainly the Dominican Republic and Jamaica, follows a somewhat different pattern. Although large numbers of Dominicans also have entered the United States—that is, Puerto Rico—by small boat, entry with documentation—a passport and visa—is the rule rather than undocumented entry. Many of the 200,000 or more illegal Dominicans in the United States entered legally but remained in violation of their nonimmigrant status.

The same is true of large numbers of Jamaicans and nationals of other English-speaking Caribbean entities. Approximately 40,000 nonimmigrant visas per year are issued to citizens of the Dominican Republic, a significant number of whom remain illegally in the United States. Only approximately 17,000 nonimmigrant visas are issued annually to Haitians. This difference reflects both the relative ease with which illegal entry can be accomplished, as well as the difficulty in qualifying for nonimmigrant visas for most poor Haitians. Cuba carefully controls travel and very few nonimmigrant visas have been issued to Cubans in recent years, except for official travel.

The population of the Caribbean, including Cuba, approaches 25 million. Despite the so-called middle income status of most of these countries, meaning per capita incomes are little more than one-tenth of U.S. levels, the great majority of these people are poor, a significant portion of them desperately so. Most of them are potential emigrants to the United States, especially if there is a reasonable expectation of remaining and making a livelihood in this country.

The Need for National Development

Let me turn to another aspect. Clearly we all sympathize with the plight of the millions of poor in Haiti. The long-term, fundamental response to this situation is to sustain a process of economic development which will improve the conditions of life and the prospects for the future of the millions who now have little to look forward to. This is an international responsibility, requiring the cooperation of the international financial institutions and a number of bilateral donors.

The Agency for International Development's (AID) bilateral development assistance program—$5.8 million this year and $7.2 million contemplated for 1981—is designed to address the most fundamental problems of the rural poor. Since Haiti is starting from such a low base, assistance must be substantial enough and must be carried out for a sufficiently long duration to have a meaningful impact. AID strategy is to focus on such problems of the rural poor as low-income levels, malnutrition, inadequate health services, primitive agricultural technology, soil erosion, and poor farm-to-market roads. These are the types of problems which impinge directly on the lives of potential immigrants and are factors in shaping their decision on remaining in Haiti or migrating elsewhere.

In addition to the long-term strategy of development, food assistance under the PL–480 program is necessary to address acute and immediate needs. Title II commodities—$9.4 million this year—are distributed on a grant basis, largely by private voluntary organizations. Title I commodities—$9 million in 1980—are sold through the usual commercial channels, and the proceeds used to augment public sector financial resources for development activities. We are currently projecting a PL–480 program in 1981 of a total of $30 million, which would include title II and a title III program in place of the usual title I. Title III would be based on a series of fiscal and administrative reforms which would provide increased domestic revenues for development and improve Haiti's institutional capability to manage development activities.

The conduct of U.S. relations with Haiti has been based on the pursuit of certain basic goals: economic and institutional development and promotion of a process of peaceful, positive social and political change which will foster human rights safeguards.

Haiti did not inherit the institutions which benefit most other Caribbean entities which achieved independence much later and under more peaceful circumstances. There is no tradition of democracy or history of peaceful and constitutional transfers of power in Haiti. Very little except the population size changed from independence in 1804 until well into this century. Once a rich colony of France, since independence it probably has always been the poorest country in the Americas. It has a primitive economy, little infrastructure, and few natural resources.

Institutional development under such circumstances is necessarily a long-term effort. Haiti will be poor, and Haitians will continue to emigrate for a long time to come. We believe that the conditions which exist now in Haiti are favorable for an acceleration in the rate of development, however, and our policies are designed to pursue that objective.

MR. PALMER

I am pleased to be here to discuss the questions raised by the arrival of Haitian asylum applicants in this country. The issue has been a prominent one and has attracted the attention of the media and of a great many of our citizens. The debate to date, however, has often generated far more heat than light. This country has needed a careful and systematic review of the kind that your committee is today undertaking, and we welcome your efforts.

I want to do two things today: first, to focus on current human rights conditions in Haiti; second, to discuss what has been done by the Department of State in reviewing Haitian asylum applications.

One key point must be emphasized: My two subjects are separate matters. Obviously they are related—one must be informed about human rights conditions in a country to pass judgment on a particular asylum application. But there is no one-to-one relationship between human rights conditions and asylum determinations.

The Department of State is keenly aware of the abysmal series of human rights abuses that Haiti has known practically throughout its 180-year history. We know of the depths to which Haiti sank under Francois Duvalier, and we are aware of the halting and checkered progress made since those days. We know how far Haiti falls short of observance of internationally accepted human rights standards, and we have labored hard to use the limited footholds a country like Haiti affords—and they are quite limited—to press for human rights progress.

The determination of a particular asylum claim, however, is not a general referendum on human rights in the home country. We are not asked, in passing on that application, to state whether we approve in general of human rights practices of the home government. We are not asked whether we know of instances where individuals have been persecuted in that country. We are not asked whether prison conditions are bad, whether free speech exists, whether people are ever beaten or tortured.

Instead, we must apply a narrow and carefully focused standard established by treaty and by U.S. statutes. The question in passing on an asylum application is this: Does *this particular individual* have a "well-founded fear of persecution" based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, if he or she were to return to the home country. In applying that standard to Haitians, we have found relatively few who qualify for asylum. This finding does not diminish any respect we might feel for people who have taken it upon themselves to cross 800 miles of ocean in order to better their lives. It does not diminish our concern about the general human rights climate to which they would return to Haiti. It does not mean that their cases are utterly without humanitarian appeal. It does reflect, rather, our efforts to apply conscientiously the narrow and precise standard the Congress has established for deciding on cases of this sort.

I can understand many of the concerns voiced by the critics of our denials of Haitian asylum claims, for they spring from the same concerns we share about observance of human rights in that country. But I believe that in most instances their real quarrel is not with our application, but with the asylum standard itself.

If that standard is to be changed—to include, for example, a wider range of persons who suffer economic deprivation—that change will have to be accomplished by congressional action. It should only be done, moreover, if there is full awareness—and acceptance—of the broad range of consequences that such a change would bring in its wake.

Human Rights Conditions

The year 1979 saw many discouraging developments with regard to human rights in Haiti. There had been some genuine progress in 1977 and 1978. When Ambassador Andrew Young and others from the Department of State visited Haiti in August 1977, discussions of human rights conditions formed a prominent part of their conversations with government officials. Not long thereafter all of the remaining political prisoners known by the U.S. Government to be incarcerated in Haiti were released. Haiti signed the American Convention on Human Rights and invited the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to send a mission to visit the country. That mission arrived in August 1978.

However, 1979 brought several setbacks. Long-awaited elections for the National Assembly held in February proved to be closely controlled with many credible allegations of vote rigging. Although one independent candidate was elected, two candidates who had sought to run, Joseph Maxi and Sylvio Claude, were arrested shortly after the elections. Claude was exiled to Colombia but returned in July and resumed his political activities.

In May the government decreed censorship of plays and films. Human rights supporters took some heart, however, from the strong response, both from the international community and from Haitian authors and artists, against this measure.

In late August there was a new series of widespread arrests, most notably of Sylvio Claude and Gerard Resil, a radio operator who had permitted Claude the use of his radio facilities to broadcast a fiery political statement. A presidential speech in September boosted the prominence of the Volunteers for National Security (VSN), the relatively undisciplined militia who are the successors to the Tonton Macoutes, reversing a decline in their prestige in recent years. A new press law was decreed in September, with a broad range of repressive provisions. Finally, a large meeting of the Haitian Human Rights League on November 9 was violently disrupted by thugs who were most probably government agents.

Throughout the period, prison conditions remained poor, and prison regimen was marked by frequent beatings. Corruption persisted. Prisoners often were held for lengthy periods—many exceeding a year's duration—without ever being brought to trial. Sometimes this simply reflected the extreme understaffing of Haiti's judicial system; sometimes it apparently reflected governmental reluctance to proceed with a trial where the apparent offense had political overtones. The latter group includes persons arrested near St. Marc in February 1979 for alleged involvement in a plot against the government. The U.S. Government regularly made known its concern on these matters.

In the last few months, we have seen some changes, moderating to some degree the negative trends of 1979, and marking a return in large measure to the old pattern of human rights problems checkered by some reform steps. The September press law, widely criticized within Haiti and internationally, was never implemented. Instead, a panel including some of the September law's staunchest critics was established to suggest changes, and a new law was promulgated in April. It is less restrictive in some respects than its predecessor, but there is no doubt that it leaves in place substantial potential for controls on the Haitian press.

Sylvio Claude, a subject of considerable international attention, was released in May and has resumed some of his political activity. A ranking member of the VSN, Antoine Khoury, who had killed a civilian, was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in December 1979. The Haitian Government has taken steps designed to include most of the national revenue in the governmental budget. If these economic reforms, which have been strongly advocated by the International Monetary Fund and by the United States, were to be fully implemented—and on the basis of experience this is doubtful—they would reduce many existing opportunities for diversion of the national wealth to certain private coffers.

The positive steps I have just outlined, of course, have not fully dispelled the chilling effect of many of the 1979 actions—especially the August arrests and the November disruption of the Human Rights League meeting. Nonetheless they are a welcome relief to the negative trends of 1979, and we hope that they

*165	6/30	Muskie: statement at the U.S. Embassy, Ankara, June 24.
166	6/30	Muskie: press briefing, Ankara, June 24.
*167	6/30	Muskie: statement at Ankara airport, June 26.
168	6/30	Muskie: statement at the opening of the North Atlantic Council, Ankara, June 25.
169	6/30	Muskie: news conference, Ankara, June 26.

* Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

1951 Foreign Relations Volume Released

The Department of State in March released *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1951, vol. I, "National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy." The *Foreign Relations* series has been published continuously since 1861 as the official record of U.S. foreign policy. This is the third of seven volumes covering 1951.

This volume of 1,774 pages presents high-level documentation (nearly all of which is newly declassified) on general U.S. national security policy, foreign assistance, the regulation of armaments, the foreign policy aspects of atomic energy, and U.S. foreign economic policy. Papers presented in this volume were selected mainly from the files of the Department of State, but also include material from the Truman Library and the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. I, was prepared by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Listed as Department of State Publication 8975, this volume may be obtained for $22.00. Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents and should be sent to the U.S. Government Printing Office Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Press Release 74 of Mar. 31, 1980. ■

GPO Sales

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25% discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown here, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—$38.75; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—$16; 20 for foreign mailing; plastic binder—$2.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 95¢ each. These may be ordered by pub. numbers.

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The Second Committee

In March 1780 the Congress turned the design and final report of the first committee over to a new committee, composed of James Lovell, John Morin Scott, and William Churchill Houston. They asked Francis Hopkinson, the gifted Philadelphian who had designed the American flag and the great seal of the State of New Jersey, to serve as their consultant. They too failed to create an acceptable seal, but, influenced by the flag adopted in 1777, they contributed to the final design 13 red and white stripes, the constellation of 13 six-pointed stars, and the olive branch, a symbol of peace.

Second committee's consultant, Francis Hopkinson, contributed red, white, and blue colors to shield, an arrow and olive branch, and radiant constellation of 13 stars.



Lawyer William Barton's design for third committee combined white eagle, flag, and reverse side with 13-step pyramid and first committee's Eye of Providence.

The Third Committee

In May 1782 the Congress appointed a third committee. The three members, John Rutledge, Arthur Middleton, and Elias Boudinot, did little or no serious work themselves, relying on the services of William Barton of Philadelphia. A young lawyer with artistic skill and well versed in heraldry, he became a central figure in the seal's refinement.

Barton's chief contribution at this stage was the eagle, not the American bald eagle, but a small crested white eagle "displayed" (with its wings spread). He combined it with a small flag and a design for the reverse which contained a 13-step unfinished pyramid and the first committee's Eye of Providence. He quickly drew up two designs and their technical explanations and the committee turned in its report 5 days after it was appointed.

Charles Thomson's Proposal

The Congress still was not satisfied. On June 13, 1782, it presented the collected work and recommendations of the three committees to Charles Thomson, Secretary of Congress. Thomson was not an

artist, but he was a practical man with the ability to get things done and he was just what was needed at this moment. He selected what he believed to be the best features of all the previous designs, assigning prominence to the eagle. Feeling that the new nation's symbol should be strictly American, however, Thomson replaced Barton's crested Imperial eagle with the native American bald eagle, wings extending downward as though in flight. He placed in the left talon a bundle of arrows and in the right, the olive branch.

Thomson's modified crest (a device placed above the shield) was a constellation of 13 stars surrounded by clouds. The shield, borne on the eagle's breast, was a chevron design with alternating red and white stripes. Adopting the motto *E Pluribus Unum* from the first committee's report, Thomson included it on a scroll clenched in the eagle's beak. His was the first proposal in which the final design of the obverse can be seen.

In his design of the seal's reverse, Thomson retained the pyramid with the Eye of Providence in a triangle at the zenith and, as products of his Latin scholarship, introduced the mottos *Annuit Coeptis* (He [God] has favored our undertakings) over the eye and *Novus Ordo Seclorum* (A new order of the ages) beneath the pyramid. He gave his rough sketches and reports to Barton, depending on him to polish the designs.

Secretary of Congress Charles Thomson united ealier suggestions, gave them fresh and novel arrangement, pleasing in its simplicity and lack of clutter. His design was first to foreshadow one Congress adopted.

Remarks and Explanation

by Charles Thomson*

"The Escutcheon is composed of the chief [upper part of shield] & pale [perpendicular band], the two most honorable ordinaries [figures of heraldry]. The Pieces, paly [alternating pales], represent the several states all joined in one solid compact entire, supporting a Chief, which unites the whole & represents Congress. The Motto alludes to this union. The pales in the arms are kept closely united by the chief and the Chief depends on that union & the strength resulting from it for its support, to denote the Confederacy of the United States of America & the preservation of their union through Congress.

"The colours of the pales are those used in the flag of the United States of America; White signifies purity and innocence, Red, hardiness & valour, and Blue, the colour of the Chief signifies vigilance, perseverance & justice. The Olive branch and arrows denote the power of peace & war which is exclusively vested in Congress. The Constellation denotes a new State taking its place and rank among other sovereign powers. The Escutcheon is born on the breast of an American Eagle without any other supporters [figures represented as holding up the shield] to denote that the United States of America ought to rely on their own Virtue.

"Reverse. The pyramid signifies Strength and Duration: The Eye over it & the Motto allude to the many signal interpositions of providence in favour of the American cause. The date underneath is that of the Declaration of Independence and the words under it signify the beginning of the New American Æra, which commences from that date."

*Adopted by the Continental Congress, June 20, 1782.

The Final Device

Barton portrayed the eagle with its wings displayed, but with wing tips upward, and simplified Thomson's chevron arrangement of stripes on the shield. He arranged 13 vertical stripes, alternately white and red, below a rectangular blue "chief" (upper part of the shield). And he specified that the arrows in the eagle's left talon should number 13.

The designs were returned to Thomson on June 19, 1782. He made a few alterations and overnight produced the "blazon" (written description) with accompanying "Remarks and Explanation" and presented them to the Continental Congress on June 20. The Congress acted the same day to adopt the report, which did not contain a drawing of either design.

Thus, nearly 6 years after establishment of the first committee, Charles Thomson and William Barton "brought in a device." The Great Seal of the United States was unique—simple and uncluttered, yet bold—the composite product of many minds.

MEANING OF THE SEAL

Symbolically, the seal reflects the beliefs and values the Founding Fathers attached to the new nation and wished to pass on to their descendants. The report which Thomson submitted to the Congress explained the obverse this way: The red and white stripes of the shield "represent the several states . . . supporting a [blue] Chief which unites the whole and represents Congress." The colors are adopted from the American flag: "White signifies purity and innocence, Red, hardiness & valour, and Blue, the colour of the Chief, signifies vigilance, perseverance & justice." The shield, or escutcheon, is "born on the breast of an American Eagle without any other supporters to denote that the United States of America ought to rely on their own Virtue."

The number 13, denoting the 13 original States, is represented in the bundle of arrows, the stripes of the shield, and the stars of the constellation. The olive branch and the arrows "denote the power of peace & war." The constellation of stars symbolizes a new

economic assistance to Africa has doubled —to more than a billion dollars each year.

We have focused that aid on people—people who need clean water and food; who need decent health care, housing, and education. We support special efforts to help those who are forced to flee their homes by drought or war. And we have encouraged regional economic cooperation, such as ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States).

Much of our assistance is in agriculture. Hunger not only inflicts suffering on millions, it also makes a people vulnerable to political manipulation. A strong agricultural economy not only brings decency to millions, it also strengthens their freedom. All human rights are linked—and freedom from want bolsters freedom from oppression.

The agricultural agreements we will sign tomorrow will advance Nigeria's "green revolution." And they will mean cooperation not only between our governments but also our business leaders and technical experts.

For aid alone cannot supply the resources and technology needed to meet Africa's massive development needs. Today, even Marxist African leaders are openly seeking strengthened trade and investment ties with industrialized democracies. We welcome this pragmatism, and we are encouraging American businesses to respond—so that American capital, technology, and markets can play a role in the development process.

Perhaps more important to development—ultimately even more important than the transfer of goods and capital—is the sharing of ideas. That is why, in our discussions here and in our programs, we have emphasized exchanges of technical experts and other joint educational ventures.

For of all the values Americans share with Nigerians, none defines our national characters more vividly than our common belief in education. The trained mind, in my country and in yours, is our greatest resource. As the United Negro College Fund says in its motto: "A mind is a horrible thing to waste." Today more than 20,000 Nigerians are studying in America —the second largest body of foreign students in our country. They enrich us; they enrich you; and they prove that knowledge is a treasure that grows when it is shared.

Peace

America's third goal for Africa is peace: freedom from the waste of war, freedom from outside domination and military intervention.

I have spoken about our active support for peaceful settlements in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Let me say also the United States supports your efforts, and those of the other nations in the OAU, to find negotiated settlements to conflicts in this continent—in Chad, in the Western Sahara, and elsewhere.

We respect the independence and nonaligned status of states in this region. We oppose outside military intervention in Africa.

In the Horn of Africa and elsewhere, we have seen that foreign military intervention aggravates tensions. It prolongs conflicts. It denies local peoples the right to find their own solutions. It threatens the right of Africans to be free.

For all these reasons, the United States has not only undeddeddedderaken to help nations in Africa build their societies and strengthen their institutions; we have also pledged to help friendly nations strengthen themselves against outside interference. And we stand ready to honor that pledge.

We have obviously far to go before together we reach our goals. But as President Franklin Roosevelt once said: "Democratic government has an innate capacity to protect its people against disasters once considered inevitable; to solve problems once considered unsolvable."

And so tonight I would say this about our efforts as Americans and Nigerians, as Americans and Africans: We democracies will grow stronger—not because we express dissent but because we cherish it. We will grow more rich—not because we crush personal liberty but because we respect it. We will grow more just—not because we deny our inequities but because we confront them.

Dissent may sometimes make us raucous nations—but we prize the spirit more than the silence. Liberty may sometimes make us fractious nations—but we value an open society more than an oppressed one. Acknowledging our injustices may sometimes make us impatient nations—but we would rather admit our yearnings than turn our back on work undone.

Other nations may be deflected to a different course. They consolidate their strength—by oppressing their people's liberty. They increase their wealth—by diminishing their people's dignity. They trumpet their achievements—by muffling their people's discontent.

But we believe—as we see in Zimbabwe—that democracy is a means toward peace. We believe—as in Nigeria—that democracy is a means toward economic development. And we believe—as

White House photo by Bob Burgess

Vice President Mondale and Nigerian Vice President Ekwueme signing Joint Communique.

in Africa, in the United States, and throughout the world—that democracy, more than any other weapon, is the best arsenal of national security.

Those of us who enjoy democracy are blessed. And those who are not yet free must not lose hope. "Hold fast to dreams," said Langston Hughes, one of our great black poets, "for if dreams die, life is a broken-winged bird that cannot fly."

Those dreams will not die—neither here in Nigeria nor anywhere across this continent, which is so rich and so beautiful and so full of promise for humanity.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE[2]

The U.S. delegation emphasized its readiness to consult with the Nigerian Government as developments emerge, to expedite an early decision on this important project.

Both sides held discussions on possible areas of cooperation in the field of science and technology. The U.S. delegation presented a number of proposals for cooperation in the areas of agriculture, energy, oceanography, environment, housing, industrial technology, technical training, and transportation. It also submitted a draft Agreement as a proposed framework for scientific and technological cooperation between the U.S. and Nigeria.

On its part, the Nigerian delegation indicated its main areas of immediate concern and interest, in particular, the development of Nigerian scientific and technological capability for undertaking a number of priority programmes, including research and development in agriculture, road and building construction, engineering, and energy as well as development programmes in housing and the environment.

Both sides took note of these submissions and expressed the hope that progress would be made at the talks to take place in August 1980 leading to the conclusion of an Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation during the visit to Nigeria of the U.S. Presidential Adviser on Science and Technology later in the year. In trade and investment, the U.S. side agreed to improve its efforts to provide information on opportunities for increased United States investment in Nigeria as well as increased trade between the two countries. In this connection, it was noted that Nigeria intends to set up Trade and Investment Centres in the United States. United States Government will facilitate this effort and work with the Federal Government of Nigeria to identify ways in which Nigeria can take greater advantage of existing United States Government services to provide information and advice on trade and investment opportunities in Nigeria, including the organization of high level joint seminars.

The United States side will assist Nigeria to derive maximum benefit from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. To this end, the Federal Government of Nigeria will provide a list of specific projects, which OPIC will consider. OPIC will lead an investment mission to Nigeria at the invitation of the Federal Ministry of Industries in consultation with the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture.

On trade, it was agreed that the United States Government and the Federal Government of Nigeria will begin negotiations of a bilateral trade agreement within one month.

The United States delegation noted Nigeria's continuing interest in becoming eligible to benefit from the United States Generalized System of Preferences. It stated that congressional authorization would be needed prior to Nigeria's being designated for GSP eligibility, and that it would support such legislation.

Both sides noted the progress made in the last round of negotiations for a bilateral tax treaty and agreed to meet in February, 1981 in Lagos to resolve the outstanding issues.

The United States delegation noted the positive steps taken by the Federal Government of Nigeria to improve the country's investment climate and access to its market. The Nigerian delegation will examine other suggestions made by the United States delegation for further improvement. In order to facilitate trade and investment relations between them, each side will designate a senior official to be in frequent contact with one another so as to resolve problems which inhibit expansion of such relations.

The two Governments welcomed the initiative of the Chambers of Commerce of both countries to create a Joint Business Council and will encourage this effort. A high-level United States delegation led by Mr. Walter Mondale, Vice President of the United States of America, visited Nigeria from 20th to 23rd July, 1980. The delegation visited Kano and later held discussions in Lagos with its Nigerian counterparts led by Dr. Alex I. Ekwueme, Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as part of ongoing bilateral economic talks between the two countries which started in 1977.

While in Lagos, Vice President Mondale was received by Alhaji Shehu Shagari, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, to whom he conveyed a message of goodwill from Mr. Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America. The two leaders agreed on the need to take necessary measures to achieve more concrete results from their bilateral talks particularly in the fields of agriculture and energy.

The two delegations discussed cooperation in the areas of agriculture, energy, science and technology, trade and investment, and education.

In agriculture, the two Vice Presidents signed a Memorandum of Understanding designed to facilitate, on a continuing basis, the development of projects of mutual interest in the agricultural sector. Under the Memorandum, a government-to-government working group will be formed to provide a forum for the planning and implementation of specific projects. The working group will hold its first meeting in September.

The two governments also agreed to form a Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee, made up of representatives from the public and private sectors, to promote contacts between Nigerian and American businessmen in the field of Agriculture.

The first project to be considered under the memorandum will be technical assistance for the comprehensive soil survey of Nigeria, on a reimbursable basis, with the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Other areas which the parties agreed to consider included technical assistance and training in various fields of agricultural production, processing, marketing, water resources development, and management as well as agricultural research and extension.

In energy, the Vice Presidents signed a Memorandum of Intent concerning Energy Cooperation. Within this framework, the two Governments agreed to identify areas of cooperation and specific projects, where appropriate, in the following fields:

- Technologies to protect the environment from the effects of energy exploration, production, transportation, and utilization;
- Secondary and tertiary oil recovery methods;
- Exploration and production of hydrocarbons from deep onshore formations, and in deep waters;
- Training in management and operations of drilling rigs;
- Facilitation of joint ventures and other appropriate vehicles for manufacturing equipment and material to support oil industry operations in Nigeria;
- Development of Nigeria's coal, including an appraisal of reserves and exchange of information on combustion and conversion technologies;
- Establishment of solar energy research capability in Nigeria with a supporting demonstration project;
- Training in petroleum refinery management and operations;
- Exchange of information on hydroelectric projects.

It was agreed that these proposed activities ought to be pursued expeditiously. To that end, the Nigerian Government will send an official delegation to the United States to discuss in detail the implementation of specific projects and areas for further cooperation.

The two sides also discussed extensively the Bonny LNG [liquefied natural gas] project, particularly in the context of the outlook for U.S. gas supplies and recognized the overall importance of this project and the long term commitment it would represent. The U.S. delegation expressed its support for the development of the project, but noted that the project can move

agreed to work toward significant reductions within this decade in their dependence on foreign oil; to press major energy conservation efforts; and to use energy sources other than oil where possible—coal, nuclear, synthetic, and renewable energy sources.

The Venice discussions covered other economic topics also, principally inflation, the foreign exchange market, and the serious economic problems of the less developed countries.

I will not attempt to repeat what has already been said in the communiques. Let me simply underscore what we see as the major achievement of these economic discussions. First, they represent a new departure—a concerted effort by the industrial nations to analyze their economic problems together and to set joint goals for solving them. Second, the communiques are consistent with, and indeed reinforce, our own energy and economic policies.

The political discussions at Venice were marked by similar unity. On the eve of the summit, the Soviets announced their intended troop withdrawal. The Western response was prompt and firm. The leaders challenged the Soviet Union to undertake a complete, not cosmetic, withdrawal if it wished to heal the breach caused by the Afghanistan invasion.

Let me mention briefly another aspect of the Venice summit which was of great concern to the United States: the initiative of the European Community on the Middle East. The United States—before, during, and after the Venice meetings—has worked hard to make one point clear: that we welcome initiatives which support the Camp David process, and we strenuously discourage initiatives which might undermine that process.

Having made these points clear, I welcomed the statement of Italian Prime Minister Cossiga that the European Community wants to support the Camp David process. Last week, the nine European foreign ministers decided to ask Luxembourg Foreign Minister Thorn to undertake an exploratory mission to the Middle East. We understand that this is a fact-finding mission to enable the European Community to obtain a clearer picture of thinking in the Middle East on the peace process.

As that exploration goes forward, the position of the United States remains clear and firm: We believe the effort of the Europeans will be most constructive if it builds on the ongoing negotiations. We would welcome broader participation in those negotiations. But we believe it would be a profound mistake to encourage a solution which cannot be negotiated or to ignore the central fact that the complex political realities are already being addressed in the autonomy negotiations.

Ankara. Immediately after the Venice summit, I flew to Ankara for the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the first such meeting in Turkey since 1960. In Ankara, I outlined as forcefully as I could the importance of the actions of our allies to our shared goal of deterring further Soviet aggression. After an extremely candid discussion, the ministers agreed on a tough, Afghanistan-focused communique which built on the Venice declaration.

I also took advantage of being in Ankara to meet with Turkish Prime Minister Demirel and Greek Foreign Minister Mitsotakis. I stressed to both the importance of strengthening NATO's southeastern wing; that to accomplish this, it is urgent that Greece resume active participation in NATO and that Greece and Turkey continue working to resolve their differences. They in turn affirmed their commitment to work toward these goals and, after the NATO ministerial meetings, the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers held lengthy discussions which I understand were quite positive.

Kuala Lumpur. Upon leaving Ankara, I traveled halfway around the world to Kuala Lumpur. There I met with the foreign ministers of the ASEAN nations: Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines, together with several other nations which support the dialogue with ASEAN—Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Japan.

Those discussions took place in the wake of the Vietnamese attack across the Thai border, an attack we strongly condemned. I announced in Kuala Lumpur a series of concrete steps to bolster Thailand's defense. These included $2 million in immediate economic aid, speedy delivery of tanks and other weapons, and improved credit terms to Thailand.

The 10 foreign ministers in Kuala Lumpur also issued a joint appeal to Secretary General Waldheim to use the prestige of his office to restore feeding operations to help thousands of desperate Kampuchean refugees on the Thai border. I reaffirmed our intention, subject to consultations with the Congress, to accept 168,000 refugees from Southeast Asia in FY 1981 to help relieve the enormous burden of first asylum borne by the ASEAN countries.

The Kuala Lumpur visit achieved several purposes. It demonstrated the importance we attach to our relations in Asia. It solidified our growing relationship with ASEAN. And it demonstrated to Hanoi and Moscow our continued support for the independence and integrity of non-Communist Southeast Asia.

Tokyo. I returned home from Kuala Lumpur on June 29th. One July 9 I returned to the Pacific, to accompany President Carter to Tokyo for the funeral of President Ohira. In deference to Japan's official mourning, we scheduled no substantive talks with the Japanese. But I believe that the President's vivid demonstration of our respect for Prime Minister Ohira and for our Japanese friendship created enormous good will in our relations.

President Carter met in Tokyo, for the first time, with Premier Hua Guofeng of the People's Republic of China. That meeting was strikingly relaxed and cordial. It confirmed that the strategic views of our two countries converge at several important points. We agree, for example, on the importance of support for nations pressured by aggression on their borders, such as Thailand and Pakistan. And we agree that Chinese-American relations are making good progress.

Summary. The meetings I have described differed in many respects. But in summarizing them I believe we can find some common denominators.

First, while there unquestionably are differences between us and our friends and allies about how to respond, I have found striking agreement on both sides of the world on one point: that the Soviet Union has set in motion forces and events which threaten world stability, which threaten the interests and the security of free and independent nations, and which must be resisted. I believe I was able to impress upon my colleagues our intention to meet our responsibilities and the importance of their doing their part.

Second, I have found on both sides of the world impressive support for the views and positions of the United States. The era of lockstep unity between the United States and its allies, to be sure, has passed. The strengthened economic and political power of the other industrial nations, and their perception of their own interests, made this inevitable. But to cast the current situation as "disarray" or "disunity" would be to misread profoundly the true state of our relations. The sum total of Venice and Ankara, and the other encounters I have described, is mutual respect and cooperation. There should be no mistake about this.

Conclusion

Let me conclude by pulling the focus back from specific issues and events to discuss two more general subjects: the state of U.S.-Soviet relations and the state of our most important cooperative structure—the NATO alliance.

U.S.-Soviet Relations. That relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are severely strained is undeniable. And that this strain is largely created by Soviet behavior is also undeniable.

What does this recent tension mean for the future? Let me make several points very briefly. The relationship between the two great powers is the most decisive single influence on peace in the world. And so a stable, balanced relationship between our country and the Soviet Union remains our goal.

We remain interested in lessening tension and broadening cooperation with the Soviet Union. But as the President put it in Philadelphia last spring, ". . . detente must be built on a firm foundation of deterrence." The Soviets must understand they cannot recklessly threaten world peace—that they cannot commit aggression—and still enjoy the benefits of cooperation with the United States and the West. They must understand the invasion of Afghanistan has had a profound adverse effect on world opinion, including here in America.

Having said that, let me make it clear that the way to better relations is open if the Soviets alter their conduct. That is clearly the path we prefer. We are prepared to accept the Soviet Union as a great world power with its own legitimate interests. We have no interest in an implacable cold-war approach which holds the Soviet Union responsible for all the world's instabilities; we know the world is too complicated for such simple-minded notions. But we will insist that Moscow respect the legitimate interests of other nations, and that it not pursue its own advantage in ways that threaten the fabric of peace.

In short, we seek negotiations and better relations with the Soviet Union. But we have no intention of sacrificing our interests, our good sense, and our long-time prospects for peace in the name of detente.

NATO Alliance. This attitude is expressed clearly in our approach to a current issue between East and West: the issue of theater nuclear missile systems in Europe.

Last December, as you know, the NATO allies decided on a two-track approach to the military imbalance in Europe threatened by the Soviet Union's buildup of SS–20 missiles and Backfire bombers. The first track was a decision to add Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles to NATO's forces—a decision which is going forward. The second track was to seek negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, in the context of SALT III talks, to limit land-based, long-range missiles.

Last month the Soviets dropped their demand that such talks not be held unless NATO halted or abandoned its modernization plans. We and our allies regard this as a success for our dual commitment to seek a stable military balance while pursuing arms limitations.

We are now preparing for these preliminary exchanges. We will be consulting closely with our allies before meeting with the Soviets. Once SALT II has been ratified—a goal to which we remain firmly committed—these preliminary exchanges can lead to formal negotiations and, we hope, meaningful limits on theater nuclear forces in the SALT III framework.

We believe that the wisdom of our policy—a policy of firmness and willingness to pursue cooperative arrangements—has been confirmed by events. It is important to understand that it is also the basic approach of our allies. The Soviet Union will make a great mistake to think that it can separate us from our allies on fundamental issues. The results of Venice and Ankara make this point clear, and Chancellor Schmidt's statements on his visit to Moscow reinforce the point.

Let me be candid. We and our allies did undergo a difficult period several months ago. We encountered difficulty because we encountered a situation that was unprecedented. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a challenge to our common interests although not to our collective territory. As we searched for ways to make a coherent response to that new challenge, there were differences among us.

We have emerged from that difficulty. In Venice and Ankara, the allies showed themselves capable of moving—and speaking—together. We signaled the Soviets that we are serious about Afghanistan and about the larger issue of fidelity to the rules of international conduct.

Today the allies stand together on issues of interest that lie beyond the alliance area. And certainly we stand together when it comes to the defense of that area. NATO's commitments of recent years are ample evidence of this: the Long-Term Defense Program, the joint commitment to increase real defense spending by 3% each year, the decision last December to redress the theater nuclear balance in Europe by deploying new missiles and by seeking negotiations to limit missile forces.

It will remain a central problem to prevent the Soviets from dividing our alliance—and to head off the tempting but dangerous illusion that Europe can remain a stable island of detente while the Soviets create dangerous situations elsewhere. Dealing with this problem will require vigorous and subtle diplomacy; it will call for patience and wisdom from the American people. But we are on the right path.

This government is committed to a foreign policy that is at once strong and generous. We are pursuing the most ambitious military program in two decades. But we will resist becoming locked into a cycle of renewed arms competition—for a new unbridled arms race would threaten America domestically while not increasing our security.

We are working with our allies in an atmosphere of mutual concern and support. But we reject the illusion that we can—or should—return to the kind of domination we enjoyed when our allies were still recuperating from World War II.

We are firmly opposing Soviet adventurism. But we have no interest in a policy of knee-jerk hostility which sees a Russian under every Third World stone.

Finally, we are working to build peace and stability—in Africa, in the Middle East, in Central America, and other troubled regions.

In each of these areas, we have received the understanding and cooperation of this committee and your support for the resources necessary for success. I welcome that continued support, for I am convinced that these are the best policies for today and for the decade to come. And I am convinced they reflect the opinion and the will, the realism and good sense, of the great majority of the American people.

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[1] Press release 207. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

presage further progress. Our diplomatic efforts continue to encourage such progress.

As our 1980 human rights report indicated, Haiti remains vulnerable—and will for many years—to the kind of seesaw trends we have seen over the past 2 years because it lacks solid institutions to preserve human rights gains which are made. In the long run, solid reform must be based on firm establishment of the rule of law, with independent institutions strong enough to check abuses. We have supported efforts to foster such institution building, for example, with an AID-sponsored legal aid program now beginning to be implemented in Port-au-Prince. Institution building, however, is inevitably a lengthy process. There is much that is needed on many fronts and relatively little to build on.

The Inter-American Human Rights Commission report on Haiti, issued last April, stressed a similar point. It urged that "all resources available be used to improve social and economic conditions [in Haiti] in order to lessen the inequalities which are an obstacle to observation of human rights." The commission made a "special appeal to international organizations to give Haiti the aid it urgently needs to improve living conditions among the population." We agree with this basic precept: Institutional deficiencies are a principal limiting factor in human rights progress in Haiti. Our policies, aside from assuring that the Haitian Government and public are acutely aware of our human rights concerns, must better address these deficiencies if we are to hope for sustained progress.

Asylum Policy

Let me turn now to our asylum policy. In a perhaps perverse way, one side benefit of the recent Cuban problem has been substantially greater attention to and understanding of the asylum provisions of our immigration law. Previously, those provisions had received little systematic attention.

Our immigration laws have long provided discretion to the Attorney General to withhold deportation of persons who would be subject to persecution in their homeland. In 1968 this country made that commitment more concrete when the Senate approved ratification of the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. In ratifying that treaty, we committed ourselves to the international law doctrine of *nonrefoulement*—the obligation not to send persons to countries where their life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The Refugee Act of 1980 formally codified the protocol standards into U.S. statutory law. Also, the Refugee Act improved some of the proceedings involved in the asylum process—especially by creating for the first time an "asylum" status for persons whose applications are approved.

The asylum provisions are unique elements in our immigration laws. Virtually all other portions of those laws, including the new refugee provisions, provide for screening of individuals overseas before they come here. Our immigration laws usually provide explicit numerical limits, or provisions for setting those limits in advance, by category, on the number of people allowed to immigrate. The asylum privilege, however, is potentially open to any person who reaches our shores on his own. It permits those who qualify to stay no matter how they entered—legally or illegally. Few of the usual eligibility qualifications set forth in Section 212 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act apply in asylum cases. There is no numerical ceiling on the number of people who may be granted asylum and no way to set such a ceiling without abrogating our obligations under the U.N. protocol which we have accepted in law. Persons in asylum status may be sent to a third country, but third-country offers of resettlement are rare and generally cannot be obtained without substantial diplomatic effort.

Our asylum commitment is fully consistent with the strong humanitarian tradition of this nation. It would be totally unacceptable to return people to countries where we know they would be persecuted. The Administration is strongly committed to honoring our protocol commitment.

Nevertheless, the asylum provision could become an enormous loophole in our immigration laws if it is not carefully and expeditiously applied to sort out valid claimants from those not entitled to asylum. As I indicated earlier, the protocol standard is narrow. One does not qualify for asylum merely by showing that serious human rights abuses exist in the home country. The applicant must instead show, in essence, that he is likely to be singled out as a victim of such abuses.

Our policy regarding Haitian asylum applicants has been and remains to review carefully their individual cases and to grant meritorious applications. We do not hesitate to grant valid claims. The allegation sometimes made that we routinely deny Haitian applications in order to foster better relations with the Government of Haiti is false. In fact, the State Department has recommended favorably in approximately 250 Haitian boat people cases.

Most of the applications we receive from Haitian nationals base the asylum claim solely on the fact that the applicants have departed from Haiti illegally. They assert that mere departure and the seeking of refuge in the United States will be treated as a political act by the Government of Haiti and that that government will persecute them if they are returned. Most applications contain no allegation that the applicants or their families suffered persecution before they left or that other factors in their background would make them suspect politically in Haiti. We do not believe that such applications support a finding of a well-founded fear of persecution, and in such cases we recommend denial of the application.

There are, of course, cases in which the applicant does speak of past episodes of mistreatment or threats to the individual applicant or to his family or friends. Cases of this type must be carefully evaluated on their own merits. They require both a judgment of the credibility of the individual's story and a determination of whether the episode is sufficient to make any claimed fear of persecution well-founded. Where appropriate, we pursue additional information from our Embassy in Port-au-Prince.

As an added measure to assure the accuracy of our asylum determinations, we made special arrangements with the U.N. *High Commissioner for Refugees* (UNHCR) in 1977 to secure UNHCR review of all Haitian applications filed in Florida. To date the final State Department determinations in all Haitian cases have been in complete accord with the view of the UNHCR. At present we are refining the procedures we use to obtain UNHCR advice in asylum cases. UNHCR is currently sending staff to Washington to advise us on asylum applications on a continuing basis. We are expanding UNHCR involvement to include review of those applications by Cuban nationals whose claims are not sustained in our initial review.

Under international law, the individual who is applying for asylum has the burden of proving that he or she is entitled to asylum status. Our obligation is to assess whether that burden has been met and to do so on the basis of information which the individual applicant brings forward.

We also, however, in many cases seek out additional information on our own. Sometimes this involves sending a query to the Embassy in Port-au-Prince. On occasion, it means that we send cases back to INS requesting that they develop more information through an interview with the applicant.

Moreover, in May of 1979 we sent a team to Haiti to develop additional information of use to our consideration of Haitian asylum applications. Their specific mission was to check on the treatment of those Haitians who had been returned to their home country from the United States. Such a step was not a required part of our obligation in reviewing asylum applications. But this extra review step had been suggested by groups which have supported Haitian asylum applicants. We were persuaded to send the mission especially because of the persistence of allegations that virtually all returnees were systematically persecuted. Our knowledge of conditions in Haiti and regular Embassy reporting did not support that allegation. But we had been frequently reminded by Haitian asylum support groups that the Embassy's contact with returnees took place mainly in Port-au-Prince. The team was sent largely to see what information could be developed on returnees on rural areas.

While in Haiti, the team covered both the northern and southern peninsulas. It interviewed 86 returnees and close family members of 11 others. The team members also spent considerable time with other observers of the Haitian scene, especially U.S. citizens who had spent many years in Haiti working with relief efforts of voluntary agencies. The statements of these persons corroborated the results of the individual interviews: There is no pattern or policy of mistreating those returned from the United States. On their return, they have generally been ignored, resettling in their home areas, usually to the difficult life of poverty that is the lot of most Haitians.

That conclusion is decidedly different, however, from saying that there is no persecution in Haiti. Instead, the team reported carefully on the indications it received, some from remarkably candid conversations with government officials, that some of those returned—especially those who had been politically active—would indeed be in some jeopardy. The team's fundamental conclusion was that careful case-by-case review must be maintained to insure that valid claimants continue to be afforded asylum.

There has been a measure of controversy about the findings of this team. Many of the criticisms I have seen are based on exaggerated misstatements of what the team did or what it found. I think a reading of its report confirms the care of its efforts and its scrupulous attempt not to draw broader conclusions than the modest ones possible in this kind of inquiry.

As this committee knows, return to Haiti of most of the unsuccessful asylum applicants has been blocked by a series of Federal court injunctions. I will not go into the specifics of those cases, except to say that the government has vigorously contested them. There is no doubt, however, that one effect of these injunctions has been to encourage additional illegal migration from Haiti, as the perception has spread there that no persons who reach the United States will be sent back.

The recent and massive Cuban influx has also had a major effect on our response to this problem. As has been made clear in earlier hearings before this subcommittee, we are committed to even-handed treatment of Cuban and Haitian asylum applicants. We will be working with the Congress to solve this emergency—as respects both Cubans and Haitians—in a way that restores our ability to deal fairly but expeditiously with groups of asylum applicants. Restoration of a well-functioning, equitable asylum review must be a key part of our long-run strategy, if we are to be able to cope reasonably with migration pressures from Haiti, the rest of the Caribbean, and Central America. And a key part of that must be restoration of our ability to reach finality in the asylum determination promptly. No one's interest is served by prolonging the limbo of asylum applicant status.

In the meantime, it is vital to maintain vigorous human rights diplomacy as regards Haiti, other Caribbean countries, and indeed all of the globe. Asylum can never be a major avenue for solving the problem of human rights abuses in the country of origin. If we pretend that it is, I fear we would soon suffer a backlash in this country that might sweep away all possibility of asylum even for people unmistakably in danger of severe persecution. The ultimate response to human rights abuses is not relocation of large populations. The response must be a resolute continuation of our efforts to support an end to those abuses in the home countries.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Cuban-Haitian Refugees

Following are a statement at a State Department briefing by Victor H. Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, and a White House fact sheet of June 20, 1980.

AMBASSADOR PALMIERI

For more than two decades south Florida has been providing a haven for Cubans fleeing from Castro's repressive policies and Cuba's failing economy. In recent years, it has also become an entry point for thousands of Haitian "boat people." In the last 2 months, more than 114,000 Cubans have entered south Florida by boat.

The sudden and disorderly arrival of these Cubans on our shores without proper documentation has presented this country with an unprecedented political and humanitarian challenge. Under international law, we have an obligation to provide temporary refuge to arrivals claiming a well-founded fear of persecution in their homeland. Under previous U.S. law, we did, in fact, provide a permanent haven to almost 800,000 Cubans fleeing communism under Castro. Several factors, however, have determined the way we have responded to this extraordinary emergency and the strains it has created in south Florida.

First, those Cubans admitted in past years arrived under an orderly departure program that involved interviews and reviews of documentation before departure from Cuba. This allowed a careful screening process in accordance with U.S. immigration laws. This has not occurred with the current Cuban or Haitian entrants.

Second, our refugee and asylum provisions are now governed by new legislation, the Refugee Act of 1980, which came into effect on April 1 of this year. The Refugee Act established a framework for selecting groups of refugees overseas for admission to the United States, as well as for granting asylum to individuals already in this country who can demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution if they were to return to their country of origin. But this legislation did not contemplate the kind of situation we face now, with a sudden massive influx, without overseas processing and valid documentation. The procedures for dealing with asylum seekers in this country require lengthy

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

The Great Seal of the United States

nation taking its place among other sovereign states. The motto *E Pluribus Unum*, emblazoned across the scroll and clenched in the eagle's beak, expresses the union of the 13 States. Recent scholarship has pointed out the probable source of this motto. *Gentleman's Magazine*, published in London from 1732 to 1922, was widely read by the educated in the American Colonies. Its title page carried that same motto and it is quite possible that it influenced the creators of the seal.

The reverse, sometimes referred to as the spiritual side of the seal, contains the 13-step pyramid with the year 1776 in Roman numerals on the base. At the summit of the pyramid is the Eye of Providence in a triangle surrounded by a Glory (rays of light) and above it appears the motto *Annuit Coeptis*. Along the lower circumference of the design appear the words *Novus Ordo Seclorum*, heralding the beginning of the new American era in 1776.

THE DIE IS CUT

1782

The first die was cut from brass in 1782 by an engraver who has not been positively identified (possibly Robert Scot of Philadelphia). It is thought that Charles Thomson, since he was to have custody of the seal as Secretary of the Continental Congress, took it upon himself to find an engraver and someone to supply a suitable press. If Thomson provided a drawing to the engraver, it has disappeared and no drawing made by the engraver has been found. In any case, the seal and its press came into existence sometime between June and September 1782. They were placed in the State House in Philadelphia and on September 16, Thomson used them for the first time. That first sealed document was a full power authorizing General Washington to negotiate and sign with the British an agreement for the exchange, subsistence, and better treatment of prisoners of war. It was signed by the President of the Continental Congress John Hanson and countersigned by Secretary Thomson. Thomson continued as keeper of the seal until the Congress handed over power to the new government in 1789 and custody of the seal passed to the Secretary of State.

The Masi Treaty-Seal Die of 1825

European custom in the late 18th century called for the use of pendant seals on certain state documents, such as treaties. These seals consisted of impressions of the die on red or white wax discs which were then placed in silver or silver gilt boxes called skippets. The seal and skippet were suspended from the document being sealed by heavy ornamental cords that bound the pages together, passed through the seal and its box, and ended in tassels.

The United States did not begin to use pendant seals until 1815 (on the instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Ghent), and then it used the die of the 1782 seal to make the wax impressions. But its small size compared unfavorably with the impressive European pendants and Seraphim Masi of Washington, D.C., was asked to design a special treaty seal. He responded with an elegant and graceful design, quite in contrast to the 1782 seal, and $4^{11}/_{16}$ inches in diameter. He didn't follow the official description of 1782 closely, but produced a realistic, uncrested eagle turned slightly to one side, as though resting on the branch of an olive tree. He clearly defined 13 arrows, made the shield narrower and more pointed and altered its crest, and centered the motto *E Pluribus Unum* over the eagle's head. This beautiful seal was used for treaties until 1871, when the government ceased using pendant seals and retired the die. It is available for viewing in the National Archives.

Masi Treaty-Seal Die of 1825, used for pendant seals impressed in wax and enclosed in gold or silver boxes, then fastened with ornamental cords and tassels to treaties.

The 1782 seal, now on public display in the National Archives, is rather archaic in appearance. It measures $2^{5}/_{16}$ inches in diameter and carries a relatively crude rendering of a crested eagle,[1] thin-legged and awkward, its head protruding into the constellation of six-pointed stars. The bundle of 13 arrows and the olive branch, bare of fruit, are pressed against the border of modified acanthus leaves.

First Great Seal, possibly engraved by Robert Scot of Philadelphia in 1782. Brass die of seal was in use almost 60 years.

1841

By 1841 the original die of 1782 had become worn and a new steel die was cut by John Peter Van Ness Throop of Washington, D.C. This die has been called "the

illegal seal" because of its faulty design. Whereas the law called for 13 arrows in the left talon, Throop gave his eagle only 6. It is assumed that he didn't work from the text of the resolution of 1782 but rather from an impression made by the worn, original die, which would have shown a bundle of arrows but perhaps not the precise number. This may also account for the fact that he engraved five-pointed stars,[2] instead of the heraldic six-pointed stars of the original. However, these departures from the official design didn't affect the legality of the documents on which this seal was affixed.

The Throop die is of steel, 2⅜ inches in diameter, about the same size as the original. In fact, it is thought that the same press was used for both. But the differences in style are marked: The border is without acanthus leaves; the whole design has been crowded upward; the eagle is more vigorous and uncrested; two arcs, instead of a straight line, form the top of the shield; and the olive branch bears fruit, i.e., four olives.

In early 1866 a crude counter-die of the die was cut for the first time and put into use. It was a duplicate cut in relief, apparently in bronze. Its purpose was to improve the impression from the die when a document was pressed between them. However, the impressions grew less distinct and the die was retired after some 36 years of use.

Great Seal of 1841, engraved in steel by John Peter Van Ness Throop of Washington, D.C. It departed from 1782 design by showing only six arrows in eagle's claw and by giving stars five, rather than six, points. It also added fruit to olive branch.

1877

With the celebration of the Centennial in 1876, Americans were reminded of their heritage and interest was aroused in the origins and forms of the Great Seal. An article appeared in the press about this time revealing that there were "irregularities" in the 1841 die of the seal's obverse and that the reverse, although created by law in 1782 had never been cut.[3] The Department of State seemed unaware of any public criticism and the irregularities in the obverse were not corrected when the Throop die began to wear and a new die was cut during 1877. The engraver was Herman Baumgarten of Washington, D.C., who followed the design of the 1841 die very closely, including the errors. The seal was the same size as its two predecessors, but Baumgarten enlarged the stars and the lettering on the motto. It is considered the poorest of all the Great Seal dies and, ironically, it was the one in use for the Great Seal's own centennial in 1882.

1885

By early 1881 the Department of State was beginning to listen to comments from the public and the press about the errors and omissions and bids were asked for engraving a reverse and a new obverse that would correct them. The firm selected was Tiffany & Co. in New York, and its head designer, James Horton Whitehouse, was asked to submit sketches. Whitehouse was a seal engraver, jewel cutter, and art designer of exceptional skill, taste, and artistic judgment. A great deal of research went into these two designs, going back to the original written description adopted in 1782. The Tiffany die of the obverse differs radically from all earlier dies. It is formal and heraldic, rather than realistic, and it served as the pattern for the die in use today. Its 3-inch diameter makes it larger than its predecessors and the eagle once again carries 13 arrows. The olive branch has 13 leaves and 13 olives on it and for the first time the cloud of the crest is in the form of a complete circle.

But it is the eagle itself that has undergone the greatest change. Gone are the thin-kneed eagles with L-shaped legs, replaced by a muscular and unmistakable American bald eagle. More of the body appears above the shield, and the engraving is so skillfully done that the break between the white feathers of the head and neck and the dark feathers of the body is visible in both the die and the impressions. In another departure, the eagle grasps the olive branch and arrows in large, strong claws from behind, not from the front, as previously drawn.

Although a die for the reverse was ordered from Tiffany & Co. and funds were appropriated, the die was not cut. With the passing of pendant seals in 1871 there was no practical use for it.

forward from its standpoint only within the framework of competitive conditions in the U.S. market.

The Nigerian side presented a proposal to the United States delegation for an agreement on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation. The United States Delegation undertook to consider promptly its contents and formally respond to this initiative in September, 1980.

On education, Nigeria and the United States agreed to encourage increased cooperation between particular universities in faculty exchange and enrichment, collaborative research and joint degree programmes. In these endeavors, both the Fulbright Programme and other suitable institutional arrangements will be utilized.

As a means of enhancing Technical Teacher Education and manpower development in Nigeria, both sides intend to sign an agreement which will involve Technical Teacher Training in both the United States and Nigeria. This agreement will be concluded within the next month.

It was agreed that the further establishment of linkages between Nigerian and American institutions of higher education is of great mutual advantage. Means of funding such linkages was then discussed extensively. At the end of the discussion, the Nigerian side asked the American side to review all possible means of such funding, including Title XII of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 so amended. The U.S. side agreed to initiate such a review.

In the area of recruitment of faculty for higher education, the two sides agreed to work together to facilitate and to improve selection of U.S. professors to teach in Nigeria. It was agreed that further Fulbright awards in broad scientific fields would be added through funds from the N.U.C. supplementation budget.

The U.S. side welcomes the Nigerian intention to send education attaches to the Nigerian consulates in the USA to strengthen the educational services provided by those consulates, thereby improving educational cooperation between the two countries. The American side will explore ways to strengthen its official representation in Nigeria with persons who are more knowledgeable about higher education in the United States and in Nigeria.

Finally, the two sides agreed to explore ways of ensuring that recipients of Nigerian government scholarships return to Nigeria at the completion of their studies.

The two delegations noted that the discussions had taken place in a cordial atmosphere and renewed their confidence that these consultations would lead to better understanding and fruitful cooperation between their two countries.

Finally, it was decided that the next round of talks will take place in Washington in 1981 at a date to be agreed upon.

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[1] Texts from the Vice President's press secretary.

[2] Lists of the U.S. and Nigerian delegations not printed here. ■

America's Strength: Ideals and Military Power

by Secretary Muskie

Address before the G.I. Forum in Los Angeles on August 7, 1980.[1]

I'm glad to be here. And I want to begin by saluting some remarkable Americans: first, Dr. Hector Garcia, one of democracy's freedom fighters, who not only founded this organization but forged it into a powerful, creative, insistent voice for a better America; second, Lupe Saldana, a Marine Captain in Vietnam, chairman of the G.I. Forum, and a leader of Hispanic Americans whose counsel is sought—and heeded—in the White House; and third, the entire membership of this remarkable organization. You have always believed that America was good enough to be better. And you have helped assure Hispanic Americans that their cause will have powerful support—in the armed services, in veterans affairs, in government, and in the making of foreign policy.

One of my goals as Secretary of State is to attract more young people to careers in the Foreign Service from groups that are underrepresented there: Hispanic- and Asian-Americans, black people and women, and others to whom opportunities in the past have too often been closed.

I want to do this not as a favor to them but as a favor to our country. I believe that such people—the son of a Polish tailor, the grandson of a slave, the granddaughter of a migrant worker—can help enrich our foreign policy and improve our standing in the world, for they bring with them some special qualities: closeness to other cultures, sensitivity to the pain of poverty and injustice, and a special enthusiasm for the power of democracy to unlock human potential and improve human life. And so my goal is to make affirmative action in the U.S. Department of State an accomplished reality—and I invite you to help me meet that goal.

For a few minutes today, I want to talk about America's strength, for I cannot think of any group that better understands how this strength is twofold. It is found in America's military power. And it is found in the strength of the ideas America stands for—in our commitment to justice and human rights.

I have a strong sense, as I stand here, that this audience itself says more about that subject than any speech of mine can express. For the story of this G.I. Forum is a story of military valor in war—and of devotion, in peace and war, to America's best values. You have demanded that America fulfill the dream you have fought for. You have championed the cause of an America that is both strong and decent, and you have believed that America could be both.

I share that belief. And today, as we enter a season of intense debate about America's purpose in the world, I want to talk about what will be required if we are to keep America strong in its defenses and steadfast in its pursuit of decent purposes in the world.

National Defense

First—and fundamental—is a strong military defense. Let no one whose purpose is political advantage tell you that America is weak or growing weaker—for that is not true.

It is true that over the past 20 years our chief potential adversary, the Soviet Union, has been building its military forces massively and relentlessly, in every category from nuclear missiles to naval forces, and at tremendous economic cost.

It is true that the Soviet Union has shown itself, over the past few years, eager to assert itself as a global power and all too willing to disturb the peace—with Cuban proxy forces in Africa and with Soviet tanks in Afghanistan. But it is not true that President Carter and his Administration have neglected our side of the military balance.

Let's look at the record.

When this Administration took office, we inherited a military posture and a defense budget that simply had not kept pace. In the 8 years preceding President Carter's inauguration, real defense spending, after inflation, had declined by more than 35%. In particular, our spending on strategic nuclear weapons had declined by 20%.

It was soon clear to President Carter that only by changing course could we prevent the growing Soviet military capability from surpassing our own; only by increasing our efforts could we pre-

vent a dangerous Soviet military superiority in the future.

So this Administration, since taking office, has increased real defense spending every year. Already this has resulted in an overall increase of 10%. And under our 5-year defense plan, real defense spending will have increased more than 27% by 1985. That is not a story of declining strength; it is a story of growing strength.

And President Carter has devoted his Administration to increasing our strength in every category.

- To improve the nation's strategic nuclear arsenal, we are developing the MX missile on land, the Trident II system at sea, and the cruise missile for our bomber fleet.
- To improve our conventional capabilities, we are developing the rapid deployment force and arranging new basing privileges around the world.
- And to improve the capabilities of our NATO alliance, we have led our partners to develop a long-term defense plan, to increase real defense spending by at least 3% a year, and to modernize NATO's long-range nuclear missiles in the European theater.

Does this sound like a winding down of America's defense capabilities? Of course not. It is, in fact, a buildup—a buildup of funding and equipment, a buildup of strength. It is a buildup aimed at improving quality, not piling up mere quantity. And President Carter has accomplished this buildup without sacrificing this nation's commitment to look after its own people—to help the poor, to heal the sick, to educate our young people, and to care for our old people in retirement. I think this is a record to be proud of.

And while he has worked to build up our strength, President Carter has also pursued, in the name of increased security for America, a process pursued by Presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Ford: negotiations aimed at prudent, balanced arms control. The SALT II Treaty is in America's interest. It will serve our security interests by preventing an uncontrolled arms race. It deserves your support. And it deserves to be ratified by the U.S. Senate.

So that is the record of our efforts to protect America's security. It is a record that is clear, consistent, prudent, and practical.

It stands in contrast to the rhetoric of those who sow panic about American defenses in order to reap political profit. They ask for a blank check for massive military spending but call at the same time for a massive tax cut. They say that they are for arms control but against SALT II. Well, I say they can't have it both ways. I have been in public life for nearly 30 years, and I know partisan doubletalk when I hear it.

I prefer—and I believe you prefer—a record of achievement to the rhetoric of a campaign. I believe the record I have outlined deserves your confidence.

And you have a basis for confidence beyond our record in building America's military strength, for this Administration has moved to assure that the might of our arms is matched by the power of our ideals; that our arsenals are maintained not simply to buttress America's power but to defend values which resound all over the world.

We are defending our values in our strong response to aggression against Afghanistan. We are defending our values when we promote peace among nations and the human rights of individuals. Without our strength, our values might be in danger. But without these values, our strength would be empty.

Let me tell you what I mean when I speak of a foreign policy based on values.

American Values and Foreign Policy

To begin with, this Administration believes in dealing with other nations on a basis of mutual respect.

Several years ago, the G.I. Forum gave its support to a vital reflection of this principle—the new Panama Canal Treaty. That treaty, which acknowledged Panama's right to operate the Panama Canal, came under fierce attack. There were many in this country who thought it folly to deal with tiny Panama on terms of equality and respect. Some might even try to reverse this step if they were given half a chance.

But President Carter and his Administration stood up for the agreement; he saw it through to ratification. He did it not only because the treaty was important to our future access to the canal and to our relations with Panama; not just to calm a dispute that threatened the canal's security. He did it because that treaty said something to the rest of the world about America. It said that America was willing to make and abide by a fair agreement with Panama that benefited both nations. It said that America was prepared to establish a relationship based on bargaining, not on bullying.

In today's world, we are well served by that message—in our relations in this hemisphere and in our ability to work with other nations toward goals we share. And today, our treatment of a smaller neighbor stands in stark contrast to the continuing Soviet assault on the free people of Afghanistan.

Another value we uphold is peace. And so this Administration has worked tenaciously to build peace in troubled regions of the world.

In the Middle East our efforts still have great obstacles to overcome. But we have come a long way. There is peace between Egypt and Israel—an historic accomplishment. And the Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt also represent an historic beginning. We must not waver there, in patience or in persistence.

In southern Africa, patience and persistence have also been rewarded. The people of Rhodesia—now the new nation of Zimbabwe—today enjoy peace, a government based on majority rule, and an authentic chance for a stable future. All this is possible, in part, because the United States worked hard to support a negotiated solution to Rhodesia's racial war. Here again, President Carter did not bend his support for a real settlement—and the results vindicate his policy.

Another value the United States stands for in the world is economic and social progress for the world's poor nations and the world's poor people.

It is a stark fact of our time that millions of people are sick and hungry—in Africa, in Asia, and close to home in Latin America.

Our economic aid programs—in the face of these overwhelming human needs and spiraling energy costs—are at best modest. They deserve your support, for they work. They are essential if we want a foreign policy that is active and effective. How ironic it is that some of the loudest demands for wider American influence in the world come from the same people who consistently vote against American involvement in the world, who vote against programs to help nations and people break the shackles of poverty.

We will continue to resist those who vote against these programs, and we need your help, for this Administration believes that the real way to build our influence and to stave off violence in the world is to help people meet their basic human needs: energy, food and agriculture, education and health. We intend to

The North-South Dialogue

Statements by Richard N. Cooper, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs; Thomas Ehrlich, Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA); Joan Spero, U.S. Representative to the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); and C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, before the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 15, 1980.[1]

MR. COOPER

I appreciate the opportunity to talk with you about the North-South dialogue, its importance to the United States, and the directions we see it taking in the months ahead. This subject is particularly timely, as late this summer we will attend the 11th Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, which will bring together two major themes for the first time – the launching of a round of global negotiations on major international economic issues, including energy, and the formulation of an international development strategy for the 1980s.

The North-South dialogue can be looked at on two levels. Most generally, it can be defined as the whole range of discussions and negotiations between industrial and developing countries – bilateral, regional, and international. More specifically, however, the dialogue can be defined as a discussion in multilateral fora of the international economic system which has evolved since 1945. The developing countries use this dialogue to press for fundamental restructuring of the system in ways they believe would benefit them. Industrial countries attempt to strike a balance between promoting mutually beneficial change and preserving the fundamentals of a system which they believe has generally served well not only their interests but those of all countries.

It is this latter concept of a dialogue we are discussing today. Yet, at the outset, I should note the interrelationship between the two concepts. Clearly, our bilateral relationships with developing countries and our actions in such specialized economic organizations as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the development banks, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), all have a strong impact on international political-level discussions. And conversely, the tone set in the international dialogue provides a backdrop on which more concrete bilateral and multilateral relations occur.

The North-South dialogue grew out of the experience of the developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s, when they discovered that in the U.N. General Assembly they could command world attention. Unlike the Bretton Woods institutions, in which voting is weighted heavily in favor of industrial countries and meetings are closed to the public, in the U.N. institutions each country has an equal vote. Developing countries are able to make their demands heard and constitute majority votes in those fora, particularly when they act in unison. They first used this power to demand an end to colonialism, but by the 1960s, as the curtain rang down on the colonial empires, developing countries increasingly turned their attention to the international economic system in the U.N. fora.

The decade of the 1970s marked an intense period of North-South dialogue. Debate turned highly confrontational in the U.N. Sixth Special Session in the spring of 1974, in which the developing countries demanded a new international economic order. A more constructive tone was set in 1975 with the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations and the launching of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris, and in the spring of 1976 with UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development] IV in Nairobi. In 1979 the combination of a deteriorating world economic climate and dissension among the developing countries over their priorities and over the question of energy, led the developing countries to call for an inclusive, high-level round of global negotiations, to be launched by the 11th Special Session.

As we prepare for this major undertaking, it is appropriate that we review the importance to the United States of the North-South dialogue, the issues debated, and the factors which encourage or impede progress in the dialogue.

Importance to U.S.

For the United States, the developing countries are increasingly important both economically and politically. They are major suppliers of raw materials, including, of course, oil, and our most rapidly growing export markets. For example, from 1970 to 1978 U.S. exports of capital goods to developing countries quadrupled from under $5 billion to over $22 billion. In fact, taken as a group, developing countries now account for more U.S. exports than the European Common Market and Japan combined. During the recessionary period of 1974–76, while exports to industrial countries stagnated or declined, exports to developing (including oil-exporting) countries continued to expand. Without that demand for U.S. goods, our unemployment and production would have been even worse. About 24% of our $170 billion in overseas direct investments are in developing countries,

For the United States, the developing countries are increasingly important both economically and politically.

as well as around 31% of the $190 billion in U.S. bank claims on foreigners. Profits and interest from these investments and loans play an important role in helping to offset the merchandise of trade deficits we have run in recent years.

The cooperation of the developing countries is becoming increasingly essential if we are to use the world's resources efficiently. We need to work with them if we are to continue effective use of the world's electromagnetic spectrum and to mine the floor of the sea and harvest its fish. Policies in developing countries which result in deforestation or desertification affect not only their own futures but the future availability of food and timber and even the nature of weather patterns for the world community. Their attitudes toward pollution as they spur economic growth affect not only their own rivers and air but the world's oceans and atmosphere.

It is also in our strong security interest to see that most of these countries find that we and our allies are receptive to their desires for improved economic growth. It is true that so long as we maintain a strong national

defense, the direct threat of developing countries to the physical security of the United States is negligible. But the internal upheavals and regional disputes can endanger individual Americans and risk confrontation between the superpowers. Moreover, events of the past few years have demonstrated anew that even overwhelming force of arms cannot assure the United States of sure friends or the achievement of security objectives in the Third World. If the developing countries believe we are uninterested in their economic and political welfare, no amount of arms will win their respect and their cooperation on matters of importance to our security and well-being.

Perhaps even more important than these current considerations is the fact that the kind of world our children inherit will be heavily determined by the choices developing countries make as to their social and economic systems. The developing countries, after all, account for about three-quarters of the world population, and their share is increasing. The degree to which they identify or oppose the Western system of economic, social, and moral values will have an influence, perhaps even a determining influence, on whether our descendants live in a world which is hospitable to their values and welfare or whether they live under a psychological state of siege.

Developing Country Concerns

Thus, it is not only out of humanitarian concern but also for hardheaded economic and security reasons that the United States should listen carefully to the concerns enunciated by the developing countries in the North-South dialogue. These demands tend to revolve around three themes – obtaining needed foreign exchange, assuring availability of technology for development, and increasing the decisionmaking power of developing countries in the economic system.

The most important means of obtaining foreign exchange for most developing countries is through exporting raw materials or processed goods to the world community. Much of the North-South dialogue has, therefore, revolved around developing countries' desire for higher and more stable prices for raw materials and improved market access for their manufactured goods.

Many developing countries, particularly the poorest, depend heavily on official development assistance to obtain their foreign exchange. They demand larger, more automatic transfers of resources on concessional terms with a minimum of political and economic strings attached.

Finally, developing countries, particularly the more advanced, can also open their doors to foreign investment or obtain loans from private capital markets. They obtain resources in the present in return for promising to allow payment of profit, interest, and principal in the future. The terms and conditions under which international investment and capital borrowing take place, and what happens when disputes arise, are therefore another important area of debate involving resource flows.

Developing countries also want to assure that increased resource flows will be used productively. To this end, they want to see increased the amount of scientific and technological research which will be of benefit to the developing world. They would like to improve the terms under which technology is transferred through private and public means to the developing world. Finally, they want to increase their own capacity to develop, select, adapt, and apply technology to their specific requirements. These themes were highlighted in the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD) held in Vienna last year and run through the negotiations on an international code of conduct on technology transfer being conducted under UNCTAD auspices.

The developing countries have also sought through the North-South dialogue to increase their role in international economic decisionmaking. The dialogue itself, by highlighting the economic concerns of the developing countries, partly accomplishes this goal. In addition, the developing countries have pressed for increased voting power in institutions such as the IMF, have sought to move debate on particular issues to fora they find politically more hospitable (e.g., UNCTAD for trade), and have proposed new institutions in which they have a greater role at the outset. The establishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development, in which developing countries have two-thirds of the vote, and the voting structure being negotiated for a Common Fund, both reflect this pattern.

In sum, the goal of the developing countries in the North-South dialogue is to restructure the international economic system – to create a new international economic order – which has as primary objectives the promotion of their development and what they consider a more equitable distribution of the world's wealth.

U.S. Concerns

We understand and sympathize with the aspirations of the developing countries. However, we also have an enormous stake in the continuing smooth functioning of the international economic system. We are the world's largest exporter and importer of both raw materials and manufactured goods, the largest overseas investor, and the largest international debtor as well as the largest creditor. Major changes in the system can thus have important implications for our own welfare.

As we look back over the past three decades, we believe that the system has responded flexibly, if not always smoothly, to major changes in the world, including the growing economic and political importance of the developing countries. We favor continued evolution of the system to meet new situations. But suggested changes must have a high probability of improving the system for everyone – if this is not the case, it makes no sense to disrupt a system which works reasonably well.

We naturally have additional criteria with which we evaluate suggestions for changes in the system. We want a system which provides the stability and predictability that promotes trade and facilitates financial transactions – transactions which are increasingly long term in nature. This does not imply a system which resists change but rather recognizes that national social and economic structures can only absorb change at a reasonable pace. Sudden changes in the rules of the game for investment and financial transactions or massive shifts in trade patterns tend to inhibit overall economic activity. Thus, we favor needed change at a rate which can be absorbed without undue dislocations.

Second, we want an international system which promotes efficient use of the world's resources. As the current energy situation has made us painfully aware, we cannot afford to waste the world's resources – be they capital, raw materials, or human beings. We have thus pursued an international system of basically open trade and free capital flows. We are convinced that such a system will result in countries benefiting from their comparative advantage and increased global efficiency.

Additionally, as we are all well

examinations on a case-by-case basis that would leave many arrivals in limbo status for long periods, without eligibility for federally funded assistance. And the strict standards for asylum would prevent many of the Cubans and Haitians from qualifying for admission under that category.

This is clearly an intolerable situation for the Cuban and Haitian entrants as well as for the States that are receiving and resettling them, particularly the State of Florida. To date, the Cuban-American community and the voluntary resettlement agencies have generously assisted these exiles. But they can no longer bear this burden alone, especially since those being released from the processing centers are increasingly persons without relatives in this country. The size of this special population and the difficulty of returning them to their homelands or resettling them in other countries make it all the more important to clarify their status and eligibility for some forms of federally funded assistance.

In order to redress this extraordinary situation, yet maintain the integrity of our refugee laws for those applying for admission in the prescribed manner, the President has decided to seek special legislation regularizing the status of Cuban-Haitian entrants. This legislation will allow them to remain in the United States and will make them eligible for certain benefits, but it will not provide the status or benefits accorded to those admitted as refugees or granted political asylum.

U.S. Steps

Until this legislation is enacted, we will take the following steps to deal with the special needs of the communities in which the Cuban-Haitian entrants relocate and to prevent the occurrence of such crises in the future.

- Cubans who have arrived in the United States during the period April 21-June 19, 1980, and who are in Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) proceedings as of June 19, 1980, and all Haitians who are in INS proceedings as of June 19, 1980, will have their parole into the country renewed for a 6-month period as "Cuban-Haitian entrants (status pending)."
- Under this 6-month parole, these Cubans and Haitians will be eligible, if they otherwise qualify, for supplemental security income (SSI—for the elderly and handicapped), Medicaid, aid to families with dependent children (AFDC), and emergency assistance under the rules of the States in which they are residing and with normal Federal-State matching of funds. In order to qualify, Cuban-Haitian entrants must first report to the INS for their new parole documents. Procedures for applying for these benefits will be announced by INS and the Department of Health and Human Services next Friday, June 27.
- Minor children in camps without close relatives in this country will be provided English-language training, health services, counseling, and individualized planning for permanent placement.
- Per capita grants will be provided to private resettlement agencies for all persons leaving processing centers after June 19, 1980, and for Cuban-Haitian entrants being relocated out of the south Florida area after that date. In addition, funds will be provided to the resettlement agencies to provide employment counseling and referral services to all Cuban-Haitian entrants already released from camps or resettled directly into the Miami area.
- The President has already sought funding totaling $385 million to finance reception, processing, care and maintenance, transportation, initial relocation, health services, and educational costs as part of the FY 1980 supplemental appropriation. The Administration will seek necessary funding for the continuation of this program in FY 1981.
- Special legislation will be submitted to the Congress as soon as possible to:

—Establish a "Cuban-Haitian entrant" status for recently arrived Cubans and Haitians;

—Define services and benefits for these arrivals for 1 year after release from processing centers;

—Provide SSI, Medicaid, AFDC, and emergency assistance under the rules of the States in which they are residing and with normal Federal-State matching of funds; and authorize retroactive reimbursement to States and localities for 75% of the total cost of other general assistance, medical assistance, special educational programs, and social services for 1 year;

—Provide for conversion to permanent resident alien status after 2 years;

—Improve future asylum processing, both to expedite case-by-case review, including exclusion and deportation, and to reduce the likelihood of future problems of this nature;

—Provide minor children without close relatives in this country English-language training, health services, counseling, and individualized planning for permanent placement. States will be reimbursed for 100% of the costs of maintenance and services provided to such unaccompanied minors until they reach the age of majority; and

—Seek a method to identify and extend "Cuban-Haitian entrant status" to those other Haitian "boat people" who have arrived in Florida prior to June 19, 1980, but who are not in INS proceedings.

- Criminals continue to be subject to detention and exclusion or deportation from the United States.
- Processing of applications for asylum will continue. Those who are granted asylum status will be eligible to adjust to permanent resident alien status after 1 year.
- U.S. Government enforcement agencies will continue to interdict boats bringing undocumented aliens into the United States. Enforcement will be maintained to prevent future illegal arrivals, and violators will be subject to civil or criminal prosecution in accordance with the President's declaration of May 14, 1980. Persons who arrive illegally after June 19, 1980, will not be eligible for the program and will be subject to exclusion or deportation in accordance with U.S. immigration laws.

All of these steps are consonant with the policy that the President outlined on May 14. Throughout this emergency, our objectives have been to uphold our international obligations and protect the integrity of our immigration and refugee laws. We have, therefore, sought to treat the arriving Cubans and Haitians in an equitable way by providing them temporary safehaven until their status can be resolved in this country or until they are offered resettlement in other countries.

In the case of the Cubans, we have also tried to limit both the inhumane and hazardous conditions of their journey and their impact on communities in Florida by deterring the Cuban-American community from illegally bringing in any more undocumented Cubans. At the same time, we have pursued international efforts to negotiate with Castro to establish an orderly departure program to allow the humane and manageable departure of Cubans who qualify for admission to the United States under the Refugee Act of 1980.

To date, our efforts have virtually stopped the boat flotilla from Cuba. We hope that our enforcement measures will discourage others from undertaking the long and dangerous journey by boat in violation of our laws. The problem of un-

documented aliens in the United States is clearly broader than the current Cuban-Haitian entrants, and it will have to be the subject of future policy decisions made in consultation with the Congress. We expect that the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy will be addressing the situation of Haitians who are not covered by the President's decisions I have announced today, as well as other documented aliens in this country.

Summary

In summary, the current Cuban-Haitian crisis is but a symptom of a worldwide trend toward greater dislocation and migration. In the past, the American people have responded generously to the plight of the uprooted. And our laws provide for the acceptance of large numbers of immigrants and refugees. In fact, we will be admitting over 600,000 this year.

However, there are millions more who would like to begin new lives in this country than we can accept. Our laws, therefore, establish numerical limits and require careful selection and processing prior to admission. Many applicants for admission have waited for years, and on arrival they have managed with little or no assistance from the Federal Government.

In the case of Cuba, we have long been the country of preferred asylum. We cannot stand by in silent witness to the unsafe and uncontrolled exodus from Cuba, yet our laws do not allow us to accept for permanent resettlement any Cuban or Haitian who arrives here in this manner. While we work for the eventual return of those who are found inadmissable under our laws, particularly criminals, we must now find ways to resettle those whom common decency compels us to receive.

WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET[1]

To date about 114,000 Cubans and more than 15,000 Haitians have entered south Florida as "boat people," requiring an emergency response from the U.S. Government and from the States, localities, and private voluntary organizations involved. More than 65,000 Cubans have been resettled with families and other sponsors, a remarkable feat during this 2-month period. The Cubans are a heterogeneous group of people of wide age range and with a wide range of reasons for coming to the United States. Some were political prisoners, many seek reunification with their families here, and many seek the greater economic opportunities and personal freedoms of our country.

On May 14 President Carter publicly offered Castro a means for orderly and safe movement of Cubans to this country. That offer has not been accepted. In addition, the President ordered many actions to stop the unsafe movement of boats from Florida to Cuba to seek additional emigres. Those actions were successful.

Haitian entrants tend to be a more homogeneous group seeking greater economic opportunities, but many claim to be fleeing political repression.

After exhaustive review of the Refugee Act of 1980, the Immigration and Naturalization Act, and other authorities and after extensive consultation with Members of Congress, affected State and local officials, and interested groups in the communities, the President has determined to pursue the following course of action to resettle the recent Cuban-Haitian entrants and to assist state and local governments, as well as private voluntary organizations.

• Cubans who have arrived in the United States during the period April 21–June 19, 1980, and who are in INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service] proceedings as of June 19, 1980, and all Haitians who are in INS proceedings as of June 19, 1980, will have their parole into the country renewed for a 6-month period as "Cuban/Haitian Entrants (Status Pending)."

• Under this 6-month parole, these Cubans and Haitians will be eligible, if they otherwise qualify, for SSI [supplemental security income], Medicaid, AFDC [aid to families with dependent children], and emergency assistance under the rules of the States in which they are residing and with normal Federal/State matching. In order to qualify, Cuban-Haitian entrants must first report to the INS for their new parole documents. Procedures for applying for these benefits will be announced by INS and HHS [Department of Health and Human Services] on June 27.

• Per capita grants will be provided to private resettlement agencies for all persons leaving processing centers after June 19, 1980, and for Cuban-Haitian entrants being relocated out of the south Florida area after that date. In addition, funds will be provided to the resettlement agencies to provide employment counseling and referral services to all Cuban-Haitian entrants already released from camps or resettled directly into the Miami area.

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—Seek a method to identify and extend "Cuban-Haitian entrant status" to those other Haitian "boat people" who have arrived in Florida prior to June 19, 1980, but who are not in INS proceedings.

• Criminals continue to be subject to detention and exclusion or deportation from the United States.

• Processing of applications for asylum will continue. Those who are granted asylum status will be eligible to adjust to permanent resident alien status after a year.

• U.S. Government enforcement agencies will continue to interdict boats bringing undocumented aliens into the United States. Enforcement will be maintained to prevent future illegal arrivals, and violators will be subject to

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Cover:
The Great Seal of the United States

The DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

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Great Seal of 1904 by Bailey Banks & Biddle, in Philadelphia. The engraver, Max Zeitler, was instructed to reproduce 1885 die as exactly as possible. The engraving was deeper, however, and impressions are still sharp and clear after 76 years of use.

1904

After only 17 years of use, the steel Tiffany die of 1885 was no longer producing a sharp impression, probably due to a worn counter-die. Whatever the reason, the Department ordered a new die in 1902 and funds were appropriated. Although there was some debate about changing the design, the instructions that went to the Philadelphia firm of Baily Banks & Biddle were to "furnish a fac-simile" of the design of the Tiffany die "not later than June 15, 1903."[4] The new die was engraved in hardened steel by Max Zeitler, and impressions from it are so nearly identical that it is hard to tell them from those of the 1877 die. There are differences, however. Impressions from the Zeitler die are sharper and clearer, particularly in the feathering of the eagle and in the 19 clouds of the crest. The eagle's feathers are more pointed and its talons have shorter joints. Zeitler also corrected two heraldic errors which had been called to the Department's attention. But it takes close inspection to see any of these changes.

The Zeitler die of the Great Seal was first used on January 27, 1904, and has been in use ever since, some 16 years longer than any of its predecessors.

Designs of the Reverse

Although drawings of the obverse side of the Great Seal were done immediately upon adoption of the design in 1782, the first reverse was not drawn until 4 years later. A Philadelphia engraver, James Trenchard, working from the written description, produced a full page engraving of the reverse for the October 1786 issue of *Columbian Magazine*. He followed the law closely and produced an elongated, 13-step unfinished pyramid, with the two mottos, the date in Roman numerals, and the Eye of Providence in a blaze of glory.

The second drawing of the reverse was probably done by the artist and historian, Benson J. Lossing, to accompany an article he wrote on the Great Seal for the July 1856 issue of *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*. Lossing gave his rather square pyramid a deep perspective and filled the ground around it with flowers and grass. He also changed Trenchard's right Eye of Providence to a left eye, which it has been ever since. This drawing has influenced all later realizations of the written description of 1782, with the exception of the Great Seal Centennial Medal struck in 1882. The back of this medal, which followed closely Trenchard's design, was the first realization of the reverse to be issued officially by the U.S. Government.

The design for the reverse was made available by the Continental Congress in case it was desired to impress the back surfaces of wax pendant seals. The United States used pendant seals for treaties from 1815 to 1871, but the backs were never impressed. Enthusiasm for cutting a die of the reverse has diminished, and to this day one has not been cut. The current official design of the reverse of the Great Seal follows almost exactly the Lossing drawing, and can be seen on the $1 bill.

Reverse side of Great Seal. Although description was adopted in 1782, no die has ever been cut.

USES OF THE SEAL AND THE COAT OF ARMS

The Great Seal is used to seal documents 2,000 to 3,000 times a year. Although custody of the first seal had been assigned to the Secretary of the Continental Congress Charles Thomson in 1782, the new government in 1789 assigned it to the Secretary of State. Mr. Thomson hand-carried the seal and press to President Washington, delivered his resignation with genuine regret, and surrendered the books, papers, and records of the late Congress. Thomas Jefferson thus became the first of a long line of Secretaries of State to have custody of the Great Seal.

The actual sealing is done by an officer from the Department's Presidential Appointments Staff. At present it is impressed on the following types of documents, after they have been signed by the President and countersigned by the Secretary of State:

- Instruments of ratification of treaties and other international agreements;
- Proclamations of treaties and other international instruments;
- Appointment commissions of Ambassadors, Foreign Service officers, Cabinet officers, and all other civil officers appointed by the President whose commissions are not required by law to issue under another seal; and
- Assignment commissions for consular officers.

The seal is also affixed to the envelopes that contain letters accrediting and recalling our ambassadors and other ceremonial communications from the President to heads of foreign governments.

The design of the obverse of the Great Seal, which is the coat of arms of the United States, is used by the government in many ways. It has been shown in some form on coins, postage stamps, stationery, publications, flags, military uniforms, public monuments, public buildings, passports, and other

items the U.S. Government has issued, owns, or uses. In full color it is displayed above the doors to all U.S. embassies, consulates general, and consulates throughout the world. It may also appear in black and white, and it may be printed engraved, embossed, shown in relief, etched, carved, stamped, painted, lithographed, stitched, or reproduced by any other process appropriate to the materials being used. One of the more unusual uses of the coat of arms is in a stained glass window of the Prayer Room at the U.S. Capitol.

We see the seal design almost every day, both the obverse and the little-noticed reverse, as it passes through our hands on the $1 bill. In 1935, the Department of the Treasury sent President Roosevelt a new design for the bill, incorporating the obverse and reverse of the Great Seal. After approving it rather routinely, the President changed his mind, scratched out his signature, and inked in several significant changes. He switched the obverse and reverse and added "The Great Seal" under a rough outline of the pyramid and "of the United States" under an even rougher sketch of the eagle, and initialed the whole "FDR." Upon receipt, Treasury's Bureau of Engraving and Printing duly noted "Received by the Engraving Division June 26, 1935," and revised the model.



Model of back of 1935 dollar bill submitted to President Franklin Roosevelt for approval. The President changed his mind after approving it, reversed placement of obverse and reverse and added legend "The Great Seal of the United States" in two parts under his roughly sketched pyramid and eagle.

All of these uses of the Great Seal die and the design, or coat of arms, are official. Often private, nonofficial requests to use one or the other come to the Department of State. It is the position of the Department that the Great Seal can be affixed only as provided by law and that impressions of the seal cannot be made for display purpose or in response to requests for souvenirs or samples. This position has been applied not only to impressions made from the present die but also to impressions from earner dies still in existence.

As for the coat of arms, the Department has expressed concern in the past over the increasing tendency to use it in commercial enterprises and in ways that give the impression of U.S. Government sponsorship or involvement. However, it is the current practice not to give opinions as to the suitability of proposed uses, leaving that to the taste of the user. The matter of legality is left to the Department of Justice. Title 18 of the U.S. Code as revised in January 1971 prohibits use of the likeness of the Great Seal or any facsimile in "any advertisement, circular, book, pamphlet, or other publication, play, motion picture, telecast, or other production," for the purpose of conveying a false impression of sponsorship or approval by the U.S. Government under threat of a fine of not more than $250 or imprisonment of not more than 6 months, or both.

be on the side of helping ordinary people build self-sufficient lives. In the process we will serve our own interest in building a more stable world.

We believe, quite simply, that even in a turbulent world, we must be loyal to our values—at home and abroad. We must stand for democracy and human dignity, for free speech and free institutions.

Human Rights

American human rights policy does not displace our other international interests. Indeed, it serves those interests. It underscores the contrast between us and our adversaries. It encourages our friends to build stronger, freer societies. And it aligns the United States with the tide in favor of human rights which is running in the world.

In our own hemisphere, we have seen that tide surge in Ecuador and Peru, in the new human rights emphasis of the Organization of American States and the Andean pact nations. We have seen tragic setbacks, as in Bolivia last month. But we believe that the broad trend is in favor of human freedom, and the United States should be on the leading edge of that trend.

Perhaps most important of all, our human rights policy reflects the character of the American nation and the best qualities of the American people.

As the agenda of your meeting here makes clear, we have a great deal left to do. We have a long way to go before all Americans enjoy a fair stake in our economy and our political life.

We intend to make the State Department a part of that process. My predecessor as Secretary of State, Cy Vance, launched a number of wise and hopeful precedents. He called for stepped-up recruitment of Hispanics; he held meetings with Hispanic-American leaders to seek their counsel. The Department held its first Hispanic conference last October. I intend to continue and build on these efforts. And I urge you to give me your insights, your participation, and your advice, for by living up to our best values at home can we strengthen our position abroad.

For years, you have been helping your government do just that. The evidence lies in one of the truly great stories of America's battle against discrimination.

When a funeral home in Texas refused to give Private Felix Longorria a military burial in an "Anglo" cemetery, Dr. Hector Garcia and the G.I. Forum became the champions of this dead soldier's rights. They took their cause to Washington. And on January 11, 1949, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson sent a telegram to Dr. Garcia that included these words: "This injustice and prejudice is deplorable. I am happy to have a part in seeing that this hero is laid to rest with the honor and dignity his service deserves." Soon afterward, Private Felix Longorria was buried, with full military honors, on a hillside in Arlington National Cemetery with his brother heroes.

For several decades now, in that spirit, you have championed respect and fair treatment for your fellow citizens—young and old, the living and the dead. You have stood for an America that is powerful but whose power always serves decent ends. What you stand for is what we stand for. So let us work together, now and in the future.

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[1] Press release 212 of Aug. 8, 1980. ■

The U.S. and Its Allies: New Patterns of Cooperation

Address before the Commonwealth Club of California and the World Affairs Council of Northern California in San Francisco, August 8, 1980, and a question-and-answer session following the address.[1]

When the President asked me to become the new Secretary of State, he assured me that there wouldn't be too much traveling. Since then I've been to Brussels and Vienna; to Venice, Ankara, and Kuala Lumpur; and to Japan—twice.

The traveling is not bad, actually. There's a similarity, I've found, between foreign travel and the seniority system in the Senate: They're both tastes that grow on you.

Partly by circumstances, but in larger part by choice, I have spent a fair portion of my time over the past 2½ months—both in these travels and at home—on the relationship between the United States and its major allies. I have done so because I deeply believe, as I have throughout my public career, that the strength and cohesion of our alliances are vital to our well-being as Americans.

This morning, I want to share some thoughts with you about our basic alliances—their condition today and their direction for the future.

My own public career began when our postwar security alliances—particularly NATO and our alliance with Japan—were being formed. From that time to this, there has scarcely been a moment when the strength of these partnerships was not being questioned.

Journalistic and other building inspectors regularly have examined our alliances and found them endangered—by "hairline cracks," sometimes by "gaping holes." They describe these problems with words like "disarray." Those same assertions are with us now.

It might be possible to base a response solely on the very real and broad agreement that was evident at the Venice summit and the meeting of NATO Ministers in Ankara. But I don't want to indulge in the rhetoric of blanket reassurance. The fact is that there are differences among us.

Nor do I offer the rhetoric of recrimination. From time to time, tension among free allies is understandable. We and our allies are now confronting new challenges as well as the old—challenges to our interests outside our alliance boundaries and others that arise from our growing economic interdependence.

Our common goals are enduring. We are joined to preserve our democratic way of life, by deterring war and also by working to lessen tensions between ourselves and our adversaries. But as we pursue those abiding central objectives, our patterns of cooperation must be broadened.

Beyond our collective defense, it has always been desirable for us and our allies to coordinate our actions elsewhere in the world. Today, however, that broader cooperation is not only desirable; it is indispensable. For we have reached a new era. We live in a time when central interests of the industrial democracies are touched not only by threatening military power on adjacent borders but by the reality of more distant aggression. It is an era when economic policy as well as military strategy profoundly affect our security interests, when we must concern ourselves with both the direct threat of armed attack and the conditions which breed turbulence in the developing world. And it is an era in which the defense of common Western interests increasingly requires a concerted Western response.

The challenges of this new era must be met. The industrial democracies must fashion a coordinated response to challenging events beyond our alliance areas.

If we do not, the consequences can be severe. In all our nations, confidence in our alliances and in each other can erode. And if we were to let short-term national concerns divert us from meeting shared strategic challenges—as in Afghanistan—we would risk our future security.

There have been tensions, in recent months, as we and our allies put together new responses to aggression in Afghanistan and terrorism in Tehran. But the differences we have had should not obscure a central fact. In the actions we are fashioning, we are also creating new patterns of cooperation. This process has generated considerable noise. But, in large measure, the sounds we hear are the sounds of construction.

Let us first be clear about the basic strength that is at the hard core of these relationships.

Our alliances are succeeding in their fundamental purpose—the collective defense of their collective territory. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has fostered more than 30 years of peace. Because it could defeat aggression against Western Europe, NATO has deterred that aggression. In the process NATO has shown remarkable resilience and growth.

- We have successfully managed far-reaching adjustments in strategic doctrine, from the era of massive retaliation to a more realistic strategy—one of flexible response to the full range of dangers we face.
- In June 1978, NATO adopted the Long-Term Defense Program to remedy weaknesses in our defense and build for the future.
- The NATO allies have committed themselves to a goal of 3% real growth in defense spending each year.
- NATO is responding effectively to the presence of new Soviet nuclear weapons in the European theater with new systems of our own and with an offer to negotiate truly equal limits on these weapons with the Soviets.

These are the efforts of a defense alliance vigorously meeting its basic purpose—strong and stalwart defenses.

The same is true in the Pacific. Our strategic relationship with Japan is growing. And our ANZUS relationship with Australia and New Zealand is strong.

So we begin with the fact that our major peacekeeping relationships, on both sides of the world, are working. They are solid. They are progressing. They are doing what they were created to do—deterring aggression.

New Realities

Nevertheless, it would be folly to ignore the new realities which now press us to shape new patterns of cooperation. One of those new realities is exemplified by the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.

In recent years, the military reach of the Soviet Union has extended to the Third World. Afghanistan is the most recent, and the most dramatic, evidence of growing Soviet military activism in the developing world.

By proximity and by precedent, the Soviet invasion has escalated the threat to energy supplies and trade routes vital to the United States and its allies. And it clearly demonstrates that there are new challenges to Western interests beyond immediate alliance boundaries.

A second new reality is the improved economic and political stature of our allies. The United States still holds the strategic umbrella. But gathered beneath that umbrella is a group of increasingly prosperous and powerful nations. The problems this development creates are a little like the tax problems of a multimillionaire—they are difficult, but they are the sort of problems you wouldn't mind having.

Strong partners deserve serious consultation; there will be no automatic acquiescence in American decisions. That fact may be unsettling to those who long for the days when America might dominate our allies. But the change is a fact nonetheless.

That decisions are now debated with vigor is not a sign of an alliance grown weak; it is a sign of allies grown stronger.

It is also a reality that our economic and political interests are not always identical. To many Americans, for example, detente may be an abstraction—a commonsense policy, but one that is remote from daily life. To the people of West Germany, on the other hand, the degree of tension between East and West has a direct bearing on everyday concerns. The opportunity to visit loved ones, the chance for Germans in the East to emigrate, the daily conditions in Berlin—all of these are at stake.

And there are other differences. For example, the dependence of the nations of Europe and Japan on outside energy sources is heavier than ours. Such differences in perspective must be accommodated as common positions are reached.

We in the United States need to be sensitive to the special concerns and vulnerabilities of our allies. At the same time, our allies must accept the growing responsibility that comes with growing strength. They must be prepared to bear their share of our common burdens.

The beginning of wisdom is to recognize these realities frankly and to use them as the basis for new patterns of cooperation.

Let me briefly describe how I see those patterns evolving.

Managing East-West Relations

The first area is our common strategy for managing East-West relations. The foundation of that strategy, today as in the past, must be an unquestioned military deterrent. For deterrence continues to be the cornerstone of the peace we intend to preserve.

The contribution our NATO partners make to our collective defense is not sufficiently recognized here at home. Our partners provide nearly half of NATO defense spending, almost 60% of its armed forces, about 75% of its tanks, more than 90% of its armored divisions.

But in the face of steady growth in Soviet military power, we and our allies are compelled to muster even greater defense efforts. These new burdens must be shared fairly and equitably.

As we in the United States significantly increase our own defense spending, we will expect our allies to fulfill their pledge to increase their own spending by 3% annually. And as the United States takes the lead to protect shared allied interests in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, our allies will shoulder a greater share of NATO's strength in Europe. In short, as we do what is needed to maintain a military balance, we will continue to call upon our allies to assume defense burdens commensurate with their prosperity, influence, and strength.

A common strategy toward East-West relations also requires a concerted political response to Soviet actions around the world.

The industrial democracies must make it unmistakably clear to the Soviet leaders that adventures such as that in Afghanistan carry genuine costs in our direct relations. As the President said in Venice, Europe cannot be an "island of detente" while aggression is carried out elsewhere. For that would simply invite new adventures and new crises, in Europe or elsewhere.

We must be prepared to hold to our course on Afghanistan for as long as that assault on national freedom continues. If allied nations or their business firms step in where the United States and American

aware, industrial countries are faced with domestic budgetary constraints, particularly in these times of stagflation. This is a major reason that we find it difficult to accept some of the developing countries' most pressing and legitimate claims, such as those for more official assistance and greater access to our markets. These are claims which do not jeopardize the world economic system but do require increased expenditures on aid and adjustment programs for workers and industries affected by increased imports.

Progress in Global Negotiations

In a sense, then, the North-South dialogue involves weighing a variety of politically, economically, and socially desirable goals – development, growth, efficiency, equity, and stability – in evaluating specific policy proposals. This is not dissimilar to the same kind of evaluation which the executive branch and the Congress must make in determining domestic policies. In both cases, it is a complicated process, but one in which progress is possible and imperative.

And progress has been made in the North-South dialogue. Measures have been taken which benefit both developed and developing countries and which have brought developing countries more fully into the international economic system. Without going into great detail, a few examples can be mentioned.

- In commodities, new agreements on rubber and sugar were negotiated, and the United States joined the tin agreement. Negotiations are well along on a Common Fund with a final package hopefully to be concluded in June. Liberalizations of the IMF's Compensatory Finance Facility in 1975 and 1979 are particularly useful to raw materials exporters.
- In the Tokyo Round the industrial countries agreed to cut tariffs by about one-third and impose greater discipline on nontariff trade barriers. In addition, the United States signed 27 bilateral agreements with developing countries. Further, all the industrial countries had previously implemented preferential tariff systems to help less developed countries.
- In finance, new facilities established in the IMF and enlarged quotas can make resources available to meet a variety of developing-country adjustment problems in larger amounts and on more flexible terms. Two weeks ago agreement in UNCTAD was reached on a restrictive business practices code.
- Regarding development assistance, in the past 4 years replenishments involving over $100 billion have been negotiated for multilateral development banks and funds. This includes $40 billion for the World Bank's general capital increase, which will guarantee its ability to operate well into the 1980s. The International Fund for Agricultural Development was established in Rome. Individual industrial and OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries have expanded their own assistance programs.
- Special attention has been given to the poorest developing countries. Official development assistance to them has risen from a level equal to about 4.1% of their combined GDP in 1971 to approximately 10.3% in 1978.
- In technology, we agreed at UNCSTD to the establishment of an interim fund for science and technology for development. Earlier, at the Tokyo summit, we agreed to double the resources of the international agricultural research centers, which focus on developing country agricultural problems.

If we wish to continue to make progress in the North-South arena, we should consider what factors have contributed to successful outcomes in the past. Two points are worth emphasizing. First, the dialogue has been most productive when it has been focused on specific issues and on realistic proposals. UNCTAD II dealt with trade preferences and UNCTAD IV on commodity agreements and the Common Fund. Developing countries continued to press these themes at subsequent international meetings, and positive accomplishments were eventually forthcoming.

Second, progress is most likely when there are clearly mutual interests involved, rather than one side asking the others to make concessions without getting anything in return. Regarding commodity policy, for example, the United States responded in the belief that stable commodity prices and production benefit consuming as well as producing countries. Unduly low prices discourage producers and can lead to subsequent shortfalls and high prices, and sharply rising prices have an inflationary impact on consumer economies. Similarly, liberalizing the Compensatory Finance Facility not only helped raw material producers to offset temporary shortfalls in their export earnings but enabled them to maintain their demand for manufactured goods at a more constant level, thus having a beneficial countercyclical impact on producers of capital goods.

Factors Impeding Progress

These conditions have sometimes been lacking. Last year at UNCTAD V in Manila, for example, the developing countries produced a long list of demands but with no particular focus. The conference was hence an unstructured affair which produced limited results. Developing countries prepared their positions for UNIDO [U.N. Industrial Development Organization] III in the highly political atmosphere of Havana and not only produced another long list of demands with little focus or attention to the interests of industrial countries but also put forth a totally unrealistic proposal for a $300 billion North-South fund for the promotion of the industrialization of developing countries. Once again progress proved impossible.

One reason it is so difficult for developing countries to limit their attention to a few priority items is the wide diversity of interests among them. The poorest countries need increased official development assistance, middle-income countries want balance-of-payments support and improved conditions for commodity trade, and the wealthier developing countries are most concerned about access to markets for industrial products, to private capital markets, and to technology. Oil-importing countries want stable oil prices and help to pay for the oil; oil-exporting countries worry about industrial-country inflation and security of their financial assets. Policies which might help one group of developing countries are of limited value or even detrimental to others. This results in formulating a list of demands based on a maximum common denominator, which satisfies their collective political needs but limits their political effectiveness in dealing with industrial countries, and greatly complicates the overall dialogue.

Future Approaches

As we prepare for global negotiations, we have carefully reviewed our experience in North-South discussions and examined the critical problems we see ahead. We know we are moving into a period of high oil prices, relatively low economic growth rates, and major financial imbalances. Slow growth and trade deficits will tempt many parties to urge protectionist trade measures. Further, a

number of developing countries will face increased food shortages by the mid-1980s.

In the next few years we must find ways to use energy more efficiently and locate new energy sources. We must find ways to assure that the enormous OPEC surpluses are recycled to allow reasonable growth levels to continue. We need to resist protectionist pressures and to assure growth in food production.

In the longer run, we must be certain that all countries can and do increase their production of conventional and nonconventional energy, as we move away from economies based on petroleum to ones based on a broader mix of energy sources. We need to encourage all countries to take positive measures which will encourage their economies to adjust to changing conditions, and we must help developing countries increase their food production.

These are major tasks, which must be pursued on many levels and in many fora. Some may be too urgent to await attention in the global negotiations. For example, the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD] already are examining new ways in which they can respond more effectively to the financial problems caused in large part by the recent rise in oil prices. But the global negotiations provide one mechanism which could help address these problems. The United States has accordingly devoted considerable attention to examining ways in which the international community might take maximum advantage of the global negotiations.

We suggested, at the outset, that we should try to focus the global negotiations on a limited number of subjects of interest to all participants where there was a realistic possibility of achieving tangible results. When the developing countries nonetheless presented a lengthy agenda including almost all topics covered in North-South discussions over the years, we urged that, at a minimum, the participating countries agree to focus immediately on an early action program which would address critical problems.

Specifically, we proposed that the global negotiations immediately turn its attention to four topics:

- A worldwide trade pledge to resist protectionist pressures and to promote positive adjustment;
- Assistance for exploration and development of energy resources in energy deficient countries;
- Improved world food security by fulfilling national targets of the food aid convention, backing these commitments with food aid reserves, and improving food storage and distribution in developing countries; and
- Suitable steps to facilitate the recycling of payments surpluses.

We are certainly open to other suggestions. But we emphasize that in such an early action program, we should select critical issues on which early agreement is possible. The global negotiations could identify these key issues and provide the political impetus needed for negotiating specific agreements in specialized fora, where they exist, or in the global negotiations themselves when there are no other appropriate fora. Once an early action program has been launched, the global negotiations could turn to longer term problems, such as food production, population and health, and structural adjustment.

We are pressing this approach in the preparatory work for global negotiations and in the special session itself, if agreement on an agenda for global negotiations has not been reached by that time. It should perhaps be reiterated that global negotiations are but one forum to address these problems. And it should also be pointed out that global negotiations, even if successful, will not solve all of the problems of the less developed countries. The negotiations and the North-South dialogue in general must be kept in perspective. Genuine economic development depends on a complex variety of factors. The institutions and the rules of the international economic system are of course important. But at least as important are the policies of the major industrialized countries with respect to inflation, growth, and trade, which together set the tone of the world economic environment. And, of course, the most critical variables are the developing countries' own policies, which influence either positively or negatively the millions of economic decisions by households, entrepreneurs, and firms which must provide the core of economic development. After all, we have examples of economic success stories and economic disasters among the developing countries – both occurring within the existing international economic system.

Unfortunately, overall development policy – as opposed to specific demands – is seldom addressed in North-South fora. The negotiation of an international development strategy for the 1980s is an exception, where greater attention is paid to the contributions both industrial and developing countries ought to make to development.

Like its predecessor of the 1970s, the new international development strategy is intended to set down a more systematic and more rational approach to economic and social development. It should provide a basis for meaningful coordination of national and international programs. By supporting provisions for reviewing development progress, we hope to make the strategy a document of continuing relevance through the decade.

Negotiations, however, have been contentious and the Group of 77 (G–77) and the industrialized countries still have major differences on the content of the new strategy. The developing countries are pushing for growth targets to be accepted as commitments, rather than as indications of what we hope can be accomplished. They also have included in their suggestion for policy measures a series of proposals for special development funds and other transfer mechanisms to which the industrialized countries cannot agree. There is one more regular negotiating session before the special session on which occasion the strategy is scheduled to go into effect to guide the United Nation's Third Development Decade.

The 11th Special Session, then, provides a unique opportunity both to launch a process of global negotiations which focuses on improvements in the international economic system which might benefit us all and to address questions of development strategy and goals which might better define how both industrial and developing countries can accelerate economic development. This is an important opportunity which we cannot afford to waste.

MR. EHRLICH

The last decade has been marked by periods of tension between developing countries of the South and industrial nations of the North. At times each group has been deeply suspicious of the other's motives and has expressed widely differing perceptions of global needs and priorities. This pattern may well persist; relations between developed and developing countries may periodically be abrasive far into the future, particularly in multilateral settings. But this reality

meetings and informally in the corridors. Many countries drew attention to the fact that any cessation of multilateral-development-bank lending caused by U.S. inaction would adversely affect development prospects in a large number of countries at a time of greatly growing need.

Countries were also troubled that the current problems concerning the regional development banks might spill over into the whole range of multilateral-development-bank issues, including the IDA sixth replenishment and the IBRD General Capital Increase. These concerns were expressed explicitly in the recent development committee communique, where legislative difficulties were singled out as threatening a hiatus in the commitment authority of the banks.

U.S. failure to meet its pledges to the multilateral development banks is rapidly becoming a major issue in U.S. relations with the developing world. The concerns expressed in Hamburg will almost certainly be echoed in other North-South fora unless we move quickly to repair the situation.

The IMF and the World Bank provide complementary sources of external capital. In the narrow sense, they have distinctly different functions and objectives. Yet both aim fundamentally at a strong global economy. The energy situation has brought to the surface the widespread need for structural adjustment in all oil-importing countries—developed and developing countries alike.

By cooperating closely, the Fund and World Bank can enable countries to undertake the needed medium-term structural adjustments, while simultaneously meeting the shorter term external financing needs. Fund policies aimed at eliminating internal and external imbalances can be reinforced with structural adjustment programs supported by the Bank. However, without strong and unwavering support from the United States for these two institutions, as well as the regional development banks, the international financial institutions will be unable to demonstrate the flexibility and strength necessary to meet the economic challenge before us.

Conclusion

There has been considerable progress during the past few years in North-South relations. In the process of attaining this progress, we have sought to insure that the policies adopted will provide benefits for the United States as well as for the developing countries. Indeed, this is the only politically viable way in which such progress can be made.

The primary task before us now is to consolidate and make full use of those international economic instruments which have recently been put in place or improved, most of which I have discussed today. Once we have implemented the new agreements and given them a chance to work, we can determine what further steps need to be taken.

At home, this requires timely and faithful implementation—including by the Congress—of the various steps which have been worked out internationally. Abroad, it requires patience and perseverance in effectively utilizing the agreements of the late 1970s. By building on the progress made on specific issues in functionally specific fora over the past few years, we can hope to evolve a more stable and equitable world economy in the 1980s and beyond.

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[1]The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.■

GLOSSARY

Brandt Commission. An independent commission on international economic issues headed by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and created in September 1977 at the suggestion of World Bank President Robert McNamara. It gathered information and proposed solutions to North-South problems. The commission issued its report on North-South relations in February 1980.

Common Fund. A fund to finance commodity buffer stocks as proposed in the 1976 Nairobi UNCTAD IV integrated program for commodities.

Compensatory Financing Facility. An IMF program established in 1963 to finance temporary export shortfalls, as in coffee, sugar, or other cyclically prone export items, for reasons beyond the member's control; member must cooperate with the IMF to find appropriate solutions (100% of quota; repayment in 3–5 years).

Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC). A conference of 8 industrial nations, 7 oil-producing nations, and 12 developing countries held in several sessions between December 1975 and June 1977. The CIEC was sometimes referred to as the North-South dialogue.

Developed Countries. Countries with relatively high per capita GNP, education, levels of industrial development and production, health and welfare, and agricultural productivity. International agencies differ in their classification of countries but, in general, the developed countries are considered to be the 24 OECD members and six centrally planned economy countries of Eastern Europe, including the U.S.S.R.

Developing Countries. The remaining countries of the world. They are largely poor and lack significant industry and efficient agriculture, although there is no uniform definition in terms of wealth or economic structure. The OPEC members, for example, are considered developing nations.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). A multilateral trade treaty negotiated and signed in 1947. The original 23 signatory nations had been appointed by ECOSOC to draft a charter for a proposed international trade organization. Since the charter was never ratified, GATT, intended to be an interim agreement, remains the only code of conduct for international trade accepted by the countries responsible for most of the world's trade. GATT has 83 members plus 23 developing countries participating under special arrangements.

Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). A system approved by GATT in 1971 which authorizes developed countries to give preferential tariff treatment to developing countries. The United States adopted the system in 1976.

Global Negotiations. The 34th U.N. General Assembly in the fall of 1979 adopted a resolution calling for a special session in August-September 1980 to decide on launching a new round of international economic negotiations. These negotiations—to include issues of raw materials, energy, trade, development, money, and finance—have come to be called "global negotiations."

Group of 77. A majority of developing countries that has its origins in the "caucus of 75" developing countries preparatory to UNCTAD I in Geneva in 1964. By the time UNCTAD I had completed its deliberations, the group had expanded by two members and issued a "Joint Declaration of the 77 Developing Countries" appraising the work of the conference. The numerical designation for the group has persisted, although in 1980 the membership is 119.

The G–77 has continued to function as a caucus for the developing countries on economic matters in UNCTAD and many other fora of the U.N. system. Although regional differences, level of development, trade relationships, and resource endowment have continued to provide areas of potential and actual cleavage within the group, it remains politically cohesive. The group includes

OPEC countries with per capita incomes higher than any developed country as well as the world's poorest nations.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, or World Bank). Created as a companion organization to the International Monetary Fund as a result of the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, the IBRD began its operations in 1946. Its purpose, after initially emphasizing the reconstruction of Europe after World War II, has been to lend funds at commercial rates and to provide technical assistance in order to facilitate economic development in its poorer member countries. The Bank works closely with other international organizations in preparing and identifying development projects in such areas as agriculture, education, electric power, transportation, and family planning.

IBRD funds are derived from members' subscriptions, sales of its own securities and parts of its own loans, repayments, and net earnings. Membership in the IMF is a prerequisite to membership in the IBRD.

International Development Association (IDA). The IDA was established in 1959 as an affiliate of the World Bank group. It lends money to developing countries at no interest and for a long repayment period (soft loans), because many developing countries cannot afford development loans at ordinary rates of interest and in the time span of conventional loans. IDA's funds are furnished by regular "replenishments" from member countries and by loans from the IBRD.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). An independent international organization created in 1945 as a result of the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, the IMF's chief purpose is the maintenance of international monetary stability. Members are assessed a membership quota to create the monetary fund; the standard rule is that 25% of the member's quota must be paid in gold and 75% in the member's own currency. The IMF's resources are used as a revolving fund that does not need to be replenished; whenever the Fund sells an amount in one currency to a member state, it obtains an equivalent amount in another currency.

Nonaligned Movement. A grouping of nations that have deliberately chosen not to be politically or militarily associated with either the West or the Communist bloc. Although this movement has its roots in a 1955 meeting of the leaders of 25 Asian and African countries at Bandung, Indonesia, it began formal meetings using the name "nonaligned countries" in Belgrade in 1961. At a Cairo meeting preparatory to the Belgrade conference, the countries adopted a definition of nonalignment which states that a nonaligned country must: "1) pursue an independent policy based on peaceful coexistence; 2) not participate in any multilateral military alliance . . . 3) support liberation and independence movements; and 4) not participate in bilateral military alliances with the Great Powers."

Six nonaligned summit meetings have been held—Belgrade (1961), Cairo (1964), Lusaka (1970), Algiers (1973), Colombo (1976), and Havana (1979). Interim leadership of the nonaligned countries rests with the country that last hosted a summit meeting. (A list of the 95 members of the nonaligned movement was printed in the February 1980 BULLETIN, p. 35.)

North-South Dialogue. Refers to economic discussions between the North (the industrialized developed countries generally located in the Northern Hemisphere) and the South (the developing countries located mainly in the Southern Hemisphere). Although the term "North-South dialogue" is used as a synonym for the CIEC, North-South issues are discussed at a number of international forums. The Soviet Union and its allies generally remain aloof from the North-South dialogue and only occasionally actively participate in North-South discussions. The Communist countries respond to the growing pressures to be more forthcoming toward LDC demands with the argument that LDC problems are the result of past colonialism and capitalism and, therefore, are the sole responsibility of the West.

Official Development Assistance. This is defined by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee as:

"Those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following tests: a) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective and b) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25 percent."

Official development assistance may be in the form of soft loans, bilateral grants, or multilateral flows of various types.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD was created in 1961 with 22 members—the industrialized market economies of North America, Europe, and the Far East. Its objectives are to promote economic growth among member nations, to contribute to the economic development of both member and nonmember nations, and to further world trade. A prominent organ of the OECD is the Development Assistance Committee, which coordinates and tabulates the official development assistance given by OECD members to developing countries. The membership is currently 24.

Supplementary Financing Facility. This IMF facility provides larger amounts and for longer periods in order to support economic programs under standby arrangements reaching into the upper credit tranches or under extended arrangements. Members are subject to relevant policies on conditionality, phasing, and performance criteria (102.5–140%) of quota; repayment in 3.5–7 years.

Third World. Refers to those countries with underdeveloped but growing economies, often with colonial pasts and low per capita incomes. "Third World" is often used interchangeably with the terms "less developed countries," "developing countries," or "the South." In the 1970s a "Fourth World" has been distinguished from the Third World to include those developing countries with little economic growth, few natural resources, lack of financial reserves, and with annual per capita incomes below $200. Two main branches of Third World institutions are the nonaligned movement (which acts primarily as the political caucus of the Third World) and the Group of 77 (which functions as the economic voice of the Third World).

U.N. Development Decades. A term used by the United Nations to refer to its 10-year plans for international development strategy in achieving eventual economic self-sufficiency in developing countries. The First Development Decade, proclaimed by President Kennedy in an address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, 1961, set as its goal a minimum rate of growth in national income of 5% in developing countries by the end of the decade. Developed countries were asked to provide 1% of their national incomes as financial aid to developing countries.

The Second Development Decade, adopted at the 25th General Assembly in 1970, called for an annual growth rate of at least 6% in the GNP of developing countries, an annual growth rate of 3.5% in per capita income in these countries, and resource transfers of at least 1% (of which 0.7% should be official development assistance) of GNP from developed countries.

Negotiations are now underway for a development strategy for the Third Development Decade—the 1980s. ■

hands of the Soviet Union. Within the next 6 months this is supposed to happen. Have you heard anything about this? And also what are you doing to strengthen our position in the Middle East now? What is currently being done?

A. By the "Middle East," what do you mean?

Q. Iran, Turkey, Yemen—to prevent Soviet control of that area and of the oil sources.

A. We're doing a number of things to deter further Soviet expansion, all of which have a bearing on it.

With respect to Soviet intentions vis-a-vis Iran, I think that is an uncertainty that ought to trouble Iran, as well as us and other countries. There is no way of determining Soviet intentions with certainty, but the fact that they have troops on the Iranian border and indulge in military exercises on the border, as well as getting involved in infiltration as they do in any country which they border, we know that creates an air of uncertainty that ought to be of concern.

The fact that our relations with Iran are at such an unfavorable level minimizes or makes impossible any influence on our part with respect to the Iranian interests.

On the other hand, we are in a position to be of assistance to Turkey, which adjoins Iran, which is having its own economic problems; and we are involved in a consortium led by Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany and the other NATO allies in putting together an economic package to help Turkey pull out of the economic doldrums in which it finds itself at the present time, and that, I think will be of significant assistance. We are doing the same thing with Pakistan in a consortium with other countries.

On the military side, we are building the rapid deployment force, to which I referred in my speech, and getting access rights to bases in that area which gives us more flexibility in emergencies. The NATO defense alliance is being strengthened in such a way as to give us flexibility to deploy forces outside the NATO area, if necessary. So along the defense line, we are doing a great deal to create a threshold across which the Soviets might be deterred from crossing, with the experience they have had with the world's reaction to Afghanistan.

Q. Recently the Canadian Government had some discussion with regard to the prebuilt pipeline running from Alberta into the United States, and there was some question here that they should not go ahead with the prebuilt lines unless the American Government was prepared to give some guarantees that the full Alaska-U.S. pipeline would be built. Can you say that these guarantees are forthcoming to the Canadian Government?

A. I know that as a result of our talks directed at that very point, Congress adopted a resolution—it doesn't have the force of law, but it gives the support of the Congress to the project—and my impression is that that assurance on the part of Congress may be enough for the Canadians to go forward.

We are also undertaking to press on the fisheries treaty affecting the eastern Provinces and our Northeastern States—another issue which I think affects Canadian perceptions of our commitment to this gas pipeline. So we are working on both and trying to get both.

Then there was another issue which troubled the Canadians, and that was the question of acid rain from our Midwest. And I just signed an interim agreement with Ambassador Towe, of Canada and [Environment] Minister Roberts of Canada committing ourselves to a program which, one, commits us to enforce our present laws, but secondly, to put together a program directed specifically at transboundary pollutants, of which acid rain is the most troublesome and most visible at the present time.

We are very concerned about our relations with Canada. Those are three issues that could become very divisive, and it is our intention and our determination to work on all three so that our generally good relations are not disturbed.

Q. Just to clarify one answer you gave earlier regarding the hostages: Would it be fair to say that you are ruling out the possibility that they might be released in the coming weeks, and that you know of no such plan?

A. No, I wouldn't rule out anything, nor would I raise expectations. You have to be very realistic and pragmatic. Release might be the result of what, on its face, is not a logical act or it might be the result of painful, carefully negotiated arrangements, or anything in between. And to try to predict in advance—

Who predicted Queen's release? An hour before he was released, he didn't even know it was being considered. He said he was given the word: "One hour from now you re being put on a plane to the United States," and so nobody anticipated that.

Q. I think what we're trying to get at is, besides the normal contacts which the State Department and this government have with Iran through third countries, is there something special that is happening regarding the arrangements that you mentioned just a minute ago?

A. Anything that works would be something special.

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[1] Press release 211 of Aug. 11, 1980. ■

Hostages' Families

While in San Francisco, Secretary Muskie met with families of the hostages held in Iran. Following are excerpts from a question-and-answer session held at the Hilton Inn Airport following a luncheon with the families on August 8, 1980.[1]

The purpose of coming here is because if you're a member of a hostage family, you've got to understand that they are scattered across the country—many of them a distance from Washington, feeling lonely—and it's important that they have the sense, from time to time, of direct contact with their government and especially with that department or agency which has a large part of the responsibility for solving their problem.

I undertook to come here for that purpose, so they could take a look at me, listen to me, and get some feeling as to whether or not there is reason to have some confidence that I am involved in a real effort, a genuine effort, and a meaningful effort to help bring their loved ones back to them.

With respect to the means that we used, those of you who are close to the State Department in your day-to-day work understand that a great deal of this effort takes the form of quiet diplomacy, involving channels of communication available to us or to friends and allies around the globe—channels of communication which, if revealed, could dry up. So it's not possible for me to answer your questions such as the one or two that have been raised here so explicitly and in such detail. You would know as much about it as those of us who have some responsibility for it.

We seek to take advantage of the dynamism of the situation, which is responsive to forces operating within Iran and on the borders of Iran. It is affecting Iran's economy, their potential safety or lack of safety, their political process, the development of government institutions with the authority to deal with this issue, to make decisions on this, as well as other decisions that the Government of Iran will eventually have to make as they are held accountable for the welfare of their own people, as well as for the welfare of the hostages. This is about as detailed a characterization as I can make of my conversations with the hostage families.

In addition to that, I undertook to listen to each one of them, and listen to their own frustrations, their own suggestions about how our policy ought to be applied to the problem—and that was a very moving experience. I mean the toughest question to answer is: "Why can't my boy come home tomorrow?" or "Why was he held there in the first place?" Questions like that aren't easily answered. But the fact that they had an opportunity to ask it of the Secretary of State and to challenge the Secretary of State to answer it gives them some escape and some relief from the frustrations that they face in their day-to-day lives.

This is why I came here. I didn't come here to make hard news or to unveil a magic new formula for dealing with the problem. I came out here to listen to the hostage families in a way that is helpful and meaningful to them and useful to me, and that's what it's all about. I have no hard news to give to any of your questions.

Q. Did any of the families advocate taking advantage of the current situation with the Iranian students, to use them as trading material or at least a psychological break in the hostage crisis?

A. No, I don't recall that any of them did. Some of them expressed frustration that these demonstration might have an undesirable and unfavorable impact upon the hostages in Iran.

Q. About the families' morale, how is it holding up after all this time?

A. It's about what you would expect. Frustrations grow. There were a lot of tears in there, and that is bound to continue.

Q. Do you hold out any more hope now than might have been held out back in November? Has there been any improvement at all, as far as any release at any time in the foreseeable future?

A. Obviously, what I said just a little while ago. There is a dynamism to this situation which is changing the political situation internally, which is changing the economic situation internally, which is changing the leadership situation internally—and all those changes may well, after the fact, be seen as improvements in the prospects for resolving the problem. But I think it is difficult to reach such a conclusion at this point. It's like looking at the latest polls bearing upon our own election campaign and asking the question: "Well, does this poll mean that the President is worse off or better off?" We'll know the answer to that on November 5.

Q. Did they have a lot of criticism for the State Department? There was a lot of frustration. Was it directed toward the Department?

A. I told them to make me their target. I mean, frustration has got to have a target if you want them to be relieved, but I don't sense that there was specific criticism directed at the State Department as an institution.

There were differences of opinion among the hostage families as to whether a hard line, a diplomatic line, or some other line ought to be used; but this comes, I think, out of the frustrations. So I don't think they gathered in some concerted effort to shoot at us.

Q. Did they make any comments regarding the rescue attempt?

A. There were a number who expressed the hope that there would not be another one, but there were others who seemed more receptive to another try. There were differences of opinion.

Q. Do you know where all the hostages are?

A. I don't think I had better answer that question.

Q. Did any of the families discuss any desire to go to Iran at all, ask your permission?

A. I think the accurate answer to that is no, but that ought not to be taken as a reflection of what their response might be if they were directly asked that question.

. . . .

Q. What is your reading today of the pro-Khomeini demonstrations in

Exports of Tropical Woods, 1966-77

(millions of Cubic Meters)



Interpretation:

Vertical axes of histograms indicate millions of cubic meters of wood exported. Exports of plywood, lumber, etc., are converted to roundwood equivalents.

Note the very different scales used on the vertical axes of the histograms.

Note downward trend of Latin American exports over period, in contrast to relatively stable situation in Africa and the rapid increase and recent leveling off of Asian exports.

(Source: FAO, 1979b.)

to conduct sound forest management; and

• Success by the international community in relieving pressures on the tropical forests by providing food and energy for the poor and by slowing population growth and regulating land-use patterns and practices.

Clearly there are difficult obstacles to achieving the goals. The most formidable lies in the fact that the greatest pressures on the forests come from the quest of poor people for land, food, and energy. In this regard the solutions will, in large part, depend upon efforts undertaken outside the forest sector—actions involving increased food production on existing lands, development of energy alternatives for rural areas, and family planning programs.

A related challenge involves the problem of increasing the economic return from the forests and on a sustained basis, while at the same time protecting and preserving wildlife, ecological, and other noncommercial values. While international discussions reveal a willingness by tropical countries to consider and introduce measures to improve forest management, their representatives say that this must not be at the expense of sacrificing the economic return. Indeed, some developing country spokesmen are suggesting that if the tropical forests are a resource of global importance, then the rich countries must share the cost of protecting and maintaining them.

This, in turn, leads us to a third area wherein both problems and opportunities exist: namely the role and responsibilities of the commercial sector, including U.S. overseas industry. With the demand for wood and wood products for domestic and international markets projected to increase significantly, governments of tropical countries will be seeking to expand commercial cutting of timber. They indicate that their objectives include both obtaining increased prices per unit of wood harvested and requiring concessionaires to exercise improved harvesting and processing techniques to eliminate waste and to protect adjacent forest areas. This means that U.S. and other foreign firms may face different "rules of the road" governing their overseas operations dictated by host governments.

There is, consequently, a need to insure that commercial forestry in the tropical countries moves forward in a fashion that maintains wood production while affording greater protection to the forest environment. There is, in particular, the need to move vigorously toward plantation forestry that will enable other forest areas to be reserved for nontimber uses. To achieve this, the international community must press for an investment climate that provides incentives for corporations to pursue sound, long-term management without damaging their competitive position vis-a-vis other firms.

Finally, there is the difficult problem of gaining international agreement on the priority, funding, and coordination of a tropical forest program involving a multitude of governments, international and regional institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. On the basis of the international experts meeting in Nairobi, and subsequent supportive action by the UNEP governing council, there is a rapidly emerging worldwide consensus that the loss of tropical forests demands high priority attention. However, the matter of mobilizing the necessary financial resources during a period of inflation and tight budgets is yet to be faced, as are the issues of overall program leadership and coordination. Still to be worked out are the appropriate roles of the array of international and regional bodies with relevant tropical forest mandates and interests.

We are pleased to see that the subcommittee plans to devote the second in its series of hearings on this subject specifically to international organizational issues. In the view of our Federal task force, one of the key needs is to encourage and assist the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization to strengthen and expand its tropical forest activities and to assume the central coordination function for the international program we are working toward. Significant contributions from the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UNEP, the World Bank, the Organization of American States, and a host of other organizations will also be required if an effective program is to be launched.

As noted earlier, the United States has broad-based and vital interests in insuring that the viability of the tropical forest resource is sustained—this despite the small amount of tropical forest this country possesses. We have, to date, managed to play a lead role internationally in raising awareness of the tropical forest loss problem and the range of values being sacrificed. We

have also participated actively in the initiation of an international program designed to achieve the goal of conservation of the world's tropical forests to serve man's long-term needs. Domestically, a variety of Federal agencies have already taken steps to strengthen and expand their tropical forest activities, and U.S. Federal and non-Federal sector institutions have demonstrated a desire and ability to join forces to develop an effective U.S. response to international needs. We believe it important that we be alert to opportunities to contribute to alleviating these problems.

The task force has developed a number of specific recommendations. We expect to carefully review these recommendations in terms of specific programs, resource commitments, and their impact on other policies and interests.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Copies of Tropical Forests Report

The World's Tropical Forests: A Policy, Strategy, and Program for the United States was published in May 1980 by the U.S. Interagency Task Force on Tropical Forests. Copies of this 53-page report are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for $3.50 each. Remittance, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany order.

Continuing the CSCE Process

Following are remarks by President Carter at a White House ceremony commemorating the 5th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act and remarks by Secretary Muskie before a foreign policy conference on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at the State Department on July 29, 1980.

PRESIDENT CARTER[1]

This event which will take place in Madrid is one of the most important of 1980. I'm very pleased that all of you could come to Washington today to meet with the leaders of the delegation. Our public members, about 30 of you, are here in the audience and you've had a chance to review both the purpose of the Helsinki accords and what we hope to accomplish working with the other nations in November of 1980. We will have to rely on you very heavily, not only to represent our nation and the principles on which it's founded but also in an evocative way, a clear way, to present our beliefs and our commitments, our principles and our ideals to the rest of the world.

There is opposition abroad, as you well know, to the pursuit of the principles espoused by the 35 nations at Helsinki. And there is some skepticism here at home from others who don't understand the fundamental truth that peace on the one hand and the pursuit of human rights on the other are irrevocably interrelated. Peace and the pursuit of human rights cannot be strengthened one without the other. They cannot be successfully advanced independently of one another. That belief which we all share is above party as the history of the Helsinki process proves. A Republican administration signed the accords and now a Democratic administration is deeply committed to carrying out those agreements.

The accords embody goals and values in which Americans believe as human beings who are struggling to build a more decent and a more humane world. The pledges given by the 35 signatories at Helsinki 5 years ago were not lightly undertaken, and they cannot be lightly abandoned or ignored. The document that was signed there, even though it was called the final act, was not the end of our work. It was just a fresh start on work that commenced in this nation more than 200 years ago.

The Madrid meeting this year [beginning November 11, 1980] is designed to assess what progress has been made and, if possible, to speed its pace and to widen the scope of that progress. Like the Belgrade meeting in 1977, attended by some of you, Madrid is an opportunity to look carefully backward and also to permit us to push forward vigorously.

Some have said that we should stay away from Madrid, that we ought to drop out of the Helsinki process. Such ideas spring from ignorance of the meaning of Madrid. Some have even compared the meeting in Madrid to the Moscow Olympics, suggesting that since American athletes chose not to go to Moscow, that American diplomats and citizens should not go to Madrid. This reasoning is, of course, very confused. As host to the Olympics, the Soviet Union sought to enjoy both the fruits of aggression in Afghanistan and the prestige and the propaganda value of being the host of the Olympics at the same time. American athletes and those of 50 other nations rejected that equation as indecent and unacceptable. I commend them. They stayed at home, at great sacrifice to themselves, and without them the Moscow spectacular has become a pathetic spectacle. But Madrid will not be an aggressor's propaganda festival. The Spanish are the hosts, not the Soviets. The Soviet Union will be there as the other 34 states will be there.

To give an account of the manner in which the commitments at Helsinki have been fulfilled or not fulfilled is the undertaking of the meeting at Madrid. It would certainly please those who are most guilty of violation of the principles of Helsinki, including human rights, to be freed of their obligation to account for their actions before world opinion, which will be focused upon the meeting in Madrid. There will be no medals awarded in Madrid. It's not a wrestling match or a gymnastic tournament among diplomats. What it will test is the progress made on the international agenda of security and cooperation and the firmness of the principles by which the 35 participants agreed to be bound.

In pursuing the cause of human

the contemporary phenomenon of worldwide inflation is being influenced by rising demand associated with the vast increases in population. Commodities become more costly as supplies dwindle or fail to keep pace with rising demand, or as they become more expensive to obtain. Population growth has also been linked with pressure on energy and raw material supplies. A recent Worldwatch study concludes that, "everywhere one turns, limits are being encountered and the effects are being compounded . . . . It seems clear that the world is entering a new period of scarcity." Problems of water pollution, soil erosion, and deforestation are becoming major international issues as a consequence of overintensive farming, overgrazing, encroachment of cities, and uncontrolled industrialization.

President Carter, in a message to Congress in May 1977, stated that: ". . . without controlling the growth of population, the prospects for enough food, shelter, and other basic needs for all the world's people are dim." It is worth underscoring the fact that there are no food, energy, or resource problems *per se*, but only in relation to numbers of people and their consumption levels. If the world does not address the underlying causes, our efforts will continually lag behind growing imbalances and strains.

National Security

For many countries, the prospects for at least the next two decades are not promising: food scarcities and probable expansion of malnutrition, diversion of potential investment resources to maintain an expanding population, increasing underemployment and unemployment, growing numbers of landless poor people, and a tremendous growth in urban proletariat—all exacerbated by such global factors as inflation, higher priced energy, and environmental degradation. Rapid population growth is a major contributing element to all of these conditions and, in addition, itself creates a large proportion of youth in the population. Recent experience, in Iran and other countries, shows that this younger age group—frequently unemployed and crowded into urban slums—is particularly susceptible to extremism, terrorism, and violence as outlets for frustration.

On balance, these factors add up to an increasing potential for social unrest, economic and political instability, mass migrations, and possible international conflicts over control of land and resources.

It is admittedly difficult to be analytically precise in pinpointing exact causes of a given historical breakdown in domestic or international order. Nevertheless, there is, in my opinion, a clear connection between such instability and the frustrations caused by absolute and relative poverty, reinforced by unprecedented demographic pressures. The examples of warfare in recent memory involving India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, El Salvador, Honduras, and Ethiopia and the potential for increased instability in such places as Turkey, the Philippines, Central America, Iran, and Pakistan surely justify the question being raised as to the contributing role of population factors.

Many developing countries of particular importance to U.S. security are currently experiencing some combination of fast population growth, high and growing population density relative to arable land, massive rural-urban migration, and high underemployment and unemployment—particularly among urban youth. Our interests in many of these countries include—in addition to our traditional concern for human welfare and dignity—such geopolitical factors as strategic location, provision of military bases or support, and supply of oil or other critical raw materials.

In the Middle East, the four most populous nations—Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan—are experiencing in varying degrees the complex effects of rapid population growth. In Egypt, for example, where the ratio of population to arable land is among the highest in the world, almost 10% of GNP is devoted to food subsidies; attempts to lower these subsidies 3 years ago led to rioting in Cairo and other cities. In each of these countries, unemployment is already a serious concern, and the labor pool is growing at an alarming pace. The possible spread of political instability through this so-called arc of crisis could imperil vital U.S. interests in oil-producing countries, as well as weaken the southern flank of NATO.

Other countries affected by demographic pressures include such key suppliers—or potential suppliers—of U.S. petroleum imports as Indonesia, Mexico, Venezuela, and Nigeria—already heavily populated countries with high growth rates. They also include countries like Bolivia, Brazil, Morocco, the Philippines, Zimbabwe, and Thailand, which supply essential U.S. imports of tin, antimony, tungsten, manganese, chromite, and rare ores used for production of jet engines and similar purposes. The U.S. Department of the Interior estimates that, by the year 2000, the United States will be dependent on imports for 12 out of 13 critical minerals required by U.S. industry.

The near certainty of at least a doubling of the populations of most developing countries within the next two to three decades has particular significance for the United States, which has been the goal of so many of the world's emigrants and refugees. Problems of unemployment and income distribution, aggravated by high population growth, contribute to pressures for migration to the United States from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.

In sum, the potentially destabilizing effects of excessive population growth in the years ahead must be taken seriously. Disorders abroad can affect our military and strategic situation, as well as our own unemployment, inflation rate, the prices and availability of critical industrial raw materials, and markets for our exports.

U.S. International Population Policy

Both the Secretary of State and the President's National Security Adviser have emphasized the fundamental linkage between population developments, foreign policy, and national security. [Former] Secretary of State Vance, in a letter to all U.S. Ambassadors in December 1978, noted that excessive population growth in many areas of the world complicates and makes more difficult U.S. and international efforts to address a broad range of global issues, including economic development, political stability, unemployment, poverty and malnutrition, migration, inflation, the environment, and energy and resource scarcities.

The fact that this modern phenomenon of rapid population growth—both on a global scale and in particular key countries—is not merely another economic development issue, is reflected in the U.S. Government's approach to this subject. In recognition of the special problems posed by population issues for U.S. foreign policy, the President has assigned to the Department of State, through an NSC [National Security Council] interagency

framework, "the responsibility to define and develop policy in the population field and to coordinate its implementation." The NSC Ad Hoc Group of Population Policy, comprising 18 U.S. Departments and agencies, is chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs; the Department's Coordinator of Population Affairs acts for the Assistant Secretary in working sessions of the group. Each year, the group produces an annual report to the President which is the basic national policy document on this subject.

U.S. international population policy fully supports the expression at the 1974 World Population Conference in Bucharest of the basic human right of individuals to decide on the number and spacing of their children and the corollary responsibility of governments to provide the information, education, and means to do so. The United States has accepted a leadership role in global efforts to limit population growth and to implement the various actions ratified at Bucharest under the "World Population Plan of Action." In exercising this role, however, the U.S. objective is to work closely with other nations and organizations, rather than seeking to impose our views.

It has been U.S. policy during recent Administrations to respond promptly and fully to requests from developing countries for assistance in dealing with their population growth problems. U.S. policy emphasizes encouraging leaders of developing countries to establish and actively promote, in cooperation with multilateral institutions and other donors, national programs to reduce fertility levels. We believe that such programs, to be more effective, should be fully integrated into a country's development strategy. Finally, we hold that both donors and recipient countries should emphasize programs, in the context of development, which enhance motivation for small families, as well as provide a full range of family planning information and services.

U.S. international population policy is reflected in a range of activities, including diplomatic and other high-level contacts and statements, positions at international conferences, assistance to governments in establishing and implementing population programs, training, provision of commodities, and biomedical and social sciences research. U.S. foreign assistance is provided by the Agency for International Development (AID), operating under the policy and budgetary guidance of the new International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA). U.S. aid is given bilaterally directly to foreign governments, as well as through multilateral organizations—primarily the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA)—and nongovernmental intermediaries. In addition, the Center for Population Research at the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, Department of Health and Human Services, is primarily responsible for administering U.S. Government research in population sciences, much of which has important implications on the international scene.

U.S. international population policy is predicated on the fact that the demographic situation is obviously serious, but it is not hopeless. A growing body of evidence demonstrates that population trends can be influenced by determined public and private sector programs. Data developed during 1979 reinforced earlier evidence of significant fertility declines in a number of populous countries, notably China, but also including Indonesia, Thailand, Colombia, and most recently, Mexico. Impressive results have been achieved in many areas among poor, illiterate, and rural populations of varying ethnic and religious backgrounds. The keys to success generally include commitment of goverment leadership, effective delivery of family planning information and services, local community involvement, and an enhanced status of women, including education and employment opportunities. Improvements in health and economic conditions and hope for future progress appear to be important factors in motivating couples to desire smaller families. In a growing number of countries—for example, China, Singapore, and Thailand—economic incentives and disincentives have contributed to dramatic declines in fertility.

Some observers believe, however, that these successes represent the easy phase. Reducing fertility to replacement levels will require considerably more intensive, and expensive, efforts in terms of education, motivation, and expansion of services. Over one-half, and perhaps as many as two-thirds, of Third World couples (outside of China) do not currently have access to family planning information and services. The major countries of South Asia—India, Pakistan, Bangladesh—are making limited progress at best in slowing population growth; the same is true of Egypt, Jordan, Iran, and Turkey in the Middle East; and of many smaller, but nonetheless, densely populated Latin American countries. Much of Africa has not yet recognized the need for action in the face of high-population growth rates.

The constraints impeding effective population programs continue to present formidable problems. These include uneven commitment of political leadership, limited administrative capacity, logistical difficulties, religious conservatism, fatalism, apathy, and personal attitudes toward family size. There is also a great need for improved contraceptive methods, more effective rural delivery systems, and enhanced efforts toward motivation.

Yet there are signs of growing realization of the problem and of growing potential demand for family planning services. Population is no longer a North-South confrontational issue, and many LDC leaders have spoken forcefully and publicly on the need to reduce fertility in order to achieve the development aspirations of their peoples. In most of the 18 developing countries studied by the World Fertility Survey, substantial proportions of married women indicated they desired no more children. A recent poll in India revealed a strong consensus on the urgency of controlling population growth, with a majority favoring use of incentives to limit family size.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The above paragraphs summarize the context for U.S. international population policy. It is evident that, as [former] Secretary of State Vance has said: ". . . it would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of this problem." Current demographic projections convey a clear message that the future consequences of complacency and delay in reaching replacement fertility levels will be billions of individuals added to an overpopulated and overstrained future world. But strenuous efforts will be required to reach the two-child norm. It has been estimated that, in order to reach replacement level of fertility, two-thirds of couples must practice family planning; currently, however, only about one-quarter to one-third of couples in developing countries (apart from China) are estimated to do so. And, many more women are entering the reproductive age each year than

in no way diminishes the need for the governments of all nations to meet on common problems of global concern. Indeed, over the course of the last decade, significant progress of mutual benefit to both developed and developing countries has been achieved in areas of trade, monetary and financial affairs, commodities, and food and agricultural development. In the decade ahead it will remain in our interest to continue to work with developing countries on problems of common concern. Global negotiations provide one—among many—occasions for partnership.

Last December, when the United States agreed with other U.N.-member states to prepare a new round of global negotiations, we said they could make useful contributions to resolving international economic problems if they focused on a limited number of specific issues. We also said that the negotiations should give momentum to ongoing efforts in other international organizations. From a development perspective, the need to set priorities and not to disrupt or duplicate ongoing activities is still a key requirement.

We are now working with other countries to establish the agenda and procedures for global negotiations. This may be a difficult and trying process. The United Nations is a highly visible, political forum. Discussions take place among more than 150 countries with widely disparate needs, capabilities, and interests.

Before discussing the issues that those and other aspects of our relations with developing countries might usefully address in the year or two ahead, I want to underscore deep concern about one legislative problem. If not corrected, it could cripple our efforts to strengthen ties with nations of the South as well as bring to a halt vital support for development throughout the Third World.

Several weeks ago the House refused to approve the conference report on legislation to authorize our participation in several of the regional multilateral development banks. I emphasize at the outset, however, its importance for our development policy concerns, for our continued leadership in North-South relations, and for the credibility of our position in preparation for the global negotiations. We have stressed that on monetary and financial issues the fora for negotiations are the IMF and the multilateral development banks.

My comments this afternoon will emphasize four main points.

- It is in our interest to focus serious attention on the problems of development and on economic negotiations with developing countries, and it is in our interest to be perceived as serious.
- Among the priority development issues for the 1980s are food, energy, population, and economic adjustment. These concerns are important to us as well as to developing countries. And they correspond to our priorities in development assistance.
- Those four issues are substantively interrelated; prospects for mutually acceptable progress on each of them would be enhanced by attention to the interrelations.
- Global negotiations can contribute to progress on these issues. Those negotiations are not the only context in which we are discussing food, energy, population, and economic adjustment; we are also addressing these and other concerns in negotiations with developing countries on a new international development strategy and elsewhere as well. But the global negotiations do offer a prime opportunity for progress. It would be misleading to be enormously optimistic; a significant dose of healthy skepticism is essential about any prospective international undertaking, particularly when the agenda is, quite literally, global. But it would be equally wrong to be only pessimistic, for we believe that real gains for all nations are possible through the global negotiations.

In the decade ahead it will remain in our interest to continue to work with developing countries on problems of common concern. Global negotiations provides one—among many—occasions for partnership.

U.S. Interests

Against that background, I begin with the profound importance to the United States of helping to promote development and working with developing countries to solve problems of mutual concern. Earlier this year, a distinguished international commission [Independent Commission on International Economic Issues or Brandt Commission] issued its report on North-South relations. It was headed by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and included leaders from developed and developing countries, including two eminent Americans. Later this year the International Development Cooperation Agency will report to the President on the results of an interagency review of the commission's recommendations. The central theme of the Brandt Commission report is the common interest of nations within both the North and the South in meeting the challenge of development and in responding to specific global economic problems. For us, this common interest relates not only to the humanitarian concerns of our people but also to our political, economic, and strategic future.

Political. We have important political interests in helping to promote development among Third World countries. And we have political interests in maintaining an international economic order in ways that benefit all nations. We seek a world at peace—in which each nation honors the others' national independence, in which the people of each nation participate in its political process, in which each nation respects the human rights of its citizens, in which each nation strives to meet equitably the economic aspirations of its people.

Development is often destabilizing. Pressures to redistribute economic and political power can be unsettling. But the resulting changes are not as threatening to peace and international stability as the dangers of pent-up rage from injustice and hunger. The question is not whether change from development should occur, but whether change will be channeled in constructive directions. Development, with our help, is the best hope for a world in which human and political liberties flourish. The road to this goal may be rough, but our interests are clearly served by conducting relations in a way that promotes development.

Economic. The growing economic basis for our interests in developing countries is also striking.

- More than one-third of U.S. exports are shipped to developing nations.
- 800,000 American jobs in manufacturing alone depend on exports to developing countries.

• We export 50% of our cotton, 65% of our wheat, and 70% of our rice to the developing world.

• To a growing extent we must rely on developing countries for vital materials. For example, the United States imports 100% of our tin requirements, 90% of the bauxite used for aluminum, and all of our natural rubber needs from developing countries. Most important, 41% of the petroleum we use comes from developing countries and roughly half of that from nations outside the Middle East.

• And as of 1978, American firms have invested over $40 billion in developing countries, nearly one-quarter of our total foreign direct investment.

These are a few examples of our deepening economic involvement with the Third World.

Strategic. The United States has another critical stake in relations with the countries of the South. Developing nations are vital to the resolution of a wide range of global problems that concern the American people directly – from the peaceful resolution of disputes in Africa to the protection of our Earth's environment. Wasteful use of the Earth's resources, pollution of the Earth's atmosphere, international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, unchecked arms competition, and the pressures of rapid population growth, all threaten the well-being and safety of the human race. None can be solved without the involvement and cooperation of developing nations.

Humanitarian. Finally, overwhelming humanitarian needs require us to work with Third World governments to help poor people in their countries. Almost one billion of those people live in absolute poverty. They lack safe drinking water, access to basic health care, and other essentials. Fifteen million children die each year from malnutrition and infection.

Our political, economic, strategic, and humanitarian interests can be served by U.S. support for development and by progress in North-South negotiations. The North-South dialogue and development efforts are intricately interrelated, although they are by no means synonymous. Development is one goal of North-South economic negotiations. It is explicitly the focus of concern of negotiations on an international development strategy for the decade of the 1980s. That strategy, thus far the subject of considerable disagreement between developed and developing countries, aims to set long-run objectives for development cooperation. Goals for actions by developing as well as developed countries are the subject of the negotiations on the international development strategy. But, clearly, there is much we can do to support development that is outside this and other North-South negotiations. And there is much that developing countries need to do within their own societies, quite apart from the efforts of other nations to help them.

Conversely, North-South negotiations are about more than promoting development. They are about the rules, principles, and procedures governing international economic relations. Of particular importance, they are about the role and responsibility of both developing and developed states in the management of the international economic system. The challenge for us as well as for all other countries is to deal with North-South issues in a way that is conducive to meeting both development concerns and other global economic goals.

For all these reasons, we should be – and be viewed as – serious about engaging in substantive negotiations with developing countries on issues of mutual concern. This means that neither the United States nor other countries should approach the North-South dialogue as a discussion of what the rich can give the poor but rather as one of several means by which nations can work together to meet global economic problems for their mutual benefit.

Taking the North-South dialogue seriously also means that we cannot begin with unalterable positions. We cannot dictate unilateral solutions. Nor can other countries. We are talking about a negotiating process. As in any negotiation, there must be real give and real take.

We need now to arrive at an agreement with developing countries on an agenda of priority issues on which both sides are prepared to enter active negotiations. We have urged this problem-solving approach concerning the global negotiations and in the key international financial institutions. That approach is antithetical to putting every possible demand on an agenda. Sharp focus on key problems is the only way that the dialogue between North and South has made – and can continue to make – progress on critical problems that affect both prospects for development and the health of the global economy.

Key Issues

The main point I want to emphasize today can be simply stated. The most pressing development goals we believe the world community has for the 1980s are economic adjustment, food, energy, and population. Those issues are important to the Third World prospects for development. They are issues on which sufficient international consensus can be generated to enable agreement on specific actions. And their resolution would be consistent with U.S. interests. Let me describe, briefly, the central features of each issue, beginning with adjustment.

Adjustment. By adjustment, I mean the necessary process within all societies of accommodating to changing world economic conditions, including the higher costs of energy and the payments imbalances they engender. For many developing countries the need to adjust to structural imbalances has become the major medium-term challenge to achieving sustainable economic development.

In the past, in dealing with problems of developing country deficits and adjustment, adjustment has been synonymous with austerity. In the 1960s and early 1970s, many developing countries sought short-term balance-of-payments support to help in difficult years when imports exceeded exports. In response, they were generally told to tighten their belts. Now we are considering adjustment in a broader dimension. We are considering adjustment to structural changes in the global economy, and this is going to have to entail the reallocation of investment in developing countries geared to increasing their exports and reducing their imports of goods they can produce efficiently at home. This includes – of particular importance – developing alternative energy resources and making greater strides to achieve food self-sufficiency when economically feasible.

Without the changes, those countries will be overwhelmed by financial and political strains. To help promote the changes, suitable steps to facilitate the recycling of payments surpluses will be needed and adequate levels of development assistance provided for the poorest countries.

The rise in oil prices, as you well know, has led to enormous OPEC surpluses. The oil price increases have also led – directly and indirectly – to sizable increases in current-account deficits of Third World countries already much in debt. Although the situation is manageable in 1980, looking at 1981 and beyond, there is cause for concern and careful attention. Crippling financial

The Global 2000 Report

Following are the President's and the Secretary's statements of July 24, 1980, on The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the Twenty-First Century, *together with the major findings and conclusions taken from volume 1 of that report.*

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT[1]

Shortly after assuming office in 1977, I directed the Council on Environmental Quality, the Department of State, and other government agencies to study the profound changes that may take place in our world's population, natural resources, and environment through the end of the century.

Never before had our government or any government attempted to take such a comprehensive, long-range look at interrelated global issues such as world population, agriculture, water resources, forest resources, energy needs, and the overall environmental quality of the Earth we live on.

The *Global 2000* study is now complete. Its report projects global conditions which could develop by the end of this century, assuming that present trends and patterns around the world continue. Many of the report's findings must be of great concern to all of us. These findings point to developments related to the world's peoples and resources that our prompt attention can begin to alleviate. We will make use of the information from the *Global 2000* report in carrying out public policy wherever possible. In addition, we must continue to analyze the serious issues it raises.

It is important to understand that the conditions the report projects are by no means inevitable. In fact, its projections can and should be timely warnings which will alert the nations of the world to the need for vigorous, determined action, at both the national and international levels.

The United States is not alone in responding to global population, natural resources, and environmental issues. The recent Venice summit declaration committed the Western industrial nations to cooperate with developing countries in addressing global food, energy, and population problems. The summit nations agreed on the need for a better understanding of the implications of resource availability and population growth for economic development. In the United Nations many of the key issues raised in the *Global 2000* report are being included in the formulation of a new international development strategy.

A number of U.S. and international responses to critical global issues are already underway. For example, since the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, our government has contributed actively to a series of world conferences on these issues and to followup actions.

Nonetheless, given the importance, scope, and complexity of the challenges set forth in the report, I believe America must provide special leadership in addressing global conditions. I am, therefore, today appointing a Presidential Task Force on Global Resources and the Environment, to be chaired by the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, and to include the Secretary of State, the Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The task force will report to me as soon as possible with recommendations for action in problem areas needing priority attention. I am directing other Federal agencies to cooperate with and support the task force's efforts.

I am also directing the State Department to raise the issues and problems identified in the *Global 2000* report in all appropriate international meetings, and I myself will raise them as well. For example, in my second environmental message last August, I expressed my concern about the loss of tropical forests. For immediate action on this critical problem, I am directing all relevant Federal agencies to respond within 60 days to the Interagency Task Force Report on Tropical Forests, which was submitted to me last month. In their responses, agencies will detail the steps they will take to carry out the report's recommendations. In receiving these reports, the Interagency Task Force on Tropical Forests will operate as an arm of the Presidential Task Force on Global Resources and the Environment. Finally, I am requesting the Commission of the Eighties to give careful attention to these global issues.

There are less than 20 years left in our 20th century. The time to look forward to the world we want to have in the year 2000 and leave to succeeding generations is now. It is my firm belief that we can build a future in which all people lead full, decent lives in harmony with a healthy and habitable planet. And I believe that the skills, experience, vision, and courage of the American people today make the United States a natural leader in charting and guiding humanity's course toward a better world tomorrow.

SECRETARY'S STATMENT[2]

World population growth, the degradation of the Earth's natural resource base, and the spread of environmental pollution collectively threaten the welfare of mankind. If these challenges are ignored, they will overwhelm our efforts to improve the quality of life and social opportunities for the world's people, including our own. If they are met and successfully overcome, we will face the 21st century with renewed hope and security. This is the essential message of *Global 2000*.

Global 2000 is not a prediction. It is merely one vision of the consequences of present trends. Even with a decline in the rate of population growth, world population is expected to exceed 6 billion by the turn of the century. Even with major advances, it will be an enormous challenge to feed these billions, house them in our cities, and provide even modest social and economic opportunity.

This social challenge is matched by the challenge to our resources, particularly our supplies of fuel. Pressure will increase on our forests; our coal, oil, and natural gas; our stores of basic metals; and our supply of the most fundamental of all resources—air, water, and land.

The world community will have difficulty coping with these challenges. Many reflect longstanding social, cultural, and economic preferences and life styles, including our own. In addition,

the financial and technological resources available to governments to fashion remedies are limited, here as well as elsewhere. But the *Global 2000* report is not a fatal prophecy merely waiting to be played out. Prompt action can change the pace and direction of present trends.

Our own record is frankly mixed. We remain, in overall dollar terms, the largest contributor to international programs on family planning, food production, environmental protection, disaster relief, health services, and others. Yet even our contribution is pitifully small when measured against the need.

And even this modest commitment to the world's future comes under regular attack, and opponents have succeeded too often in recent years. This year we do not have a foreign aid bill at all. We are operating at 30% below budget. Our commitment ought to be a national embarrassment, whatever the motive of the opponents. *Global 2000* demonstrates, I think, just how important our investment in the welfare of our neighbors can be and just how great are the human costs of shortsighted policies.

The study concludes that, if present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruptions than the world today. Barring revolutionary advances in technology, life for most people on Earth will be more precarious in 2000 that it is now—unless the nations of the world act decisively to alter current trends. To avoid such a world, people, through their governments, must rededicate themselves to the fight against three fundamental enemies: overpopulation, hunger, and the supply of energy.

First and foremost, we must come to grips with the tremendous growth in world population. With a projected 55% increase in world population by the end of the century—90% of it in developing countries—the prospects for increased hunger and social disruption are high. We in the United States are the largest contributor, by far, to international programs to address it. We now contribute about $200 million a year to family planning in the developing countries. If we doubled that contribution by 1985—and if others joined us—there might be 3 billion fewer people on Earth when population finally stabilizes. And stability might come 20 years sooner. That would be quite a return on our investment.

A second major target illuminated by *Global 2000* is world food supply. Despite significant increases in production, the food supply will be unchanged or worse for the poorest of the world's people in large regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The United States has been a world leader in this area. We have shared our knowledge—as well as our food aid—freely and effectively. Where we have been generous, we can point to startling success. India, for example, is now able to meet its own food needs in no small part due to U.S. assistance in the 1950s and 1960s.

Yet even if we keep up with population growth and maintain current dietary levels to the year 2000, there will still be an estimated 800 million people with not enough to eat. Clearly the cost to meet their needs does not exceed our resources. It must not exceed our will.

Energy as been a dominant concern here at home. People in other parts of the aorld, particularly in the developing nations, have also faced severe difficulties as energy prices have risen. And the *Global 2000* prognosis for the poorest two-thirds of humanity is bleak. The introduction of small, low-cost energy alternatives has become a high priority need not only in the United States but for all mankind. We have begun this work. We must do more.

The issues of global resources and environmental protection have been a fundamental concern of mine as long as I have been in public life. They are a fundamental concern of the Carter Administration as well. President Carter asked for *Global 2000* in one of his first directives. Under his leadership, policies and programs are changing. But he needs the support of the Congress. He needs the support of the American people. After all, food programs make sense to our own farmers as well as to hungry people around the world. Energy alternatives are just as valuable to us as to our neighbors. Our stake in these programs is fundamental. It ought to be obvious as well.

A great deal more needs to be done, and the United States has a special role to play. We ought to acknowledge our responsibilities and commit ourselves to carry our full share of the international burden. We ought to ask other nations to join us.

What we *cannot* do is back away from the conclusions of *Global 2000*. The stakes are too high—for the United States and for mankind.

These are not problems which will yield to simplistic response. They cannot be ignored despite our very real problems here at home. But they are problems which will yield to the best efforts of mankind. Since the days of Malthus, those who predicted doom for humanity have been wrong. They have been wrong because they discounted the vision of nations and the willingness of the Earth's people to respond to the need for change.

If we begin our work now, we will say in 20 years that the *Global 2000* was also wrong. And we will congratulate ourselves for having the foresight to build a better future.

MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruption than the world we live in now. Serious stresses involving population, resources, and environment are clearly visible ahead. Despite greater material output, the world's people will be poorer in many ways than they are today.

For hundreds of millions of the desperately poor, the outlook for food and other necessities of life will be no better. For many it will be worse. Barring revolutionary advances in technology, life for most people on earth will be more precarious in 2000 than it is now—unless the nations of the world act decisively to alter current trends.

This, in essence, is the picture emerging from the U.S. Government's projections of probable changes in world population, resources, and environment by the end of the century, as presented in the *Global 2000* Study. They do not predict what will occur. Rather, they depict conditions that are likely to develop if there are no changes in public policies, institutions, or rates of technological advance, and if there are no wars or other major disruptions. A keener awareness of the nature of the current trends, however, may induce changes that will alter these trends and the projected outcome.

Principal Findings

Rapid growth in world population will hardly have altered by 2000. The

Washington, New York, and London? Has your assessment of them changed?

A. We have examined the suggestion that appeared in the press that it was being orchestrated in some fashion. We have not yet identified any evidence on that point. It's easy to speculate that that may be the case, but we simply haven't got any evidence.

Q. Have you discounted the possibility?

A. No, I wouldn't discount it, but in saying that, I can see the headline, "Muskie doesn't discount the possibility" of that [laughter], so whenever I give that kind of an answer, I'm a little leery.

Q. Some of the families feel that the authorities in Washington are being kinder to the protesters because of our hostages in Iran. Do you feel that that is so?

A. I think it is obvious that we are giving these protesters the benefit of due process of law—it isn't a question of kindness—and that our hostages are not being given the advantages of due process of law, which they should, independent of any feelings of kindness or compassion that they have. I don't think it is a matter of kindness; it is a matter of what is right and what is just.

We are dealing with these people on the basis of what our laws require us to do in respecting the rights of people, whoever they are. That doesn't spring from kindness, which is an *ad hominem* kind of virtue that not all people share. But we hope that by our example of recognizing the due process rights of these people, the Iranians might be persuaded to give our people the same kind of consideration.

In addition, if they can find it in their hearts to be kind, I would not reject that.

Q. There have been reports in the press that the Iranian Government—the Khomeini government—has been financing demonstrations in the United States. Does that reflect the dynamics of the situation at the moment?

A. I said, in response to an earlier question, that I have seen the speculation to that effect, but we, as far as I know, have no evidence to that effect, as yet.

Q. Is there an indication that the militants in Tehran might be losing some of their authority or hold on the government? Do you see any of that?

A. My impression is that their hold on the hostages is the only authority they've got, and it is a question of another authority taking its place in Iran which is able to assert itself and take over possession of the hostages.

Q. Is the parliament going into the vacuum, at this point?

A. The parliament is organizing; it has elected a speaker; a prime minister seems about to be designated; and increasingly various factions are pointing to the parliament as the place where authority to deal with the hostage question will eventually occur.

Whether that is the case, we've been building toward that possibility because if, in fact, a decisive debate takes place there, we would hope, in whatever way we can, to influence the shape of that debate, which could be critical.

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[1] Press release 214 of Aug. 13, 1980. ■

are enormous and close upon us. Yet there is reason for hope. It must be emphasized that the *Global 2000* Study's projections are based on the assumption that national policies regarding population stabilization, resource conservation, and environmental protection will remain essentially unchanged through the end of the century. But in fact, policies are beginning to change. In some areas, forests are being replanted after cutting. Some nations are taking steps to reduce soil losses and desertification. Interest in energy conservation is growing, and large sums are being invested in exploring alternatives to petroleum dependence. The need for family planning is slowly becoming better understood. Water supplies are being improved and waste treatment systems built. High-yield seeds are widely available and seed banks are being expanded. Some wildlands with their genetic resources are being protected. Natural predators and selective pesticides are being substituted for persistent and destructive pesticides.

Encouraging as these developments are, they are far from adequate to meet the global challenges projected in this Study. Vigorous, determined new initiatives are needed if worsening poverty and human suffering, environmental degradation, and international tension and conflicts are to be prevented. There are no quick fixes. The only solutions to the problems of population, resources, and environment are complex and long term. These problems are inextricably linked to some of the most perplexing and persistent problems in the world—poverty, injustice, and social conflict. New and imaginative ideas—and a willingness to act on them—are essential.

The needed changes go far beyond the capability of responsibility of this or any other single nation. An era of unprecedented cooperation and commitment is essential. Yet there are opportunities—and a strong rationale—for the United States to provide leadership among nations. A high priority for this Nation must be a thorough assessment of its foreign and domestic policies relating to population, resources, and environment. The United States, possessing the world's largest economy, can expect its policies to have a significant influence on global trends. An equally important priority for the United States is to cooperate generously and justly with other nations—particularly in the areas of trade, investment, and assistance—in seeking solutions to the many problems that extend beyond our national boundaries. There are many unfulfilled opportunities to cooperate with other nations in efforts to relieve poverty and hunger, stabilize population, and enhance economic and environmental productivity. Further cooperation among nations is also needed to strengthen international mechanisms for protecting and utilizing the "global commons"—the oceans and atmosphere.

To meet the challenges described in this Study, the United States must improve its ability to identify emerging problems and assess alternative responses. In using and evaluating the Government's present capability for long-term global analysis, the Study found serious inconsistencies in the methods and assumptions employed by the various agencies in making their projections. The Study itself made a start toward resolving these inadequacies. It represents the Government's first attempt to produce an interrelated set of population, resource, and environmental projections, and it has brought forth the most consistent set of global projections yet achieved by U.S. agencies. Nevertheless, the projections still contain serious gaps and contradictions that must be corrected if the Government's analytic capability is to be improved. It must be acknowledged that at present the Federal agencies are not always capable of providing projections of the quality needed for long-term policy decisions.

While limited resources may be a contributing factor in some instances, the primary problem is lack of coordination. The U.S. Government needs a mechanism for continuous review of the assumptions and methods the Federal agencies use in their projection models and for assurance that the agencies' models are sound, consistent, and well documented. The improved analyses that could result would provide not only a clearer sense of emerging problems and opportunities, but also a better means for evaluating alternative responses, and a better basis for decisions of worldwide significance that the President, the Congress, and the Federal Government as a whole must make.

With its limitations and rough approximations, the *Global 2000* Study may be seen as no more than a reconnaissance of the future; nonetheless its conclusions are reinforced by similar findings of other recent global studies that were examined in the course of the *Global 2000* Study. All these studies are in general agreement on the nature of the problems and on the threats they pose to the future welfare of humankind. The available evidence leaves no doubt that the world—including this nation—faces enormous, urgent, and complex problems in the decades immediately ahead. Prompt and vigorous changes in public policy around the world are needed to avoid or minimize these problems before they become unmanageable. Long lead times are required for effective action. If decisions are delayed until the problems become worse, options for effective action will be severely reduced.

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 28, 1980.
[2] Press release 202. ■

Copies of Global 2000

The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the Twenty-First Century was made available to the public on July 24, 1980, in three volumes. Copies may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Remittance, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany order.

Volume 1—The Summary Report (041-011-00037-8) $3.50.
Volume 2—The Technical Report (041-011-00038-6) $13.00.
Volume 3—The Government's Global Model (041-011-00051-3) $8.00.

rights through the Helsinki accords, there are no shortcuts. The road that we're on is the right one. As the Belgrade meeting was ending, Dante Fascell, who was our congressional chairman at the time, said, and I quote from him: "Advocacy of human rights is not a quick fix. It holds no promise of easy victories." We know that all too well. But this advocacy of human rights, no matter how difficult it might be at times and how much it is scorned at times, must be pursued. And at Madrid it will be pursued, aggressively, persistently, and with the full focus on it of world opinion.

When I became President, as a matter of fact even in my acceptance speech, almost exactly 4 years ago, I emphasized our commitment as a nation to human rights as a fundamental tenet on which our foreign policy was based. That commitment of mine is as deep and as important to me today as it was then. It's as central to America's interests now as when our nation was first born. Then as now, our commitment to human rights persists in our own country and also worldwide. Beyond Europe, we've sought in Africa, Asia, Latin America, to stand behind basic principles of respect for each individual person, for fair trials, for political liberty, and for economic and social justice.

We've made it clear that the United States believes that torture cannot be tolerated under any circumstances and that officially sanctioned so-called "disappearances" are abhorrent in any society as we've insisted on the right of free movement everywhere. So we've worked hard to give aid to the world's refugees, compelled to flee from oppression and hardship.

As we have maintained these policies as a government, sometimes they have not had the full support of American citizens. I have often had people come to me and say: "Drop this human rights posture; it's damaging our relationship with such-and-such a dictatorship, where people are being imprisoned and where they are being hidden or where they are being killed." We have maintained our opposition and will continue to do so. We pursue these policies because we recognize that both our country and our world are more secure when basic human rights are respected internationally. In pursuing our values, we enhance our own security. Let no one doubt that our words and actions have left their mark on the rest of the world.

Many governments have released their political prisoners. Others have lifted states of siege, curtailed indiscriminate arrests, and reduced the use of torture. We've seen several dictatorships, some of them in this hemisphere, change into democracies, where their present leaders were freely elected by people who did not fear any further political persecution because they expressed themselves as human beings. And because of our leadership, the defense of human rights now has its rightful place on the world agenda for everyone to see. I doubt that there is a leader on Earth who is frequently not reminded of the human rights of the citizens of that particular country and of the human rights performance of that country's neighbors or others associated with it in other parts of the world.

Those who seek to deny individual rights must now answer for their actions. At least among these 35 nations, those brave men and women struggling for liberty, often against great odds, are no longer alone. In the past, because our nation turned its head away, they were frequently alone.

In working with the 35 Helsinki states, in North America and in Eastern Europe and in Western Europe, we pursue the same values with great vigor. The Helsinki accords commit the signatories to ease military threats and to ease international tensions, to promote progress and to respect human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the self-determination of peoples. We have never expected an uninterrupted record of progress. The behavior of the Soviet Union, in particular, has dishonored the principles of the Helsinki accords, both inside and outside its own borders.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the increasingly brutal occupation of that once free nation can no more be reconciled with the Helsinki pledges than it can be reconciled with the Charter of the United Nations. For invading a neighbor, the Soviet Union already stands condemned before the world. One hundred and four members of the United Nations condemned the Soviet Union and demanded the immediate withdrawal of its occupying troops. If they are still there at the time of the Madrid conference, we will continue the pressure for the withdrawal of those Soviet troops.

As many of you know vividly, because of the experiences of your own family and those people whom you love, Soviet authorities have also intensified at home their repression of the freedoms which they pledged at Helsinki—to promote the banishment into internal exile of Andrey Sakharov, a great scientist and a great humanist, is the best known, but sadly not the only instance of such violations of the Helsinki commitment made by the Soviet Union. More than 40 courageous men and women are now in prison or in exile just because they worked in private groups to promote the Helsinki agreement and to encourage the Soviet Union to live up to its pledges. Now they are silenced. But in Madrid, no one can silence their cause, and we will make sure.

Although I do have importunities from some of our own citizens to lessen our commitment and our public posture concerning human rights, I have had from those who are in exile or who are persecuted in foreign countries unanimous messages, sometimes of a highly secret nature—"Mr. President, do not abandon us, do not abandon the commitment of the United States to protect our rights."

Madrid will be a sober meeting. The talk will be frank and straightforward, but we hope without polemics. We will be seeking progress, not propaganda. There is some progress, of course, which we can welcome, and we will be glad to do so. Some confidence-building measures have been implemented. The Helsinki accords have given some impetus to the long-term process of breaking down East-West relations and easing the flow of people and the flow of ideas across frontiers that were once almost completely closed.

For example, thousands of people immigrated to the West last year from East European countries in accord with the Helsinki undertakings. There have been recent efforts by a number of states to resolve outstanding family reunification problems with us, and we welcome those also. The Helsinki provisions have also helped Soviet Jews to emigrate, although the encouraging record level set in 1979 is being reduced this year. At Madrid, we will seek an explanation for that decline and a commitment by the Soviet Union to reverse it.

I might say now, as I approach the close of my remarks to you, that on all these issues at Madrid we can count on the support of the great majority of participants. This is not always the U.S. position in international fora. The others share the basic philosophy of international relations that underlie the Helsinki accords. Indeed, the effort to negotiate the accords originally and now to assure their implementation has made Western Europe and the United States recognize all the more vividly how much we share political and moral values and interests in a time when there is so much glib talk, most of it ill-advised and erroneous about Western disharmony.

The Madrid meeting can give a clear expression to our unity on fundamental values and on fundamental goals. And with that support, we can continue at Madrid to pursue the aims to which we committed ourselves at Helsinki. We want to encourage progress in human rights performance by the Soviet Union and its allies, and we have no hesitation about submitting our own record to examination by others at Madrid. We are not perfect. We don't claim that the United States is perfect. But we're making a strong and continuing effort to improve because preserving and extending human rights is the heart and soul of our whole system in this country.

At Madrid, we will use the CSCE process to break down even more the barriers to human contacts between the East and the West, to help with the reunification of families, to help with the movement of people and ideas and the resolution of immigration issues. We'll try as part of a balanced result to achieve practical progress in the military security field.

The Helsinki session should not become primarily an arms control forum at Madrid. But the United States is prepared to test the possibility of achieving significant, verifiable, and comprehensive confidence-building measures relating directly or indirectly to weaponry, which can help to enhance mutual security desired in East and West Europe.

Madrid gives us an important opportunity to restate both our genuine desire for better East-West relations and our firm belief that the principles of reciprocity and mutual restraint are there on which workable ties can be built. There will be sharp differences at Madrid between the values we espouse and those which the Communist nations will seek to advance, but we will not go to Madrid looking for conflict.

We approach that meeting, instead, eager for progress, determined not to abandon our principles in any instance, determined to put our views forward in the most forceful possible manner, and committed to only one contest—the struggle to advance freedom and through freedom, mutual security.

The Helsinki accords to us hold the promise of a freer, more humane, and thus a more secure Europe, based not just on superpower accommodation but on the fundamental principles of international conduct. These principles require that states earn the respect of their neighbors by treating their citizens with full respect for their rights and dignity as persons.

My own faith in the ultimate outcome of this struggle is undimmed. Our nation's role must never be in doubt. One of the best ways to express this commitment, I'd like to say in closing, is to quote from the words of Archibald MacLeish: "There are those who will say that the liberation of humanity, the freedom of man and mind, is nothing but a dream. They are right. It is. It's the American dream."

The Helsinki accords to us hold the promise of a freer, more humane, and thus a more secure Europe, based not just on superpower accommodation but on the fundamental principles of international conduct. These principles require that states earn the respect of their neighbors by treating their citizens with full respect for their rights and dignity as persons.

SECRETARY MUSKIE

First of all I would like to take this opportunity to welcome all of you to this conference on CSCE. I would like to assure you that I do so from the perspective of a job that I like more every day, and I hope that I have that job for perhaps 4 years more. But I didn't come here today to campaign even for that job.

Five years ago in Helsinki, 35 nations gathered to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It is a landmark document for it embodies essential principles of East-West relations and human rights. It pledges the European states, the United States, and Canada:

- To refrain from the threat of use of force;
- To respect the territorial integrity of each participating state;
- To respect human rights and fundamental freedoms; and
- To respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination.

Three years ago the Helsinki signatories met in Belgrade to review how those and other obligations were being carried out. This November they will meet again for the same purpose. We are fortunate to have with us today Arthur Goldberg, who served with distinction as chief of our delegation at Belgrade, and Griffin Bell and Max Kampelman, who will lead our delegation to Madrid. And I would like to convey my personal appreciation and gratitude to all three of them for having assumed or assuming this heavy responsibility.

Formal review conferences such as Madrid are only a part of what can fairly be called the "Helsinki process." This meeting, too, is part of that process. More than 100 ethnic, religious, and human rights organizations are here today to help us fashion an effective approach to the Madrid meeting.

Through the persistence of our efforts and the weight of international opinion, we hope one day there will be open and frank meetings like this not only in Western countries but throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well.

I would like to take a few minutes this morning to discuss the place of CSCE in our foreign policy. The importance of CSCE is growing, and I believe it is important to understand why.

It is clear that in 1975 few understood the power of the Helsinki idea:

- That the Helsinki accords would become a manifesto for the oppressed,

are leaving, which means that more people must be reached just to stand still in terms of birth rates.

Yet, despite these considerations, population policy is not a dominant theme, with very few exceptions, in the affairs of nations or at international meetings. The population growth rate seems glacial in comparison with changes in other areas that attract the attention of decisionmakers. As one observer recently noted: "Population growth assumes the character of background noise"—while political leaders, in the Third World as well as in developed countries, focus on such seemingly more immediate issues as energy, food shortages, terrorism, unemployment, and political crises.

By the world's actions, by its relative budget priorities, and by its silences, it would seem that, even now, many would prefer not to agree with World Bank President Robert McNamara that ". . . short of nuclear war itself, population growth is the gravest issue that the world faces over the decades immediately ahead." Public attitudes toward population lack a sense of urgency, even though the gradual and accumulating effects of population growth threaten to undermine efforts to solve a broad range of other problems.

Against this background, U.S. international population policy now needs increasingly to focus on the extention of family planning information and services to all peoples as rapidly as possible, combined with programs to increase motivation for smaller families. By virtue of experience and resources, the U.S. cannot relinquish the leadership role in this area.

Unfortunately, there are no quick and easy solutions. Many things must be done simultaneously. For purposes of simplicity, I would divide my policy recommendations into three categories: diplomacy, assistance, and biomedical research.

Diplomacy. Understanding and awareness of the problem are essential preconditions for action. There is a continuing need for educating new policymakers—and their constituencies.

Building on the World Population Plan of Action and the Colombo declaration of international parliamentarians, the United States should seek to keep the population problem at the forefront of the world's agendas, as a matter of urgent global priority. The objective is a strong and sustained international consensus which can support—and influence—national leaders in their approach to population issues.

- The major themes of these efforts should be the inescapable relationship between fertility reduction and the potential for meaningful economic development and the need for coordinated and expanded population assistance and research by industrialized countries in support of Third World efforts.
- The United States should seek opportunities for public statements by senior U.S. officials and for diplomatic contacts with national leaders on these subjects.
- The United States should promote meaningful resolutions on population in the United Nations and other international forums, including the international development strategy for the Third Development Decade and the North-South global negotiations.
- The United States should consult with other donor governments at highest policy levels, e.g., the economic summit meetings.
- To reinforce these efforts, it would be desirable to assign or designate a population officer in the staffing of every embassy where population factors are important.

Assistance. Measured against the magnitude of the problem, current levels of global population assistance are derisory, amounting to only about 2% of total aid flows, and they are declining in real terms. In constant dollars, U.S. assistance in FY 1979 was lower than in FY 1972; severe budget constraints are holding FY 1980 to no increase, even in current dollars. Even so, the United States remains by far the world's leader in international population assistance, providing more than half of total governmental aid flows. After a 19% increase in 1978, aid from other donors grew by less than 5% in 1979.

Many observers, including the Brandt Commission, have noted a flagging of donor support at precisely the time when the need is most urgent and when LDCs are becoming more receptive. The International Conference of Parliamentarians at Colombo last fall called for urgent world attention to the population growth problem and proposed an increase in international assistance from current levels of approximately $450 million to $1 billion by 1984.

IDCA has initiated a population assistance study and priorities with the collaboration of AID and the Department of State, which should serve to sharpen our focus and provide analytical underpinning for a renewed U.S. leadership role as we enter the 1980s. Such a role could hopefully serve also to stimulate other donor governments.

I am certainly aware of the very tight current budgetary situation, but nevertheless feel obligated to renew the National Security Council's recommendation of 1975 for a "major expansion" of U.S. funding for both bilateral and multilateral population programs—an expansion I believe essential to reflect the priority of the population growth issue. Both AID's bilateral assistance program and the UNFPA have significantly more requests for help than they can handle with current budgetary resources.

If more funds were available, a worldwide effort could be launched, consistent with recommendations of the Alma Ata and Bellagio conferences, to extend primary health care services to all peoples by the end of this century. By linking family planning services with basic maternal and child health and nutrition, a combined package of benefits, at not unreasonable cost, could produce hope and change attitudes in previously unreached areas. Such an effort would involve coordination among UNFPA, World Bank, WHO, UNICEF, other agencies, and donor governments. I recommend that it be further explored in the context of North-South negotiations.

Because of the security implications of population growth factors and their effects in undermining the benefits of general development assistance, serious consideration should be given to expanding our population assistance in selected cases by allocations from the economic support fund.

Biomedical Research. Existing methods of regulating fertility suffer from serious drawbacks in terms of safety, convenience, acceptability, or effectiveness. Numerous observers agree that it is imperative to increase research funding in order to expand the

options, follow up on currently promising leads, adapt existing methods to the particular physiological and social circumstances of LDCs, and attract high-quality scientific talent to the field.

Yet, although improved methods of controlling fertility would bring far-reaching health and economic benefits to mankind, only about 1–2% of global biomedical research funding goes toward research in reproductive physiology and contraceptive development. Such research is not a current global priority in comparison with disease-related research affecting far fewer people. WHO was forced to abandon several activities in 1979 due to flagging donor interest. Private industry cannot be expected to fill the gap because of the unprofitability of an "ideal contraceptive."

In the United States, most research is carried out by the NIH [National Institutes of Health] Center for Population Research, in well conceived programs of basic and applied research. In addition, AID's applied research, although modest in size, has produced some impressive practical results.

I agree with the conclusion last year of the House of Representatives Select Committee on Population that ". . . there are few areas in which a strong commitment of American scientific expertise and resources could contribute more to overall health and welfare, both in the United States and the world as a whole."

Unless the United States, and others, join in urgent and concerted efforts along the various lines discussed above, I believe that the consequences of population growth will increasingly affect international economic and political stability. Time is not on our side: 1 million people are currently added to the Earth's population every 5 days, and the time needed to add the next million continues to grow shorter.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.■

Security Council Meets on West Bank Situation

Following is a statement made by Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, in the Security Council on June 5, 1980, and the resolution adopted by the Council on June 5.

AMBASSADOR McHENRY, JUNE 5, 1980[1]

A brutal crime has been perpetrated on the West Bank. On June 2 the official spokesman of the Department of State expressed the distress of the American people and their Government in these words:

> We are deeply saddened by these terrible acts. Our profound sympathy goes out to Mayor Shakah, Mayor Khalaf, those who have been injured in Hebron, and their families. I would note there has been at least one Israeli injury as well. Nothing can justify such senseless violence. We condemn those responsible and hope they will be brought swiftly to justice. In the interest of the welfare of the peoples of the area, we urge everyone to exercise maximum restraint.

Today we have convened to consider a resolution which focuses on these cowardly attacks, the latest in a spiral of acts which has brought more distress to the West Bank than at any time since the occupation began. This sad situation and the equally sad murder of Israeli citizens at Hebron, are, of course, part of a broader tragedy—the continuing Arab-Isareli conflict. The Council has the responsibility to keep in mind, in its actions, the range of these events and other factors bearing on the dispute; a fact which, regrettably, is not the case in the present resolution. For our own part we continue to believe that Resolution 242, a change in which we would oppose, provides the basis for a just settlement of the conflict. And it is on the basis of Resolution 242, which is not modified in any way by the resolution which is before us, that the United States has pursued a peaceful settlement through the Camp David accords.

An accelerating cycle of violence, of actions and counteractions born of fear and insecurity, erodes the shared vision of an equitable peace from which any negotiation must draw its sustenance. Instead of a steady advance toward mutually beneficial resolution of problems, more grievances are created which require redress, and historic suspicions are reinforced. Solutions become more complicated as belief in the very possibility of a prosperous and secure coexistence is perceived to recede.

Further, as violence proliferates, many may conclude violence is inevitable, and brave men dedicated to bridging gaps of mutual suspicion in the delicate early stage of a search for peace will find their reasoned appeals are no longer heard. Fear radicalizes by undermining the sense of the possible and the willingness for compromise and compassion. At a minimum, the law must be upheld.

There must be absolute certainty in every mind that criminals will be brought to justice and the law scrupulously observed. If, instead, the law—which on the West Bank includes the provisions of the fourth Geneva convention—is flouted or perceived to be flouted, the voices of moderation, of reflection and good will, may be stifled. The fear of ever-increasing violence will come to dominate every life. Many will conclude active self-defense must be their first priority, with a concomitant loss of interest in understanding the fears of the other side.

The historic result of this kind of radicalization is tragically clear. The emotion and, ultimately, intolerance of immoderate minorities not only wins adherents but a controlling hand in a deteriorating atmosphere where one violent act is assumed to guarantee another. A distorted sense of self-preservation by individuals and groups will give false credence to those who preach force and will insidiously discredit those who argue for a conscious effort first to understand and then to work to allay the concerns of the other side.

On behalf of my government and the people of the United States, I appeal most earnestly to those with influence and authority to exercise leadership and restraint. No provocation

difficulties may well arise in some countries, if, as we expect, the real price of oil remains high and there is a significant slowdown of exports from developing countries to developed nations.

Third World nations that import oil will face current-account deficits this year of $50 billion compared to $14 billion just 3 years ago. The deficits in 1981 are likely to be even larger. More than half of these deficits are concentrated in countries that have borrowed heavily, mostly from private banks. The scale of further commercial bank lending to help these countries in 1981 and beyond is uncertain. For the poorest countries, almost wholly dependent on concessional assistance, prospects for continuing growth and development will be bleak without increased flows of development assistance.

The United States and other members of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are now considering ways to help developing countries adjust. A crucial factor in providing assistance – a central element of adjustment on a global scale – will be successful recycling of oil revenues that have accumulated in some OPEC countries.

Adjustment on a global scale will also require all states to resist the temptation to retreat into protectionism. It is tempting to use trade restrictions to export economic difficulties. But this path, which may seem helpful in the short run, invites retaliation and breakdown of the international system in ways we all can remember.

Hunger. A second problem that the international community must address seriously is the elimination of hunger. Both the Presidential Commission on World Hunger and the Brandt Commission urge attention to this problem as a matter of priority. Recent events in Southeast Asia, Somalia, and elsewhere have heightened international awareness of the precarious food situation in many of the poorest developing countries. The number of undernourished people in these countries is continuing to expand. Furthermore, poor people in low-income countries are increasingly vulnerable to periods of acute food shortages.

To overcome the fundamental causes of hunger, developing countries need to increase their food production, raise the incomes of their people to enable them to buy food, and develop efficient internal food storage and distribution networks. For countries willing to take these necessary steps, adequate international assistance ought to be made available by all countries with the financial capacity to provide it. Furthermore, the international community ought to help to insure that poor countries have the means to meet their food import needs, and that community should continue to seek ways to enhance the stability of the international grain market.

Energy Production. Increased energy production in developing countries is a third common concern: World economic prospects depend critically on the ability of all societies to reduce the link between imported oil supplies and economic growth. The problem is particularly acute for non-OPEC developing countries. They are less and less able to bear the financial burdens those imports entail.

Continued economic growth of developing countries will probably mean that their share of world oil demand will increase from 6% to 25% of total demand within the next decade, further straining the world oil market.

One of the promising approaches to today's energy problem—in addition to rigorous conservation efforts—is to increase energy exploration and development within non-OPEC developing countries. As much as 40% of the oil yet to be found may be in those countries. And renewable energy sources in Third World nations must be pursued with equal vigor.

Population Explosion. Finally, we and others should recognize that today's population explosion is as serious and as central a problem as adjustment, food, and energy. Rapid growth in population limits development everywhere. In the poorer nations, it frustrates efforts to end the poverty, malnutrition, and degradation that are the lot of one-quarter of the world's people. In many countries of Africa, for example, though food production is expanding, population is increasing faster. The result is a growing number of starving people and increasing pressure on the world's resources.

We now face the prospect of a population increase in the final quarter century that will equal the entire growth of the world's population in the last 2,000 years. If current trends persist, the world's population of 4.5 billion people will more than double before stabilizing in the 21st century.

Too few developing countries are now paying enough attention to population, and too few industrial nations are providing significant support in this area. Population aid currently accounts for only 2% of total development assistance worldwide. The United States has been the leader in this field – in terms of both emphasis and volume of aid. The United States will give $195 million this year for family planning assistance. We are also urging other donors to do more. An increasing number of developing countries share our concern. Thailand, Indonesia, and Colombia, for example, have given much attention to population over the last decade; their declining birth rates testify to the success of their efforts.

A Framework

Given the importance of these four issues, how can they best be considered? Analysis shows, I think, that food and energy have several similar characteristics, and that these and the other two issues – adjustment and population – are substantively interrelated problems. In regard to both food and energy, international action is needed to promote: security of supply; increased production in developing countries; and financing required by poor countries to pay for increased production and imports.

The adjustment issue relates to both the demand side and the supply side of the food and energy problems. On a national scale, adjustment in many developing countries includes the production of more food and energy. As part of the adjustment process, but on the global scale, there is a need for avoiding protectionism and for increasing financial flows – or recycling – to developing countries to support their adjustment efforts. If one asks the question "recycling for what?", one is immediately led back around to the need in many developing countries for increasing production and financing imports of food and energy. Population is a critical companion issue because of the long-term pressures that high birth rates place on critical resources.

Progress on any or all of these issues will benefit every nation. Progress on the issues also calls for action by every nation.

- All countries must be prepared to reduce long-term demands on the world's limited resources. This includes making real strides in energy conservation. For developing countries, it also means making a greater effort to increase agricultural production and to reduce population growth rates.

• At the same time, we in the United States should recognize that – just as we seek energy security – those who depend on food imports seek food security through increased production and an adequate system of grain reserves.

• OPEC countries, for their part, should recognize their greater official responsibility for recycling the surplus capital that results from higher oil prices. Since 1973, Western countries have assumed most of the financial risk of recycling, largely through private commercial banks. In the future the surplus countries should assume more of that risk.

We are now in the process of preparing an agenda for global negotiations with other countries. We cannot guarantee the final outcome of those discussions. But we will continue in the next several months to urge particular focus on a short list of key concerns. And we will continue to direct attention to the central issues I have been discussing in this context and in the context of other North-South negotiations and consultations.

MS. SPERO

Much of the North-South economic dialogue takes place in New York at the United Nations, and our mission to the United Nations heads the U.S. representation in these talks. Thus, I am here today to talk to you about the process of the North-South economic discussions in New York, the dynamics of the North-South negotiations themselves, and the political environment within which discussions are conducted.

At the United Nations, economic issues are among the principal concerns of developing countries. Problems associated with poverty and the quest for economic development in Third World nations are enormous. With world inflation, recession, and the oil crisis the problems are becoming increasingly serious. In the view of the less developed countries (LDCs), the developed world and many of the existing international economic institutions pay insufficient attention to their economic plight and to their development needs. What the LDCs want is to create a new international economic order which will promote their development and which will thereby lead to a more equitable distribution of the world's wealth.

In order to draw attention to their problems and to achieve this new order, the developing nations feel they need a forum that commands maximum visibility, insures high-level participation by developed states, and offers procedures which make possible participation by all governments. The U.N. General Assembly and the subsidiary economic bodies it has created meet these requirements. They are highly visible. Their debates receive high-level attention in the capitals of the industrialized world. And all nations participate in their deliberations on an equal basis regardless of size, wealth, or strength.

Hence, the United Nations has been the focal point for the conduct of North-South negotiations. Indeed, during the last decade all high-level North-South meetings, except for Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), were conducted under U.N. auspices – some in New York and some elsewhere. The United Nations in New York – particularly the General Assembly – will continue to be a central forum for North-South issues. The procedures, practices, and organization of the U.N. system, therefore, will continue to be important features in shaping the North-South dialogue.

We in New York are now engaged in the most recent phase of the North-South dialogue: preparations for the special session of the U.N. General Assembly which will be held in late August and early September of this year. Two central topics for discussion, and we hope agreement, at the special session will be the U.N. international development strategy for the 1980s and the global round of negotiations. We at the U.S. mission are now engaged in intensive preparatory negotiations for the special session.

Dynamics of the Negotiations

Before describing those negotiations, it may be useful to review the context of North-South negotiations and specifically the dynamics of the interaction among the principal economic working groups at the U.N.

The less developed countries cooperate closely on economic issues in the United Nations through the G–77. The G–77 emerged as less developed countries sought to mobilize and maximize the bargaining advantages which derived from their growing numbers and voting strength in the General Assembly. The Group was initially created in the early 1960s by the united action of 77 countries at UNCTAD, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, and has evolved as the principal vehicle for developing country cooperation on economic issues at the United Nations.

Let me clarify a few points about the G–77. The G–77 is not the same as the nonaligned movement, although the membership of the two groups overlaps substantially. The 119 members of the G–77 represent virtually every developing country, including some that are aligned with one or the other of the major blocs. In contrast to the nonaligned movement, the G–77 focuses its attention almost exclusively on economic issues. It is a highly decentralized, though cohesive, body with annual revolving chairmanships. The G–77 places great stress on, and has succeeded, in achieving a large measure of group solidarity. There exist, however, considerable economic and political differences among developing countries, which reflect the various levels of development they have attained, the approaches they prefer to take toward development, and their access to resources, particularly oil.

In addition to the G–77, there are two working groups in New York. There is no formal industrialized country group but instead a loosely coordinated, informal working group, whose members represent governments which belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These delegations participate actively in the North-South dialogue. The group of Eastern bloc Socialist states, remains on the sidelines for the most part, on the pretext that, Western nations, as former colonial powers and as dominant forces in an exploitative international market, are solely responsible for the Third World's economic problems.

There are advantages and disadvantages to conducting North-South negotiations against the backdrop of these working groups. The G–77 can be an extremely rigid negotiating body. Because of its size, it is cumbersome and slow moving. The need to present a united front encourages the G–77 to adopt a "lowest common denominator" approach that simply adds up individual claims and concerns of the members and reflects the tremendous diversity of national interests among the Group's members.

The need to present a united front and the lowest common denominator approach inhibit the setting of priorities and also make the Group rigid in negotiations. Having carried out intense internal negotiations to develop a group

world's population will grow from 4 billion in 1975 to 6.35 billion in 2000, an increase of more than 50 percent. The rate of growth will slow only marginally, from 1.8 percent a year to 1.7 percent. In terms of sheer numbers, population will be growing faster in 2000 than it is today, with 100 million people added each year compared with 75 million in 1975. Ninety percent of this growth will occur in the poorest countries.

While the economies of the less developed countries (LDCs) are expected to grow at faster rates than those of the industrialized nations, the gross national product per capita in most LDCs remains low. The average gross national product per capita is projected to rise substantially in some LDCs (especially in Latin America), but in the great populous nations of South Asia it remains below $200 a year (in 1975 dollars). The large existing gap between the rich and poor nations widens.

World food production is projected to increase 90 percent over the 30 years from 1970 to 2000. This translates into a global per capita increase of less than 15 percent over the same period. The bulk of that increase goes to countries that already have relatively high per capita food consumption. Meanwhile per capita consumption in South Asia, the Middle East, and the LDCs of Africa will scarcely improve or will actually decline below present inadequate levels. At the same time, real prices for food are expected to double.

Arable land will increase only 4 percent by 2000, so that most of the increased output of food will have to come from higher yields. Most of the elements that now contribute to higher yields—fertilizer, pesticides, power for irrigation, and fuel for machinery—depend heavily on oil and gas.

During the 1990s world oil production will approach geological estimates of maximum production capacity, even with rapidly increasing petroleum prices. The Study projects that the richer industrialized nations will be able to command enough oil and other commercial energy supplies to meet rising demands through 1990. With the expected price increases, many less developed countries will have increasing difficulties meeting energy needs. For the one-quarter of humankind that depends primarily on wood for fuel, the outlook is bleak. Needs for fuelwood will exceed available supplies by about 25 percent before the turn of the century.

While the world's finite fuel resources—coal, oil, gas, oil shale, tar sands, and uranium—are theoretically sufficient for centuries, they are not evenly distributed; they pose difficult economic and environmental problems; and they vary greatly in their amenability to exploitation and use.

Nonfuel mineral resources generally appear sufficient to meet projected demands through 2000, but further discoveries and investments will be needed to maintain reserves. In addition, production costs will increase with energy prices and may make some nonfuel mineral resources uneconomic. The quarter of the world's population that inhabits industrial countries will continue to absorb three-fourths of the world's mineral production.

Regional water shortages will become more severe. In the 1970–2000 period population growth alone will cause requirements for water to double in nearly half the world. Still greater increases would be needed to improve standards of living. In many LDCs, water supplies will become increasingly erratic by 2000 as a result of extensive deforestation. Development of new water supplies will become more costly virtually everywhere.

Significant losses of world forests will continue over the next 20 years as demand for forest products and fuelwood increases. Growing stocks of commercial-size timber are projected to decline 50 percent per capita. The world's forests are now disappearing at the rate of 18–20 million hectares a year (an area half the size of California), with most of the loss occurring in the humid tropical forests of Africa, Asia, and South America. The projections indicate that by 2000 some 40 percent of the remaining forest cover in LDCs will be gone.

Serious deterioration of agricultural soils will occur worldwide, due to erosion, loss of organic matter, desertification, salinization, alkalinization, and water logging. Already, an area of cropland and grassland approximately the size of Maine is becoming barren wasteland each year, and the spread of desert-like conditions is likely to accelerate.

Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and ozone-depleting chemicals are expected to increase at rates that could alter the world's climate and upper atmosphere significantly by 2050. Acid rain from increased combustion of fossil fuels (especially coal) threatens damage to lakes, soils, and crops. Radioactive and other hazardous materials present health and safety problems in increasing numbers of countries.

Extinctions of plant and animal species will increase dramatically. Hundreds of thousands of species—perhaps as many as 20 percent of all species on earth—will be irretrievably lost as their habitats vanish, especially in tropical forests.

The future depicted by the U.S. Government projections, briefly outlined above, may actually understate the impending problems. The methods available for carrying out the Study led to certain gaps and inconsistencies that tend to impart an optimistic bias. For example, most of the individual projections for the various sectors studied—food, minerals, energy, and so on—assume that sufficient capital, energy, water, and land will be available in each of these sectors to meet their needs, regardless of the competing needs of the other sectors. More consistent, better integrated projections would produce a still more emphatic picture of intensifying stresses, as the world enters the twenty-first century.

Conclusions

At present and projected growth rates, the world's population would reach 10 billion by 2030 and would approach 30 billion by the end of the twenty-first century. These levels correspond closely to estimates by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences of the maximum carrying capacity of the entire earth. Already the populations in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Himalayan hills of Asia have exceeded the carrying capacity of the immediate area, triggering an erosion of the land's capacity to support life. The resulting poverty and ill health have further complicated efforts to reduce fertility. Unless this circle of interlinked problems is broken soon, population growth in such areas will unfortunately be slowed for reasons other than declining birth rates. Hunger and disease will claim more babies and young children, and more of those surviving will be mentally and physically handicapped by childhood malnutrition.

Indeed, the problems of preserving the carrying capacity of the earth and sustaining the possibility of a decent life for the human beings that inhabit it

Human Freedom: America's Vision

by Secretary Muskie

Address before the United Steelworkers of America in Los Angeles on August 7, 1980.[1]

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We stand for human freedom. It is what unites us as a people. It is what distinguishes us from our adversaries. It is our compass in the world to defend our freedoms at home and to advance human freedom around the world.

There are those who suggest that the freedom of other people is none of our business, that with enough military hardware our freedom can be secure while the freedom of others is stifled, that our purpose in the world is to preserve the status quo.

I say, and I believe you say, that is an invitation to trouble. It is a narrow vision of ourselves and of the world. It would be a foreign policy of reaction.

We must, of course, equip ourselves with the arms to defend our vital interests. But that's not enough. We must also arm ourselves with the conviction that our values have increasing power in today's world.

For if America is not the companion of human progress in the world, if we do not work to shape events in progressive directions, the world will pass us by. If we do not promote freedom in the world, there will be less freedom in the future for Americans.

Today, let me describe to you the kinds of freedom we must promote and the tools we need to promote it.

First is the freedom of nations: the freedom of nations, including our own, to be independent, to be free of outside domination. That has been and is the enduring goal of U.S. foreign policy. But it cannot be our only goal, for America's national interest, America's national ideals, require that we support other kinds of freedom in the world.

This Administration is committed to a second kind of freedom: the political freedom of people within nations.

And we are committed to a third goal: the freedom from poverty and human misery, conditions that destroy human lives and create unrest in the world.

A narrower approach, an approach which ignores the hopes and needs of people within nations, cannot succeed. For it would ignore the political stirring of humanity, the current of human freedom that is gaining strength in the world. And when peaceful change is frustrated, violent and radical change can explode in a storm that damages America's interests and creates opportunities for our adversaries.

So when Soviet troops seek to crush the freedom of an independent nation, we will oppose it.

When an adversary threatens our vital interest in the Persian Gulf, in Europe, in the Caribbean, in Asia or elsewhere, we will oppose them.

When foreign governments allow the seizure of American citizens, as in Iran, we will not give up until they are home safe and free.

And when governments anywhere suppress the freedoms of their own people, when malaria or malnutrition degrade human lives, we will oppose that as well.

We believe, in short, that America can flourish best in a world in which freedom is growing—freedom in all its aspects: national independence, political liberty, and freedom from hunger, poverty, and disease.

To promote these freedoms, we need to maintain a foreign policy that rests on four pillars.

- The first is an unwavering commitment to our security through a strong defense, solid alliances, and unyielding opposition to aggression.
- The second is an unrelenting effort to help resolve the regional disputes that threaten peace.
- The third is our foreign assistance programs which support the security and progress of other nations around the world, while providing us with the influence we need to advance our interests.
- The fourth is our support for human rights and human dignity.

In each of these four areas, this Administration has been active, and it has achieved results. The world is an unruly place. The headlines will always reflect new crises and new challenges. But I'm tired of hearing the fear merchants who overstate the dangers and undersell America for their own political profit. Let's listen to the facts and not their fears.

Military Modernization

First, this Administration is devoted heart and soul and sinew to a strong national defense. We have undertaken the most sweeping military modernization program in nearly 20 years.

In the 8 years before President Carter took office, real defense spending after inflation had declined by more than 35%.

Since taking office, this Administration has increased real defense spending every year by 10% overall.

We are modernizing every element of our strategic nuclear forces, with the new MX missile on land, with a new Trident submarine and missile at sea, and with new cruise missiles in the air. We are building a new rapid deployment force and obtaining new basing rights abroad to strengthen our hand in emergencies. We have led our NATO allies in several major initiatives: a new long-term modernization of NATO's conventional forces, real increases in allied defense spending, and deployment of new missiles in the European theater to meet the Soviet buildup.

Let us be clear. This military modernization program has, and will continue to involve, heavy costs. Our 5-year defense program will put defense spending in fiscal 1985 at a level more than 25% higher than in fiscal 1978. This is a price we must pay to preserve our strength.

In recent weeks, you and I have heard this effort described as inadequate. We have heard the call for a military buying binge. And we have heard demands that we radically alter our fundamental national security objective from a stable military balance to a quest for across-the-board military superiority.

Let there be no mistake. That is a prescription for a dramatic new arms race. For having achieved a position of equivalence, the Soviet Union will not accept military inferiority anymore than we will—no matter what the price to the people of the Soviet Union.

The costs of a new arms race would

Tropical Deforestation

Statement by R. Max Peterson, Chief of the Forest Service at the Department of Agriculture, and Bill L. Long, Director of the Office of Food and Natural Resources in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, on May 7, 1980, before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.[1]

MR. PETERSON

We appreciate the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to discuss tropical deforestation and the activities of the U.S. Interagency Task Force on Tropical Forests. The subject of this series of hearings is important and exceptionally timely, both for the United States and for the world community of nations. We would like to note that the testimony relates to the task force report and should not be construed as necessarily reflecting the position of the Administration.

In June 1978 a national conference on tropical deforestation was convened in Washington by the State Department and the Agency for International Development. The purpose was to assess the discussions and implications of the tropical forest loss problem and to examine U.S. interests and responsibilities. One-hundred twenty invited experts attended, representing U.S. Government agencies, universities, industry, the environmental community, and several international organizations. The principal conclusion of this meeting was that:

> The world is being confronted by an extremely serious problem with immediate and long-range socio-economic consequences as the result of the accelerating loss of forest and vegetative cover in the humid and semi-arid lands within or near the tropical latitudes. Further, the community of nations must quickly launch an accelerated and coordinated attack on the problem if these greatly undervalued and probably irreplaceable resources are to be protected from virtual destruction by the early part of the next century.

This conclusion and perspective served to energize a broad-based response by the U.S. Government, working in close cooperation with the non-Federal sector. We would like to report on this response today and in so doing present what is emerging as a government-wide consensus on the nature and implications of the problem, U.S. interests involved, this nation's influences on the situation, the type of policy and program this country should undertake, and unresolved issues and needs.

This month a Federal Interagency Task Force on Tropical Forests will submit to the President a report recommending a comprehensive U.S. policy, strategy, and program on tropical forests. The report is a direct outgrowth of the 1978 national conference cited earlier. We will be drawing on the findings of this forthcoming report to the President for the purpose of this testimony, along with the results of an international meeting on tropical forests convened in Nairobi 2 months ago by the U.N. Environment Program (UNEP).

Tropical Forests: Extent and Distribution

Tropical forests constitute a major world resource, totaling 1.9 billion hectares [1 hectare=2.5 acres]. They cover 42% of all tropical lands. Of this 42%, 18% is "open" forest—woodland and semiarid shrubland such as the African Sahel—and 24% is "closed"—a continuous forest canopy such as the Amazon rain forest.

Africa has about 64% of all tropical open forest, while more than 50% of the closed forest is in South and Central America and 30% in Asia/Australia/Oceania. The U.S. tropical forests represent less than 1% of the world's total and are found mainly in southern Florida and Texas, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.

Forest Values

Forest environments are vital to human existence in the tropics. They provide food, fiber, fodder, fuel, building materials, and medicines. Forests also provide habitat for wildlife, as well as for indigenous human populations, and perform important protective functions by regulating water flow and by minimizing soil erosion. In addition, since tropical forests provide commodities important in international trade and regulate or influence critical environmental processes that occur on regional and, possibly, global scales, people far removed from tropical forest ecosystems are affected by the integrity of this resource. The following is a brief summary of major forest values.

- An enduring use of forests by tropical communities is a source of wood. One-third of the wood removed from the world's forests for human use comes from the tropics—more than 1 billion cubic meters per year. Some 30% of tropical wood is used for fuel, mainly to meet household cooking needs of a large majority of the populations of most tropical countries.
- The food supplies that sustain nearly 2 billion people who live in the tropics are produced on soils that generally owe both their existence and productive qualities to former forests. Tropical forests accelerate soil formation, retard erosion and silting, regulate streamflow, create favorable soil structure, and store nutrients useful for food crop production.
- Reliable supplies of fresh water in the tropics, whether from rivers or wells, depend in most instances on forested lands. By stabilizing soils, maximizing their receptivity to rainwater, and retaining available minerals, tropical forests help regulate both the quantity and quality of usable water. The production of paddy rice and other irrigated crops in the tropics is especially dependent on forest-regulated water supplies. And this relationship is the basis for a new U.S.-Panama cooperative program to protect the forested watersheds that regulate water inflow into the Panama Canal.
- Tropical forests contain the greatest diversity of life on Earth—probably more than 3 million species of plants and animals. In addition thousands of migratory species seasonally inhabit these forests. This diversity is the source of an increasing number of valuable products for both local and worldwide use.
- Human populations in many tropical areas depend on wild animals and fish for protein. And both aquatic and terrestrial animals are dependent on healthy forest ecosystems.
- The integrity of forested watersheds is also critical to the functioning of downstream estuaries, mangrove swamps, and nearshore coral reefs—the principal nursery areas for many commercially important fish and shellfish.
- Besides supplying products used locally, forests provide many tropical countries with significant income from

exported wood products. The aggregate value is about $4.7 billion annually. Currently, more than 70% of the tropical wood exports is from Asia and the Pacific and the rest primarily from Africa. The chief products are sawlogs and veneer logs, shipped mostly from Southeast Asia to Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea for processing, or from Africa to Europe, and sawed wood shipped from Southeast Asia to various temperate zone countries, from Africa to Europe, and from Brazil to North America.

- Other products derived directly or indirectly from tropical forests contribute significantly to export trade. Their aggregate value is unknown, but a wide variety, including latexes, gums, essential oils, medicines, nuts, and ornamentals, is included. Prospects for an expanding demand for such products are favorable. The U.S. National Academy of Sciences has screened 400 underexploited tropical plants and identified 36 with special economic promise.
- To these values must be added certain exported agricultural products, most of which are, in one way or another, dependent on forest-generated soils and water or the clearing of forests for cropland. The aggregate value of exported agricultural products is now about $36 billion per year, apparently the largest single source of outside revenue for tropical developing countries from products generated locally.
- On the worldwide scale, the forests of the tropics have unequalled scientific and educational value. The complexity of tropical forests has for years attracted scientists and students in search of answers to basic questions about life processes. No other region on Earth offers so much material for study.
- Forest cover influences ground temperature, soil moisture, and rainfall on a local scale; weather patterns on a regional scale; and also may be an important factor in regulating global carbon dioxide levels and, hence, global climate.

Distribution of Tropical Forests



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Deforestation Rates

The amount of permanent forest cover being lost is difficult to establish. Historical records are poor, our ability to monitor deforestation is limited, and changes in cover occur rapidly. It is estimated, however, that closed tropical forests have already been reduced by human activities by more than 40%.

The current annual rate of decrease is 10–20 million hectares a year, according to the best available estimates. This decline means that 1–2% of the world's closed tropical forests is being cleared each year.

Causes of Loss

The principal direct causes of tropical forest loss are: (1) conversion and use for agriculture, (2) fuelwood gathering, and (3) poorly managed industrial logging. But behind these direct causes are more fundamental problems—rapidly increasing population, great inequalities of land tenure, absence of advancement in agricultural technology, and lack of opportunities for employment on proven agricultural land or outside the agricultural sector. With changing world conditions and rapid loss of forests, the quantitative importance of the various causes of deforestation may be shifting, but the conversion and use of tropical forests to support agriculture is still considered to be a major contributor.

Agriculture. It is widely believed that shifting agriculture is the single most important contributor to the destruction of tropical forests worldwide. While this approach to food production has been used for centuries in a manner which also sustained the forests, the sheer numbers of poor people now seeking land to cultivate is overwhelming the forest resource. "Slash and burn" farmers generally work upland soils that cannot maintain fertility with continuous cropping and can support crops for only a few seasons before they must be left fallow. The system is ecologically sound if the fallow period is long enough and the cleared area relatively small. In many places, however, the length of the fallow period is too short to restore the fertility of the site. The most common reason for inadequate fallows is population pressure.

Typically, rapid and widespread deforestation occurs where roads are constructed into formerly inaccessible areas. The clearing of land thus made accessible usually is done by landless people who must concentrate their main efforts on the current season's crops. As a result, little labor or capital may be left for investment in land maintenance necessary for sustained agriculture. The farmers must work whatever accessible site is not claimed by someone else. They have no alternative investment for their labor, and while they may be well aware of the poverty and impermanence of the soils they use, they have no choices.

Often the users of the land are illegal squatters who seldom get agricultural advice or aid from government sources. On other occasions, they are colonists who are encouraged by their governments to settle in forested areas. Furthermore, new agricultural techniques that might let settlers prolong

giving them new courage and hope;

- That groups would arise spontaneously in many countries, including this one, to hold their governments accountable for the way they fulfill their obligations under the accords; and
- That CSCE would become a standard against which the actions of all signatory states would be judged on a continuing basis.

The Helskini accords today are a dynamic force in the world. They are a recognized benchmark for human rights performance. And they have improved day-to-day life for thousands of Europeans, enhancing opportunities to visit loved ones, offering the chance for many to emigrate.

The impact of CSCE had not been limited to human rights. The process has fostered increased contacts in many areas: economic, scientific, and environmental. And it has provided a forum for useful discussions on security, discussions which we hope to advance at the Madrid meeting.

Unfortunately, it is also clear that there are dark corners where Helsinki obligations are forgotten. Andrey Sakharov has been banished to exile. More than 40 other individuals—men and women who took seriously the Soviet Union's commitments at Helsinki—have been arrested. Their only "crime" was to monitor Soviet compliance with the accords.

The Madrid meeting takes place at a time of heightened tensions between East and West—tension caused by the brutal Soviet effort to destroy the freedom of the people of Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion and continued occupation seek to crush the right of self-determination of the Afghan nation. The invasion is totally contrary to the Helsinki accords.

We remain open to a cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union. We are prepared to maintain the framework of East-West relations.

But the Soviet Union cannot expect that East-West relations will not be affected by what Soviet troops are doing beyond its borders and by what Soviet police are doing within them. Nor can the CSCE process—or the Madrid meeting itself—be insulated from the overall state of those relations.

The Soviets have argued that detente is divisible. It is not; Soviet aggression in one part of the world inevitably has consequences elsewhere. They have argued that an emphasis on human rights mars the prospect for peace. It does not; on the contrary, the two are inextricably linked. The Soviet leaders must come to understand that the prospects for a peaceful and cooperative relationship with the West cannot be divorced from how they treat their neighbors and their own citizens.

In current international circumstances, it has been suggested that the Madrid meeting is a gift bestowed on the Soviet Union and its allies and that the United States should boycott it. We reject such a course, for continuation of the CSCE process serves the interests of the United States. So the United States will go to Madrid, and we will advance these objectives:

First, we will press for progress on human rights. Our approach will be forthright but not polemical as we assess the record of compliance by the participants. And we will certainly take positive account at Madrid of any significant progress on human rights that is made before the review meeting begins.

Second, we will work at Madrid for an increase in contacts between ordinary people in Eastern Europe and in the West. We will seek specific progress, for example, in reunifying families and in resolving emigration problems.

Third, in the security field, we will explore the possibility of further military confidence-building measures. But we are not interested in cosmetic measures or talks which go nowhere. And we will not permit discussions of security at Madrid to overshadow or in any way diminish the attention paid to human rights.

It is essential that these objectives be pursued in ways which reenforce the unity of the NATO alliance. There will be efforts at Madrid to divide the Western allies. We must insure that such efforts do not succeed.

And the CSCE process can also help strengthen our ties with the neutral and nonaligned countries of Europe. The states which signed the Helsinki accords did so in their sovereign capacities, not as members of a political or military alignment. We are also mindful of the opportunities CSCE provides to further our relations with the countries of Eastern Europe on a basis of mutual benefit and reciprocity.

Progress at Madrid and afterward will come slowly. But I firmly believe the CSCE process can contribute to a more humane and more secure Europe. That shall be our overriding objective in Madrid.

May I also confess at this point some envy that you all will have this opportunity. It is an opportunity to contribute to a moderation of the tensions between East and West on the only basis which makes any sense whatsoever in the terms of the prospects for peace—true peace and true accommodation in the world. The Soviets and those who are like-minded must be made and persuaded to appreciate the fact that only by accommodating their system and their goals and objectives to the rights created and endorsed by the Helsinki accords can true peace come.

So I congratulate you upon your interest. I pledge you my wholehearted support, and I hope with the leadership you will be following that we can somehow find our way through the minefields created by those who would like to convert this process to their own purposes; purposes which are at odds to the real objective of the Helsinki accords.

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 4, 1980.
[2] Press release 205. ■

Refugees: A Global Issue

by Warren Christopher

Statement before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States on July 23, 1980. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.

Earlier this month, the Secretary General of our Organization referred to the OAS as a forum for dialogue on important world and hemispheric issues. I appreciate this opportunity to join that dialogue on an issue of growing concern to us all.

I refer to the global issue of refugees —to the problems that follow the abrupt, massive, induced displacement of persons. Such migrations may result from wars, natural disasters, persecution, or other local conditions. Whatever the causes, they raise deep legal and humanitarian issues. And these issues are fitting concerns for the international community and this Organization.

Our governments will shortly begin intensive consultations on this problem. Today, therefore, I will outline the challenges we face as a backdrop for actions that this forum, or others, may consider in the future.

The problem of refugees and displaced persons is serious, widespread, and—I regret to say—growing. More than 15 million inhabitants of our planet have fled their homes in recent years because of wars, civil disturbances, persecution, or hostile government policies. They include more than 7 million Asians, 4 million Africans, 3 million from the Middle East, and 300,000 Europeans. Perhaps most pointedly for the people in this room, they include 1.2 million people of our hemisphere.

In a few cases, fortunately, these odysseys have proved temporary. The settlement of the Zimbabwe conflict enabled nearly 200,000 men, women, and children to return to their homes. In our own hemisphere, a similar number of Nicaraguans, who had fled to neighboring countries, returned home once the civil war ended in that country.

Sadly, however, such happy endings are relatively rare. The past year alone has witnessed the flight of more than 1.2 million Afghans, 1 million Somalis, and hundreds of thousands of Kampucheans and others who remain homeless and miserable. Ours is becoming an epoch of refugees.

Today, as a consequence, few countries can be confident that they will not suddenly face refugee problems originating outside their borders. And no one country, however well-intentioned, can deal by itself with large-scale flights of refugees. As this problem transcends national boundaries, so should the solution transcend single nations.

Since 1975, the United States has welcomed over 600,000 refugees for permanent resettlement. In the past 10 months alone, we have taken in 230,000 refugees, and this total does not include the 150,000 Cubans and Haitians now in the United States, seeking to settle here. We are doing everything we can to assist refugees from around the world who look to us for help. But we need help if we are to help them.

Cuban Refugees

A new and critical dimension of this problem developed for the United States in April of this year. At that time, the first of what are now more than 115,000 Cubans began arriving on our shores. The salient facts are these:

- In April, more than 10,000 Cubans seeking asylum crowded into the Peruvian Embassy in Havana. An airlift was organized by Costa Rica and several international agencies, but Cuba abruptly ended the airlift before it could be completed.
- As a consequence, many of the refugees from the Peruvian Embassy, and thousands more, were induced to depart in small and dangerously overloaded boats. Few of those boats met even minimum safety standards. The ensuing boatlift brought great suffering; a number of lives were lost at sea.
- The Cuban refugees who did reach our shores included many who do not qualify for admission under our immigration laws. At least 1,000 among them are known to have committed serious criminal acts. Many of them were released from jail on the specific condition that they would leave for the United States.
- Cuba has rejected repeated efforts to work out safe, orderly, legal procedures so that Cubans may emigrate to countries willing to receive them. These include bilateral representations by the United States and other nations, multilateral contacts through responsible international agencies, and the effort of a tripartite group formed at the international conference in San Jose last May. All have been rebuffed.
- Last month, the United States formally sought to repatriate 65 Cubans who had asked to return to their country. That effort, too, was rebuffed.
- In May, several hundred Cubans seeking to come to the United States in full conformity with our immigration laws were set upon and beaten in front of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. More than 300 of them sought temporary sanctuary inside, and to this day, most of them remain in our Interests Section.
- Finally, as you are aware, the chaotic flow of Cubans into the United States has dropped off sharply in recent weeks. This has been primarily due to vigorous preventive efforts by my government. Yet the fundamental problems remain: thousands of people eager to leave that country; the refusal of Cuba to cooperate in devising orderly, legal arrangements for dealing with this migration; and the massive burdens that are imposed when thousands of people migrate under such adverse conditions.

. . . no one country, however well-intentioned, can deal by itself with large-scale flights of refugees. As this problem transcends national boundaries, so should the solution transcend single nations.

Role of the Inter-American Community

I should like to suggest that in this deeply affecting situation, the entire inter-American community has an important role to play. One challenge is to resettle those Cubans who have come to the United States but who do not have strong ties with this country. For example, at least 800 Cubans now in refugee centers here have made clear their interest in settling in other countries. We will continue to look to the hemisphere to play a role in their resettlement.

Another challenge—and one of even greater long-term significance—is to develop and reinforce legal instruments which more adequately spell out the rights and obligations of states in dealing with refugee problems.

There are some grounds for optimism. The generous hospitality of Honduras, Costa Rica, and other Central American countries during the recent Nicaraguan civil war enabled almost 200,000 people to find refuge. Assistance

can justify terror, intolerance, or disrespect for the law. There must be an end to the fear engendered by the horrors of recent events so that the people of the area can turn constructively and creatively to the urgent task of building a peaceful and equitable framework in which to live their daily lives. Where wrongs can be righted, those in authority should act to that end. Where a wrong cannot be reversed, we hope the perpetrators can be promptly discovered and delivered to the appropriate courts of justice.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 471[2]

The Security Council,

Recalling once again the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), and in particular article 27 which, *inter alia* reads:

> "Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons . . . They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof;",

Reaffirming the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949) to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,

Recalling also its resolutions 468 (1980) and 469 (1980) of 8 and 20 May 1980,

Reaffirming its resolution 465 (1980), by which the Council determined "that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have no legal validity and that Israel's policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East" and strongly deplored the "continuation and persistence of Israel in pursuing those policies and practices",

Shocked by the assassination attempts on the lives of the mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al Bireh,

Deeply concerned that the Jewish settlers in the occupied Arab territories are allowed to carry arms thus enabling them to perpetrate crimes against the civilian Arab population,

1. *Condemns* the assassination attempts on the lives of the mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al Bireh and calls for the immediate apprehension and prosecution of the perpetrators of these crimes;

2. *Expresses deep concern* that Israel, as occupying Power, has failed to provide adequate protection to the civilian population in the occupied territories in conformity with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949);

3. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to provide the victims with adequate compensation for the damages suffered as a result of these crimes;

4. *Calls again upon* the Government of Israel to respect and to comply with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, as well as with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

5. *Calls once again upon* all States not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connexion with settlements in the occupied territories;

6. *Reaffirms* the overriding necessity to end the prolonged occupation of Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the present resolution.

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[1] USUN press release 63.

[2] Adopted on June 5 by a vote of 14 to 0 with 1 abstention (U.S.). ■

Security Council Meets on South African Situation

Following is a statement made by Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, in the Security Council on June 13, 1980, and the resolution unanimously adopted by the Council that day.

AMBASSADOR McHENRY[1]

The problem of institutionalized racial domination in the Republic of South Africa, and related questions throughout southern Africa, have been priority items on the agenda of this Council and for many years have been of concern to the nations located in southern Africa and throughout that continent. These issues have been the cause of violence, upheaval, and dislocation. They have impeded progress toward needed development in southern Africa.

They have also been the cause for hope as, one by one, all of these questions, except those of South Africa and Namibia, have been resolved in favor of full political participation of all citizens in governing themselves. And the Namibian situation is, we all hope, on the brink of a resolution that will transfer political power to all the residents of that land without further violence. This would leave the troubling question posed by South Africa's policies of apartheid.

South Africa faces a time for critical choices. It must choose one of two paths to deal with the legitimate aspirations of the majority of its population for the full civil, political, and human rights that are the birthright of all men.

It can choose the path of peaceful settlement of the dispute between the white minority and the nonwhite majority. South Africa can recognize that its people will not be denied what they ask and what is in fact already theirs and make the courageous decision to join them in a historic enterprise—the search for the best, the least disruptive, the most meaningful way to bring about the inevitable changes in its national way of life.

No one can pretend that it will be easy for such a society to bridge the gulf between apartheid and full political participation. Yet we know that men of good will can build such a bridge through negotiation and compromise. We know that in other difficult situations it has been possible to hammer out that measure of political consensus which provides the basis of acceptable government for all. We have only to look at the example of Zimbabwe. Despite the bitterness born of bigotry and racial injustice, the bloody heritage of civil war, and the understandable fears of both blacks and whites about the real possibilities for peaceful coexistence, a new country was born in peace in Zimbabwe. While we have not yet reached a final settlement in Namibia, that situation too, demonstrates the advantages of peaceful to violent settlement.

Or there is the other course—the course of resisting change by the South African Government.

We know all too well what happens of this path. The oppressed, who are effectively disenfranchised and with no peaceful means of redress, lash out in frustration in the only way open to them—violence. Violence in turn breeds repression on the part of the authorities. Repression leads to more and greater violence, in a cycle from which there seems to be no escape.

We have seen this phenomenon in South Africa time and time again—in Sharpville, in the exile and imprisoning of moderate popular leaders, in Soweto, in the senseless death of Stephen Biko. This week, we see it in the protests of school children and the officially sanctioned response to their protests. We see it in the bombing of the SASOL oil refinery.

Such acts of violence or repression can only harm the prospects for a peaceful settlement and can only discourage the moderate leaders and elements who seek to promote peaceful change.

The course adopted by the South African Government during the coming months and years will have consequences, not only for that country but for the future of all of southern Africa. South Africa has much to contribute to its region if it and its neighbors can begin to put behind them the animosity that separates them because of the policy of apartheid. Long obsessed with throwing off their own colonial yokes, the southern African states are now beinning a cooperative effort to address the tremendous economic and social problems they face. As a developed country with a relatively advanced economy, South Africa could make a significant contribution to that effort. In the process, South Africa could make progress toward resolving its own doubts and fears about the process of change, since development and prosperity would doubtless enhance the prospect of peace and stability in the entire region.

If, on the other hand, South Africa rejects change, and if friction and violence increase, the other states in the region will suffer additional economic setbacks; and their path to development and stability will be impeded. Continuing instability will not enhance South Africa's willingness to come to some accommodation with its majority.

South Africa is not deaf to the plea for change in its country. Nor are many of its people ignorant of the inevitability that change will occur. There is considerable debate within the government, and among the majority of whites in South Africa, about what changes should be made and how to make them. Governmental commissions have studied the country's economic and social problems and recommended changes. The government has instituted some reforms during the past year.

We do not wish to denigrate the importance of those reforms. But, similarly, we cannot delude ourselves. Because these reforms have not gone to the heart of the matter, they will never be sufficient. South Africa's majority is not wrong or unreasonable to ask for more fundamental changes so that they are full political participants in a government of a society that is not stratified along racial lines. They seek the recognition of their rights as human beings. They will be satisfied with nothing less. And unless South Africa is immune from the historical forces that have triumphed in every other corner of the world, the majority in South Africa will, in the end, obtain what it seeks. We cannot predict the time when this will happen, but we know that it will.

The pursuit of peaceful change, were that the course chosen, would be a long process; one beset with difficulties. There would, no doubt, be setbacks, which could tempt the South African Government to swerve from a progressive course and could tempt some to resort to violence in order to speed up the painful process of negotiation. But we know from the example of Zimbabwe's 14-year-long armed struggle that intransigence will not hasten peace. It will hasten violence. Only negotiation holds out the prospect of finding the best way to achieve change.

Now is the time for South Africa to move toward fundamental social and political change—change that will come about because of, or in spite of, the course it chooses. At this moment, the Government of South Africa, with its strong economy and formidable defenses, should have the confidence and strength to commit itself to make necessary reforms.

Those of us who are not citizens of South Africa cannot dictate the form that a final resolution of this dilemma will take—as the front-line states declared in the Lusaka manifesto—all of us stand ready to extend whatever assistance the South African Government and people need or desire if the goal of a full participatory government can be agreed upon. But we know that no progress will be made until all South Africans—black, white, and colored—come together and find a level of accommodation that will provide the basis for a just and representative government.

This means that South Africa must avail itself of the talents of all its people. Instead of harassing a Desmond Tutu, South Africa must call upon him. Instead of imprisoning political leaders on Robben Island, South Africa must call upon them to represent their people in the process of negotiation. Meaningful discussions are seriously jeopardized as long as those whom the people themselves would choose as their representatives are forcibly prevented from participating.

We call upon South Africa to make a gesture of good faith by freeing, recalling, and dealing with those whose participation is essential to the country's peaceful and stable future. Such a gesture would warrant an equivalent response, in the form of coopertion instead of violent resistance. Taken together, these two gestures would help create an atmosphere in which serious negotiations between majority and minority could begin.

And now let me say a word about the role and responsibility of this Council at this moment in this longstanding dispute. We, too, are at a crossroads. We can demonstrate a helpful attitude by offering our good offices, and those of the Secretary General, as mediators and facilitators of a solution. Or we can be content to add to the long litany of resolutions, immoderate in tone, which do not materially advance the chances for settlement and may affect them adversely. We can be as much a prisoner of our history as South Africa has thus far been to its past. I suggest that the former course would be more propitious at this crucial time.

Many members are aware of a point of view I have advanced throughout the extensive consultations on the resolution to be voted on by the Security Council. I have argued that much of the language of this resolution repeats earlier pronouncements of the Security Council and urged that the Council

119 Members of the Group of 77

Afghanistan
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Burma
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cyprus
Djibouti
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Fiji
Gabon
The Gambia
Ghana
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Jordan
Kampuchea
Kenya
Korea, North
Korea, South
Kuwait
Laos
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Maldives
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Palestine Liberation Organization
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Qatar
Romania
Rwanda
Sao Tome-Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Syria
Tanzania
Thailand
Trinidad-Tobago
Togo
Tonga
Tunisia
Uganda
United Arab Emirates
Upper Volta
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam
Western Samoa
Yemen (Aden)
Yemen (Sana)
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia

NOTE: The G–77 consisted originally of one of the formal membership groups (groups A and C) of UNCTAD. Subsequently, the G–77 has excluded Israel and South Africa and admitted Mongolia, Romania, and the PLO.

position, it is difficult for the G–77 to be flexible in altering its demands and positions in the process of negotiation beyond the Group. Finally, such a large group of 119 nations must rely on strong leadership by a few, often self-selected, activist nations and individuals. If the G–77 activists are radical, as they have been at times in the past, they are able to exert a disproportionate influence on the Group's positions. All these factors create a strong tendency for the G–77, as an institution, to polarize North-South negotiations.

There are, however, positive aspects to the existence of a group of developing countries. The existence of the Group has enabled us to focus on the valid needs of developing countries and provided us with a necessary interlocutor both in formal and informal consultations. The G–77's insistence on consensus can also lead to moderation. Under responsible leaders, like that of the present Indian chairman, the G–77 can reach effective compromises that take into account the interests of both industrialized and developing states. These more moderate leaders can inject an element of realism in the Group and help it achieve greater flexibility and thereby aid us all to achieve agreement on issues of common concern. These negotiating dynamics have great importance for the series of North-South negotiations on which we are now embarked. The key conference will be the General Assembly special session on development, scheduled to be held just before the regular General Assembly this September. The special session was originally scheduled over 2 years ago, for the purpose of approving the international development strategy and thus launching the United Nation's Third Development Decade, but its mandate was expanded last year also to include responsibility for launching the global negotiations. It is now likely that the special session will itself become a major negotiating forum. The negotiations for a new international development strategy have been going on for more than a year. Progress has been limited, and there will be only one more 3-week preparatory session in June before the special session.

The new international development strategy will be a complex document, intended to provide a long-term blueprint for efforts on the part of governments and international institutions to promote economic and social development in the 1980s. It attempts to establish economic and social goals, objectives, and specific targets to be achieved over the course of the decade, to accelerate the development of Third World countries as well as to sustain global development. The strategy will also contain specific policy measures to implement its objectives and targets.

The G–77 has been attempting to include in the strategy commitments by developed countries to increase official development assistance as well as to provide financial resource transfers and reforms in the international monetary system. For our part, the United States and other developed countries have attempted to introduce the concept of necessary reforms within developing countries to facilitate their development, particularly in the area of social development. We would also like to see the strategy provide for a system of review and appraisal which would evaluate all countries' performance.

Global Negotiations

In conception, global negotiations are to be a new departure for the United Nations. The intent of all parties is to engage in truly meaningful negotiations about difficult economic issues. The United States is anxious to avoid the pitfalls of some past U.N. negotiations. In particular, we want to avoid getting bogged down in the negotiation of omnibus "declarations" in which real

disagreements are papered over with acceptable, but ultimately meaningless, language. We mean to achieve real, not merely rhetorical, results.

To that end, the resolution of the last General Assembly for global negotiations authorized its Committee of the Whole to act as a preparatory committee for the global round. The Committee of the Whole is charged with making agreed recommendations on an agenda, procedures, and a timeframe for completing the negotiations. The Committee of the Whole is currently holding its third preparatory meeting and will reconvene once more in June prior to presenting its results to the special session. The committee has not yet reached consensus on the difficult issues it faces, but it has grappled with all of them. Let me review for you the results of the committee's early sessions on agenda and procedures.

A very long agenda has been proposed by the G–77. It constitutes a virtual compendium or "shopping list" of all recent economic proposals by members of the Group in various international fora. Some proposals address serious issues of mutual concern while others reflect more narrow interests less appropriate for global negotiations. Although we understand the group dynamics leading to such an omnibus proposal, we feel that, unless it is subjected to rigorous priorities, the G–77 agenda would likely lead to only superficial discussion – and meager results – in the timeframe of less than 9 months (January to September 1981) generally envisaged for the negotiations.

For our part, the United States believes that priority attention and actual negotiations should focus on a few issues of paramount urgency which also offer the possibility of early, concrete results. With other OECD countries, we have suggested food, energy, and protectionism as agenda items. The United States has proposed the four-point early action program, including a trade pledge, further development of energy resources in energy-deficient countries, improved world food security, and facilitating recycling of payments surpluses.

In the Committee of the Whole, the European Community and Switzerland have made rather detailed proposals on agenda which are compatible with our approach. As yet, however, there is no meeting of minds on agenda, but we hope the last preparatory session, in June, will bring us close to a workable compromise.

Both the United States and the G–77 have already indicated their preferences for procedures to govern the global negotiations. We and the other OECD countries favor decentralizing the negotiations. Multilateral fora such as the IMF, IBRD, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) exist for discussing many of the most pressing international economic issues. We would prefer to take up these issues in the fora which have made the mandates and the expertise to conduct such negotiations. Where no global forum currently exists, as is the case with energy issues, we might expect global negotiations to lead to the formation of some mechanism within which continuing discussion can take place. We have also emphasized that we do not wish to interfere with ongoing negotiations in whatever U.N. fora.

Under our proposals, the central forum in New York would by consensus agree on general objectives for negotiation in specialized fora. After the specialized fora have completed negotiations, the central body would review their results.

The G–77 has a different view of the way in which the negotiations should be conducted. They would prefer that a single global forum be set up to negotiate all issues, regardless of the existing mandate and competence of specialized agencies.

U.S. Objectives

Global negotiations are high on the list of priorities of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. Mission staff has been very actively involved in the work of the Committee of the Whole, seeking the sort of focused agenda and procedures which will facilitate realistic negotiations toward achievable ends.

In this enterprise, we, of course, work closely with our Washington colleagues. To the extent the U.S. mission can play a special role in the global negotiation process, it arises out of our intimate knowledge of the United Nations and our constant contact with the G–77 and with the delegations of developed countries in New York. In the coming months, our special objectives include:

- Improving the coordination of our strategy with other developed countries;
- Working with the G–77 to assure an acceptable and realistic agenda for the negotiations;
- Achieving decentralization, so that we can respect the mandate and take advantage of the expertise in existing U.N. fora; and
- Finding ways to increase informed and serious consideration of the substance of issues.

We anticipate that global negotiations will be a long and arduous process with no quick and easy results in sight. But our approach need not and should not be confrontational in order to protect our own national interests while contributing to the larger common good of the international community. There is some give and take on every good-faith negotiation and we have high hopes that satisfactory progress will be made in global negotiations to improve the international economic environment for both developing and industrialized countries.

MR. BERGSTEN

There has been a great deal of progress in North-South economic relations during the past 4 years. Significant results with mutual benefit to all sides have occurred on trade, monetary, commodity, food, energy, and resource-transfer issues. There is, to be sure, much more that can be accomplished. But the key to further success is twofold: a realistic recognition of both the achievements of the past and the needs of all nations, developed and developing, and a commitment to pursue the common interests of all rather than to seek benefits for one group at the expense of another.

Some observers have suggested that North-South relations could be headed for extremely rocky times over the next 4 years. It is certainly true that the crippling effect of higher oil prices, coupled with the dual problems of inflation and recession in the developed countries, may continue to cause serious problems for some developing countries. These and other key economic issues can, however, be addressed constructively through existing international institutions which have served the global community well in the past such as the International Monetary Fund, the multilateral development banks, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. We must continue to use these functionally specific fora to consolidate the progress already made; they hold the expertise, the experience, and the basic commitment of governments which are essential for further progress.

The capability of the United States to reach agreements of mutual benefit

be staggering. We would have to cut back significantly on vital human services. And most importantly, we would increase the risk of a nuclear nightmare.

The consequence of a new arms race would not be greater security. It would be greater insecurity at home and abroad.

And there is a further point. In this effort to achieve military superiority, we would destroy the future of arms control. For arms control can only move forward on the basis of genuine equivalence. That is the basis of the preliminary agreement reached with the Soviets by President Ford in Vladivostok in 1974. It is the basis of the SALT II Treaty. It is the basis on which we have agreed with our allies to pursue further arms control, including limits in Europe.

Let us have no illusions. If we abandon the quest for arms control now, if we cast aside the treaty negotiated by three Presidents—two Republicans and one Democrat—the threats we face will be greater. Our knowledge about Soviet military plans will be less certain. Our own defense will be more difficult.

Today America is strong, and we are growing stronger. We have already reversed more than a decade of inattention to our national defense. We are prepared as a nation to spend whatever is needed.

But we must be as hard on overspending on the military as we are on waste in our domestic programs. And we should reject outmoded military doctrines that add danger to an already dangerous world.

Our commitment to the freedom of nations also means that we must be prepared to oppose aggression against the freedom of others.

Every day Afghan people are dying in defense of freedom. Every day the Soviet Union is paying a price for their aggression. Every day the free nations of the world must demonstrate their opposition to this assault on freedom.

Measures like our grain embargo and the Olympic boycott express not only our disapproval; they express the readiness of the American people to sacrifice in the cause of freedom. These sacrifices were necessary. And they have been felt in the Soviet Union.

I am proud of our athletes who did not go to Moscow, and I know you are, too. I am proud of our farmers and our businessmen and workers who have given up exports to send the Soviets a message. And I know you are, too. For the message has been received in an Olympics that was a sham, in declining meat supplies on Soviet shelves, and in the stinging rebuke of world opinion.

The rhetoric of the past few weeks calls for us to be firmer on Soviet aggression but to reverse the grain embargo, to write off the Olympic boycott, to conduct business as usual.

There is a short answer. We cannot fight Soviet aggression more by doing less.

We know, and the American people know, that we cannot oppose aggression abroad without exerting ourselves at home. We know, and the American people know, that security cannot be bought without sacrifice. To suggest otherwise in the hope of gaining partisan advantage is not leadership but expediency.

Achieving Peace

A second element of a foreign policy of freedom is to build peace: to help achieve peaceful, negotiated settlements to dangerous disputes in the world.

You know of President Carter's patient efforts to bring forth an agreement between Israel and Egypt at Camp David. That agreement was a beginning, not an end. It was the beginning of a long and difficult process that is not yet over. Camp David was one of the finest achievements of this or any other Administration. It has already produced peace between Israel and Egypt. And it provides the only practical process yet devised that can lead to a comprehensive peace.

In a similar fashion, the Panama Canal Treaty, which ended 14 long years of negotiations, healed festering resentments in Latin America and laid the groundwork for sounder relations between the United States and our neighbors in this hemisphere.

To build peace and buttress our strategic position, we have normalized relations with the People's Republic of China.

President Carter's unswerving support for a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia helped end a bitter and bloody civil war. It helped bring forth a new nation, Zimbabwe, based on majority rule and minority rights. It helped calm a dispute that could have become a broader conflict in Africa. By working toward a settlement, by refusing to lift sanctions against Rhodesia until a fair settlement was insured, we emphasized not only our commitment to peace but our willingness to support abroad the principles of democracy and freedom we espouse at home.

Lloyd McBride and the steelworkers stood by the President in that difficult moment. You supported continuing the sanctions until a fair, free election could be held. You can be proud that this union has contributed in an important way to a solution that fostered peace.

There is a lesson in this experience. The same people who call now for a narrow vision of our foreign policies were bitterly opposed to our approach in southern Africa. Had they prevailed, there would not have been a settlement in Rhodesia. The fighting would have raged on. This would have been bad for the people of Zimbabwe, bad for the region, bad for our allies, bad for us, and good only for the Soviets who stood to profit from conflict.

Foreign Assistance

A third element of a foreign policy of freedom is helping developing nations defend their independence, expand their economies, and dispel poverty.

For a good many years, this union and its members have understood an important fact—that a generous foreign assistance program is not a giveaway but a gateway: a gateway to new markets and new influence for the United States and a gateway to greater world stability.

That fact needs to be better understood by the American people.

American foreign assistance dollars are investments we make in others and in ourselves. These U.S. investments mean security aid to nations whose independence is threatened by outside intervention. These investments mean economic development for poorer nations. They help developing countries buy American equipment to build highways and dams, help hire American experts to strengthen their institutions, help them produce the food and the jobs that increase living standards for their people. And these investments directly benefit our own people.

Seventy cents of every dollar we commit for country-to-country development programs are spent here in the United States. They purchase American goods and American services, from farm

equipment to technical training. Those purchases amounted to nearly $2 billion last year alone. Our Agency for International Development has spent over $650 million for goods and services just in California over the past 10 years. Well over another billion dollars last year went to American farmers for grain and other agricultural commodities.

The economic return to the American people goes beyond what is spent here, for our investments in development abroad create new markets for U.S. goods. Every dollar we pay into institutions like the World Bank, for example, generates between $2 and $3 of new growth in our own economy. The activities of these development banks mean 50,000–100,000 new American jobs each year.

In such transactions everyone gains. The United States gains jobs and markets and the capacity to help shape events in constructive ways. Small, struggling nations gain strength against aggression and subversion; they gain economic and social progress. Millions of people gain the beginnings of a better life. And the cause of freedom also gains.

So I would urge you to continue to defend these programs and help defeat attacks and cuts recently suffered in the Congress. Together, we must convince the American people that the defense of freedom requires not only a strong military fist but also an extended hand.

Human Rights

Finally, let me emphasize a fourth element of a foreign policy of freedom: support for human rights.

Throughout a long history of struggle and success, the trade union movement in general, and the steelworkers in particular, have supported that cause.

Today, as hundreds of thousands of refugees flee from assaults on human rights around the world, the steelworkers once again are showing their concern. Your effort on behalf of the AFL-CIO Cambodia Crisis Campaign, which Lloyd McBride unveiled this week, is a dramatic testament to the power of this great union for good. And it is an eloquent expression of your support for human rights.

Human rights has been a special concern of this Administration.

We stand for the right of people to be free of torture and repression, to choose their leaders, to participate in the decisions that affect their daily lives, to speak and write and travel freely.

There are limits on our capacity to influence affairs in other countries. And we must seek a practical approach that builds the long-term strength of our friends. But the fact that there are obstacles and risks should not keep us from holding up the banner of human rights—and it will not.

Ultimately, our firm support for human rights, for human freedom, will help build a more stable world. It will help remove the causes of violent and convulsive change.

There is, in various places in the world, a strong tide for human rights. We see the evidence for this in Spain, in Greece, in Portugal, in Ghana, in Nigeria, in Ecuador and in Peru, in other nations which have recently embraced and strengthened democracy. America cannot claim sole credit for these developments. But we can take pride that we have encouraged abroad the freedoms we enjoy at home, for they run hand in hand.

I have sketched the outlines of the foreign policy of freedom: a strong emphasis on security, a vigorous quest for peace, concrete development for nations and peoples, and practical support for human rights. This has been our policy for the past 4 years. And despite the difficulties, despite limits to our influence, it is working.

We must not succumb to the voices which say we should now turn back. These voices are pessimistic about the possibilities of freedom in the world. They see change abroad, for the most part, as dangerous for America. They are hostile to it. We see in change not only threats to be met but opportunities to be seized.

Their voices sound a note of fear, rather than hope, when they speak about the world. They have cried out against our efforts to strengthen the center in Nicaragua and to pursue prudent arms limitation agreements.

Above all, these voices suggest that our defense of freedom should be concentrated almost exclusively in arms.

We do need to revitalize our military. And we are. America can and will do all that is necessary to maintain its military position, to counter aggression, and to deter war.

America is and will remain a global power, second to none. But I believe the American people understand that a foreign policy premised on a renewed arms race is a foreign policy of folly, not wisdom; of weakness, not strength.

I believe the American people will rightly refuse to write a blank check for belligerence. America's purpose is not a new cold war but a realistic peace based on a solid foundation of deterrence.

We must seek security not only in arms but also in a diplomacy that is generous, that is willing to cope with inevitable change, that is faithful to decent human values. If we do that, we can be in the 1980s not only as strong as steel but as resilient and enduring. We can be not only a fortress of arms but a fortress of hope and freedom as well.

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[1] Press release 210 (opening paragraphs omitted). ■

the use of their sites are often unfamiliar or risky, and there is little incentive or margin to assume extra risks.

To get to the fundamental causes of deforestation, it is necessary to understand why so many people are without job opportunities and why so many seek marginal land to cultivate. In many countries, the traditional agricultural lands simply cannot absorb the rapidly growing population. Intensified production, which might increase both yields and employment opportunities on land already cleared, often depends on the availability of technical assistance and material inputs, such as irrigation water, fertilizer, and credit, that are beyond the reach of most farmers. In some areas land ownership systems keep productive agricultural land from absorbing as many workers as it profitably could; in others, farm workers are displaced by modernization that substitutes capital for labor, by construction of reservoirs, or by other nonagricultural land uses. With urban labor already in surplus, many of the displaced people must move to the forests. Others who move are refugees from war or from political oppression.

The most optimistic estimate of annual loss is 7.3 million hectares. The most frequently cited estimate is 12 million hectares a year. Recent analyses of deforestation in specific countries suggest a current rate of 20 million hectares or higher; and a report by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences released last month cites the annual worldwide loss as 24.5 million hectares—a particularly high estimate. Due to limitations in the data base, assessments of forest loss are best given in terms of worst-case and best-case scenarios.

In the worst-case scenario, the closed forest area is projected to decline by one-half, to about 580 million hectares, by the year 2000, i.e., under the assumption that forest loss in 1979 is 20 million hectares and that the rate of forest conversion will thereafter increase at the expected rate of population growth in the tropics. In this case, most tropical countries will have little economically accessible forest remaining at the end of the century. Millions of people will be without wood for fuel, shelter, or fiber. Watersheds of the major agricultural areas largely will be denuded, and reservoirs needed for flood control, irrigation, and hydropower will be filling rapidly with silt. Hundreds of thousands of plant and animal species will vanish, and much of the potential for remedying agricultural, ecological, and medical problems will vanish with them. Although this case is possible, most analysts think it is not likely to occur over the next 20 years.

The best-case scenario also is plausible but equally unlikely to happen over the next 20 years unless significant changes in policies and practices are made to insure improved forest management.

If the current rate of deforestation is only 10 million hectares, and if all forestry plans and goals of tropical countries are fully successful over the next 20 years, then the deforestation rate may drop to less than 5 million hectares a year by 2000. Under these assumptions, the projections indicate that wood will still be abundant in some countries of Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia. Wood for fuel and for construction material will still be available for people living near the remaining forests and for relatively wealthy people elsewhere. Whether wood will be available for subsistence farmers away from the edges of forests and for the urban poor depends on whether plantations of fast-growing trees can be established in the next few years.

No comparable estimates are available on the rates at which open forests in the tropics are being denuded. The process of converting open forests is more subtle than that in closed forests and thus is seldom accurately measured. Destruction of the trees in open forests is believed to be a causal factor in desertification, a process that is claiming an estimated 5 million hectares worldwide each year, according to UNEP.

The very high deforestation rates cited from the few available studies cannot be extrapolated to the entire tropical forest resource. These studies, however, indicate some alarming national and regional problems, and even the best-case projection is cause for concern.

Shifting cultivation is not the only agricultural practice that leads to deforestation. The processing of agricultural products, such as grain drying, food preservation, tobacco curing, and rubber preparation, require large amounts of fuelwood.

Fire also contributes significantly to deforestation in the tropics. It is not only a widespread problem but reportedly is increasing at an accelerating rate. In most instances it is man-caused. Fire is a primary tool of primitive and shifting agriculture to dispose of felled trees and is also used to "renew" pastures and to prevent invasion of shrubs and trees. In terms of forest destruction, fires are of greatest significance in the dry forest areas, having converted millions of hectares into derived savannas where chronic burning makes reinvasion of trees virtually impossible. Except as employed by man in certain cases, fire is not an important cause of destruction of rain forests which are generally not readily flammable.

The production of beef has become increasingly important worldwide, particularly in the more humid tropics. In some cases, the conversion of forests to grazing land is not sustainable, but the international demand for beef is strong enough and the price high enough that it has become profitable to convert to pasture even on poor soils that deteriorate rapidly and must be abandoned after a few years. Although data on the acreage converted from tropical forest to permanent or temporary pasture are not available on a worldwide or even regional basis, the large increase in beef exports from forested tropical countries, particularly in Central and South America, suggests the scope of the changes in land use.

Fuelwood-Gathering. Cutting wood for fuel is another important cause of deforestation and in some places is the major cause. More than 1 billion cubic meters of wood are harvested each year in the tropics, and the rate is increasing. At least four-fifths of all the wood harvested annually in tropical countries—some 825 million cubic meters—is used for firewood and charcoal; the rest for building materials and for export.

Industrial Logging. Industrial wood—wood for construction materials, fiber, and manufactured products—accounts for one-fifth of the total volume removed from tropical forests. Only about 6% of total removals is exported each year. The relationships between deforestation and the removal of industrial wood are complex. Most tropical logging is highly selective as to species and tree size. The use of heavy equipment for timber extraction can, however, cause substantial secondary loss. The immediate result of logging operations is thus more likely to be degraded forest than conversion to nonforest. But the roads and clearings made by the loggers are commonly

used by farmers who complete the process of deforestation. Industrial logging often depletes or destroys valuable resources of people living in or near the forest, with most or all of the benefits going to distant companies, governments, or foreign consumers.

New techniques of logging and wood use, including whole-tree harvesting and on-site chipping, are making clearcutting—the removal of all trees—more common in the tropics. On some clearcut sites, the forest will not regenerate naturally. Thus, the new harvesting techniques may lead to greater resource loss if the sites are not replanted immediately with appropriate species. Replanting after industrial logging, even after clearcutting, is uncommon, however.

The reasons for the lack of reforestation in the tropics are a complex array of economic, political, cultural, and environmental factors that vary from place to place. Some partners in multinational logging firms are unwilling to invest profits in efforts that will have no immediate payoff. Insecure tenure is a major constraint on reforestation investments, both for large companies and small farmers, and this is often more a political than an economic issue. Concessionaires commonly are unable to protect reforested areas from people seeking land to cultivate. Site-specific cultural factors may inhibit tree planting, as in Papua New Guinea where local people object to tree planting by timber companies because planting, unlike cutting, implies permanent ownership of the land. Depredations by domesticated, feral, and wild animals cause some reforestation efforts to fail.

Consequences of Forest Loss

Although many consequences have been alluded to above, it is useful to summarize by indicating that the impacts of uncontrolled loss of tropical forests are many and serious. They include rising prices and shortages of wood in tropical countries, as well as a diversity of ecological problems. Floods of unprecedented severity, with large losses of life and property, have been reported recently by Asian nations and attributed largely to the loss of vegetation on upland watersheds. Lakes, reservoirs, and irrigation systems are adversely affected by siltation.

In the semiarid regions of Africa and Asia, woody vegetation used for fuel by up to 90% of the rural population is receding ever farther from human settlements. Fuelwood prices, the family time taken to collect wood, and the suffering from doing with less continue to increase. With no other substitutes available, people are burning dung and crop residues which previously were used to maintain soil fertility. The process of "desertification," triggered by removal of vegetative cover and overgrazing in semiarid regions, now threatens the productive capacity of the resource base over large areas of the tropics.

Consequences of forest loss also include the extinction of indigenous plant and animal species which is occurring at a rate never before experienced during the history of this planet. According to a recent National Academy of Sciences report, fully one-third of all tropical organisms—almost a million species—may become extinct by the end of the century as a result of deforestation. As an additional source of concern, recent investigations of the carbon cycle have suggested that continuing tropical forest losses on the current scale may contribute to destabilization of the Earth's climate in the 21st century.

Development and Environment Relationships

The underlying cause of deforestation in the tropics is the unremitting pressure for food, fuel, shelter, and capital in the developing countries of the world. These pressures tend to relegate environmental concerns and values to a secondary role, with development being primary.

In some cases, the forests were regarded, and may still be regarded, as obstacles to development, with minimal regard for their present environmental values or their future economic and environmental benefits.

The challenge is to provide for these human needs in ways that are more in harmony with nature. A purely protectionist approach will not suffice; neither will all-out exploitation. Both protection and rational exploitation must somehow be provided for in development.

Strategies for improved management of tropical forests must also recognize the sovereign rights that nations have to use and manage their resources as they see fit. National programs to meet perceived national needs should be the cornerstone of such strategies. However, international, bilateral, and multilateral arrangements can do much to assist nations as they develop pro-

Areal Extent of Closed and Open Tropical Forests (mid-1970)



Note: Graphs depict approximate extent of forest cover based on best estimates.

Sources: Persson, 1974; UNESCO/UNEP/FAO, 1978; Myers, private communications, 1980

from international and regional organizations and neighboring countries helped the Central American nations deal with this crisis until the end of hostilities enabled the refugees to return to Nicaragua.

Similarly, many nations in the hemisphere have made generous contributions toward resolving the problems posed by the exodus from Cuba. Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Venezuela, among others, have received or offered to receive Cuban migrants. Costa Rica made a generous offer to receive Cubans for onward resettlement. Costa Rica also played a leading role in establishing the unfortunately short-lived "air bridge" and called two international meetings to discuss means of regularizing the Cuban exodus.

The two San Jose conferences constitute an unprecedented international effort to give effect to certain basic precepts of international law—precepts designed to protect the rights of individuals as well as the rights of states. It is, for example, a fundamental principle of customary international law—incorporated in many international conventions—that persons may not be transported in disregard of the immigration laws of the receiving state. No government has the right to select emigrants for permanent resettlement in another country. This right to establish and enforce national immigration laws is grounded in the principles of mutual respect and equality of states which are the foundation of all international law. Needless to say, the intentional export of convicted criminals is a particularly egregious violation of this elementary principle.

Moreover, each nation has a corresponding duty to receive its own citizens who have been expelled by another state. This obligation is clearly spelled out in modern treaties for the protection of human rights.

Nations must also, of course, observe the basic safety requirements set forth in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. But as we have already noted in the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, the vessels which formed the Mariel sealift were deliberately overloaded; they did not meet convention safety standards. The U.S. Coast Guard, in fact, rescued a large number of those who left Cuba via Mariel.

Need for a Worldwide Response

The challenges I have outlined—and others arising from refugee migrations—require a concerted response in this hemisphere and in the world community. In the past, the Organization has set precedents that other regional bodies and the United Nations have later adopted. Today, the inter-American system is again well-situated to make a similar contribution.

In the past few years, movements of people fleeing their homelands have touched all our countries. Such mass movements of people are likely to continue with potentially serious repercussions for each of our societies. To date, however, we have developed no mechanism to cope with massive waves of displaced people or with countries which induce such displacements in violation of basic international norms.

A global and humanitarian problem of such sweep requires our best collective efforts. On behalf of my government, I would suggest four principles that might well guide our collective search for a solution.

First. Large-scale displacements of persons should be discouraged in the name of humanity and international order. I can imagine no justification—political, social, racial, or religious—for a government to induce large numbers of its citizens to flee their homeland.

Second. Persons displaced from their homelands should be repatriated, as promptly as conditions permit. Permanent resettlement should not be accepted as the inevitable result of crisis, for such permanent displacement may serve neither the welfare of the individuals or the nations concerned. The repatriation of persons following the end of the fighting in Zimbabwe and Nicaragua demonstrates that there are effective and humane alternatives to permanent resettlement.

Third. International procedures must be devised to solve the problems which arise when permanent resettlement becomes necessary. In such situations, the task of resettlement should be shared on an equitable basis so that no single nation or group of nations is faced with the entire refugee burden. Any system for resettlement must take into account that displaced persons are truly an international problem requiring an international solution.

Fourth. Our efforts must be focused on the fundamental human issues involved. These issues are too serious to be made the subject of partisan or ideological polemics.

In developing the elements of such an international solution, we might well begin by reaffirming the principle of mutual respect for immigration laws. A concrete way of doing this would be to develop cooperative machinery to prevent the misuse of vessels and aircraft in refugee migrations. We should also reaffirm the absolute obligation of states to permit the return of their citizens.

We should, in addition, consider ways in which the inter-American system can help international relief organizations, private voluntary organizations, and other agencies in their efforts to deal with future crises.

The OAS can work closely with international agencies like the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration to develop procedures for coping with these complex and highly sensitive problems. The OAS might, for example, provide the institutional framework for insuring that appropriate legal obligations are carried out and that member nations get the help they need to meet their responsibilities to displaced people. Our efforts to develop regional procedures to control dangerous and chaotic refugee flows could set a precedent for larger international efforts to deal with this global problem.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to suggest that we of the Americas can take the lead in responding to this grave humanitarian problem. And I should like to suggest that in the weeks ahead, we focus our efforts in two directions.

First. Toward the immediate problem: What role can the OAS play to assist the permanent resettlement of persons now in countries of first asylum? We should specifically consult on whether an OAS Permanent Council meeting should address this problem.

Second. Toward the long-term issue: What norms and mechanisms can be established to deal with future problems of this nature? Our consultations should focus, in particular, on how to involve the OAS General Assembly in efforts this fall to develop such norms and mechanisms.

The United States looks forward to the day when all peoples can live happily, peacefully, and productively in their own countries—a day which unfortunately is not yet in sight. Meanwhile the community of nations, of which the OAS is a vital institution, must develop remedies that will protect the rights of people and of nations and serve the cause to which all of us are dedicated—the cause of peace, stability, and cooperation among the nations of the world. ■

Deposed Shah Dies in Cairo

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JULY 27, 1980[1]

We have been informed that the former Shah has died in Cairo.

The President and Mrs. Carter are sending their personal condolences to the Shah's family. At this time of great personal grief for the members of the Shah's family, they deserve sympathy and an atmosphere of tranquility. Ambassador [to Egypt Alfred] Atherton has been asked to deliver the Carters' condolences.

The Shah was the leader of Iran for an exceptionally long period of time—38 years. History will record that he led his country at a time when profound changes were taking place. His death marks the end of an era in Iran, which all hope will be followed by peace and stability.

[1] Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman David Passage. ■

Visit of Jordanian King Hussein

His Majesty King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan made an official visit to Washington, D.C., June 16–21, 1980, to meet with President Carter and other government officials. Following are the dinner toasts exchanged at a state dinner at the White House on June 17.[1]

President Carter

A lot of people have accused me of inviting Their Majesties to Washington just so we could have Queen Noor visit the White House. [Laughter] That's not entirely accurate, because there are many reasons why we should want His Majesty, King Hussein, to come back to visit with us, as well as his beautiful bride and the new mother of his new child, to come with her parents and her brothers and sisters and to be with us this evening. It's a delightful experience for us, and her presence vividly demonstrates the close relationship and the unbreakable ties between our two countries.

The first time that King Hussein came to visit a President of the United States was in 1960, when President Eisenhower lived in this home. And he's been here many times since, a great leader, one who represents accurately the courage and the dynamism and the commitment and the progress of the people of Jordan.

He has led his nation over more than a quarter of a century, in good times and in dangerous times, in successful times and in disappointing times, but always with a deep commitment to what's best for his own people and the preservation of stability and peace and the honoring of human rights not only in Jordan but throughout the Middle East.

He's indeed been an inspiration to many people who have served as the leaders of other nations. This is a troubled time in the history of the world, and to have a leader like him, still young, but with deep experience, reaching out his hand of friendship and peace to those neighbors of Jordan who look to him with confidence and with admiration, is reassuring to us all.

We share a great deal in common—a commitment to the integrity of international boundaries; a commitment to the unity of nations in the Middle East, to the preservation of peace, to the security of all, and to the enhancement of those principles which guide human beings and which never change. But, at the same time, he has exhibited to a remarkable degree an ability to insure economic progress and utilization of modern science and technology to give his people a better life.

King Hussein is a good counselor and adviser for other leaders of nations who meet with him. And although sometimes our two nations do disagree on the technique for achieving a goal, we share completely a common commitment to the same goals—to the realization of the full rights of the Palestinian people, to the security of Israel and all the nations in the Middle East, to the honoring of deep religious feelings, and to the knowledge that people of good will ultimately with courage and with perseverence, sometimes with patience, can triumph.

We have had good discussions so far today—much better than would have been expected—because of his frankness and because of his generosity, his eagerness to understand different points of view without yielding at all on the deep principles which have guided his life and which he holds so dear. We have expressed our concern about aggression demonstrated by the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan. We've expressed our concern about international terrorism, exhibited in Iran with the unwarranted holding of innocent Americans hostage for many months, and we've expressed our commitment to stability in the Persian Gulf region and to peace in the Middle East.

I would like to say in closing that because of his own leadership and because of geographical circumstances of his own nation, Jordan will indeed play a central role in the realization of the hopes and dreams of all who want peace and stability and freedom and security in the Middle East.

At this time, I would like to propose a toast, if you will stand and join me. To Their Majesties, King Hussein and Queen Noor, to the friendship which binds our two nations and our two people together, and to the commitment to peace and the enhancement of human rights and a better life for all those of faith and good will everywhere throughout the world.

White House photo by Jack Kightlinger

President and Mrs. Carter with King Hussein I and Queen Noor.

should move away from what has become a debasement of language, including name calling, and should adopt a new approach. I want also to note that the Chapter VI Resolution on which the Council is voting this afternoon contains, for example, in operative 7(b), particular wording that is not appropriately drawn.

In order to make clear our view as to the direction that Security Council action on the question of South Africa should take, I am today sending the President of the Council a letter containing the text of the kind of resolution we have in mind. We hope that the ideas and expression of this draft may prove useful to members in the future.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 473[2]

The Security Council,

Taking note of the letter dated 29 May 1980 from the Charge d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Morocco to the United Nations contained in document S/13969,

Gravely concerned over the aggravation of the situation in South Africa, in particular the repression and the killings of schoolchildren protesting against *apartheid*, as well as the repression against churchmen and workers,

Noting also with grave concern that the racist regime has intensified further a series of arbitrary trials under its racist and repressive laws providing for death sentences,

Convinced that this situation has been brought about by the continued imposition by the South African racist regime of *apartheid* in defiance of resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions on the question of South Africa, in particular resolutions 392 (1976) of 19 June 1976, 417 (1977) of 31 October 1977 and 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977,

Recalling further resolutions 454 (1979) of 2 November 1979 and 466 (1980) of 11 April 1980, in which South Africa was condemned for the flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring African States,

Reaffirming its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people for the elimination of *apartheid* and the establishment of a democratic society in accordance with their inalienable human and political rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Taking note of the extensive demands within and outside South Africa for the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners,

Gravely concerned over reports of supply of arms and military equipment to South Africa in contravention of resolution 418 (1977),

Taking note of the letter dated 27 March 1980 by the Chairman of the Special Committee against *apartheid* concerning an oil embargo against South Africa (S/13869),

Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

1. *Strongly condemns* the racist regime of South Africa for further aggravating the situation and its massive repression against all opponents of *apartheid*, for killings of peaceful demonstrators and political detainees, and for its defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 417 (1977);

2. *Expresses* its profound sympathy with the victims of this violence;

3. *Reaffirms* that the policy of *apartheid* is a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind and is incompatible with the rights and dignity of man, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and seriously disturbs international peace and security;

4. *Recognizes* the legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people for the elimination of *apartheid* and for the establishment of a democratic society in which all the people of South Africa as a whole, irrespective of race, colour or creed, will enjoy equal and full political and other rights and participate freely in the determination of their destiny;

5. *Calls upon* the South African Government urgently to end violence against the African people and to take urgent measures to eliminate *apartheid;*

6. *Expresses* its hope that the inevitable change in south Africa's racial policies can be attained through peaceful means, and declares, however, that the violence and repression by the South African racist regime and its continuing denial of equal human and political rights to the great majority of the South African people greatly aggravate the situation in South Africa and will certainly lead to violent conflict and racial conflagration with serious international repercussions and the further isolation and estrangement of South Africa;

7. *Calls upon* the South African regime to take measures immediately to eliminate the policy of *apartheid* and grant to all South African citizens equal rights, including equal political rights, and a full and free voice in the determination of their destiny. These measures should include:

(a) Granting of an unconditional amnesty to all persons imprisoned, restricted or exiled for their opposition to *apartheid;*

(b) Cessation forthwith of its indiscriminate violence against peaceful demonstrators against *apartheid*, murders in detention and torture of political prisoners;

(c) Abrogation of the bans of political parties and organizations and the news media opposed to *apartheid;*

(d) Termination of all political trials;

(e) Provision of equal education opportunities to all South Africans;

8. *Urgently calls upon* the South African regime to release all political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela and all other black leaders with whom it must deal in any meaningful discussion of the future of the country;

9. *Demands* that the South African racist regime refrain from committing further military acts and subversion against independent African States;

10. *Calls* on all States strictly and scrupulously to implement resolution 418 (1977) and enact, as appropriate, effective national legislation for that purpose;

11. *Requests* the Security Council Committee established under resolution 421 (1977) in pursuance of resolution 418 (1977) on the question of South Africa to redouble its efforts to secure full implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa by recommending by 15 September 1980 measures to close all loopholes in the arms embargo, reinforce and make it more comprehensive;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report by 15 September 1980 on the implementation of the present resolution;

13. *Decides* to remain seized of the question and to consider the situation again not later than 30 September 1980.

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[1] USUN press release 66.
[2] Adopted unanimously June 13, 1980. ■

Security Council Votes on Status of Jerusalem

Following is a statement made by Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, in the Security Council, the text of the resolution, and a statement made by Secretary Muskie at the White House all on June 30, 1980.

AMBASSADOR McHENRY, JUNE 30, 1980[1]

The United States is deeply committed to making practical progress toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle

East which would permit people of all faiths to live at peace in an undivided Jerusalem.

We strongly believe that Jerusalem must become a city of peace—undivided with free access to people of all faiths. We also believe that its status should be determined in the negotiations for a comprehensive peace.

The process of achieving a durable peace requires negotiations among the parties. Only in the give-and-take of negotiations can solutions be worked out with which all parties to an agreement can live in dignity and at peace with each other.

In recent weeks and months we have faced, in this Council, a series of debates on issues related to the Middle East. These debates and the unilateral acts of the parties have the effect, if not the intention, of undercutting the one active negotiation currently in progress. Progress in any negotiation will be more difficult so long as we are expending our energy in the treadmill of actions and reactions in the Security Council rather than devoting those energies to a realistic process of negotiation.

The United States, Israel, and Egypt are currently engaged in a process of negotiations designed to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. These negotiations, under the Camp David accords, are designed to resolve the Palestinian problem in all of its aspects, while fully protecting the security of Israel. This is the first effort in 30 years aimed at resolving some of the most intractable problems that stand in the way of a just and lasting peace. We do not believe resolutions which undermine the negotiating process are consistent with the search for a peaceful settlement to which this Council and its members are committed.

The resolution before us contains a number of deficiencies in its formulations. It does not, for instance, root consideration of the Jerusalem issue in the context of the negotiated peace envisioned in Resolution 242, but rather quotes selectively from that resolution. It contains a provision which affirms the need for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 without any reference to the other central provision of Resolution 242—Israel's right to secure and recognized boundaries in a just and lasting peace. Resolution 242, in all its parts, remains the basis for a comprehensive peace.

What is really needed in a resolution on Jerusalem is a practical method for bringing peace to the people of that city. We must establish the basis for a negotiation to resolve the final status of Jerusalem in the context of peace. We must find a way to assure in clear and unequivocal terms that the city is not again divided and that people of all faiths have free access to the holy places.

The real challenge to those who seek peace in this holy city is to develop the basis for such a negotiation. In such a negotiation, the issues must be addressed in a more realistic manner than the present resolution's impractical call for rescinding past actions.

At the same time I must note that this resolution contains much which is consistent with the policy of my government because it deplores unilateral acts which have sought to change the character of the city outside a negotiated settlement. The significance of those acts is they are inconsistent not only with international law but, indeed, with the very nature of negotiation, which is essential to peace.

The position of the United States on Jerusalem has been stated consistently by successive American Administrations and remains as stated in this Council by Ambassador Goldberg on July 14, 1967, and by Ambassador Yost on July 1, 1969. Beyond that, the policy of the United States is reflected in "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David." It remains the view of the United States that the comprehensive peace envisioned there can only come about when an agreement has been negotiated on the final status of Jerusalem.

We do not intend to be diverted from our course of negotiation by a series of actions and reactions resulting in resolutions in this Council which do not contribute to a negotiated peace. The clearest way for us to indicate that determination is for us to abstain in the vote on the resolution before the Council.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 476[2]

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter of 28 May 1980 from the representative of Pakistan, the current Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, as contained in document S/13966 of 28 May 1980,

Reaffirming that acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible,

Bearing in mind the specific status of Jerusalem and, in particular, the need for protection and preservation of the unique spiritual and religious dimension of the Holy Places in the city,

Reaffirming its resolutions relevant to the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, in particular resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969, 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 and 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980,

Recalling the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,

Deploring the persistence of Israel, in changing the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure and the status of the Holy City of Jerusalem,

Gravely concerned over the legislative steps initiated in the Israeli Knesset with the aim of changing the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem,

1. *Reaffirms* the overriding necessity to end the prolonged occupation of Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;

2. *Strongly deplores* the continued refusal of Israel, the occupying Power, to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly;

3. *Reconfirms* that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem have no legal validity and constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

4. *Reiterates* that all such measures which have altered the geographic, demographic and historical character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem are null and void and must be rescinded in compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

5. *Urgently calls* on Israel, the occupying Power, to abide by this and previous Security Council resolutions and to desist forthwith from persisting in the policy and measures affecting the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem;

6. *Reaffirms* its determination in the event of non-compliance by Israel with this resolution, to examine practical ways and means in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to secure the full implementation of this resolution.

and to avoid acrimonious political debate, however, is severely handicapped when the credibility of our negotiating posture is weakened by perceptions of our inability to deliver. I refer specifically to the current need for congressional action with regard to authorization and appropriation legislation for multilateral development banks, which I will address in more detail later.

My comments today will focus on two key issues: first, the progress achieved in recent years; and second, the critical need for Congress to support the international financial institutions and the U.S. position therein, given the particular importance of these institutions in the current economic environment.

Recent Progress

The Administration's comprehensive approach to North-South economic relations has led to significant progress on a number of fronts.

Trade. The United States reinvigorated the deadlocked multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) and brought them to a successful conclusion. As a result of the negotiations, the major industrialized countries will reduce their industrial tariffs by 33% on a weighted average basis. A 25% cut in developed-country tariffs will be made on items of traditional export interest to LDCs. U.S. tariff cuts on LDC products, excluding textiles and apparel, average about 35%.

New non-tariff codes on subsidies, government procurement, standards, import licensing, and customs valuation will provide a much more open and stable environment for future trade growth for all nations. The procurement code alone will open over $30 billion of trade to eligible countries. The agreements also provide a permanent legal basis for special and more favorable treatment of developing countries, accompanied by more liberal rules on trade measures taken by LDCs for development purposes. Since opportunities for trade expansion are probably the single most important feature of the world economy for most developing nations, the MTN agreements mark an enormous step forward in North-South economic relations.

Trade is also probably the most important area of U.S. economic relations with developing countries and provides the clearest example of mutual benefits for industrialized and developing countries alike. Exports are an important generator of U.S. investment, production, employment, and income. The non-oil LDCs are by far the fastest growing market for U.S. exports, where our sales have tripled from $16 billion in 1973 to $48 billion in 1979.

Imports help dampen inflation and encourage competition and, hence, productivity. Despite the fact that the United States accounts for about 40% of the combined GNP of the industrial countries, in 1978 the United States took more than 52% of developing country manufactured exports to all industrial countries. Nearly 22% of all our manufactured imports in 1978 came from developing countries; the corresponding figure for all other industrial countries was less than 5%. U.S. economic growth since the global recession of 1975 has been particularly beneficial to the non-oil LDCs, whose exports grew much faster to the U.S.

The primary task before us now is to consolidate and make full use of those international economic instruments which have recently been put in place or improved . . . .

market than to either Japan or the European Community.

Energy. With strong support from the United States, the World Bank plans to support oil and gas projects which, combined with private and government financing, will total more than $33 billion over the next 5 years. This should ultimately provide an additional 2.5 million barrels of oil equivalent a day to the world market. Our own Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has established political risk insurance for oil exploration, production, and development in developing countries, with significant results already. These multilateral and bilateral efforts will help reduce the dependence of developing countries on expensive oil imports and, at the same time, improve the world energy balance—a clear example of mutual benefit to industrialized and developing countries alike.

Commodities. The United States supports the negotiation of stabilization agreements to reduce commodity price volatility, to lessen inflation in the consuming countries, and stabilize resource availability for investment and growth in producing countries. The International Sugar Agreement was finalized in September 1977; the President signed the necessary authorizing legislation in April. The framework of an agreement for the Common Fund has been negotiated, and the full treaty is scheduled for completion in June. The Natural Rubber Agreement, completed in October 1979, is now receiving congressional consideration. The United States participated actively in the recent renegotiation of the International Tin Agreement and has offered to make a stockpile contribution to the current agreement.

In short, the previous U.S. policy of "rejecting commodity agreements on a case-by-case basis" has been replaced by a positive, constructive approach—because we believe such agreements are of mutual benefit to ourselves and the developing countries alike.

Food. The Administration has continually sought to improve world food security. It supported the creation of a $1 billion International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), which is helping the developing countries increase their food production. We have pledged 4.5 million tons of food aid annually under the international Food Aid Convention, nearly half of its 10 million ton target. U.S. farmers, acting on government incentives, placed 35 million tons of grain in reserve during 1977–78; the value of this reserve was demonstrated last year when 14 million tons were released into the market in response to rising world demand. By ending the set-aside program in agriculture, we have helped provide more food for the world and more markets for our farmers. We have proposed the creation of a special domestic food aid security reserve of 4 million tons of grain, which will guarantee our ability to meet our food aid commitments even under tight market conditions. Indeed, the U.S. Government has already purchased the 4 million tons of wheat destined for this reserve.

The United States has been in the forefront in urging the multilateral development banks to help develop effective food strategies; in particular, we strongly support the World Bank's program to improve food distribution and storage infrastructure in developing countries. The World Bank is far and away the largest single source of external funding for agricultural and food

production, providing over 40% of all official commitments to agriculture. Over the 5 years just ended, total lending commitments equaled $11.6 billion, representing 33% of total lending. The World Bank expects to finance projects which will contribute approximately one-fifth of the increase in annual food production in its developing member countries in the 1980s.

Strengthening the Monetary System

As the world's central monetary institution, the IMF provides the basic framework for international monetary cooperation. Its resources are made available to all members, developed and developing, to help them implement economic adjustment programs to correct balance-of-payments problems. In the wake of the latest oil price increases, the IMF has expanded its financing activities and, in the early months of this year, has provided resources and made loan commitments amounting to $2.8 billion – all for developing countries and more than it lent in all of 1979.

The IMF has increased substantially the resources available for its lending, through establishment in 1978 of both the $10 billion Supplementary Financing Facility and its sixth quota increase (of which about a quarter goes to developing countries). These countries receive a similar share of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocations, which will total $4 billion annually during 1979–81. The Fund will receive a further injection of resources from the seventh quota increase, scheduled to take effect this fall. And, in light of the size of current-payments imbalances and the attendant adjustment and financing requirements, the IMF will be conducting discussions with potential lenders on the terms and conditions on which the Fund could borrow additional resources, if and when the need arises.

The Fund has also greatly expanded access to its resources through the Supplementary Financing Facility, the substantial liberalization of the Compensatory Financing Facility, and the quota increases. As a result of these steps, member countries can in some cases obtain financing which exceeds 600% of their quota.

In view of the difficult adjustments which countries must make to the changed economic situation and new energy balance, the period of adjustment and repayment associated with IMF financing has been increased. For example, economic adjustment programs can now be implemented over a 3-year period compared with the 1-year programs normally required in the past. The maturities on IMF loans have been increased to 10 years on Extended Fund Facility drawings and 7 years on Supplementary Financing loans, compared with the 3–5 year repayment periods on regular IMF financing.

Finally, the IMF is examining further steps that might be taken to improve its ability to meet members' balance-of-payments requirements, including actions to reduce the interest cost on Supplementary Financing drawings and the possibility of using part of the Trust Fund repayments to ameliorate the conditions of loans to low-income developing countries.

Multilateral Development Banks

The multilateral development banks are a cost-effective and efficient means by which the United States can help developing countries help themselves. Because these institutions are at the heart of international efforts to address the fundamental concerns of the developing countries, the Administration has been unswerving in its support of the banks.

For 1979 the Congress voted a record level of appropriations of $2.5 billion for the multilateral development banks, up from $700 million voted for FY 1977 before this Administration took office. We have supported a capital increase for the World Bank of $40 billion and a replenishment of almost $10 billion for the Inter-American Development Bank. We participated in a new replenishment of over $2 billion for the Asian Development Fund and an expansion of membership that will increase the capital of the African Development Bank by $4.5 billion. For International Development Association (IDA), the largest concessional assistance program in the world, we have completed our contribution of 31% to the fifth replenishment of $7.6 billion and have pledged 27% to the sixth replenishment of $12 billion for 1980–82.

The Need for Congressional Action

Implementation of many of these initiatives now requires congressional action. Several pieces of commodity legislation are still pending. Early floor action is needed on the latest IMF quota increase, already reported out by the Senate Foreign Relations and House Banking Committees.

Most urgent, however, is passage of the necessary authorization and appropriations legislation for the multilateral development banks. The failure of Congress to do so has already resulted in a suspension of lending from the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Development Fund. This can have severe economic and political consequences for developing countries throughout the world. It also weakens U.S. influence in these institutions, and in overall North-South relations, and leads other donor countries to doubt our pledges across a wide range of negotiations. This is an untenable position for the United States.

Such congressional inactions seriously damage the moral, political, and economic leadership role of the United States. At the recent meeting of the IMF Interim Committee and IMF/IBRD Development Committee in Hamburg, criticism of U.S. delays concerning the multilateral development banks was a major topic. Many developed and developing countries expressed their acute concern, both formally during the

30 Developed Countries

OECD Members

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany, West
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
U.K.
U.S.

Centrally Planned Economies

Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Germany, East
Hungary
Poland
U.S.S.R.

News Conference of August 7 (Excerpts)

Following are excerpts from a news conference Secretary Muskie held after his address to the United Steelworkers of America in Los Angeles on August 7.[1]

Q. At the end of your speech just a few moments ago, you asked for the steelworkers to lend their support to you in a broader political arena. Were you confining it to your role as the Secretary of State or perhaps to a broader role like the Presidential campaign, or as the President?

A. A very good question. My purpose is simply to enlist their support in responsibilities I now have as Secretary of State into a much broader arena—the whole world—and Americans have an influence on that world, which is very similar to the influence they are able to bring to bear upon their domestic problems and domestic issues. I was simply trying to drive that point home.

. . . .

Q. Since taking over the State Department, have there been any fundamental changes in the operation of the Department and/or in the making of foreign policy?

A. If by "fundamental changes" you mean has there been any restructuring of the institutions of government to deal with foreign policy, the answer is no. I think it would be premature to walk in as a very unexpected Secretary of State with a handmade blueprint of how the structure ought to be adapted to my needs.

For this year, which obviously has its own pressures because it is an election year, I am working with the structure as I find it, undertaking to familiarize myself with it, and in terms of change, at some point in the future, with some developing perceptions of how the policymaking process works, so that when the right time comes I can make recommendations.

. . . .

Q. What impact do you see the continuing holding of the hostages in Iran having on the American political process?

A. Obviously, it's a negative factor from the point of view of the President, and I would suspect it is a frustrating issue from the point of view of all the candidates. Finding a magic, simple answer for that problem is not the easiest thing in the world, as I've found over the last 90 days. If there were some way for us to find and touch a responsive chord among those who have authority in Iran and achieve their release, that fact would have a political impact in this country, I would assume.

Q. There is a story out of the Middle East today that four nations—I believe Switzerland, Austria, an Arab country, and the United States—are trying to work out a deal on the hostages that might see a breakthrough in the third week of August. Are you aware of any major effort under way at this time to achieve that end in that time?

A. If that is the standard of the word "major," there have been a number of such initiatives in the last 90 days. None of them, obviously, were yet successful involving other nations, involving other individuals. We continue to pursue them, and there have been recent developments that give us some reason to believe that we ought to try not to raise our expectations too high. But there is the fact of Richard Queen's release, which indicated at least two things: one, that somebody had the authority to make that decision and do it quickly—there was some doubt on that point prior to his release; and secondly, that it was done apparently on compassionate grounds, if not compassionate motives.

Then you have the Ramadan holy season which ends on August 12, which might release some wellsprings of compassion and humanity that might influence the leaders. And they seem to be trying to distinguish between the Government of the United States in the person of President Carter and any other officials and the people of the United States. They made that distinction quite clear in connection with Mr. Queen's release, so that's something.

And finally, there is the slow emergence of the political institutions of Iran. The Parliament is meeting, has elected a speaker, and they seem to be on the verge of agreeing on a prime minister, so that authority is being put in place—authority, presumably, with some ability and capacity to make decisions that will be held accountable not only for the condition of the hostages but for the welfare of the people of Iran, which is being undermined by this hostage crisis.

It has inhibited normal relations with their natural trading partners; it has reduced the flow of goods into Iran; it has cut down on their oil production and their ability to sell their oil. Economic conditions within the country, political fragmentation within their country, the rising tide of violence in Kurdistan in northwestern Iran, the pressures on their border as they may perceive them from the Soviets, and the Afghanistan invasion—all of these pressures are working on the decisionmakers within Iran.

They are going to be held accountable for the failure or success in dealing with these problems. And their ability to deal with those problems, we believe, is being affected unfavorably by their preoccupation with the hostage crisis. This point is being made by friends, by interested countries on a constant basis in the hope that we can influence the environment there.

Q. There has been a confluence of seemingly favorable developments in the past, and they have been disappointing. Is there a special reason to believe that there may be genuine cause for optimism, some kind of breakthrough, in the near future?

A. I would not be optimistic until I saw the 52 gathered in front of me.

Q. How would you characterize, though, the efforts of the United States in this affair? Are we merely sitting back and waiting for Iran to crack in its demands and to come to us and say: "All right, we're ready to talk and negotiate on a reasonable level"?

A. I guess I haven't succeeded in the last 5 minutes. I don't think what I said is a description of inactivity, of

sitting back, or of indifference or lack of effort. This involves an enormous amount of effort. We have a special Iran watch in the State Department. It operates on a 24-hour basis with volunteers from hostage families and from others constantly watching developments.

The first report I get every morning delivered to my door is the one- or two-page report on the current status of the current talks, the current contacts that are being followed, the channels of communication, the reports back that we are getting. We are constantly devising messages to send back, ways to try to influence them to influence the people with whom they are in contact.

It's an intensive, full-court press on the diplomatic front that we continue, and we are constantly searching ways for expanding it, messages that might have appeal—and that's why I mentioned some of the recent developments that we think may enable us to reshape our messages.

The treatment that we gave to these Iranian student demonstrators is a way of contrasting the way they treat our hostages and the way we treated people who have violated our laws. We use every crumb of an idea that we can pick up to impress the leadership. We are considering others.

. . . .

Q. You talked a few moments ago about the Iranians who were being detained in New York—they have now, most of them, been released. We occasionally hear from the public such suggestions as to why don't we hold their people until they return ours to us. Can you give us your thoughts on that type of thinking; whether it's useful or not and whether it's part of the tactics or not?

A. You can speculate all over the lot. I'm not sure that those people want to go back there. Our hostages do want to come back here, so whether or not there is a *quid pro quo* in the making is a question.

Number two, whether or not these demonstrations are somehow orchestrated from Iran is a legitimate question to which I don't have any evidence upon which to base an answer. I thought it ought to be made clear to these Iranian students that if they really dislike this country, they are perfectly free to return to Iran and that we'll help them in the process. If that is the message you suggest conveying, I will convey it, and it will be in the most persuasive ways I can find.

Q. I was wondering if the use of, in effect, hostages on this side of the ocean to put pressure on for the release of the hostages on that side of the ocean, if that had ever been considered as part of the overall—

A. We think about it—we think about options of that kind. In the first place, these students were arrested for disorderly conduct. The time they spent in jail was the maximum that would normally be imposed in cases like that, so that when 5 days passed, holding them on that charge any longer would have been, in a way, going beyond what our own laws would have required.

Secondly, the other issue involved was their unwillingness to identify themselves under the immigration laws that made them subject to deportation. So that was the pressure that we were positioned then to apply.

We shifted them to a facility in New York which was much less like a prison—much less like the D.C. prison, among other things. In the new environment, they would be with lawyers, they would have lawyers by that time—American lawyers, American Civil Liberty lawyers, and so on—and they began to change their minds and identified themselves. Once they identified themselves, we were able to establish the legality of their status here in the United States, and there was no basis for holding them. So that we couldn't, really, if we were going to enforce our own laws, on some arbitrary charge, hold them as hostages. I mean, we would in effect be justifying, in effect, what the Iranians are doing.

Q. But you did say you considered the possibility of holding Iranians perhaps to make some kind of—

A. No. I suggested the possibility of generously inviting them to go over to Iran at our own expense, if that's where they really wanted to be. That's just a little different approach to the same problem.

Q. He did ask you directly if you had considered the possibility of holding so-called hostages, to make some sort of exchange?

A. Whenever you reporters use the word "consider," we have to be very careful about what we answer. "Consider" to some reporters means to seriously consider; to me the word "consider" means that this is among the list of things that someone or other suggested. It doesn't mean we seriously consider it. So if you would drop the word "consider" from your questions, my answers can be more precise.

Q. Do you think that the foreign policy record of this Administration would be a help or a drag on Carter's reelection?

A. It depends on how well and how accurately it is presented and what the contrast is. You know, you have a foreign policy on the other side.

Q. Do you think the American people understand your viewpoint?

A. I hope they will by the time we get to November 4. There is no guarantee of that. Having been involved in elections, I'm sure of that.

Answering your question seriously, I would think that the foreign policy issues, as well as the economic issues, would be the centerpieces of this campaign to date. And as far as I'm concerned, I find the President very knowledgeable about all of his policies in detail, well equipped to debate his policies, good in debate, cool under pressure, and tough.

I've not found him the kind of indecisive person that he is often described as being. I find that when he makes a decision in which I have an input, he has no patience with anybody who comes back asking him to reconsider it, whatever it is. He tends to be tough-minded, cool under pressure, knowledgeable, and I would think he'd hold up well in debate, so that if debating these issues has an effect on the final result, then I think President Carter is in a good position to hold his own.

Q. Are you planning on campaigning for the President at all?

A. The Secretary of State is nonpolitical.

Q. I've heard from a couple of sources that Iran is slipping into the

grams to both use and protect their tropical forest resource. Many kinds of potential assistance have been identified by the U.S. Interagency Task Force on Tropical Forests, by international meetings of experts, and by the developing countries themselves.

There are encouraging signs that governments are giving increased attention and priority to tropical forests. At the recent UNEP meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, participants indicated that national policies for the management of tropical forests were being developed in many countries where such forests occur. Most of these policies emphasize (1) economic utilization of the resource, (2) conservation of the resource according to the principles of wise use, (3) protection of important water catchments and the environment in general, and (4) protection of indigenous forests and the wildlife they contain by means of parks and preserves.

These actions indicate high-level government concern and should help provide a sound basis for more effective international cooperation.

MR. LONG

U.S. Influences

The United States affects tropical forests both positively and negatively through a variety of public and private sector policies and practices. Major influences include: (1) U.S. consumer demand for wood and beef, the latter associated with conversion of forested land to pasture, particularly in Central and South America, (2) U.S. tariff policies and quotas on wood and meat imports, (3) domestic environmental policies that restrict cutting of temperate forests, regulate international trade in endangered species, and require environmental assessments of certain types of U.S. overseas activities that might impact tropical forests, (4) U.S. development assistance projects in tropical countries which may modify, restore, or protect forests, (5) commercial forestry activities, with some 30 U.S. firms currently involved, mostly in Southeast Asia, and (6) private investment in cattle-ranching operations in other countries.

In many cases, the precise nature and magnitude of U.S. influences have not been adequately described or quantified, as is the case of beef and wood imports, but studies are about to be undertaken to help fill these knowledge gaps.

As pointed out above, only 6% of total wood removals in the tropics is exported. Harvesting of wood for in-country use and large-scale conversion of forest land to other uses, mainly agriculture, are by far the principal sources of tropical forest loss.

Further, although U.S. imports of tropical hardwood and hardwood products are substantial in terms of value, in terms of *volume* they amount to only 1-2% of the total softwoods and hardwoods used in this country. Tropical wood imports are used mainly for decorative purposes and thus are not limiting in terms of strategic applications of wood.

U.S. Interests

Why should the United States be concerned about tropical forests when it exercises sovereignty over less than 1% of the world's total resource? The answer involves a combination of political, humanitarian, economic, developmental, environmental, educational, and scientific considerations—each with proponents within the diverse U.S. public and private sectors.

- U.S. commitments to world peace, economic and social stability, and the maintenance of the Earth's basic life support system all require concern about the productivity of the natural resource base, including forests.
- The United States is party to international agreements which call for sound resource management and environmental protection.
- Economic and social progress in less-developed countries, a basic U.S. foreign policy goal, is influenced by the integrity and use of indigenous forest resources.
- The influence of tropical forests on global physical, biological, and geochemical processes—including the stability of world climate—is poorly understood.
- One-third of the U.S. export market is with non-oil-producing developing countries, and their purchasing power is affected by the health of their natural resource base. Further, the United States earned more than $16 billion from direct investments in the developing world in 1978 alone.
- U.S. economic growth is aided by a sustained supply of wood and other tropical forest products at reasonable prices. Imports of tropical wood averaged $430 million annually from 1974 to 1978.
- Closed tropical forests contain large numbers of uninvestigated plant and animal species, many of which are likely to have important uses as food, medicinal, or industrial products. The United States already imports medicinal plants valued at $25 million annually, as well as primates used for medical research and various natural products such as rubber and gum arabic.
- The United States shares with tropical countries hundreds of animal species including migratory birds, mammals, insects, and turtles whose survival depends, to varying degrees, on tropical forests.
- Unique tropical flora and fauna provide outstanding scientific and educational opportunities.
- U.S. assistance to the international community for improved forest management is increasingly in demand.

In sum, although the U.S. share of the world's tropical forests is small, our overall stake in their sustained productivity is substantial.

U.S. Response

We would now like to turn to the paramount matter of the U.S. response to the situation we have just described. Two types of responses are in fact involved—domestic and international.

At the domestic level the efforts of the Federal task force have been designed to accomplish the following objectives: (1) raise public awareness of the tropical deforestation situation, (2) establish "tropical forest management" as a focal point for attention by the public and private sectors, (3) insure improved coordination of U.S. Federal activities related to this subject, and (4) develop a rationale, justification, and program proposals for an expanded U.S. effort to be carried out within an emerging international tropical forest management program.

Following the 1978 national strategy conference on tropical deforestation, the State Department established an Interagency Task Force on Tropical Forests which is cochaired by State and the Forest Service. It is this body that prepared the report to the President, and it will assume responsibility for coordinating the followup activities the government undertakes pursuant to the President's direction.

The Federal task force also serves as a point of contact with environmental

groups, universities, private industry, and other private sector interests. During preparation of the report to the President, the task force worked closely and productively with a counterpart nongovernmental task force chaired by Mr. Robert Blake and also with the National Forest Products Association. We intend to continue our close interaction with these groups in the future. One of the successes to date has been the high degree of interest that the U.S. Government and the various non-Federal interests share in pursuing improved management of the tropical forest resource base to meet a wide range of needs and values.

International cooperation is, however, essential for achieving sound stewardship of the world's tropical forests. Over 99% of such forests exist outside the United States in countries which exercise sovereignty over the development and management of their resources, including forests.

The U.S. strategy has, therefore, been to raise worldwide awareness of the scope, origins, and consequences of the tropical forest loss problems and to promote development of a coordinated international program on tropical forests which would attract support from governments and international organizations.

Consequently, the United States has raised the tropical forest loss problem at the last two U.N. General Assembly sessions, calling upon the nations of the world to join together in efforts to preserve this valuable resource for use by current and future generations. As a follow-up, the U.S. delegation to the 7th session of the governing council of UNEP, in May 1979, introduced a resolution calling for an international meeting on tropical forests to begin development of an integrated "global plan of action." The resolution drew broad support and led to the convening of an experts meeting in Nairobi from February 25 to March 1, 1980. In opening the meeting, UNEP Executive Director Mostafa Tolba referred to the world's tropical forests as "one of the great development challenges of the 1980's" and emphasized the importance of addressing the situation through creation of "a comprehensive detailed program of activities, coordinated among governments and international agencies, in conjunction with those nongovernmental organizations that possess specialist skills in this field." This call echoed one made by President Carter in his environmental message of 1979 in which he identified the loss of tropical forests as one of the major global problems which will confront mankind in the years immediately ahead.

As the United States had hoped, the international experts meeting in Nairobi reached agreement on a series of program recommendations to improve tropical forest management. These recommendations were presented in the report of the meeting as an "important first step" toward development of an internationally coordinated global plan of action. We are pleased to note that last week the UNEP governing council approved the report of the experts group and—most important—a procedure which guarantees that the existing program framework and recommendations will be further elaborated and developed over the next year.

In the coming months it will be necessary to insure that the momentum for this emerging international program is sustained. It will also be essential for the United States to determine exactly what and how it will contribute to the international program.

In our efforts to define an appropriate and meaningful U.S. program on tropical forests, the Federal task force confronted the important issue of program goals. Specifically, we addressed the questions: What conditions do we wish to see reached with respect to the world's tropical forests within the next 5 years (by 1985)? Over the subsequent 10 years (by 1995)? And by the year 2000 and beyond? It is especially significant that the answers to these questions—developed by the task force in the form of "short-term," "medium-term," and "long-term" goals—were presented by the U.S. delegation at the February international experts meeting, and they drew strong support. The U.S. goals will be further examined internationally, but we believe that they will ultimately be adopted, with some modification, as proper goals for the *overall* international plan of action.

Goals for the Future

The following are the goals that we believe the United States and other nations can realistically achieve within the next 5 years:

- Policy commitments by virtually all nations to the concept of improved forest management;
- Initiation of an internationally coordinated action program, involving research, monitoring, training and education, information exchange, technical assistance, and management demonstration;
- Doubling of the current annual rate of reforestation and afforestation worldwide;
- Completion of a comprehensive worldwide analysis of the causes and rates of tropical forest loss;
- Substantial increases in international research and development in tropical forest management, ecosystem dynamics, and commercial forestry operations;
- Launching of a major international effort to develop and introduce alternative low cost energy and food production systems into rural areas;
- Initiation of an international program to inventory and catalog unique forest, plant and animal types; and
- Expansion of national parks, wildlife refuges, ecological and biosphere reserves, and similar protected areas by at least one-third.

By 1990 the Federal task force believes that the following can be achieved internationally:

- Significant reduction in the present rate of tropical deforestation, with any large-scale forest clearing the result of deliberate, enlightened decisions by governments and local communities;
- Availability in virtually all tropical forest countries of revised policies and laws and improved management capabilities, dedicated to sound forest management;
- Additional commitment and programs by nations for the preservation and study of representative and unique forests, protection of forest peoples, and continued expansion of biosphere reserves and protected areas;
- Increased flow of wood and wood products, with expansion provided increasingly from plantation forestry; and
- Adequate understanding of forest-carbon dioxide-climate relationships on which to assess the impact of additional forest loss and reforestation on global climate.

And, by the year 2000 and beyond, the following goals have been recommended by the task force:

- A stabilized global situation in which a broad mix of forest types and values are maintained, and where reforestation and afforestation efforts offset cutting;
- Adequate knowledge of biological and soil characteristics, ecosystem dynamics, and land-use effects on which

King Hussein

I'd like to thank you for your kind and warm words of friendship toward both Noor and I, toward a friendship that I value, toward the ties and relations that have grown between our two nations over many years, and through good and difficult times, the ties that we treasure, for the fact that there are links of people who uphold the same ideals and principles and are dedicated toward fulfilling the same objectives for a better tomorrow which, hopefully, will bring a preservation of dignity to human beings, peace, justice, and a better life.

It's true I have had the privilege of visiting the United States over many years. I'm a firm believer and have always been dedicated to the cause of friendship between our people, a better understanding, and I'm proud to have been able to serve this objective and will continue to do so to the end of my days.

Throughout these many years and many occasions, I've had the privilege of meeting with leaders of this great nation. I said it today, and I've said it often: Throughout all these meetings, none gave me more of his time to discuss the problems of our part of the world and indicated as much of an interest in the problems that we face in the area from which I came and the determination to contribute toward solutions to those problems as have your good selves.

It is true that we may have differences in approach, but we respect your dedication to the cause of peace in our part of the world. It's a dedication that we share. We look into the future with hope, with determination, to contribute our full share for the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East which will affect not only those who live there but future generations there and elsewhere in the world.

We thank you for the opportunity to be with you, to have this opportunity to discuss our problems, to discuss all matters as friends, as brethren, and I'm convinced that this opportunity will enable us to address ourselves more adequately to the challenge in the times to come. We have been overwhelmed by the kindness and warmth with which we have been received once again, almost at home and amongst friends.

Thank you very much from both Noor, myself, and all who accompanied me from Jordan on this visit to the United States. May God bless you; may your efforts always meet with success in the times to come. Thank you, Mr. Carter.

Ladies and gentlemen, please, I call upon you to rise and join me in drinking a toast to the President and Mrs. Carter, to the United States, to friendship and fruitful cooperation in serving our mutual and common objectives, to peace and a better future.

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 23, 1980, which also contains remarks made at the welcoming ceremony and a statement by the White House press secretary of June 17 and the President's and King's remarks and a statement by the White House press secretary of June 18. ■

Iran Chronology, July 1980

July 10

Khomeini orders the release of one of the hostages, Vice Consul Richard I. Queen, because of illness.

July 11

Queen arrives in Zurich, Switzerland, and is hospitalized for observation of what is said to be a neurological disorder.

Iranian Government smashes plot to overthrow the government. The plot, reported to involve plans to bomb Khomeini's home and other targets in Tehran and Qom, is linked to Shahpur Bakhtiar, former Prime Minister of Iran.

July 12

Reports state that many Iranians are arrested and seven are killed in connection with the alleged coup attempt.

Queen in transferred from a Zurich hospital to a U.S. Air Force hospital in West Germany.

July 15

After 4 days of examinations, U.S. doctors diagnose Queen's illness as "multiple sclerosis."

July 18

Richard Queen arrives in Washington, D.C.

In Paris, four men identified as Palestinians, attempt to assassinate Bakhtiar.

July 20

Iranian Parliament takes over legislative power from the Revolutionary Council.

July 22

Ali Akbar Tabatabai, who served as press attache during the deposed Shah's reign, is assassinated in Washington, D.C.

Bani-Sadr is formally sworn in as President of Iran.

July 23

Iran's U.N. delegate, Mansour Farhang, resigns.

July 26

President Bani-Sadr nominates national police chief, Mostafa Mir-Salim as prime minister.

July 27

Deposed Shah of Iran dies in Cairo.

A spokesman for President Bani-Sadr states that the Shah's death will not affect U.S.-Iranian relations nor change the status of the hostages.

In Washington, D.C., on hearing of the Shah's death, Khomeini supporters and opponents stage demonstrations throughout the city. Violence breaks out between the pro-Khomeini groups and American protesters leading to the arrest of between 160 and 175 people.

July 29

Deposed Shah is buried in Cairo with full military honors. U.S. is represented at the funeral ceremony by U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Alfred Atherton.

July 31

Twenty-four men, including 11 who are implicated in the alleged coup against the Khomeini regime, are executed. ■

U.S. International Population Policy

by Richard Elliot Benedick

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 1980. Ambassador Benedick is Coordinator of Population Affairs.[1]

Demographic Setting

It is encouraging to note that the world's population growth rate gradually slowed during the 1970s, reflecting fertility declines in many developing as well as industrialized countries. However, tomorrow's parents are already born: Even if they should decide to have fewer children themselves, there is a builtin demographic momentum, due to the youthful age structure in the Third World, which will probably carry the world's population from the current 4.4 billion to over 6 billion by the end of the century. This prospective 20-year growth is almost as much as the entire world population as recently as 1930 and is the equivalent of adding more than 20 new countries of the current size of Bangladesh. Ninety percent of this growth will occur in the low income countries. The proportion of industrialized countries' population in the world total will probably decline, from 33% in 1950 to only 20% by the year 2000. Because of the expanding base, more people will be added to the world's total in the year 2000 than this year, even though the overall growth rate may decline.

The World Bank currently projects a possible stabilization of total population at around 10 billion late in the next century, but this number could be affected, up or down, by acceleration—or by delays—in attaining lowered fertility levels. The issue of further, and faster, reduction of fertility is far from academic: In a world which is already characterized by growing scarcities, political uncertainty, and strains on biological and environmental systems, numbers of these dimensions have portentous implications.

Effects of Modern Population Growth

It is difficult to overemphasize the fundanental effects of high population growth on the development process. There is ample data that population expansion in many less developed countries substantially offsets development efforts, as well as foreign aid. Rapid growth in the number of consumers, under conditions of relative scarcity of domestic resources, means that a significant portion of capital and labor has to be devoted merely to preventing deterioration of already low consumption levels—and is thereby diverted from needed investment for the future.

During the 1970s, much of the economic gains of the Third World were, in fact, canceled out by the steady rise in population. For hundreds of millions of people, the United Nations' "Second Decade of Development" was a decade of virtual stagnation. In Africa, average annual per capita growth of GDP was 0.2%. On a per capita basis, the gap in income levels between rich and poor nations has not narrowed.

Food production is not keeping pace with population growth in most parts of the world. From 1970 through 1977, per capita food output in market-economy developing countries rose at an annual rate of only 0.2%, and their dependence on food imports increased significantly. Moreover, rising food demand must now compete with increasingly higher priced energy imports. Norman Borlaug, pioneer of the "green revolution," has cautioned that innovations in agricultural technology can only buy limited time with which to control population growth.

The toll in maternal and child deaths resulting from consequences of excessive fertility and unwanted pregnancies is staggering. WHO [World Health Organization] studies indicate that the health of women and children is demonstrably undermined by pregnancies during teenage and late in life, by close spacing of children, and by high orders of birth. It has been estimated that, for every five births in the world today, there are probably two induced abortions; the consequences of pregnancy and abortion are a major cause of death among young women in many developing countries. And, according to UNICEF, even now, millions of children die each year from malnutrition and related causes.

UNESCO estimates that the number of illiterates are growing, from the current 800 million to approximately 1 billion by the year 2000; efforts to provide schooling are simply being overwhelmed by the tide of children. The proportion of illiterates who are women has actually increased, from 58% in 1960 to an estimated 60% currently.

ILO [International Labor Organization] estimates that, in the next two decades, approximately 700 million more people will enter the labor pool of developing countries—this is more than the total current labor force of the industrially advanced countries. The amount of investment required to put these numbers of people to work is astronomical. And this comes on top of unemployment/underemployment already reaching 40% in many areas. Pressures to migrate continue, especially in southern and West Africa and to the Middle East and the United States. Because of the sheer numbers involved, as well as social and political frictions associated with foreign workers, emigration cannot solve the growing problem of surplus labor in less developed countries (LDCs).

A recent Worldwatch Institute study estimated that the number of rural people who are effectively landless would approach 1 billion over the next two decades and predicted that "conflict rooted in inequality of land ownership is apt to become more acute in country after country." Already the estimated proportion of rural families who are landless, or nearly so, in over 80% in such countries as El Salvador and Guatemala and between 70% and 80% in Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Bangladesh, and the Philippines.

As rural population growth increases the fractionalization of landholdings, as croplands are depleted due to overintensive farming, and as job opportunities in the countryside diminish, migration to the cities is producing a virtual urban explosion in the Third World. The United Nations estimates that, in only 20 years, some 40 LDC cities may contain over 5 million inhabitants each; half of these may have over 10 million, including Mexico City at 32 million; Sao Paulo, 26 million; Calcutta, 20 million; Bombay, 19 million; Karachi, 16 million. By the year 2000, three-fourths of the Latin American population will be living in cities. Provision of jobs, housing, and social services to numbers of this magnitude, over such a short period of time, will present difficulties hitherto unimagined by town planners and governments.

Some recent studies suggest that

SECRETARY MUSKIE, JUNE 30, 1980[3]

I thought I'd like to make a statement on the vote at the United Nations today on the Jerusalem resolution. The issue was discussed very thoroughly this morning with the President and his other advisers, and our conclusion is this: that we are being faced now constantly with resolutions from the United Nations whose purpose it is, whether intentionally or not, to undermine the negotiations going on in the Camp David process.

They are not constructive in the sense that they do not substitute for a process. They divert attention from it; they undertake to prejudge some of the issues which will be negotiated or which are scheduled to be negotiated in the Camp David process. They have had the same effect as unilateral actions by the parties themselves.

The process is difficult enough to keep moving. The problems facing the parties are challenging enough and complex enough that the process ought not to be undermined, whether intentionally or unintentionally, by these kinds of resolutions or by unilateral action. The only way that we can indicate clearly our commitment to the negotiations now going on, in the hope that by concentrating on them and by keeping the parties that are actively pursuing them so we can finally resolve the issues that stand between the present situation of almost constant possibilities of violence, is to transfer them into a peaceful arrangement in the Middle East.

The only way we can do it is by abstaining from these votes, and so our abstention is not a negative act; it is a positive act designed to indicate our commitment to the negotiations, our commitment to the Camp David process, and our determination to pursue it and to resolve such issues as Jerusalem, the settlement question, the economy. We are in direct confrontation on the autonomy questions, and I think that we ought not to be diverted from them. I think these resolutions have the effect of creating such diversion.

Q. Do you think a unilateral move on the part of Israel to make Jerusalem its capital is also diversionary and hurts Camp David?

A. I've indicated that all unilateral actions—and I don't exclude any—have that effect.

Q. Why is it so impossible for the United States of America not to be able to say to the world that Israel is a democratic country, the only one in the Middle East we've supported. They want this capital and we recognize that. Why is it so impossible?

A. I'm sure that is impossible. I think we've said that many times. I've said it many times. This Administration has said it many times. The question assumes a condition that doesn't exist.

One of the problems of these resolutions is that we are asked to repeat rhetoric over and over again. But what we're trying to do is to get away from the rhetoric that does nothing but create sometimes emotional responses, divisiveness, diversionary actions. What we're trying to do is to get down to the nitty-gritty of the issues that stand between us and peace in the Middle East.

Now you can embroider it with all the rhetoric that you want, but the issue and the problem has been surrounded by rhetoric for almost 40 years now, and the only real effort to get down to nitty-gritty has been the Camp David process. We've negotiated, we've achieved results—important results. We want to continue that process. There are those, of course, who would like to undermine the Camp David process. There are those who would like to see it fail because they would like then to play in the chaos that would follow such a failure. What we're trying to do is to keep our eye and our focus and our effort and our energy on this process, and you cannot do it by a succession of resolutions in the United Nations which consume energy, which confuse issues, which ask us to prejudge issues that are going to be negotiated. That's my point, and abstention is the only way that we can make that point clearly. I wish there was some other way.

What I'm saying is, that in my judgment, abstention in this context is a positive act in the direction of resolving these problems and these issues.

[1] USUN press release 76 of June 30, 1980.

[2] Adopted on June 30 by a vote of 14 to 0 with 1 abstention (U.S.).

[3] Department press release 172 of July 1, 1980.■

Question of Palestine

Following are two statements made by William J. vanden Heuvel, Acting U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, in an emergency special session of the U.N. General Assembly on July 24, 1980, and July 29 and the texts of two resolutions adopted by the Assembly on July 29.

JULY 24, 1980[1]

The procedure under which this special session of the General Assembly has been called was set up by the resolution known as "Uniting for Peace." There is surely no issue on which the international community stands more in need of unifying for peace than the conflict of the Middle East.

Today, the need for peace is greater than ever, the quest more urgent. The confrontation that has continued for more than 30 years has hampered every nation in the Middle East from achieving the stability and prosperity that their peoples need and desire. It has caused profound dislocation for many of those people and has caused them to live their daily lives under enormous stress. It continues to cause untold human suffering in terms of lives lost, families bereaved, grievous wounds inflicted. It has made each day a time of fear and tension for Arab and Israeli alike.

The international community is gathered here today once again to consider this tragic conflict. My government would like nothing better than to see this body make a genuine contribution toward building a lasting peace. But the record of the past does not provide encouragement. Innumerable resolutions have been passed, but we are no closer to peace as a result of them. The reason is simple and apparent to all: Resolutions that do not take into account the legitimate rights and concerns of both sides will not be accepted by both sides and, therefore, cannot be the basis for negotiations. And without negotiations, we cannot move toward peace.

We do not pretend that the course of negotiations opened up by Camp David is more than a start. There is a long way to go before a just and lasting peace is assured. But we do believe a major step has been taken—and no

country should begrudge or attack a result that moves the world closer to peace. What better alternative to the negotiating process of Camp David do those who oppose it suggest? Neither the endless sessions of the Security Council nor the deliberations of the Assembly on the problems of the Middle East has produced an answer to that question.

Proposals circulated by the proponents of this emergency session of the General Assembly do not offer a realistic alternative. They are totally one-sided and, as such, totally unrealistic. They are not founded on the one agreed basis on which a settlement in the Middle East could be constructed—Resolution 242.

They make no attempt to understand, much less accept, Israel's concern for its security. Nor do they make any attempt to understand, much less reflect, a realistic procedure for moving toward peace through concrete agreements. When was a negotiation for peace ever achieved or encouraged by an intervention so careless of the real concerns of the parties involved?

Nor can this tragic conflict be resolved by one-sided rhetoric of the sort that characterizes the proposals which have been advanced. There are two sides to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and each has legitimate interests, aspirations, and concerns. Any nation that wants to contribute to bringing peace to the Middle East must understand those interests, aspirations, and concerns. To urge the interests of only one side does a disservice to the peoples who have suffered most from the conflict and who yearn most for a change in the status quo.

The United States has considered the provisions of the draft resolution being discussed, as it has all others, on the complicated problems of the Middle East on its merits. We will continue to ask, as a minimum of any resolution on which we must vote, whether it will help or hinder the process of negotiating a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement within the framework of Security Council Resolution 242.

Today it is possible to say that as a result of the negotiations launched at Camp David, an important start has been made toward the objective which all of us share—the achievement of a just, lasting, comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

For the first time in more than 30 years, two major warring powers of the region—Egypt and Israel—are at peace with a commitment to continue their efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace.

For the first time also in 30 years, the Palestinian question is inscribed on the agenda of a continuing negotiation in which important elements of the Palestinian question related to the West Bank and Gaza are being addressed concretely and in ways that can produce specific tangible benefits for the Palestinians.

My government intends to persevere in the effort to make progress in the negotiations. As we do so, we are guided by a number of principles with respect to the Palestinian question. I welcome the opportunity to restate those principles.

- The search for peace must be based on the principles of Security Council Resolution 242, which is the only internationally accepted foundation for a resolution of the Middle East conflict.
- The United States is committed to help the parties to the conflict achieve a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement. We will not be satisfied with partial solutions; as the Camp David framework acknowledges, a real peace will not come to the area until all aspects of the conflict are resolved.
- Peace cannot be imposed on the parties. A lasting peace can only come about through negotiations among the parties in which detailed accommodation on the complex issues is worked out. There can be no shortcut to this requirement. On the other hand, history has amply demonstrated the efficacy of the negotiating procedure. Faced with real and practical choices, negotiating parties have changed their perspectives on issues in a manner that has made agreement possible.
- We have made it clear that any concerned party may participate in the search for peace if it accepts Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, including recognition of Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized borders.
- We recognize that no peace will be just or lasting unless the independence and territorial integrity of all the states in the Middle East, including Israel, is explicitly acknowledged by all parties to the conflict. Let me repeat the phrase, "including Israel." There cannot be peace and there will not be a negotiated settlement that brings an end to this conflict unless all parties recognize that one of the significant elements in the recognition of Israel's right to exist and to exist with assurances of its security in the context of the military, terrorist, economic, and political assaults that threaten it.
- We recognize as another fundamental principle that peace will not be comprehensive unless the Palestinian problem is resolved in all its aspects. The Camp David framework recognizes that there are dimensions to the Palestinian question beyond the refugee problem that must be addressed. We believe that the Palestinian people should have the opportunity to secure for themselves and their future generations—through negotiations—the right to live in dignity and freedom; the right to economic, social, and cultural fulfillment; and the right to responsible politicai expression. The Camp David framework establishes a course of negotiations envisaging Palestinian participation to achieve these rights in the context of arrangements that will insure Israel's security and fulfill Israel's own deep desire for peace with its neighbors.
- It is a self-evident historical truth that the political rights of any people can only be given expression in the context of the maintenance of the rights of neighboring peoples. Surely no one would deny the Palestinians their fundamental human rights. Surely also no one would deny that the unique conditions that govern the Arab-Israeli problem—the tightly confined geography, the legacy of suspicions, emotions, and unresolved issues resulting from 30 years of conflict—make the working out of these rights in practical and real ways exceptionally complicated. Yet we are convinced they can be worked out through the negotiating process, if the two sides bring determination, patience, and good will to the task.
- We further believe that the Palestinian people must be able to participate through negotiations in the determination of their future. As [former] Secretary Vance said in his remarks in May 1979 at the opening of the autonomy negotiations, the United States believes deeply in the principle that ". . . governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed."
- We also recognize that the full spectrum of issues involved in the Palestinian problem is far too complex to be resolved all at once but that the problem should be resolved in all its aspects. The only realistic approach to such a constellation of issues is to establish a transitional period during which the decisions that need to be

using its energy resources at a rate which will promote that country's economic and social development. We want to be a good customer, paying a fair price for the oil and gas Mexico chooses to export. We understand the economic and political reasons for diversification and believe that new, expanded contacts can contribute to the recognition of Mexico's place in the world community and improve its relationships with the United States.

Migration

The complex issue of Mexican migration is being dealt with by the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy —consisting of representatives from the Administration, Congress, and the public; by the two governments through the Consultative Mechanism; and by the Administration as a whole in protecting the human and civil rights of undocumented workers. All of these efforts are complementary.

Instead of enacting the Administration's comprehensive 1977 legislative proposals, Congress established the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy which is scheduled to report its findings along with policy, administrative, and legislative proposals early in 1981.

In February 1979 Presidents Carter and Lopez Portillo agreed for the first time to cooperate closely to find a realistic and long-term solution, one which would respect the dignity and human rights of undocumented workers and which would take account of the many social, economic, and development issues involved.

In both the February and September 1979 presidential meetings, President Lopez Portillo expressed Mexican concerns over mistreatment of Mexican undocumented aliens in the United States. President Carter has emphasized his responsibility to enforce our nation's immigration laws but committed himself to safeguard the constitutionally guaranteed rights of all persons in our territory. The Administration has taken a number of steps to guard against abuse of these rights.

The Migration Working Group of the Consultative Mechanism has agreed on the following work program now underway: joint training sessions for U.S. and Mexican immigration officials, exchange of information and research including joint review of methodology of a major Mexican migration study, cooperation against undocumented alien smugglers, and improving channels of communication to insure high human rights standards in the treatment of undocumented workers.

Border Relations

The uproar over the so-called "tortilla curtain," which was more a symbolic than substantive issue, has largely abated. According to the scaled-down plan, work on short stretches of existing and replacement fences began in June 1979 and is expected to be completed this year. There continue to be periodic disturbances, especially in the Tijuana-San Ysidro sector, but cooperation between local authorities is generally good.

Opening new border stations and bridges and, in particular, environmental issues have predominated in recent bilateral meetings on border questions. Significant progress was made on these questions at a January 1980 meeting of the Border Working Group in Mexico City.

The two governments propose to open an urgently needed border inspection station at Otay Mesa to relieve existing facilities for San Diego-Tijuana 8 miles to the west and to serve new development in the area.

We have concluded an agreement with the Mexicans on disaster assistance in border areas. Progress is being made on agreements for the return of stolen vehicles and aircraft and procedures for confrontation of witnesses in Mexico whose testimony may be admitted in U.S. criminal trials.

The International Boundary and Water Commission, a model of border cooperation, has been assigned responsibility for planning and monitoring works to correct five problem areas where Mexican sanitation wastes are polluting waters entering the United States. The commission expects to reach agreement for two areas this year, and meanwhile, the Mexican Government has taken interim steps at each location to reduce hazards while permanent solutions are being devised and agreed upon. The commission is also studying means to avert controversy over competing exploitation of border underground water basins and overutilization of three streams crossing the Arizona boundary and not yet allocated between the two countries.

U.S. and Mexican environmental experts recently met in El Paso, Texas, under the 2-year-old cooperative agreement concluded between our Environmental Protection Agency and its Mexican counterpart. Important understandings were reached on subjects such as air pollution and the transportation and disposal of hazardous wastes.

The Border Working Group held its third plenary session 3 weeks ago. The two sides reviewed the full range of bilateral cooperation programs along the border, which also include activities by the Department of Health and Human Services and its counterpart Mexican ministry in cooperation with the Pan American Health Organization and the Border Health Association, educational and cultural exchanges, and exchanges of information and experiences by the U.S. and Mexican agencies concerned with housing and urban development. A new procedure relating to applications, studies, and approval for border crossings and international bridges was discussed.

Near agreement has now been reached on a joint marine pollution contingency plan, which would provide for coordinated responses by our two governments for future incidents, such as last year's Ixtoc I oil well blowout.

Also at the June 1980 meeting, the coordinator for the Mexican Commission for the Development of the Border Zones and the U.S. Federal cochairman of the Southwest Border Regional Commission explained to other working group members the functions, goals, and objectives of their respective economic development plans.

Tourism

Tourism is an important issue in U.S.-Mexican relations not only because tourist money is important to both countries but because the experience of tourists influences mutual perceptions. Revenues from tourism have provided almost 10% of Mexico's total export earnings with U.S. visitors accounting for between 60% and 70% of that amount. While tourist income is only 5% of U.S. export earnings, approximately 25% of U.S. tourism earnings come from Mexican tourists whose expenditures are especially important in U.S. ski resort and border areas as well as in areas with growing Hispanic populations.

The Tourism Working Group under the U.S.-Mexico Consultative Mechanism met in San Francisco in June 1979 when it:

- Established working parties on statistics, training, development of tourism to third countries, and tourism facilitation;
- Recommended the creation of a new subgroup within the U.S.-Mexico Quadripartite Commission to deal with border tourism;
- Requested that airlines consider a

new pricing regime for flights between the two countries; and

• Called for the development by 1982 of the Otay Mesa border crossing.

The 1978 air transport agreement with Mexico has led to an increase in service with the United States and to some lowering of fares. The main problem in implementing the agreement has been the Mexican fear of low U.S. fares and U.S. domination of the routes.

Other tourism controversies include the balance of trade in tourism and the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1976. Although the United States insists the balance of trade in tourism favors Mexico, the Mexicans disagree, but without statistics to support their claims. Mexicans resent the provision of the 1976 U.S. Tax Reform Act restricting U.S. travelers to two tax deductible overseas conferences each year. The Mexicans, along with the Canadians, have pushed for an exception for their countries or for the Western Hemisphere.

Narcotics Control

The U.S.-Mexico cooperative antinarcotics program has stressed two approaches. The most extensive has been the effort to eradicate illicit opium poppies in the fields. A parallel and complementary approach has been bilateral law enforcement cooperation to neutralize the narcotics trafficking syndicates on both sides of the border through exchange of intelligence, joint investigation, interdiction, and prosecution.

This is primarily a Mexican effort, consuming an estimated $40 million annually from that country's financial resources. The assistance funds provided by the State Department, approximately $86 million since 1973, help the Government of Mexico purchase and maintain reconnaissance and spray aircraft for the Attorney General's office. Purchase of herbicides and other operational costs are paid by Mexico. In the early days of the eradication effort, U.S. technical assistance, including both State Department and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) personnel, was also necessary. Today, however, Mexican expertise is such that U.S. experts also learn through participation.

The opium poppy eradication campaign has been a great success. Three or four years ago, poppy fields in Mexico's rural areas were often a quarter acre or larger in size, and an estimated 6 tons of heroin annually crossed the border into the United States. During the past 2 years, however, poppy fields have been fewer, more widely dispersed, and considerably smaller, with one-tenth of an acre plots considered large. There has been a decrease in the amount of Mexican heroin entering the United States. We estimate that some 1.5 tons of Mexican heroin entered the United States last year.

The cooperative U.S.-Mexico law enforcement program is conducted primarily through exchange of intelligence and joint investigations by the Drug Enforcement Administration and its Mexican counterparts. U.S. officials do not participate in actual arrests or other direct Mexican law enforcement activities.

This joint Mexican-U.S. cooperation has resulted in the immobilization of many major international narcotics traffickers. In 1979 Mexican police seized 5 heroin laboratories and 102 kilograms of heroin and opium. Since drug enforcement efforts have not been relaxed, these lab and drug seizures—only 25% of comparable seizures the previous year—demonstrate the diminished supply of Mexican narcotics.

A major element of U.S.-Mexico law enforcement cooperation has been the Janus program. Initiated in 1976 by the two governments, Janus is a system whereby violators in one country can be prosecuted on the basis of court evidence from the other. To date, at the request of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Government of Mexico has pursued 68 Janus cases. As a result, 36 traffickers are presently imprisoned with 17 fugitive warrants outstanding. The remaining cases are currently under Mexican judicial process.

In 1978–79, heroin from Mexico is estimated by DEA to have comprised less than 45% the total entering the United States, compared to 90% in 1975. Present indications point to a continuation of this favorable trend.

Stolen Vehicles

An estimated 10,000–20,000 stolen U.S. vehicles (automobiles, aircraft, etc.) are transported to Mexico each year. It is likely that many of them enter the Mexican domestic market in violation of tax and duty requirements. In 1978, 120 vehicles were recovered from Mexico through the 1936 convention governing their return and through administrative releases authorized by Attorney General Flores. Continued and expanded cooperative efforts between the United States and Mexico are required if the flow of stolen vehicles is to be reduced. To this end, the Legal Affairs Working Group has been developing a new treaty governing the return of stolen vehicles and aircraft. Both sides are now very close to an agreed text. We have been assured that Mexican approval can be expected momentarily.

Multilateral and Regional Issues

On multilateral and regional issues, Mexico and the United States sometimes take different positions. Mexico's election to the U.N. Security Council last year amounts to recognition of Mexico's increasing importance on the world scene. Again, we differ on some international issues in the United Nations but, by and large, enjoy a good deal of cooperation in areas such as U.N. reform and disarmament.

Mexico traditionally has felt constrained from playing a predominant role in the Caribbean and Central America due to her policy of nonintervention. This is changing somewhat, particularly in Central America where Mexico broke relations with Somoza before he was overthrown by the Sandinistas.

In general, Mexico shares with the United States the goal of a stable, healthy, nonextremist Central America. Through the Organization of American States and the United Nations, Mexico has generally pursued a policy similar to ours toward Nicaragua. The Mexican Government has maintained a "wait and see" attitude toward El Salvador, preferring not to grant the same degree of support to the revolutionary junta as we have.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.■

Department of State bulletin

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October 1980



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had an important role in the region's economic and social development, and we are eager to continue this contribution wherever it is welcome. We share the view of these governments that their economic and social development must be sound and wisely paced.

The Gulf governments are aware that we welcome their efforts to devise political institutions which will respond effectively to the desire of their people to participate in the shaping of national policy in a period of rapid economic and social change. These governments understand we advocate no particular doctrine or political system for them but that we support their interest in developing viable institutions of government, which assist in providing protection for basic human rights.

Middle East Peace. The Palestinian issue weighs heavily on all the Gulf governments and on our relations with them. These governments seek a comprehensive Middle East peace on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242. They all strongly assert the need to fulfill the rights of the Palestinian people in any peace arrangements, and Saudi Arabia in particular feels a special responsibility toward the future status of Jerusalem.

Consistently these governments assert that absence of peace in the Middle East is the primary threat to Middle East security, including the stability of the Gulf region. They regard tensions and alienations created by one-third of a century of conflict between Arabs and Israelis as the main source of Societ influence in the region, as a leading contributor to revolution and radical political currents throughout the Middle East, and as the primary obstacle to developing the sort of firm relationships with the United States which their national interests otherwise call for.

In the last 2 years the Gulf states, except Oman, have rejected the approach we have taken toward the peace negotiations. Even Oman has recently stated publicly that continued negotiations on Palestinian autonomy should be "discarded" if Israel refuses to end its efforts to consolidate control over East Jerusalem occupied in June 1967. The Gulf states generally are skeptical that the negotiations under the Camp David agreement will lead to a comprehensive peace. Our differences on this question have caused strains in our relations. We intend to continue to stay in close touch with them. We seek their understanding that the course we are pursuing is the only practical approach to a lasting peace. These states all understand the commitment of the United States to a determined pursuit of the peace process and our unique ability among outside powers to influence events.

The Arab-Israeli problem is the most striking example of the interrelationship of concern and hope in the Gulf states. Our own responsibility to seek peace in the Middle East flows from national objectives much broader than our interests in the Gulf. But if we can successfully pursue the path to peace at some early point with the cooperation of the Gulf states, we can proceed to turn a danger into an opportunity, for progress toward peace will enhance the security and domestic tranquility of the Gulf. It will strengthen the quality of our overall relations with the region. And it can unleash enormous additional Gulf resources to enhance the international effort to improve the lives of all the peoples of the Middle East and areas beyond. As a final point, I would stress that while a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem will not solve all the problems of the Persian Gulf, visible progress in pursuit of such a solution would contribute significantly,to our pursuing a Gulf policy in active harmony with the states of the region.

The Economic Issues

Our policy and our relations address the total context of these countries, which play and will continue to play an important role in some of the most pressing economic issues facing the world community.

Energy. These six states currently provide almost half of the free world's oil imports. Because their absorptive capacity is, at least in the short run, limited in relation to their enormous oil reserves, they have considerable flexibility in production policies. Because oil is overwhelmingly the mainstay of their national economies, they face growing domestic pressure to conserve this national patrimony. These countries have generally been on the moderate side in OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] price debates, and they have tended to produce more than their domestic revenue needs require in order to help meet international demand. Saudi Arabia, by far the largest producer, has, of course, been noteworthy in the responsibility toward the international economy it has demonstrated in both price and production policy.

A key issue for the United States and the world generally in this decade is

Qatar—A Profile

Geography

Area: 4,000 sq. mi. (about the size of Connecticut and Rhode Island). **Capital:** Doha (pop. 150,000).

People

Population: 250,000 (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 11%. **Ethnic Groups:** Arab (40%), Iranian (17%), Pakistani (7%). **Religion:** Muslim. **Languages:** Arabic (official), English, and Farsi.

Government

Type: Traditional Emirate. **Date of Independence:** Sept. 3, 1971. **Constitution:** None; however a 1970 "Basic Law" serves as a constitution. **Branches:** *Executive*—Council of Ministers (cabinet). *Legislative*—Advisory Council (has assumed only limited responsibility to date). *Judicial*—independent. **Political Parties:** None. **Suffrage:** None.

Economy

GNP: $4.5 billion (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** NA. **Per Capita Income:** $18,000. **Natural Resources:** Petroleum, fish. **Agricultural Products:** Fruits, vegetables. **Industries:** Oil production and refining, fishing, cement, desalting plants. **Trade (1978):** *Exports*—$2.5 billion: oil. *Imports*—$1.2 billion: industrial and consumer goods. *Partners*—U.K., Western Europe, Japan, U.S. **Official Exchange Rate:** 1 riyal=US$0.27. **Economic Aid Received:** None. **Economic Aid Sent:** $1.1 billion (1974–78).

Membership in International Organizations

U.N., Arab League, OPEC, OAPEC.

Principal Government Officials

Qatar: Amir; Acting Prime Minister—Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani; Minister of Foreign Affairs—Suhaim bin Hamad Al-Thani; Ambassador to the U.S.—Abdel Qader Bareek al-Amari. **United States:** Ambassador to Qatar—Charles Marthinsen.

how narrowly or how broadly these oil producers define their economic interests in approaching production and price decisions. As we face the tight energy supply situation anticipated in this decade, there will be continuing need to find means to encourage these producers to maintain their production. We have pursued a sustained exchange with them in recent years on energy issues and their relationship to the world economy.

We seek to intensify this dialogue to develop a stronger sense of the common responsibility of key producers and consumers toward an orderly transition to a world less dependent upon oil as an energy source. As this dialogue has developed in the last year, it is noteworthy that the Gulf producers have strongly welcomed the efforts we are making to reduce our dependence on imported oil and have urged us to do considerably more.

International Finance. The official foreign assets of these Gulf states now total over $140 billion and are increasing rapidly as these states produce more oil than they currently need to meet domestic expenses. The Gulf states have acted responsibly in their investment of these surplus assets, but such huge amounts pose a number of problems for the international economy:

- The difficulty of sustaining world economic growth with financial stability in the face of the massive transfer of resources from industrial democracies and the developing world to the producer states;
- The need to maintain adequate opportunities for investment by Gulf states in the U.S. and other economies;
- The requirement for stability in the international financial system and to maintain confidence on the part of investors; and
- The problem of coping with the needs of those developing countries which are increasingly strapped to pay their oil bills.

We consult in a variety of fora with key Gulf countries on these problems and other financial issues. They have become important and constructive members of the international financial community. We seek to encourage their further participation, including greater recognition of the need for the wealthy oil producers to bear a larger share of the task of helping poorer countries to finance their large balance-of-payments deficits through concessional aid and direct lending.

International Development. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have collectively committed over $20 billion in economic assistance to developing countries in the Arab world and beyond, including some $5 billion in support of a variety of regional, OPEC, and international lending institutions. They devote some 5% of their GNP to economic development lending. We seek to work closely with them in a common effort to assist third countries. In the decade ahead there is great scope for even closer cooperation, in some cases combining U.S. and other Western technology with the financial power of the Gulf states to pursue constructive development projects in needy nations, including helping them develop energy resources.

Commerce. U.S. exports to these six Gulf countries now exceed $7 billion a year, representing about one-half of our sales to the Middle East. Our sales to these countries provide employment for some one-quarter million Americans. Yet because of our dependence on Gulf oil and the rapid increase in oil prices, we ran a $4-billion trade deficit with these countries last year and expect that gap to increase this year.

U.S. exporters currently hold over one-sixth of the market in these countries and an even higher one-fifth share in Saudi Arabia. But we continue to face extremely tough competition from other industrial democracies and some developing countries in our efforts to maintain and expand our sales. There are a number of important policy issues under the general heading of "export disincentives" which both the Administration and the Congress must continue to address if we are effectively to pursue our national interest in expanding commercial ties with this region.

Transfer of Technology. We can take satisfaction in the role of private Americans in the development of the Gulf oil industry, which has provided the wherewithal for the remarkable improvement in the living conditions of the people of the Gulf. American technology continues to contribute in a wide range of development activity. Today there are some 30,000 private Americans working in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states contributing to the orderly development of these societies. It is in our interest, consistent with other national policies, to encourage greater U.S. participation.

There has long been official American involvement in the development of Saudi Arabia through the activities of the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S. Corps of Engineers. In recent years we have significantly expanded our official participation under the U.S.-Saudi Joint Economic Commission, which provides expertise to the Saudi Government on a fully reimbursable basis. There are currently 20 Joint Commission projects in such areas as water resource planning, solar energy, vocational training, highway management, water desalinization, data processing, and financial information services.

We have recently established a U.S.-Omani Joint Economic Commission which also will focus on technical assistance for development projects. The United States intends to contribute, along with Oman, in financing the activities of the commission, which we regard as the centerpiece of expanding economic cooperation.

For some years our Peace Corps has been active in Oman, as it was until recently in Bahrain. There we have also provided a number of Agency for International Development experts on a cost-sharing basis. In the other Gulf states through a variety of mechanisms we have provided U.S. Government experts at host government request. In recent years, the trade and development program of the International Development Cooperation Agency has been an effective mechanism for facilitating this transfer of technology.

It is our policy to be helpful, wherever host governments desire, in making official U.S. expertise available to their development programs. We fully recognize, however, that in the future as in the past our private sector will play the leading American role in helping the Gulf societies meet their development aspirations.

Educational and Cultural Ties. In the last decade both the official and private American cultural and educational links with the Gulf countries have grown enormously. Today there are over 15,000 students from the Arabian Peninsula in U.S. institutions of higher learning. The exchange of visits by public and private officials in educational and cultural fields has grown significantly. In our policy toward the Gulf region we fully recognize the need to continue to nurture these relationships. Our ongoing effort to develop stronger relations with the Gulf states will greatly benefit from the understanding and ties which are being created by the experience of students from these countries in our universities. The importance of this region to the United States today and in the future requires

Q. So you are still very hopeful in spite of the confusion in this Iranian administration?

A. That makes it particularly frustrating. We have never been in that particular kind of a situation before, but one can recall the hostages that were seized by North Korea in connection with the *Pueblo* in 1964. Those hostages were held 11 months before they were released and they were finally released. That was a frustrating period and 11 months is an awfully long time. And there have been other instances.

So that patience, especially in a situation such as this where events from time to time escalate emotions there—after all, the economy is in bad shape, there is factionalism, there are those who seek to dethrone the Khomeini and his revolutionary government. So in that kind of a situation it's easy to whip up popular emotions and use the hostages as sort of a scapegoat, the bargaining chip for getting some kinds of political power. They really are a source of political power now more than anything else.

. . . .

Q. How do you view the situation in Afghanistan right now? The Russians are still there. What are your plans to make them leave?

A. There are two objectives that are important. I don't think that we really entertained any hope that the Russians would leave very soon or that they would withdraw or reverse their policy in response to the pressures that we tried to bring upon them. But nevertheless, we hope to influence that and influence the level of fighting there; but in addition, to deter the Russians from further expansionism beyond Pakistan.

So it is important, I think, to maintain the pressure that we sought to impose. The grain embargo which did not involve Europe very much, because Europe is not a big grain growing area, but with the help of other countries I think we did exact an important price. The Russians did not recapture what they lost in American exports. As a result they were not able to increase their meat supplies, which was one of their objectives. In addition they had to draw down their grain reserves, and it is very doubtful that their crop this year will enable them to restore those reserves or build up their meat supplies. So there has been a price they have had to pay.

COMECON [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] is very important. It is very important that the industrial countries hold the line. This involves high technology related, of course, to military uses. And up to now, I think, the allies have held pretty steady on that policy to build up our defenses, I think, is a fact that the Russians cannot ignore and over time promises to increase their own defense levels with the resulting impact upon their peoples' standard of living and so on. So all of these pressures, I think, are important.

I think also the disapproval of the Islamic conference—a conference within which the Soviet Union had made great headway prior to the Afghanistan invasion—is an important deterrent to the Russians. They have run into more difficulty in Afghanistan than they anticipated which makes it difficult for them to pull out and save face. But I think if we hold steady that eventually that problem will perhaps be worked out.

Q. In the next coming days the President of the European Council, Mr. Gaston Thorn, is going to the Middle East to try to promote the European initiatives and the negotiation in the Middle East. How do you view that?

A. It is not a very encouraging time. In all of these actions—unilateral actions taken by the parties to the negotiatons, these resolutions in the United Nations, the special session of the United Nations related to Palestinian rights—all of these things so exacerbate the emotional climate in both Egypt and Israel as to be counterproductive. I understand the objective of the European initiative. It seeks to play the role of middleman, and at some point it may be of help in broadening the negotiative base so that we can include all parties who will be affected. But in the meantime the principal engine—the negotiations—have stalled again because of these outside diversions which have prompted the parties to pull back from the talks.

[1] Press release 220 of Aug. 15, 1980.
[2] Press release 221 of Aug. 15, 1980.■

Interview for "U.S. News & World Report"

Following is the text of an interview Secretary Muskie held with the editors of U.S. News & World Report *and which appeared in the August 18, 1980, issue.*

Q. There is a great deal of criticism that the Carter Administration has bungled foreign policy—that after 3½ years we are in trouble with allies, adversaries, and the Third World. What do you say to it?

A. I've heard the same criticism made of just about every Administration I've been involved with as a senator. I don't know that there is a general, succinct rebuttal to a sweeping criticism of that kind. It would be more useful to deal with particular situations—the North Atlantic Treaty alliance, for example.

I can recall when the state of the alliance was such that Senator Mike Mansfield almost persuaded the Congress to vote to withdraw all our troops from Europe. And I remember the complaints that our European friends and allies didn't seem to be sufficiently concerned about the threat and about adequately supporting NATO. Surely, that must have been a low point—and it did not occur in this Administration.

Q. What about all the talk of disarray in the alliance that critics attribute to Administration policies?

A. The fact is that NATO, in terms of the defense of Europe, is in better shape than it has been in a long time—thanks to President Carter's leadership as well as the impact of events such as the invasion of Afghanistan.

Even before Afghanistan, NATO committed itself to a 3% annual real growth in defense spending, and, by and large, that commitment is being honored. Furthermore, the allies agreed in May to give us greater flexibility in deploying our forces outside the NATO area. Finally, there is the decision to modernize theater nuclear weapons.

So, in terms of the original purpose of NATO—the defense of the territory covered by the treaty—the alliance is strong and supportive of U.S. leadership. Really, I don't think there is any basis for complaint.

Q. Have the allies been dragging their feet when it comes to helping us counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and protect Persian Gulf oil?

A. Outside the NATO territory there have been differences of opinion—not over the strategic significance of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but over the means for implementing our concern.

With respect to the grain embargo, although the Europeans are not big suppliers, they did support us.

With respect to technology transfers to the Soviets since the Afghanistan invasion, our NATO allies and Japan have been cooperating with us in COCOM [Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy], the organization which regulates exports to Russia that have potential strategic value.

With respect to the Olympics, there was disagreement—but not so much among the governments as among the Olympic committees. It's interesting, too, that the Olympics emerged as we said they would—sort of an East Germany-Russia bilateral track meet.

In addition to that West Germany has led the effort to form a consortium to help Turkey economically; Britain has been helpful in allowing us to expand our facilities on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

The performance among the allies has been mixed, but there's been performance.

Still, it's true that there's an inclination on their part to continue the benefits of detente in terms of trade and economic benefits and, in the case of West Germany, in terms of human contacts. And they want to see arms control continue; that's a very high priority with them.

When we disagree, it does not mean that they necessarily are challenging American leadership so much as pursuing their own interests to the extent that they can while still cooperating with us. You're not going to get a monolithic line—unquestioning support for every initiative that we take or every policy that we seek to put in place.

Q. Do you share the concern of other Administration officials who see the future danger of what they call self-Finlandization of Western Europe—a drift to neutralism?

A. No. I think that's a theoretical argument. I suspect it may be a Soviet objective down the line. But in terms of the day-to-day relationship of Western Europe and the Soviet Union and our perceptions of our alliance with Western Europe, I don't see any impulse toward neutralism.

It's directly the contrary: There is a vigorous determination to restrain Soviet behavior and to demonstrate that it's unacceptable, not only in NATO but elsewhere. The allies understand that their independence and their freedom can be inhibited and restrained without war if we don't maintain a strategic balance, if the NATO defense is allowed to flag, if we don't establish common policies and common views with respect to common areas.

The European allies would like to be independent of us, but they'd like even more to be independent of the Soviet Union. They don't want to be too independent of us, but they'd like to be perceived as able to be independent whenever they're in a position to assert themselves. That is natural.

Nevertheless, when you get through all the angry rhetoric that occasionally erupts and you sit around the table with the foreign ministers and you've had your arguments and your disagreements, then you come to understand there's a basic agreement that the alliance is important to us all. It's important for all of us to sustain it, to support it, to work at it, and to minimize the perception that it's in disarray.

Q. Looking at another specific area of American foreign policy that is widely viewed as the Administration's outstanding achievement: Isn't the Camp David agreement on Middle East peace showing signs of unraveling? Is there danger that Egypt might pull out of the negotiations?

A. There is that danger. There is a problem with mutual reaction—the tendency by one side to take unilateral actions that create political difficulties for the other side and produce reactions that in turn tend to put the other side on the defensive.

The settlements question and the Jerusalem issue have been the most difficult. The parties get diverted by unilateral actions, their concentration is disturbed, and they tend to cause the other side to walk away from the talks.

The actions now taken and being considered in Israel on Jerusalem cannot finally settle the status of Jerusalem. At some point it will be discussed as an issue. If agreement eventually is reached concerning the status of Jerusalem, then presumably both the Israeli and Egyptian Governments will support it notwithstanding any prior position either government may have taken. I've tried to make that point to both sides.

I regret the actions that Israel is now taking because the risk is that they will lead to interruption of the talks. At the same time, I make the point to the Egyptians that the issue of Jerusalem really is still there to be discussed, and they ought to bear that in mind in their reactions to such things.

Q. How do you answer our European allies and others who maintain that events have demonstrated that the Camp David process can't work and that it's necessary now to move to a comprehensive negotiating framework to include the Palestinians and Jordanians?

A. The conclusion that the Camp David process can't work applies even more to any other approach to this problem that one can conceive.

Nothing else has worked for more than 30 years in the Middle East. There have been four wars. There have been U.N. resolutions before. Nothing else has ever produced anything. If one uses pessimism based upon 30 years of frustration as the test of this or any other process, one can conclude that it won't work.

My answer to that is that the Camp David process has worked remarkably up to this point and that it can work the rest of the way if we don't adopt that defeatist attitude. It's like Winston Churchill's description of democracy: The worst form of government—until you consider the alternatives. When I consider the alternatives for dealing with this issue, all I can see in the future is a growth of violence, an exacerbation of tensions, and maybe a destruction of what has been accomplished under Camp David.

Q. Do you contemplate some new American initiative to get the talks back on the tracks again?

A. What I see developing is something like this: As the talks go forward, from time to time the parties ask the United States: "Do you have any advice? Do you have any suggestions on how to handle this next point?"

I think that we can be a positive force in the context of ongoing talks in which U.S. influence, innovation, and creativity can be one of the ingredients that all of the parties can take advantage of. It is a leadership role that must be played. But I think the idea of using the State Department bureaucracy to build a plan and then take it over there and present it is the least effective way to exercise leadership.

made can be dealt with in a measured and logical way.

• And, finally, we know that all parties in the conflict must renounce the use of force and violence against each other if peace is to be secured.

We believe these principles are the essential underpinnings of a successful negotiation. We call on other members of the Assembly to work responsibly with us and with the parties to expand on these principles in a manner which retains the parties' confidence and adherence to them.

The United States is not merely committed to the objective of peace but determined to work toward it in concrete and realistic ways. In the process, we seek a resolution of all aspects of the Palestinian question; a peace that will make refugee camps and violence of all kinds no more than a memory; a peace that will make it unnecessary for the Palestinian question to be inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly as it has been annually since the founding of this Organization; a peace that will assure the security of Israel and of all its neighbors.

That peace will not come without efforts by men of good will, and of courage, on all sides. The participation of the Palestinian people, as well as other Arabs, and of Israel is an essential prerequisite to full success. My government is committed to this effort. This is the route we have chosen and which we will follow. We cannot and will not abandon it for the declarations that offer only the illusion of progress but which contribute nothing toward achieving the just and lasting peace to which the peoples of the Middle East and the world aspire.

The United States calls on those who would foster peace, as a sign of good will, not to indulge in inflammatory rhetoric without even a pretense of a balanced approach.

We call on those who would foster peace to refrain from prejudging the results of negotiations between the parties and do everything possible to encourage the achievement of meaningful results.

We call on those who would foster peace to take no steps that would undermine, or be perceived as undermining, the prospect of achieving a negotiated settlement. This admonition applies equally to Israel, the Palestinians, the Arab countries—indeed, to all of us represented here.

We call on those who would foster peace to sense that there is a real opportunity for that peace, that the time is at hand to grasp that opportunity and encourage it, that this world and its people are weary of conflict and pray that those nations which live in the cradle that produced mankind's noblest dreams and ideals would now find the will and the leadership to move courageously toward peace.

RESOLUTION A/RES/ES–7/2[2]

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Palestine at an emergency special session,

Convinced that the failure to solve this question poses a grave threat to international peace and security,

Noting with regret and concern that the Security Council, at its 2220th meeting on 30 April 1980, failed to take a decision, as a result of the negative vote of the United States of America, on the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 31/20 of 24 November 1976, 32/40A of 2 December 1977, 33/28A of 7 December 1978 and 34/65A of 29 November 1979,

Having considered the letter dated 1 July 1980 of the Permanent Representative of Senegal, Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People [U.N. document A/ES–7/1, annex],

Having heard the statement by the Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people [U.N. document A/ES–7/PV.1],

1. *Recalls and reaffirms* its resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 and all other relevant United Nations resolutions pertinent to the question of Palestine;

2. *Reaffirms*, in particular, that a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be established, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant United Nations resolutions, without the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories including Jerusalem, and without the achievement of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine;

3. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property, in Palestine, from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return;

4. *Reaffirms also* the inalienable rights in Palestine of the Palestinian people, including:

(a) The right to self-determination without external interference, and to national independence and sovereignty;

(b) The right to establish its own independent sovereign State;

5. *Reaffirms* the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate on an equal footing in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East within the framework of the United Nations;

6. *Reaffirms* the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;

7. *Calls upon* Israel to withdraw completely and unconditionally from all the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem, with all property and services intact, and urges that such withdrawal from all the occupied territories should start before 15 November 1980;

8. *Demands* that Israel should fully comply with the provisions of resolution 465 (1980) adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 1 March 1980;

9. *Further demands* that Israel should fully comply with all United Nations resolutions relevant to the historic character of the Holy City of Jerusalem, in particular Security Council resolution 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980;

10. *Expresses* its opposition to all policies and plans aimed at the resettlement of the Palestinians outside their homeland;

11. *Requests and authorizes* the Secretary-General, in consultation, as appropriate, with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, to take the necessary measures towards the implementation of the recommendations contained in paragraphs 59 to 72 of the report of the Committee to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session [U.N. document A/31/35] as a basis for the solution of the question of Palestine;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session of the implementation of the present resolution;

13. *Requests* the Security Council, in the event of non-compliance by Israel with the present resolution, to convene in order to consider the situation and the adoption of effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter;

14. *Decides* to adjourn the seventh emergency special session temporarily and to authorize the President of the latest regular session of the General Assembly to resume its meetings upon request from Member States.

RESOLUTION A/RES/ES–7/3[3]

The General Assembly,

Having heard the statements by the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People [U.N. document A/ES–7/PV.1] and by the Rapporteur of the Committee [U.N. document A/ES–7/PV.1],

1. *Commends* the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the

Palestinian People for its efforts to discharge its duties;

2. *Expresses great appreciation* for the studies on the various aspects of the question of Palestine published by the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat under the guidance of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and requests the Committee to study thoroughly the reasons for the refusal of Israel to comply with the relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly resolution 31/20 of 24 November 1976, in which the General Assembly endorsed the recommendations of the Committee contained in its report to the Assembly at its thirty-first session [U.N. document A/31/35], and the numerous resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and to submit the study to the Assembly;

3. *Requests* the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to report on the progress of its study to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

JULY 29, 1980[4]

As set forth in my statement to this Assembly on July 24, the U.S. Government believes the resolution just adopted fails to take into account the legitimate rights and security concerns of all parties in the Middle East. Neither is it founded upon U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, the one agreed basis for a comprehensive settlement. The resolution ignores one of the basic principles of Resolution 242, which is that establishment of a just and lasting peace should include ". . . termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area. . . ."

By calling on Israel to withdraw "unconditionally" from territories occupied since 1967, this resolution contradicts and seeks to undermine Resolution 242, one of whose essential principles is the right of Israel and its Arab neighbors to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. In addition, I wish to note specifically that the recommendations in paragraphs 59–72 of the report to the 31st General Assembly of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, which are cited in the present resolution are as unrealistic and impractical as the resolution in its entirety.

In brief the resolution cannot serve as a basis for negotiations which can advance just, comprehensive, and durable arrangements for peace. Resolutions that do not take into account the legitimate rights and the concerns of both sides will not be accepted by both sides, and, therefore, cannot be the basis for negotiations. And without negotiations, we cannot advance toward peace.

My delegation has therefore voted against Resolution A/RES/ES–7/2. In view of our opposition to the work of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, we have also voted against Resolution A/RES/ES–7/3.

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[1] USUN press release 81.
[2] Adopted on July 29, 1980, by a vote of 112 to 7 (U.S.), with 24 abstentions.
[3] Adopted on July 29 by a vote of 112 to 5 (U.S.), with 26 abstentions.
[4] USUN press release 83. ■

U.S. Participation in the U.N., 1978

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, JULY 3, 1980[1]

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress this report of the activities of the United States Government in the United Nations and its affiliated agencies during calendar year 1978.

This 33rd annual report covers the second year of my Administration, and I believe it confirms our conviction that the United Nations is of vital and growinr importance to the conduct of U.S. foreign relations.

The year 1978 revealed some of the strengths of the UN system. Among the actions taken during 1978 by the United Nations that best exemplify its strength were the rapid establishment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the development of a UN plan to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections. The UN plan for Namibia includes the authorized establishment of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to assist the Secretary General's Special Representative for Namibia. Formation of UNTAG still awaits final agreement on the implementation of a Namibia settlement.

The establishment of UNIFIL was particularly important for the development of the UN's peacekeeping operations. UNIFIL is a test of the UN's ability to gain the cooperation of the parties concerned because, unlike other peacekeeping operations, it operates without a precise agreement between opposing parties. In an area where there has been little or no exercise of legitimate civil authority, the Force is attempting to maintain peace within the territory of a sovereign country where there are indigenous, rebellious armed groups supported from outside. The technique of peacekeeping is among the most innovative activities of the United Nations, and one of the most successful.

The year 1978 also witnessed small but growing third world interest in UN human rights initiatives, and the Special Session on Disarmament, which set forth goals and priorities for disarmament negotiations. The United Nations also began to become closely involved in efforts to alleviate the human tragedy in Kampuchea.

The continuing difficulties of the United Nations in dealing with general economic issues were demonstrated by the year-long impasse over the mandate of the Committee of the Whole. In contrast, the decision to convene a Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, which we strongly support, and the reconvening of the negotiating conference on the Common Fund for Commodities, which has since made substantial progress, are solid evidence of the UN's growing ability to deal effectively with specific international economic problems.

The United States remains deeply concerned about the budgetary growth in the UN system, and in 1978 voted against the UN budget for the first time because it failed to exercise the necessary financial restraint. We are continuing to monitor closely UN expenditures, programs, and personnel practices.

It is my hope that this report will contribute to knowledge of and support for the UN as an institution, and to continued active and constructive U.S. participation.

JIMMY CARTER

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[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 7, 1980. Copies of the 309-page report, entitled "United States Participation in the UN—Report by the President to the Congress for the year 1978," are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for $6.00 each. Remittance must accompany order. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation
Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.
Accession deposited: Syrian Arab Republic, July 10, 1980.[1]

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accession deposited: Syrian Arab Republic, July 10, 1980.[1]

Conservation
Convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources, with annex for an arbitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20, 1980. Enters into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval by states participating in the conference which adopted the convention.

Consular
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Ratification deposited: Finland, July 2, 1980.

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Ratification deposited: Finland, July 2, 1980.

Containers
International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037.
Accession deposited: Sweden, June 9, 1980.

Copyright
Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.
Accession deposited: Panama, June 3, 1980.

Customs Cooperation Council
Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S. income tax reimbursements. Effected by exchange of letters at Brussels May 30 and June 23, 1980. Entered into force June 23, 1980; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Load Lines
Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966, relating to amendments to the convention. Adopted at London Nov. 12, 1975.[2]
Senate advice and consent to acceptance: July 2, 1980.
Instrument of acceptance signed by the President: July 22, 1980.

Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 14, 1975.[2]
Senate advice and consent to acceptance: July 2, 1980.
Instrument of acceptance signed by the President: July 22, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 17, 1977.[2]
Senate advice and consent to acceptance: July 2, 1980.
Instrument of acceptance signed by the President: July 22, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 15, 1979.[2]
Acceptance deposited: F.R.G., June 23, 1980.[3]

International convention on maritime search and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done at Hamburg Apr. 27, 1979.[2]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: July 2, 1980.
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: July 22, 1980.

Narcotic Drugs
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980. TIAS 9725.
Accession deposited: Ethiopia, June 23, 1980.

Patents
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978; except for chapter II. Chapter II entered into force Mar. 29, 1978.[4] TIAS 8733.
Ratification deposited: Finland, July 1, 1980.

Pollution
International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the U.S. Dec. 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.
Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, June 10, 1980.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954 (TIAS 4900). Done at London Apr. 11, 1962. Entered into force May 18, 1967 except for art. XIV which entered into force June 28, 1967. TIAS 6109.
Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, June 10, 1980.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London Oct. 21, 1969. Entered into force Jan. 20, 1978. TIAS 8505.
Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, June 10, 1980.

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.[2]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: July 2, 1980.
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: July 22, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Sweden, June 9, 1980.

Convention on long-range transboundary air pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979.[2]
Ratification deposited: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, June 13, 1980.

Property—Industrial
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1–12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. Articles 13–30 entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Sept. 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization of deposit of accession: Argentina, July 8, 1980.[5]

Property—Intellectual
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm, July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Accession deposited: Argentina, July 8, 1980.

Rubber
International natural rubber agreement, 1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979.[2]
Signatures: China, June 17, 1980; Finland, June 16, 1980; Ireland, Mexico, June 25, 1980; Norway, June 16, 1980; Papua New Guinea, June 25, 1980; Sweden, June 16, 1980.
Acceptance deposited: Japan, June 13, 1980.

Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700.

Accession deposited: Italy, June 11, 1980.

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 (TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.[2]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: July 2, 1980.
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: July 22, 1980.
Ratification deposited: F.R.G., June 6, 1980.[3,6]
Accession deposited: Japan, May 15, 1980.

Satellite Communications System
Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Accession deposited: Guinea, July 14, 1980.

Operating agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Signature: Guinea, July 14, 1980.

Slavery
Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva Sept. 7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30, 1957; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418.
Accession deposited: Togo, July 8, 1980.

Sugar
International sugar agreement, 1977, with annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered into force provisionally, Jan. 1, 1978; definitively, Jan. 2, 1980. TIAS 9664.
Ratification deposited: Paraguay, July 8, 1980.

Telecommunications
Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), as revised, relating to the aeronautical mobile (R) service, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva Mar. 5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1979,[7] except for the frequency allotment plan for the aeronautical mobile (R) service which shall come into force on Feb. 1, 1983.
Approval deposited: F.R.G., Apr. 14, 1980.[3]

Terrorism
International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17, 1979.[2]
Signatures: Togo, July 8, 1980; Zaire, July 2, 1980.

U.N. Industrial Development Organization
Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.[2]
Signature: Cameroon, July 8, 1980.

Whaling
International whaling convention and schedule of whaling regulations. Done at Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849.
Adherence deposited: Oman, July 15, 1980.

Wheat
Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.
Accession deposited: Luxembourg, June 30, 1980.
Terminated: July 1, 1980.

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.
Ratifications deposited: Portugal, July 23, 1980; Tunisia, July 8, 1980.
Accession deposited: Luxembourg, June 30, 1980.

Food aid convention, 1980 (part of the international wheat agreement, 1971, as extended) (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Mar. 11, 1980. Entered into force July 1, 1980.
Ratifications deposited: Australia, June 5, 1980; Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, June 30, 1980; Norway, June 13, 1980; Sweden, June 16, 1980; Switzerland, June 2, 1980.
Declarations of provisional application deposited: Argentina, June 24, 1980; Belgium, France, F.R.G., Italy, Luxembourg, U.K., European Economic Community, June 30, 1980; Finland, Japan,[1] June 17, 1980; Spain, July 21, 1980; U.S., June 27, 1980.

Women
Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York Mar. 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954; for the U.S. July 7, 1976. TIAS 8289.
Signature: Nigeria, July 11, 1980.

Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Adopted at New York Dec. 18, 1979. Enters into force on the 30th day after the date of deposit with the Secretary General of the U.N. of the 20th instrument of ratification or accession.
Signatures: Bolivia, May 30, 1980; Cuba, Mar. 6, 1980; Ethiopia, July 8, 1980; G.D.R., June 25, 1980; Honduras, June 11, 1980; Hungary, June 6, 1980; Poland, May 29, 1980; Portugal, Apr. 24, 1980; Rwanda, May 1, 1980; Sweden, Mar. 7, 1980; U.S., July 17, 1980.[1]
Ratifications deposited: G.D.R., July 9, 1980; Sweden, July 2, 1980.
Accession deposited: Guinea, Mar. 14, 1980.

BILATERAL

Australia
Agreement providing for the continuation of a cooperative program facilitating space flight operations. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra May 29, 1980. Entered into force May 29, 1980; effective Feb. 26, 1980.

Belgium
Memorandum of understanding for the development of a cooperative program in the sciences, with annex. Signed at Brussels June 2, 1980. Entered into force June 2, 1980.

Botswana
Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Gaborone Nov. 7, 1978 and Sept. 26, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 26, 1979.

Canada
Protocol amending the agreement of June 15, 1955, as amended and supplemented (TIAS 3304, 3771, 4518, 5102, 6649, 8287, 8782), concerning civil uses of atomic energy, with agreed minute. Signed at Ottawa Apr. 23, 1980.
Entered into force: July 9, 1980.

Colombia
Agreement extending the agreement of Apr. 22, 1976 (TIAS 8244), concerning procedures for mutual assistance in the administration of justice in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation matter, to Textron, Inc. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington July 7 and 15, 1980. Entered into force July 15, 1980.

Cook Islands
Treaty on friendship and delimitation of the maritime boundary between the United States of America and the Cook Islands. Signed at Rarotonga June 11, 1980. Enters into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Egypt
Grant agreement relating to commodity imports. Signed at Cairo June 30, 1980. Entered into force June 30, 1980.

Loan agreement relating to commodity imports. Signed at Cairo June 30, 1980. Entered into force June 30, 1980.

Loan agreement relating to commodity imports. Signed at Cairo June 30, 1980. Entered into force June 30, 1980.

Federal Republic of Germany
Extradition treaty. Signed at Berlin

Department of State bulletin

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Secretary of State

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Director,
Office of Public Communication

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor

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that in our society there be a better understanding of the culture and aspirations of the peoples of the Gulf.

The Evolving Relationship

As we seek to build our relations with Saudi Arabia and its Arab neighbors on the Gulf, in a mutually beneficial way, we are sensitive to the fact that the pursuit of each of our interests—security, peace, energy, economic development, financial cooperation, commerce, and culture—impacts on the prospects for our other interests. We will continue to seek a balance in our relationships which reflects the totality of our own interests and the total personality of the Gulf states.

We do not underestimate, nor do our friends in the Gulf states, the problems that lie ahead and the difficulty of the issues which our expanding relationships must address. On the contrary, we recognize that we are striving for security and stability in the midst of complex and crosscutting issues in a region whose continued independence and orderly progress are in our deep interest. On the basis of the progress made to date, however, we believe that we can continue to build firm and close relations with each of these countries in a way which will increasingly serve the interests of both our peoples and, indeed, of the world community generally.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

National Security Policy

President Carter's address before the annual convention of the American Legion in Boston on August 21, 1980.[1]

This morning, as Commander in Chief, I want to talk to you very briefly and very frankly about some of the problems that we face, some of the achievements that we've had, some of the uncertainties about the future, and how you can help. As Commander in Chief of America's Armed Forces, working with the Congress, I have the final responsibility for making those difficult choices. They are critical choices. They are far from simple. I need your support and your understanding based on experience in the Armed Forces in understanding the real choices that we face in defense and in the broader realm of national security policy.

Our goals are simple but profound: security, honor, and peace. Those are the victories we seek for ourselves, for our children, and for our children's children. These victories can be won but not by nostalgic nor wishful thinking and not by bravado. They cannot be won by a futile effort either to run the world or to run away from the world. Both of these are dangerous myths that cannot be the foundation for any responsible national policy.

Objectives

American requires the authority and the strength—and the moral force—to protect ourselves, to provide for the defense of our friends, and to promote the values of human dignity and well-being that have made our own nation strong at home and respected abroad. To this end, our national security policy has four specific objectives:

- First, to prevent war, through the assurance of our nation's strength and our nation's will—in this we will not fail;
- Second, to share with our friends and allies the protection of industrial democracies of Europe and Asia—in this we will not fail;
- Third, to safeguard and to strengthen our vital links to the nations and the resources of the Middle East—in this we will not fail; and
- Fourth, to defend America's vital interests if they are threatened anywhere in the world—and in this we will not fail.

All of these objectives require America's great military strength. But arms alone cannot provide the security within which our values and our interests can flourish. Our foreign policy must be directed toward greater international stability, without which there is no real prospect for a lasting peace. Thus, our strength in arms—very important—must be matched by creative, responsible, and courageous diplomacy.

We have as a nation that strength and that courage now to present clearly to potential adversaries as well as to our allies. We must continue to build wisely for a future when our patience and persistence will be taxed by challenges perhaps even more diverse and even more dangerous than those that we've seen in recent years. In planning for that future, we must have the foresight to accept the reality of change. Americans have never feared change. We must prepare for what we cannot completely predict—there is no way for any nation or any person to know what might happen next—and to know with certainty the objectives that we intend to reach and to hold.

For the sake of all humanity, we must prevent nuclear war. To do so requires the most modern strategic forces based on America's superior technology. Our country has always been in the forefront of new developments, new ideas, new technology, new systems for defense. The decisions that we make today—some of them highly secret—will affect the risks of nuclear war well into the next century.

Like our weapons, our diplomacy must also be aimed at enhancing strategic stability. Thus far in my Administration we've strengthened every single element of our strategic deterrent, and we have also worked to enhance strategic stability through world peace and through negotiation of mutual and balanced limits on strategic arms. And I'm thankful to the American Legion for your support of that effort to control nuclear weapons.

Strategic Forces

We could have spent more money on our strategic forces, but we would not have spent it as wisely. We could have placed our chips on the B–1 bomber, which would have been in service quickly and obsolete almost as quickly. In order to

capitalize on advanced American technology and to deal with predictable improvements in Soviet air-defense capabilities, I decided instead, after close consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to accelerate the development of cruise missiles.

Four years ago there was no program for long-range air-launched cruise missiles. This year, in a very quick period of time, we will actually begin production of those kinds of missiles. Because of their accuracy and because of their ability to penetrate Soviet air-defense systems, they represent a far more effective deterrent than would have the B–1 bomber. We needed the right answer for the long run, and Soviet air-defense capabilities, as known today, and U.S. technological developments, as known today, have proven this answer to be the right one.

Similarly, we could have decided, and some still propose, to resume production of land-based intercontinental missiles and simply build more vertical silos to house them. But that solution would not have increased our strategic strength, because the new missiles in fixed silos would have been just as vulnerable as the old ones to the predictable improvement in the accuracy of Soviet missile systems. Instead, we conducted a searching evaluation of our real and responsible choices, and I chose to go forward with the MX missile program.

Four years ago, there was no known solution to the increasing vulnerability of fixed silos. Today, we've devised a mobile system for basing these missiles that will really shelter them from attack. The MX will be ready to strengthen our strategic defenses just when we need that added strength. And I might point out to you that the total area covered by the MX system—from which civilians, newsmen, and others, would be excluded—only would comprise 25-square miles, a block of land in our whole country just 5 miles on a side. And the total cost of the MX mobile missile system, in constant dollars, would be less than the B–52 bomber system, less than the Minuteman missile system, and less than the combined cost of the Poseidon and the Polaris submarine-launched missile systems.

At sea, as well, we've altered the wayward course that we were steering in 1977. We've put the Trident missile system and the Trident submarine programs back on track. The U.S.S. *Ohio*, the first Trident submarine, is about to begin sea trials. Its sister ship, the U.S.S. *Michigan*, is ready to be launched, and five more Tridents are under construction.

And finally, in this combined system, let me mention that we've made steady progress in a less visible and less dramatic but crucially important area of our strategic forces, and that is the system of command and control to insure that they and the communications associated with them can survive a crisis, a peremptory, unexpected attack or a major conflict. This has been an area of our defense system which has been too long overlooked and neglected in the past.

All these steps add up to a prudent and a forward-looking program for enhancing our strategic forces and the credibility of our deterrent. In order to keep those forces adequate for the future, we continue to work on new aircraft and on new technology and weapons of all kinds that will be equal to any threats that may arise in the next decade or beyond.

Our strategy, now modernized to take advantage of Soviet planning and Soviet attitudes, must leave them no room for the illusion that they can obtain any advantage over the United States of America by the use of their force. And we will keep our forces that strong and that clearly dominant.

Recently there's been a great deal of press and public attention paid to a Presidential Directive that I have issued, known as PD–59. As a new President charged with great responsibilities for the defense of this nation. I decided that our nation must have flexibility in responding to a possible nuclear attack—in *responding* to a possible nuclear attack. Beginning very early in my term, working with the Secretaries of State and Defense and with my own national security advisers, we have been evolving such an improved capability. It's been recently revealed to the public in outline form by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. It's a carefully considered, logical, and evolutionary improvement in our nation's defense capability and will contribute to the prevention of a nuclear conflict.

No potential enemy of the United States should anticipate for one moment a successful use of military power against our vital interest. This decision will make that prohibition and that cautionary message even more clear. In order to insure that no adversary is even tempted, however, we must have a range of responses to potential threats or crises and an integrated plan for their use.

Arms Control

Equally vital for our strategic purposes is the pursuit of nuclear arms control and balanced reduction of nuclear arsenals in the world. Just as we build strategic forces equal to our needs, we seek through negotiated agreements to keep unnecessary competition from carrying us into a purposeless and dangerous nuclear arms race to the detriment of our nation's security and to the detriment of the adequate strength of our conventional and other forces. We will continue to make every responsible effort to bring our forces and those of any potential foe under strict, balanced, and verifiable controls, both in the quantity of strategic arms and in their quality.

I want to make clear that if an unlimited nuclear arms race should be forced upon us, we will compete and compete successfully. Let no one doubt that for a moment. But to initiate such a dangerous and costly race, abandoning our efforts for nuclear-weapons control, would be totally irresponsible on our part.

The destructive power of the world's nuclear arsenals is already adequate for total devastation. It does no good to increase that destructive power in search of a temporary edge or in pursuit of an illusion of absolute nuclear superiority. To limit strategic nuclear weapons, as the SALT Treaties do, is not to reduce our strength but to reduce the danger that misunderstanding and miscalculation could lead to a global catastrophe. This is a course that has been pursued by the last six Presidents, both Democratic and Republican. To go beyond the reductions that were outlined in the SALT II Treaty, as I firmly intend to do, is to advance the stability on which genuine peace can be built.

Strategic Stability

Stability in the strategic area, however, leaves us still to meet serious challenges now and in the future in Europe, in the Far East, the Middle East, and in Southwest Asia. We must understand those challenges in order to deal with them prudently and responsibly. We do not need massive standing armies in place everywhere in the world to defend our friends and our interests. But we do need and we and our allies are acquiring the skilled, modernized, specially equipped conventional forces that can respond fast and effectively to crises and threats before they engulf us in larger conflicts.

Q. Do you see any prospect of breaking the stalemate and making major progress in the Camp David negotiations before the American elections?

A. I think there is that possibility if the parties would concentrate. They might not complete the job by election day. But before the talks were suspended in May, they were moving from point to point.

What strikes me about the talks is that the attitudes of the Egyptian and Israeli negotiators and their delegations are constructive; they're positive. There's no sign of foot-dragging.

Q. Turning to relations with the Soviets: What are the prospects of improving relations with Russia while its army remains in Afghanistan?

A. There certainly will not be any business-as-usual relationship with the Soviet Union so long as their troops are in Afghanistan. We should continue our policies that are designed to impose a cost on them. We don't, however, totally destroy the framework of East-West relations within which there are contacts.

For example, the meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Madrid to review compliance with the Helsinki Final Act is going forward. This is a way for us, among other things, to raise the Afghanistan issue and to challenge the Soviets' performance and all participating countries' performance in the human rights area.

We must not forget, also, that the CSCE framework is a way for the Eastern European countries to relieve the repressive nature of their relationships with the Soviet Union—to establish more contacts with the West. So you would not want to destroy the CSCE or postpone it or suspend it. In that sense, we continue our relationships with the Soviet Union.

With respect to arms control, we're preparing for preliminary exchanges on controlling theater nuclear forces in Europe that we agreed to begin with the Soviet Union. It's important to our security interests as well as theirs that we begin to establish a system of restraint for nuclear arms in Europe. I expect we will meet the Soviets on this before too long.

Q. And SALT?

A. Yes, we need to pursue that. But it's very difficult to do. At the moment, the prospects of getting the necessary votes in the Senate are pretty remote.

But time is running out on us with respect to the deadline for the dismantling of missiles that SALT II requires of the Soviet Union. Thus far, the Soviets are honoring the SALT II Treaty—or at least not violating it. Neither are we. There's no explicit agreement on this, but there's a very clear understanding.

With respect to trade relations, the grain embargo, technology transfers, and other contacts, we will insist upon continuation of our current policies designed to impose a cost on the Soviet Union.

The Soviets, of course, are having a very difficult time in Afghanistan. Right now, there's no progress at all on Afghanistan, except the fact that we're communicating.

Q. Are you considering other sanctions against the Soviets to exact a higher cost for their invasion of Afghanistan?

A. No. I think what we've got in place really covers the options that are available: grain embargo, technology transfers controlled under the COCOM list, the buildup of Western defenses, and defense budgets. That imposes a heavy pressure on the Soviet Union.

Q. Have those measures had any practical effect on the Soviets as far as forcing them to rethink their Afghanistan policy is concerned?

A. They are obviously uncomfortable, at the very least, and seriously concerned that world reaction has been what it ha. been. They would like to restore their relationships with Europe, the West, and the United States. There's no doubt in my mind they're seeking to do that. Of course, they may hope to have their cake and eat it, too. But I think it's been made very clear to them up to now that they cannot.

They're having difficulty pacifying Afghanistan—and yet they have refrained from any troop buildup beyond what it has been for several months. Now that the Olympics are over, it will be interesting to see whether their policy changes, whether they begin to put in more forces in an effort to bring the situation in Afghanistan under control. I suspect they will not do that immediately, because they will want to continue their diplomatic efforts—Madrid, talks on theater nuclear forces, and so on.

The pressure we have applied on the Soviets has had its effect. But whether it's had enough to cause them to actually reverse their policy in Afghanistan is certainly not clear.

Q. If not an all-out offensive to crush the insurgents, what do you expect the Soviets to do?

A. They're in sort of a dilemma as to which course to pursue in Afghanistan. I suspect they're going to build up their pressure on the Pakistani border in order to stop the flow of materiel and arms and food to the insurgents.

Q. What is the United States doing to deter the Russians from pressuring Pakistan or to respond if they actually move troops across the border?

A. We are in communication with the Pakistanis. Maybe I could just put it this way:

The Pakistanis see increased pressure and occasional hot pursuit across the border, but not a major invasion at this point. They need economic assistance. But at the moment, the situation seems controllable.

Even though we've not been able to reverse Soviet policy, there's a high probability that the international reaction to Afghanistan has had a deterring effect upon any thought that the Soviets may have of extending their expansion beyond Afghanistan. I think they'd be very careful about that.

Q. Does the Administration intend to help the Afghan insurgents continue their resistance against the Soviet army of occupation?

A. Do you mean go to war?

Q. No. Provide the insurgents with arms—

A. If that were a question under serious consideration, it isn't one I could discuss.

Q. Has the death of the Shah somehow cleared the way toward a resolution of the crisis and the release of the hostages?

A. Not in any way that we've been able to perceive at this point. Nevertheless, we place it in rank with other developments that have taken place which might warrant new initiatives by us.

The death of the Shah was one such development. Another was the return of Richard Queen, which indicated at the very least that somebody was in a position to make the decision and had the authority to do so very quickly. Also, Ramadan—the holy season—expires on August 12 in Iran. And finally there is the slow but gradual emergence of political institutions—the Parliament, in particular—which might

Access Agreement With Somalia

Following are a Department announcement of August 22, 1980, and a statement by Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on August 26.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, AUG. 22, 1980[1]

On August 22, 1980, the United States and the Somalia Democratic Republic exchanged diplomatic notes providing for expanded cooperation between Somalia and the United States in both the civil and military spheres. The implementation of this agreement will be a matter of mutual and continuing consultation between the two governments as we work together toward an expanded relationship across a broad range of mutual interests, including the development of programs of security assistance and economic cooperation.

This exchange of notes allows the United States increased access to Somalia's air and port facilities. The provisions of this agreement are defensive in nature and are aimed at the promotion of stability in the general area; they are not directed against any particular nation or group of nations.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE, AUG. 26, 1980[2]

On August 22 we exchanged notes with officials of the Somali Democratic Republic which incorporated an agreement to allow our military forces increased access to the port and air facilities in Somalia.

We will shortly be sending copies of this agreement to the appropriate House and Senate committees as required under the Case act. At that time you will see that they are unremarkable and differ only in minor ways with other agreements which we have negotiated.

As you know, the agreement with Somalia is one of three which we have sought for the purpose of increasing our ability to project our military strength in the Southwest Asian area. We have felt that access to the facilities in Somalia would round out our military capabilities in this region. I want to emphasize that we have undertaken these negotiations and this agreement in furtherance of a global strategic objective.

We have had a series of discussions with countries in the Southwest Asian and Indian Ocean littoral area and have found general acceptance of our desire to enhance our ability to counter potential threats in the Indian Ocean region.

To date, we have had little reaction from African nations to our efforts to acquire access to additional facilities along the Indian Ocean. We have made clear on numerous occasions that these efforts do not represent any basic change in the policy established by this Administration toward Africa. We continue to believe that conflicts on the African Continent should be resolved peacefully and that economic development remains the primary task with which we should associate ourselves. I feel that an undue amount of attention has been paid to the military assistance aspects of our agreements with both Kenya and Somalia. In point of fact, in both cases we have placed considerable emphasis on responding to economic needs within the framework of our new relationship.

Negotiations on the agreement with Somalia have taken considerable time and have been the occasion for frank discussions between the Somalis and ourselves on bilateral problems—past, present, and future. In particular, they have given us the opportunity to discuss problems which could arise from the continuing dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden region.

We believe that we have made abundantly clear to the Somalis the limitations imposed by our laws on the use of materiel which might be supplied in the future under foreign military sales agreements and the possible consequences of their violation of these provisions. We are confident that the Somalis understand our views on the activities in the Ogaden.

In this connection, we have again expressed our view that the problems of the Horn cannot be solved by military means, and we believe the Somalis agree that their only long-term solutions lie in the political realm. This latter view is supported by most of the states of Africa, and we continue to hope that the OAU [Organization of African Unity] Good Offices Committee on Settlement of the Dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia, which met again in Lagos last week, will eventually be able to bring the two parties to some sort of agreement on a solution to the Ogaden which is acceptable to all.

[1] Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman David Passage.

[2] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.■

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eventually concentrate authority that's accountable and responsive. Now all of those are coming together.

You will remember that when the U.N. commission went to Iran early this year, there was no follow-through of its plan because there was nobody with the authority to implement it. We've been waiting for this authority to develop and to emerge. The situation has reached a point where perhaps shortly it will have emerged.

Q. What kinds of new initiatives do you have in mind? Can you elaborate on that?

A. I cannot, because I would destroy them if I were to do so. But basically what it involves is contacts that we've developed over these agonizing months—diplomatic, nondiplomatic, various countries, through our allies. These enable us to establish indirect contact with people of importance in Iran. We're considering expanding the effort.

Q. Would you say you're more hopeful now about the release of the hostages?

A. I'd rather not use words like that in connection with the hostages.

I think eventually a decision is going to be made. Increasingly there's a perception in Iran that holding the hostages is against Iran's self-interest. Once that perception coincides with our desire to have the hostages returned, I think something's going to happen.

Q. In 1 month, 6 months, or when?

A. Don't put out a bulletin on it.■

Bolivian Coup d'Etat

Following is a Department statement of July 23, 1980, a statement made by Ambassador Gale McGee, U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (OAS), on July 24 in the Permanent Council, text of the resolution adopted by the Council, and a statement by Secretary Muskie, both on July 25.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JULY 23, 1980[1]

The Department remains seriously concerned over the July 17 coup and subsequent developments in Bolivia. We are particularly disturbed over the reports we have been receiving from a number of reliable sources of widespread, even savage, violations of human rights reportedly being conducted by the Bolivian Armed Forces at their center of joint operations in the Miraflores barracks in La Paz. Repeated and severe beatings, torture, and denial of needed medical attention are said to be common. We have reports that hundreds of people are being held under detention in various places throughout the country. These reports concern us deeply. We strongly urge that the rights of all Bolivians be respected and that the leaders of the Bolivian military insure that these violations of human rights cease whenever and wherever they may be occurring.

We are continuing our consultations with a number of concerned governments on the Bolivian situation. We have stressed that we deplore this coup by the Bolivian military, the interruption of the democratic process, and the accompanying violence. The Andean nations have called for a meeting of the OAS Permanent Council, which has been scheduled for tomorrow (July 24), to review the human rights situation in Bolivia. We support this initiative and will participate fully in the deliberations in that meeting.

As we announced, we have suspended security assistance, suspended any new economic assistance commitments, and recalled Ambassador [to Bolivia Marvin] Weissman for consultations. We are now engaged in complete review of all ongoing U.S. programs in Bolivia, which may well lead to significant reductions in these programs, with the exception of humanitarian programs carried out through CARE and other private voluntary agencies. This review of U.S. programs is underway, and we would expect to have results to announce within the next week or so.

AMBASSADOR McGEE, JULY 24, 1980[2]

The United States deeply deplores the brutal events that have convulsed Bolivia during the past week. Constitutional authorities have been arrested; their whereabouts kept secret. Many political leaders have been detained; some may have been tortured and murdered. The offices of newspapers and radio stations have been attacked. A climate of repression and fear prevails.

Archbishop Manrique of La Paz, the principal representative of the Bolivian church, spoke for all of us Sunday when he condemned the violations of human rights and the interruption of the democratic process.

Just as last November, when a military officer claimed to be able to interpret the popular will better than freely elected representatives, a handful of officers have embarked upon a course that defies basic principles of constitutional order, human rights, and the self-determination of peoples.

The U.S. delegation considers these tragic events especially reprehensible because they come on the heels of the election of June 29, which provided a clear popular mandate to consolidate the progress Bolivia had made toward the restoration of constitutional and democratic government after almost 15 uninterrupted years of military regimes.

In July 1979 Bolivians went to the polls to cast ballots in what all observers agreed were free and honest elections. Absent a majority, the Bolivian Congress, in accordance with the constitution, then chose Walter Guevara Arze to serve as an interim President for a period of 1 year.

The Guevara government had barely begun to address the country's problems when it was deposed in a bloody coup that cost more than 200 lives.

Many of us here today were in La Paz when it happened. The coup came only hours after the closing session of the OAS General Assembly, held in La Paz, during which all of us had witnessed the progress democracy had made in Bolivia.

In fact, that progress was such that the united opposition of the Bolivian people to that coup last November led to the restoration of democratic government, this time under the leadership of President Lydia Gueiler.

A few politicians and military officers, however, speciously charged the Gueiler government was not governing, that the country had been infiltrated by international Communists, and that there was anarchy and chaos.

These charges were false then, and they are false now. President Gueiler governed wisely and well for 9 months. Her government began a needed economic stabilization program. It guaranteed respect for constitutional rights, and it conducted free and honest elections which clearly mandated the orderly transfer of power that has now been arbitrarily interrupted.

There can be no question that the international condemnation of last November's coup provided crucial support for the efforts of the Bolivian people to determine their own destiny. That same international condemnation must make itself felt here today.

There must be a stop to torture, murder, illegal imprisonment, and the flagrant dishonoring of constitutional norms in Bolivia. There must be a prompt restoration of a legally constituted government in which all Bolivians can strengthen freedom and foster national development under the law.

The United States believes civilized opinion and international obligation require us to support democracy in Bolivia. We should instruct the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to follow the situation closely and keep our governments fully informed of developments in Bolivia. We should support humanitarian agencies, like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in providing assistance to the victims of repression. And we should make the views of this body unmistakably clear in these regards.

OAS RESOLUTION 308 (432/80) JULY 25, 1980[3]

The Permanent Council Of The Organization Of American States, Considering:

The principles established in the Charter of the Organization, especially those

expressed in Article 3, paragraphs d) and j);

The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and

The Declaration of La Paz, adopted by consensus at the ninth regular session of the General Assembly; and

Bearing In Mind:

That each state has the right to develop its cultural, political, and economic life freely and spontaneously and that in this free development, the state shall respect the rights of the individual and the principles of universal morality, as set forth in Article 16 of the Charter of the Organization;

That this precept has been violated by the military coup that has taken place in Bolivia in disregard of the elections recently held in that country; and

With strict respect for the principle of nonintervention,

Resolves:

1. To deplore the military coup, which indefinitely suspends the process of democratic institutionalization that was culminating in the sister Republic of Bolivia.

2. To express its deepest concern over the loss of human life and the serious violations of the human rights of the Bolivian people, as a direct consequence of the coup d'état.

3. To request that, in the shortest time possible, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights examine the situation of human rights in Bolivia.

4. To express its solidarity with the Bolivian people and its confidence that they will find the most suitable means to maintain the viability of their democratic institutions and their freedoms.

SECRETARY MUSKIE, JULY 25, 1980[4]

We are deeply concerned over the coup in Bolivia and subsequent developments there. Bolivia's democratic process has been thwarted. The will of the Bolivian people, freely expressed in recent elections, has been flagrantly violated. We deplore these actions. We believe the democratic process should be resumed and the desires of the Bolivian people respected. We also deplore violation of the rights of hundreds of political, religious, and labor leaders being held by the new regime.

We have been in consultation with other countries. Our views are widely shared both in this hemisphere and elsewhere in the world. Most notably, the Andean group has taken the initiative to bring the Bolivian situation before the OAS. We strongly support that initiative.

For our part we have taken several steps to emphasize our concern over developments in Bolivia. We have terminated military assistance. We have ceased new commitments of economic assistance. We have recalled our Ambassador for consultations. We have made the decision today to withdraw our military group from Bolivia and substantially reduce embassy personnel.

In addition, we have been reviewing our present economic assistance programs with an eye toward substantial reductions. I have ordered today the termination of all economic assistance projects where there is a basis to do so under existing agreements. The only exception will be those programs which support humanitarian assistance such as food programs carried out by private voluntary agencies.

These actions are designed to demonstrate the depth of our concern over the situation in Bolivia. The United States cannot support this attempt to thwart the will of the people of Bolivia. Their journey toward stable democratic rule had not been an easy one. But the people had demonstrated their eagerness to follow that path. We condemn this attempt to force them to turn back.

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[1] Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman John Trattner.

[2] Delivered during the first session of the special meeting of the OAS Permanent Council on Bolivia.

[3] Adopted on July 25 by a vote of 16 to 3 with 4 abstentions.

[4] Press release 204. ■

Maritime Boundary Treaties

by Mark B. Feldman

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 30, 1980. Mr. Feldman is Deputy Legal Adviser.[1]

I welcome the opportunity to testify today in support of three significant treaties that establish maritime boundaries between the United States and Mexico, between the United States and Cuba, and between the United States and Venezuela off the coasts of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

These treaties are necessary to delimit the U.S. Continental Shelf in these areas and to resolve overlapping claims of jurisdiction arising out of the establishment of a 200-nautical mile fishery conservation zone off the coasts of the United States in accordance with the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 and the establishment of 200-nautical-mile zones by neighboring countries.

The U.S. fishery conservation zone, created by act of Congress as of March 1, 1977, encompasses approximately 2.8 million square nautical miles of waters. Together with reciprocal actions by other states, this act created more than 30 new boundaries between areas of U.S. fisheries jurisdiction and those of other nations. Such boundary questions arise with neighboring states adjacent to the United States and with opposite states wherever the coasts of the two countries are less than 400 nautical miles apart.

Thus, the 200-mile zone off the coasts of the continental United States abuts that of Canada in the Atlantic Ocean, in the Beaufort Sea, and in two places on the Pacific coast. It abuts the 200-mile zone of the Soviet Union in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, the North Pacific Ocean, where the maritime boundary is determined by the 1867 convention with Russia in connection with the purchase of Alaska, and it borders the Mexican 200-mile zone in the Pacific Ocean and in the Gulf of Mexico. It also borders on the 200-mile zone of Cuba and the Bahamas off the coasts of the southeastern United States.

Similar boundary situations arise in the Caribbean between Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands and the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and a

July 12, 1930. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1931. 47 Stat. 1862.
Terminated: Aug. 29, 1980.

Treaty concerning extradition, with protocol. Signed at Bonn June 20, 1978.
Instruments of ratification exchanged: July 30, 1980.
Entered into force: Aug. 29, 1980.

Haiti
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of June 8, 1979, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Port-au-Prince June 24, 1980. Entered into force June 24, 1980.

Hungary
Agreement extending the air transport agreement of May 30, 1972, as amended and extended (TIAS 7577, 8096, 8617). Effected by exchange of notes at Budapest May 30, 1980. Entered into force May 30, 1980.

India
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036, 9232, 9578, 9663), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 22, 1980. Entered into force May 22, 1980.

Agreement amending the project loan agreement of September 28, 1979 for fertilizer promotion. Signed at New Delhi May 27, 1980. Entered into force May 27, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036, 9232, 9578, 9663), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington July 1 and 3, 1980. Entered into force July 3, 1980.

Indonesia
Agreement for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with annex and agreed minute. Signed at Washington June 30, 1980. Enters into force on the date of the latter written notification from one party to the other that it has complied with its legal requirements for entry into force.

International Atomic Energy Agency
Agreement for the application of safeguards in the U.S., with protocol. Signed at Vienna Nov. 18, 1977.
Senate advice and consent to ratification: July 2, 1980 (with understandings).

Israel
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Dec. 16, 1974 (TIAS 7978), with minutes of negotiation. Signed at Washington July 23, 1980. Entered into force July 23, 1980.

Ivory Coast
Air transport agreement, with memorandum of understanding and exchange of notes. Signed at Abidjan Feb. 24, 1978. Entered into force provisionally Feb. 24, 1978.
Entered into force definitively: June 3, 1980.

Jordan
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Nov. 27, 1974 (TIAS 7995), with minutes of negotiation. Signed at Amman June 29, 1980. Entered into force June 29, 1980.

Kenya
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Mar. 6, 1980 (TIAS 9735). Effected by exchange of notes at Nairobi May 15, 1980. Entered into force May 15, 1980.

Agreement concerning the use of certain facilities in Kenya by the U.S., with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Nairobi June 26, 1980. Entered into force June 26, 1980.

Malaysia
Agreement amending the agreement of May 17 and June 8, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9180), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at New York and Washington July 13 and 27, 1979. Entered into force July 27, 1979.

Mauritius
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of June 29, 1979 (TIAS 9541), with minutes of negotiating meeting. Signed at Port Louis July 11, 1980. Entered into force July 11, 1980.

Mexico
Agreement amending the agreement of Feb. 26, 1979, as amended (TIAS 9419), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico and Washington May 21 and 28, 1980. Entered into force May 28, 1980.

Mozambique
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of June 28, 1979 (TIAS 9635), with agreed minutes. Signed at Maputo June 23, 1980. Entered into force June 23, 1980.

Netherlands
Agreement on research participation and technical exchange in the USNRC heavy section steel technology (HSST)/elastic plastic fracture mechanics (EPFM) and aerosol release and transport (ART) research programs and the Dutch BROS I-II/EPOSS and aerosol research programs, with appendices. Signed at Washington and The Hague Apr. 21 and June 6, 1980. Entered into force June 6, 1980.

International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at The Hague and Washington May 19 and June 10, 1980. Enters into force on the date mutually agreed upon by the administrations, after it is signed by the authorized representatives of both administrations.

Extradition treaty. Signed at The Hague June 24, 1980. Enters into force 30 days after the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Nicaragua
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Aug. 31, 1979. Effected by exchange of notes at Managua June 19, 1980. Entered into force June 19, 1980.

Pakistan
Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 4 and 9, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9050, 9551, 9661), relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington June 20 and 25, 1980. Entered into force June 25, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 4 and 9, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9050, 9551, 9661), relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington June 25 and July 1, 1980. Entered into force July 1, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Mar. 25, 1980. Effected by exchange of notes at Islamabad July 2, 1980. Entered into force July 2, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 4 and 9, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9050, 9551, 9661), relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington July 3 and 8, 1980. Entered into force July 8, 1980.

Peru
Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. Signed at Washington July 6, 1979.
Instruments of ratification exchanged: July 21, 1980.
Entered into force: July 21, 1980.

Agreement for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with annex and agreed minute. Signed at Washington June 26, 1980. Enters into force on the date on which the parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that they have complied with all applicable requirements for its entry into force.

Portugal
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Mar. 18, 1976 (TIAS 8264), with minutes. Signed at Lisbon June 24, 1980. Entered into force June 24, 1980.

Romania
Agreement amending the agreement of June 17, 1977, as amended (TIAS 8833, 8924, 9167, 9211, 9646), relating to trade in wool and manmade fiber textiles. Effected by exchange of letters at Bucharest June 6 and 11, 1980. Entered into force June 11, 1980.

Sudan
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Khartoum May 17, 1980.
Entered into force: June 19, 1980.

Turkey
Agreement extending the agreements of July 8, 1976, as extended, and June 18 and 26, 1979 (TIAS 8371, 9006, 9539, 9540), on procedures for mutual assistance in the administration of justice in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, and the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation and its subsidiaries and/or affiliates. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington July 8 and 15, 1980. Entered into force July 15, 1980; effective July 8, 1979.

Yugoslavia
Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation. Signed at Belgrade Apr. 2, 1980.
Entered into force: June 24, 1980.

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[1] With a statement.
[2] Not in force.
[3] Applies to Berlin (West).
[4] Chapter II not in force for the U.S.
[5] Not applicable to Articles 1–12.
[6] With reservation.
[7] Not in force for the U.S. ■

July 1980

Events pertaining to Iran may be found on page 56.

July 2
By a vote of 90 to 0, the U.S. Senate ratifies the U.S.-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement.

July 4
George Kalkoa, a senior official in the outgoing colonial Government of New Hebrides, is elected first president of the New Hebrides island chain. He is chosen by an electoral college vote of 27 to 12.

President Carter makes official visit to Tokyo to attend memorial ceremony honoring the late Japanese Prime Minister Ohira. While in Japan, he confers with Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng, also attending the ceremony.

July 14
Second World Conference of the U.N. Decade for Women opens in Copenhagen. U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. Ambassador McHenry and Presidential Assistant Sarah Weddington head U.S. delegation.

July 15
Zenko Suzuki is named Prime Minister of Japan.

July 16
U.S. and Japan hold discussions on Pacific Basin spent fuel storage study, July 16–18.

July 17
Vice President Mondale makes official visit to Senegal, Niger, Nigeria, and Cape Verde, July 17–23.

Military junta overthrows Bolivian Government.

July 18
In response to the Bolivian military coup, the U.S.:

- Terminates military assistance;
- Recalls ambassador for consultations; and
- Ceases new economic assistance commitments.

July 19
Olympic Games open in Moscow.

July 24
Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) adopts a resolution deploring the military coup in Bolivia, expressing its "deepest concern" over the loss of life and violations of human rights as a direct result of the coup, requesting that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights "examine" human rights problems in Bolivia, and expressing its "solidarity with the Bolivian people."

July 25
In addition to measures taken in response to the Bolivian coup the U.S.:

- Terminates all economic assistance projects except those supporting humanitarian assistance and
- Withdraws military groups and reduces personnel.

July 29
U.S. recalls Ethiopian Ambassador, Frederic L. Chapin.

Meetings are held at the White House and Dept. of State to commemorate the 5th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). (The Act was signed in Helsinki on Aug. 1, 1975.) Discussions at the meetings include U.S. preparations for the next CSCE meeting to commence in Madrid November 11, 1980.

By a vote of 112 to 7, with 24 abstentions (including U.S. and nine Common Market countries), U.N. General Assembly, ending its 7th emergency special session, votes for a new call for the formation of a Palestinian state.

July 30
Israeli parliament enacts a law affirming Jerusalem as the Israeli capital.

New Hebrides gains independence as the Republic of Vanuatu. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
170	7/1	Status of U.S. contributions to international efforts for Khmer relief.
*171	6/30	Muskie: statement at U.S. Embassy, Kuala Lumpur, June 27.
172	7/1	Muskie: statement on U.N. vote on Jerusalem, June 30.
*173	7/3	National foreign policy conference for Presidential management interns, July 28–29.
*174	7/3	Foreign policy conference for State and local officials, July 14–15.
175	7/7	Muskie: address before the Foreign Policy Association, New York.
175A	7/7	Muskie: question-and-answer session following Foreign Policy Association address.
*176	7/7	U.S., Canada reciprocal agreement on employment of family members, June 12.
*177	7/8	Francis J. McNeil sworn in as Ambassador to Costa Rica (biographic data).
178	7/8	Muskie: excerpts from news conference with ASEAN Foreign Ministers, Kuala Lumpur, June 28.
*179	7/3	U.S., IAEA safeguards agreement ratified, July 2.
*180	7/8	U.S., Poland amend textile agreement, Jan. 22 and Mar. 17.
181	7/8	Muskie: statement at meeting with ASEAN Foreign Ministers, Kuala Lumpur, June 28.

FEATURE

Persian Gulf: Common Interests, Different Views

Following are excerpts from a statement by Assistant Secretary Harold H. Saunders before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 3, 1980. The full text will be available as a committee print.

. . . .

Nine years ago, the British withdrew from the [Persian] Gulf. There was much concern and uncertainty about the area because of internal, regional, and external pressures . . . . As events evolved, these states have enjoyed a period of relative security and impressive national progress, thanks to their own efforts and a helpful regional environment.

Now in the past 2 years that regional environment has changed dramatically, and these states, having successfully met the challenges of the 1970s face new ones in the 1980s. While their domestic development goes on, developments such as the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet activism in the Horn of Africa and South Yemen, the still unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, and Iraq's search for a new role in the area have changed the regional political and strategic environment.

. . . .

The people in this area have their own view of the security threat they face, and this view is not widely understood. They are as concerned as anyone in the area about potential Soviet efforts to achieve a predominance there which would curb their independence. They recognize that they themselves do not have the capacity to meet that threat militarily, but they do believe that a strong Arab nationalism and vigorous Islamic faith can be important bulwarks against Soviet efforts to move toward predominance in individual states.

But they also see security issues of two other kinds. They see the opportunity for external aggression or for subversion, either with Soviet support or stemming from regional conflicts. The modernization process itself brings strains to traditional societies. The large influx of foreign workers, including many Palestinians and other Arabs so necessary to implement their national development programs, has given most Gulf states a work force more foreign than indigenous. The leadership in these countries has shown concern for human development in the use of oil wealth, but they are likely to be faced in the years ahead with continuing internal pressures to assume various elements of society—particularly the unusually large percentage of young people—a fair and meaningful role. Having made progress in establishing government institutions, these states face the challenge of maintaining sensitive contact with their peoples and of developing institutions which will carry their traditional social harmony over into the modern era. Since the Iranian revolution, the attitude of minority Shia'a communities in many of the Gulf societies has been of concern because propaganda from Tehran has urged Shia'a residents to oppose the monarchical Gulf regimes and their Western ties.

On a different plane, the governments of the Gulf states also consistently assert that the absence of an Arab-Israeli peace is a primary threat to security and stability in the Gulf region. They regard the Arab-Israeli conflict as providing a main opportunity for enhanced Soviet influence in the region, as an instrument for revolutionaries and those who would spread radical political influence, and as the primary obstacle to the firm relationship with the United States which their national interests otherwise call for.

. . . .

We continue to share many common goals and interests with the states of the Gulf: We all want to maintain a global strategic balance which protects their independence. We all want to achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace. We all want to maintain orderly energy and financial markets. We all want to expand economic cooperation.

. . . .

Today, some aspects of our earlier approaches remain valid; others must be adjusted to take into consideration conditions in Iran and neighboring Afghanistan. My comments here today are designed to present to you our sense both of the continuity and more permanent elements of U.S. policy toward this region and an explanation of why and how we are making the adjustments necessary in response to changed local and regional circumstances. ■

U.S. Relations With the Persian Gulf States

by Harold H. Saunders

Statement submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 3, 1980. Mr. Saunders is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.[1]

In each of the past 2 years at this time, I have been asked by this subcommittee to present an overview of the developments in the Middle East and Southwestern Asia. Although today's hearing is not billed as that presentation, it is appropriate in that context to discuss with the subcommittee the evolving U.S. relationship with the Arabian Peninsula states on the Persian Gulf—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), and Oman. Developments in the surrounding region and the importance of the Gulf itself warrant our having made this area the centerpiece of a significant policy review.

My purposes in this statement are to:

- Outline our interests in these states as they have intensified in the last several years;
- Present our perception of the dynamics of this area, how it has developed in the past decade, and the challenges ahead; and
- Discuss how our policies toward this area fit our expanding interests and the changing circumstances there.

U.S. Interests

Our interests in the region are longstanding, major, and interrelated. They take cognizance of:

- The area's strategic location and its significance to maintaining a global strategic balance;
- The significance we place on the sovereignty and independence of these countries as part of a more stable world;
- The world's vital need for the region's oil; and
- The importance of these states in international finance and development and as markets for our goods and technology.

In the last decade our interests in the region have changed little in nature but have grown in importance.

We then spoke of the vital flow of Gulf oil to our NATO allies and our friends east of Suez. Now we ourselves have become excessively dependent upon Gulf oil.

As the Gulf countries have grown prosperous, they have assumed a much more prominent role in both regional and world affairs.

Our commerce with the area has expanded enormously, as has the presence of Americans there.

Our cultural relations have greatly increased, including the education in American universities of large numbers of students from the region.

Events in surrounding countries have sharply increased concern about Soviet pressure on this sensitive region.

In the last decade, our relationships with these six Gulf states have been solidly developed on a foundation that includes:

- The strategic importance of the area to the Western world and the importance the Gulf states attach to our ability to maintain a global strategic balance which discourages outside intervention in the area;
- The priority these states attach to a just and lasting resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and their recognition that among outside powers the United States is unique in its ability to play an effective role in the search for a comprehensive Middle East peace;
- A general recognition of the common responsibility of major oil producers and consumers to maintain orderly markets conducive to international economic welfare;
- An expanding mutual interest in economic cooperation including: the growth of commerce, the transfer of technology for sound economic develop-

Bahrain—A Profile

Geography

Area: 260 sq. mi. (four times the size of Washington, D.C.; it is an archipelago of islands of which six are inhabited). **Capital:** Manama (pop. 90,000).

People

Population: 343,000 (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 3.4%. **Ethnic Groups:** Arab (80%), Iranian (12%), Pakistani, Indian. **Religions:** Shia'a Muslim (60%), Sunni Muslim (40%). **Languages:** Arabic (official), English, Farsi, Urdu.

Government

Type: Traditional Emirate (Cabinet-Executive system). **Date of Independence:** Aug. 15, 1971. **Constitution:** May 26, 1973. **Branches:** *Executive*—Amir (Chief of State), Prime Minister (Head of Government), Council of Ministers (cabinet). *Legislative*—suspended. *Judicial*—independent judiciary with right of judicial review. **Political Parties:** None. **Suffrage:** Not applicable.

Economy

GDP: $1.7 billion (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 6% (est.). **Per Capita Income:** $4,967 (1979 est.). **Inflation Rate:** 15%. **Natural Resources:** Oil, associated and nonassociated natural gas, fish. **Agricultural Products:** Eggs, vegetables, dates. **Industries:** Oil, aluminum, ship repair, natural gas, fish. **Trade (1978):** *Exports*—$1.9 billion: oil, aluminum, fish. *Partners*—Japan, Saudi Arabia, U.K., U.S. *Imports*—$2 billion: machinery, industrial equipment, motor vehicles, foodstuffs, clothing. *Partners*—Japan, U.K., U.S. **Official Exchange Rate:** .384 Bahrain dinars = US 00.

Membership in International Organizations

U.N. and most of its specialized agencies, Arab League, OAPEC.

Principal Government Officials

Bahrain: Amir—Shaikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa; Crown Prince—Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa; Prime Minister—Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa; Minister of Foreign Affairs—Mohammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa; Ambassador to the U.S.—Abdulaziz Buali. **United States:** Ambassador to Bahrain—Peter Sutherland.

Europe. With NATO in Europe, for example, we do not need overwhelming tank forces. We and our allies do not plan to start a war on the European Continent. What we do need and what we will maintain are the weapons to repulse any force that seeks or threatens the domination of Europe. After years of neglect during the Vietnam war, we have led NATO's commitment to the deterrent levels of strength it actually needs. The Long-Term Defense Program to which we are now all committed—a 15-year program—will add $85 billion to NATO's fighting strength over the next decade or so and will permit the alliance to meet any real threat to Europe's security and to our own. This is a major step forward in the closer coordination among ourselves and our allies and a restoration of the spirit of NATO that is crucial to the defense of Europe and to the security of our own country. It must be continued, and it will be continued.

Reversing a long, downward trend in real defense expenditures, above and beyond inflation, we have had real growth for the last 4 years, and we will continue this commitment during the years ahead. That is a promise that I make to you, and that is a promise that the Congress of the United States has also confirmed. We will not permit us to take a downward trend, as was the case during the 8 years before I became President.

A very significant development was the NATO decision last December to modernize theater nuclear forces in Europe, a direct response to the Warsaw Pact buildup of the last 10 years with their SS–20 medium-range missile and others similar to it. This is a vital part of our commitment. It was very difficult politically for some of the European nations to agree to take this major step. The Soviets used every possible propaganda that they could marshal. But our efforts and those of our allies were successful.

Pacific and East Asia. In the Pacific and in East Asia, our alliances and our military strengths are firm and they're adequate. We have the military presence on land and at sea to insure that no would-be aggressor can profit at the expense of ourselves or our friends from any upheaval in that region. Sustained, normal relations with China are very important and improve the prospects for a stable and a peaceful future in Asia.

You of the American Legion have pledged at this convention to the cause of Kampuchean relief. It's important that we Americans show the world the strength of American compassion and concern. I applaud your decision to alleviate human suffering and to help the cause of peace in Southeast Asia.

Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. In the most volatile and vital area to our security—the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia—we're taking additional steps to protect our vital interests. The security of the region and the crucial energy that it supplies to us and other nations are both now exposed to the new threat of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, which have turned that country from its former status as a buffer state into a wedge pointed at the sealanes of the Persian Gulf and to the rich oil deposits. To deter any further encroachment of Soviet power in this region, we must help to strengthen the resolve and the defenses of the countries there.

We are continuing to build up our own forces in the Indian Ocean and in the adjacent areas and to arrange to use facilities on land which we might need to aid our friends in the region in case of conflict and primarily to prevent the need for conflict. We've speeded up formation of a mobile force of up to 100,000 personnel that could be rapidly deployed to any area where sudden trouble loomed and needed to be met. We've arranged to put supplies and equipment for such a force in place ahead of time so they will be there when and if they're needed.

Most of all, in the Middle East, we've pursued the arduous, difficult, frustrating but absolutely essential cause of peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The real security of that crucial area of the world depends heavily on the force with which we promote stability and political compromise to avoid the outbreak of conflict. It's crucial that our nation use all its influence to prevent a fifth Middle East war. The Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaties that followed them were two extraordinary steps on a long road that until 1978 no one had been able to travel.

In the real world we know that we cannot expect miracles on the Middle East peace negotiations. The issues are too emotional. The difficulties are too great. The obstacles sometimes appear to be insurmountable. But I'm convinced that Israel wants peace, and I'm convinced that the Egyptians want peace, and I'm equally as convinced that those who live in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians all want peace. We know that our own future peace makes this work very important, and it's work that must be continued.

Other Concerns

At home, over intense opposition, as you know, but with great help from the American Legion, we have won the fight for peacetime draft registration. We need the ability to mobilize quickly and effectively, and we have shown our resolve to both friend and foe alike.

It should be clear to everyone who studies national security or defense that our work to keep America the strongest nation in the world is not finished. There are no laurels on which to rest. There are no victories which are final. There are no challenges which have disappeared magically. But we've resumed a firm and steady course of diplomacy and defense preparedness to lead our allies and our friends and ourselves with confidence toward the challenges facing the world of today and the world of tomorrow.

The independance, the security, and the development of the countries of the Third World—the small nations, the new nations, the developing nations, the nonaligned nations—are also very important to our national security. Violence and radical revolution thrive in an atmosphere of political repression, economic want, massive unemployment, and hunger. Our interest is served when the countries of the developing world are able to meet the needs and aspirations of their people peacefully, democratically, and through cooperation with the United States of America and the other Western nations.

In helping them to achieve these objectives, we are encouraging democracy, yes, but we are also strengthening our ability to compete effectively with the Soviet Union. Those who are most concerned about Soviet activism in the world should be the strongest supporters of our foreign aid programs designed to help the moderate transition from repressive tyranny to democratic development and to bolster the strength and independence of our friends.

We've revived in this Administration the policy that gives added purpose to our nation's strength: our whole-hearted, national commitment to promote the universal standards of human rights. Freedom for ourselves is not enough. Americans want to see other people enjoy freedom also. It's an unswerving commitment of our nation, and as long as I'm in the White House, it'll be a major part of our international policy.

We do not maintain our power in order to seize power from others. Our goal is to strengthen our own freedom and the freedom of others, to advance the dignity of the individual and the right of all people to justice, to a good life, and to future secure from tyranny. In choosing our course in the world, America's strength must be used to serve America's values.

The choices ahead are every bit as demanding as the ones we've already made. Facing them takes a clear understanding of where we are and where we want to go as a nation. Responding to dangers that might menace our future security also will measure America's common sense and courage, just as previous history has measured America's common sense and courage.

I've known America's courage by seeing it tested. I've seen it in the men who went to Iran to attempt so valiantly in an isolated desert to rescue their fellow Americans, who are still held hostage there. I saw it in the families of the men who died in that effort, and I've seen it in the families—with whom I've met as frequently as possible—of the citizens who are still held captive in Iran. What a nation we are to produce such men and women. All Americans are thankful to them.

And finally let me say that our country also has the courage to reject the easy illusions of something for nothing, the fantasy goals of strength without sacrifice, the irresponsible advocacy of shortcut economics and quick-fix defense policy. There are no magic answers. Easy solutions are very difficult to find. Courage, sometimes quiet courage, unpublicized courage, is the most to be appreciated.

I see this kind of courage in you, as veterans who have served and sacrificed already, but who still work continuously for the sake of service, not for recognition or reward. Your example strengthens my faith in our nation and in the future of our nation. With your help and with your courage and with your common sense, I know America will continue to be a nation of unmatched strength, a nation that faces the world as it is today and works with realism to bring to the world of the future freedom, peace, and justice.

[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 25, 1980 (opening paragraphs omitted).■

News Conference of August 4 (Excerpts)

. . . .

There are few governments in the world with which we have more sharp and frequent policy disagreements. Libya has steadfastly opposed our efforts to reach and to carry out the Camp David accords to bring peace to the Middle East. Our two governments have strongly different opinions and attitudes toward the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] and toward international terrorism. Within OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries], Libya has promoted sharply higher prices of oil and, on occasion, has advocated the interruption of oil supplies to the United States and to other Western nations.

On the other hand, we have substantial trade with Libya. Libya is one of our major oil suppliers, and its high-quality crude oil is important to our east coast refineries. Libya has publicly and privately opposed Iran's seizure and holding of our hostages, and for a time, Libya joined with other Muslim countries in opposing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

So for many years, our policies and actions toward Libya have, therefore, mixed firmness with caution.

And now I'd like to say a word about my brother's relations with Libya. As all of you know by now, Billy is a colorful personality. We are personally close. I love him, and he loves me. Billy is extremely independent. On occasion he has said: "I don't tell Jimmy how to run the country, and he doesn't tell me how to run my life." When I was elected President, Billy was thrust into the public limelight. Media attention made him an instant celebrity. He was asked to make a number of television and other speaking engagements, and he even put his name on a new brand of beer.

And in the summer of 1978, Billy was invited to visit Libya with a group of businessmen and State officials from Georgia. This highly publicized trip occurred late in September 1978. I was not aware that he was planning the trip until after he had left the United States and shortly before he arrived in Libya. When I heard about it, I was deeply concerned that there might be some serious or unpleasant incident while he was there.

Shortly after he returned from Libya, in October 1978, I saw a message from our charge in Tripoli reporting on the positive nature of the visit. I was greatly relieved, and I sent a copy of that message to Billy. This message contained no sensitive information, was never encoded, and, in fact, more than a year ago it was made publicly available by the State Department to a news columnist.

Early in 1979 a Libyan trade mission came to the United States, visited several localities in our country. Billy visited with the Libyans and made a number of controversial statements, which were roundly criticized both by the press and also by the American public. I publicly deplored, in a news conference, some of those comments myself.

As a result of Billy's remarks and his new association with the Libyans, almost all of his scheduled television and other appearances were canceled. His income from these public appearances almost totally disappeared, while his financial obligations continued to mount.

I shared the general concern about Billy's relationship with Libya, and the members of our family were also concerned about some of his personal problems. During this period, Billy entered the hospital for medical treatment. On one occasion while he was hospitalized, he discussed with me the possibility of another trip to Libya, and I urged him not to go, partly because of his health and partly because of the adverse effect it could have on our Middle East negotiations, which were at a critical stage at that time.

By the late summer of 1979, Billy had successfully completed his medical treatment, and despite my advice he made a second trip to Libya. There was relatively little publicity about this trip.

I am not aware of any effort by Billy to affect this government's policies or actions concerning Libya. I am certain that he made no such effort with me. The only occasion on which Billy was involved, to my knowledge, in any matter between Libya and the United States was his participation, with my full approval, in our efforts to seek Libyan help for the return of our

U.S.-Canada Relations

by Sharon E. Ahmad

Statement before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 17, 1980. Mrs. Ahmad is Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.[1]

I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to review with you the nature and current state of U.S. relations with Canada. The involvement of the United States with Canada over a broad range of areas—political, economic, cultural, commercial, and defense, etc.—is greater than with any other foreign country.

In the political area, our governments work closely and harmoniously, both bilaterally and in international fora. As friends and allies we share the same goals of peace, freedom, and the betterment of mankind's existence on the planet.

We are deeply involved with each other economically, as our people produce and exchange goods and services for our mutual benefit. More than one-fifth of our exports go to Canada, nearly twice that which goes to Japan, our next largest customer. U.S. exports to Canada are greater than our exports to all the countries of the European Economic Community combined. A quarter of all U.S. foreign investment is located in Canada, while the net flow of equity investment has now shifted and is now directed toward the United States from Canada.

We are allies in NATO, but our defense relations go well beyond those with other NATO allies, involving the 40-year-old Permanent Joint Board on Defense. Also, we have a unique military joint command—the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD)—and longstanding defense procurement relations.

Our people know each other well and share a common outlook on the world. Over 70 million people cross the U.S.-Canada border annually. In addition to business and government travel, we vacation in the areas of each other's country that we find attractive. Our students attend each other's educational institutions in large numbers. We see many of the same films and television shows and read many of the same publications.

We share a common interest in a large part of our environment—land, air, and water—and are both increasingly concerned about the maintenance and improvement of the quality of life and the effects of our actions on each other's environment.

All of this involvement leads frequently to the need for cooperation, consultation, and negotiation at many levels of Federal, provincial, and local government. The success or failure of this cooperation has a significant impact on our bilateral relations.

I think it is also useful to discuss some of the factors which affect how the relations between the two countries are perceived from each other's perspective. The difference in size, on the order of 10 to 1 in terms of both population and economic strength, is a central fact. In addition, the distribution of the Canadian population should be noted. Canadians are concentrated along the U.S. border, with 80% of Canadians living within 100 miles of the United States.

As a result, Canadians are far more conscious of the relationship than are Americans, and our bilateral issues are usually national issues in Canada, while they more often are regional issues in the United States. Furthermore, there is an ambiguity in Canadian attitudes toward the United States. While Canadians are attracted to many elements of our culture and society and welcome their relationship with us, at the same time they are determined to maintain their own separate identity and not be overwhelmed by us.

Situation in Canada

With these general factors in mind, I would now like to say a few words about the current situation in Canada and the state of our relations. As you know, the Liberal Party of Prime Minister Trudeau currently governs Canada, having won a majority of 12 in the House of Commons in elections last February. With this majority, the Liberals will probably be in power for the next 4 to 5 years.

More recently, the most important event on the domestic political scene in Canada has been the May 20 referendum in Quebec. Canada has a heritage of two distinct founding cultures which has no parallel here. For many years there has been substantial attention given to what the relation between the two cultures should be. The referendum was on a proposal by Quebec Premier Rene Levesque to negotiate with Ottawa a new relationship termed "sovereignty-association." That proposal was defeated by a vote of nearly 60%. Levesque was opposed by the provincial Liberal Party, headed by Claude Ryan.

With the decision in Quebec, the people of Canada now are turning their renewed efforts to resolving their constitutional differences. Canadian provinces already have far more autonomy than do our States. Nevertheless, and for different reasons, the provinces are also interested in constitutional change. Prime Minister Trudeau met with the 10 provincial premiers on June 9 and agreed to an intensive series of constitutional negotiations over the summer, culminating in a federal-provincial formal meeting September 8–12 to revise the country's federal structure. Trudeau has said that failure to reach substantial agreement in the September talks would be "a disaster" for Canada.

Recognizing that the national unity issue is vital to the future of Canada, the United States has followed with interest the events taking place to the north. However, we recognize that while we hope Canada will remain united and strong, these questions are internal issues which Canadians must decide without outside interference.

Canada has emerged as the world's seventh-ranking industrial power. With regard to the current state of the Canadian economy, it is expected to grow in 1980 at less than 1%. Inflation will be held to about 10%, in part because Canada, as a net energy exporter, is insulated from increases in the costs of imported oil. Export industries will suffer as a result of an expected decrease in demand in the United States. Unemployment should increase slightly to about 8.5%. However, a deep recession in the United States could change this outlook substantially for the worse.

Bilateral Relations

Current U.S.-Canadian relations are now in excellent shape. The differences which prevailed during the Vietnam era have been put aside, and our relationship can properly be characterized as warm and cordial. As I mentioned earlier, the United States and Canada share a broad range of global interests and are active in cooperating in pursuit of those interests throughout the world.

Canada has been strongly supportive of the United States on a wide variety of global issues. Canada gave strong support on Iran and Afghanistan from the beginning of the crisis in Southwest Asia and took the lead in the boycott of the Moscow Olympics. Canada agreed in January to support the U.S. partial grain embargo against the Soviet Union and not to replace U.S. grain withheld from the U.S.S.R. Canada has held to 3.8 million tons the amount of grain to be delivered to the Soviet Union during this Canadian crop year, which ends July 31.

Americans will not forget the bravery of the Canadians who protected and aided in the escape of our six Americans from Tehran in January. Also, Canada implemented from the start informal financial restrictions on trade with Iran in concert with our major European allies and Japan. Canada attaches great importance to allied unity and concerted action and favors close consultation with the United States and its other allies on the developing events in Southwest Asia.

As I indicated earlier, our joint inhabitation of this continent also involves us in a wide range of bilateral matters. Let me turn now to some of the current specific issues involved in U.S.-Canadian relations, an area where the potential for unsettling our relations is greater and, therefore, bears close watching.

East Coast Maritime Boundary and Fisheries Treaties. Last year the United States and Canada signed two treaties concerning the disputed boundary between the two countries in the Gulf of Maine and related issues involving mineral resources and fisheries. Current U.S.-Canadian east coast maritime boundary differences have as their origin the extension of fisheries jurisdictions to 200 miles by both countries in 1977. The fisheries treaty covers fish stocks of mutual interest on the Atlantic coast, including those in the disputed area. It would establish a U.S.-Canada east coast fisheries commission for the management of many of the fish stocks and would assign percentage shares to each country for each stock covered. In addition, the treaty provides for conciliation of disagreements and for ways of settling disputes through an arbitrator. The boundary treaty provides for settlement of the boundary dispute by referral to a special chamber of the International Court of Justice.

There has been substantial opposition in the Senate to approval of the treaties. Opponents have been critical of the permanent nature of the treaty, of the division of shares of some fish species, and of the treaty's provision for Canadian access to certain stocks off the U.S. coast.

Recognizing that the treaties have encountered very substantial opposition, we are in touch with the Senate, with representatives of fishery interests, and with Canada in an effort to work out an early and acceptable resolution of this important matter. Failure to do so would have a serious adverse effect on our bilateral relations.

Alaska Gas Pipeline. In 1977 the United States and Canada agreed to foster the construction of a pipeline to bring Prudhoe Bay gas through Canada to the U.S. market. Most of the regulatory procedures have been completed, and early agreement on financing this $23 billion project has become critical to continued progress.

The U.S. builder envisaged financing the southern legs of the pipeline (from Alberta to California and from Alberta to the Midwest) through the advance construction or "prebuild" of facilities to carry increased Canadian gas exports. It was planned that transmission revenues would cover the construction costs.

From the outset Canada was concerned that financing the technically complex Alaska segment might prove difficult, leaving Canada in the position

U.S., Canada Sign Memo on Air Pollution

The United States and Canada took an important step on August 5, 1980, toward dealing with acid rain and other forms of air pollution crossing the U.S.-Canada border. They agreed to set in motion a bilateral process to deal more effectively with these problems. The action took the form of a Memorandum of Intent signed for the United States by Secretary Muskie and Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Costle and for Canada by Ambassador Towe and Environment Minister Roberts.[1]

In signing the memorandum, Secretary Muskie stated that this action confirms the mutual goal of the United States and Canada to take concrete, cooperative steps to combat the problem of transboundary air pollution and to negotiate a bilateral agreement as soon as possible. The Secretary noted that the memorandum responds to the 1978 congressional resolution calling for U.S.-Canadian negotiations to preserve and protect mutual air resources.[2]

The Canadian Government welcomed the Memorandum of Intent as a step forward in efforts to develop cooperative measures with the United States to combat transboundary air pollution. This includes the already serious problem of acid rain which affects the environment of both countries. Ontario Environment Minister Harry Parrott also attended the Washington signing ceremony.

The Memorandum of Intent establishes five work groups to prepare for future negotiation of an agreement on air pollution. The work groups will undertake the necessary technical preparations for the negotiations. The United States and Canada are moving ahead to name experts and technicians to these work groups.

The Memorandum of Intent also creates a U.S.-Canada coordinating committee to oversee the activities of the work groups and provides that the work groups submit work plans to the coordinating committee at an early date. Preparatory U.S.-Canadian discussions on transboundary air pollution will continue, and formal negotiations will commence as soon as possible.

The Memorandum of Intent also calls upon both governments to take important interim actions, under current authority, to combat transboundary air pollution, pending conclusion of the agreement. The interim measures include mutual commitments for development of domestic air pollution control policies, vigorous enforcement of existing laws, increased advance notification of proposed actions involving risk of transboundary air pollution and further development of exchanges of scientific studies, cooperative monitoring programs, and research on pollution control technologies.

Press release 209 of Aug. 5, 1980.

[1] For text of the Memorandum of Intent, see press release 209A of Aug. 6.

[2] The statements by the participants in the signing are printed in press release 209B of Aug. 6. ■

number of islands, including the British Virgin Islands. In the Pacific, our 200-mile zone off American Samoa, Guam, and other island territories creates maritime boundaries with Tonga, Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, the Trust Territory, and several other islands including the new country of Kiribati.

Most of these boundaries remain to be established by agreement. Although the United States has exercised sovereign rights over the resources of the Continental Shelf since the Truman proclamation of 1945, the need to define the boundaries of our Continental Shelf with other nations has only recently become a matter of practical concern as the technical ability to exploit the hydrocarbon resources of the Continental Shelf has developed.

The problem of maritime boundary delimitation became urgent, however, with the extension of fisheries jurisdiction out to 200 miles. Precise limits are needed for purposes of fisheries management and law enforcement, and that need forced the issue of international maritime boundaries to the fore.

In anticipation of legislative action, the State Department established, in 1975, an interagency group to develop a U.S. maritime boundary position. I chaired that group for the Department's Legal Adviser, and it included representatives of other interested bureaus in the Department and representatives of the Departments of the Interior, Commerce, Defense, Energy, and Transportation (Coast Guard). This group's task was to identify in each situation the maritime boundary that would maximize U.S. resource and security interests consistent with international law and friendly relations with our neighbors.

Recognizing that it would not be possible to conclude boundary agreements with most of our neighbors before establishment of the fishery conservation zone on March 1, 1977, the United States published the provisional limits of that zone on March 7, 1977, "pending the establishment of permanent maritime boundaries by mutual agreement."

Subsequently, we have pursued negotiations with several nations and have concluded the three treaties before the committee today; the treaty with Canada, submitting the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine area to international adjudication, which the committee has under review, and a treaty with the Cook Islands which was signed on June 11 and which will be transmitted to the Senate in due course for advice and consent to ratification. Other boundary negotiations are being undertaken, and we intend to work to achieve agreements on all U.S. maritime boundaries as soon as possible.

With this background, I would like to turn to the three pending treaties with our Latin American neighbors. These are the first treaties establishing Continental Shelf and 200-nautical-mile fisheries boundaries to be signed by the United States and submitted to the Senate. They are important treaties that demonstrate that the United States can reach peaceful agreements with our neighbors on sensitive issues of sovereign rights and jurisdiction. We hope this committee will report them favorably and that the Senate will advise and consent to their ratification at an early date. [The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported favorably on the three treaties on July 24, 1980.]

Mexico

I would like to consider, first, the Treaty on Maritime Boundaries Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, signed at Mexico City, May 4, 1978. The United States and Mexico first agreed upon maritime boundaries in 1970 in the Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and the Colorado River as the International Boundary Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States. The 1970 treaty, in addition to dealing with the land frontier, established a maritime boundary in the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico to a distance of 12 nautical miles from the coast. The establishment of 200-nautical-mile zones by our two countries made it necessary to reach agreement on the seaward extension of those boundaries out to 200 nautical miles. The two governments concluded an exchange of notes establishing provisional maritime boundaries on November 24, 1976, and that line was confirmed in the treaty signed on May 4, 1978.

The 200-mile zones established from the coasts of the United States and Mexico overlap in three areas: off the Pacific Coast and in the western Gulf of Mexico where the U.S. and Mexican coasts are adjacent and in the eastern Gulf of Mexico where Mexico's 200-mile zone developed from certain islands off the Yucatan Peninsula opposite the Louisiana coast overlaps the U.S. 200-mile zone.

In the central Gulf of Mexico there is a reach of waters approximately 129 nautical miles in length where there is no fisheries boundary between the two countries. In this area the coasts of the two countries opposite each other are more than 400 nautical miles apart, so our fisheries zones do not overlap. We have not drawn a continental shelf boundary in this area for the time being because the limit of the outer edge of the continental margin is presently a matter under active negotiation at the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. In respect of this process and in view of the fact that water depths in this area do not readily admit of exploitation at the present time, it was decided that there is no immediate need to determine a boundary in this area. We intend to keep this matter under active review and, at such time as may be appropriate, establish a maritime boundary with Mexico in this area.

I am aware that one scholar has questioned the use of islands as basepoints for the boundary line in the Gulf of Mexico. This practice follows the precedent of the 1970 treaty, but the argument is made that the agreement gives Mexico more area in the deep waters of the east central gulf than should be the case. In considering this issue, the committee should note that the use of islands as basepoints gives the United States substantial areas in the Pacific off the coast of California. These Pacific areas have hydrocarbon potential and are also of considerable interest to U.S. fishermen. There may also be hydrocarbons in the seabed under the waters of the east central gulf, but these areas are under deep waters and will not be exploited for some years. There are no significant fisheries in that area.

I can assure you that before making this agreement the Department of State solicited the best available expert advice including scientists at the U.S. Geological Survey, the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, and the U.S. fishing industry. We contacted interested Members of Congress at an early stage, and the agreement was and is supported by all interested agencies of the U.S. Government.

Moreover, the approach followed in the treaty with Mexico is consistent with the general U.S. interest in giving full effect to islands off the U.S. coast. The boundary agreement with Cuba,

for example, gives full effect to the Florida Keys. The United States has other important island interests including the Alexander Archipelago in southeastern Alaska which affects the maritime boundary with Canada in and seaward of Dixon Entrance.

Finally, this agreement is a further example of United States' and Mexico's efforts to work together as equals to solve problems on the basis of mutual interest. Ratification of the agreement will strengthen relations between the United States and Mexico by settling an issue which could become contentious if left unresolved.

Cuba

The Maritime Boundary Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba signed at Washington December 16, 1977, establishes the boundary in the Straits of Florida and the eastern Gulf of Mexico. It begins in the west at a point 200 nautical miles from each coast and continues through the eastern gulf and Straits of Florida to a potential trijunction point with the Bahamas. At its closest point the boundary is approximately 38 nautical miles from the U.S. coast.

In the spring of 1977 the United States resumed direct, formal discussions with the Cuban Government for the first time in many years. The maritime boundary agreement was one of the first items on the agenda for those talks because both countries recognized the need to avoid incidents over that issue. At that time discussions were held in New York and Havana, and on April 27, 1977, the parties concluded a *modus vivendi* establishing a line which served as the boundary for 1977. Following further negotiations in 1977, a boundary treaty was signed in Washington on December 16, 1977.

That agreement provided for provisional application of the boundary line for 2 years from January 1, 1978. When that period expired on January 1, 1980, the parties, by exchange of notes dated December 27 and 28, 1979, extended provisional application of the boundary line for another 24 months. The establishment of the boundary with Cuba proved to be a complex technical task due to the difference in charts utilized by the two countries and other technical issues, but the negotiations were conducted on a businesslike basis that could be a model for how relations between our two countries can be conducted. Although relations with Cuba are seriously strained at the present time, both governments see advantage in concluding a permanent understanding as to our maritime boundary. Ratification of this treaty will remove a potential problem in U.S. relations with Cuba and will, therefore, contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the area.

Venezuela

The Maritime Boundary Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Venezuela, signed at Caracas on March 28, 1978, establishes the maritime boundary off the coasts of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in the Caribbean Sea. This line is based on the same general principles as the agreements with Mexico and Cuba and follows the line published by the United States when the U.S. fishery conservation zone was established in 1977. The Caribbean Regional Fishery Management Council and the authorities in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico were consulted prior to the establishment of the U.S. boundary position in this area and concurred in this line.

The three treaties I have discussed this morning all follow a similar format. Each contains the geographic coordinates of the boundary and technical information concerning the establishment of the boundary. Each contains an article which describes the legal effect of the boundary: that neither country shall claim nor exercise, for any purpose, sovereign rights or jurisdiction over the waters or seabed and subsoil on the other country's side of the boundary line. Each treaty also provides that establishment of the boundary does not affect or prejudice either country's position concerning the maritime jurisdiction that may be claimed by the other country. This disclaimer was deemed necessary as many of these countries assert claims of jurisdiction over the high seas not recognized by the United States.

As I noted previously, the U.S. position in the negotiation of these treaties was adopted after a full interagency review of legal questions and resource considerations and consultation with interested constituents and Members of Congress. We believe all three treaties are advantageous to the United States and fair to the other party. Ratification of these treaties will resolve issues with neighboring states which could become contentious and difficult if they are left unresolved.

Before I conclude my remarks, I would like to note that much of the work required to establish our boundary position, in general and in these cases, was carried through by Dr. Robert D. Hodgson who passed away last December. Dr. Hodgson was Geographer of the Department of State for 10 years and a world renowned expert in this field. He was a dedicated American, respected everywhere for his professional integrity as well as his expertise. The United States owes Dr. Hodgson a considerable debt of gratitude for his contribution to the law of the sea. The new frontiers we are creating are in significant measure a memorial to his work.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Response to Congressional Inquiry on Letelier-Moffitt Case

by Malcolm R. Barnebey

Statement before the Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation of the House Committee on Government Operations on May 9, 1980. Mr. Barnebey is Director of the Office of Andean Affairs in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.[1]

I am here this morning to testify about the response of the U.S. Government to the assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt.[2]

Subsequent to the 1978 indictments by a U.S. Federal grand jury in Washington of three officers of the Chilean intelligence service, the U.S. Government requested that the Government of Chile order the extradition of the three officers. This request was reviewed by the President of the Chilean Supreme Court but was denied in May 1979. The U.S. Government appealed this decision to a special review panel made up of five Justices of the Chilean Supreme Court. In elaborating U.S. arguments for extradition before the courts, a

Treaties

*182	7/9	Hume A. Horan sworn in as Ambassador to Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea (biographic data).
*183	7/10	Herbert Stuart Okun sworn in as Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic (biographic data).
*184	7/9	U.S., Poland amend textile agreement, May 5 and June 3.
185	7/11	Presidential messages on the 100th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Romania.
*186	7/14	William Bodde, Jr., sworn in as Ambassador to Fiji, Tonga, and Tuvalu (biographic data).
*187	7/17	U.S., Singapore amend textile agreement, May 27 and June 2.
*188	7/17	U.S., Romania amend textile agreement, June 6 and 11.
*189	7/17	U.S., Malaysia amend textile agreement, July 13 and 27.
*190	7/17	U.S., India amend textile agreement, May 22.
*191	7/17	U.S., Pakistan amend textile agreement, June 25 and July 1.
*192	7/17	John J. Crowley, Jr., sworn in as Ambassador to Suriname (biographic data).
*193	7/17	Muskie: arrival remarks, Kuala Lumpur, June 27.
*194	7/17	Muskie: statement before the national foreign policy conference for State and local officials, July 15.
*195	7/18	Muskie: interview by Barry Schweid and George Gedda of AP, Jim Anderson of UPI, and Roy Gutman and Robert Horton of Reuters, July 16.
*196	7/18	Muskie, Queen: arrival of U.S. hostage Queen from Iran.
*197	7/18	U.S., India amend textile agreement, July 1 and 3.
*198	7/18	U.S., Pakistan amend textile agreement, July 3 and 8.
*199	7/18	U.S., Mexico amend textile agreement, May 21 and 28.
*200	7/23	U.S., Pakistan amend textile agreement, June 20 and 25.
201	7/24	Muskie, Shahi: remarks following meeting, July 23.
202	7/24	Muskie: statement on public release of *Global 2000* report to the President.
*203	7/25	Meeting to commemorate 5th anniversary of signing of Helsinki accords, July 29.
204	7/25	Muskie: statement on coup in Bolivia.
205	7/29	Muskie: statement before foreign policy on CSCE.
*206	7/30	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Committee on Ocean Dumping, Sept. 4.
207	7/30	Muskie: statement before House Foreign Affairs Committee.
*208	7/31	Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Advisory Committee, Antarctic Section, Sept. 25 (partially closed).

*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

U.S.U.N.

Press releases may be obtained from the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.

No.	Date	Subject
1	1/6	McHenry: Afghanistan, Security Council.
*2	1/13	McCall: keynote address at the Martin Luther King day convocation.
*3	1/11	McHenry: Iran, Security Council.
*4	[Not issued.]	
5	1/12	McHenry: Afghanistan, UNGA.
6	1/13	McHenry: Iran, Security Council.
7	1/13	McHenry: Iran, Security Council.
*8	1/17	Meissner: global negotiations, Committee of the Whole.
*9	1/30	McCall: Third World, Nigerian-American Friendship Society, New York.
*10	2/1	Announcement that Ambassador McHenry will visit the Middle East and North Africa for 2 weeks.
*11	2/2	McHenry: Rhodesia, Security Council.
12	2/8	U.S. perspective of the 34th UNGA.
*13	2/11	McHenry: address at Oberlin College, Feb. 7.
*14	2/19	Petree: membership application of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Security Council.
*15	2/19	Announcement of the arrival of Prince Sihanouk.
16	3/1	McHenry: Israeli settlements, Security Council.
17	3/3	McHenry: address before the Women's National Democratic Club, Washington.
18	3/3	Vance, Rhodesian elections, Mar. 2.
*19	3/19	Sorenson: food, FAO Conference for Asia and the Pacific, New Delhi, Mar. 12
*20	3/26	Vanden Heuvel: Kampuchean relief, Kampuchean relief donors' meeting.
*21	4/2	McHenry: address at Spelman College, Atlanta.
*22	4/9	Spero: statement following swearing in ceremony, USUN.
*23	4/10	McHenry: global negotiations, Committee of the Whole.
*24	4/10	Horbal: World Conference on Women, preparatory committee, Apr. 8.
*25	3/3	McCall: host country relations, Host Country Relations Committee, Apr. 10.
*26	4/11	McHenry: South African incursion into Zambia, Security Council.
*27	4/15	Horbal: effects of apartheid on women in southern Africa, preparatory committee for the World Conference on Women, Apr. 14.
*28	4/15	Ambassador McCall attends Zimbabwe independence celebration.
*29	4/18	Horbal: Palestinian women, preparatory committee for the World Conference on Women, Apr. 15.
*30	4/18	Horbal: Palestinian women, preparatory committee for the World Conference on Women, Apr. 16.
*31	4/18	Good: women refugees, preparatory committee for the World Conference on Women, Apr. 17.

*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

ment of the Gulf states, maintaining international financial order, and facilitating the development of poorer countries; and

• The desire of these states for U.S. assistance in developing an appropriate defense capability and our willingness to join our allies in fulfilling this need.

A Decade of Progress

Eight years ago the Department testified before this subcommittee on U.S. policy toward the Persian Gulf, following an intensive, prolonged review of U.S. policy toward that region in light of the ending of the United Kingdom's historic protective treaty relationships with the smaller states on the Arab side of the Gulf. Then we looked forward to developing formal relations with three states achieving full independence, while retaining an historic relationship with Oman and building on well-established relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

But the international community contemplated the British withdrawal from the Gulf with understandable concern.

Revolutionary ideologies had long attacked the Gulf's ruling order.

Territorial disputes complicated the quest for regional cooperation.

Communist-supported insurgency in Oman's Dhofar Province demonstrated the destabilizing effect of outside intervention.

The world wondered if states so small and thinly manned could develop the institutions and national character required to stand on their own in a troubled world.

As it turned out, the smaller states of the Gulf were helped in their progress toward nationbuilding by a relatively tranquil environment. Their larger neighbor, Saudi Arabia, was and remains in a period of great national progress. The concept of close cooperation among the Arabian Peninsula states on the Gulf progressed steadily. The harmonious relationship that the two largest Middle East countries, Iran and Egypt, developed with one another and with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states provided an atmosphere conducive to orderly development.

In this environment, progress on the Arab side of the Gulf was impressive.

The seven so-called Trucial States came together to form the United Arab Emirates. Bahrain and Qatar firmly established their national identities. All the lower Gulf states developed a strong foundation of cooperation across a broad range of economic, political, and security issues among themselves, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

Many of the sensitive boundary disputes in the Gulf were resolved.

The insurgency in Oman's Dhofar Province, supported by the radical South Yemen regime, collapsed when faced with Oman's spirited resistance and progress toward national unity. Oman was aided by significant support from its neighbors.

Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors made progress in developing institutions of public administration, accommodating traditional social structures to the needs of modern government. In the U.A.E. the federal assembly has developed as a constructive expression of public sentiment. Kuwait and Bahrain have experimented with popularly elected national assemblies and in the process have gained valuable experience in how to engage public opinion constructively in the formulation of national policy. Kuwait's ruler has just issued a decree calling for the reconvening of an elected national assembly before the end of February. Saudi Arabia has announced that it will soon establish a consultative council.

Without exception these six governments have made important strides in using the benefits of oil wealth to better the lives of their peoples by meeting basic human needs and developing human potential while building the material attributes of modern societies.

The Surrounding Environment

Presently, however, and as we look ahead, the reassuring record of progress in these six Gulf states must be weighed against events in surrounding countries which impact heavily on these states.

The revolution and the decline of central authority in Iran have radically altered the strategic environment of other Gulf countries.

The Soviet invasion of nonaligned Afghanistan threatens the security of all of Southwest Asia.

In this regional atmosphere, Soviet, Cuban, and East German presence in the Horn of Africa and South Yemen reinforces longstanding concern about Soviet pressure through support of radical forces.

There is, furthermore, an atmosphere of marked instability within the wider region. Rejection of long-cherished traditions of civility is becoming more notable. Specific examples are:

Kuwait—A Profile

Geography

Area: 7,780 sq. mi. (slightly smaller than New Jersey). **Capital:** Kuwait (pop. 1.04 million).

People

Population: 1.2 million (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 6% (1977 est. which includes immigration). **Ethnic Groups:** Arab, Iranian, Indian, Pakistani. **Religion:** Muslim. **Languages:** Arabic (official), English widely spoken.

Government

Type: Constitutional monarchy, governed by an Amir chosen by consensus of the ruling al-Sabah family from its own members. **Independence:** June 19, 1961. **Constitution:** Suspended temporarily. **Political Parties:** None. **Suffrage:** Males over 21.

Economy

GDP: $23.8 billion (1979 est.). **Per Capita GDP:** $19,817 (1979 est.). **Inflation Rate:** 5.2%. **Agricultural Products:** None. **Industries:** Crude and refined oil, fertilizer, chemicals, building materials, shrimp. **Trade (1979):** *Exports*—$18.3 billion: crude and refined petroleum, shrimp. *Imports*—$4.9 billion: foodstuffs, automobiles, building materials, machinery, textiles. *Partners*—Japan, U.S., U.K., F.R.G. **Official Exchange Rate:** 1 Kuwaiti dinar=$3.68 (1980). **Economic Aid Received:** None. **Economic Aid Sent:** $2.7 billion (1975–79).

Members[illegible] Internat[illegible]rganizations

U.N., Arab League, OPEC, OAPEC, IMF, IBRD.

Principal Government Officials

Kuwait: Amir—Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah; Crown Prince and Prime Minister—Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah; Minister of Foreign Affairs—Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah; Ambassador to the U.S.—Khalid M. Jaffar. **United States:** Ambassador to Kuwait—Francois M. Dickman.

• The violation of international law and standards of civilized conduct among nations in the continued holding of diplomatic hostages in Iran;

• The unprecedented campaign of terrorism by Libyan leaders against their own people abroad;

• The violence in Lebanon and the difficulty of rebuilding civil order; and

• The legacy of Iraq's support for radical groups engaged in terrorism.

The complexity of Iraq's search for its national personality, its future relationship with Gulf neighbors, and its international role as a wealthy member of a world under economic pressure all impact significantly on the region.

Historic progress in achieving peace between Egypt and Israel has in its current state created tension between Egypt and other Arabs. The current isolation of Egypt from the Arab world has inhibited Egypt's role as a force for stability elsewhere in the Middle East.

At the same time, our commitment to deal with all aspects of the Palestinian problem while sustaining Israel's security nourishes hopes for the tranquility which peace can bring throughout the area. But this quest challenges leaders in the Gulf and elsewhere in the Middle East to rise to the level of vision and courage required to proceed on the path to a lasting peace.

The Present and Future Gulf

The Gulf states perceive themselves and the world perceives the Gulf region with a remarkable mixture of anxiety and hope. Tensions in surrounding areas have increased concern about the Gulf's security, while the very progress in the region has brought internal stresses. The vast resources of the region and the demonstrated willingness of its leaders to meet new challenges at home and abroad suggest that these states have the capability to keep their own houses in order while playing an ever more constructive and important role in regional and world affairs.

We can pursue our interests in the region in harmony with the aspirations and concerns of its people. To do so we must constantly bear in mind how our various interests and their various needs relate. There is, for instance, an obvious relationship between the security of the region and its reliability as an oil supplier. The growth of our economic relationships will have an impact on the pace and quality of development in the Gulf states, and this in turn will influence the prospects for stability.

Our ability to be supportive of the security of the region will be influenced by both international economic and regional political factors, and regional security will in turn enhance the prospects for orderly development and stability. The progress which we can make toward a comprehensive Middle East peace not only will heavily influence the quality of our relationship with these states but also will have profound impact on their prospects for orderly progress.

Security and Orderly Progress

Given our deep interest in the security of the region and the alertness of the Gulf states to external and internal pressures on their stability, we might define possible threats to the region as a framework for discussing part of the U.S. policy response, making clear that our posture is one of defense, finely tuned to the sensitivity and sovereignty of the states in the area.

Direct Soviet Aggression. In the light of historic Russian objectives and expansionism into Central Asia, the Gulf states have good reason to be apprehensive about the possibility of direct Soviet military intervention. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gives a tangible quality to this longstanding concern. The turbulence in revolutionary Iran suggests a further immediate possibility for the Soviets which could give them a direct opening into the Persian Gulf and its oil and a further lever with which to upset domestic stability in the Gulf region. The thinly populated Gulf states realize they have no prospect for developing a military capability to meet these threats. They look to us to check them, but they prefer that we do so by actions outside the region and in a way that minimizes their involvement. They greatly fear that the area will become an arena of superpower confrontation.

Our response to the Soviet threat must, therefore, involve a complex of

Saudi Arabia—A Profile

Geography

Area: About 873,000 sq. mi. (one-third the size of the U.S.; boundaries are undefined and disputed). **Capital:** Riyadh (pop. 750,000 est.). **Other Cities:** Jidda (615,000; site of the Foreign Ministry and the foreign diplomatic representatives), Mecca (250,000), Medina (150,000), Taif (100,000), Damman (100,000).

People

Population: 7.1 million (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 3.1% (1979). **Ethnic Groups:** Arab tribes with admixture of peoples from other Arab and Muslim countries. **Religion:** Muslim. **Language:** Arabic.

Government

Type: Monarchy. **Date of Unification:** Sept. 23, 1952. **Constitution:** None. **Branches:** *Executive*—King (Chief of State and Head of Government). *Legislative*—none. *Judicial*—Islamic Courts of First Instance and Appeals. **Political Parties:** None. **Suffrage:** None.

Economy

GDP: $78 billion (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 24.9% (1979). **Per Capita Income:** $11,500 (1979 est.). **Inflation Rate:** 10%. **Natural Resources:** Petroleum, natural gas. **Agricultural Products:** Dates, grains, vegetables, livestock. **Industries:** Petroleum and petroleum products, fertilizer, cement. **Trade (1979):** *Exports*—$46.5 billion: petroleum. *Partners*—EEC (50%), U.S. (16%), Japan (15%), LDCs (19%). *Imports*—$217 billion: transportation equipment, machinery, foodstuffs. *Partners*—EEC and Japan (62%), U.S. (25%), LDCs (12%), other (1%). **Official Exchange Rate:** 3.34 Saudi riyals=US$1.00. **Economic Aid Received:** None. **Economic Aid Sent (1974–78):** Approximately $15 billion.

Membership in International Organizations

U.N. and its specialized agencies, OPEC, OAPEC, INTELSAT.

Principal Government Officials

Saudi Arabia: King and Prime Minister—Khalid bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud; First Deputy Prime Minister and Crown Prince—Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud; Minister of Foreign Affairs—Sa'ud bin Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud; Ambassador to the U.S.—Faisal Alhegelan. **United States:** Ambassador to Saudi Arabia—John C. West.

hostages from Iran. Let me discuss this incident briefly.

On November the 4th, 1979, our hostages were seized in Tehran. In the weeks that followed, we explored every possible avenue to bring about their release. We increased our military presence in the Persian Gulf, we stopped all oil imports from Iran, and we seized the assets of that country. We appealed to the U.N. Security Council and to the World Court. We asked other governments, and particularly Muslim governments, including Libya, to support our position. As is still the case, we explored every official and unofficial avenue of contact we could find to encourage the Iranians to release the American hostages.

Public statements coming out of Libya at that time were not supportive and indicated that our diplomatic efforts to secure their assistance had not been successful. During the third week in November, it occurred to us that Billy might be able to get the Libyans to help to induce the Iranians to release the American hostages. As requested, he talked to the Libyans about our hostages and arranged a meeting with a Libyan diplomat at the White House. I did not attend that meeting, and so far as I'm aware, Billy played no further role in these discussions with the Libyans.

As matters turned out, the Libyan foreign office announced that the hostages should be released, and the leader of Libya, Col. Qadhafi, also made the direct private appeal to Ayatollah Khomeini that we requested. At least in this respect, the approach to the Libyans was successful; whether it would have been successful if Billy had not participated is a question that no one can answer with certainty.

I made this decision in good faith, with the best interests of the hostages and our nation in mind. Billy merely responded to our request for assistance, and I believe his only motive in this effort was to seek release of the American hostages from Iran.

. . . .

Q. But don't you think that by using your brother, Billy Carter, at least as an emissary to make contact with a foreign government—don't you feel that perhaps it might have been better judgment to have used a trained diplomat in that capacity?

A. No, not in that particular instance concerning the hostages. We were using trained diplomats. Immediately after the hostages were seized, this became an absolute, total obsession of mine, to get those hostages released. We inventoried every possibility of influence on the Iranians to induce them to release our hostages, safely and immediately. We sent messages—and had our diplomats in those countries and contacted their diplomats in Washington—to almost every nation on Earth, every one that we thought might have the slightest semblance of influence with Iran. We especially thought that the Muslim countries, believing in the Koran, having the same religion as the Ayatollah Khomeini, might have a special influence.

We had tried through diplomatic means to get Libya to give us some support in condemning the Iranian action and calling for the release of the hostages. Up through the 18th of November, the public statements coming out of Libya—and these are documented in Dr. Brzezinski's [Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs] report—had been negative, against our position, in effect supporting the holding of the hostages. Some private comments from Libyan diplomats to our diplomats in the United Nations, for instance, had said, "We would like to help you," but the public comments, which were the important ones, were contrary to that.

Under those circumstances, I decided to use Billy to see if he could have some special influence to get the Libyans to help. I had no reticence about it.

That was the same day that the religious fanatics attacked the mosque in Saudi Arabia. It was the same day, I believe, that Khomeini announced that the hostages—American hostages—would be tried and, if convicted, Khomeini said, "Jimmy Carter knows what's going to happen to them." We thought that the hostages' lives were directly in danger.

I saw then and see now nothing wrong with asking Billy and other private citizens to try to help if it's appropriate and legal. The only thing Billy did was to contact the Libyans, whom he knew personally—he does not know Qadhafi, but he did know the charge in Washington—and say, "We would like very much to have your help in having the hostages released. Will you meet with Dr. Brzezinski at the White House," a week from then, which was the 27th day of November.

Billy then met a week later with Dr. Brzezinski and the charge, and we believe that some progress was made. As I said in my opening statement, I cannot say for sure that Billy had anything in the world to do with the progress that was made. But 2 days after Billy contacted the charge, they made a public announcement for the first time—Libya did—calling for the release of the hostages. After that meeting, Col. Qadhafi himself sent a personal emissary to Khomeini, asking Khomeini for the first time to release our hostages, and then he sent me word that he had done so.

I'm not trying to claim great things from that small involvement of Billy. But Billy came up to Washington, so far as I know, at his own expense on two occasions. He went back to Plains. He never told anybody publicly that he had done it. He never bragged about it. And I have enough judgment to know that that may have enhanced Billy's stature in the minds of the Libyans. That's the only down side to it that I can understand. And that may have been bad judgment, but I was the one that made the judgment. I did what I thought was best for our country and best for the hostages, and I believe that that's exactly what Billy was doing.

. . . .

Q. You said that you were obsessed with the hostages and that's why you called your brother in. Do you have any new ideas for freeing the hostages now?

A. No, we are pursuing the same kind of degree of effort that we were then.

I think I tried to point out, as best I could remember, a couple of things that were happening at the time—the threat by Khomeini that the hostages might be killed and the fact that the Grand Mosque in Jidda was—in Mecca, I think—was attacked by radical believers in the Muslim faith. Those were the kind of things that were causing me great concern.

The approach to Libya, although now it has taken on great significance, here, 9 or 10 months later, was one of a broad pattern of things that I was doing, the National Security Council was doing, everyone in the State Department assigned to this task was doing, and many private citizens were doing. And there was nothing extraordinary about it. It was just one of a broad gamut of things that we were attempting to do in every possible way to get word to Khomeini that it was better for Iran to release those hostages.

. . . .

Interview by the French Media

While he was in New York on August 13, 1980, Secretary Muskie was interviewed by Dominique Bromberger of French television and Christian Mollard of French radio. Following are excerpts from those two interviews.

TELEVISION[1]

Q. Apparently there is a new U.S. nuclear strategy contained in a document known as Presidential Directive 59. Could you give us an update on this?

A. I am hardly the man to give you an update, since I was not involved in developing it. But as I understand it, it is not a new doctrine. PD 59 has been described to me as a codification of a doctrine that has been in the process of evolution since 1977 when PD 18 directed a study following on the Schlesinger doctrine of 1974 to evaluate what our policy ought to be. And as it has evolved, I am told that it has been stated in the Secretary of Defense's posture statement of January and February of 1979, and especially that one of 1980.

Having said that, I ought to make these points about it, as I understand it. First, that it does not abandon assured destruction as a deterrent policy. It is designed to add flexibility to that policy in order to make deterrence a more effective policy It is based, in part, on the fact that the Russians, given our evaluation of their policy, see nuclear war as possibly a prolonged exchange of weapons. We've always conceived of nuclear war as being of rather short duration given the devastation that would follow.

And so this new policy is not new but a policy which has evolved over these several years and which Secretary [of Defense Harold] Brown refers to as countervailing strategy and involves mixing our response so as to preserve the assured deterrence aspect which is aimed at the urban industrial complex but adding selected military targets as well.

Q. Nevertheless, do you think it is a priority to being able to strike at military targets in the Soviet Union other than cities? Doesn't that make war more thinkable because it leaves the aggressor less possibilities of total destruction?

A. I don't believe so and neither does Secretary Brown, because I don't think a limited nuclear war is conceivable. I think that as soon as there is an exchange of nuclear weapons, the war would rapidly escalate to an all out nuclear war. I can't imagine that anything less than that would happen.

Secondly, neither side has a first-strike capability. So there is no way that either side could eliminate the other side's ability to retaliate given the present posture of both parties. That being so, it would seem to me that the deterrent value is still there. But if the Russians, for any reason, consider a limited nuclear war possible, the purpose of the countervailing strategy is to discourage them from that notion.

Q. In Europe it is difficult to hold a clear distinction between the deterrence, which is war avoidance, and defense, which is a damaging addition, because we feel that if there is a limited war it could be limited from an American point of view and yet in Europe—Do you rule out completely this possibility?

A. I am not sure the human mind can comprehend all of the hypothetical possibilities. My own view may be an oversimplistic one, but, as I said earlier, I think nuclear war in any form is unthinkable because I cannot conceive of a limited one. Nevertheless, the argument that we must have an ability to strike selected military targets as well as the urban industrial complex as well as military related industrial targets as well as command and control targets, I think is a possible deterrent, a more sophisticated deterrent added to that one of assured destruction. Our capacity to destroy cities is formidable, and, I think, one in analyzing the countervailing strategy ought not to overlook that. We are not abandoning our policy at all; we are simply refining it, as I understand it.

Q. You have indicated at the beginning of this interview that you were not consulted in the process of elaborating the evolution of this strategy. How could this be possible?

A. First of all let me make clear that I raised the question not in a personal sense but in an institutional sense. And what I have been examining—and I have been examining the records since the question first arose last week, and I didn't raise it, it was raised in a *New York Times* article based upon a leak from some agency—that the State Department did not participate, and I have been examining that record. And that comes pretty close to being true. There was some State Department participation a little over a year ago which then terminated. I think this is institutionally wrong, and I have said so, and the President and the Secretary of Defense have agreed with me at this point. So it remains to be seen whether or not this institutional problem will be corrected. Now how long that institutional problem existed, I have not yet determined. It has gone back at least to 1977.

Q. This last example seems to confirm what is the common feeling in Europe that there is some difficulty in managing the foreign policy in this country among the White House, the National Security Council, the State Department, and other government agencies. What is your feeling about that?

A. One ought not to overblow it. Just as I think the question of consultation between the allies and differences between the allies has been escalated this year and, indeed, since I have been Secretary of State under a widespread conception of disarray in the alliance which I think was overblown, now that I have examined it closely. So this can be overblown. The President, after all, is the supreme foreign policymaking authority. The Constitution of the United States makes him so. And he has not been excluded from this policy. He has made it. PD 59 means Presidential Directive 59 and it is for him to organize,

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Q. Your spokeman, Mr. Powell, has said, in defending your use of your brother as an intermediary—and you have alluded to this as well—that we'd be very surprised some day when we hear of some of the other unorthodox emissaries you've used, channels to other countries to try and secure the release of the hostages. Can you surprise us a little and tell us who they are, who some of them might be? And might we be embarrassed by the revelations of any of their names?

A. No, you wouldn't be embarrassed, but I think maybe the surprise ought to come later.

. . . .

[1] For full text, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 11, 1980. ■

of having authorized increased exports of Canadian gas to the United States to facilitate a pipeline for Alaskan gas that might never be built. Accordingly, Canada seeks assurances that the entire line will be built before it will authorize additional gas exports and the construction of the "prebuild" facilities.

We are working with Canada to find a formula for the assurances Canada seeks. We are optimistic that the remaining issues can be resolved in the near future and that it will be possible to move ahead on authorizing construction of the "prebuild" facilities within a short time.

Bilateral Air Quality Agreement. Following a request by Congress in October 1978, the United States and Canada began consultations on the negotiation of an air quality agreement. We have met several times and have agreed on principles which would be included in an agreement. At this juncture we are considering the next steps to be taken to accomplish the important objectives we share in this area.

One of the major concerns prompting U.S. interest in an air quality agreement is the desire to control Canadian sources of air pollution near the U.S. border. Examples include the Poplar River plant just north of the Montana line, Atikokan near the Minnesota boundary waters canoe area, and Nanticoke across Lake Erie from Cleveland. Air quality in Canada is under provincial rather than federal control, and Canadian provincial pollution controls are generally less stringent than U.S. controls. There are, for example, no scrubbers required on coal-fired power plants or smelters in Canada.

On the Canadian side, a major motivation for concluding an air quality agreement with the United States is to reduce acid rain. Also the United States is itself interested in combating acid rain. (Acid rain is caused by a combination of sulfur dioxide with oxygen and water vapor, producing a mild sulfuric acid which returns to the Earth in rain.) Although a recent study indicates that Canada generates at least half its own acid rain, it is a fact that the United States produces five times as much sulfur dioxide as Canada, much of which originates in the Middle Western and Northeastern States, which are generally upwind from eastern Canada. Also, some of the acid rain falling in the United States originates in Canada. The geological makeup of eastern Canada and parts of the United States are particularly vulnerable to acid rain pollution, which in certain cases kills aquatic life and may be harmful to crops and trees.

We share Canada's concern about transboundary air pollution and acid rain, issues of vital importance to the people concerned in both countries. We wish to move ahead to develop an air quality agreement and have under consideration mechanisms to aid both countries in arriving at a workable agreement on this important problem.

U.S.-Canadian Automotive Agreement. Until recent years the North American auto industry was unique. It was dominated by three manufactures of large cars to meet demand in North America. In Europe and Japan, production was principally of smaller cars to satisfy demand in Europe and elsewhere. In recognition of Canada's interest in the North America auto industry—particularly in the areas of trade, investment, and employment—in 1965 the United States and Canada concluded an agreement in this area. The agreement provides for duty-free trade in finished vehicles and original-equipment parts in commerce between both countries. Two-way trade has increased from $700 million in 1964 to about $22 billion in 1979. This has resulted in substantial advantages for both countries in terms of investment, employment, and economies of scale.

For several years Canada has suffered a persistent deficit in its automotive trade with the United States. Last year's deficit came to $2.5 billion, a record high. This has caused some Canadians to question whether Canada is receiving a "fair share" of the benefits under the agreement. There is also concern in Canada that it may not benefit sufficiently from investment and research and development expenditures made by auto manufacturers to meet the increased demand for smaller cars.

In 1978 the Canadian Federal Government and the Province of Ontario provided the Ford Motor Company a $68 million incentive to encourage the company to locate a $500 million plant in Ontario rather than Ohio. This brought a U.S. effort to reach agreement with Canada on the use of investment incentives in the North American automotive sector. The U.S. and Canadian Governments have consulted several times on mutual restraint on investment incentives. Canada has also expressed the desire to consult on the state of the auto industry, including operation of the auto pact. We expect that within the next few weeks the first of these formal consultations will take place.

Defense Issues. The United States and Canada have few differences in the defense field. The North American Air Defense Command agreement remains a key element in the U.S.-Canadian defense relationship. Earlier this year we agreed to extend for 1 year the NORAD agreement, to allow time for the Standing Committee on External Affairs and Defence of the House of Commons to consider issues involved in the NORAD agreement. There is every reason to believe that the forthcoming negotiations will result in a new agreement for an extended period and a continuation of this longstanding close defense relationship.

The Canadian Government announced on April 10 its decision to purchase the McDonnell Douglas F-18A as Canada's new fighter aircraft to replace the existing fleet of obsolescent fighters. The number of aircraft to be purchased will be between 129 and 137 depending on arrangements now under discussion concerning the possible waiver of certain costs incurred by the U.S. Government. Delivery of the aircraft is scheduled to begin in the second half of 1982 and will continue until 1989.

Conclusion

The questions I have described are illustrative of the many issues which are involved today in U.S.-Canadian bilateral relations. There are many more, and I would be happy to try to provide any additional details which members of this subcommittee may wish.

As I have noted, U.S.-Canadian relations are close and friendly. I see no reason to expect that our shared view of global issues will alter significantly in the foreseeable future. Bilaterally the same priorities will continue to apply: energy, transborder pollution control, maritime boundaries and fisheries, and trade and investment. The close interdependence which exists between our two countries will inevitably bring clashes of interests. We must vigorously seek ways to resolve these issues to the mutual satisfaction of both countries.

While success or failure in dealing with individual problems is bound to have some broader impact on other issues, we must recognize that in a relationship as extensive and complex as exists between the United States and Canada, there are real risks in drawing specific linkages between unrelated issues. Such a practice can give rise to a trade-

off mentality that could greatly complicate our efforts to resolve individual issues, and would not serve us well in the long run. Further, our two nations clearly have the capacity to help or hurt one another, and this fact dictates caution and restraint in our relations. Our tradition of consultation, of prior notification on issues of importance to the other country and of genuine consideration of each other's concerns is of greatest value to us. In most cases we are able to resolve our differences by meeting them head on, but when we are unable to do so it is strongly in our interest to isolate and minimize the area of conflict involved.

U.S.-Canadian relations are carried on in an atmosphere of mutual confidence. Given the broad range of our two nation's interests, it is understandable that we are challenged by individual differences, particularly in the bilateral area. We must remain vigilant to insure that our differences are managed in the perspective of our broader relationship. This is significant not only for the two countries involved, but it sets an important example for the world of how two free, dynamic, and complex societies can create a productive and cooperative relationship on the basis of mutual respect and consideration.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.■

Canada Approves Segment of Alaska Gas Pipeline

Following are President Carter's letter to Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau and his statement of July 18, 1980.[1]

LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Since you last wrote to me in March, the United States Government has taken a number of major steps to insure that the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System is completed expeditiously.

Most significantly, the Department of Energy has acted to expedite the Alaskan project. The North Slope Producers and Alaskan segment sponsors have signed a joint statement of intention on financing and a cooperative agreement to manage and fund continued design and engineering of the pipeline and conditioning plant. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission recently has certified the Eastern and Western legs of the System.

The United States also stands ready to take appropriate additional steps necessary for completion of the ANGTS. For example, I recognize the reasonable concern of Canadian project sponsors that they be assured recovery of their investment in a timely manner if, once project construction is commenced, they proceed in good faith with completion of the Canadian portions of the project and the Alaskan segment is delayed. In this respect, they have asked that they be given confidence that they will be able to recover their cost from U.S. shippers once Canadian regulatory certification that the entire pipeline in Canada is prepared to commence service is secured. I accept the view of your government that such assurances are materially important to insure the financing of the Canadian portion of the system.

Existing U.S. law and regulatory practices may cast doubt on this matter. For this reason, and because I remain steadfastly of the view that the expeditious construction of the project remains in the mutual interests of both our countries, I would be prepared at the appropriate time to initiate action before the U.S. Congress to remove any impediment as may exist under present law to providing that desired confidence for the Canadian portion of the line.

Our government also appreciates the timely way in which you and Canada have taken steps to advance your side of this vital energy project. In view of this progress, I can assure you that the U.S. Government not only remains committed to the project; I am able to state with confidence that the U.S. Government now is satisfied that the entire Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System will be completed. The United States' energy requirements and the current unacceptable level of dependence on oil imports require that the project be completed without delay. Accordingly, I will take appropriate action directed at meeting the objective of completing the project by the end of 1985. I trust these recent actions on our part provide your government with the assurances you need from us to enable you to complete the procedures in Canada that are required before commencement of construction on the prebuilt sections of the pipeline.

In this time of growing uncertainty over energy supplies, the U.S. must tap its substantial Alaska gas reserves as soon as possible. The 26 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in Prudhoe Bay represent more than ten percent of the United States total proven reserves of natural gas. Our governments agreed in 1977 that the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System was the most environmentally sound and mutually beneficial means for moving this resource to market. Access to gas from the Arctic regions of both countries is even more critical today as a means of reducing our dependence on imported petroleum.

Successful completion of this project will underscore once again the special character of cooperation on a broad range of issues that highlights the U.S./Candian relationship.

I look forward to continuing to work with you to make this vital energy system a reality.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT

My Administration's energy policy has always recognized that the energy problem is not unique to our country. The energy burden of the 1980s is shared by all the industrialized nations and by the lesser developed nations as well. Just as the energy burden is shared by all nations, so must the solution be borne by all in a cooperative spirit.

Just last month in Venice, I met with the heads of six other leading nations of the industrialized world to establish specific goals and a series of comprehensive commitments to conservation and the development of new energy supplies. At the time, we pledged increased international cooperation among ourselves and with other countries to help achieve these objectives.

strong case was made, as is well known both to those Americans who have followed the case closely as well as to large numbers of Chileans who followed the extensive coverage of the trial in the Chilean press. On October 1, 1979, the review panel of the Chilean Supreme Court issued its findings, denying our appeal and upholding the initial denial of extradition.

Concurrent with our request for extradition, a Chilean investigation was underway of the possible fraudulent use of Chilean passports and other matters related to the assassination. By October 1979, this investigation had proceeded for over 20 months without any indication that it would be pursued vigorously. The decision of the review panel gave no indication that this situation would change.

U.S. Measures

As a result of the failure of the Government of Chile to investigate seriously or to prosecute these crimes, the President decided on a series of actions which were announced on November 30, 1979. These measures were taken to make clear both to the Government of Chile and to others throughout the world that any such act of terrorism as that committed against Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt on the streets of Washington, D.C., cannot be tolerated.

- We reduced the number of U.S. Government personnel in Chile. This reduction is complete except for a few individuals, and they will depart from Santiago before mid-July. The reduction involves 25% of mission personnel and has significantly lowered the profile of U.S. Government activities in Chile.
- On January 1, 1980, the foreign military sales pipeline to Chile was terminated, and thus all deliveries of military equipment and spare parts to the Government of Chile by the United States has been ended.
- Concerning the military group stationed at our Embassy in Santiago, the measures announced November 30 prescribed that the military group would be phased down as the foreign military sales pipeline was reduced and that in 1980 an assessment would be made as to whether the military group should be eliminated. This assessment has been made, and the decision was to eliminate the military group.
- Pursuant to the Export-Import Bank Act and to authority delegated by the President, the Secretary of State determined that suspension of Export-Import Bank financing in Chile would "clearly and importantly advance United States policy" in combatting international terrorism. The Export-Import Bank has, therefore, suspended its limited remaining financing operations in Chile. In addition, the Federal Credit Insurance Agency, a private organization closely associated with the Export-Import Bank, is no longer providing export insurance.
- The Overseas Private Investment Corporation will not approve further investment guarantees or undertake new activities in Chile.

We have continued to make clear to the Government of Chile our grave concern over its failure to investigate seriously the Letelier/Moffitt assassinations. For example, we recently voted in the World Bank against a proposed water supply project loan in Chile. In our contacts with the Government of Chile, we have continued to stress the adverse impact of this case on our bilateral relations.

We believe that the measures which have been taken constitute clear and strong indications of the U.S. Government's abhorrence of terrorist killings and our determination to take significant and appropriate steps against those who, by their actions or failure to act, condone such crimes.

Civil Aviation

You have also asked what is the U.S. Government's policy with respect to international terrorism in the civil aviation context. The statutory guidelines in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, which deal with illegal seizure of aircraft (i.e., hijacking) obviously do not apply in this case.

Our 1948 aviation agreement with Chile contains a provision for revoking the permit of a Chilean airline that fails to comply with U.S. laws and regulations pertaining to: (a) the admission to or departure from U.S. territory of the airline's aircraft; (b) the operation and navigation of the aircraft within U.S. territory; and (c) the admission to or departure from U.S. territory of passengers, crew, or cargo (i.e., regulation on entry, clearance, immigration, passport, customs, and quarantine). Unless there is an established use of aviation for an illegal act, therefore, we would not terminate operations. The determination of whether or not a violation of U.S. law or regulation actually occurs must be made by the agency responsible for enforcing the particular law or regulation in question. Once a determination is made that an airline has violated U.S. laws or regulations, the responsible U.S. agency must determine what punitive action should be taken against that airline.

We have never unilaterally abrogated an aviation agreement. Even where there has been mutual agreement to suspend services, we have left the basic agreement in place for future use. However, and with particular reference to the Chilean airline, LAN-Chile, the U.S. Government in the present political context has not agreed to the request for additional authority which that airline made in July 1979 and which, if approved, would have permitted LAN-Chile to fly to Los Angeles. We also decided not to enter at this time into negotiation of a new bilateral air transport agreement with the Chilean Government.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

[2] Orlando Letelier was Chilean Ambassador to the U.S. during the Allende period. He and his coworker, Ronni Moffitt (a U.S. citizen), were killed in Washington, D.C., in Sept. 1976 by a bomb attached to their car. ■

U.S.-Mexican Relations

by Robert Krueger

Statement before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 26, 1980. Ambassador at Large Krueger is U.S. Coordinator for Mexican Affairs.[1]

Since Mexico and the United States are intricately entwined by a host of linkages and interrelationships, the domestic problems of one country often have considerable impact on the other. Mexico presents a particular challenge to the U.S. Government because the issues have both foreign and domestic implications and a plethora of domestic interest groups and government agencies are affected.

President Carter marked the importance he attaches to U.S.-Mexican relations by inviting the Mexican President to make the first state visit under the

Carter Administration. During this February 1977 visit the two Presidents agreed to establish the U.S.-Mexico Consultative Mechanism to better manage the relationship through cooperation and consultation on a broad range of issues. At their meeting in February 1979 the two Presidents directed that the Consultative Mechanism be reorganized and strengthened and that it focus on energy, trade, finance, industry, tourism, migration, border cooperation, and law enforcement.

The President subsequently named me to be U.S. Coordinator for Mexican Affairs and Executive Director of the Consultative Mechanism. Under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State, I direct U.S. participation in the Consultative Mechanism and work closely with our new Ambassador to Mexico, Dr. Julian Nava.

Several sharp differences over aspects of the Iranian crisis gave rise at the end of 1979 to a public perception of deterioration in U.S.-Mexican relations. In fact, relations with Mexico under the reorganized Consultative Mechanism have been quite positive in recent months with the natural gas agreement and a third successful presidential visit last September and in 1980 with a natural disasters agreement; a major sale to Mexico of U.S. agricultural commodities formerly earmarked for the Soviet Union; agreement of a joint marine pollution contingency plan and the final capping of the runaway Ixtoc I oil well; progress on border sanitation agreements; progress on a revised treaty on the return of stolen vehicles and aircraft; expanded air routes and increased tourism as a result of a new, broad civil aviation agreement; and continued close cooperation on narcotics control.

The main issues in our relationship include trade, energy, migration, and border affairs. I would like to describe the current status of those issues and also say something about tourism, narcotics cooperation, the problem of stolen vehicles, and Mexico's more active role in multilateral and regional questions, particularly in Central America.

Trade

Trade with Mexico, our fifth trading partner, is assuming increasing economic and political significance. According to Department of Commerce statistics, total U.S. trade with Mexico in 1979 reached a record $18.7 billion—an increase of 46% over 1978. Since the United States is Mexico's largest source of imports and its major export market, our trade policy actions have a heavy impact on the Mexican economy.

Our trade relations with Mexico are in a state of uncertainty, resulting from the recent Mexican decision not to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This decision nullified the agreement on tariff concessions which we concluded with Mexico last December under the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) after 5 years of tough negotiations. Mexico's nonadherence to the code of conduct on subsidies/countervailing duties will encourage countervailing duty petitions by U.S. industry. The bilateralization of our trade with Mexico will doubtless require protracted trade negotiations.

We look forward to continued expansion in trade with Mexico, but it appears that the growth may be slower than what might have been expected with GATT adherence and the MTN agreement. While we would have preferred to deal with our important trade with Mexico in a multilateral and technical context through the GATT, we await Mexican proposals for bilateral trade negotiations with much interest.

Energy

Mexico's large oil and gas reserves—50 billion barrels proven and 200 billion potential—are its most important and readily exploitable resource. Given our geographic proximity, the United States is the logical market for Mexican hydrocarbons, and last year we imported over 80% of Mexico's oil exports. However, in response to domestic concerns that Mexico is becoming overly dependent on the United States, the Mexican Government is seeking to diversify its energy customers. While our percentage will decrease in the future, planned Mexican production increases should result in somewhat greater oil imports to the United States this year and next (up to 730,000 barrels per day).

In September 1979 the United States and Mexico finally reached agreement on a natural gas deal for which negotiations began in 1977. Shipments amounting to 300 million cubic feet per day began in early 1980.

We understand Mexico's objectives of

MEXICO—A PROFILE

Geography

Area: 764,000 sq. mi.
Capital: Mexico City (Mexico, DF—pop. 8.6 million, 1978 est.)

People

Population: 69 million (1979 est.).
Ethnic Groups: Indian-Spanish (*mestizo*) 60%, American Indian 30%, Caucasian 9%.
Education: Years compulsory—9, percentage attendance—65%, literacy—75%.
Health: Infant mortality rate—73 per 1,000 (US=17/1,000), life expectancy—62 yrs.

Government

Type: Federal republic.
Independence: First proclaimed September 16, 1810; Republic established 1822.
Date of Constitution: February 5, 1917.
Branches: *Executive*—President (Chief of State and Head of Government). *Legislative*—bicameral. *Judicial*—Supreme Court, local and Federal systems.
Political Parties: Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN), Popular Socialist Party (PPS), Authentic Party of the Revolution (PARM), Socialist Workers Party (PST), Mexican Democratic Party (PDM), and Mexican Communist Party (CPM).

Principal Government Officials

Mexico: President—Jose **Lopez Portillo**; Minister of Government (Interior)—Enrique **Olivares** Santana; Minister of Foreign Relations—Jorge **Castaneda**; Ambassador to the United States—Hugo B. **Margain**.
United States: Ambassador to Mexico—Julian Nava; U.S. Coordinator for Mexican Affairs—Ambassador at Large Robert Krueger.

Economy

GDP: $120 billion (1979 est.).
Annual Growth Rate: 8% (1979 est.).
Per Capita GDP: $1,800 (1979 est.).
Agriculture: *Products*—corn, coffee, sugarcane, vegetables.
Industry: *Types*—food processing, chemical, basic metal and metal product, petroleum.
Trade: *Exports of goods*—$8.9 billion (1979): manufactured goods, petroleum, and agricultural products (coffee, cotton, fruits and vegetables). *Partners*—U.S. (69%), the European Community, and Japan. *Imports of goods*—$12.1 billion: machinery, equipment, industrial vehicles, intermediate goods. *Partners:* United States (63%), the European Community, and Japan.
Average Exchange Rate: 22.5 pesos=U.S. $1.00 (1980).

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military, economic, and political actions, and working in close cooperation with our allies, our friends in the Gulf, and key states in the broader region.

Economic and political measures we and our allies have taken to bring home to the Soviets the cost of intervention in Afghanistan are part of this response. The Gulf countries, in their own Islamic context, have led international efforts to obtain Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Other industrial democracies have joined us in intensified efforts to support two key neighboring states which are deeply concerned about Soviet intentions in the region—Turkey and Pakistan. Gulf governments have indicated their desire to assist and cooperate with these countries. We are also seeking to provide the states of the region with an improved defense capability of their own.

We have made significant sacrifices to transfer scarce resources into a strengthened global military capability and continue to work with our allies in the common task of maintaining a military balance which will deter Soviet intervention in the Gulf or elsewhere. We and our NATO allies are proceeding with actions in Europe to buttress Western strength vis-a-vis the Soviets, while we also direct resources and military capabilities toward the Persian Gulf to establish the capacity to deter there as well.

Because of its strategic location and its critical resources, the Gulf is inescapably a factor in the global balance. Our ability to maintain that balance requires a capability to project effective force toward the region for the purpose of confronting aggressors and safeguarding the integrity of its nations. We are determined that the Gulf will be secure against outside interference. In his State of the Union address the President made this point clearly when he said:

> An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

The logistics of maintaining this deterrent capability requires cooperation from friendly states in the region. For one-third of a century we have maintained a military presence in the Gulf and our deployed forces have had access to logistic support facilities. Our continued ability to contribute to the security of the region greatly depends upon such access.

In order to carry out this policy in the region, we have undertaken several initiatives. In response to the destabilizing situation and Soviet pressures in the general region, we have significantly increased our naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Further, we are improving our capability to surge forces into the area by organizing the rapid deployment force (RDF) and by improving our airlift and sealift forces to move the RDF more quickly. In addition, we have sought and are seeking selective and limited access to air and naval facilities in the area, such as Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. We are also upgrading facilities in the area, such as Diego Garcia.

These facilities are to support our peacetime presence, periodic exercises and deployments, and to allow us to move more significant forces into the area if necessary. We seek no bases. Our cooperative arrangements fully respect the sovereignty of the cooperating states, and of their neighbors. Such cooperation reflects the realism and strategic grasp of governments determined to preserve their own independence and to foster a secure regional environment.

Soviet-Supported Aggression. Over the years, Gulf governments have been concerned about Soviet military support for and political influence in radical neighboring states with aggressive policies. In the last decade the Marxist regime in South Yemen, strongly backed and heavily armed by the Soviets, fought border actions against Saudi Arabia, supported the insurgency in Oman's Dhofar Province, and last year invaded North Yemen. The Soviet position in Ethiopia, combined with a prominent Soviet role in South Yemen, increases the vulnerability of the Bab-al-Mandab/Red Sea access and intensifies the concern of the Gulf countries. Cubans and East Germans are actively engaged in supporting Soviet efforts in the area.

All six Arabian Peninsula countries on the Gulf seek harmonious relations

United Arab Emirates—A Profile

Geography

Area: About 32,000 sq. mi. (about the size of Maine). **Capital:** Abu Dhabi (pop. 300,000). **Other Cities:** Dubai, Sharjah.

People

Population: 900,000 (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 8% (1979). **Ethnic Groups:** Arab, Iranian, Pakistani, Indian (less than 25% of the population are U.A.E. citizens). **Religions:** Muslim (90%), Hindu, Christian. **Languages:** Arabic (official); Farsi and English widely spoken.

Government

Type: Federation of Emirates. **Date of Independence:** Dec. 2, 1971. **Date of Provisional Constitution:** Dec. 2, 1971. **Branches:** *Executive*—7-member Supreme Council of Rulers which elects President and Vice President. *Legislative*—40-member National Consultative Council. *Judicial*—secular legal codes being introduced; Islamic law influential. **Political Parties:** None. **Suffrage:** None.

Economy

GDP: $16 billion (1979). **Annual Growth Rate:** 5% (1979 est.). **Per Capita Income:** $16,000 (1979 est.). **Inflation Rate:** 15%. **Natural Resource:** Oil. **Agricultural Products:** Vegetables, dates, limes. **Industries:** Light manufactures, petroleum. **Trade (1979):** *Exports*—$55.5 billion: petroleum. *Imports*—$13.1 billion: machinery, consumer goods, food. *Partners*—Western Europe, Japan, U.S. **Official Exchange Rate:** 1 dirham=US$0.26. **Economic Aid Received:** None. **Economic Aid Sent:** $3.5 billion (1974–78).

Membership in International Organizations

U.N., Arab League, OPEC, OAPEC.

Principal Government Officials

United Arab Emirates: President and Ruler of Abu Dhabi—Shaikh Zayid bin Sultan al Nuhayan; Vice President, Prime Minister, and Ruler of Dubai—Shaikh Rashid bin Said al-Maktum; Minister of Foreign Affairs—Ahmad Khalifa al-Suwaidi; Ambassador to the U.S.—Vacant. **United States:** Ambassador to the U.A.E.—William D. Wolle.

with all their neighbors. Their basic policy has been to foster a sense of common purpose among Arab and Islamic nations which finds no room for Soviet intervention.

This policy is supportive of our own desire to see the Gulf peoples preserve peace and tranquility. We are encouraged by signs that Iraq has developed a greater harmony with Arab neighbors on the Gulf. We have noted the emergence of a new leadership in South Yemen and will watch carefully for tangible indications it might come to live in peace and perhaps in cooperation with its neighbors.

As elsewhere in the Middle East, we stand ready to work with others in the region to ease tensions where our help is beneficial. Our political and military supply efforts and deployments in response to last year's Yemen war manifested this intent.

But if Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors are to be secure from Soviet-backed military threat or the political pressure such threat can bring to bear, they must have a modern defense capability. Our security assistance to these countries is a significant factor in providing this capability and a key element in our overall relationship with them. Our peacetime military presence in the region is an additional element in assuring the security of the area.

Over the years we have had an important role in assisting Saudi Arabia to develop a modern defense capability. Over the last decade we have played a significant part in Kuwait's defense program. In recent years we have demonstrated our willingness to be supportive of the defense requirements of the other Gulf states.

Our arms policy toward the region is consistent with our worldwide approach to providing military equipment and training. Our arms sales to all six states are designed not to seek short-range political or commercial gains by loading them with unsuitable or excessive equipment but rather to help provide them with an appropriate and effective national defense. In this effort we do not wish an exclusive role and welcome the contribution of our industrialized allies and of governments in the region, such as Jordan, which can assist in various ways.

Regional Conflict. The atmosphere in which the Gulf states seek their future is influenced by rivalries, tensions, and violence in the wider region—in the Arab/Israel dispute, in Lebanon, in parts of Africa, and, closer to home, in the current tension between Iraq and Iran and South Yemeni pressures on neighbors. The Gulf states recognize clearly the need to defuse these tensions. Our own policy remains dedicated to this objective. In some cases we can play a significant role, at times working together with Gulf countries. In other situations, such as the tension between Iraq and Iran, our concern exceeds our ability to influence events. We welcome whatever influence the Gulf states can bring to bear in removing the source of regional tension.

Externally Supported Subversion and Internal Threats. No catalogue of possible threats to the Gulf states would be complete without acknowledging that there is widely publicized concern about threats from within. That outside forces seek to subvert these states is a matter of public record. The Gulf states face a number of challenges, some resulting from the very progress they have made.

The modernization process itself brings change to traditional societies.

The large influx of foreign workers—so necessary to implement their national development programs—has given most Gulf states a work force more foreign than "native." This raises the long-term problem of the claims of foreign residents on the society.

The leadership in these countries has shown wisdom and concern for human development in the use of oil wealth. In the years ahead, however, they are likely to be faced with continuing internal pressures to assure various elements of society a fair share and a meaningful role. Insuring a meaningful role for the unusually large percentage of young people in these societies, all of them with access to education, is a special challenge.

Having made progress in establishing government institutions, these states face the challenge of maintaining sensitive contact with their peoples and of developing institutions which will carry their traditional social harmony over into the modern era.

Since the Iranian revolution the attitude of minority Shi'a communities in many of the Gulf societies has been of concern. Propaganda from Tehran urges Shi'a residents to oppose the monarchial Gulf regimes and their Western ties. The Gulf states wish to maintain decent relations with Tehran. They desire a reduction of tensions between the United States and Iran as a means of fostering regional tranquility.

We will not interfere in the internal affairs of any country. We have, however, through both official and private channels,

Oman—A Profile

Geography

Area: 115,800 sq. mi. (about the size of Kansas). **Capital:** Muscat (pop. NA).

People

Population: 860,000 (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** NA. **Ethnic Groups:** Arab, Baluchi, East African, Indian, Pakistani. **Religions:** Muslim, some Hindus. **Languages:** Arabic (official), English, Farsi, Urdu, Indian dialects.

Government

Type: Absolute monarchy; sultan rules through ministries and other government agencies. **Constitution:** None. **Branches:** *Executive*—Sultan. *Legislative*—None. *Judicial*—Traditional Islamic judges and a nascent civil court system. **Political Parties:** None. **Suffrage:** None.

Economy

GDP: $3.4 billion (1979 est.). **Per Capita GDP:** $3,934 (1978 est.). **Inflation Rate:** 8% (1979 est.). **Natural Resources:** Oil, some copper, asbestos, marble, limestone. **Agricultural Products:** Dates, alfalfa, wheat, bananas, coconuts. **Industries:** Petroleum, fish, construction. **Trade (1979 est.):** *Exports*—$2.3 billion: oil. *Imports*—$1.4 billion: machinery and transportation equipment, food and live animals, mineral fuels, tobacco. *Partners*—Japan, U.K., U.A.E., West Germany, U.S., Netherlands. **Official Exchange Rate:** Omani rial=US$2.90. **Economic Aid Received:** *Total*—NA. *U.S.*—as of 1979, U.S. aid consisted of a small Peace Corps program and a small reimbursed Federal Aviation Administration program.

Membership in International Organizations

U.N. and several of its specialized agencies, Arab League, INTELSAT.

Principal Government Officials

Oman: Sultan, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Finance—Qaboos Bin Said; Minister of State for Foreign Affairs—Qais Abdul-Munim Al-Zawawi; **Ambassador to the U.S.**—Sadek Jawad Sulaiman; **United States:** Ambassador to Oman—Marshall W. Wiley.

so organize his agencies as to enable him to make foreign policy in a way which he finds useful, convenient, and comfortable. One ought not to think of foreign policy being made by anyone but the President of the United States. And how he organizes his assistants is for him to decide, and each President will do it in a different way. Nevertheless, even within those limits it seems to me the President would be wise to include in the formulation of doctrines like this, advice from the State Department because of its foreign policy implications which your questions obviously suggest.

Q. Let's stay for awhile in the strategic field. The Republican Party and Reagan called for military and nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. What do you think of that?

A. I think it is unthinkable. I think it is totally inconsistent with the notion of arms control because if we were to achieve nuclear superiority and then seek an arms control treaty, it is inconceivable to me that the Russians would sign a treaty that froze them into a position of nuclear inferiority. That proposition seems so obvious on its face that it must have been obvious when that Republican plank was written.

And the reverse is also true. We would not sign a treaty which froze us into nuclear inferiority. So that that prescription of nuclear superiority is a prescription for an uncontrolled escalating arms race with enormous costs in terms of greater insecurity for the superpowers and others and also enormous costs for the tax payers of both countries.

I might add incidentally that this concern of mine—it is obvious to me that our NATO allies place a high value on arms control not only with respect to central systems but theater nuclear systems as well. So it seems to me that that policy on the part of the Republican platform raises an issue of serious concern to the alliance that could weaken our alliance ties.

Q. Since you are talking of the allies, President Carter pointed to the unity of the Atlantic alliance Sunday and quite frankly many observers here or in Europe think also of the why and what kind of basis can you claim unity to the point that it was claimed by President Carter.

A. Let me turn your question around a little bit. The United States is 50 States and 220 million people. Now by unity, you mean unanimity? Obviously, in a free society this is not unanimity. Within your own country there is more than one political party, and you pursue unity in terms of national goals but there is not unanimity, not at least from my perception of France. And even within Europe, excluding the United States, there are differences of opinion and yet you strive for unity in the European Community and in other fora. So unity ought not to be overplayed. I mean unity of purpose is an important thing but disagreements as to the ways for achieving those purposes may be a healthy thing.

Now with respect to NATO's primary objective, which is the defense of NATO territory, I think the alliance has never been in a stronger position. When one looks back to the days of the Mansfield amendment, when I was then a Member of the Senate, and Senator Mansfield failed by less than a handful of votes in getting the Senate to adopt that proposition which would have involved the total withdrawal of American forces from Europe to the present time when the alliance is committed, among other things, to 3% real growth each year, in real terms, to modernization of theater nuclear weapons, to a more flexible NATO defense which will enable the United States to deploy its forces outside the NATO territory if our common interests were jeopardized outside that territory. Now these are, I think, significant improvements in NATO defense and significant commitments to NATO defense.

So within that alliance territory perspective there has been, I think, better performance on the part of all countries, including the United States and France and so on, than previously.

With respect to issues that arise outside the NATO territory, one positive development that has taken place is a growing appreciation of the need to find some way to consult on such issues more effectively. I have heard that idea expressed by Francois-Poncet, by Genscher, by myself, by other Foreign Ministers, by the Japanese Foreign Minister, and so on, and it is important to do so. Afghanistan is such an issue.

Q. Have you any idea at this point how this kind of consultation could work?

A. I think to suggest a framework at this point might destroy the suggestion. I think that at the present time, we do it not as effectively as some would like through the NATO structure, to some extent through the United Nations where there are opportunities for meetings on bilateral and multilateral bases independent of the United Nations. So we have ad hoc possibilities for consultation that many of us would like to see institutionalized, but no one yet has come up with a suggestion.

Q. Are you still frustrated, as you said during your first press conference, by the independent voice of France?

A. There are frustrations with this job, and I have heard other foreign ministers express them. But I say that overall I think that the opportunity to deal with the diverse world on a global basis and to discuss its problems and approaches to it with men of the capabilities that I have encountered in NATO and elsewhere is an intellectually stimulating exercise; frustrations from time to time, challenges from time to time.

Each country has it's own interests to protect, and I think I have a slightly different perspective on how to take that pursuit of national interests in the context of establishing a common point of view, and struggling with that I think is a stimulating challenge, and I enjoy it on the whole. I like my colleagues in the NATO alliance; I have enjoyed working with them, and my instinct is that on the whole they seek positive solutions.

Q. Fifty-two Americans have been held hostage in Iran for more than 9 months now. Can this situation last until the election day, for example? Do you plan any new initiative?

A. We continue to pursue the option of quiet diplomacy through all of the channels that are made available to us by our friends, by our allies, by nongovernmental sources. We have been undertaking, in these indirect ways, to persuade the emerging powers in Iran that it is in Iran's self-interest to get the hostage situation behind it. We have been waiting for the emergence of effective governmental authority in Iran without which the decision to release the hostages or even to create a dialogue of negotiation has been very difficult. With the appointment of a new Prime Minister, perhaps we are close to that second objective.

With respect to the first, there has been a growing appreciation of the need to get the decision behind us, and, increasingly, various elements in Iran have identified the Parliament as the

place where the decision will be made. And once the Parliament is fully constituted with a Prime Minister and a Cabinet as well as a President, then it seems to me we'll know how soon we can begin to get to grips with the problem finally.

. . . .

RADIO[2]

. . . .

Q. Recently you complained about the fact that you learned through the press the change of nuclear policy of President Carter. So we got the impression that there was a lack of coordination at the White House at the same time that many Europeans complain about the lack of firmness, the lack of leadership of President Carter. Are you very satisfied with the Administration you work for?

A. You have implied a lot of questions. As I perceive Europe I see differences of opinion. I don't see the alliance countries always agreeing with each other or each other's policies, and yet the alliance is strong and it is strong in part because of confidence demonstrated in President Carter's leadership. It was President Carter's leadership which led to the decision to increase NATO defense spending in real terms by 3% a year. It was his leadership that led to the decision to deploy modernized theater nuclear weapons, at the same time asking for talks on limiting theater nuclear weapons for the Russians. It was his leadership which prompted the NATO Defense Ministers to begin planning for a more flexible defense of Europe which would enable the United States to deploy its forces elsewhere in the area if needed. These surely are not signs of lack of confidence in President Carter's leadership.

With respect to the decision here on nuclear strategy, it is a fact that the State Department's participation in the development of that strategy has been minimal. That's a fact that I have learned since last week, and I think it should be comprehensive, for the foreign policy implications are obvious and evident in the fact that you asked me the question. And yet our European friends ought not to overlook the fact that, after all, it is the President who is constitutionally the foreign policymaker. And he was not excluded from this policymaking. The State Department apparently was to an extent that it shouldn't have been. The question that was raised really is not a complaint on my part, it's not personal on my part. I just think that the President's ability to deal with that sort of policy would be enhanced if the State Department as well as the Defense Department and the National Security Council were involved. I suspect from now on it may be.

Q. Last May, a few days after your trip to Vienna, you harshly complained about the Europeans and especially about the French political initiatives toward the Soviet Union. How would you qualify today the French foreign policy and its relationship to the United States?

A. I think that my complaint was very limited and had to do more with consultation than with the fact of the meeting. And I raised the question of consultation somewhat with tongue in cheek because I had been pretty severely lectured in Europe about the lack of American consultation of allies only to learn on my return here that we had not been consulted on that. So we both have something to learn about the importance of consultation, and I thought I made the point relatively gently but I think it stuck and I expect that we'll have better consultation in the future.

Q. But how would you qualify the Franco-American relationship today and the exchange of views?

A. I think that you French are in a better position to qualify that. I think there is a lot of residual goodwill for the French people here going back to the Revolution and our historic ties. In my own State, about 25% of our people are of French extraction—French Canadian mostly. And so there is that.

The special French trait of seeking an independent position for the sake of being independent is sometimes frustrating to us, but on the other hand there have been evidences of French cooperation that are important. So, the French have captured the knack of getting special attention by acting in a specially different way, and I suppose all countries seek to find that way. The United States, being a superpower, gets attention by virtue of that fact which I suspect is frustrating to our European friends at the same time that they understand and support the value of our collaboration.

Q. How do you view the attitude of Mr. Brezhnev using France, and especially President Giscard d'Estaing, very often as a sort of mediator between the Eastern and the Western world? Does it hurt you quite a lot?

A. It all depends upon what the French response is. I think looking at it one way, if as a result of those contacts Mr. Brezhnev comes away impressed with the fact of alliance unity on a particular issue, then to get it from two or three different countries is a useful kind of thing.

If, however, as a result he succeeds in dividing the alliance on an important issue then the result is negative. I don't think we should prejudge such contacts as being either negative or positive but seek rather by consultation to insure to the maximum extent possible that we are moving in a common direction.

Q. Do you really believe that during the Venice Summit that the Soviets were withdrawing the 10,000 troops when everybody knows that for 3 weeks before they sent 10,000 more?

A. We tried to take it at face value because we knew that our friends wanted to show that we weren't totally negative on it. But we really did not find that there was anything more than some redeployment of about 5,000 troops from within Afghanistan to the Afghanistan border, and it involved units that were not particularly valuable to the kind of fighting that was going on.

Q. Let's come back to the U.S. hostages in Iran. How do the negotiations go now between Washington and Tehran, and do you have any hope to have the hostages freed before next November, especially after the nomination of a new Prime Minister, Mr. Mohammad Ali Rajai?

A. There is no way of setting a date, and if one were to do so it could prove very unfortunate in raising expectations. Nevertheless, the development to which you refer—the election of a Prime Minister and a gradual emergence of the formal government in Iran—at least moves us closer to the day when there will be somebody in authority—somebody with the authority. Khomeini himself has said that the Parliament will settle this issue. The hardliners have said that the Parliament will settle this issue. And others have said that the Parliament will settle this issue. So once the Parliament is constituted, it is our hope and we'll try to build on that hope through all the diplomatic channels made available to us by our allies and others in order to shape the decision and the terms which will eventually resolve in the release of the hostages.

When I met with Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada in Venice, we agreed that one of the potential cooperative projects—one that could be most meaningful to both our countries—was the Alaska natural gas transportation system. I am very pleased that today the Canadian Government has announced its willingness to move forward on this vast project by approving the construction of the first major segment of what is intended eventually to be a 4,800-mile pipeline from Prudhoe Bay in Alaska through British Columbia and Alberta to the heartland of the United States.

This first segment, approved today by the Canadian Government, will enable U.S. consumers in 33 States to begin receiving additional natural gas from Canada by 1981, replacing 200,000 barrels a day of crude oil, even before the Alaskan and northern Canadian portions of the pipeline are completed. Eventually, too, Canadian natural gas from the north will be able to flow to consumers in Canada.

The entire project, which I approved in 1977, is intended to be completed in 1985 and will bring about 2.4 billion cubic feet of Alaskan natural gas to U.S. consumers each day, replacing more than 400,000 barrels of foreign oil. Prudhoe Bay natural gas represents 10% of our nation's reserves.

I have today sent a letter to Prime Minister Trudeau expressing our confidence that this project will be carried forward to completion and become an example to the world of how international cooperation can serve the common energy needs of both partners. Both Houses of Congress have recently passed resolutions of support for the Alaska pipeline, and I have been able to provide several specific assurances to Prime Minister Trudeau on our commitment as a nation to this joint project.

The pipeline is one of the most complex and demanding energy ventures ever undertaken. When completed, it will be a major element in our transition to a more diversified and secure energy economy.

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[1]Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 21, 1980. ■

Thai-Cambodian Border Situation

by Morton I. Abramowitz

Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 29, 1980. Mr. Abramowitz is U.S. Ambassador to Thailand.[1]

I am pleased to be here today and to have this opportunity to talk with you on the situation along the Thai-Cambodian border and in Cambodia. I have welcomed this committee twice in Bangkok and genuinely hope to see it again in Bangkok at an early time. It is important for our own interests that we understand what is happening in Indochina; it is important that Thailand and the other members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) know that we are deeply interested and concerned about what is going on in the region and are prepared to play a constructive role there. Our continued involvement in Khmer relief remains a life or death matter for the Khmer people.

Let me briefly review the principal elements of the present situation.

Present Situation

The Vietnamese in December 1978—3 weeks after creating their Heng Samrin puppet authority—invaded Cambodia, quickly took Phnom Penh, and drove on to the Thai border. In the process, the country's population was dislocated and the 1979 harvest doomed, with consequences starkly seen in subsequent months of hunger and refugee wanderings. The Vietnamese forces, however, have failed to destroy the Khmer Rouge and other small resistance efforts, such as Son Sann's Cambodian nationalist movement.

The Vietnamese Army has garrisoned Cambodia with about 180,000 troops and perhaps 20,000 more support personnel. They impose authority in the name of Heng Samrin on all the key cities and along the main roads. Insecurity and conflict are most prevalent in the stretch of Cambodian territory along the Thai border. There Khmer Rouge and Son Sann units carry out their struggle against Vietnamese forces, taking advantage of rugged territory and a porous, often poorly marked border that is unsealable by either side.

We have little good information on the composition of the Democratic Kampuchean or Pol Pot forces. We do not know their strength but realistic estimates range from 20,000 to 40,000. Their forces, badly decimated in 1979, have recovered. They are a cohesive, disciplined fighting force with strong organization and good communications. They are concentrated along the border on the Cambodian side but with some strength far into the interior of Cambodia. Given the bloody history of their short rule in Cambodia it is questionable whether they can recruit more forces. They hope to capitalize on Khmer nationalism and the strong anti-Vietnamese sentiments of the Khmer people. The Son Sann forces total about 5,000 and have focused more on political proselytizing than fighting.

The Thai-Cambodian border is roughly divisible into four segments of military activity.

- The most active combat is taking place in Khmer Rouge-dominated area south of the Thai border town of Aranyaprathet anchored on Phnom Melai on the north and extending into the Cardamon Mountains in the south.
- The southwestern corner, where the Thai border meets the sea, is also an area of Khmer Rouge operations and presents considerable security problems for the Vietnamese, who have not extended strong control over Koh Kong Province and the shoreline.
- The northern border of Cambodia is a sparsely populated area with the border formed by mountains sharply dropping to the Cambodian plain. Its rugged territory provides protection for both Khmer Rouge and small Son Sann units.
- The less-rugged land north of Aranyaprathet has received most of the news coverage. Here are intermingled over 100,000 refugees with small numbers of petty Khmer Serei warlords (mostly a collection of ragtag anti-Vietnamese units who have spent more time fighting each other than the Vietnamese and profiteering on the relief effort), one substantial Khmer Rouge area (Phnom Chat), and the bases of Son Sann's forces. The Vietnamese have sought with limited success to

strike at military opportunities here and, until the Mak Mun incursion, exercised considerable restraint with respect to the civilian concentrations which are no military threat.

Recent Incursion

The most dramatic recent event has been the Vietnamese incursion into Thailand June 23. Our best reconstruction of that event is as follows. Early that day the Vietnamese sent several hundred troops into the Thai village of Ban Non Mak Mun, enveloping the perhaps 20,000-person refugee concentration, Camp 204, on the border east of that Thai village. Elements of three Vietnamese regiments were involved in the full operation—one in a blocking position just north of the attack point; the other just south, while the third, in the center, provided most of the troops which moved against the refugees and the Thai village.

A newly dug antitank trench, located between the border and the Thai village, was crossed by the Vietnamese, who thus could have no question about their location. The nearest Thai Army unit responded quickly, but the platoon was ambushed on the road to the village with heavy casualties. By midmorning the Thai moved against the Vietnamese positions using artillery support and air force helicopters and planes. The Vietnamese withdrew from the village that afternoon, and some fighting continued in the area until the 24th. Thereafter, the two sides disengaged but exchanged mortar and artillery fire for another day.

Intelligence indicates that Vietnamese commanders told their troops they would be going into Thailand, that they would stay for a well-defined if short space of time, and that they would contest, if necessary, Thai army efforts to move into the area they occupied. It seems, therefore, that the operation was planned in advance and not a result of vague demarcation of the border, hot pursuit, or local initiative.

I would emphasize that this was not a major military action. It did not extend over a large area, the number of Vietnamese involved was limited, and they employed no armor or air. In short, it was an incursion not an invasion.

Nevertheless, an armed incursion is not a trifling matter. Consider if such an incident had happened along the demilitarized zone in Korea with the casualties involved—22 for the Thais and 86 Vietnamese killed and one captured, according to the Thais. The greatest sufferers were actually the Khmer refugees caught in the artillery crossfire. It appears that some hundred were killed, several hundred wounded, and thousands forced from the camp into the interior. Overall, the major significance of the event lies in its demonstration of Vietnamese disregard for Thai sovereignty and its disruption of refugee congregations.

The U.S. response to the Vietnamese incursion was swift and welcomed by the Thai. Secretary Muskie's condemnation of Vietnamese action and support for Thailand was unambiguous. I myself called on the Vietnamese Foreign Minister visiting in Bangkok and underlined our deep concern and our ties to Thailand. We also made strong representations to the Soviet Union. Simultaneously we accelerated delivery of arms purchased by the Thais to defend their borders, providing a timely airlift of howitzers and other items direct to Bangkok. We are continuing close consultation with the Thais on political and military measure appropriate to deter further Vietnamese aggression and strengthen Thailand's defenses. I might note that the question of sending U.S. troops is not at issue, by Thai desires as well as our own assessment of the situation.

Vietnamese leadership appears to have miscalculated the impact of their incursion on ASEAN. Whereas, Hanoi strategy has attempted to sow division among ASEAN, the incursion in June on the eve of the ASEAN ministerial conference in Kuala Lumpur united the ASEAN allies firmly in support of Thailand. That support was reflected in the ASEAN communique which strongly condemned the Vietnamese incursion. The fact that Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach in Jakarta denied that any incursion had occurred underscored the cost to Hanoi's credibility caused by the crossing of Vietnamese Army troops of the second international frontier—for the first time in history—despite repeated promises to the contrary.

While a Vietnamese invasion of deep incursion into Thailand is unlikely, the situation remains very serious. The Vietnamese have mounted in this rainy season a concerted campaign all along the Thai-Cambodian border. Seven Vietnamese divisions—some 60,000 troops—are involved in the effort. They appear to be intent on destroying the Khmer Rouge along the border and at a minimum depriving them of any military initiative during this rainy season. Their efforts raise again the possibility of further incursions into Thailand and action against the restored refugee concentrations. The Foreign Minister of Vietnam swore both publicly and privately in Bangkok in late June that the Vietnamese would not transgress Thai territory. We hope his credibility will not be impaired again.

Plight of Khmer People

Let me now turn to the plight of the Khmer people. Their sufferings and the holocaust visited on them since Pol Pot's rise to power in 1975 are well known to all of you. From your trips to Thailand, many of you are personally familiar with the starvation and disease that wracked the Khmer people in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion. The situation has improved, if far too slowly, since the massive international relief began last November, and we can take pride in our role in that humanitarian endeavor. The United States has been the catalyst and prime contributor to an effort which I believe has thus far saved large numbers of Khmer people. The support of the American people and Congress has been gratifying.

Nevertheless, the situation is still tenuous. The first question remains whether a good portion of the Khmer people will have enough food to eat until the coming harvest some 4 months away. Our interviews over several months of hundreds of Khmer farmers appearing at the Thai border produce a depressingly unanimous response: Rice supplies from the previous harvest—nature conspired with invasion to produce an extremely poor one—have been exhausted.

Relief Efforts

The subject of international assistance is a difficult one to assess. There have been different perceptions of how effectively the programs have been carried out. There have been limitations on both the channels through the Heng Samrin administration in Phnom Penh and across the border. Given the enormity of the requirements and the limited means for achieving delivery, we have sought to maximize the infusions of aid through all channels.

Assistance through Phnom Penh has had myriad problems: the devastation of the infrastructure during the Pol Pot years; lack of vehicles, cargo landing facilities, destroyed bridges, a road net left untended for years; and near total lack of personnel with either the

mains modest—less than 20% of consumption. Further, our sources of supply are concentrated in developed countries, with Canada alone supplying one-half our needs. None of these critical materials could have the economic impact that oil has had on our economy. U.S. petroleum imports were $45 billion in 1977, or 50% of total U.S. imports, as compared to $1 billion for iron ore, the highest value of any industrial raw material outside the energy field.

We are not wholely insulated from the possibility of supply disruptions, particularly in cobalt and chromium. The disruption in the Zairian province of Shaba illustrated the short-term world dependence on that source of cobalt. However, unexploited cobalt reserves are plentiful in many other nations. Also, within this century, we can look forward to a considerable quantity of cobalt mined from the ocean floor. Chromium is likely to be a longer lasting problem, since over time we are likely to become increasingly dependent on South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the U.S.S.R. Fortunately, however, chromium is not that crucial to U.S. interests, and, further, between our strategic stockpiles and private supplies, we have a 5-year reserve. More generally, our ample strategic stockpiles protect us against supply disruption in the event of a national security emergency.

Looking ahead, we will have to increase the level of investment in minerals worldwide in order to insure *adequate* supply in the next century. This may become a major problem, as it currently appears we are underinvesting significantly, and we may, therefore, have to adjust to the higher prices that may be required for the needed investment to be undertaken. However, for the foreseeable future, we in the United States need not fear supply disruption that could severely affect our balance of payments or economic growth.

Europe and Japan are far more dependent than we for their raw materials; Europeans import 75% of their critical commodities and the Japanese 90%. This does not mean that our allies will suffer from supply disruption more frequently than we. As I mentioned before, there are major reasons on the production side that mitigate the likelihood of such disruptions. However, we should not underestimate the psychological impact of such overwhelming reliance on imported raw materials. The fear of supply disruption and of producer cartels is significant enough to influence the foreign and economic policies of our allies.

U.S. Trade Policy

by Harry Kopp

Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee on June 26, 1980. Mr. Kopp is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs.[1]

We have been operating now for several months in the new environment that was created by the conclusion of the MTN [multilateral trade negotiations], the 1979 Trade Agreements Act, and trade reorganization. It is entirely appropriate that we should take stock to see how we are doing. I hope that from these hearings we can get the kind of support and constructive criticism that we need from the Congress to do our job effectively.

The State Department attaches high priority to trade and commodity policies. We play an active role at all levels of the decisionmaking process here in Washington, and our ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and economic officers are regularly involved in trade and commodity policy issues overseas. We give trade this much attention because of its importance in our foreign relations. It is important in three ways.

Trade and the U.S. Economy

First, trade is increasingly important in the U.S. economy. Exports now represent about 8% of our GNP, as compared with 4% 15 years ago. If we exclude services from GNP, they account for more than 20%. That is a remarkable statistic. One-fifth of the goods that we produce are exported. As for imports, I need not elaborate here on the importance of foreign oil and other raw materials to our economy.

While trade with other countries is increasingly important to us, trade with the United States is even more important for other countries. U.S. trade accounts for about 19% of total world trade. For 42 other countries, the United States is the most important export market. These include not only our neighbors—Canada, Mexico, a number of Central American and Caribbean countries—but also major developed and developing countries in other parts of the world—Japan, the U.K., Korea, Israel, India, Singapore, and the Philippines. Because trade with us is so important for these countries, our trade policies are bound to have a strong effect on our overall political—and even security—relations.

Maintaining a Strong Defense

Finally, let me return to the question of national security in the conventional sense—security from physical attack. Our key line of defense here is the vigor of our own economy, including its capacity for technical change, combined with the share of resources we are willing to spend on defense. During the past decade the Soviet Union has spent considerably more on its military forces than has the United States. It is paradoxical that as we become richer, we seem to find greater, not less, difficulty in financing traditional government expenditures, such as national defense. The share of national defense expenditures in our 1979 gross national product was 4.5%, less than one-half of the 9.3% share 20 years ago in 1959, which itself was not an exceptional year in this regard.

More alarming, national defense expenditures in real terms actually fell (after rising in the late 1960s for the Vietnam war) between 1959 and 1979. (It is worth noting here that the other major component of what might be called foreign affairs expenditures—foreign economic assistance—also fell in real terms, by about 7%, between 1959 and 1979.) I find it extraordinary that an economy that has doubled in size during this period finds itself unable or unwilling to spend a bit more on its own security or to help friendly developing countries.

More important in today's world than the quantity of goods and services purchased for national defense is their quality, which above all depends on continual scientific and technical advances. Weapons systems, reconnaissance, communications, etc., are all greatly enhanced by improvements in technology. We must continue to provide adequately for basic research in our universities and research institutions. It is this research which lays the foundation both for improved national security and for technological progress in the civilian economy in future years. Our national security in all of the senses I have described depends heavily on it. ■

For many developing countries, trade in raw materials is the principal economic activity and accounts for the bulk of foreign exchange earnings. The United States is both a major producer and consumer of raw materials, and we are dependent on foreign sources for supplies of many critical commodites. As a result of this convergence of resource interests, commodity issues are a dominant element—if not the dominant element—in our relations with certain developing countries—Bolivia, for example, a major tin producer; or Malaysia, the leading rubber and tin producer; and the Ivory Coast, the biggest producer of cocoa.

In the multilateral setting of the United Nations, moreover, developing countries have made commodity issues a major topic on the agenda of the North-South dialogue. In these discussions, the U.S. objective has been to seek international measures, where feasible, to improve the functioning of commodity markets for the benefit of producers and consumers alike. The International Rubber Agreement, which the Congress recently approved, is a good example of these efforts. This agreement is intended not to manage the rubber market but to help create more stable conditions under which to undertake investment and assure adequate supply. In short, commodity issues can offer opportunities for international cooperation to improve the open market trading system.

When I stress the importance of trade in our foreign relations, I am not advocating that we make unilateral trade concessions for the sake of political harmony. What I do mean is that as a result of the explosion of trade and investment over the past 35 years, the economic links are often the major element in our bilateral relations. The way in which we deal with problems arising from those economic links can significantly affect the overall relationship.

The world trading system works best when each country promotes and defends its interests in a healthy and vigorous way—but does so in accordance with established rules. Differences are normal. When we meet with our major trading partners for periodic bilateral consultations, the agendas are long, and many of the problems are difficult. As long as we deal with the problems responsibly, recognizing the rights, obligations, and vital interests of all parties, no serious damage will be done to our relations. Sudden measures that do not follow the rules of the game, on the other hand, even when they do not provoke retaliation, can have a severely negative impact on our broader relations.

Multilateral Trading System

It was 46 years ago this month that Congress adopted a trade agreements act that marked the beginning of this country's commitment to freer trade. Since the end of World War II and the establishment of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], every Administration has worked hard to strengthen an open world trading system on a multilateral basis. That system has promoted economic efficiency and growth throughout the world. Trade is now the most dynamic sector of the world economy, growing faster than production.

The multilateral trading system—strengthened by the new codes of conduct negotiated in the MTN—is now under enormous pressure because of developments in the world economy. The oil shock of 1979–80 is proving to be at least as severe as the shock of 1973–74. World payments problems are becoming more intractable. The OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] surplus could be as high as $120 billion this year. Even countries like West Germany and Japan are facing trade deficits. Our own deficit could be an all-time high. Governments of industrialized countries are mounting export drives to cover their oil bills. At the same time, they are being urged by domestic constituencies to resort to protectionism to protect sectors where imports are a symptom, not a cause, of economic distress. We cannot afford to succumb to a new wave of protectionism. Neither can Europe, Canada, and Japan. The costs—economic and political—would be incalculable.

Rising energy costs and slow growth in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] are also causing serious problems—perhaps more serious than our own—in developing countries. The oil-importing less developed countries (LDC) as a group are expected to run combined current account deficits on the order of $60 billion in 1980 and comparable amounts in the years immediately thereafter. They face a major challenge in financing these deficits and servicing their debt. Exports are crucial to the ability of these countries to manage their economic problems without reducing economic growth to socially unacceptable levels. Because of the increasing importance of these countries to U.S. trade—they are the most rapidly growing markets for U.S. exports—we have an economic, as well as a political, interest in helping them avoid a downward spiral.

Developing Countries

Our objectives toward developing countries are twofold.

- We want to encourage them, particularly the advanced ones, to rationalize and open up their trade regimes. This is good for our exporters and also for their development. What we are seeking is not only more liberal trading structures but also more stable and predictable ones. A more active and constructive participation by these countries in the GATT system of mutual rights and obligations would also serve our own and their interests.
- Recognizing that trade is necessarily a two-way street, we will need to maintain access to our market and continue to give developing countries the opportunity to earn foreign exchange. Obviously, given our own economic slowdown, as well as the substantial MTN liberalization now being implemented, we will not be able to offer substantial new trade benefits over the next few years. Generally speaking, however, access by LDCs to our market is already very good, although some of the products of greatest interest to developing countries are also those of greatest domestic sensitivity for us—for example, textiles and footwear.

These and related questions in the trade area are some of the most important and controversial issues being discussed internationally in various intergovernmental fora, covered by the shorthand term "North-South dialogue." At a time of growing economic difficulties, we can expect LDCs to express their frustrations vocally and to press strongly for changes in the international economic system to their benefit. Where we can, and where it is in our interest to do so, we will respond positively to the concerns of developing countries; at the same time, however, we recognize that some of the proposals advanced by the Group of 77 would, if adopted, undermine the effective functioning of the international trading system. We will continue to insist on an international trading system in which all countries undertake obligations that are consistent with their economic capabilities and needs.

example, is under 10 acres which makes it inefficient. But nevertheless, there has been very careful treatment of that problem of enlarging those units in order to make the agriculture more efficient.

So there have been a number of ways in which the Poles have been allowed—perhaps because of their history, because of what they are—a greater measure of liberalization than some of the other Eastern bloc countries. That, obviously, has triggered some dissatisfaction—not very visible, I don't think—on their part, but it may, at some point, trigger greater dissatisfaction and lead to pressures for similiar liberalizations within their own countries. That is clearly possible.

Q. We have a new government now appointed by the Prime Minister or Premier in Iran being submitted to the Parliament. Do you see signs that this is going, in any immediate future, to forward the question of the hostages and their release?

A. There are signs that they are beginning to think of actually debating the hostage issue. There are signs of increasing awareness on the part of leaders in various factions that the hostage issue ought to be settled in Iran's interests. There are, of course, signs that there will be responses to initiatives taken on our side from Members of Congress, my own letter to the Prime Minister.

Perhaps in other ways, there are signs that also they are listening to urgings—from other sources, other countries—to settle the hostage issue in their own interest. So it may be that as governmental authorities put together that they will begin to debate the issue, consider the terms on which they are willing to resolve it, and we may find ourselves engaged in a debate or dialogue with them on those terms.

Q. One of the initiatives which you referred to a minute ago was the letter from 187 Members of Congress. They are drafting a reply and as published, at least in the Iranian press, the draft reply suggests a kind of congressional inquiry into the past history of Iranian-American relations and into the question of Iran's legitimate claims, as they put it, for redress on the financial side. Some time ago, you remember, the congressional inquiry was discussed when Congressman [George (Idaho)] Hansen was out there. The Administration, at that time, was very negative about it. Do you have a view now as to whether such a congressional inquiry could be useful in this process?

A. I think it would depend upon its timing and nature as related to the timing for the release of the hostages and other possible terms that might be raised. I think, standing by itself, its value might be lost. I think that when this hostage crisis is over that there will be congressional hearings whether as part of an agreement with the Iranians or not. I can't imagine Congress being insensitive to the usefulness of such an inquiry when it's behind us, but its timing within the timeframe when the question of the release of the hostages is involved has to be very carefully identified.

Q. If the Iranian Parliament, as is now indicated, suggests this to the U.S. Congress as a means of paving the way for the settlement of the hostage problem, do you think it would be a good idea or a bad idea?

A. I think it would depend upon what else is part of that initiative.

Q. You wrote a letter, as you mentioned, to the new Iranian Prime Minister. There have been rumors that in that letter you proposed that you might meet with some representative of their government. Did you, in fact, do that? And what can you tell us about that letter?

A. The letter was consistent with positions that we had taken previously and which were known publicly. That particular subject was not in it. I refer to that only to make it clear that it was not in the letter. But I am not inclined to otherwise characterize the contents of the letter because I think I want to maximize the possibility that the Iranians will respond to that letter on its merits and perhaps initiate a dialogue. It's conceivable that if I were to release the text or characterize it—even though I don't think there are many surprises, if any, in it—that they would regard that as being an affront, and I see no point in risking that.

Q. The last time you were sitting in this chair as a Senator, I think, before you were even invited to become Secretary of State, you said that in the case of American relations with Iran, you would see nothing wrong with admitting things that America had done to Iran because that was part of history, and we might as well admit it; there would be no problem. You were not saying we should take blame or say *mea culpa* but that you saw nothing wrong with admitting American actions to Iran which were part of past history. Is that still your attitude now that you are Secretary of State or—

A. I'm not sure that you have correctly and accurately characterized what I said then, but I remember it quite clearly, and I see nothing wrong with it as I remember it.

Q. You would still be willing to put on the record America's past actions—

A. I think they were part of history.

Q. There have been reports that in order to get the Palestinian autonomy talks going, Prime Minister Begin is willing to forego the moving of his office into East Jerusalem. He may also release some Palestinian prisoners. Are those reports accurate?

A. I've read the transcript of Mr. Linowitz' [Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations] press conference yesterday, and his statement is consistent with my own understanding that what he did was discuss all those issues with both Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadat. Out of his conversations with Mr. Begin and members of the Israeli Parliament—the Knesset—he got very strong impressions which he conveyed to Mr. Sadat and also to Mr. Begin about issues that troubled Mr. Sadat. And on that basis and on the basis of the apprehension of both of those statesmen that the situation might be slipping into a time of great threat to peace in the Middle East, they were prompted to move forward. I am not under the impression that there were specific *quid pro quos* discussed.

Q. There were not?

A. Not. There were very strong impressions conveyed to both sides.

Q. Why then would Mr. Sadat have changed his mind and put himself further out on the limb *vis-a-vis* his Arab brethren by agreeing to return to the talks when, in fact, he had said he would not do so unless some of these things did take place?

A. Mr. Linowitz made this point about as clearly as anyone could. First of all, both Mr. Sadat and Mr. Begin took the opportunity in the statement to which they jointly agreed to as a commitment to the Camp David process as the only viable road to peace. That's a very strong statement for each of them to make at this point, and especially for Mr. Sadat, given some of the questions that have been raised as a result of the frustrating events of recent weeks and months, but they made it. And the second point they made was that the process could not continue effectively unless there was an atmosphere of trust and confidence slowly developed between the two countries.

Q. Reports that there have been Cuban and middle European troops aiding the attempt to subdue the rebels in Afghanistan, do you know of any confirmation or do you believe those reports?

A. I recall only the vaguest of rumors with respect to Cuban involvements, and that's not been verified by any information that's come to my attention.

Q. And middle European forces besides the Russians?

A. I've not even heard rumors to that effect.

Q. You're going up to the U.N. General Assembly meeting this fall, and we understand that you're going to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on, I believe, it is the 25th of this month.

There have been reports that you are going to discuss with Mr. Gromyko the subject that they—the Soviets—are very anxious to discuss and that we have avoided in the recent past; the reduction of nuclear forces in Europe, the theater nuclear forces issue. Is it true? Does that mean that we have decided to go ahead with detente and arms control despite the Soviet presence in Afghanistan?

A. From the beginning we have indicated a desire to discuss theater nuclear weapons limitations with the Russians, and that was the second part of a two-part decision that NATO made last December. NATO decided to deploy the Pershing II missile but, at the very same time, offered to discuss limitations with the Russians.

The Russians delayed for 6 months by imposing a precondition upon discussion, and that is a reversal of the decision to deploy. It was when the Russians dropped that precondition that we agreed to go forward, and they know we have agreed to go forward. It's a question of agreeing on the time and the character of the initial talks which have to be certainly technical and preparatory, and I expect to discuss that with Mr. Gromyko in New York. That may be the only positive development that comes out of that meeting, but is this inconsistent with our policy on Afghanistan? I think not.

I think that both pursuit of arms control and our policies in Afghanistan are designed to impose restraint upon Soviet aggressive intentions. And so they are consistent.

Q. Are you ready to suggest a time as suggested by some news reports for going ahead with these technical preparatory talks, and will it be before November as these reports suggest?

A. I think that's possible. I don't like to try to preempt the question of time from the Soviets, and I don't know what would be convenient for them, but we're willing to go forward as early as possible.

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[1] Press release 247. ■

dian Ocean and are rapidly proceeding with plans to expand our facilities in Diego Garcia.

We have concluded agreements with friendly governments in the area which will increase their capacity to resist Soviet pressure. Some of these agreements will provide us access to facilities that will significantly improve our ability to respond quickly and effectively to provocative actions.

Our response has not occurred in a vacuum. On the diplomatic front we have worked closely with our allies and with other nations concerned by the invasion. No action by a major power has been more quickly or universally condemned, as votes in the United Nations, the European Community, the Islamic conference, and numerous other international bodies testify. Any hopes Moscow may have had that the international community would shrug off the invasion have been shattered.

We boycotted the Moscow Olympics and helped to persuade 59 other countries to take similar action. Countries joining in the boycott included major sports powers such as West Germany, Japan, Canada, and the People's Republic of China. Many participating teams were diluted by individual and federation decisions not to attend. The sweep of medals by the Warsaw Pact countries illustrates the extent to which outstanding Olympic teams from all continents supported the boycott.

Economically we took a number of measures in areas intended to result in substantial costs and disruptions for the U.S.S.R. These included restrictions on exports of grain and other agricultural commodities, phosphates, goods for the Olympics, and high technology items. It is, of course, obvious that any interference with trade would involve costs for the exporting country as well as for the importing country. But under the circumstances it was inappropriate to maintain business as usual.

Some of our actions were clearly punitive in character and intention—designed to get the Soviets to take notice of the strong negative reaction of the United States and other countries. Other actions were a longer term response to a new situation. The Soviet invasion makes it most important that the United States and its allies bolster the countries of Southwest Asia, especially Turkey and Pakistan, and increase the capability of our military forces in the region. We must also reassess the strategic significance of our exports to the U.S.S.R. In this context we have proposed tightening the application of COCOM [Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy] procedures and suggested that COCOM consult on all major process know-how sales of potential military significance.

We believe that our actions have demonstrated to the Soviets that they cannot engage in aggressive actions with impunity. The United States has shown that it is willing to assume a leadership role among our allies and make sacrifices when we are provoked. This demonstration of our readiness to react will help deter future Soviet aggression.

In formulating our response we chose specific measures such as the restrictions on the export of grain and high technology which would impose tangible costs upon the Soviets. We have deliberately avoided sweeping measures such as a total trade embargo. We do not seek a return to the cold war. We wish to leave the door open for rebuilding our economic relations if the Soviet Union withdraws from Afghanistan.

Grain

The partial grain embargo announced by President Carter on January 4 stopped 17 million tons in U.S. grain shipments to the Soviet Union. This action limited exports during the fourth year of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. grains agreement (October 1979-September 1980) to the 8 million tons to which we were committed by that agreement. To compensate for a disastrous harvest, the Soviets had expected to import about 36 million tons, including 25 million tons from the United States. The President also prohibited sales of soybeans and of other agricultural commodities which would contribute to the Soviet livestock sector.

We estimate that, because of our action, grain imports by the Soviets

Secretary Meets With German Foreign Minister

JOINT PRESS STATEMENT, AUG. 26, 1980

Secretary of State Muskie and Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany met on August 26 to continue consultations on matters of importance to their two countries. They agreed that these consultations are particularly useful and necessary at the present time.

Developments in Poland occupied an important part of their talks. They agreed that the issues there are for the Polish people and the Polish Government to settle and that all outside parties should exercise the greatest restraint. Minister Genscher informed the American Government about the considerations which have led the Federal Government to adjourn the meeting between the German Federal Chancellor and the President of the State Council of the G.D.R. [German Democratic Republic], although the will to develop relations with the G.D.R. continues.

Secretary of State Muskie and Minister Genscher reiterated their condemnation of the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and called once again for withdrawal of Soviet troops. With respect to this objective, they consider it necessary to continue to pursue coordinated policies of their countries within the framework of the Atlantic alliance.

They exchanged views on the current state of disarmament negotiations. They underscored the importance of the alliance decision of December 1979 on theater nuclear forces (TNF) and discussed the preparations for preliminary exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union on TNF which, in their view, are expected to occur at an early date.

They discussed the prospects for the Madrid Review Conference of CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] and agreed on the importance of thorough preparations and constructive work to insure a balanced outcome which contributes to East-West cooperation.

The present status of the North-South dialogue and the situation at the 11th U.N. special General Assembly were also discussed.

In conclusion the Secretary of State and the Minister agreed that they should take every possible opportunity to continue these consultations which both countries believe are of great value to them and to the purposes of the NATO alliance.■

will be about 8–9 million metric tons less than they had planned for the year ending September 30. This means that by October the Soviets will have made up only about half of the 17 million metric tons we stopped from the United States. Our actions have forced the Soviets to rely on an unpredictable variety of feed grains and substitutes arriving on an irregular schedule. As a result of our restrictions, and their poor harvest, we expect Soviet meat production in 1980 to drop by 200,000–300,000 tons or 1%–2% below the 1979 level. By January 1981 livestock inventories may be down 2%–3%. Even though the Soviets will have an improved grain crop this year—we now estimate an average harvest of between 200–225 million tons—the continuation of the embargo will curtail Soviet ability to rebuild depleted grain stocks and will make its impact felt on the livestock sector for several years to come. The availability of meat is a very sensitive internal issue in the U.S.S.R. and is considered by Soviet consumers to be one of the most important measuring sticks in gauging improvements in their standard of living. Despite Soviet Government promises of a steady increase, per capita consumption has not risen during the past 5 years. Our partial grains embargo has made it still more difficult for the Soviet leadership to fulfill promises of significant increases in meat availability to Soviet consumers. Reports have been growing of severe meat and dairy product shortages. News reports attributed work stoppages in May at auto and truck plants in the Soviet Union to food shortages.

In addition to its effects on the Soviet economy, the partial grains embargo has proved to be a successful example of allied cooperation in response to the invasion of Afghanistan. Canada, Australia, and the European Community all imposed restraints on their sales to the U.S.S.R., despite serious opposition by some segments of their populations. Australia and the European Community recently agreed to hold 1980–81 grain sales to the U.S.S.R. to the 1979–80 level, while Canada will limit sales to "normal and traditional" levels. Argentina's exports increased to 5.1 million metric tons in 1979–80, as compared to 1.3 million tons in 1978–79. Argentina has agreed to supply the Soviets with 4.5 million metric tons of coarse grains and soybeans under the terms of a recently concluded 5-year agreement. But Argentine sales have not been large enough to offset restraints imposed by the United States and other exporters.

Phosphates

In February we blocked exports to the U.S.S.R. of U.S. origin phosphates, whether in the form of rock, acid, or fertilizer. The phosphate embargo stopped annual U.S. shipments to the U.S.S.R. of about 1 million tons of superphosphoric acid as part of a major 20-year trade agreement. Inability to obtain this phosphoric acid will delay and disrupt Soviet plans to produce a complex liquid fertilizer, since there is no alternative supply for this quantity of superphosphoric acid. Utilization of lower grades of phosphoric acid or conventional phosphatic fertilizers, either from Soviet or foreign sources, could reduce the impact of our embargo. It is too early to see what effect this restriction will have on future Soviet grain output.

High Technology

In January, in the area of high technology, we suspended issuance of new licenses and shipments to the Soviet Union under old licenses, pending the development of a new licensing policy. The most important element of the new policy, which was announced on March 19, is generally to approve no exceptions from agreed COCOM controls on exports to the U.S.S.R. The result of our virtually no-exceptions policy is to cut off U.S. high technology exports to the U.S.S.R. which, for 1979, were valued at $50 million, in large part related to computers. We also increased controls on computers, polycrystalline silicon, lasers, and fiber optics and stopped shipments of spare parts for a computer and of a diesel engine assembly line for the Kama River truck plant.

We tabled proposals in COCOM in March to multilateralize tighter controls on high technology. COCOM review of these proposals has not yet been completed.

The actions we have taken in the area of high-technology transfer have had their impact on the Soviets. They will disrupt Soviet programs. They have also introduced serious uncertainties into the Soviet planning process at a time when the next 5-year plan is in the final stages of elaboration.

Fish

An additional economic measure we have taken has been to withhold from the Soviets the allocation of approximately 300 million tons of fish in the U.S. fishery zone during 1980. This amounts to roughly 5% of the Soviet annual catch, which will be difficult to replace because of worldwide scarcities.

Essential Elements

Where do we go from here? We believe it is essential that we and our allies maintain pressure on the Soviets to let them know they cannot selectively carry out a policy of reduced tensions in one sphere, beneficial to them, while they commit naked acts of aggression in another. We will continue to insist upon a satisfactory political resolution of the crisis which the Soviets have created through their intervention in Afghanistan. As Secretary Muskie noted last month, we believe that a political settlement must contain four essential elements:

- A prompt and complete withdrawal of all Soviet forces;
- Nonintervention in Afghan affairs by any outside state;
- A government acceptable to the Afghan people; and
- An independent and nonaligned Afghanistan.

Until the Soviets make it clear that they are prepared to move in this direction we cannot relax our efforts.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Human Rights in South Africa

by Patricia M. Derian

Statement before the Subcommittees on Africa and International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 13, 1980. Ms. Derian is Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.[1]

The status of human rights in South Africa is a crucial and timely subject for the following reasons:

First, in recent weeks, tens of thousands of colored (mixed racial origin) students have been engaging in a massive school boycott. They are protesting against the inferior education system given them under the white-dominated apartheid system. Several hundred have been detained. The system for the South African black student is even worse.[2]

Second, South Africa's policy of institutionalized and legalized racism is one of the cruelest forms of human rights abuse in the world today. Under the apartheid system, the black, colored, and Asian South African majority suffers pervasive discrimination in all areas of life. Protest against this discriminatory racial system is punishable by law.

Third, apartheid remains among the most persistent human rights abuses before the world community. The United Nations has focused on this issue almost from its inception. Although considerable achievements in combating racial discrimination have taken place in many nations, including our own, there has been rooted resistance to change in South Africa.

Fourth, time is running out for the prospects of peaceful change in that country. Dissatisfaction and resentment on the part of black South Africans have never been more widespread than they are today. As a result of the suppression of the Soweto demonstrations in 1976, several hundred black South Africans died; others fled to neighboring countries in search of military training; others were sentenced to prison terms.

Today's hearings, significantly, focus on the perilous human rights situation in South Africa. I hope that the recommendations resulting from these hearings will contribute to the rapid development of racial equality and respect for all human rights in that country.

LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND PROCEDURES

The subcommittee has addressed several questions to me. The first asks that I identify the South African laws, regulations, and procedures which result in the greatest and most serious violations of human rights in that country.

Apartheid is a system of legalized racism. It is a web of discriminatory laws and practices by which 16% of the population dominate 84% of the population. The Constitution entrenches a white monopoly of political power in a parliament whose membership is all white and elected by whites only. The parliament is the supreme lawmaking authority. Thus, the Constitution itself denies to more than 19 million black as well as colored and Asian South Africans the right to participate in the political process which ultimately governs them.

"Homeland" Policy

The government's "homeland" policy is perhaps the most explosive single issue in South Africa today; the homelands legislation is serving to forcibly relocate substantial numbers of the black population and divest all black South Africans of their citizenship. Black South Africans comprise 72% of the population. The government has designated 13% of the land area as "independent" homelands for this 72% of the population. The 13% of the land designated is generally the less arable and removed in large part from advanced centers of commerce and industry.

In the homelands, there is often neither space nor water to conduct agriculture. There is often no industrial development to provide jobs. Under the law, once a homeland gains "independence," its members lose their South African citizenship. To date, three homelands have reached independence, and the black people assigned to them have been divested of citizenship. When the government grants independence to all the homelands, South Africa will no longer have any black citizens. Thus, black men, women, and children, who have lived all of their lives in South Africa—people whose families before them have lived in South Africa—suddenly find themselves stripped of their citizenship and dumped into resettlement areas where they cannot find jobs and where they do not necessarily want to reside.

The photographs on the board in front of me show the tragic human consequences of this policy. They were recently taken by an officer in the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. These are pictures of a destroyed village of the Makgato people. Since most of the Makgato resisted moving from their longstanding home in the northern Transvaal to a desolate and arid resettlement area in Kromhoek, government forces entered the community in September 1979, destroyed buildings, and removed their belongings. Thus, a community of 500 families, who had developed substantial homes, a school, and prosperous farms, have been forced to leave their property, their homes, their community because they are black and because they were located in areas designated as white by the South African Government.

Similarly, this government remains intent upon forcibly removing a neighboring and much larger community—the Batlokwa people—to the same arid resettlement area. They number 50,000–80,000. They, too, have substantial homes, schools, and agricultural productivity in the northern Transvaal. Their lives are also to suffer dismantling and the destruction of their communities as a result of the homelands policy.

Black laborers who cannot subsist in the homelands and must seek work in white urban areas have no political or economic rights in these areas. They are relegated to the status of migrant workers in their own country. Their families are not allowed to live with them; they must remain in the homelands, often great distances away. The human suffering involved in these forcible family separations is one of many cruel consequences of the homelands legislation.

Group Areas Act

To rigidly maintain racial separation in urban areas, the Group Areas Act de-

fines separate residential places for all black, colored, and Asian South Africans. As a result, tens of thousands of human beings have been moved into specially designated urban areas because they are not white. In 1979 alone, 2,317 colored families and 819 Indian families were moved out of their homes as were nine white families who found themselves forced to leave their homes to satisfy the apartheid policy. Most of the black South Africans at Crossroads had been moved more than once before they created that threatened community.

A highly reputable private source, Black Sash, reported in February 1980 that as a result of the Group Areas Act, the homelands policy and the pass laws, over 2 million people had been forcibly uprooted by 1978. At least 1 million people were still to be removed, and during 1979, these removals continued apace.

Influx and Pass Laws

Influx and pass laws are used to enforce racial separation. Under these laws, known as one of the most despised requirements of the apartheid system, black people over age 16 are required to carry reference books at all times. They must produce them to demonstrate that they are entitled to be in any urban area. Arrests for pass law offenses totaled 272,887 in 1978 and 119,869 in 1979. They have resulted in the removal of large numbers of black people from urban areas, although they entered such areas looking for economic opportunities otherwise denied them.

POLITICAL OPPOSITION

You also asked about the treatment of black activists who are seeking to promote change in South Africa. South African laws do not only racially segregate black people, restrict economic opportunities—including the use of land—and bar participation in the political process, South African legislation also curtails the ability of everyone to express their views or opposition to the political and economic system imposed upon them. Restrictions are placed on their right to publish, to assemble, to form organizations, and to lobby; in sum, to peacefully affect the white political process.

Banning

A variety of laws ban organizations on loosely defined political grounds. The basic ones are the Internal Security Act (1976), previously called the Suppression of Communism Act, and the Unlawful Organizations Act (1960). Under the latter act, the two most influential black political organizations were banned—the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress. As a result, their members and supporters became liable for imprisonment, and many hundreds were arrested for furthering the organizations' aims, for attending meetings, for distributing pamphlets.

The Internal Security Act further enables the government to ban individuals for activities loosely defined as a danger to state security or public order. Banned individuals are restricted in their freedom of expression, association, and movement. They are prohibited from publishing or making public statements. They are restricted to a particular area. They are forbidden to meet with others. They must periodically report to the police. In some instances, they have been prohibited from carrying on their occupation. For example, black leader Thomazile Botha of Port Elizabeth, released from detention to banning, was forced to peddle goods in the street. Mrs. Winnie Mandela and Dr. Mamphela Ramphele have been moved to remote areas, tantamount to internal exile.

Banning is no ordinary human rights abuse. As recently described by our Representative to the U.N. Human Rights Commission, Jerome J. Shestack, banning negates human worth in its entirety. It seeks to make a person disappear by making his human personality disappear. A banned person cannot even be quoted. There are currently 146 banned men and women in South Africa.

Generally, banning orders are imposed for a 2- or 5-year period arbitrarily by the Minister of Justice. Frequently, they are renewed. Under the law, the Minister is not required to give any grounds for his banning decision, and there is no judicial review.

Arbitrary Detention

In addition to the baning laws which have served to stifle and silence black African opinion, the government is empowered to arbitrarily and preventively detain its critics. A variety of security laws provide the state with extraordinary powers to detain persons without charge, in some cases indefinitely. Section 6 of the 1967 Terrorism Act authorizes the government to detain individuals and hold them incommunicado, indefinitely. No court may intervene by writ of *habeas corpus*. Visits to the detainee by family, lawyers, clergy, doctors, or the press are prohibited.

Arbitrary detention is authorized by other South African laws as well, among these the Internal Security Act and the Sabotage (General Law Administration) Act.

At present, there are about 500 men and women serving prison sentences under these main security laws; other political prisoners have been convicted under criminal laws; still others are detained. From January to November 1979, a total of 334 people were placed in detention. At least 64 of the persons detained during 1979 were known to the Institute of Race Relations to have been students. The Minister of Justice places at 48 the number of persons under 18 that were detained in 1979. Six were females.

The incommunicado interrogation of detainees has resulted in reports of systematic abuse and torture of detainees by the police. Since 1963, at least 52 persons died while detained under security laws, including 24 between March 1976 and mid-July 1978. Tortures applied have included severe beatings; electric shocks; extracting teeth with pliers; depriving detainees of food, water, and sleep; forcing them to run on stones; and long periods of interrogation and solitary confinement. Partly in response to the strong domestic and international reaction to the death in detention of student leader

. . . Apartheid is a system of legalized racism. It is a web of discriminatory laws and practices by which 16% of the population dominate 84% of the population.

echnical or administrative expertise to manage an assistance program. These problems were compounded by the earlier general debilitation of the Khmer people and new deprivations following the Vietnamese invasion. Moreover, at least until recently the priorities of the Vietnamese/Heng Samrin administration essentially ignored the rural Khmer, most of whom at best received a kilogram or less of food per person per month from the Phnom Penh administration since relief efforts began in the late fall. Finally the Vietnamese held the relief effort hostage to their political purposes.

The cross-border feeding operation from Thailand obviously also has had serious limitations. The arduous and long trek across Cambodia and back for sustenance is a terribly inefficient means of achieving relief for the already weakened Khmers. It has also hampered agricultural activity, but without food or seed for the farmers, most of which came from the border, agriculture is seriously inhibited. Moreover, transients who come to the border have been subjected to harassment, robbery, and physical jeopardy by a variety of both Khmer and Vietnamese. Despite these hazards, prior to the Vietnamese attack on the refugee camps June 23, an estimated 60,000 Khmers a week turned up for food distribution at the main food point at Nong Chan. These figures are rough, but we estimate that 500,000–1 million people, principally in western Cambodia, benefited from this cross-border feeding operation.

Despite the difficulties and vagaries of both aspects of the program, we estimate that roughly 100,000 tons of relief, including 22,000 tons of rice seed, were distributed across the border. Some 100,000 tons of food and some 20,000 tons of rice seed have been sent via the Phnom Penh administration.

I would be remiss if I did not express my appreciation to the Thai Government and people for their cooperation in this and all other aspects of the relief and refugee programs for the people of Cambodia and all of Indochina. Thailand has had up to a million people running in and out of its borders since 1975. It has the burden of granting asylum to almost 300,000 Indochinese refugees at this point. It has received over 10% of the population of Laos. Thai support for the whole relief operation has been essential in keeping alive a goodly portion of the people of Cambodia and Indochina.

As I have indicated, despite faults and controversies, the first phase of the effort has been a success in saving countless lives from starvation and disease. A limited crop is now in the process of being planted. Our knowledge of its extent and prospects are limited. In any event the acreage will certainly be short of the need. Nevertheless, a corner toward self-sufficiency will have been turned. Relief agencies and donors must also start to plan now for the 1981 planting season.

The short- and long-term problems faced by the international relief agencies are complex and very difficult. I have alluded several times to the restrictions placed on operations within Cambodia. We all welcome the recent news from the international organizations of relaxations of restrictions and a successful effort to clear Cambodian ports of relief commodities. But given past history it seems wise to see what they mean in practical terms of feeding the rural Khmer. We cannot rest until a comprehensive system permitting broad, reasonably monitored distribution to the countryside is achieved. Controversy continues as to the best means to do this—the keys are obviously in Hanoi and Moscow. The excuse of noninterference in the internal affairs of the Heng Samrin government does not wash in the face of the urgent needs of the Khmer people and Hanoi's massive influence in all other aspects of Cambodian life. Conceivably recent reports of improvement reflect a Vietnamese perception that there are more political benefits to be gained from cooperation with the international relief effort rather than from obstructionism.

On the border, the international relief effort has also faced multiple frustrations. Most discouraging perhaps has been the repeated outbreak of fighting between the so-called Khmer Serei groups, whose disreputable leaders seek to maintain their petty positions of personal power and the undoubtedly lucrative cut from diversions and sales of relief supplies. There is no simple solution, but the Thai Government and international organizations are working within their limitations to overcome the problems by both separating out armed elements and trying to develop direct distributions which would make black market profiteering more difficult.

The second major border dilemma is assuring that relief supplies go to the needy civilians in Khmer Rouge controlled area; not to soldiers. Their numbers are uncertain: Some put it as low as 20,000, some as high as 55,000. Insecurity makes monitoring here nonexistent. International relief supplies to this area have been recently suspended. This issue is under the urgent consideration of the Thai Government and international organizations. I understand from recent reports that direct distributions to civilians in these areas as well is being considered.

The dilemmas of the relief effort both on the border and through Phnom Penh have been caught up in the political objectives of the countries involved. This has been principally reflected in the debate about relative priorities to be given to the Phnom Penh vs. border program. But it must not be forgotten that cross-border feeding and large concentrations of Khmer refugees at

Military Equipment to Thailand

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT, JULY 1, 1980[1]

President Carter today approved an immediate U.S. airlift of military equipment to Thailand, involving the shipment of small arms and artillery on U.S. military aircraft from Army arsenals in the United States directly to Bangkok. The President's determination, about which the appropriate committees of the Congress have been informed, was taken under section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act.

The decision was made in the wake of last week's Vietnamese attack across the Thai/Kampuchean border on refugee concentrations and Thai villages. The airlift responds to urgent Thai requests for accelerated delivery of equipment items purchased by Thailand under the foreign military sales (FMS) program. The airlift, which is expected to cost roughly $1 million, will transport M–16 rifles, 106mm recoilless rifles, and 105mm howitzers.

The United States will also begin expediting surface shipments to Thailand of needed small arms and artillery ammunition and is making arrangements to accelerate the delivery by sea of 35 M48–A5 tanks, following completion of the required 30-day congressional review period on July 23, 1980.

[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 7, 1980. ■

the border developed because of the absence of an adequate food distribution program within Cambodia. Once that is in place, the border operation should wither away in any event. Until then both avenues of relief have to be pursued as vigorously as possible. We simply cannot risk the cessation of cross-border feeding which puts food into the hands of those who need it, notwithstanding the associated uncertainties, on the basis of hopes out of Phnom Penh.

Since the Vietnamese invasion a month ago, the refugee and relief situation north of Aranyaprathet has changed significantly. The number of refugees at the border is down and is now very crudely estimated at from 100,000 to 150,000. The armed Khmer elements of all stripes in the area are a small fraction of this amount—some 5,000–10,000. The bulk of the refugees are at the two camps of Nong Samet and Nong Chan being cared for by international and voluntary agencies. There are, of course, another 150,000 Khmer in refugee camps within Thailand.

The cross-border feeding situation remains seriously disrupted. Only small amounts of food have been distributed in recent weeks at two border points by international agencies. The international agencies are trying but have not yet reestablished the previous major mechanism of cross-border feeding that was in place at Nong Chan. Most significant only very small numbers of people are appearing at the border to seek food, although in the past few days numbers coming to the border on foot have increased. Some of this reduction may be due to the present absorption in planting in Cambodia, but the main factor seems to be that the Vietnamese are stopping at least some and perhaps many Khmer from going to the border. Khmer may also simply fear going to the border for fear of hostilities. The possible impact of all this can be catastrophic. In the months of April and May some 12,000–16,000 tons of food was going into western Cambodia. That supply has been cut off for over a month, and there is no evidence that food distributions from Phnom Penh have made up that deficiency.

Finally, we must frankly recognize that while the world has saved millions of Khmer, the end of the Khmer relief problem and some serious reconstruction in Cambodia can derive only from a political resolution of the struggle for control in Cambodia. The resolution passed by the last U.N. General Assembly provides a solid basis to pursue a settlement of the Cambodian problem. But nothing has so far been achieved, and the prospects for a political solution are hardly promising.

Thus far, the Vietnamese have shown no flexibility on their part over substantive issues involved in the Cambodian problem. Vietnamese insistence on keeping its troops in Cambodia indefinitely and on the outside world's acceptance of the Heng Samrin regime remain the nub of the problem. Their recent statement on the subject—the Indochinese ministerial statement of July 18—artfully seems to indicate some flexibility but in effect offers us again only the Heng Samrin government and Vietnamese occupation. We cannot achieve peace in Cambodia if the Vietnamese insist on a peace exclusively on their own terms. Without some flexibility, there can be no hope for resolution of the problem.

In addition to the Vietnamese attitude, other major uncertainties remain. The situation inside Cambodia is still ambiguous. Democratic Kampuchea capabilities to harass the Vietnamese are unclear. The border situation continues to be tense and dangerous. Thai security remains a major concern of ours. Amidst all this uncertainty, we cannot lose sight of the near total dependence of the Khmer people on outside sources for their very lives.

I would conclude by saying that despite the ambiguities and difficulties, the United States has no choice but to continue its vigorous relief efforts to save Cambodia and the Khmer people from extinction while at the same time remaining vigilant for possibilities of a satisfactory negotiated outcome—however remote it appears at this time.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Khmer Relief Efforts

STATUS OF U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS[1]

The U.S. Government, as of July 1, 1980, has spent or obligated for Khmer relief $108,810,500. This figure does not include $1,425,000 the U.S. Government spent for the same objective during the previous fiscal year. Grants break down as follows. Figures are rounded to the nearest hundred dollars.

UNICEF

Amount	Reason/Date
$2,500,000	Startup costs for Khmer relief program (10/79)
2,000,000	Rice purchases in Thailand for distribution in Kampuchea (11/79)
448,000	(in kind) Airlift of cranes from Japan to Singapore for onward shipment to Kampuchea (11/79)
44,600	(in kind) Incremental air transport cost of Archer, Daniels, Midland-donated food (12/79)
6,500,000	Relief of cash shortage (12/79)
2,500,000	Cash for ongoing relief program (5/80)
2,000,000	Cash for rice purchases for World Food Program (6/80)
$15,992,600	

International Committee of the Red Cross

$2,500,000	Startup costs for Khmer relief program (10/79)
27,000	(in kind) Two field labs (11/79)
20,000	(in kind) Medical survey team for contingency planning (11/79)
2,500,000	Relief of cash shortage (12/79)
1,012,900	(in kind) 40-day lease of Hercules for shuttle flights to Phnom Penh (12/79, 1/80)
5,500	(in kind) Airlift of a field hospital donated by SAWS (1/80)
714,400	(in kind) Lease of Hercules for shuttle flights to Phnom Penh (4/80)
1,785,600	Cash for ongoing relief program (5/80)
$8,565,400	

World Food Program

$43,108,000	Food for Peace commodities including shipping costs ($34.23 million directly to Kampuchea; $8.878 million in and through Thailand, 11/79, 3/80, 5/80)
290,000	Lease of trucks in Thailand (11/79)
150,000	(in kind) Airlift and commodity cost of instant corn soy milk (11/79)

Trade Reorganization

The impact of Reorganization Plan No. 3 on the Department of State has been greatest in the handling of export-promotion activities abroad. The establishment of the Foreign Commercial Service of the United States under the Department of Commerce, and the transfer of positions and responsibilities from State to Commerce in more than 60 overseas posts, has proceeded more smoothly and cooperatively than most observers expected.

The officers and foreign service national employees of the Foreign Commercial Service are responsible for trade promotion and other commercial support activity and share with the officer and foreign service national employees of the Department of State responsibility for monitoring foreign compliance with MTN agreements. The delineation of responsibilities is described in two messages (State 92661 of April 9, 1980, and State 110972 of April 27, 1980) that I am submitting with this statement for the record.

East-West Trade

In the area of East-West trade, the U.S. Trade Representative and the Trade Policy Committee have assumed the functions formerly carried out by the East-West Foreign Trade Board under Section 411 of the Trade Act of 1974. That board had been chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Department of State participates in interagency discussions of East-West trade issues in the Trade Policy Committee system in much the same way it did under the East-West Foreign Trade Board and its working group. With respect to national security controls under the Export Administration Act on the export of militarily significant goods and technology to the Soviet Union, the Department of State participates in the committee, chaired by Commerce, that advises the Secretary of Commerce on the administration of those controls. The Department of State has primary responsibility under the Export Administration Act for U.S. participation in COCOM [Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy], the Coordinating Committee of NATO countries (except Iceland) and Japan that develops and administers multilateral controls on strategic trade with Communist countries.

In the area of investment policy, trade reorganization has brought new responsibilities to the U.S. Trade Representative. The delineation of responsibilities between the Department of State and the Trade Representative is set forth in a memorandum of October 19, which I submit for the record as an attachment to this statement.

The reorganization also transferred lead responsibility on commodity matters from the State Department to the Trade Representative. As noted earlier, commodity issues form an important element of U.S. relations with developing countries. Consequently, the State Department continues to be heavily engaged in the interagency policy process, as well as in the negotiating phase. The Economic and Business Affairs Bureau of State remains a major source of government expertise on commodity markets and issues.

Finally, I want to reaffirm that my Department has a major stake in trade policy. We will continue to cooperate with other agencies and with the Congress in defending our interests in the open multilateral trading system. At the same time, our officials at home and overseas will continue to work closely with the business community and with the Department of Commerce to promote American exports. In my view expanding the stake that American industry, labor, and agriculture have in world markets is the key to maintaining the American commitment to an open world trading system—the commitment on which our prosperity, and that of much of the world, depends.

[1]The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Oil-Supply Prospects and U.S. International Energy Policy

Statements by Gerald A. Rosen, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, and Joseph W. Twinam, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 1, 1980.[1]

ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROSEN

Oil-supply prospects and U.S. international energy policy are critical subjects. Even though the oil market has eased over the past few months, the long-term outlook gives cause for serious concern. Oil exports from the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are unlikely to increase beyond today's level, and competition for that oil is likely to increase. The total amount of imported oil available to the industrial democracies is likely to decline significantly over the next decade. Furthermore, these diminishing supplies could be subject to sudden interruptions or price increases.

Superimposed on all of these potential difficulties is a substantially altered structure in the world oil market. Since 1973 the influence of the major oil companies has declined as their share of OPEC exports has gone from over 90% to about 45%. Oil-producing countries now market directly, in channels outside the majors, almost 13 million barrels per day (mm b/d) compared to only 2.4 million barrels in 1973. Some important implications of these developments are:

- During a period of market tightness, prices are bid up as potential buyers, formerly supplied by the majors as third-party customers, compete against each other for oil now sold directly by producers;
- Some crude-short majors also are forced into the spot market;
- Oil sales may become increasingly politicized as government-to-government deals become more common; and
- The industrialized oil consumers are becoming lower priority customers of OPEC as OPEC's own consumption needs and LDC [less developed countries] oil requirements, frequently met through direct government deals, take precedence over OPEC sales to major oil companies.

To attempt to deal effectively and systematically with these and other troublesome aspects of the energy situation, which confront all nations of the world, the Administration has developed three closely interconnected elements of its international energy policy:

- To cooperate with other industrialized democracies to control oil

consumption, promote development of alternative energy sources, and prepare a common approach to possible oil supply shortfalls or disruptions;

- To work with the OPEC countries to insure that their oil production and pricing policies take account of the world's need for an adequate supply of oil at reasonable prices; and
- To promote the development of energy sources in developing countries to increase global energy supplies and to ease the energy constraint upon these nations' economic growth.

To be successful, our international energy activities must be based on a strong domestic energy policy. Other industrial nations look to the United States for leadership in developing effective domestic policies since they recognize that acting alone they can have no decisive effect on global energy balances. The major oil-producing nations have emphasized that our conservation efforts make it easier for them to contribute to stabilizing energy markets through their price and production policies. Developing nations will be more responsive to our international policies if they see that we are making a maximum effort to develop our own energy resources and to use energy wisely.

I would like to concentrate on the following elements of our policy:

- The production and pricing policies of some of the major oil producers outside the Middle East;
- U.S. international energy policy, with particular emphasis on recent accomplishments at the annual economic summit meetings and in the International Energy Agency; and
- The energy recommendations of the Brandt Commission.

Oil-Supply Outlook

Last month in Algiers, the OPEC ministers decided to set a price ceiling for "marker" or benchmark crude at $32 per barrel. They also agreed that surcharges or value differentials of up to $5 per barrel could be added to reflect differences in quality or location. We do not know how this decision will affect other premiums, such as premiums for new buyers, for incremental volumes, or for exploration rights. The Saudis have indicated they may increase oil prices in the next few months but probably not to the $32 ceiling, at least initially.

According to press reports, the OPEC long term strategy committee at its meeting in May recommended that over the long term, prices should approximate the cost of alternative fuels. To insure advancement toward that target, the committee proposed a price floor adjustment mechanism. This mechanism would adjust oil prices to account for inflation, exchange rate changes, and OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] real growth rates. To sustain these price changes OPEC countries would adjust production as necessary.

Moreover, as OPEC's own oil consumption grows, with production likely to be essentially steady or declining, OPEC oil available for export will necessarily decline. At the same time, the non-OPEC developing nations and the Communist nations are likely to increase their demand for OPEC oil. This means that developed country access to OPEC oil will be reduced. It is, in our view, crucial that this expected decline in oil availability be matched by a reduction in developed countries' demand brought about by our own efforts to conserve energy and switch to alternatives.

If we are unprepared to cope with reduced oil supplies, the result would be a rapid bidding up of world oil prices which would impose tremendous economic costs on us. Any interruption of these reduced supplies—whether by accident or political design—would impose still more serious costs.

I believe it would be useful to indicate why we believe OPEC's exports are unlikely to increase beyond today's level. The Persian Gulf oil producers are the most important in this regard because these are the countries which have the physical capacity to increase oil production substantially. I will, however, defer to Mr. Twinam for an analysis of the oil policies of the Persian Gulf and North African producers and will instead discuss briefly other important oil producers, their likely output levels, their policies, and our influence.

Other Producers

Oil consumers have begun to look with increased interest toward oil producers in other areas of the world because of recent events in the Middle East. I do not propose to cover in detail all of these producers but would like to provide some information on four groups of countries: major non-Middle East OPEC countries, oil-exporting LDCs, the North Sea producers, and China and the Soviet bloc countries.

Non-Middle East OPEC. The largest producers in this group are Indonesia, Nigeria, and Venezuela. Each has limited resources of conventional oil and faces potential production declines. Since these countries have relatively large developing economies which can make good use of oil revenues as a tool for economic growth, they will probably continue oil production at maximum capacity.

Indonesia has recently increased exploration expenditures, reversing the trend of the past few years. Additional oil will no doubt be found (reserves are now 9.5 billion barrels), but the discovery of large fields is unlikely, based on the geology of the country. If there are no major new finds, rapidly increasing domestic demand for oil (12–15% annually) may result in Indonesia becoming a net oil importer by 1990.

In many ways, Nigeria is similar to Indonesia. Output is static at about 2 mm b/d, while proved and probable reserves are only 20–26 billion barrels. While it is likely that more oil can be found, the Nigerian Government has not emphasized exploration and appears to be focusing on the exploitation of other energy sources. One project being considered is to export some 1,500 million cubic feet per day of liquefied natural gas.

Venezuela is another example of a large oil producer facing declining production. Output has declined from 3.7 mm b/d in 1970 to 2.1 mm b/d projected for 1980. Official reserves are less than Nigeria's, requiring Venezuela to intensify its exploration activities or exploit its nonconventional petroleum if it is to sustain output at current levels.

Venezuela has a major source of nonconventional oil in the Orinoco heavy oil belt. Estimates vary widely, but oil-in-place is probably in the range of 750 billion to 3 trillion barrels. Since the recoverability factor could be anywhere from 10% to 25% of oil-in-place, ultimate potential production from these reserves is highly uncertain, ranging from as little as 75 billion barrels to as much as 750 billion barrels (compared to Saudi Arabian reserves of 166 billion). Venezuela has decided on a phased plan for exploration of its heavy oil in order to test out alternative technical processes in commercial-scale pilot projects before deciding what processes to use for subsequent expansion of heavy oil production. The present plan calls for 1 mm b/d output of heavy oil by the year 2000. Limiting factors are Venezuela's

Secretary Muskie's News Conference of September 15

The Senate is considering the Foreign Service Act this afternoon, and I take this opportunity to urge my former colleagues to enact it.

The bill is a response to the mandate of Congress in 1976 for a comprehensive review of the personnel system of the Foreign Service. It is designed to simplify the system and to link advancement more closely with performance. It is also designed to establish a more equitable relationship between the Civil Service and the Foreign Service.

Our diplomatic service is the best in the world. The men and women who run it are capable and dedicated. Increasingly, they serve under difficult or dangerous conditions abroad. The Foreign Service Act is designed to recognize their work and their working conditions and to codify their treatment. It deserves enactment, which I hope it will receive.

The Congress will soon be voting on the President's decision to supply fuel and equipment for India's Tarapur reactors. I have reviewed the arguments carefully on both sides of this issue. I approached that review from the perspective of a committed advocate of nuclear nonproliferation. Our nonproliferation policy is one I helped shape as a Senator and one I support without reservation. I understand and share the seriousness with which the Senate and House view this policy. I am convinced our interests are served by going ahead with the Tarapur shipments.

Indeed, the President based his decision on his own deep commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. We have a responsibility to make our nonproliferation policy work in the real world, to obtain tangible progress, and to gain the cooperation of other nations to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The heart of the issue is how best to accomplish these objectives.

In 1963 we agreed to provide all the nuclear fuel for the Tarapur reactors. In return, India agreed to use only U.S. fuel in these reactors.

India also agreed to accept international safeguards on the Tarapur fuel and to obtain U.S. consent before transferring the spent fuel to third parties or reprocessing the spent fuel to extract its plutonium.

If the Congress blocks our decision, India might well claim that we have breached the 1963 agreement and that India is, therefore, no longer bound by its nonproliferation commitments. Fuel for Tarapur is available elsewhere. Indeed, in the longer run, the Indians may reprocess the spent fuel and use the resulting plutonium for fuel. I need not remind you that plutonium is a weapons-usable material. The spent fuel is being stored at Tarapur. If it is removed from the agreed upon international safeguards, inspection would be impossible, and a precedent would be set that would strike at the very heart of our efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

Other nations which support strong nuclear safeguards have told us they understand the President's decision and our desire to maintain a dialogue with India on this critical issue. And they understand the importance of living up to an existing commitment.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act permits the supply of fuel to India. These two shipments fall under a grace period designed to assure that lines of communication remain open with countries which have not yet accepted full-scope safeguards. The Administration's proposal does not contravene the law; it is intended to maintain nonproliferation controls over the Tarapur facility while we seek broader application of the goals of our policy.

Q. On Iran: Do you see any signs of any hope that the hostage crisis is closer to resolution today than last week?

A. I think it is very important to be cautious in our reaction to statements coming out of Iran. We have read them before. As a matter of fact, we have been reading them over a period of weeks and months. I think it would be a mistake to raise expectations based upon any specific statements which are now the subject of speculation in the press.

Q. The public statement attributed to Ayatollah Khomeini the other day—has that been reflected in any other direct or indirect communications with the United States? In other words, the dropping, apparently, of one condition—for an apology?

A. Different statements coming out of Iran over a period of several weeks have focused upon some combination of the totality of ideas that have been advanced by Iranian spokesmen of one kind or another.

Q. The *Saudi Report* reports today that the Administration authorized a study by the Rand Corporation of security implications of Israel's giving up the West Bank and that it concluded Israel's security would not be hurt if it yielded the West Bank. I'm not even aware of such a report, so if there is one, I wonder if you would tell about it and tell us about your feelings?

And, while you are at it, U.S. officials over the last several weeks have been quoted as saying that they thought the internationalization of Jerusalem might not be a bad idea, and I wondered if you thought it was a good idea or a bad idea?

A. With respect to the first part of your question, I'm not aware of the report—that doesn't mean it doesn't exist. Secondly, it has been our policy not to characterize the ultimate decision with respect to Jerusalem beyond saying that our position is supportive of an undivided Jerusalem, open to all religions. And for us to go beyond that formulation, at this point, I think, would have the effect or be perceived as having the effect of undertaking to prejudge the outcome of the negotiations.

Q. Against the background of your opening remark warning against raising expectations, I wonder how you can reconcile that with what President Carter has said today, "statements by Iranian authorities"—if I am quoting it precisely—"might very well lead to a resolution of the hostage question in the future." And another report says "in the near future."

How do you reconcile what the President has said against your own warning about building expectations? And, secondly, what can you tell us about whatever negotiations, or whatever the President is hinting at, to avert the possibility that what the President has said will be seen by many as Presidential politicking?

A. I have no reason to conclude that the President is hinting at anything. I think his statement is perfectly consistent with statements I've made, pointing out that we have been looking to as many channels of communication as we could find—private and governmental—over the last several months, with the view to ultimately establishing official contact that might lead to negotiations. It is our constant hope that one or more of these channels might hold promise for the kind of result that the President suggested this morning.

Q. Shortly after you took office, you spoke about the possibility of economic incentives to encourage Iran to release the hostages. Would the United States, if there is a satisfactory conclusion of the hostage crisis and they come home safely, be willing to consider economic aid to Iran to address what you have described many times as "the real problems that confront the nation"?

A. What I have had reference to in the past is the fact that in my judgment —and I think this is borne out by the events in Iran in the last 4 months—it is in Iran's economic self-interest, as well as political self-interest and in the interest of normalization of relations with its normal trading partners, to get the hostage problem behind it.

In that sense it has an economic dimension. Precisely what may be the ultimate basis for the release of the hostages is something I don't think could be advanced by public discussion.

Q. Would you be willing, for example, to consider either a partial lifting of the sanctions against Iran or unfreezing of some of the Iranian assets prior to the actual release of all the hostages?

A. To answer your question would be to appear to be opening a negotiation process publicly. I don't think that's the way to advance the objective.

Q. You're not ruling it out?

A. I'm not ruling it out or ruling it in.

Q. A week ago you made public the text of a letter to the new Iranian Prime Minister asking for the opening of direct channels of communication. Have you received any reply from him, either directly or indirectly?

A. I have received the oral reply in the sense that he read the letter to an audience in Iran. I look forward to a written reply, although I have had no clear signal on that.

Q. There is a report today that the State Department has been negotiating for the last 3 months on some document with former Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh. This creates the impression that there have been some very active negotiations going on. Is that accurate?

A. That story is inaccurate.

Q. On Poland: Can you tell us whether you believe that the recent labor troubles and the drive for freedom in that country is over and the Soviet Union has decided not to intervene, or whether this infectious disease of freedom is liable to spread further and be a continuing problem for the Soviet Union?

A. Obviously, the questions you've raised are questions we all speculate about, without really knowing the hard answers. I think that the Soviet attitude toward developments in Poland will emerge over time. The fact that they've received Polish representatives since those agreements were concluded and that the result has been some step up in Soviet economic assistance suggests that the Soviets are going to be supportive with respect to the economic problems that may have been generated.

Beyond that we can only speculate. I would like to believe that the workers in Poland have achieved an important gain to themselves and that it will prove to be a constructive contribution to their national life.

Q. Ronald Reagan said over the weekend that he felt we should accept three of the Ayatollah's demands—unfreezing the assets, dropping claims, and promising not to intervene. Can you go that far?

A. It was useful to have that guidance. [Laughter.]

Q. Do you endorse his guidance? Do you agree with his guidance?

A. Again, they are questions the answer to which would imply that we are in some kind of negotiating posture, which I think would be premature. I think it may represent an overreaction to the news coming out of Iran, and I just found it useful in these past few months to be as cautious in public reaction to developments in Iran as possible.

Q. Could you say whether it is helpful or not helpful for statements such as this to be made by a person who is seeking the Presidency in a few weeks?

A. Well, I don't find it unhelpful.

Q. Did you meet with the liaison board of hostages' wives when they met here about a week or 10 days ago, and did they show their letter to you before they sent it?

A. Yes. We've been in touch.

Q. Did you promise them, at that time, any part of the assets of Iran for the hostages or their families?

A. No. That question was not discussed.

Q. Last week the President announced commodities aid to Poland. Is any other aid possible under the existing laws should the Poles request it?

Trident I Missile Sale to the U.K.

Following are an exchange of letters between British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Carter and a White House statement.[1]

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS[2]

10 July 1980

Dear Mr. President,

As you are aware the United Kingdom Government attaches great importance to the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent capability. It will be necessary to replace the present Polaris force in the early 1990s, and having reviewed the options, the Government has concluded that the Trident I weapon system best meets the need to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent capability into the 21st century. I write therefore to ask you whether the United States Government would be prepared, in continuation of the cooperation which has existed between our Governments in this field since the Polaris Sales Agreement of 6 April 1963, to supply on a continuing basis, Trident I missiles, equipment and supporting services, in a manner generally similar to that in which Polaris was supplied.

The United Kingdom Government would wish to purchase sufficient missiles, complete with multiple independently targettable re-entry vehicles and less only the warheads themselves, together with equipment and supporting services, on a continuing basis to introduce and maintain a force of 4 British submarines (or 5 if the United Kingdom Government so prefer), close coordination being maintained between the Executive Agencies of the two Governments in order to assure compatibility of equipment.

The successor to the Polaris force will be assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, like the Polaris force; and except where the United Kingdom Government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake, the successor force will be used for the purposes of international defence of the Western alliance in all circumstances. It is my understanding that cooperation in the modernisation of the United Kingdom nuclear deterrent in this way would be consistent with the present and prospective international obligations of both parties.

In particular, I would like to assure you that the United Kingdom Government continues to give whole-hearted support to the NATO Long-Term Defence Programme and to other strengthening of conventional forces. The United Kingdom Government has substantially increased its defence spending, in accordance with NATO's collective policy, and plans to make further such increases in the future in order to improve the effectiveness of its all-round contribution to Allied deterrence and defence. In this regard the objective of the United Kingdom Government is to take advantage of the economies made possible by the cooperation of the United States in making the Trident I missile system available in order to reinforce its efforts to upgrade its conventional forces.

If the United States Government is prepared to meet this request, I hope that as the next step the United States Government will be prepared to receive technical and financial missions to pursue these matters, using the framework of the Polaris Sales Agreement where appropriate.

Yours sincerely

MARGARET THATCHER

July 14, 1980

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

In reply to your letter of July 10, 1980, I am pleased to confirm that the United States attaches significant importance to the nuclear deterrent capability of the United Kingdom and to close cooperation between our two Governments in maintaining and modernizing that capability. To further that objective, the United States is prepared to supply the United Kingdom TRIDENT I missiles, equipment and supporting services, as you propose in your letter, subject to and in accordance with applicable United States laws and procedures.

I view as important your statements that the POLARIS successor force will be assigned to NATO and that your objective is to take advantage of the economies made possible by our nuclear cooperation to reinforce your efforts to upgrade the United Kingdom's conventional forces. As you know, I regard the strengthening of NATO's conventional and nuclear forces as of highest priority for Western security.

I agree that as the next step in implementing these agreed arrangements, our two Governments should initiate the technical and financial negotiations which you propose.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JULY 15, 1980

Today in London, the British Government is informing the House of Commons of its decision to modernize the British strategic nuclear deterrent force. In this connection, the British Government has requested that the United States sell the United Kingdom U.S. Trident I missiles. The Trident I missiles would be carried in new submarines built in Britain and would replace the existing British Polaris sea-based strategic missile force in the early 1990s. This request was formally conveyed in a letter from Prime Minister Thatcher to the President on July 10, 1980. In a letter sent to the Prime Minister yesterday, the President agreed that the United States will sell Trident I missiles to the United Kingdom.

Since the Second World War, the United States has cooperated intimately with the United Kingdom on nuclear matters. In President Roosevelt's Administration, American and British scientists began working together on the development of nuclear weapons. In 1962 at Nassau, President Kennedy agreed to assist the British in the development of their strategic nuclear forces by selling Polaris missiles to the United Kingdom.

Today's announcement of Anglo-American cooperation on a modernized British Trident missile force signals a continuation of this longstanding cooperation, which is a central element in the close cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom. This cooperation is, of course, not limited to the nuclear field and includes a strong U.K. conventional commitment to NATO, which Britain also intends to strengthen.

The Administration believes the independent British strategic nuclear force which is assigned to NATO makes an important contribution to the ability of the North Atlantic alliance to deter Soviet aggression. For this reason, the President decided to assist the United Kingdom in the maintenance of a modernized, independent British deterrent force into the 21st century.

This joint step by the United States and United Kingdom is part of

the broader pattern of efforts by this Administration and our allies in Europe to strengthen NATO defense capabilities—3% real growth in defense budgets, the NATO Long-Term Defense Program, and the NATO decision to modernize theater nuclear forces. It is a sign of our determination to strengthen close cooperation with our allies on sensitive security matters.

[1] Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 21, 1980.
[2] Texts of the letters were released by the White House on July 15. ■

20th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, JULY 22, 1980[1]

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the following report on progress made during the past 60 days toward conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.

The intercommunal talks remain recessed despite persistent efforts by UN Secretary General Waldheim and his staff to bring the two parties back to the conference table. Ambassador Hugo Cobbi, the new Special Representative of the Secretary General, arrived in Cyprus in May and immediately began working with the two sides in an effort to overcome the remaining difficulties. As the UN efforts intensified, the Secretary General also dispatched Under Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to Cyprus. Mr. Perez de Cuellar presented the two parties with a compromise formula under which they might resume the intercommunal talks. Early on June 7, the Greek Cypriots informed the Under Secretary General that they would accept the proposal. Later that day, the Turkish Cypriots told Mr. Perez de Cuellar that they had given the UN formula serious consideration but felt unable to accept it.

It is encouraging to note, however, that the Perez de Cuellar mission succeeded in narrowing somewhat the gap between the positions of the two parties, and Ambassador Cobbi is continuing to consult with the two sides in an attempt to reach a compromise. The Secretary General's June 13 statement to the Security Council on Mr. Perez de Cuellar's mission is attached.

I am pleased to report that the United Nations Security Council voted on June 13 to extend the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another six months. The calm that prevails on the island today is due to the professionalism and dedication of the men of UNFICYP. Without the stability provided by the peacekeeping troops, there would be little hope for eventually achieving a negotiated Cyprus settlement. (The Secretary General's report to the Security Council on UNFICYP is also attached.)

Secretary of State Muskie recently returned from Ankara where he discussed the Cyprus problem with Turkish Prime Minister Demirel. In a productive exchange of views, Secretary Muskie stressed the continuing interest of the United States in seeing the Cyprus dispute resolved. During his meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister as well as in his discussions with Greek Foreign Minister Mitsotakis, the Secretary of State reaffirmed our faith in Secretary General Waldheim's efforts as the best hope for achieving an early resumption of the intercommunal talks.

Other members of the Executive Branch have also been active in support of the Secretary General's efforts. On June 23, for example, while in Athens, Under Secretary of State Nimetz took the opportunity offered by the presence of Cyprus Foreign Minister Rolandis to arrange an informal but useful meeting on the Cyprus problem.

The United States Government will continue to use every opportunity to emphasize to all concerned parties that cooperation with the efforts of UN Secretary General Waldheim offers the best chance for a resumption of the intercommunal talks. The Secretary General has pledged to persevere in his mission, and the two parties on Cyprus have renewed their commitment to reach a negotiated settlement. The roots of the Cyprus problem are deep, and a solution will not easily be found. I am convinced, however, that if the two communities on Cyprus are seriously committed to resolve their differences, a settlement will eventually be achieved. I urge both sides to return to the negotiating table and begin the process of searching for a just and lasting solution that will meet the needs of all people of Cyprus.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

[1] Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 28, 1980). ■

Poland

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, AUG. 22, 1980[1]

We are concerned about the situation in Poland. It is a key European country with which we have had good relations for a number of years. It is also a country to which 12 million Americans are linked by family ties. We have stressed repeatedly our view that internal problems in Poland are for the Polish people and the Polish authorities to resolve.

We are watching developments closely. We are concerned to hear of the arrest of a number of Polish dissidents, and we hope they will be released soon. We continue to hope that a solution will be found to the current problems in Poland which meets the wishes and interests of the Polish people.

[1] Read to news correspondents, on the Secretary's behalf, by acting Department spokesman David Passage. ■

Steve Biko, there have been no known deaths of security detainees since mid-July 1978. However, this does not mean that torture and mistreatment have come to an end. The laws giving rise to such abuses and the security apparatus enforcing them remain in effect.

Thus, the incidence of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment remains an exceedingly serious problem. The government, itself, does not completely deny the use of torture. The government, in fact, has paid claims arising out of assaults on detainees. It paid $214,000 for 78 claims in 1978. In 1979, the government paid R65,000 to the family of Steve Biko. Thirty-two similar cases are pending. Its attitude perhaps is reflected in the statement by Justice Minister Kruger in response to the Biko case: "I am not sorry about Mr. Biko. He leaves me cold."

The result of this governmental determination to repress black activists is that black leaders who have standing in the black community and probably could influence events in a moderate and lawful direction continue to be detained, banned, or imprisoned. Such policies surely serve to heighten anger and bitterness and drive black South Africans to violence in their struggle for their legitimate rights. This repressive treatment for peaceful change has led many black activists to leave South Africa to seek military training.

GOVERNMENT POLICIES

The third question in your letter was whether Prime Minister Botha's policies have resulted in any improvement in human rights of South Africans. The answer unfortunately is, no; there have been no significant changes. Reliable reporting attests that it is the overwhelming opinion of black South Africans that changes effected so far have been inconsequential adjustments in an unacceptable system.

The Botha government has allowed a relaxation of certain segregation measures, including an easing of restrictions against multiracial sports; the removal of "whites only" signs from some public places; and the opening of certain hotels, theatres, and municipal buildings. Small numbers of black students have been admitted to white universities. The changes, thus, have been limited to opening up institutions and privileges reserved exclusively for whites to limited numbers of blacks. They have not taken the form of change in the basic laws; they are merely exemptions, often on an *ad hoc* basis.

The Prime Minister has promised to review discriminatory legislation, for example, laws limiting the amount of land available for Africans, as well as the Immorality Act and the Mixed Marriages Act which prohibit sexual relations between white and black. The government, also, has indicated willingness to engage in dialogue with black, colored, and Asian leaders. In 1979, a government commission recommended major changes in labor laws affecting blacks. However, few results have emerged. New labor legislation perpetuates ultimate government control of black labor organizations. With regard to the Immorality Act, I would note that during 1979, 299 persons were prosecuted under this act, and 222 convicted; 46 await trial.

In sum, for black South Africans, there has been little or no change in existing patterns of discrimination. None of the measures have made any real change in the overall pattern of apartheid. Black South Africans remain excluded from the political process and continue to be denied their basic human rights.

Certainly, we hope that meaningful steps will be taken and that the considerable debate in the white community on the apartheid system will lead to concrete actions to end discrimination and afford participation for all black citizens in the political life of the nation. Otherwise, the deepening frustration at the lack of substantial change will increase an already polarized political situation and increase the prospect for violent convulsion.

U.S. RESPONSE

Your final question was what specifically the United States has done to protest human rights violations in South Africa.

The U.S. Government has continued to underscore our opposition to the apartheid system in South Africa.

Private and Public Diplomacy

At the diplomatic level, the United States has repeatedly protested human rights violations to the South African Government at the highest levels. In these exchanges, we have raised the practice of banning, arbitrary detention, torture, the pass laws, the forcible removal of black communities, the systematic denial of South African citizenship to blacks, the denial of meaningful participation by all South Africans in the political process, and the lack of justice in the judicial system.

The United States also has publicly protested the egregious abuses in South Africa. Our Ambassadors at the United Nations have delivered forceful public statements on apartheid's abhorrent nature. On October 4, 1979, speaking before Ambassadors and Ministers of the Organization of African Unity [OAU], former Secretary Vance reaffirmed that unless a system of government evolved in which all South Africans could participate equitably, our relations with South Africa would inevitably deteriorate. Vice President Mondale has affirmed this same point publicly.

Arms Embargo

In addition to private and public diplomacy, the United States imposed a voluntary arms embargo against South Africa, beginning in 1962. In 1977, the Carter Administration supported the U.N. mandatory arms embargo on South Africa. In 1978, we imposed a ban on all exports to the South African military and police and have made sometimes effective representations to other governments to do likewise. We shall continue to do so. There have been no sales to South Africa under the U.S. foreign military sales program since 1973. We, further, have tightened procedures on the commercial sale of civilian aircraft to South Africa to help assure that they will not be used for military, police, or paramilitary purposes.

There also have been no exports of nuclear supplies or materials to South Africa since 1975. We have made it clear that resumption of peaceful nuclear cooperation would depend on South Africa's agreement on the Nonproliferation Treaty and safeguards issues.

Economic Endeavors

In the economic sphere, legislation was passed in 1978 to confine Export-Import Bank support to those private firms implementing fair employment practices. In consequence of this restriction, there have been no new authorizations for Exim financing for ex-

ports to South Africa since September 1978. Prior to these restrictions, the United States had halted Eximbank financing to the South African Government.

In 1979 and 1980, CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation, U.S.A.] credits have not been made available to South Africa.

In the area of private investment, we have urged U.S. firms operating in South Africa to follow fair employment practices for black employees in accordance with the Sullivan code. The Sullivan principles set reasonable standards for corporate conduct in South Africa. They have sought to involve the business community in promoting economic opportunities for blacks. The Sullivan principles call for improvements in wages, working conditions, fringe benefits, and advancement opportunities for black workers.

They also support recognition of representative black trade unions. To date, more than 130 companies have subscribed to the Sullivan principles, representing 75% of the work force on the payrolls of U.S. corporations doing business in South Africa. Certainly, those American firms which have not implemented the Sullivan code are not acting in accordance with the thrust of U.S. policy. It is noteworthy that as a result of the Sullivan initiative, similar codes of conduct have emerged from other nations and some South African corporations, too, have agreed to implement these principles.

SUMMARY

Politically and legally, the United States has refused to recognize the independent homelands, proclaimed by the South African Government.

At the United Nations, we have supported resolutions condemning the establishment of these independent homelands. We also have supported resolutions on South Africa's ill-treatment of political prisoners and have endorsed continuation of U.N. trust funds for South Africans. I would note that we have been unable to support resolutions that encourage violence or call for economic sanctions against South Africa.

We have sought to maintain ties with many elements of the black South African community, including human rights organizations and banned individuals. We have dispatched embassy observers to political trials.

We have contributed generously to U.N. funds providing educational assistance and training to black South Africans. We also have contributed funds for legal aid to prisoners, relief for their families, and assistance to black South African refugees in neighboring states.

Through the visitors program of the International Communications Agency (USICA), we have brought approximately 50 South Africans annually to the United States. Twenty-five Americans, in turn, have visited South Africa. By means of this program, we have demonstrated our support for black South Africans seeking change; we have encouraged white South Africans to recognize the need for change. The program's effectiveness is perhaps evidenced by the South African Government's refusal on occasion to grant passports to some of the black grantees. We have vigorously protested these actions.

Banning is no ordinary human rights abuse. It seeks to make a person disappear by making his human personality disappear.

In sum, the United States has undertaken a variety of measures to influence and persuade South Africa to change its policies. There is still a great deal to do.

For example, many private groups in the United States today are calling for stronger measures to combat apartheid in South Africa. They have urged broadening of the Sullivan principles and strengthening their implementation. It would be useful for this subcommittee, in its hearings on the role of U.S. corporations, to examine this proposal. Private groups also have called upon the U.S. Government to disassociate itself more clearly from the South African Government through our trade and investment policies. Specifically, they have urged the U.S. Government to curtail or halt private trade and investment to South Africa. They have called upon corporations to withdraw from South Africa. In at least two cases, corporations have done so. It might be useful for this subcommittee to review these recommendations too. Private groups also have urged the United States to consider if there are any circumstances whereby it could support economic sanctions against South Africa in the United Nations. To date, the United States has limited its support of sanctions to our expanded arms embargo.

Our policies must encourage rapid, peaceful, and significant change in South Africa. It is incumbent upon the United States, consistent with its obligations under the U.N. Charter, to continue to seek respect for the rights of all South Africans to participate in the political process of South Africa without distinction based on race. The Government of South Africa will remain in violation of its human rights obligations under the charter as long as this participation is denied. We, further, must persist vigorously to seek an end to the use of violence and force by the Government of South Africa to maintain apartheid. Such practices could, in turn, lead to violence by the victims of apartheid. We look forward to a South Africa in which race, creed, or color form no basis for distinction and in which fundamental human rights and freedoms are guaranteed to all.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

[2] In 1976–77, the average expenditure per black South African student was R49 ($73.50); per white student, R654 ($981). ■

1,026,009	Food processing in Thailand and Singapore (11, 12/79)
891,600	Food management in Thailand (12/79)
3,000,000	Rice purchases in Thailand for border and holding center feeding (12/79)
8,800	(in kind) Air transport cost for soy fortified bulgur (2/80)
4,000,000	Cash for cross border seed rice programs (3, 5/80)
$52,474,400	

Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees

$ 381,200	(in kind) Airlift and commodity cost of 800 tents and tent flies (10/79)
9,000,000	Care and maintenance of Khmer in holding centers and center construction (11/79)
5,618,800	Care and maintenance of Khmer in holding centers and center construction (balance of U.S. Government pledge to UNHCR, (1/80)
3,000	(in kind) Four hand pumps (5/80)
6,400,000	Care and maintenance of Khmer in holding centers (6/80)
$21,403,000	

Food and Agriculture Organization

$ 3,000,000	Agricultural rehabilitation program in Kampuchea (3/80)

National Council for International Health

$ 87,200	Medical assistance clearinghouse (12/79, 5/80)

Cambodia Crisis Center

$ 80,900	Startup costs for informational clearinghouse (1/80)

Church World Service

$ 1,250,000	Emergency delivery of medicines, relief supplies, and seeds for agricultural rehabilitation in Kampuchea (1/80)

World Vision Relief Organization

$ 3,103,300	Rehabilitation of rice culture, small animal breeding, orphanages, and a youth hostel in Kampuchea (3/80)

Care

$ 55,800	Ocean freight reimbursement for baby food and relief supplies (3/80)
100,000	Cash for cross border seed rice program (3/80)
$ 155,800	

American Friends Service Committee

$ 558,300	Agricultural rehabilitation in Kampuchea (3/80)
15,900	Ocean freight reimbursement for medical supplies and vegetable seeds (4/80)
$ 574,200	

World Relief

$ 1,000,000	Subsistence agricultural packages (tools, 6/80)

Office of the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative for Kampuchean Humanitarian Relief

$ 150,000	Startup costs of coordinating office (3/80)

Embassy Bangkok

$ 102,500	Emergency funds for Khmer relief at Ambassador's discretion (some for communications equipment, 11/79)

Thai Red Cross

$ 100,000	Mrs. Carter's presentation for Khmer relief (11/79)

Task Force 80 (Thai Supreme Command)

$10,700	Office supplies for Thai coordinator (3/80)

Royal Thai Government

$ 25,000	Assistance to Thai victims of Vietnamese incursion (6/80)

Unattributed

$ 384,000	Special airlift of medical and other relief supplies in response to the President's 11/13 decision (11/79)
351,500	Travel and administrative expenses of staffing Khmer relief program in Thailand (10/79–9/80)
$ 735,500	

$108,810,500 **(Grand Total)**

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JULY 9, 1980[2]

The United States is deeply concerned by the continuing disruption of relief efforts to the Khmer people along the Thai/Kampuchean border and inside Kampuchea, which was cut off as a result of the Vietnamese attacks on several refugee concentrations in Thailand 2 weeks ago. Food, rice seed, and other relief supplies distributed to the Khmer who came to the Thai border prior to the Vietnamese attack comprised a vital element of the international community's relief effort and sustained hundreds of thousands of Khmer inside Kampuchea who had no other source of sustenance and who were attempting to plant a new rice crop there.

The United States believes it is essential that relief supplies continue to be distributed to all needy Khmer wherever they are via the border as well as through Phnom Penh and Kampong Som. We believe urgent steps must be taken to provide adequate care for the refugees from the camps disrupted by the fighting. We also urge the Vietnamese and Phnom Penh authorities concerned to facilitate distribution of food and relief supplies throughout Kampuchea. At the same time, we call on the international organizations, voluntary agencies, and the governments concerned in this critical humanitarian effort, with the support of the donor nations, to take all measures necessary to restore these urgent feeding operations to insure survival of the Kampuchean people.

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[1] Press release 170 of July 1, 1980.
[2] Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman John Trattner. ■

Accounting for MIAs: A Status Report

by Michael A. Armacost

Submitted to the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 27, 1980. Mr. Armacost is Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.[1]

As you will recall, Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard] Holbrooke appeared before your subcommittee last October with a full update on developments up to that time. From time to time since then there have been informal briefings and discussions. I propose to touch briefly on some background, and then to deal in more detail with events since last October.

From the beginning this Administration and the Department of State have followed a policy of obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing personnel. In one of his earliest foreign policy initiatives, President Carter sent a Presidential commission to Indochina—the Woodcock Commission—to explore directly with the Vietnamese and Lao how such an accounting might be obtained. On March 12, 1977, the President referred to the Woodcock Commission, saying he was ". . . hopeful that this step we are taking will meet with a positive response and put in motion a process that will obtain the fullest possible accounting for our men who sacrificed so much for their country. At the same time, we recognize that information may never be available on many of them."

The commission's report stated: "The highlight of the Commission's talks in Hanoi was the SRV's formal undertaking to give the U.S. all available information on our missing men as it is found and to return remains as they are recovered and exhumed." The report also noted that Vietnam ". . . promised to set up a permanent study mechanism by which the U.S. Government can provide information that we have about the potential whereabouts or identity of servicemen who were lost, and the Vietnamese have promised to cooperate in pursuing the evidence we might present them in the future."

The United States met with the S.R.V. [Socialist Republic of Vietnam] on three occasions in 1977 to discuss prospects for normalizing relations between our countries. In those meetings we stressed Vietnamese willingness to follow policies supportive of peace and stability in the region and continued Vietnamese efforts to provide us with the fullest possible accounting of our missing personnel as factors which would affect progress toward normalization of relations.

We also stressed that we rejected any effort to link the accounting issue to the question of aid, or any idea that the return of remains or information could be traded for diplomatic relations. We stressed then, as we do now, that Hanoi has a humanitarian obligation to provide this information irrespective of U.S. recognition or a commitment for aid.

During 1978 the S.R.V. showed signs of flexibility in its position on U.S. aid, and by the fall Hanoi had stopped demanding U.S. aid as a *quid pro quo* for normalization or for progress on accounting for the missing. As you know, however, progress toward normalization was halted due to the emergence in October and November 1978 of new Vietnamese policies which were destabilizing to the region—closer ties with the Soviet Union, the massive flow of refugees, and sharp clashes with Kampuchea, culminating in Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea in December 1978 and January 1979.

Although under the circumstances there is no question of any movement toward normalization of relations with Vietnam at this time, we have continued our efforts to obtain a full accounting on MIAs [missing-in-action]. As Assistant Secretary Holbrooke told you last fall, this has been underscored in all high-level contacts between our governments. You will recall, we acted on a number of suggestions made by your subcommittee: contacting the Soviets for their assistance, using U.N. channels, and following up on statements the Vietnamese made to you during your August 1979 visit to Hanoi about new information and about the visit of JCRC [Joint Casualty Resolution Center] experts. As you are aware, however, the Vietnamese have provided no new information and have not allowed visits by JCRC experts as they suggested to you last August they would. Nor have they returned any remains since August 1978.

Assistant Secretary Holbrooke also reviewed efforts we had made with the Lao Government, including his talks with the acting Lao Foreign Minister, contacts by State Department officials and Members of Congress with the Lao Chargé here, and efforts by our Chargé in Vientiane, Leo J. Moser, to underline the importance of the issue. We have consistently pressed the Lao and Vietnamese authorities on this issue. There is no doubt that they understand its importance to us. We will continue our efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting for our missing personnel.

Vietnam

In November 1979, we learned that a refugee from Vietnam stated he knew that the Vietnamese were holding the remains of over 400 Americans. Many of you were intimately involved in the events that followed. The refugee was exhaustively debriefed and was found to be a credible source. He met with some of you, and during your January trip to Hanoi, you and other members raised the information he provided with the S.R.V. authorities.

In order to follow up on the matter, [former] Secretary of State Vance sent a letter February 7 to the Vietnamese Ambassador to the United Nations, Ha Van Lau. In the letter he referred to the report of remains and to your efforts to raise the matter with S.R.V. officials and noted that, without full inquiry and investigation, serious questions about the report would remain unanswered. He suggested that U.S. experts go to Hanoi to discuss the matter with Vietnamese officials and also asked that Ambassador Lau meet with Deputy Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, John D.] Negroponte.

The letter was hand delivered to the Vietnamese Mission in New York on February 8. The State Department officer carrying the letter referred to the Secretary's personal interest in continuing progress on MIAs. The officer also noted the long time that had passed since the Vietnamese had shown any progress on the matter, which was puzzling in light of the "new information" they had said in the summer of 1979 might soon be available. He also noted the continuing congressional and public interest in the matter.

Ambassador Lau replied in a letter dated February 20 that the S.R.V.

sensitivity to including foreign multinationals, which could help with the technology required and the need for refinery modifications to process the heavy oil.

While the United States has good relations with these countries, our ability to influence their oil production decisions is limited. The primary action we can and have taken is to urge provision of adequate incentives for new exploration.

Oil-Exporting LDCs. The more important of these countries are Mexico, Malaysia, Egypt, and Angola. With the possible exception of Mexico, these countries are likely to continue to produce at full capacity because petroleum revenues are critically important to finance their economic development.

The case of Mexico is somewhat more complicated. Mexican oil production is continuing to grow, and reserves could support a very high level of production. President Lopez Portillo has stated, however, that Mexico will limit its production to domestic needs plus an export level which will provide revenues needed for balanced growth. Mexico is finding that it can absorb a greater quantity of imports than initially anticipated, and if the Mexican Government expands social programs, it would imply an increase in petroleum export beyond projected levels. There are some in the country, however, who argue that production should be restrained either to manage resources more conservatively or because they fear ambitious development programs would lead to disastrous inflation. In any event, it is unlikely that long-term production decisions will be made in the next 2 years, before the 1982 presidential election.

The United States, Mexico's largest customer, is receiving about 590,000 b/d of current Mexican exports of 820,000 b/d. Because of the economics of transportation, the United States will continue as Mexico's largest customer, but many countries are vying for Mexican oil, and the Mexican Government has indicated a desire to diversify its sales. Nonetheless, even though the U.S. share is declining, Mexico's accelerating production may lead to an increase in the absolute level of exports to the United States.

The North Sea Producers. Based on current estimates of proven reserves, U.K. oil production should peak at about 2.5 mm b/d in 1985. Production is then expected to decline steadily and could reach about 1 mm b/d by the early 1990s. This suggests that the United Kingdom could become self-sufficient in oil within the next year and be a net exporter into the late 1980s. These estimates, however, do not take into account future discoveries or development of fields not judged commercial at mid-1979 prices.

Because North Sea crudes are light and sweet, they command top prices along with North African and some Nigerian crudes. Thus far, the United Kingdom has followed prices of comparable OPEC crudes.

There are indications that the U.K. Government is considering restricting depletion rates to stretch out the period of net self-sufficiency. No official announcement has been made, but U.K. Energy Secretary David Howell has publicly indicated that a new policy is being considered, and Labor Party shadow Secretary for Energy David Owen has called for a long-range production policy aimed at self-sufficiency.

Should such a policy evolve, it could mean that the United Kingdom will be producing in the mid-1980s at about 300,000–500,000 b/d less than has been officially projected based on technical consideration. We have urged the United Kingdom to consider allowing production to continue at the maximum efficient rate.

Norway's proven oil and gas reserves as of mid-1979 were estimated at about 11.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent, divided about equally between oil and gas. The Norwegian Government recently reaffirmed its longrun oil and gas production goal of 1.8 mm b/d which could be reached by the mid-1980s. Currently, Norway produces about 600,000 b/d of oil and a slightly smaller amount of gas. Following an export-oriented production policy, Norway exports almost all of its gas as well as 400,000 b/d of oil.

The Norwegian Government is undergoing a comprehensive review of its North Sea production policy in the wake of the recent disaster in which the offshore structure, *Alexander Keilland*, capsized with the loss of 123 lives. Indications are that Norway's longrun oil policies will remain unchanged, but its offshore operations will be more carefully scrutinized. The result is likely to lead to slower exploration, especially north of the 62d parallel, as more stringent safety requirements are imposed on offshore structures and personnel. This northern region, yet unexplored, encompasses 85% of the Norwegian Continental Shelf, and substantial discoveries could enhance Norway's production possibilities significantly. Although this area appears promising, development will be very costly. Even if commercial discoveries were made, 5–8 years would be required before production could begin.

Norway has not been an oil price leader but has been quick to follow other producers of sweet, light crudes to post top prices. This has evoked criticism from some of Norway's neighbors.

China and the Soviet Bloc. Substantial uncertainty surrounds the petroleum situation in China. Large-scale exploration is just getting underway, and it will be a few years before we have a reasonably accurate picture of China's potential. Present production is about 2 mm b/d. While China may have as much as 80 billion barrels of recoverable oil, the rate of annual increases in output is declining. Growth in output in 1979 was 1.9%, and China is now turning to Western firms for the sophisticated technology needed for offshore exploration and development.

China looks toward petroleum to finance the import of technology and capital goods needed for modernization. It is difficult, however, to judge how much revenue will be needed to support planned growth rates. In any case, sizable increases in exports are not likely before 1985, when results can be expected from activities recently initiated by foreign firms.

The Soviet Union's energy situation is characterized by declining or stagnant oil production, along with an abundance of oil, gas, and coal resources and nuclear energy capability. Their production problems result mainly from managerial and technological difficulties compounded by reserves being located in extremely hostile environments at long distances from energy consumers.

One problem which complicates our assessment of likely Soviet oil production and policies is lack of hard data on Soviet oil reserve estimates and on projected Soviet oil production. The uncertainties are substantial, but it appears that the Soviet bloc might soon shift to a net importer position from its traditional role as an exporter of oil.

Cooperation with Industrial Consumers

Excessive dependence on imported oil clearly threatens the economic health of the industrial nations. In 1979 a relative-

ly small and temporary interruption of supplies caused a more than doubling of oil prices. Today the United States is receiving about a million barrels a day less oil than a year ago, but U.S. payments for imported oil in 1980 are expected to reach $90 billion. This import bill will make it harder to master inflation and overcome the current recession.

These problems are likely to grow more serious over the coming decade as oil supplies tighten further. We recognize that the economic strains of the energy crisis have the potential to weaken the mutually reinforcing economic, political, security, and cultural ties which we have built up since World War II with the democracies of Western Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Many of these nations are more dependent on imported oil than we are. Their vulnerability increases our own vulnerability. We cannot let our energy problems tear down relationships which have taken us years to build. Rather,we are determined to find cooperative solutions to our mutual energy problems and by so doing to turn energy into a force which will unify, not divide, us.

Our urgent tasks are to reduce our vulnerability to sudden supply interruption and price increases and to make an orderly transition to a world economy less dependent on oil. We have been making some progress on these issues in the International Energy Agency (IEA) and at the annual economic summit meetings.

Since 1974, the IEA nations have had an emergency oil-sharing system for use in the event of major disruptions. In 1979, however, we learned that even a relatively small shortfall could, under conditions of uncertainty, lead to sharp increases in the world price of oil, with painful effects on our economies. Since the onset of the Iranian crisis, we have developed a flexible system for responding to oil-market disturbances which are not large enough to trigger the IEA emergency sharing system. In March 1979 the IEA nations agreed to reduce their collective demand for oil on the world market by 2 mm b/d. Although reduction did not take place fast enough to cool off a steaming oil market right away, our restraint was helpful in slowing down the pace of oil price increases throughout the first half of this year and in encouraging moderate oil producers to maintain responsible production levels. Without the IEA action, prices would probably have increased even more.

To replace the creative but improvised response to the oil crisis of 1979, the May 1980 IEA meeting at ministerial level established an ongoing system of oil-import yardsticks and ceilings designed to improve our ability to deal with tight oil markets. Under this system, the IEA nations will establish national oil-import "yardsticks" each year. These yardsticks will be based largely on projections of oil requirements. In normal circumstances these yardsticks will be used to monitor each nation's performance in reducing oil imports. If the oil market tightens, the IEA nations will consider converting the yardsticks into politically binding oil-import ceilings. Nations would be expected to use effective energy policy measures to restrain demand for oil to levels compatible with their national ceilings.

The United States and its allies have also made progress toward the longrun goal of reducing imports and thus facilitating the transition of the world economy away from its heavy dependence on oil. At the Tokyo summit last June, we pushed for strong commitments on limiting medium-term oil imports and achieved the following results.

- The United States adopted as a goal 1985 imports not to exceed the 1977 level of 8.5 mm b/d.
- Japan agreed to limit 1985 imports to between 6.3 and 6.9 mm b/d.
- Canada agreed to limit 1985 imports to 0.6 mm b/d or less.
- France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom agreed to limit 1985 imports to the 1978 figure.

At the December 1979 IEA ministerial meeting, all IEA nations adopted national oil import goals for 1985. At the May 1980 IEA ministerial meeting, IEA nations agreed that it would be necessary to undershoot substantially these 1985 goals. The United States and the IEA Secretariat believe that a reduction of 4 mm b/d for the IEA as a group is both necessary and achievable.

At the May 1980 IEA ministerial, IEA nations for the first time established energy objectives for 1990. They agreed to take action to limit the ratio between energy growth and economic growth to 0.6. (Before the oil crisis the ratio had been about 1.0). They also

World Crude Oil Production

(excluding natural gas liquids)

(thousand b/d)	1978	1979
WORLD	**60,190**	**62,400**
Non-Communist countries	**46,425**	**48,370**
Developed countries	**12,170**	**12,745**
United States	8,700	8,535
Canada	1,315	1,495
United Kingdom	1,080	1,570
Norway	355	405
Other	720	740
Non-OPEC LDCs	**4,455**	**4,915**
Mexico	1,215	1,460
Egypt	485	525
Other	2,755	2,930
OPEC	**29,800**	**30,710**
Algeria	1,160	1,135
Ecuador	200	215
Gabon	210	205
Indonesia	1,635	1,590
Iran	5,240	3,035
Iraq	2,560	3,435
Kuwait[1]	1,895	2,215
Libya	1,985	2,065
Neutral Zone[2]	475	565
Nigeria	1,895	2,305
Qatar	485	505
Saudi Arabia[1]	8,065	9,250
United Arab Emirates	1,830	1,835
Abu Dhabi	*1,445*	*1,465*
Dubai	*365*	*355*
Sharjah	*20*	*15*
Venezuela	2,165	2,355
Communist countries	**13,765**	**14,030**
U.S.S.R.	11,215	11,470
China	2,080	2,120
Other	470	440

[1] Excluding Neutral Zone production, which is shown separately.

[2] Production is shared equally between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Are you studying the matter? Do you have any thoughts on what else the United States could provide?

A. Resources, as I think those of you who attend these conferences regularly know, are very limited at the present time because of the failure of Congress to enact a foreign aid appropriations bill in fiscal year 1980 and the generally negative climate on Capitol Hill to such programs. If the Poles decide to place their problem before us and to seek our assistance, we certainly will consider their request. But I must say at the moment our resources are limited except for the CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation] grants that we approved. And, incidentally, those were approved at a higher level than we've ever approved before.

Q. There seems to be a slight difference in the mood, at least, of what you have said here and what President Carter said earlier today. Let me ask the question in a slightly different way. The President was quoted as saying: "They are making statements"—meaning people in Iran—"that might very well lead to the resolution of this problem in the near future." Do you agree with that statement by the President?

A. I could, I think, if my memory were precise enough, identify maybe a half dozen statements that have been made by one Iranian leader or another over the last month which might very well lead. But that isn't, I don't think, phraseology to suggest either optimism or pessimism. It's a rather obvious conclusion. It might, but the reverse is also true: It might not.

Q. Would you recommend a trilateral meeting among the Egyptians, the Israelis, and Americans while Ali [Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali] and Shamir [Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir] are in Washington this week?

A. Would I recommend what?

Q. Trilateral talks among the Americans, the Israelis, and the Egyptians this week in Washington. And what, in your opinion, can be the outcome of such talks?

A. We would hope that the bilateral talks, with which the present initiative will begin, will lead to trilateral talks and then to the formal reopening of negotiations somewhat later. The pace of that movement, I think, will depend upon the first talks, then the second talks, and then the third. I don't think it would be particularly helpful for me to identify which talks ought to then lead to the trilaterals. That's part of the objective.

Q. At the World Energy Conference meeting in Munich that just concluded, European and Third World leaders were extremely critical of Administration policy toward nuclear energy, saying that it had foreign policy implications, that the Carter Administration's explicit stand against aggressive nuclear energy development in this country and around the world had implications that went very far. The people who made these statements included Chancellor Schmidt.

Are they wrong to see the Administration's policy toward nuclear energy as reflecting a broader antigrowth policy of this Administration? That is, do you disagree with their charges, or will you try to convince Europe of your policies?

And, secondly, because the Third World leaders made a very direct connection between the antigrowth policies of this Administration and the deterioration of the situation in the Third World, I'd like to ask you, at this point, what the United States is going to recommend or what we will vote on in terms of the seating of Pol Pot at the United Nations?

A. Number one, with respect to the Nonproliferation Treaty and the meeting which is just concluded, may I point out the positive side of that. The meeting concluded with all parties in support of the Nonproliferation Treaty and its objectives, including the United States.

When you referred to our antigrowth policy, I'm not sure whether you were referring to anti-nonproliferation policy or anti-economic growth policy. Economic growth was not involved in negotiations on the Nonproliferation Treaty.

With respect to some of the issues that were discussed in the treaty—and there were a number of them—some of them were raised for the purpose of advancing the cause of nonproliferation; some of them I would describe as being more political in motivation. But, in any case, it was not possible, after an extensive effort, to reach agreement. Opposition did not stem only from the United States; there were opponents to some of the specific proposals from other sources. I regret that more was not done. We made an effort, and we made a last-minute effort, to try to move the conference toward a declaration which all nations could join.

With respect to the concern of the non-nuclear states that the major powers had not moved as they committed themselves to move in the Nonproliferation Treaty toward a comprehensive test ban and toward the reduction of nuclear arms, I sympathize altogether with their concern that we haven't moved in those directions. We know that, in our country, the SALT II Treaty has not been advanced and is awaiting ratification suggests that we, perhaps, are not as committed as we ought to be to the objectives of the Nonproliferation Treaty. I can only assure those who are interested in knowing that that is this Administration's commitment as soon as it is feasible.

I'm not sure what you meant with your nongrowth question, so maybe you'll get another chance.

Q. Is the United States now in the early stages of a negotiation with Iran to seek the release of the hostages?

A. No.

Q. We're not yet there? Because for so many months, it had been stated here that you were looking for the formation of an Iranian Government with which you could then negotiate.

A. Let me say this: After the fact, one is able to identify the roots of a negotiating process which may have been laid, say, 2 months ago prior to this date. I have not yet recognized it as such. I mean, when we have a number of channels opened and are trying to communicate messages of one kind or another, one never knows when one of those suggestions takes root and blossoms out into the kind of contact that results in negotiations. But that link has not yet been made.

The question that was raised earlier about a 3-month negotiation having been underway seems to have originated in one of those indirect channels that, from

somebody's perception, looked like a negotiation. Well, it was not.

Q. The Speaker of the Iranian Parliament is quoted as saying that it is now America's turn, ". . . if it has the good will vis-a-vis the hostages, to prove its sincerity in action." Does the United States now believe that there is any action that it could take to advance the cause of getting the hostages released?

A. I think action to get the hostages released involves mutuality. Unilateral action is not likely to do it. We learned something of that earlier this year.

Q. I have several questions that flow from your opening statement with regard to the Indian reactor Tarapur. Before I get to those, though, the question that was left on the table back here was about Pol Pot, whether you have made up your mind yet what to do about that? I'd like to just pose that to you.

And regarding the Indian matter, have the Indians told the United States that they will take any of the actions that you suggest they might take if the United States does not ship the fuel—that is to say, abandon the safeguards previously agreed to, reprocess the fuel which is available, and so on? Does your statement that they might do so tend to legitimatize the possibility that they could take some action if Congress does not agree to ship the fuel? And what would the U.S. position be if Congress refuses to do as you and the President suggest, and the Indians then think about abandoning the agreement they made in 1963?

A. First, "if they abandon the treaty," your question presupposes that we would have abandoned it first, so the word "abandonment," with respect to India's response to such abandonment on our part, I don't think is a very fair definition of the proposition.

With respect to what the Indians might do, they have not uttered any threats, but the Indian options which the 1963 agreement foreclosed are clear. And if the agreement is no longer binding on us, it is surely a fair assumption that they might consider it no longer binding on them. And if it is no longer binding on them, then the specific provisions to which my statement refers could well be aborted; we ought to assume that.

The opponents of the shipments make speculative arguments about Indian behavior or performance, but the argument I make is not a speculative one. I'm making an argument based on a very simple proposition: If one party to an agreement abandons it, the other party surely is free not to feel bound by it.

With respect to the Kampuchean credentials question, anticipating that I might just conceivably be asked this question, I have the following statement to make.

In the event that the credentials of the Democratic Kampuchean regime are challenged at the U.N. General Assembly, the United States will again vote to support the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) position in favor of the continued seating of that regime.

Our decision on this question was reached after careful consultation with our friends and allies, particularly those Southeast Asian countries most concerned about the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. We support the ASEAN position on the grounds that the Democratic Kampuchean regime has been seated by all General Assemblies since 1975, and there still is no superior claimant for the seat.

The seating of the current regime in Phnom Penh, the Heng Samrin administration, which was installed and is maintained by 200,000 Vietnamese troops, would indicate international acceptance of a government imposed by foreign aggression in violation of the U.N. Charter.

This decision is also based on our conclusion, based on careful diplomatic soundings, that Vietnam has not shown a willingness to negotiate concerning the central issues of the Kampuchean question—the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea—and self-determination for the Khmer as called for by the U.N. General Assembly last year.

Our position on the U.N. credentials issue is consistent with our objective of working actively with the ASEAN nations and with all U.N. member states to seek a permanent settlement in Cambodia which satisfies the aspirations of the Khmer people as well as the interests of all countries in the region.

This position, on the technical question of U.N. credentials, in no way implies any support or recognition of the Democratic Kampuchean regime. We abhor and condem the regime's human rights record and would never support its return to power in Phnom Penh. Our policy is to work for the termination of all forms of foreign intervention in Cambodia and for the emergence of a genuinely neutral government in Phnom Penh.

Our position on this issue cannot and will not restore the Democratic Kampuchean regime to power, but our vote can prevent legitimization of a government installed by aggression and maintained by the presence of an invading army.

Q. On Vietnam: Is it correct to assume that, in the light of the latest statement as well as other pronouncements earlier, a precondition for any progress in normalization or negotiations with Vietnam is withdrawal from Kampuchea, or is there any other linked issue which would first have to be resolved before you can progress in the normalizaiton process with Vietnam which was begun sometime ago?

A. We think the objective, consistent with the position of the ASEAN countries, is a political settlement in Kampuchea; the terms of that settlement, obviously, must emerge out of negotiations which the Vietnamese have been unwilling to undertake.

Q. We probably will not see you before you see Foreign Minister Gromyko. Could you tell us what you expect to accomplish out of that meeting? And is there a disagreement now with the Soviet Union over whether forward-based systems are a fit agenda item in TNF [theater nuclear forces] negotiations, and what are the prospects for those negotiations getting started, either before or after November?

A. It's a short timeframe, at best. It seems longer to some than to others.

With respect to my meeting with Mr. Gromyko on the TNF issue, I would expect that we would reach agreement on the time for beginning the talks on that subject, a place, the date—and my staff urge me not to use this word, but I will just to indicate that I'm slowly becoming a diplomat—the modalities of the meeting. So I would expect that we will reach agreement on those points.

Granting Political Asylum Abroad

by William T. Lake

Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 29, 1980. Mr. Lake is Deputy Legal Adviser.[1]

I am pleased to appear on behalf of the Department of State this morning to discuss the U.S. policy with respect to granting asylum in U.S. diplomatic premises abroad. I will summarize that policy briefly and then explain the considerations, both legal and practical, that underlie it. Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, William C. Harrop will then describe the events following the recent coup in Liberia that led up to the executions of a number of former Liberian Government officials [July 1980 BULLETIN, p. 18].

U.S. policy in this area is set forth in regulations in the Department of State's Foreign Affairs Manual and was published in full in the *Federal Register* in 1972. We have provided those documents to the committee.

Chief Elements of the Policy

First, the United States does not grant asylum at its embassies or at other installations within the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign state. Likewise, diplomatic and consular affairs officers are not authorized to extend asylum to persons who are not members of the officers' official or personal households. Any request for asylum that is received in the field must be reported immediately to Washington, but the policy is not to grant such requests.

At the same time, U.S. embassies are authorized to grant temporary refuge for humanitarian reasons in extreme or exceptional circumstances when the life or safety of a person is put in immediate danger, such as pursuit by a mob.

Any decision to grant temporary refuge must be made by the senior U.S. official present at the embassy, who must take into consideration the possibility that that decision may pose a danger to the safety of U.S. personnel. When the period of active danger to the individual has ended, temporary refuge is to be terminated after the embassy obtains authorization from the Department.

It is important to add that if a violent coup or similar event disrupts the normal processes of the host government and creates a danger that it may deal unfairly and summarily with some of its citizens, we do bring to bear all possible diplomatic and consular resources to try to assure that those individuals receive due process. The chief weapon on which an embassy must rely in such a situation is the power of persuasion.

The policy I have just outlined was reexamined and reaffirmed in 1977 following a study prepared for the National Security Council on the Latin American practice of granting diplomatic asylum. A year later, in 1978, the policy was again carefully reviewed, following incidents with a group of dissidents at our embassy in Bucharest and with the Pentecostalists in Moscow. It was concluded that the present policy is the proper one.

The United States has adhered to its policy of not granting asylum throughout the many violent coups and changes of government of the past decade. To the best of my knowledge, the case of Cardinal Mindszenty,[2] dating from 1956 to 1971, and the continuing accommodation of the Pentecostalists in Moscow, a situation in no way involving a change of government, are the only arguably contrary examples in recent history. I cannot provide you with statistics on past instances in which diplomatic asylum was actually requested and refused. This is next to impossible because of limitations on the storage of records at the State Department plus the difficulty in actual practice of distinguishing between an alien's inquiry into the possibility of territorial asylum, that is, asylum within the United States, and an inquiry about potential diplomatic asylum in the embassy. The chief of our asylum unit estimates, however, that each year our posts abroad receive up to 150 requests for asylum, either territorial or diplomatic.

U.S. policy in this area comports with the practice of most other states. Other states generally do not follow a practice, or assert a right, to use their diplomatic premises in this country or elsewhere as places of asylum. The most notable exception is the somewhat erratic practice of Latin American countries in allowing their embassies in other Latin American countries to provide asylum to political refugees. Even in Latin America the practice of granting diplomatic asylum has not been consistent over the years or from country to country, and the practice has not gained acceptance outside Latin America.

Reasons for Declining Asylum

The reasons for the U.S. practice of declining to grant diplomatic asylum are both legal and practical.

- On the legal side, our embassies abroad exist to perform diplomatic functions, and they receive special protections from international law to allow them to perform those functions. The granting of asylum is not recognized as a diplomatic function under customary international law or the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which both the United States and Liberia are parties.

To use our embassies as havens for asylum of nationals of the host country might invite charges that we are violating article 41 of the Vienna convention, which prohibits diplomatic personnel from interfering in the internal affairs of the host country and from using embassy premises in any way that's incompatible with the functions of the embassy.

- There are also compelling practical considerations. **First,** if we were to grant diplomatic asylum and the host country refused to permit safe conduct of the persons out of the country, the embassy would be faced with the dilemma of either accommodating the persons within the embassy for an indefinite period of time or else turning them over to the authorities.

The publicized example of Cardinal Mindszenty illustrates the dangers in this area.

Second, the residence within an embassy of persons hostile to the government of the host country would constitute a continual source of friction and controversy and would be extremely detrimental to our normal diplomatic relations. In fact, the possibility that mobs—either with or without government approval—would, however unlawfully, storm the embassy to capture such persons cannot be discounted, particularly, in light of recent events in Tehran, Tripoli, and Islamabad.

Third, since diplomatic asylum could never be granted in more than a few cases, the United States would be placed in the difficult position not only of having to deny most requests for asylum but also of having to justify granting asylum in some cases and denying it in others.

There is reason to believe that if the United States began a policy of granting diplomatic asylum, our embassies abroad could quickly become the preferred sanctuaries. In any country, the U.S. embassy generally has a special prominence which would attract persons seeking refuge. The claims of asylum would force us to distinguish among an almost limitless variety of factual situations—persons seeking asylum primarily as a means of acquiring U.S. visas, persons seeking to avoid ordinary criminal charges, and persons with various types of real political grievances.

We would need procedures and facilities for dealing with possibly large numbers of cases, particularly in the event of major, violent change in a government. The need to decide who is entitled to diplomatic asylum would thrust the United States directly into political judgments concerning events in the country involved.

Thus, a policy of allowing diplomatic asylum would expose us to charges of interference in internal affairs and would complicate greatly our emerging relations with new regimes—whether left, right, or centrist.

A final and important consideration is how the United States would respond if the situation were reversed—that is, if a foreign embassy in this country sought to give diplomatic asylum to persons sought by U.S.authorities. We might, for example, be faced with a situation in which a foreign embassy offered diplomatic asylum to political terrorists. We do not believe that the U.S. Government—or the American public—would tolerate such action by a foreign government.

Conclusion

Finally, I would like to stress again the important function that a U.S. embassy can play in a country, such as Liberia, that is going through violent change. The role that our embassies are equipped to play is to provide a calming and steadying influence on a new government, to remind it as often and as forcefully as necessary that it has obligations to its citizens and to the international community and that the world is watching to see that it respects those obligations. That diplomatic role can be extremely important at such critical times, and we should be loath to take any steps that, although intended to protect human rights, might actually diminish the role our diplomats can play in protecting those rights.

Review of Human Rights in Latin America

by Patricia M. Derian

Address prepared for presentation to the Center for Inter-American Relations in New York on April 24, 1980. Ms. Derian is Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

I am glad that you have chosen to discuss human rights in the Latin American context. It is both relevant and important. A popular theme we often hear in these first few months of 1980 is how some objective, product, or issue relates to the decade of the 1980s. This theme is particularly appropriate to describe concern for human rights, which I can firmly state has come of age and will continue to be a priority issue as we move through this period, not only in our country but worldwide.

Concern for the individual's right to enjoy civil, political, and economic freedoms are fundamental principles which we hold in common with many governments in this hemisphere. More importantly, they are principles with which the peoples of the Americas identify.

President Carter reaffirmed this government's deep commitment to human rights and to meeting human needs in his State of the Union address on January 23 when he stated that it ". . . is in our own national interest as well as part of our own national character." Secretary Vance, in a statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 27, noted that ". . . we pursue our human rights objectives not only because they are right but because we have a stake in the stability that comes when people can express their hopes and find their futures freely. Our ideals and our interests coincide."

Is it compatible with national security interests? Of course. It has always been understood that human rights policy operates in tandem with our pursuit of other interests. Secretary Vance addressed this point in the same statement mentioned earlier. He said that:

> We must constantly weigh how best to encourage the advancement of human rights while maintaining our ability to conduct essential business with governments—even unpopular ones—in countries where we have important security interests.
>
> But the fact remains that over the longer term, our pursuit of human rights is not only generally compatible with our national security, it contributes to that security.

There is much evidence to support the emergence of human rights as a major priority in our hemisphere. We have seen substantial progress regarding both personal and political rights, significant actions by both governments and international bodies, and more precise attention given to serious problems which still need alleviating.

In 1979 Ecuador and Bolivia installed civilian governments; Bolivia averted renewed efforts to install a military government. Peru adopted a new Constitution. Brazil maintained a steady course of liberalization. There was a decline in violations of the integrity of the person in countries where abuses have been most serious. Fewer disappearances occurred in Argentina. Cases of prolonged arbitrary detention were down in Chile. The Uruguayan Armed Forces adopted apparently effective internal measures to stop the use of torture. Cuba released about 3,900 political prisoners. But, as we have recently seen in the sad situation of thousands of Cubans seeking asylum

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In recent years, we have, on a number of occasions, explained to Members of the Congress our policy against diplomatic asylum. In just the last 2 years, letters on the subject were sent to Senator [Edward] Kennedy, to Congressman [J. Kennedy] Robinson, to Congressman [Andrew] Maguire, and to Congressman [Dante] Fascell. And we, of course, welcome this occasion to discuss the policy with the members of this committee. We continue to believe that our policy is the proper one, that it conforms with our obligations under international law, and that it serves the long-term interests of the United States.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

[2] Jozsef Mindszenty, Hungarian prelate and Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church who spent 15 years living in the U.S. Embassy in Budapest. ■

U.S.-Libyan Relations Since 1969

by David D. Newsom

Statement before the Subcommittee to Investigate Individuals Representing Interests of Foreign Governments of the Senate Judiciary Committee on August 4, 1980. Ambassador Newsom is Under Secretary for Political Affairs.[1]

I am here to respond to the subcommittee's request for a review of the relations of the United States with Libya since Col. Qadhafi came into power in September 1969. The Department of State wishes to cooperate fully with the subcommittee in its inquiry, and I am here in that spirit.

My own connection with Libya goes back to 1962, when I became Director of the Office of North African Affairs in the Department. I subsequently served as Ambassador to Libya from 1964 until the summer of 1969, leaving Libya just 3 months before the revolution which brought Col. Qadhafi to power. But I was not to leave association with Libya, because I then became Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and at that time the responsibility for Libya was in that bureau. In my present position, I have dealt closely with many of the recent aspects of our relationship with Libya.

This afternoon I would like to begin with a short sketch of Libya and then discuss in more detail and in response to the subcommittee's request our interests in Libya, the main features of the current U.S.-Libyan relationship, and the principal problems that we encounter in that relationship.

Libya: Past and Present

This sparsely populated desert country, which is almost three times the size of Texas with 2.5 million people, today has many of the relics of its mixed and turbulent history: as an extension of ancient Carthage, as a major outpost of the Roman Empire, as the invasion path of tribes from the Arabian Peninsula, as the site of some of the pirates who preyed on the commerce of the young United States. As an Italian colony, it was part of Mussolini's dream of a Mediterranean empire, and the charred tanks and unspent explosives which litter the Libyan desert today are reminders of the battles between Rommel and Montgomery.

In 1951, under U.N. auspices, Libya became independent. A king, Idris, was chosen, who was at the same time head of an Islamic religious order, the Senussis. A poor country until commercial oil production began in 1962, Libya lived at that time with the help of substantial aid from the United States and Britain. Each country had, during that period, as part of that cooperation an air base in Libya.

Even in the period of King Idris, certain attitudes were present in Libya which today have become more pronounced: a bitter resentment against the establishment of the State of Israel, strong support for the Arab cause, a fervent attachment to Islam, and a degree of xenophobia.

When Col. Qadhafi and his young fellow officers overthrew the King in September 1969, these attitudes intensified and became integral elements of Libyan policy. The young officers believed that the influence of the United States and Britain had prevented Libya from playing its rightful role in the struggle against Israel, and particularly in the 1967 war. They vowed to change that by closing the British and American bases in Libya, by acquiring large quantities of arms, and by supporting anti-Israel and revolutionary causes everywhere.

The Libyan leaders saw in their oil wells the opportunity to support not only Palestinian and Islamic movements everywhere but many revolutionary movements and particularly any cause which they believed would weaken traditional Arab kingdoms or would be directed at Britain or the United States. What we call terrorism, they call revolution.

On the Palestinian question, Libya under Qadhafi has taken an extreme position. Qadhafi has, in recent months, publicly called upon Palestinian groups to attack Egyptian, Israeli, and American targets in the Middle East. In addition to helping Palestinian groups, the Libyans have provided money, training, and, in some cases, arms to virtually any group around the world which asserts revolutionary credentials, including the Moro insurgents in the southern Philippines, the provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army, the Japanese Red Army, and certain African organizations. In the immediate area of Libya, activities have included support for various factions in the Chadian civil war and for the Polisario in its struggle against Morocco in the Western Sahara.

Qadhafi has also sought to develop a whole new theory of government; namely, that government is unnecessary and that the people could rule. People's committees are taking the place of traditional organs of government. Diplomats are a relic of the past to him; he has recently established, instead, People's Bureaus which represent the Libyan people to many countries, including the United States.

U.S. Interests in Libya

But despite the many problems which exist in our relations with Libya, the United States has important reasons for seeking to find a basis for satisfactory relations, and our policy choices are not easy ones. We cannot remain indifferent to the activities and orientation of a nation which is strategically situated on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, located between two nations—Egypt and Tunisia—with which we have close and particularly friendly relations.

There is an American community of between 2,000 and 2,500 people resident in Libya, connected both with oil production and other projects important to Libya's economic and social well-being and to the trade between the two countries. There is a mutuality of interest in the continuation and security of that community.

We have important energy interests in Libya. The United States receives approximately 10.8% of its imported oil supplies from Libya. This equals about 700,000 barrels a day and makes Libya our third largest supplier, after Saudi Arabia and Nigeria. The United States is Libya's largest single customer, and our purchases account for almost 40% of Libya's total production each year. It is low sulphur, light density oil of high value for gasoline production.

The Libyan economy is almost totally dependent upon oil revenues for its income. It relies heavily upon American and other Western companies for the production and the distribution of that oil.

There are currently over 50 American companies in Libya, the majority of them in oil or in oil-related fields. Over half of Libya's total oil production is in the hands of American companies, and all

of Libya's liquefied natural gas production is accounted for by one American company, Exxon.

In addition to the United States, Libya supplies oil to West Germany (14% of production), Italy (13%), France (3%), and a small but growing amount to the Soviet Union. The United States receives no liquefied natural gas from Libya, but Spain relies upon Libya for 80% of its liquefied natural gas and Italy for 40% of its supply.

In price deliberations in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Libya has been a hawk. Its current $37 per barrel price is at the upper limit of official OPEC prices. Libya has also been a strong advocate of production cutbacks as a means to husband a limited resource and to maintain price levels.

Statements have been attributed to Col. Qadhafi from time to time that because of political differences Libya might embargo oil sales to the United States. We cannot dismiss totally this possibility. To date, however, Libya has seen the oil relationship as mutually beneficial.

We also have important general trade interests in Libya. Given the high volume of U.S. oil purchases from Libya, which may surpass $9 billion in 1980, we may be running a bilateral balance-of-payment deficit of around $8.5 billion this year. In 1979 Libya purchased $468 million from the United States, and 1980 figures are likely to show little, if any, improvement. With its high oil revenues and its major development programs, Libya represents a valuable potential market for American products and services, but both strong European competition and Libyan official attitudes are currently obstacles to an increase in trade.

Main Features of the U.S.-Libyan Relationship

Aftermath of Revolution. As I said at the outset, immediately following the 1969 revolution, the leaders of the new Libyan Government closely identified the United States with the deposed Idris monarchy and with support for the Government of Israel. Libyan attitudes toward any government which had enjoyed a privileged position in that country before the revolution were marked by great suspicion and even hostility. The new government in the first year expelled almost all of the last members of the old Italian colonial community and closed first the British military base at Tobruk and then, on June 11, 1970, the U.S. Air Force Base at Wheelus.

In the early days of the revolution, our then Ambassador to Libya, Joseph Palmer, had some brief talks with Col. Qadhafi and his deputy, Maj. Jallud. After the closure of Wheelus, these contacts ceased, and Ambassador Palmer found over the next 2 years that it was virtually impossible to communicate directly with the senior levels of the Libyan Government. This difficulty has generally continued until the present time.

Terrorism. During this period, Libyan criticism of U.S. Middle East policy grew increasingly vocal and strident. Libyan support for revolutionary movements and for groups carrying on international terrorism grew, exemplified by the sanctuary which Libyans gave to the perpetrators of the terrorist attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972.

In consequence of these and other similar problems in our relations with Libya, we decided in early 1973 that we would not appoint a successor to Ambassador Palmer, who had, meanwhile, returned to the United States. From that point until our Embassy in Tripoli was temporarily closed on May 2, 1980, U.S.-Libyan relations in Tripoli have been conducted at the level of charge d'affaires.

Military Equipment. Because of Libya's support for international terrorism and subversive activities and its interference in the internal affairs of other countries, we also decided in 1973 to disapprove the sale to Libya of military weaponry and certain other equipment and products which could add significantly to Libya's military capability.

That policy was the basis for our decision to block the export of eight C–130s to Libya in 1973, despite the fact that Libya had paid for them. I should say that Libya already had eight other C–130s which were acquired through contracts signed by the prerevolutionary regime. It remains our policy to the present not to sell military equipment to Libya.

Nationalization. A further complication in U.S.-Libya relations was the Libyan decision, starting in 1973, partially to nationalize American and other Western oil companies operating in Libya on the basis that the contracts negotiated by the previous regime had been too favorable to the foreign companies. Non-American, as well as American, companies were involved. This process was a turbulent one, and several companies closed their Libyan operations.

By the late 1970s, however, most claims had been settled, and the American companies there had largely come to an acceptable working relationship with the Libyans.

Peace Process. Libya's relations with Egypt deteriorated after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, as Egypt moved closer to the United States. In July 1977 the two countries were involved in a brief but intense military conflict. President Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem produced vitriolic Libyan criticism, and Libya has pursued a policy firmly rejecting all that has flowed out of our Middle East peace negotiations. It promotes and finances opposition to the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israel Peace Treaty, as well as Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which form the basis of the Camp David accords. On several occasions, Col. Qadhafi has called for a solution involving "the expulsion from Palestine of all Jews who arrived after 1947." We can and we do have differences with other Arab states on the peace process. But with Libya, the differences are more profound and involve active and often violent opposition to the process of peace.

Aircraft Sales. Commercial aircraft sales, largely for Libya's scheduled international air routes, have been a prominent element in our relationship. Starting in the early 1970s, we allowed the export of civilian commercial aircraft, such as Boeing 727s and 707s.

We made a distinction between commercial aircraft and military aircraft, such as the C–130s, which we had refused to license. In March 1978, however, in a signal intended to underline our opposition to certain of Libya's policies and certain of its activities, the Department of State recommended to the Department of Commerce that licenses not be issued for two Boeing 727s, which were then on order for the Libyan Arab Airlines.

Decisions on matters of this kind are always difficult. Significant U.S. commercial interests are involved, not only in the particular sale but in the maintenance of a market against increasingly strong European competition in commercial aircraft. Also market conditions and the growth and route structure of Libyan Arab Airlines made it clear that use of these aircraft was justified economically.

In June 1978, recommendations from within the Department that the Department's earlier decision be reviewed and reconsidered were sent to Secretary Vance. The Department of Commerce supported reconsideration on the basis of

Ministry of Foreign Affairs had authorized him to reply that the report of the 400 remains "was completely untrue, spread with ill-intention, and aimed at creating further complications to the relations between our two countries and to the search itself for the Americans MIA." He added: ". . . it was a tendentious fabrication, and even opinion among American political circles was also skeptical about the single source of spreading speculation. I therefore believe there is no sound justification for a serious concern in the United States as it was said in your letter." Ambassador Lau recalled the earlier return of remains of 73 Americans and stated that the Vietnamese ". . . continue the search although the American side has not only failed to respond to that gesture of goodwill on the part of the Vietnamese side but also pursued a policy of overt hostility against Vietnam. . . ." He concluded by noting that the Vietnamese were still considering the subject of allowing American experts to travel to Hanoi and would advise us at a convenient time.

On March 27, Deputy Assistant Secretary Negroponte, accompanied by Brig. Gen. T.C. Pinckney of DOD/ISA [International Security Affairs], raised the report of 400 remains again during a call on Ambassador Lau. It was raised during a lengthy discussion of the entire issue of accounting for missing Americans. Gen. Pinckney also discussed four specific cases with Ambassador Lau and left with him materials, including photographs, press stories, and other identifying data on each case. Ambassador Lau said that his government would review the material, and he would reply at a later date.

In mid-March we were advised of the results of an earlier effort on the MIA question. The text of House Concurrent Resolution 10, sponsored by this committee and adopted by the House of Representatives on July 9, 1979, called for the Secretary of State to seek the good offices of the Secretary General of the United Nations for the purpose of establishing a special investigatory commission charged with the responsibility of securing a full accounting of Americans listed as missing in Southeast Asia. Through our U.N. mission, the Secretary promptly transmitted the text of the resolution to the Secretary General, who in turn transmitted the resolution to the Vietnamese mission at the United Nations. In addition, the Secretary General instructed one of his special representatives to discuss the matter directly with the Vietnamese during a visit to Hanoi.

The special representative raised the subject with senior officials of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They responded by stating that the Government of Vietnam had done all that was needed to trace the missing Americans, that the U.S. Government was fully aware of the Vietnamese position, that they were, nevertheless, continuing their efforts, and that they would not fail to inform the U.S. Government if new evidence were found. The representative raised the idea of establishing a special investigatory commission with responsibility for securing a full accounting of Americans listed as missing. The Vietnamese did not accept this proposal. Nonetheless, we continue to use the U.N. channel, and in early April, for instance, we sent background information on the report of the 400 remains to the Secretary General for his use in making further inquiries into the matter.

Laos

I would like now to turn to the MIA situation in Laos. All of you are aware, I believe, that the United States has consistently pressed the Lao Government for further information on Americans missing in Laos. The Woodcock Commission visited Laos in March 1977 as well as Vietnam. A number of congressional delegations have visited Laos since then and have also stressed to senior Lao officials the deep concern of the American people. In October 1978, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke traveled to Vientiane and met with Lao President Souphanouvong and other officials to restate the importance which we attach to obtaining full Lao cooperation relating to the provision of information on missing U.S. personnel in Laos. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke also met with acting Foreign Minister Khamphai Boupha last October 4 in New York, as he mentioned in his testimony last year, and emphasized the importance of this issue to the American people, the Congress, and the Administration.

When he met with you last October, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke also noted that our new Chargé in Laos, Leo J. Moser, was talking with Lao officials about this matter during his initial calls in Vientiane and would continue to do so throughout his assignment there.

Over the past 9 months the Chargé has been very active on this issue. Not only did he raise it during his initial round of calls, he has vigorously pursued the matter throughout his time there. He has reported on his efforts at some length, and we have tried to keep you posted on major developments. The Embassy staff has been able to travel in recent months somewhat more than had been possible for a number of years; this was helpful in getting a feel for conditions outside of Vientiane.

In January 1980, Deputy Assistant Secretary Negroponte visited Laos together with JCRC liaison officer Lt. Col. Paul Mather. While they were there, they raised the subject with Lao Foreign Ministry Deputy Secretary General Soukthavone Keola and specifically requested that periodic meetings be held to exchange MIA information. The Embassy and other visiting officials have continued to raise the matter at every appropriate opportunity.

In the course of the discussions Mr. Moser and other members of his staff have had with Lao officials at all levels, we have stressed the continuing importance of obtaining the fullest possible accounting for Americans killed or missing in Laos. The Lao have generally replied that they hope for an improvement in U.S.-Lao relations. They have reviewed the past efforts of their government, including the return of nine American prisoners from Laos in 1973 and the recovery and return of four sets of remains in August 1978. They have discussed the difficulties encountered in searching for remains and their limited resources for the task. They have expressed their experience that it is difficult to motivate people to search for remains but have also said that they would continue to look for remains.

In February our Embassy initiated an exchange of notes with the Lao Foreign Ministry. I would like to quote, for the record, the substantive parts of the Lao response:

"The LPDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic] has returned all American prisoners of war, and at present, to the knowledge of the Laotian Government, there are no longer any Americans in Laos under the category of 'deserters,' such as criminal prisoners, 'former Americans who have opted for Laotian nationality,' or under any other such category."

As our Embassy noted, the Lao statement considerably amplifies previous assertions on Americans in Laos

and covers such categories as "deserters." The Embassy also noted that they would energetically pursue any indication that POWs may, in fact, remain in Laos.

I will not go into great detail on all of the Embassy's efforts on this matter. I do want you to be aware of the great energy that the Embassy staff and Chargé Moser have brought to this effort.

There is one particular subject that has recently engaged a great deal of the Embassy's attention that I would like to mention specifically. The Embassy has been aware of the possibility that the Military Museum in Vientiane might have information on Americans that would help advance the accounting process. The museum, however, is normally closed to foreigners and diplomats. The Embassy staff initiated a series of requests to visit the museum, which were repeatedly denied. At the same time, the Embassy asked visiting news media representatives, who sometimes could get permission to enter the museum, to be on the lookout for possible information on MIAs. Several have done so, and it appears that the museum may, indeed, have some significant information.

In light of this indication that the museum contains information which might help account for Americans lost in Laos, the Embassy has repeatedly renewed its request to visit the museum.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Negroponte raised the matter with the Lao Chargé here on May 14. We also instructed our Embassy to again approach Lao authorities for permission to visit the museum, reviewing our past efforts to seek further information, and listing Lao Government assurances that it was acting in good faith in providing to the United States all information in its possession on Americans missing in Laos. We also noted that failure of the Lao Government to provide information in its possession and failure to permit U.S. Embassy inspection of this information despite U.S. requests does not reflect the earlier assurances of the Lao Government. We repeated our longstanding request that appropriate U.S. and Lao officials meet to discuss all information which might be available or obtainable which would help in the accounting and renewed the standing invitation for a Lao delegation to visit the Joint Casualty Resolution Center/ Casualty Identification Laboratory (JCRC/CIL) in Hawaii. There has been no immediate reply on any of the points raised.

We are also preparing to request access to specific crash sites in Laos. We view our request for such access, along with our request for access to the information in the Military Museum, as a new opportunity to test Lao cooperation on MIAs and to seek a better awareness among Lao officials on the seriousness with which we regard the MIA issue and their handling of it.

We have consistently addressed the MIA accounting issue in our contacts with the Vietnamese and Lao authorities. There is no doubt that they understand that the issue is important to us. We will continue to work toward eliciting from the Vietnamese and Lao forthcoming and satisfactory cooperation in obtaining the fullest possible accounting for our missing personnel.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S.-Indonesia Nuclear Energy Agreement

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, JULY 2, 1980[1]

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, pursuant to Section 123d of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)), the text of the proposed Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy with accompanying agreed minute; my written approval, authorization, and determination concerning the agreement; and the memorandum of the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency with the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement concerning the agreement. The joint memorandum submitted to me by the Secretaries of State and Energy, which includes a summary analysis of the provisions of the agreement, and the views of the Members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are also enclosed.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, which I signed into law on March 10, 1978, calls upon me to renegotiate existing peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements in order to obtain the new provisions set forth in that Act. In my judgment, the proposed agreement for cooperation between the United States and Indonesia, together with its agreed minute, meets all statutory requirements.

I am particularly pleased to note in this connection that Indonesia deposited its instrument of accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on July 12, 1979, thereby becoming the 109th Party to that landmark treaty and cornerstone of international nonproliferation efforts. This action reflected Indonesia's commitment to international nonproliferation efforts, and marks a notable step toward the ultimate goal of universal acceptance of the objectives of the NPT.

The proposed bilateral agreement between us reflects the desire of the Government of the United States and the Government of Indonesia to update the framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation between our two countries in a manner that recognizes both the shared nonproliferation objectives and the close relationship between the United States and Indonesia. The proposed agreement will, in my view, further the non-proliferation and other foreign policy interests of the United States.

I have considered the views and recommendations of the interested agencies in reviewing the proposed agreement and have determined that its performance will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. Accordingly, I have approved the agreement and authorized its execution, and urge that the Congress give it favorable consideration.

JIMMY CARTER

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[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 7, 1980. ■

agreed to reduce the share of total energy requirements supplies by oil from 52% now to 40% by 1990.

These commitments will be strongly reinforced by actions taken at the Venice economic summit meeting. At Venice, the heads of state agreed on specific policy measures that each nation should undertake to insure a substantial reduction in oil use over the decade. They also pledged to make a coordinated and vigorous effort to increase the availability of alternative fuels by the equivalent of 15–20 mm b/d of oil over the next decade. This will require greatly expanded production of coal, nuclear, gas, synthetic fuels, and renewables. The United States intends to do its share. We have made great progress in these areas in recent years; our allies acknowledge and appreciate this. We have reduced our import levels from 8.5 mm b/d in 1977 to less than 7 mm b/d during the first half of this year. Our recent energy policy initiatives will encourage a continuation of this progress in the future.

Several problem areas remain; each nation has room to make some improvement in energy policy. At recent summit and IEA meetings, we have criticized some aspects of the energy policies of our allies; they, in turn, have pointed out areas where they feel we could make improvements. Among the most important areas in which our allies see room for improvement in U.S. policy are gasoline taxes, oil use in electricity generation, and coal exports. Our allies, most of whom impose taxes of $1–2 per gallon on gasoline, were disappointed by the defeat of the President's gasoline conservation fee. They also attach importance to the Administration proposals to encourage conversion of power plants from oil to coal and to remove obstacles to increased exports of coal.

Our efforts to establish tough objectives and to take steps to achieve them are also valued by oil producers. Many of the Persian Gulf producers are concerned about stretching the productive life of their one significant economic resource and have linked responsible price and production policies to strong efforts in conservation by the industrial nations. The developing nations also support our efforts. They fear that without restraint, our appetite for energy could crowd them out of the world oil market.

Brandt Commission Report

Finally, I would like to take up the ideas on energy proposed in February of this year by the Brandt Commission report, *North-South: A Program for Survival.* In the report, energy is part of the emergency program for the next 5 years together with the problems of resource transfers, food, and reforms of the international economic system. In fact, the emergency program calls for a major global agreement on these issues, including "an international energy strategy" that would insure "regular supplies of oil, more rigorous conservation, more predictable changes of prices, and more positive measures to develop alternative sources of energy."

The report argues that there is a strong case for an understanding between all producers and consumers, citing the particular impact of sudden rises in petroleum prices on developing countries and the fact that "no country can escape serious disruption if its supplies of oil are drastically reduced." The report calls for an agreement on energy to include: production assurances, special arrangments to insure that poorer developing countries receive adequate supplies of oil, demand restraint commitments, indexed price increases at levels which give incentives for production, guarantees of accessibility and value of financial assets, major investment in energy resource development in developing nations, increased funding for energy research, and broad international access to the fruits of that research.

The United States is interested, in principle, in undertaking constructive discussions between producers and consumers on the future of the oil market. We have made clear our interest in pursuing such talks as recently as the Venice summit, when the summit nations agreed to "welcome a constructive dialogue on energy and related issues between energy producers and consumers in order to improve the coherence of their policies."

Topics mentioned for discussion by industrialized nations or by producing nations include those listed above as well as spare oil production capacity for emergency use and cooperation in industrialization of OPEC countries. Some of these subjects would present formidable legal, political, and economic challenges. In any case, to date, the main producers have declined to enter discussions about oil price and supply and are willing to discuss other aspects of energy only when linked to other development-related international economic issues. Efforts in the United Nations to initiate discussions solely on energy, such as Mexican President Lopez Portillo's proposal last fall, have not been successful, largely because of the opposition of OPEC countries.

A comprehensive producer-consumer agreement, even if achieved, would be difficult to enforce. To hold down prices in the event of an interruption would require a buffer stock or excess capacity. But a buffer stock of adequate size would be extremely expensive and difficult to build and maintain. Excess capacity, though cheaper than holding stocks, is also very expensive to install and maintain. We could offer to help finance excess capacity, but control of this capacity would effectively rest in the hands of producers. Internal political pressure would make it difficult for OPEC nations to use this capacity to hold down prices if a serious interruption drove spot prices up rapidly. And a producer-consumer agreement would not prevent interruptions arising from political instability, such as in Iran. Any agreement on prices could, therefore, turn out to guarantee a floor price but not prevent excessive price increases. Notwithstanding these potential difficulties, we can endorse the idea of producer-consumer negotiations. We are confident that at least some progress can be made.

We are moving rapidly ahead in some areas which the Brandt Commission highlights. The report makes a strong case for major financial and technical assistance for oil and gas development in non-OPEC Third World countries, estimating that additional capital of roughly $14 billion annually is needed in the 1980s for these purposes, including $3.3 billion in official multilateral loans. We are now actively seeking ways to assist in expanding oil and gas production from non-OPEC developing countries. We have made increased assistance for energy development in energy-deficient countries a high priority item in our approach to the upcoming U.N. global negotiations and expect to receive broad support. Furthermore, the Venice summit requested the World Bank to examine the adequacy of the resources and mechanisms now in place for increased conventional and nonconventional energy development in oil-importing developing countries, to investigate ways to improve and expand its lending programs in this area, and to discuss its findings with both industrialized and oil-exporting countries.

The Brandt Commission also stresses industrialized consumer countries' responsibility in energy conservation and calls for "more ambitious targets than those agreed in 1979 at the Tokyo Summit and by the twenty members of the International Energy Agency." We have been moving in this direction. Our recent commitments at the summit and the IEA ministerial indicate that the industrial nations recognize their responsibility and are taking concrete steps to achieve unprecedented reductions in energy consumption within this decade.

Emphasis is also placed on hydroelectric development and on solar energy. We are actively engaged in preparing for the upcoming 1981 U.N. Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy which will promote use of both of these resources as well as biomass, wind energy, ocean, geothermal, oil shale and tar sands, peat, and draft animal power.

While the report is clear on the issues of development of oil and gas in developing countries and renewable energy sources, it devotes less attention to coal and nuclear energy. We would emphasize that to the extent that industrialized countries shift to coal and nuclear energy sources, there will be more leeway in international oil markets which would also benefit the oil-importing developing countries. Measures to increase production, trade, and use of coal are receiving high priority both domestically and internationally in the IEA and at recent economic summit meetings.

The Brandt report proposes the establishment of a global energy research center under U.N. auspices to coordinate information and projections and to support research on new energy resources. It is certainly to everyone's advantage to increase international cooperation on energy research. Useful mechanisms for that cooperation exist now in the IEA and in other bilateral and multilateral agreements, and we shall give serious attention to other possible means to encourage research which are broadly supported within the international community.

AMBASSADOR TWINAM

I welcome the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to discuss an issue of profound importance to U.S. strategic and economic interests—the oil policies of the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the Middle East and North Africa and U.S. policies for dealing with our interest in the region's oil resources.

The importance to our country and our allies of a secure flow of Middle East and North African oil at sustainable prices is longstanding, has increased sharply in recent years, and will continue for the foreseeable future. I cannot overemphasize the need to restrain our own dependence upon this faraway resource, and it is significant that the OPEC producers of the region support the Administration's effort to make the United States less dependent upon their oil.

It is clearly in the interest of oil consumers to have good relations with producers. Our relations with the diversity of governments in the North African and Middle Eastern oil states cover the spectrum from excellent to virtually nonexistent. The Western oil industry's loss of control to producer governments, the Arab oil embargo in 1973, and the pressures brought on world oil markets by the Iranian revolution leave no doubt that political factors can profoundly influence the availability of the region's oil and attitudes with which producing governments approach pricing and other energy issues. The quality of our overall relationships with producing governments, involving a range of political and security considerations, determine to a large extent the environment in which we seek their cooperation on energy questions. Relations among the oil producers, including the political dynamics in OPEC, also affect pricing and production decisions. Political considerations will remain an important determinant of the availability of the region's oil, as will, of course, the security of the region.

Increasingly, however, as the region's producers in the last decade have gained full control of their national oil policies, economic considerations have come to play a more complex role in price and production policies. A critical concern in this decade is that the demand for the region's oil is likely to keep pressing against the limits of the producers' willingness to provide it. The issue focuses on OPEC's leading producer, Saudi Arabia, and its gulf neighbors. The demand for their oil exceeds their demand for oil income. As a result, there are strong and intensifying pressures in these countries to conserve the principal source of national wealth.

These governments, however, have strong ties to and interests in both the industrial and the developing worlds. Hence the issue is joined on how narrowly or how broadly they define their economic interests as they make decisions on how to respond to market forces in their oil production and pricing policies.

A central task for our diplomacy in this decade will be to seek a stronger base of common economic purpose with these producers. The task involves a variety of issues:

- Conservation of energy in the United States and other industrial countries;
- Development of alternate energy resources in both the industrial and developing worlds;
- Control of inflation and stability of the dollar;
- The quest for greater international financial cooperation and more effective international economic development; and
- The transfer of technology.

Given reasonably propitious political and security environments for U.S. interests in the Middle East and North Africa, our success in dealing with these economic issues will increasingly help determine the quality of our relations with key producers, our own security and prosperity, and that of the world generally.

Political Factors

The political environment in each of the producer nations and their attitudes toward the United States and other industrial countries clearly have an impact on how each government approaches oil production and price decisions. Over the last quarter century, revolutionary regimes in the region—particularly new ones—have exhibited considerable hostility to Western oil interests, have tended to be confrontational rather than cooperative on economic issues, and generally have been "price hawks."

By contrast, Saudi Arabia and the three gulf emirates in OPEC have maintained close relationships with the United States and the United Kingdom, and our political relations with these monarchies have, except in periods of intense Arab-Israeli hostilities, generally been conducive to a cooperative approach in economic matters, including oil.

With respect to what each side would be free to discuss in those talks, I think it is premature to anticipate what that may be. And the difference of view that you expressed in your question, I presume, would be a part of that discussion.

Q. Can you conceive of any basis for improving relations with the Soviet Union without negotiations beginning with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan?

A. I think that is critical, as it has been from the beginning and will continue to be.

Q. Do you have any reason to believe that Foreign Minister Gromyko will bring any willingness to begin such negotiations to New York?

A. If I had a positive response to that, I would be standing here with much greater enthusiasm than I am.

Q. You're not saying that we're unwilling to talk to the Soviets in face-to-face negotiations about theater nuclear forces in Europe until their troops are out of Afghanistan, are you?

A. No. I was talking about Afghanistan.

Q. But he was saying can you envision improved relations with the Soviets unless they make some progress—beyond TNF, can you envisage—

A. One never knows when one is in a trap. [Laughter.] Number one, we did not, in our Afghanistan policy, undertake—and you've heard this phraseology before—to dismantle the framework of East-West relations which includes arms control, arms control talks, and arms control agreements. We've made it clear that we are still going to press for ratification of SALT II when it is feasible, and that's still our commitment.

With respect to TNF, we and our NATO allies last December linked two things: one, the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe; and two, the beginning of talks on theater nuclear weapons. When the Soviets dropped their precondition about a reversal of the decision on deployment of the weapons and indicated a willingness to talk without that precondition, we responded, and we are willing to go forward with those talks.

We don't think that is inconsistent with our policy toward the Soviet Union's unacceptable action in Afghanistan. Indeed, the objective of our policy there as well as the objective of our arms control policy is Soviet restraint, and both policies work to that end.

Q. You mentioned earlier that you thought SALT should be ratified when it's feasible. I think the question is when it would ever be feasible so long as the Soviets are in Afghanistan. A group, inlcuding former Ambassador [George] Kennan, have published documents and letters urging that the Administration take up, or push for, the SALT Treaty even as early as the special session in November. Others have said the first thing next year.

Do you think it would be helpful, feeling the way toward feasibility, if President Carter, in this campaign, made SALT a major issue so that you could, in effect, have a plebiscite of the popular will on this question?

A. That's exactly our objective.

Q. What?

A. To develop the issue in this campaign in such a way that the American people can come to grips with the issues and, hopefully, create a constituency for SALT II ratification. There are a couple of points involved: number one, the one you very appropriately raised—the question that this is a Presidential campaign and it's highly appropriate that an issue of this magnitude be discussed in it.

Mr. Reagan's position is opposed to SALT II. The President's is clearly supportive of SALT II, and debate between the two conceivably could help bring that issue to the fore and give the public the benefit of both points of view.

Secondly, there is, among the military and I suspect among thoughtful citizens, a growing apprehension about the prospect of a SALT-free world, or a SALT-less world, and what that can mean in terms of our security interests, in terms of budgetary burdens, the cost of an arms race. And as those perceptions grow, I would expect the constituency for SALT II may grow.

What the odds are that that would happen is a question that one may legitimately raise. But I am simply indicating that so far as I'm concerned—and I have the full support of the President with respect to my role in this debate—I hope to press it and hope to change the climate of public opinion with respect to SALT.

Q. Is it possible to have a vote this November, do you think?

A. There are problems not necessarily associated with the SALT II issues. I gather that the postelection scenario for the Congress is likely to be limited to about 30 days—November 15 to December 15. I don't know whether that is fixed or are just dates that I've heard tossed around. That timeframe is going to be pretty much filled with budgetary issues and appropriations bills, and the time that may be necessary to really debate SALT II would not be available in that period. I would not exclude anything at this point; it just doesn't seem likely at this point.

Q. Could we close this off with a footnote question? What is the significance of that yellow ribbon in your lapel?

A. It says "Free the Hostages."

Q. Can we draw anything from that?

A. This is a very useful reminder that was prepared by the committee representing the hostage families and presented to me just this last week with a kiss on both cheeks as a reminder to me. I wear it every day, and it is a daily reminder to me that this is the first order of business.

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revenue through both volume and price. Even recent cutbacks appear influenced by technical factors, as new discoveries have lagged and reserves are declining.

Iraq

Iraq broke diplomatic relations with the United States during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Since 1972, when Interests Sections were opened in Baghdad and Washington, we have maintained sustained but limited contact with the Iraqi Government. Over the past several years, the United States has made known on a number of occasions its willingness to normalize relations. Although Iraq has not precluded this possibility sometime in the future, it has indicated it does not believe the present is the appropriate time. Thus the United States is limited in its ability to carry on an economic dialogue with Baghdad at present, but the U.S. private sector is playing an increasing role in Iraq's economic development.

With the sharp price increases of 1979–80, Iraq has become a new member of the surplus-revenue club. Iraq has carefully kept development spending within limits of absorptive capacity and is expected to continue to do so. Nevertheless, spending on development and arms has been high and until recently has not lagged far behind revenues. Since early 1979, however, Iraq's foreign exchange reserves have grown rapidly and are now believed to stand at well over $20 billion. Spending will continue to grow but not so rapidly as revenue unless the market permits Iraq to trim production without setting off further price increases. Iraq has generally produced near capacity and has plans to continue increasing capacity and exploring for new reserves. It is increasing bilateral assistance to developing countries, in part to further its desire for a leadership role in the nonaligned movement. Recently Iraq has taken a more moderate attitude toward prices.

Saudi Arabia

For over a third of a century, the United States has maintained a deep interest in the territorial integrity and security of Saudi Arabia and has worked to develop broad, strong ties with that country. This Administration has worked intensely to further this longstanding policy. Our relationship with Saudi Arabia has weathered periods of great tensions in U.S.-Arab relations and has progressed steadily. The contribution that we make to Saudi and regional security is one of the important elements in this relationship. The Saudis look to us to be a dependable supplier of military equipment and training to enhance the Kingdom's own defense capability, and they recognize the key importance of U.S. global power in maintaining a strategic balance which deters outside intervention in the region.

As Saudi wealth and influence have grown, we have increasingly worked closely with the Saudi Government in efforts to bolster other countries in Africa and Asia where our two governments perceive a common interest in security and orderly development and a need to help reduce regional tensions.

Another major element in our relationship has been the ability of the United States, as a power with influence in both Israel and the Arab world, to make a unique contribution in the long quest for a just, comprehensive, and durable peace in the Middle East. The Saudis have come to share our basic objectives in this regard. They have not supported the Camp David approach, and disagreement on how best to pursue the negotiations has caused some strain in our relations. Nevertheless, we remain in close consultation. The Saudis have continued to urge more rapid progress in the peace process, while we seek Saudi understanding of our negotiating effort and eventual Saudi support for it.

In recent years our economic ties with Saudi Arabia have expanded significantly. The U.S.-Saudi Joint Economic Commission has become an effective vehicle for the transfer of American technology to assist Saudi development, while our private sector continues to play a leading role in this regard. This year about 37% of our total exports to the Middle East and North Africa are going to Saudi Arabia. As Saudi Arabia has become an international financial power, its role as investor and development lender has expanded tremendously as has the need for close consultations between our two governments on international financial and development issues.

In this Administration our sustained diplomatic exchanges on the wide range of issues of common interest with Saudi Arabia have been reinforced by a process of frequent presidential and Cabinet-level communications and contacts. Crown Prince Fahd's Washington visit in the spring of 1977, the President's visit to Saudi Arabia in January 1978, and King Khalid's visit to the White House in November 1978 have been highlights of a sustained exchange, which on the economic side has included exchanges of visits between the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Energy, and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and their Saudi counterparts.

Saudi Arabia has, in recent years, maintained oil production at levels providing income well in excess of its domestic development needs. Since last summer Saudi Arabia has produced 9.5 mm b/d of oil (9.8 mm b/d counting its share of production from the partitioned zone between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait), a million barrels daily above its preferred production level.

Saudi oil reserves would permit expansion of sustainable production capacity significantly above present levels, but many Saudis question whether there is sufficient economic incentive to make the investment required to increase production. The Saudi Government has, in recent years, embarked on ambitious economic and social development programs. Much of the physical infrastructure of a modern society is now in place, and the absorptive limits of the economy have been revealed. Industrial prospects, except in the petrochemical area, are limited. There are strong social pressures for slower development, which in view of recent price increases suggests slower growth in expenditures and even more rapid accumulation of financial surpluses than in the past. Some Saudi officials argue that oil in the ground is a better investment than financial assets acquired with surplus revenue. It has become increasingly difficult for policymakers to justify, in terms of narrowly defined economic self-interest, continued production well in excess of domestic income requirements.

The growing conservationist trend in Saudi Arabia has been balanced by concern for the welfare of the international economy. In addition to its significant role as a lender to poorer countries, Saudi Arabia has an increasing stake in the international economy and financial system. There is no question that the government approaches oil production and price decisions with concern for the impact of its decisions on the stability of financial markets, the state of the dollar, and the impact on inflation and growth rates in the industrial countries—from which most of their imports come—and in developing countries. The importance Saudi Arabia attaches to these broader economic interests and concerns, involv-

in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana, people are still voting with their feet to flee from the Cuban model of life. Honduras has just held its first national election in almost a decade.

The American Convention on Human Rights, which entered into force in 1978, established an Inter-American Court on Human Rights. The Court has begun to meet at its permanent site in San Jose, Costa Rica. The American convention strengthened the role of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC), and the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) in its October 1979 meeting approved new statutes for both bodies. The IAHRC has undertaken five on-site investigations during the past 2 years, including a landmark visit to Argentina in 1979. The IAHRC has just released a report on human rights in Argentina, based, in part, on its on-site observations. The report confirms the findings of many human rights organizations that systematic and massive violations of human rights have occurred during the past 5 years, notes that the scale of abuses has declined in recent months, and makes numerous constructive recommendations to the Argentine Government for needed improvements.

The October 1979 OAS General Assembly devoted much attention to human rights issues. It approved resolutions urging reforms in Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile and emphasized the need to deal with the problem of disappearances.

The U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), which met for 6 weeks in Geneva in February and March, achieved very positive results, which we hope will have lasting beneficial impact. The United States strongly supported efforts to insure that the United Nations acts evenhandedly in applying human rights criteria to all countries. Among the actions taken by the UNHRC were the following:

- Condemned the U.S.S.R. invasion of Afghanistan;
- Condemned the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea as well as human rights abuses within that country;
- Extensively debated the suppression of dissidents in the Soviet Union and maintained the Andrei Sakharov case on the agenda as a priority item;
- Took public action on South Africa, Equatorial Guinea, Malawi, Israeli-occupied territories, Chile, and Guatemala; and
- Discussed in detail specific abuses in 11 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in closed sessions.

Perhaps the most far-reaching achievement of the UNHRC was the establishment of a five-member working group to investigate reports of disappearances. The group, composed of independent experts acting in their own capacity, will deal worldwide with the thousands of cases of missing persons. The group is empowered to seek and receive information from governments, intergovernmental organizations, humanitarian organizations, and other reliable sources. This is the first time in its history that the UNHRC has adopted a procedure for possible immediate action on human rights cases. The need for this type of action is particularly appropriate to the situation in Argentina, where thousands of persons have been abducted by security forces in recent years.

There should be little doubt that concern for human rights has now become universal. Our representative to the U.N. Human Rights Commission, Jerry Shestack, wrote eloquently that "human rights is far from a passing fad; on the contrary it has an increasingly wide appeal." He reported that the significance of the recent overthrow of repressive rulers in Uganda, the former Central African Empire, Equatorial Guinea, Nicaragua, and, I might add, El Salvador was not lost on the nations represented at the commission.

The positive accomplishments are encouraging. Government officials and oppositionists alike in this hemisphere have acknowledged that the steady application of U.S. human rights policies has been an important stimulant in maintaining an improving trend. This is good news, but we cannot take credit; no improvement in human rights can be sustained unless it emanates from the will of the people and their governments. Our objective is to encourage governments to take necessary action to fulfill their obligation to their own people, to their international commitments, for the sake of improving their relations with us and achieving respect in the international community.

It is our hope that the gathering momentum of human rights awareness can be brought to bear on the many serious problems that remain. In this connection I will focus my remarks on Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Grenada, Haiti, Cuba, and El Salvador.

Argentina

A distinguished recent resident of Argentina has said:

> . . . it is up to the Argentine military government to prove that it does, as it claims, wish to return to a "stable pluralistic democracy" by ending all violations of law and by accounting for those who have disappeared. The military has long argued that their aims are respectable and that the methods employed were forced upon them by a ruthless enemy. . . . It is time that the so-called moderates in the Argentine Government showed the resolution needed to account for the past and to ensure that the atrocities committed by extremists on the left and the right are not allowed to happen again. . . . It is important to get the truth out into the open and demand that if the Argentine Government wishes to have a respectable place in the estimation of the democratic world, it must act swiftly and promptly to return to the rule of law.

The message that we are getting from groups in Argentina is an expression of hope that the U.S. Government and private sectors will not ease the human rights pressure on the Argentine Government because of geopolitical contingencies. I can tell you today that we have not. One of the objectives of recent visits by U.S. Ambassador at Large Gerard Smith and Gen. Andrew Goodpaster to Argentina was to exchange views and achieve a better understanding of our respective positions regarding human rights.

Some areas of our continuing concern are the following.

Disappearances. As we noted in our report to Congress, the most carefully recorded and documented list of unexplained disappearances in Argentina, compiled by the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights in Buenos Aires, contains about 6,500 cases for the period 1976–79. Some estimates run considerably higher. Our records contain 44 cases of disappearances for 1979, compared to over 500 in 1978 and many more in earlier years. We are aware of three cases thus far in 1980. The Argentine Government has taken no meaningful action to provide to families or other interested parties an accounting of the many thousands who have disappeared during the past 4 years.

Executive Detention Prisoners. There are approximately 1,300 persons being held in this category. Most have never been charged with any offense. I should note, however, that there has

been a gradual reduction in the number of executive prisoners. There has also been some improvement in prison conditions.

Torture. There are credible allegations that torture of new detainees during interrogation continues. We are aware of no measures taken by authorities to halt this practice.

"Right of Option" Program. Although the Government of Argentina reactivated a constitutional provision permitting executive detainees to choose self-exile, and the U.S. Government established a special parole program to accept qualified applicants, almost two-thirds of our requests for interviews have been denied and the Government of Argentina has refused a large number of option requests submitted by detainees to whom we have issued certificates of eligibility.

With respect to bilateral relations, U.S. military assistance and sales remain prohibited by law. At the multinational level, since January 1977 and through January 31, 1980, the U.S. Government has opposed 18 and supported 2 out of a total of 20 loan applications submitted by Argentina to the International Development Bank. At the same time, since September 1978, we have been approving financing of U.S. exports to Argentina through the Export-Import Bank in large amounts.

Chile

Serious problems remain although there have been some improvements in the human rights situation in Chile during the past 2 years. Our bilateral relations continue to be affected by that government's disposition of the Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt assassination case. The Chilean Government has failed to fully investigate or prosecute three former security officers indicted in the United States for complicity in the 1976 assassinations.

In October 1979, the Chilean Supreme Court denied a U.S. Government extradition request for the three officers. A domestic investigation of the same case in Chile has dragged on for nearly 2 years without a full and diligent effort. Following the October 1979 decision of the Chilean Supreme Court, President Carter took a number of actions:

- Reduced the size of our mission in Santiago;
- Terminated the foreign military sales (FMS) pipeline of military equipment;
- Removed the U.S. military group;
- Suspended all Eximbank financing in Chile; and
- Terminated new Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) business.

Despite the Letelier case, there are some encouraging signs in Chile. There have been no disappearances since 1977. There is relative freedom to speak out and to criticize the government. Although institutionalized or legal guarantees against violations of the integrity of the person are weak, there are some indications that the courts and the press are taking more interest in defending human rights.

We continue to have concern in some areas.

- The IAHRC reported in October 1979 that the rights to a fair trial and to due process were subject to significant limitations, principally because of the active role of the military courts in judicial proceedings and the reluctance of the civil courts actively to investigate human rights violations.
- While fewer than in past years, in 1979 there were one dozen allegations of torture by credible sources.
- Political parties remain formally dissolved.
- While having pledged eventual restoration of an elected government, the Pinochet regime has not set a timetable for relinquishing control.
- On March 7, 1980, the Chilean Supreme Court upheld internal banishment for those who participated in the proscribed women's day activities. A total of 17 have been affected.
- The Chilean courts continue to side with the government in prohibiting the return of exiles the Government of Chile doesn't want.

The status of bilateral relations, in addition to the actions taken in the Letelier case, is that all new military assistance and sales remain terminated since 1976. New economic development assistance is also terminated. In the multinational development banks, the U.S. Government has voted "no" on all loans since 1977. At the United Nations and the OAS, we have supported resolutions criticizing Chilean human rights abuses and those establishing international procedures to work toward improvements. In recent U.N. meetings on this subject, we have issued statements taking note of the improvements mentioned earlier.

Guatemala

Guatemala is a country where human rights are in jeopardy and where the government is doing little or nothing to bring violence under control. Many human rights groups have focused concern on the level of violence. Amnesty International began a worldwide campaign in September 1979 and estimated in December that more than 2,000 persons had been killed for political reasons in the last 18 months. The International Commission of Jurists in a September 1979 report stated that the Lucas government had "embarked on a systematic campaign to suppress dissent which has, in fact, generated a widespread climate of fear, demoralization, and the growth of clandestine opposition."

Numerous other groups have spoken out against the violence, and two international unions have organized boycotts to protest specific violations. Our own estimation of political and death squad murders for 1979 is between 800 and 900. Since our report was written, violence has increased both from the right and left. Perhaps the most graphic incident was the burning of the Spanish Embassy, when government security forces broke into it in an attempt to dislodge a group of occupiers. Thirty-nine persons, the majority of whom were Guatemalan *campesinos*, died in the fire. The Spanish Embassy broke diplomatic relations as a result, and the U.S. Government expressed shock and called it deplorable because it could have been avoided.

The Guatemalan Government has invited the IAHRC to make an inspection visit, which should take place later this year. The UNHRC, in a resolution approved March 11, 1980, concerning the assassination of Dr. Alberto Fuentes Mohr, expressed profound concern at the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Guatemala.

In our bilateral relations, Guatemala has not received security assistance since FY 1978. We have con-

its own economic analysis. During the summer, Libya indicated it was ready to accede to The Hague convention on hijacking—the most important of the three international antihijacking conventions—and it did so formally in October 1978. Meanwhile Libya agreed to provide in writing assurances that the aircraft involved in the sale would not be used for military purposes. This injunction was made an actual part of the licenses.

It was finally decided on November 2, 1978, by both the Departments of State and Commerce, following congressional consultations, to go forward with this sale. In early 1979, consistent with the 727 decision, the Department of State also recommended the sale of three 747s to Libya, on condition that similarly strict assurances were obtained regarding their nonmilitary use.

We entertained hopes that these decisions would not only be commercially advantageous but would also open opportunities for a more constructive dialogue with Libya on issues which have divided us. We had candid talks with senior Libyan officials in Tripoli in late 1978. I met in October 1978 in Washington with Libyan Foreign Secretary Turayki to discuss our relations. However, a new development occurred.

Libyan Troops. In February 1979, Libyan troops were detected in Uganda, supporting Idi Amin's army in its fight against the Tanzanians and anti-Idi Amin forces. As the Ugandan Army fell back, Libya rushed in more troops and supplies. Both soldiers, possibly as many as 1,500, and military supplies were flown to Entebbe on C–130s (those which Libya had acquired before the revolution) and Boeing 727s. There is no evidence that the two 727s sold in 1978, which carried the specific prohibitions on military use, were employed, but others from the Libyan Arab Airlines fleet were used. These planes were also used in evacuating some of the 400–500 Libyan troops who were wounded in the fighting.

When these reports were confirmed, it left the State Department with no alternative but to regard the 747s for Libya, then being manufactured, as having a "potential significant military application," and in May 1979 the Department of State recommended that the Department of Commerce not allow their export. These three planes were never exported.

Bilateral Discussions. The Libyan attitude toward the United States had, throughout this period, been ambivalent. Col. Qadhafi had, as I have stated, pursued policies clearly contrary to our interests. But at the same time, he had reiterated to private Americans and to foreigners, including high foreign officials, his desire for better relations with the United States. Given our interests in the country, we believed that we had a responsibility to continue to explore whether any basis could be found for improved relations.

In 1979, and in 1978 to a lesser degree, we had serious talks at a level higher than any that had been agreed to since the early days of the revolution. In January 1979, Ambassador Quainton, who is the Director of our Office for Combatting Terrorism, held talks with the Libyan Foreign Secretary and other officials in Tripoli and emphasized to them that improvement in our bilateral relations would depend on changed Libyan policies as regards terrorism. On June 17, 1979, I met in Tripoli with Maj. Jallud, who is Col. Qadhafi's deputy. Secretary Vance met with Libyan Foreign Secretary Turayki on October 3, 1979, at the U.N. General Assembly for discussions of U.S.-Libyan relations.

All these talks confirmed that wide differences still divided our two governments but also suggested that Libya wanted to find a way to contain those differences and to "agree to disagree." It was agreed as a result of the conversations between Secretary Vance and Foreign Secretary Turayki that discussions would be continued at my level. Accordingly on October 18, Foreign Secretary Turayki designated the Libyan Ambassador to the United Nations, Monsieur Kikhya, as their point of contact. During the last week of October, I arranged to meet with him on November 8 in New York.

Diplomatic Missions. In this same period, however, changes were taking place within the Libyan foreign policy establishment. I mentioned earlier Qadhafi's philosophy which said that there should not be a government, that rules should be in the hands of the people; so he began creating a people's liaison office under their National People's Congress. The foreign policy aspect of that was the creation of Libyan People's Bureaus in Washington and other major capitals in September 1979, replacing regular embassies as the authority for dealing with the United States. Authority was increasingly shifted from Dr. Turayki's Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Liaison Office, headed by Ahmed Shahati. Ali El-Houderi, who came to Washington to open and to head the People's Bureau in September, reports directly to Ahmed Shahati in Tripoli. By the end of the year, it was apparent that the shift was complete and that the Foreign Liaison Office was to be solely responsible for all dealings with countries where People's Bureaus has been established.

Hostages in Iran. In my November 8, 1979, meeting with Libya's U.N. Ambassador Kikhya, which occurred just 4 days after the Tehran hostage crisis had begun, I urged that Libya, along with many other countries, take a stand against the seizure of the hostages. My urging was part of our global effort to mobilize international opinion and pressure.

While Ambassador Kikhya showed understanding and a helpful attitude, other official Libyan statements, including a public call at the Arab Foreign Ministers' meeting in Tunis by the Libyan Foreign Secretary for a concerted Arab boycott action against the United States following our freezing of Iranian assets, prompted us to weigh in strongly with Libyan officials to make the point that Libya could not have it both ways. Their public attacks on us and their call for a boycott were clearly inconsistent with their private and unpublicized criticism of the hostage taking. I informed Ambassador Kikhya on November 16 that because of the position which Libya had taken on this issue, we would have to postpone the planned talks on our bilateral relations. Two days later our charge in Tripoli made similar representations to high officials in both the Foreign Ministry and the Foreign Liaison Office.

On November 22 Libya issued a formal statement in which the section on hostages was helpful, and Col. Qadhafi sent a message to President Carter on November 29 which indicated that he was against the seizure of the hostages and would try to be helpful in securing their release.

Attack on U.S. Embassy. The attack on our Embassy in Tripoli on December 2, 1979, turned a new page in our relationship. The Libyan mob which attacked our Embassy and burned it as our people withdrew to safety ostensibly was demonstrating in support of the Iranian revolution. This event took place, however, against a backdrop of other developments which had caused the temperature to rise

in parts of the Islamic world. These included not only the hostage crisis and criticism over our freezing of Iranian assets but also the takeover temporarily of the Grand Mosque at Mecca and the burning of our Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, by mobs which had been incited to blame the United States for involvement in the desecration of this Islamic shrine.

Immediately after the December 2 attack on our Embassy, our efforts concentrated on getting the Libyans to do certain things: first, to accept responsibility for failing to provide adequate security for the Embassy; second, to agree to compensation for damages; and, most important, to give assurances about the security of official and nonofficial U.S. citizens in Libya.

We had received high-level assurances regarding the safety of Americans in Libya just prior to the attack on our Embassy. After the attack, we received new assurances, but we did not consider them satisfactory in the absence of Col. Qadhafi's willingness to receive our charge and to establish clear responsibility in the Libyan Government for contacts in the case of threats. Our charge returned to Tripoli on December 31, 1979, to seek those assurances from Col. Qadhafi, but he was still awaiting a meeting when other events unfolded.

Regional Dispute. In late January 1980, a commando attack was mounted against the Tunisian city of Gafsa. Ever since an abortive effort to forge a union between Tunisia and Libya in 1974, Col. Qadhafi had made clear his opposition to the regime of President Bourguiba and had offered training and sanctuary to Tunisian dissidents. Tunisia publicly accused Libya of planning and supporting the raid. Both the United States and France rushed military equipment to Tunisia. In consequence, on February 4, the French Embassy in Tripoli and the French Consulate General in Benghazi were attacked and badly damaged by Libyan mobs protesting the alleged presence of French troops in Tunisia. We told our charge to return to Washington, and he left Libya on February 8, 1980.

Intimidation Campaign. Shortly thereafter a series of assassinations of Libyan citizens in Europe commenced, in what appeared to be an effort to stifle opposition to the regime by Libyan exiles. Libyan public statements certainly offered strong evidence that these acts were officially sanctioned.

Here in the United States, as in Europe, an intimidation campaign was mounted against Libyan citizens and students resident in this country suspected by the regime in Tripoli of being dissidents or of avoiding service to the state. We took strong steps to stop this campaign. We expelled a total of six members of the Libyan People's Bureau from the United States and insisted that the Libyan mission observe accepted diplomatic norms of conduct.

Assuming, under these circumstances, that we could not safely keep our own officials in Libya, we withdrew the last two American diplomats from Tripoli on May 2, 1980, and temporarily closed our Embassy. This does not constitute a formal break in relations with Libya, and their mission in Washington—the People's Bureau— remains open. We decided, in light of these experiences and the apparent unwillingness of Qadhafi to receive our charge in Tripoli, that the relationship should not be put back on a more usual basis while present circumstances prevail.

Meanwhile, as our Embassy remains closed, we seek ways to assist and protect the private American community in Libya. We are in close and continuing touch with the American companies which have American citizens living in that country.

The intimidation campaign, meanwhile, remains an issue. Col. Qadhafi publicly indicated in June 1980 that the campaign was over but seemed to exempt the United States and supporters of Israel. There have been no assassinations of Libyans in Europe since June 11, and, fortunately, no serious incident has yet to occur in the United States. But we continue to monitor the situation closely.

Libya's Attitude. The attitude of Qadhafi and his followers toward the United States has been ambivalent and often self-contradictory. They have seen the value of cooperation with American companies in the production and marketing of their oil and have recognized the

Iran Chronology, August 1980

August 2
172 of the Iranian protesters arrested on July 27 in Washington, D.C., are transferred to a Federal prison in Otisville, New York.

August 3
Khomeini charges that the protesters are being brutally mistreated by U.S. authorities. U.S. authorities deny charge.

August 4
In retaliation for the alleged mistreatment of the protesters, Iranian Parliament announces it will delay debate on hostage issue.

August 5
Federal authorities release 171 of the protesters.

August 9
President Bani-Sadr announces Mohamad Ali Rajai, a former mathematics teacher, as Prime Minister designate.

August 11
Heads of nine embassies—Australia, Austria, Finland, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland —appeal to Iran's Parliament to end the hostage crisis.

Iran's internal security chief, Gen. Hossein Fardoust, is reported seen in the U.S. shortly before the shooting on July 22 of Ali Akbar Tabatabai, an Iranian exile. U.S. officials state that it appears that his mission was to boost activities in support of Khomeini and against his critics.

August 17
Because of growing tension in Iran, Britain announces temporary closing of its embassy.

Heads of the European Common Market appeal to Iranian Parliament to release hostages.

August 18
Speaker of Iran's Parliament rebuffs appeal from diplomats representing four U.S. allies—Japan, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands—to let an international mission visit the hostages.

August 29
300th day of capitivity for U.S. hostages in Iran.

August 30
Eleven Iranians are executed for their alleged roles in plotting a coup aimed at restoring power to Shahpur Baktiar, last Prime Minister under the Shah. Ninety-two have been shot for their part in the conspiracy and 300 arrested on charges of involvement.

After 2 weeks of disagreements, the Islamic Republic Party and Bani-Sadr confer to break deadlock over the composition of a cabinet.

August 31
Iranian Cabinet is announced by Prime Minister Rajai but Bani-Sadr disapproves of several nominees. ■

Economics and National Security in the 1980s

by Richard N. Cooper

Address at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island, on March 7, 1980. Mr. Cooper is Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

Our topic today is economics and national security in the 1980s. I will begin my remarks with a few words on what I mean by national security and then go on to discuss the relation of economics to it.

It is conventional to consider national security as the prevention of physical attack on the United States and its people. Apart from pin pricks, the only country which now, and in the foreseeable future, threatens U.S. physical security is the Soviet Union. It is worth remarking in this connection, however, that many of our potential or actual adversaries in the past—Britain, France, Germany, Japan—are technically capable, if they had a will to do so, of imparting great damage to the United States. It is a measure of the success of our foreign policy over the past 30 years that neither we nor they even conceive of such an eventuality.

The conventional response to our concerns about our physical security is to maintain a strong defense establishment —primarily for deterrence but if necessary to fight for our protection—backstopped by a vigorous and productive national economy. I will return to this response later on.

We should also, however, consider broader conceptions of our national security; for example, security in our enjoyment of our high level of economic well-being. Threats to our security in this sense were brought home to the average American by gasoline shortages last year. With those came the realization that we are vulnerable to interruptions in remote parts of the globe to supplies that are crucial to our welfare. This sense of vulnerability is new to Americans. It is much older for Europeans and Japanese. It is worth recalling that one of the reasons the Japanese bombed the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor was to remove what they conceived to be the major threat to their oil lifeline to the then Dutch East Indies.

There is a third dimension to national security, and that concerns security in the pursuit of our moral values, i.e., a perception that the world is following, or is at least compatible with, our deepest feelings about society and humanity. This factor is not normally considered a "security" issue at all. Yet it continually thrusts us into foreign affairs, as when we offer substantial help to political refugees in the far corners of the Earth. It represents a secular reflection of the still strong missionary tradition in the United States.

I was struck by a recent article in *Harvard Magazine*, in which seven professors, ranging in field from divinity to engineering, were asked to identify the most important issue facing the United States (and the world) in the decade of the 1980s. Five of the seven chose topics involving international affairs, and only one of those focused on the prevention of nuclear war. Four of the seven dealt with different aspects of what would now be called North-South relations, focusing on the pervasiveness and growth of world hunger, the maldistribution of world wealth and income, the tensions and turmoil created by the growing pressure of population on limited resources, and the increasing loss of biological species (which takes place overwhelmingly in the tropics).

The reasons why these issues should be of concern to Americans are not typically spelled out. They could lie in the ultimate threat of these developments to our economic security, as resources are used by others, or even to our physical security. (Disaffection in Third World countries can perhaps not literally threaten the United States, but it can lead to physical harm to American diplomats and travelers.)

But I suspect that the authors simply take for granted that these issues should be of concern to Americans, without having to spell out tangible ways we may feel the tensions. The threat is thus in the psychological or moral realm rather than in the physical realm. Here lies perhaps the most serious threat to our security, which rests fundamentally on our shared values and our cohesion as a nation and as a society. Some argue that it will not be politically sustainable within the United States for Americans to go on enjoying our growing affluence when there are daily reminders through our media of death and destitution elsewhere in the world.

Let me turn now to economics and the relationship that that bears to each of these three broad aspects of security. I will take them up in reverse order.

Pursuing Moral Values

The relationship of economics to security in the enjoyment of our moral values is the most difficult to define. If we are honest with ourselves, we must recognize that we may not be able to provide enough resources effectively to assure that the evils of hunger and poverty and the social and political consequences that flow from them will be diminished in any finite period of time. This is for the simple reason that we cannot control what goes on elsewhere in the world.

The best we can do is to provide a positive influence to the overall environment in which national economies can prosper, supplemented by specific guidance, technological assistance, and financial resources to help alleviate poverty. We cannot assure world prosperity, and we cannot assure that prosperity will lead to the adoption of our values and our standards of a civilized life. But we can be confident that without some technical and financial assistance from us, these aims will become immeasurably more difficult to achieve.

To be true to our own values, we must do what we can. We should provide technical and financial assistance to poor nations where it can be used effectively. And we should gear our own macroeconomic and trade policies to the maintenance of a vigorous world economy where poor countries can trade those goods they produce for the goods and services they need from us. Our own economic policies thus have a vitally important influence on creating the possibility for the eventual elimination of poverty and destitution.

Threat to Economic Well-being

It is the second notion of security—secure enjoyment of our economic well-being—that has become a matter of widespread public concern during the past decade. This issue was brought home by the dramatic increase of the prices of most commodities in 1972–73. For the general public most notable were the six-fold increase in the price of sugar and the four-fold increase in the price of oil. Sugar prices have since receded, but oil prices

have gone on to new highs; to make matters worse, we have had periods of physical shortage.

A world in which 60% of a crucial commodity comes from 14 nations, with the supply heavily concentrated in a politically unstable area, is not a comfortable one. And the medium-run outlook promises to be worse rather than better, with prospective demand outrunning prospective supply.

This outlook has several implications. The first is slower world economic growth, with possibly devastating implications for developing nations. The second is more inflation, with its corrosive effect on our own institutions. The third is that it will give rise to divisive competition among oil-consuming nations for the limited supplies of oil, with a corrosive effect on political harmony among allies. Finally, it suggests a dangerous vulnerability to interruptions in supply which may come about as a consequence of political turmoil or by military action, e.g., a Soviet move into the Persian Gulf.

I want to emphasize that our current uncomfortable condition is not due to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). OPEC, led by the Shah of Iran, took advantage of the situation in December 1973 and raised prices sharply by decree. But the basic problem is that demand for oil is growing more rapidly than supply. The recent sharp price increases were not decreed by OPEC. Rather, market prices rose sharply, and OPEC scrambled to catch up. The loss of substantial Iranian production in early 1979, combined with anxieties about further interruption in supply and a changing structure in world marketing of oil, led in 1979 to substantial increases in precautionary demand and stockpiling.

We face two conceptually different but factually related problems. The first is unanticipated interruptions in supply of oil, and the second is a prospect of future demand for oil increasingly outrunning available supply.

Interruptions in Oil Supply. Our response to the first of these problems has been a three-fold one. We have decided to create a strategic reserve of petroleum, ultimately of 1 billion barrels. We have so far achieved about 9% of this ultimate goal, and we hope to resume purchases for the reserve when market conditions permit it. Beyond that, through the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA), we have agreed with other major industrial nations to keep commercial stocks of no less than 90 days supply of oil.

Second, we have created in the IEA an emergency sharing mechanism. If oil supplies fall by 7% or more, we will be able to allocate oil on an agreed basis among the 20 member countries of the IEA, thus inhibiting a catch-as-catch-can scramble for oil under circumstances of shortage.

Third, we try to maintain cooperative relationships with the leading oil-producing nations, so that in an emergency they will be well disposed toward increasing their production as much as they can. It is noteworthy that in early 1979 several OPEC countries increased their production sharply in order to compensate for the shortfall in Iranian production.

Imbalance in Oil Supply and Demand. The second problem is the long-run imbalance between prospective demand and supply. Here the task before us is clear: to take all those sensible actions which help reduce our future demand for imported oil. I will not rehearse here all of the elements of the Administration's energy policy, but they include incentives for conservation, stimulus for switching from oil to other forms of energy, and incentives for increased domestic oil production. Moreover, through the IEA and through the various economic summit meetings we have engaged other leading countries in this vital effort. Collectively we have had considerable success, in that the relationship of energy use to total production of goods and services is substantially below pre-1974 relationships. However, much more remains to be done.

Of one thing we can be sure: We cannot consume more oil than is available. The question is not where the extra oil will come from but rather what mechanism of adjustment will be used to cut demand for oil back to available supplies. It can be done through much lower growth, even economic recession, in the oil-consuming countries. It can be done through much higher oil prices, which in addition to discouraging oil consumption will also aggravate inflation and reduce economic growth. Or it can be done through conscious policies designed to conserve oil and thus protect our growth possibilities and inhibit inflation. It is strongly in our interest to take the last course.

Supply of Other Commodities. This discussion of oil raises the question of whether we are equally vulnerable with respect to other commodities that we import from the rest of the world. We rely heavily on imports for our consumption of tin, chromium, cobalt, and a host of other materials. But none of these has the crucial importance for the economy that oil does. Moreover, the likelihood of interruption is generally less.

The potential for producer cartels and for serious disruption of supply depends on several factors: limited supply relative to demand, limited sources of production, few substitutes (at least in the short run), and essential importance to the industrialized world. All four conditions must be met. Stability of such a cartel depends also on the strength of the producer countries: They must be willing to forego immediate gains, if necessary, in order to take the product off the market and so maintain or raise prices. Many Third World nations, typically dependent on exports of a few primary products, could not long afford to deny themselves crucial foreign exchange.

What we find is that no other commodity besides oil currently has all the attributes just described. Bauxite is both essential and localized in its production, but plentiful, with ample scope for extensive recycling that would become increasingly economic as price increases. Further, many of the exporting countries would find it difficult to forego for even a short time needed foreign exchange earnings. Copper is in both tight supply and essential but production is too diffuse to offer easy cartelization. Tin is both limited in supply and mined in only a few countries but lacks much strategic or industrial importance.

Put somewhat differently, we should have a healthy regard for the power of the market. If commodities become scarce, the resulting increase in price generates investment in mines previously uneconomic, encourages substitution, and leads to greater recycling—the last option does not obtain for oil, a product that is literally consumed in use.

In an effort to guide the market, the United States has supported, where practical, the formation of consumer-producer commodity agreements. These agreements, now in place for tin, sugar, and soon rubber, represent an international effort to reduce risk by moderating price fluctuations and so spur investment in increased supplies. Such agreements should reduce the threat of supply disruption.

Turning from the likelihood of supply disruption, let us consider our vulnerability if one were to occur. Here we find the United States is particularly fortunate relative to most other industrialized nations. Although our import dependence on 12 critical industrial materials, other than fuel, has increased since 1974, it re-

A variety of political influences, including a common attachment to preserving the strength of OPEC as a mechanism for setting a price floor, work on the producers as they formulate production and pricing policies and seek OPEC price decisions.

All of the region's producers are influenced by an attachment to Third World causes, although the breadth and degree of commitment varies. The Iraqis increasingly seek a leadership role in this regard and have gone further than other producers in pushing the idea of a two-tier price system for industrial and developing countries. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Abu Dhabi are leaders in development lending.

Security considerations obviously lie at the heart of the politics and foreign policy of the producers. They produce complex and sometimes contradictory forces. All of the producers feel vulnerable to some degree to outside powers, to Middle East rivals, and to the tensions of domestic change.

This complexity prevents our drawing simple conclusions on how the gulf producers relate political and security concerns to their oil policy. Clearly, however, a strong U.S. global military posture, including an ability to project deterrent strength, is important to a long-term constructive relationship with producers. So is the perception that the United States is alert and firm in checking Soviet designs in the area and is dynamic in its role in a Western alliance with great interests in the Middle East and North Africa. The complexities and contradictions of the security situation and the basic fragility of the region require that the U.S. security role be played out with steadiness of purpose, nuance, and sensitivity to the political environment.

All of the Arab producers have indicated to some degree that in the longer term their attitudes on oil will be affected by their perception of how the international community deals with the Palestinian cause. Revolutionary rhetoric on punitive use of the "Arab oil weapon" is unabated. Among the monarchies there is a growing tendency to use a "carrot" approach, by suggesting more favorable consideration in oil supply in return for greater political support for the Palestinian cause. We cannot rule out that this trend will intensify over time if the Arab producers become increasingly disillusioned with the rate of progress toward Middle East peace. The recent trend toward state-to-state oil arrangements enhances the ability of the Middle East and North African producers to mix politics and oil and lessens the ability of the major oil companies to manage dislocations resulting from destination restrictions.

Political Dynamics of OPEC

Although economic considerations primarily determine producer policies, the impact of political factors on an organization such as OPEC, composed of nation states, is inevitable. Political relations among the diverse members of the organization play some role, as does the motivation to exert leadership within OPEC councils. Thus within the range of options which the market offers, OPEC as an organization is liable to political responses. The perception that consumer nations are banding together in confrontational posture to "break" the cartel tends to elicit a political and more confrontational response from OPEC. The perception that the industrial world is seeking to work with the OPEC countries to expand common economic interests tends to elicit a more cooperative OPEC response toward consumers.

Iran

In the context of this appearance I believe it is not necessary to lay out for the committee the recent state of our relations with Iran, on which there is an extensive public record. For the present the hostage situation prevents normal development of economic and other relations.

With regard to energy, Iran in the past was the one OPEC member that had both large oil reserves and production capacity and also a large appetite for revenues. The intent of the Islamic Republic to reshape Iran's economy toward less dependence on oil, combined with labor and technical difficulties in the oil fields, had resulted in much lower production even before Iran's attempt to charge exceptionally high prices brought its production to present low levels—currently about 1.5 mm b/d. Given the Iranians' recent willingness to forgo exports rather than reduce their high asking price, we must assume that Iran will continue to stress maximizing prices rather than seeking increased revenues through higher export volume.

Algeria

Our relations with Algeria were fully restored in November 1974 and have in general shown gradual improvement. Political differences on the Middle East peace process and on the Western Sahara have not prevented the development of a cooperative approach on bilateral matters involving mutual economic interests. Currently, however, we and certain European nations are involved in bilateral negotiations with Algeria over the price of Algerian liquefied natural gas. Shipments under the El Paso contract have been suspended pending resolution of this problem.

Our Embassy has had ready access to appropriate Algerian officials, but over the years we have had little influence on Algerian attitudes on oil pricing. Algeria, of course, has been a net borrower, whose development expenditures have regularly exceeded its income. It has maintained oil production at a high percentage of reserves and is currently attempting to increase exploration activity (e.g., through its $3 per barrel exploration fee), though on terms many companies find onerous.

Libya

Since the Libyan revolution, relations between the United States and Libya have been at best strained. In the aftermath of the attack on our Embassy in December of 1979 and allegations of a worldwide Libyan Government-sponsored intimidation campaign, relations are at a low ebb, and the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli remains temporarily closed. Nonetheless, the United States continues to emphasize the mutual benefits in our economic relations. The United States receives approximately 8% of its imported oil supply from Libya, and U.S. companies and personnel provide much of the vital expertise, manpower, and facilities for the production and distribution of Libyan oil. We have not been able to carry on a meaningful dialogue on energy issues with the Libyan Government.

In spite of its small population, Libya, though maintaining some financial reserves, has generally managed to spend the bulk of its considerable revenues on development, arms, and support for its foreign policy. It has consistently argued for keeping upward pressure on price through adjustment of production. Libya itself has used this method to some extent but has generally produced near its practicable capacity in recent years, desiring to maximize

Secretary Muskie Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

Secretary Muskie was interviewed on CBS's "Face the Nation" on September 7, 1980, by George Herman, CBS News (moderator); Robert Pierpoint, CBS News; and Don Oberdorfer, The Washington Post.[1]

Q. Is the new Government of Poland a step toward some kind of Kremlin suppression of the workers' gains in Poland?

A. Not if one is to take the first statements of the new First Secretary, Mr. [Stanislaw] Kania. He has said that he will honor those commitments to the full. And he, of course, has gotten a pretty generous endorsement from Mr. Brezhnev so that on the whole, I think a description I read in either the *Times* or the *Post* this morning, describing him as a conservative but a pragmatist, suggests that he may give comfort to the Soviets but, at the same time, determine to keep the commitments that Mr. [Edward Gierek, former First Secretary and Politburo Member of the Polish Communist Party] Gierek made to the workers.

Q. If you think the new Government of Poland is likely to continue to agree to the gains won by the workers in their strikes why bother to change it? Why get rid of Mr. Gierek? And his name disappeared from the press in the Soviet Union 3 or 4 days before he had the "heart attack." Why get rid of it if you're only going to have someone else who is going to continue with this policy?

A. Of course, in any system of government there comes a time when leaders outwear their welcome or their usefulness. I would suspect that Mr. Gierek had expended a great deal of his political capital not only *vis a vis* the Soviets but also internally, and at that point, maybe his health was such as to provide a rational explanation for change in leadership. I don't have any information to suggest otherwise.

Q. You and others in the Administration were very cautious in what you said about the Polish strikes while they were going on. And we understand that you privately pointed out to the head of the AFL-CIO, Lane Kirkland, the possible dangers of broad-scale and open American labor movement contributions to the workers. Now, the labor federation has gone ahead. Do you think this is going to complicate the situation over there?

A. That depends, I think, on how it's perceived by the Poles and the Russians and upon it's nature. Mr. Fraser [Douglas Fraser, President of the United Automobile Workers] has described it as a humanitarian effort to assist the families of the strikers, and he, in the same breath, indicated that we have to be careful that the problem—basic problem—is left to the Poles and their government. So it's a sensitive and delicate kind of situation. Up to this point, it has not been, yet, a destabilizing factor in the relationships between the Poles and the Russians. I think that if, with this new leadership, both sides within Poland develop a healthy understanding of their new relationship that it will probably last. It's not over by any means.

Q. You are aware, of course, that there was a delegation of Polish bankers and financial experts here this past week asking for agricultural credits. I think that the total they asked for was $670 million. This is not anything new. They have done it for the past several years, but this is a larger amount of money than they have ever asked for before. And some of our allies reportedly are suggesting that we wait a while before granting those credits and see whether the new Polish Government is going to live up to its promises to the workers. What is the attitude of the Carter Administration about that loan? Are they going to grant it?

A. It's been under consideration in roughly that magnitude before the recent events in Poland. I think we had been considering seriously about $550 million. The $650 or $670 million is somewhat more, but we've had that program with the Poles now for, I think, at least 3 years, and we understand the economic difficulties of Poland.

We've had a long-time economic relationship with Poland, and I think we ought not to indicate that that is doubtful at this point. They are going through a very difficult period, and their economic situation would impose strains upon these new arrangements that they have worked out with their workers; I think that's basically the attitude of our allies as well. I don't think there's been any formal request that we suspend any particular decisions. I think they also understand that there may be need for strengthening the economic ties between ourselves and Poland.

Q. So you're indicating, if I read you correctly, that we are going to go ahead and grant that $670 million loan.

A. We've not made that decision yet. The other factor in it is that those resources are limited. There are other demands upon them, and it is in that context that we will make the decision.

Q. Is it too early—have you assessed what the meaning of the workers' gains—the licensing, in the sense of free trade unions—whether this means the beginning of a really fundamental change in the satellite countries around the Soviet Union?

A. It could well be. On the other hand, it may be that Poland will be a different sort of arrangement within the Soviet bloc than others. The Poles have had—

Q. Do you think it will be isolated in Poland?

A. The Poles have had a greater degree of religious freedom, for example. They've had greater freedom in dealing with their agricultural problems. One of their problems there is that the average farming unit, for

ing the health of the international economy, is evidenced by the choices it has made in its own production and pricing policy and the role it has played in OPEC in working for a more orderly evolution of oil prices. Saudi Arabia's legitimate and continuing concern with balancing its narrower and broader economic interests will continue to play a central role in its choices on oil production and prices.

Gulf Emirates

The gulf states were important to U.S. economic interests and private American presence was significant there well before Kuwait achieved full independence in 1961 and before the independence of Qatar and the formation of the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) in 1971. In the era of full independence, it has been U.S. policy to develop close relations with these three states and their gulf neighbors and to pursue the expansion of mutual interests across a range of issues, while remaining in close consultations with the United Kingdom, which has long shared our basic interests in this region. Our general policy approach toward the gulf states, and the general course of our relationships, has been consistent with our longstanding and more developed relationship with Saudi Arabia, and we welcome and seek to encourage the commitment of Saudi Arabia and its gulf neighbors to close cooperation in the interest of the region's security and sound development.

The Iranian revolution and the intensified Soviet pressure against the region, manifested in the invasion of Afghanistan and the close Soviet relationship with South Yemen, have, of course, prompted careful and sustained review of our policy toward the gulf states and of how we best can contribute to the region's security and progress. We seek to strengthen our relations with the gulf states across the economic, political, cultural, and security spectrums. We have increased U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean and are in the process of developing an improved capability to project deterrent force toward the region.

Over a number of years we have developed security assistance relationships with Kuwait and the other emirates and continue to make appropriate U.S. military equipment and training available to help these small states develop a reasonable defense capability. We remain in close diplomatic contact with them on a variety of political issues of importance to the region, particularly our quest for a comprehensive Middle East peace. Kuwait, Qatar, and the U.A.E. share our goal of a peaceful settlement although they do not support the Camp David approach.

On the economic side we maintain important commercial ties with Kuwait, the U.A.E., and Qatar and have supplemented, when requested, the substantial exchange of private sector technology with U.S. Government experts in areas of interest to these countries' development programs. We keep in close diplomatic contact on energy and economic issues, including the significant role these states play as constructive international investors and generous development lenders. In this Administration this dialogue has been supported by visits of former Secretary of the Treasury [W. Michael] Blumenthal, Secretary of the Treasury [G. William] Miller, and Under Secretary of State [Richard N.] Cooper to both Kuwait and the U.A.E.

The oil policies of these three states differ notably. Qatar is a relatively minor producer of oil (500,000–550,000 b/d). Although it has vast reserves of non-oil-associated natural gas, which it is now making plans to exploit, its oil reserves are limited, and production is expected to decline slightly over the decade. Qatar's production has tended to move up to capacity as the market tightens and to fall off slightly as the market eases.

The U.A.E.'s production and pricing policy involves essentially the same considerations as that of Saudi Arabia. On one hand there is concern for conserving its primary resource and avoiding too great a surplus in revenues and a broader concern, reflecting its stake in the international economy, for helping to maintain the health of that economy by contributing to orderly oil markets. The U.A.E. has generally supported Saudi positions on price restraint, although in recent months its price has been above the Saudi level. The U.A.E., too, has been a substantial lender and investor. The U.A.E. has also contributed to world energy supplies and domestic economic development through fostering exports of liquefied petroleum gas and liquefied natural gas.

Recent nuances in the oil policy of Kuwait may be a guide to future tendencies in other producing countries. Kuwait's new production level of 1.5 mm b/d (1.8 mm b/d counting its share of the partitioned zone) represents a long-heralded decision to cut back production in response to conservationist pressure, and hence this level may remain firm for some time to come. This level of production provides sufficient associated natural gas and natural gas liquids to supply Kuwait's liquefied petroleum gas plant at the desired level and to meet domestic needs. It also provides oil revenues more than sufficient to finance Kuwait's domestic development, welfare, and security needs; its foreign aid; and its extensive and sophisticated investment programs. If it maintains a fixed production policy, Kuwait will, in effect, have opted out of any ongoing efforts to influence prices through production policy. In the past Kuwait has at times asserted that oil policy is a "commercial" rather than "political" issue, and its new approach seems to reflect a more aggressive commercial thrust to marketing. Kuwait's oil policymakers reportedly are focusing attention downstream and overseas—on controlling the destinations of their crude and using access to their fixed supply as an instrument to gain access to promising investments abroad in exploration, refining, and petrochemicals.

Conclusion

The implications of the foregoing discussions are clear and unsurprising. The OPEC countries that desire greater revenues have little or no flexibility to raise production. Those that have this flexibility in production capacity, and sufficient reserves to expand capacity, currently receive a surfeit of oil revenues. Thus, as noted at the beginning of this statement, the issue focuses on OPEC's leading producer, Saudi Arabia, and its gulf neighbors: Kuwait, the U.A.E., and, increasingly, Iraq. These countries can easily support or raise oil prices by trimming production. They can ease upward price pressure by producing more, though their ability to restrain prices in this manner is limited, as the past year shows. In a tight market, they can increase their revenues by producing less oil, and as prices increase so do surplus revenues and pressures for lower production.

In the case of the three monarchical states, these facts, plus their concerns for and stake in the international economy, add up to conflicting economic interests. In each of them many argue that oil production should be reduced to maximize unit revenue and to stretch

the life of their oil reserves, whose value, they believe, will increase more rapidly than the financial assets they can acquire with excess revenues. These groups also argue (a) that excessive revenues promote excessive and destabilizing development spending and (b) that restricting production and driving up the price of oil will force the developed countries to conserve energy and to accelerate the development of alternatives, thus reducing their extreme dependence on imported oil.

Opposing this narrow "conservationist" view is a broader conception: that over the long term, the economic interests of these states are linked to those of the industrial and developing worlds and that they should, therefore, follow production and pricing policies that will sustain the international economy while facilitating an orderly transition to alternative energy sources.

This broader view also recognizes the relation between healthy economies and the ability of the industrial democracies to maintain a global strategic balance conducive to world peace and the security of the Middle East.

This economic debate, of course, takes place in a political context in which the dominant themes are Middle East peace and regional security. This context, in turn, influences our ability to engage in useful dialogue with these producers. But there are no simple tradeoffs between the economic and energy issues on one hand and political and security issues on the other. Only a lessening of our dependence on Persian Gulf oil, desired by both consumers and surplus-revenue producers, will in time resolve the economic and energy issues. But such factors as significant progress toward a just and comprehensive peace and U.S. ability to accommodate regional security concerns can greatly affect our ability to make ourselves heard.

Our energy diplomacy with respect to these states aims at strengthening the broader, more cooperative view of their own interests. This purpose is served by our cooperation in their efforts to develop and strengthen their own societies and by their increasing involvement in the international economy.

The pace of economic development in, and transfer of technology to, these countries will be a factor in determining their domestic income requirements. An important element, for example, will be the extent to which countries, such as Saudi Arabia, are able to develop viable oil-related industries which might serve as an inducement to higher crude oil production levels. The continuing willingness of surplus-revenue producers to commit substantial amounts of their oil income to foreign aid will also be an important factor, and the ability of the industrial nations to draw them more closely into the development assistance community will influence this. Perhaps more critical will be the perception of the surplus producers of the benefits or lack thereof of investment of their surplus earnings in the industrial world. This involves not only questions of freedom and security of investment but also the issues of inflation, stability of financial markets, and particularly the strength of the dollar.

In the perception of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the U.A.E., a stable market for Middle East oil in the industrial world is preferable to ever-increasing demand. They fear that future gaps between supply and demand can lead to dangerous international tensions. The heart of this way of looking at things is that consumers' excessive dependence on Persian Gulf oil endangers both sides. In this situation the producer's responsibility is to make possible a reasonably smooth transition to less dependence; the consumer's is to achieve that transition as quickly as possible.

Export Restrictions on the U.S.S.R.

by Richard N. Cooper

Statement before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on August 20, 1980. Mr. Cooper is Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.[1]

I am happy to have the opportunity to appear before this committee. As you have requested, I will review Soviet actions in Afghanistan and the responses that the United States and its allies have taken to this aggression. I would like to begin with a brief status report on the current level of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

Almost 8 months have passed since Soviet forces invaded the nonaligned nation of Afghanistan in December 1979. Since that time the U.S.S.R. has increased the level of its occupation forces in an effort to quell the nationwide resistance of the Afghan people. The Soviet aggression has caused great suffering for the people of Afghanistan. It has resulted in over 1 million Afghans—about 7% of the total population—seeking refuge outside their country. Fierce resistance to the Soviet occupation continues. The U.S.S.R. has failed in its efforts to establish effective control over the country. Its attempts to obtain recognition for the puppet regime headed by Babrak Karmal have been rebuffed by the overwhelming majority of the international community.

The United States continues to regard the Soviet action as a blatant violation of the rules of international conduct and a serious threat to world peace. The presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan continues to pose a threat to other countries of Southwest Asia and to our own interests in the region.

The United States had to respond vigorously to this provocative Soviet step. Failure on our part to react would only encourage new adventures and risk miscalculation. Also, failure to react would have baffled and distressed many countries in the area and would have undermined our position there and elsewhere. Our policy has been to take a number of firm and highly visible steps which express our feelings to the Soviets in the clearest possible manner. We intend to continue to do what we can to convince the U.S.S.R. to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan and to reduce the possibility that they will be tempted to undertake similar adventures in the future.

I would now like to describe the actions we have taken.

Militarily we have accelerated our efforts to increase our strategic capabilities, including plans for the establishment of a rapid deployment force sufficiently large and mobile to deter possible Soviet aggression in critical areas such as the Middle East. We have increased our naval presence in the In-

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

tinued to give economic development assistance for projects which meet basic human needs criteria. In the multinational development banks, the United States abstained on a tourism and industrial development loan in 1979, the only application to be considered.

We recognize the instability of Central America and the threat of terrorism which exists. Nevertheless, ways must be found to strengthen the democratic processes; vital reforms are essential and acknowledged to be necessary by influential sectors of the Guatemalan society. Violence must be investigated and the instigators brought under control in order to avoid a serious radicalization of that country.

Nicaragua

There can be no doubt that the overthrow of the Somoza government in July 1979 reflected the will of the majority of the people of Nicaragua. The victory of the Sandinista forces ended a repressive family dynasty of more than 40 years' duration. The civil war that resulted in the violent change of government cost an estimated 30,000–50,000 lives and left the country in economic shambles. Nine months after the event, there is still little discernible evidence of significant economic recovery. Another legacy of the war was over 7,500 political prisoners held by the Sandinistas for association with the former Somoza National Guard or for some other relationship with that government.

The U.S. Government is making a sincere effort to have good relations and assist the revolutionary government. We worked hard to obtain a $75 million supplemental appropriation from the Congress to assist the economic recovery efforts.

The Nicaraguan revolution did not, however, bring an end to human rights concerns. A number of summary executions have occurred. Allegations of torture continue, particularly with respect to political prisoners. The Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights, a private organization which has courageously documented abuses both under this government and under Somoza, on March 27 presented a specific case of torture to the Nicaraguan Supreme Court. Other disturbing developments include efforts to intimidate the free press, the resignations this week of the two prominent moderate members of the ruling junta and the moderate Central Bank president, the slow pace of the special tribunals conducting the trials of the political prisoners, and concern that proper judicial safeguards are not being applied. This latter concern motivated a mission of the International Commission of Jurists to visit Nicaragua to observe the trial process.

These and other developments portend a consolidation of control by the Sandinistas and lead to serious speculation about the future of pluralism in that society. Thus, we believe the scheduled visit of the IAHRC to Nicaragua this summer, at the invitation of that government, is of particular importance, and we look forward to its findings.

Panama

Panama is another country in the hemisphere where important segments of the public are not satisfied with the pace of the transition to free elections. In September 1979, there was a major teachers strike dedicated to the repeal of a controversial educational reform plan. On October 9 there was an extraordinary series of protest marches throughout Panama wherein the teachers attracted widespread support for their opposition to the reform plan.

Within human rights and opposition circles in the country and elsewhere, there is criticism of the lack of independent judicial and legislative branches of government, certain penal and judicial practices, such as interrogation techniques, the "night courts," limitations on freedom of expression, and restrictions on political party formation.

Our annual report commented on the lack of freedom of expression, noting that the Panama Government's point of view dominates the media. It cited a law implemented in 1979, requiring the licensing of journalists, which was subject to criticism by many newsmen as a threat to freedom of expression and as a guarantee of self-censorship. This concern was well founded. On March 3, 1980, the licenses of four radio commentators were canceled. They were charged with distorting facts with the intention of disrupting public order and jeopardizing security and attacking the reputation of President Royo.

Opposition and human rights groups in Panama have called these sanctions a violation of human rights. I would mention that one of those sanctioned, Julio Ortega, is currently in the United States on a travel grant under our USICA [U.S. International Communication Agency] education and cultural exchange program. I understand that a suit has been filed with Panamanian courts on behalf of all four commentators asking for immediate suspension of the cancellation orders.

Grenada

The government of Prime Minister Gairy was overthrown by a coup d'etat in March 1979 by leaders of a former opposition party, the New JEWEL Movement. Our annual report documents human rights violations by the former Gairy government. There were also charges of corruption, rigging of the 1976 elections, and intimidation of the opposition by violent means. The new People's Revolutionary Government, which came into being, had the advantage of replacing a dictatorial and unpopular regime. It has maintained a reputation for honesty and begun some necessary economic programs, particularly in the agricultural field.

However, the revolutionary nature of the coup has led to the replacement of one set of human rights concerns by others equally serious. The constitution has been suspended, opponents have been detained indefinitely and without legal representation, freedom of assembly and private enterprise have been limited or abridged, and the independent press has been abolished. The Church has been a target for pressure. A publication called the *Catholic Focus* published only its initial issue before it was suspended, allegedly at the instigation of the new government. On a positive note, some 13 prisoners were released on March 25. We believe there are in excess of 50 persons still detained.

Grenada continues to send mixed signals in the international arena concerning its human rights stance. It has participated actively in human rights issues in the OAS forum but voted against the U.N. General Assembly resolution condemning Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

Haiti

Haiti continues to be the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, and it continues to function under authoritar-

ian rule. In 1979 the first independent political parties in recent history emerged, but negative developments outweighed the positive. A restrictive new press law was enacted; the political opposition was further intimidated by the militia and the executive. Objective observers characterized our report on the 1979 human rights situation in Haiti as accurate representation.

Last week the IAHRC issued a report on its August 1978 inspection visit to Haiti. Prior to its release, the report was updated to December 1979. The report concluded, among other things, that the right to life was violated, particularly in the mid-1970s, by means of summary executions, prison terms, and lack of medical care, but there has been improvement in this regard since. However, numerous persons continue to be detained without benefit of legal procedure or access to an attorney.

Freedom of inquiry, speech, and dissemination of thought do not exist, though freedom of religion does. Freedom of association is extremely limited. There have been violations of the right to residence, movement, and nationality. Numerous civil and political rights and certain prerogatives of the judiciary have been suspended. The OAS report makes a series of specific recommendations for amelioration of its findings and makes a special appeal to international organizations to give Haiti aid to improve living conditions in order that the country can establish respect for the rights currently being violated. In one development, we understand that the Haitian Government has modified the 1979 press law in response to criticism, but details are lacking.

The case of Haitian "boat people" is a topic of serious concern. The plight of these people involves disputed matters of human rights as well as issues of refugee policy. Since 1972 thousands have arrived illegally in Florida, in small boats and, therefore, at considerable risk. Many request political asylum. There are over 9,000 such cases pending in Florida. The U.S. Government is committed to the careful case-by-case evaluation of all claims for political asylum, according to our law which relates to the U.N. Protocol on Refugees. Last week President-for-Life Duvalier issued a statement on the "boat people," reiterating that Haitians deported from Florida "have not been and will not be harassed."

The Administration is urgently reassessing the situation of the Haitian "boat people." Meanwhile, none are being deported.

Cuba

Returning to the question of Cuba, I noted earlier that 3,900 prisoners had been released in 1979. According to Huber Matos, the prominent political prisoner released last October, there are about 1,100 still being held. We do not know if this number had been increased in the last 2 weeks. This situation is now complicated by the immediate problem of the 10,000 Cubans who sought refuge in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana. The Cuban Government does not permit free emigration and arbitrarily determines who may leave the country through issuance of exit permits. It has, furthermore, not held to its earlier agreement to permit those who were in the Peruvian Embassy to proceed to any country willing to receive them.

We are lending our efforts to break the impasse by cooperating with governments in this hemisphere and elsewhere to facilitate their departure. The United States has agreed to take 3,500 who meet our immigration, refugee, or asylum criteria. We believe that the boat owners and captains from the country who are taking people out of Cuba and trying to land them in the United States are playing into the hands of the Cuban authorities.

El Salvador

Those who subscribe to the domino theory in Central America view what is happening in El Salvador as the next target of international marxism after Nicaragua. Those who study El Salvador know that the problem is home grown and has been building to the present crisis level for many years. Solutions to the problems of that beleagured country are not handy, and the current U.S. Government policy is highly controversial, particularly with U.S. religious groups. What is incontrovertible is that urgent reforms are absolutely essential to the survival of the revolutionary junta now governing the country.

In early March 1980, the Salvadoran Government bit the bullet and instituted both agrarian and financial reforms, after the original junta, installed by the military coup in October 1979, failed to act before it expired at the beginning of 1980. The junta's reforms have been violently opposed by both extremes of the right and the left. It is clear that reforms must be made. The agrarian reform, if fully implemented, could be one of the most profound and far-reaching social experiments in the modern history of Central America.

I know that the U.S. Government's decision to provide security assistance to the junta is controversial. The volume of mail on this subject received in Washington in recent weeks is near the level of correspondence regarding the Iranian question. One widespread misconception that I wish to clarify is that this security assistance consists of arms; it does not. It is restricted to credits to enable the Salvadoran Armed Forces to purchase communications and transportation equipment to improve its ability to control the violence. We remain deeply concerned at the level of violence now prevalent in El Salvador, some of it the responsibility of undisciplined security forces in the countryside. Most of it, we believe, comes from rightist groups opposed to all reforms who are engaging in indiscriminate assassinations.

Before his tragic death, Archbishop Oscar Romero was given written assurance by Secretary Vance that "the advancement of human rights . . . underlies every aspect of U.S. policy toward El Salvador."

There is much that has been written about the brutal assassination of Archbishop Romero, and much that I could say. Perhaps I should merely conclude my remarks by saying that his death is a noble symbol of the human rights struggle we all are facing and that many have given their lives defending.

I returned to the United States from a month-long visit to the Near East and South Asia the day before the beautiful Requiem Mass given for Archbishop Romero at Georgetown University on March 29. I would like to quote from the eulogy given by Reverend Timothy Healy, which I profoundly believe best expresses what human rights is all about.

His message was the simplest teaching of modern theology and he couched it in the words of the Second Vatican Council. Again and again he raised his voice, in his Cathedral, in his radio station (until it was bombed out from under him), and with everyone he met, to remind his countrymen, oppressors and oppressed, the hunters and the hunted, that no man can reach his full religious being unless he enjoys some dignity, some freedom, some self-determination in his daily life; unless he has some hope of something better for his children. ■

role American citizens have played in keeping production high. At the same time, in Qadhafi's revolutionary philosophy, the American Government and all it stands for is, to quote one of his statements, "the embodiment of evil." Particularly in international policies, our differences are deep.

It is both in this latter connection and consistent with Qadhafi's general political theory that government and people can be separated, that Libya has made efforts over the past 2 years to improve its ties with nonofficial Americans. For example, in October 1978, the Libyans sponsored an "Arab-American dialogue," which took the form of bringing to Libya a large group of private Americans for meetings and discussions with senior Libyan officials. Ahmed Shahati, head of the Foreign Liaison Office, came to this country with a goodwill delegation in January 1979 and visited several American cities, including Washington, Atlanta, Miami, New Orleans, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Detroit, and Moscow (Idaho). A Libyan women's delegation in March 1979 made a goodwill visit to the United States, meeting with Americans in Washington, New York, and on the west coast. We have to assume that such Libyan efforts will be a continuing feature of Libya's foreign relations under Qadhafi.

For the Future

As the subcommittee can see, Libya is a country where the combination of our important interests and the policies of the Libyan Government present us continually with difficult choices.

We obviously cannot have satisfactory relations in the face of Libyan-supported terrorism practiced against us and our friends. While we don't see eye-to-eye on how Middle East peace can be achieved, in the absence of terrorist actions and subversion directed against other parties involved, it should be possible for our two countries to accept that we have differences and proceed on that basis—as is the case with other Arab countries in the region.

We cannot reopen our mission in Tripoli until we have credible and acceptable assurances for the safety of our personnel. But at the same time we believe it is in our interest to keep the channels of communication open with Libya, through the People's Bureau in Washington and through other channels which may be available, such as third country embassies in Tripoli.

If the atmosphere can improve, we do not exclude the eventual return of our American staff to Tripoli, the resumption of a dialogue over the differences which divide us, and possibly a lessening of our restrictions on trade.

In present circumstances, however, our broad interests require that we continue efforts to communicate with the Libyan authorities wherever possible, at the same time making clear in our specific actions and policies our concern over many of the attitudes and activities of the Libyan regime. ■

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Tank Sale to Jordan

by Harold H. Saunders

Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 29, 1980. Mr. Saunders is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.[1]

What I would propose to do this afternoon is to recall briefly my testimony of a year ago when a possible sale of tanks to Jordan was an issue and then to bring you up to date on developments since that time. I then would like to summarize the importance of this sale for U.S. national security interests and for our relations with Jordan.

Situation Last Summer

Last summer when I testified on this issue, my starting point was the study the United States did in the summer of 1973 to assist Jordan to design a force modernization plan, dropping from five motorized divisions to four, more modern, mechanized and armored divisions. In the context of these four divisions, we discussed a maximum of 18 armored battalions each with a strength up to 54 tanks, i.e., a structure identical to a U.S. tank battalion. For their own reasons, the Jordanians settled on an eventual structure of 44 tanks per battalion. Implementation of the plan was slowed by funding constraints, and the Jordanians limited themselves to 16 battalions—rather than 18—with 35 tanks per battalion—instead of even 44—in the interim.

The Jordanian tank fleet consists of a large number of aging tanks, including U.S. M48A1s and British Centurions. These are tanks of Korean war vintage and, after periods of service as long as 20 years, the Jordanians wished to replace or upgrade these vehicles. They decided to rebuild the Centurions. The M48s were to have been rebuilt/upgraded in an Iranian facility at Iranian expense, and we had concurred in this plan in 1976. This would have made the M48 a close match for the M60s now being offered. The collapse of the Iranian Government foreclosed this option.

Before the Iranian collapse, the Jordanians had also begun to consider alternative options for completing their tank modernization program—rebuild in Jordan, or new U.S. tanks and/or foreign-source tanks. They engaged in an extended cost and effectiveness study. As an input into the study, the United States was asked whether it would supply up to 300 new M60A3 tanks. We agreed to consult with the Congress on that proposal, subject to the provision that the older M48 tanks in the Jordanian inventory be retired on an essentially one-for-one basis. The Jordanians at the same time explored a mix of U.S. and foreign-source procurement.

This was the situation when we discussed the subject of tanks a year ago with the Congress. At that time, we briefed on the then current Jordanian plans to finish equipping the existing 16 battalions, i.e., to raise the strength of each battalion from 35 to 44 tanks in the process of modernizing the inventory. We also said that we were not prepared to sell the tank thermal sight at that time.

Present Situation

What has changed since last summer? The Jordanians have made two decisions. One was to buy 274 British Chieftain tanks. The other was to return to the 18-battalion structure originally proposed in our 1973 discussions. They will mechanize their last two infantry brigades, which would require the armoring of two battalions. The four-division structure remains unchanged. The Jordanians still intend to dispose of the aging M48s.

At the April 1980 meeting of the U.S.-Jordanian Joint Military Commission, we informed Jordan that we were

prepared to sell 100 M60A3s, subject to congressional concurrence, and to consult with the Congress about the sale of an additional 100 tanks. We also agreed to offer the tank thermal sight, which, since our negative decision about Jordan's request a year ago, has been released to Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Korea. At that meeting, Jordan repeated an earlier request for U.S. assistance in finding purchasers for the M48 tanks and reiterated their intent to remove these tanks from their inventory. In May the Jordanians requested 200 M60A3s to complete their force modernization plans.

U.S. Interests

With this factual background, I would now like to turn to the significant policy issues underlying this decision. These seem to me to be three. How are U.S. interests served by this sale? What will be the effect of the sale on the regional military balance? What would be the effect on our interests of a refusal to make the sale?

We believe this sale is fully consistent with America's interests in the region. U.S. cooperation with moderate regimes in preserving the integrity and security of their own nations is an important part of the role the United States is expected by its friends to play. A strong American position of this kind in the area serves the interests of all who depend on us for their ultimate security.

Jordan has a longstanding policy of denying Jordanian territory to potential terrorists. Maintenance of this policy, among other sensible Jordanian policies, is reinforced by U.S. cooperation and understanding for Jordan's legitimate defensive needs and goals.

Jordan works actively for the stability and security of the states of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. This Jordanian policy conforms to our own interests in the region's stability and in promoting a policy of regional cohesiveness in resisting outside aggression. In 1961 Jordan sent troops to Kuwait to ward off a threatened Iraqi invasion. Jordan cooperated in the defense of Oman against the 1965–75 Communist-supported rebellion in Oman. Over 1,000 Jordanian military advisers are actively serving in the peninsula states, and more than 10,000 military personnel from this area have been trained in Jordanian facilities. During his recent visit to Washington, King Hussein reaffirmed his willingness to respond, if called on for help by the peninsula states. The effectiveness of Jordan's assistance, which closely supports our interests, is directly related to both Jordan's own military strength and the close military relationship which Jordan is perceived as having with the United States.

We disagree with Jordan about the merits of the Camp David process. The recent meetings between the President and King Hussein, however, reaffirmed the fact that Jordan supports Resolution 242 and wants a comprehensive peace with Israel. Jordan's attitude will be critically important to bringing about a West Bank settlement which we would find acceptable. As we work toward the goal of a comprehensive peace, it is essential that we preserve and protect our relations of trust and cooperation with Jordan—something which we will have greater difficulty doing if we do not continue our longstanding cooperation with them in maintaining their legitimate defensive strength.

We have examined carefully the question of the military balance, both between Jordan and Israel and in the broader regional context. Let me briefly take you through the numbers.

- The present Jordanian tank force numbers 673 tanks, including 283 M48 tanks, 308 British Centurions, and 82 M60A1s.
- The Jordanians have on order 274 British Chieftains. If the Chieftains were added to the existing inventory, the total would be 947 tanks, i.e., more than the Jordanians want.
- They are, however, planning to dispose of the M48s.
- If they add the 100 tanks which you are considering today and dispose of the M48s, they will have an inventory of 749 tanks, consisting of 293 upgraded Centurions (15 Centurion tanks will be used in the upgrading process), 274 Chieftains, 82 M60A1s, and 100 M60A3s. That is 76 more tanks than they have right now and fewer than they actually have on hand and on order combined. It is also fewer than the 972 envisioned in the 1973 study.
- If we go forward with the sale of the second 100 tanks, a decision which is still under review, the total impact of both sales would be 150 more tanks than Jordan presently has on the ground. This is not, nor can it be, a significant threat to Israel; it is, nonetheless, a substantial contribution to Jordan's defense capability and to regional stability.

Iraq and Syria have both qualitatively and quantitatively increased their tank forces. In fact, this has been a primary reason for Jordan's continued modernization. Furthermore, even when Jordan's tank forces are added to those of other Arab countries, one must realize that Israel has also expanded and modernized its tank forces since 1973 and continues to enjoy an overwhelming superiority against all likely adversaries. Equally important is our judgment that Jordan has no offensive intentions, that it is a small country outnumbered by all its major neighbors, and that its forces modernization plan, long under way, is both prudent and reasonable.

In considering this sale, you must also contemplate the effects of our refusal or your rejection. In that context, it should be remembered that the British Chieftain tank, purchased by Jordan last year and which Jordan could again purchase, is at least a comparable vehicle to the M60A3 and has features, such as gun size and engine power, superior to the M60A3. The policy question we have to address is not whether Jordan will obtain more modern tanks but who will supply them and under what conditions. Consider the following.

- A U.S. sale to Jordan bolsters a key bilateral relationship and carries with it restraints (on transfer to third countries, for example), while acquisition of tanks from another country would carry few or no restraints.
- In the context of the M60 sale, Jordan has agreed to replace its M48s on a one-for-one basis and intends, in fact, to phase out virtually all its M48s. Working with the Jordanians we have already identified three friendly countries whose combined requests for tanks exceed Jordan's M48 inventory. Serveral other purchasers are also possible.

An effort to "punish" Jordan by withholding our consent to this sale will not prevent the acquisition of tanks, but it will do serious damage to a key bilateral relationship and to our efforts to work with Jordan for regional security and stability.

In summary, the sale is a clear demonstration that we are capable of recognizing and supporting our interests in the stability and security of the region as a whole and supporting these interests. Jordan performs a critically important security role in cooperation with key states of the Persian Gulf re-

In enacting this legislation, the Congress displayed the bipartisan cooperation necessary to strike a judicious balance between American domestic and international interest. This legislation has been continuously revised and improved since its original introduction in 1971. During the past 18 months, it was considered and reported by four House and six Senate committees and numerous subcommittees and was unanimously passed by both Houses. The chairmen and members of those various committees and subcommittees deserve praise for their patient leadership in shepherding this complex legislation to its final enactment. The cooperation and support of the mining industry and labor unions were instrumental in reaching this valuable result.

This act will serve three purposes. First, it will insure that when a law of the sea treaty is implemented, there will, in fact, be a viable ocean mining industry. Second, it will subject ocean mining operations conducted in the interim to stringent domestic regulation to insure protection of the marine environment, safety of life and property at sea, prevention of unreasonable interference with other uses of the high seas, and conservation of mineral resources. Third, it will encourage nations that embark on ocean mining ventures before the treaty is in force to manage the activities of their nationals in a similar fashion and to respect licenses and permits issued under this and other national legislation.

Moreover, the act is drafted to be compatible with the work of the Law of the Sea Conference. It recognizes that the resources of the seabed are a common heritage of mankind. It requires that revenues from commercial production be set aside for developing countries. No sovereign jurisdiction is asserted over areas of the international seabed. No license will be issued for exploration to be conducted before July 1, 1981, and more importantly, no permit for commercial recovery will be effective sooner than January 1, 1988.

Under this timetable, the Law of the Sea Conference will have ample time to complete its work and to prepare for implementation of the treaty before commercial recovery under American law would actually take place. At the same time, potential ocean miners are assured that they may continue the orderly progress of their work without fear that delays in the international process will cause unanticipated and costly interruptions in their development programs.

The act authorizes reciprocal agreements with any foreign nation that regulates the conduct of its citizens in a manner compatible with this legislation; recognizes the licenses, permits, and priorities of right granted under it; and provides an interim framework for ocean mining that respects other nations' freedom of the high seas. Responsible cooperation among the early ocean mining nations can set the stage for successful implementation of a law of the sea treaty.

Ocean mining holds great promise for meeting the strategic mineral needs of this nation. With the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, we can look forward to an era in which ocean resources benefit all mankind and the institutions overseeing these resources set a new standard for international cooperation.

[1] As enacted H.R. 2759 is Public Law 96-283, approved June 28, 1980 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 7). ■

Secretary Meets With Pakistani Foreign Minister

Following are remarks by Secretary Muskie and Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi following their meeting in the Department of State on July 23, 1980.[1]

Secretary Muskie. I have had the pleasure this afternoon of welcoming the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Shahi, to our country. This is his first visit to Washington since he became Foreign Minister, so in a sense we are going through the same experience of a new job in the same field. The Foreign Minister has been kind enough to give me a report on his activities as a member of the Islamic Committee of the Three which was created by the Islamic conference to deal with the Afghanistan problem. So we have spent the last hour or more discussing the Afghanistan issue—our perception of its significance and a report on his efforts to pursue a political solution. I am delighted to present the Foreign Minister at this time.

Foreign Minister Shahi. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your kind words. I came here in response to Secretary Muskie's invitation to exchange views on the developments in connection with the Afghanistan situation. As you might be aware, I have had talks with the European leaders last month. I thought I should complete this round of consultations by informing the U.S. Government of the efforts made by the Standing Committee of the Three to explore the possibilities of a political solution of the Afghanistan crisis.

Q. Can you tell us what prospects do you see for a political solution at this time?

Foreign Minister Shahi. The standing committee has made a beginning in meeting the leaders of the Mujaheddin whose cooperation is essential if there is to be a cease-fire in Afghanistan. That is the first step toward any political solution. We have expressed our readiness to hold talks with the representatives of the Babrak Karmal regime, in their capacity as members of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, to exchange views on how to advance the prospects of a political settlement. We have had to adopt this course of dealing only with the representatives of the ruling political party because we are under the injunction of the Islamic conference not to compromise the principal of non-recognition in the consultations that we undertake.

Q. Have you gotten any response at all from this political leadership in Afghanistan?

Foreign Minister Shahi. As I have said, we have had no clear indication one way or the other whether they would be prepared to talk to us. Of course, in the past, they have indicated that they would like to hold talks with the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and Iran on a bilateral basis, on a government-to-government basis, but we have indicated the position that we have taken and our readiness to meet with the representatives of the ruling political party as a standing committee.

Q. What about your contacts with the Soviets? Have they gotten anywhere?

Foreign Minister Shahi. The President of Pakistan is in communication with the Soviet leadership, and exchanges of views have taken place. We have explained to the Soviet leadership our approach to a political solution. The

Soviets take their stand on the May 14 proposals. There are common elements, but there are important differences. So the dialogue is continuing.

Q. Have you come to the conclusion that it might be time to begin active support for the nationalist forces in Afghanistan, or do you still maintain a hands-off attitude?

Secretary Muskie. I would not call it a hands-off attitude in the sense of ignoring the problem. It obviously is a very important policy objective to achieve the withdrawal of Soviet troops in conjunction with a political settlement. Our objective politically is the same as that of the Islamic conference although independently arrived at; that is, an independent Afghanistan, elected by the Afghan people, representatives of their desires, nonaligned, and the withdrawal of troops. So our objectives are the same; we have not abandoned that. What your question is aimed at is whether or not we are about to become involved as a combatant, no.

Q. Not as a combatant but as a supplier of weapons or of support, or of any sort of assistance?

Secretary Muskie. Our assistance to the Pakistan Government at this point takes the form of debt-rescheduling which we have under consideration and are willing to be responsive to Pakistan's needs for economic assistance and support. That is the extent of which we are asked to be involved at this time.

Q. What is your government's view of the possibility of assistance being supplied to the nationalist forces fighting from Pakistani territory?

Foreign Minister Shahi. We have made a policy statement that we cannot allow ourselves to become a conduit for the flow of arms to the Mujaheddin. We are extending humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees, and they now number nearly a million. That is about the extent of our assistance.

[1] Press release 201 of July 24, 1980. ■

Hostage Convention

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE, AUG. 4, 1980[1]

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a copy of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 17, 1979 and signed on behalf of the United States of America on December 21, 1979. The report of the Department of State with respect to the Convention is also transmitted for the information of the Senate.

In recent years, we have witnessed an unprecedented and intolerable increase in acts of terrorism involving the taking of hostages in various parts of the world. Events have clearly demonstrated that no country or region is exempt from the human tragedy and immense costs which almost invariably result from such criminal acts. Consequently, the urgent need to take positive action against these manifestations of international terrorism has become readily apparent. Although the penal codes of most States contain provisions proscribing assault, extortion, kidnapping, and other serious crimes inherent in hostage-taking incidents, an international framework for cooperation among States directed toward prevention of such incidents and ensuring punishment of offenders, wherever found, has not previously existed.

The Convention creates a legal mechanism whereby persons alleged to have committed offenses under the Convention will be prosecuted or extradited if apprehended within the jurisdiction of a State Party, wherever the offense was committed. In essence, the Convention imposes binding legal obligations upon States Parties either to submit for prosecution or to extradite any person within their jurisdiction who commits an act of hostage-taking (as defined in Article 1), attempts to commit such an act, or participates as an accomplice of anyone who commits or attempts to commit such an act. A State Party is subject to these obligations without regard to the place where the alleged act covered by Article 1 was committed.

Article 1 of the Convention declares that the act or offense of taking of hostages is committed by any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, injure, or continue to detain another person (the "hostage") in order to compel a third party (a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage. States Parties to the Convention will also be obligated to cooperate in preventing hostage-taking offenses by means of internal preventive measures, exchange of information, and coordination of enforcement activities.

This convention is a vitally important new element in the campaign against the scourge of international terrorism in general and the heinous crime of hostage-taking in particular. I hope that all States will become Parties to this Convention, and that it will be applied universally. I recommend, therefore, that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to this Convention.

JIMMY CARTER

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 11, 1980. ■

Ratification deposited: U.S., Aug. 12, 1980.
Approval deposited: Netherlands, July 8, 1980.[7]

Terrorism
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532.
Accessions deposited: Israel, July 31, 1980; Panama, June 17, 1980.

International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17, 1979.[2]
Signatures: Dominican Republic, Aug. 12, 1980; Mauritius, June 18, 1980; Portugal, June 16, 1980; Suriname, July 30, 1980; Switzerland, July 18, 1980.

Treaties
Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969. Entered into force Jan. 27, 1980.[1]
Accession deposited: Panama, July 28, 1980.

United Nations
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1945. TS 993.
Admission to membership: Zimbabwe, Aug. 25, 1980.

UNIDO
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.[2]
Signature: Morocco, July 25, 1980.
Ratifications deposited: Guinea, June 23, 1980; Malaysia, Sweden, July 28, 1980; Panama, July 23, 1980.

Wheat
Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 26, 1978. Entered into force June 24, 1978, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1978, with respect to other provisions. TIAS 9459.
Ratification deposited: Italy, Aug. 20, 1980.

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Iran, Aug. 14, 1980.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 26, 1978. Entered into force June 24, 1978, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1978, with respect to other provisions. TIAS 9459.
Ratification deposited: Italy, Aug. 20, 1980.

Food aid convention, 1980 (part of the International Wheat Agreement, 1971, as extended (TIAS 7144)). Done at Washington Mar. 11, 1980. Entered into force July 1, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Austria, Aug. 14, 1980.

Women
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Adopted at New York Dec. 18, 1979.[2]
Signatures: Afghanistan, Aug. 14, 1980; Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, Gabon, F.R.G., Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Laos, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, U.S.S.R., Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, July 17, 1980; Barbados, Iceland, Tunisia, July 24, 1980; Congo, Gambia, Indonesia, Senegal, Vietnam, July 29, 1980; Egypt, July 16, 1980; India, Uganda, July 30, 1980; Panama, June 26, 1980; Philippines, July 15, 1980.
Ratifications deposited: Cuba, Guyana, July 17, 1980; Poland, Portugal, July 30, 1980.

BILATERAL

ASEAN
Agreement regarding the establishment of an ASEAN Agricultural Development and Planning Center. Effected by exchange of notes at Kuala Lumpur June 28, 1980. Entered into force June 28, 1980.

Australia
Agreement providing for the continuation of a cooperative program facilitating space flight operations for the advancement and application of mutual scientific knowledge. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra Mar. 25, 1970. Entered into force Mar. 25, 1970; effective Feb. 26, 1970. TIAS 6866.
Terminated: Feb. 26, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 25, 1970 (TIAS 6866), providing for the continuation of a cooperative program facilitating space flight operations for the advancement and application of mutual scientific knowledge. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra Mar. 3 and June 27, 1978. Entered into force June 27, 1978. TIAS 9270.
Terminated: Feb. 26, 1980.

Canada
Memorandum of intent concerning transboundary air pollution, with annex. Signed at Washington Aug. 5, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 5, 1980.

Colombia
Mutual legal assistance treaty, with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington Aug. 20, 1980. Enters into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

Dominican Republic
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Jan. 3, 1980 (TIAS 9730). Effected by exchange of notes at Santo Domingo June 13 and July 22, 1980. Entered into force July 22, 1980.

Egypt
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Mar. 20, 1979 (TIAS 9683). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo June 30, 1980. Entered into force June 30, 1980.

Agreement extending privileges and immunities to U.S. military personnel in Egypt in connection with joint Egyptian-U.S. Air Force training exercise. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo June 25 and July 15, 1980. Entered into force July 15, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Oct. 4, 1979. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo July 31, 1980. Entered into force July 31, 1980.

France
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates, inheritances, and gifts. Signed at Washington Nov. 24, 1978.
Instruments of ratification exchanged: Aug. 7, 1980.
Enters into force: Oct. 1, 1980.

Federal Republic of Germany
Treaty concerning extradition, with protocol. Signed at Bonn June 20, 1978. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Aug. 9, 1980.

Guyana
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Apr. 23, 1980 (TIAS 9755). Effected by exchange of notes at Georgetown July 12 and 14, 1980. Entered into force July 14, 1980.

Honduras
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Feb. 27, 1979 (TIAS 9521). Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa July 18, 1980. Entered into force July 18, 1980.

International Atomic Energy Agency
Agreement for the application of safeguards in the U.S., with protocol. Signed at Vienna Nov. 18, 1977.[2]

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: July 31, 1980 (with understandings).

International Sugar Organization
Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S. income tax reimbursement. Effected by exchange of letters at London July 10, 1980. Entered into force July 10, 1980; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Italy
Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Rome Dec. 18, 1948, as amended (TIAS 1864, 3148, 3278, 4254, 6179, 6408). Entered into force Dec. 18, 1948.
Terminated: July 28, 1980.

Agreement extending the agreement of June 19, 1967, as extended (TIAS 6280, 7526, 8199) for a cooperative program in science. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome June 19, 1980. Entered into force June 19, 1980.

Agreement for exchanges in the fields of education and culture. Signed at Rome Dec. 15, 1975.
Entered into force: July 28, 1980.

Japan
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Aug. 5, 1975, on cooperation in the field of environmental protection (TIAS 8172). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Aug. 5, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 5, 1980.

Jordan
Nonscheduled air service agreement, with annexes, as amended (TIAS 7954, 8553, 9375). Signed at Amman Sept. 21, 1974. Entered into force Sept. 21, 1974.
Terminated: June 8, 1980.

Korea
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Seoul and Washington Dec. 27, 1979 and Jan. 14, 1980.[2]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: July 31, 1980.

Mexico
Agreement of cooperation regarding pollution of the marine environment by discharges of hydrocarbons and other hazardous substances, with annexes. Signed at Mexico City July 24, 1980. Entered into force July 24, 1980, provisionally. Definitively, upon exchange of notes informing each party that the other party has completed its necessary internal procedures.

Agreement relating to additional cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico July 25, 1980. Entered into force July 25, 1980.

Mozambique
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of June 23, 1980. Effected by exchange of notes at Maputo July 24, 1980. Entered into force July 24, 1980.

Nigeria
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the field of agriculture. Signed at Lagos July 23, 1980. Entered into force July 23, 1980.

Oman
Agreement concerning the use of certain facilities in Oman by the U.S. Effected by exchange of notes at Muscat June 4, 1980. Entered into force June 4, 1980.

Panama
Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. Signed at Panama Jan. 11, 1979. Entered into force June 27, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Aug. 5, 1980.

Peru
Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. Signed at Washington July 6, 1979. Entered into force July 21, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Aug. 9, 1980.

Sierra Leone
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Aug. 31, 1978 (TIAS 9210), with memorandum of negotiations. Signed at Freetown Aug. 8, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1980.

Spain
Master data exchange agreement for the mutual development of weapons systems. Signed at Washington June 19, 1980. Entered into force June 19, 1980.

Cover agreement on the Territorial Command Net, with annexes. Signed at Madrid July 24, 1980. Entered into force July 24, 1980.

Sri Lanka
Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo July 7, 1980. Entered into force July 7, 1980; effective May 1, 1980.

Turkey
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Ankara Dec. 11, 1979.
Entered into force: Jan. 14, 1980.

Implementing agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to the Agency for International Development. Signed at Ankara Apr. 22, 1980.
Entered into force: Apr. 22, 1980; effective Jan. 14, 1980.

Zaire
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Kinshasa May 30, 1980. Entered into force May 30, 1980.

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[1] Not in force for the U.S.
[2] Not in force.
[3] Signature definitive.
[4] With declaration(s).
[5] Applicable to The Bailiwick of Jersey, The Bailiwick of Guernsey, Isle of Man, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, Hong Kong.
[6] With reservation(s).
[7] Applicable to Netherlands Antilles. ■

August 1980

Events pertaining to Iran may be found on page 63.

August 5
U.S.-Canada sign memorandum of intent on transboundary air pollution.

August 6
Secretary Muskie visits Los Angeles and San Francisco Aug. 6–8.

August 11
Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference opens in Geneva. Ambassador Charles N. Van Dorn heads U.S. delegation.

August 19
U.S.-Colombia sign agreement on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.

U.S.-Oman sign agreement establishing a Joint Commission for Economic and Technical Cooperation.

August 20
By a vote of 14–0 with 1 abstention (U.S.), the U.N. Security Council censures the action of the Israeli Parliament in approving a law which asserts Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem and calls upon those states that have diplomatic missions in Jerusalem to withdraw them.

August 21
Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe makes official visit to U.S., Aug. 21–26.

August 22
The following newly appointed Ambassadors presented their credentials to President Carter: Don Carmelo NVONO NCA Menene Oluy of Equatorial Guinea, Abdelkadir Braik Al-Ameri of Qatar, PROK Amaranand of Thailand, Juan Jose Amado III of Panama, Aboubacar Bokoko of Gabon, and Jose Luis Fernandes Lopes of Cape Verde.

U.S.-Somalia exchange notes providing for expanded cooperation in the development of security assistance and economic cooperation programs.

Starting from today, the economic relations between our two countries will have moved from ordinary exchanges to institutionalization. Just as President Carter pointed out in his very warm message to the Chinese Trade Exhibition which opened in San Francisco a few days ago, the cornerstone of our relationship is the communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries which was solemnly declared to the whole world by the heads of government of our two countries on December 15, 1978.

Since that time, the relations between our two countries in various fields have developed rapidly on the basis of both sides abiding by the obligations undertaken in the communique. It is our firm opinion that these friendly relations should continue to develop forward. Here, it is my pleasure to declare that with the signing of the Consular Convention, we'll be setting up three more Consulates General in your country. This will give a further impetus to the friendly contacts and trade and economic cooperation between our two peoples. Facts have proven and will continue to prove that such relations are not only beneficial to the two peoples but also to the peace and stability of the world.

Not long ago, we held the third session of the fifth National People's Congress. Our newly elected Premier Zhao Ziyang explicitly pointed out that we will continue to carry out unswervingly the domestic and foreign policies which we have set forth in recent years. Through this session of the People's Congress, the whole series of the effective new policies which we have been carrying out have been or will shortly be fully legalized and institutionalized.

All our people are, with full confidence, working hard to build our country into a highly democratic and civilized modern nation. For this purpose, we need peace, we need stability, we need friendship, we need cooperation. It is my conviction that the American people too need peace, need stability, need friendship, need cooperation. Let our two great nations and two great peoples on both sides of the Pacific advance hand-in-hand and make common efforts for world peace and stability and for the prosperity and strength of our two peoples.

TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS[1]

Civil Air Transport Agreement

AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
RELATING TO CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China,

Desiring to develop mutual relations between their countries, to enhance friendship between their peoples, and to facilitate international air transport;

Acting in the spirit of the Joint Communique of December 15, 1978 on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China;

Observing the principles of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and friendly cooperation;

Recognizing the importance of reasonable balance of rights and benefits between both Parties under this Agreement;

Being Parties to the Convention on International Civil Aviation opened for signature at Chicago on December 7, 1944;

Have agreed on the establishment and operation of air transportation involving their respective territories as follows:

ARTICLE 1
Definitions

For the purpose of this Agreement, the term:

(a) "Aeronautical authorities" means, in the case of the United States of America, the Civil Aeronautics Board or the Department of Transportation, whichever has jurisdiction, and in the case of the People's Republic of China, the General Administration of Civil Aviation of China, or in either case any other authority or agency empowered to perform the functions now exercised by the said authorities;

(b) "Agreement" means this Agreement, its annexes, and any amendments thereto;

(c) "Convention" means the Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature at Chicago on December 7, 1944, including

- any amendment which has entered into force under Article 94 (a) of the Convention and has been ratified by both Parties, and
- any annex or any amendment thereto adopted under Article 90 of the Convention, insofar as such annex or amendment is effective for both Parties;

(d) "Airline" means any air transport enterprise offering or operating international air services;

(e) "Designated airline" means an airline designated and authorized in accordance with Article 3 of this Agreement;

(f) "Air service" means scheduled air service performed by aircraft for the public transport of passengers, baggage, cargo or mail, separately or in combination, for remuneration or hire;

(g) "International air service" means an air service which passes through the air space over the territory of more than one State;

(h) "Stop for non-traffic purposes" means a landing for any purpose other than taking on or discharging passengers, baggage, cargo or mail.

ARTICLE 2
Grant of Rights

(1) Each Party grants to the other Party the rights specified in this Agreement to enable its designated airline(s) to establish and operate scheduled air services on the route(s) specified in Annex I to this Agreement. Such route(s) and services shall hereinafter be referred to as "the specified route(s)" and "the agreed services" respectively.

(2) Subject to the provisions of the Agreement, the designated airline(s) of each Party, while operating the agreed services on the specified route(s), shall enjoy the following rights:

(a) to make stops at points on the specified route(s) in the territory of the other Party for the purpose of taking on board and discharging international traffic in passengers, baggage, cargo and mail; and

(b) subject to the approval of the aeronautical authorities of the other Party, to make stops for non-traffic purposes at points on the specified route(s) in the territory of the other Party.

(3) Nothing in paragraph (2)(a) of this Article shall be deemed to confer on the designated airline(s) of one Party the right of taking on at one point in the territory of the other Party traffic in passengers, baggage, cargo or mail destined for another point in the territory of the other Party (stopover and cabotage traffic), except the non-revenue traffic in personnel of such airline(s), their families, baggage and household effects, articles used by the representative offices of such airline(s) and aircraft stores and spare parts of such airline(s) for use in the operation of the agreed services. Any exchange of rights between the Parties to allow the designated airline(s) of either Party to carry on-line stopover traffic between the points on the specified route(s) in the territory of the other Party shall be subject to consultations at an appropriate time in the future.

(4) The operation of the agreed services by the designated airline(s) on routes over third countries shall be conducted on routes available to the airlines of both Parties, unless otherwise agreed.

(5) Charter air transportation shall be governed by the provisions of Annex II.

ARTICLE 3

Designation and Authorization

(1) Each Party shall have the right to designate in writing through diplomatic channels to the other Party two airlines to operate the agreed services on the specified route(s), and to withdraw or alter such designations. In the operation of the agreed services, the designated airlines may operate combination or all-cargo service or both.

(2) Substantial ownership and effective control of an airline designated by a Party shall be vested in such Party or its nationals.

(3) The aeronautical authorities of the other Party may require an airline designated by the first Party to satisfy them that it is qualified to fulfill the conditions prescribed under the laws and regulations normally applied to the operation of international air services by the said authorities.

(4) On receipt of such designation the other Party shall, subject to the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article and of Article 7, grant to the airline so designated the appropriate authorizations with minimum procedural delay.

(5) When an airline has been so designated and authorized it may commence operations on or after the date(s) specified in the appropriate authorizations.

ARTICLE 4

Revocation of Authorizations

(1) Each Party shall have the right to revoke, suspend, or to impose such conditions as it may deem necessary on the appropriate authorizations granted to a designated airline of the other Party where:

(a) it is not satisfied that substantial ownership and effective control of that airline are vested in the Party designating the airline or its nationals; or

(b) that airline fails to comply with the laws and regulations of the Party granting the rights specified in Article 2 of this Agreement; or

(c) that other Party or that airline otherwise fails to comply with the conditions as set forth under this Agreement.

(2) Unless immediate revocation, suspension or imposition of the conditions mentioned in paragraph (1) of this Article is essential to prevent further non-compliance with subparagraphs 1(b) or (c) of this Article, such rights shall be exercised only after consultations with the other Party.

ARTICLE 5

Application of Laws

(1) The laws and regulations of each Party relating to the admission to, operation within and departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in the operation of international air service shall be complied with by the designated airline(s) of the other Party, while entering, within, and departing from the territory of the first Party.

(2) The laws and regulations of each Party relating to the admission to, presence within, and departure from its territory of passengers, crew, baggage, cargo and mail shall be applicable to the designated airline(s) of the other Party, and the passengers, crew, baggage, cargo and mail carried by such airline(s), while entering, within and departing from the territory of the first Party.

(3) Each Party shall promptly supply to the other Party at the latter's request the texts of the laws and regulations referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article.

ARTICLE 6

Technical Services and Charges

(1) Each Party shall designate in its territory regular airports and alternate airports to be used by the designated airline(s) of the other Party for the operation of the agreed services, and shall provide the latter with such communications, navigational, meteorological and other auxiliary services in its territory as are required for the operation of the agreed services, as set forth in Annex III to this Agreement.

(2) The designated airline(s) of each Party shall be charged for the use of airports, equipment and technical services of the other Party at fair and reasonable rates. Neither Party shall impose on the designated airline(s) of the other Party rates higher than those imposed on any other foreign airline operating international air service.

(3) All charges referred to in paragraph (2) of this Article imposed on the designated airline(s) of the other Party may reflect, but shall not exceed, an equitable portion of the full economic cost of providing the facilities or services in question. Facilities and services for which charges are levied shall be provided on an efficient and economic basis. Reasonable notice shall be given prior to changes in charges. Each Party shall encourage consultations between the competent charging authorities in its territory and the airline(s) using the services and facilities, and shall encourage the competent charging authorities and the airline(s) to exchange such information as may be necessary to permit an accurage review of the reasonableness of the charges.

ARTICLE 7

Safety

(1) Mutually acceptable aeronautical facilities and services shall be provided by each Party for the operation of the agreed services, which facilities and services shall at least equal the minimum standards which may be established pursuant to the Convention, to the extent that such minimum standards are applicable.

(2) Each Party shall recognize as valid, for the purpose of operating the agreed services, certificates of airworthiness, certificates of competency, and licenses issued or rendered valid by the other Party and still in force, provided that the requirements for such certificates or licenses at least equal the minimum standards which may be established pursuant to the Convention. Each Party may, however, refuse to recognize as valid, for the purpose of flight above its own territory, certificates of competency and licenses granted to or rendered valid for its own nationals by the other Party.

(3) Each Party may request consultations concerning the safety and security standards maintained by the other Party relating to aeronautical facilities and services, crew, aircraft and operations of the designated airlines. If, following such consultations, one Party is of the view that the other Party does not effectively maintain and administer safety and security standards and requirements in these areas that at least equal the minimum standards which may be established pursuant to the Convention, to the extent that they are applicable, the other Party shall be informed of such views together with suggestions for appropriate action. Each Party reserves its rights under Article 4 of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 8

Aviation Security

The Parties reaffirm their grave concern about acts or threats against the security of aircraft, which jeopardize the safety of persons or property, adversely affect the operation of air services and undermine public confidence in the safety of civil aviation. The Parties agree to implement appropriate aviation security measures and to provide necessary aid to each other with a view to preventing hijackings and sabotage to aircraft, airports and air navigation facilities and threats to aviation security. When incidents or threats of hijackings or sabotage against aircraft, airports or air navigation facilities occur, the Parties shall assist each other by facilitating communications intended to terminate such incidents rapidly and safely. Each Party shall give sympathetic consideration to any request from the other Party for special security measures for its aircraft or passengers to meet a particular threat.

ARTICLE 9

Representative Offices

(1) For the operation of the agreed services on the specified route(s), the designated airline(s) of each Party shall have the right to set up representative offices at the points on the specified route(s) within the territory of the other Party. The staff of the representative offices referred to in this paragraph shall be subject to the laws and regulations in force in the country where such offices are located.

(2) Each Party shall to the maximum extent practicable ensure the safety of the representative offices and their staff members of the designated airline(s) of the other Party, as well as safeguard their aircraft, stores, and other properties in its territory for use in the operation of the agreed services.

(3) Each Party shall extend assistance and facilities to the representative offices and their staff members of the designated airline(s) of the other Party as necessary for the efficient operation of the agreed services.

Textile Agreement[2]

AGREEMENT RELATING TO TRADE IN COTTON, WOOL, AND MAN-MADE FIBER TEXTILES AND TEXTILE PRODUCTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China, as a result of discussions concerning exports to the United States of America of cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products manufactured in the People's Republic of China, agree to enter into the following Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as "the Agreement"):

1. The two Governments reaffirm their commitments under the Agreement on Trade Relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China as the basis of their trade and economic relations.

2. The term of the Agreement shall be the three-year period from January 1, 1980 through December 31, 1982. Each "Agreement Year" shall be a calendar year.

3. (a) The system of categories and the rates of conversion into square yards equivalent listed in Annex A shall apply in implementing the Agreement.

(b) For purposes of the Agreement, categories 347, 348 and 645, 646 are merged and treated as single categories 347/348 and 645/646 respectively.

4. (a) Commencing with the first Agreement Year, and during the subsequent term of the Agreement, the Government of the People's Republic of China shall limit annual exports from China to the United States of America of cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products to the specific limits set out in Annex B, as such limits may be adjusted in accordance with paragraphs 5 and 7. The limits in Annex B include growth. Exports shall be charged to limits for the year in which exported. The limits set out in Annex B do not include any of the adjustments permitted under paragraphs 5 and 7.

(b) With respect to Category 340, 200,000 dozens of the quantity exported in 1979 shall be charged against the Specific Limit for that Category for the first Agreement Year.

(c) With respect to Category 645/646, 48,000 dozens of the quantity exported in 1980 will be entered without charge.

5. (a) Any specific limit may be exceeded in any Agreement Year by not more than the following percentage of its square yards equivalent total listed in Annex B, provided that the amount of the increase is compensated for by an equivalent SYE decrease in one or more other specific limits for that Agreement Year.

Category	Percentage
331	6
339	5
340	5
341	5
347/348	5
645/646	6

(b) No limit may be decreased pursuant to sub-paragraph 5 (a) to a level which is below the level of exports charged against that category limit for that Agreement Year.

(c) When informing the United States of adjustments under the provisions of this paragraph, the Government of the People's Republic of China shall indicate the category or categories to be increased and the category or categories to be decreased by commensurate quantities in square yards equivalent.

6. The Government of the People's Republic of China shall use its best efforts to space exports from China to the United States within each category evenly throughout each Agreement Year, taking into consideration normal seasonal factors. Exports from China in excess of authorized levels for each Agreement Year will, if allowed entry into the United States, be charged to the applicable level for the succeeding Agreement Year.

7. (a) In any Agreement Year, exports may exceed by a maximum of 11 percent any limit set out in Annex B by allocating to such limit for that Agreement Year an unused portion of the corresponding limit for the previous Agreement Year ("carryover") or a portion of the corresponding limit for the succeeding Agreement Year ("carryforward") subject to the following conditions:

(1) Carryover may be utilized as available up to 11 percent of the receiving Agreement Year's limits provided, however, that no carryover shall be available for application during the first Agreement Year;

(2) Carryforward may be utilized up to seven percent of the receiving Agreement Year's applicable limits and shall be charged against the immediately following Agreement Year's corresponding limits;

(3) The combination of carryover and carryforward shall not exceed 11 percent of the receiving Agreement Year's applicable limit in any Agreement Year;

(4) Carryover of shortfall (as defined in sub-paragraph 7 (b)) shall not be applied to any limits until the Governments of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed upon the amounts of shortfall involved.

(b) For purposes of the Agreement, a shortfall occurs when exports of textiles or textile products from China to the United States of America during an Agreement Year are below any specific limit as set out in Annex B, (or, in the case of any limit decreased pursuant to paragraph 5, when such exports are below the limit as so decreased). In the Agreement Year following the shortfall, such exports from China to the United States of America may be permitted to exceed the applicable limits, subject to conditions of sub-paragraph 7 (a), by carryover of shortfalls in the following manner:

(1) The carryover shall not exceed the amount of shortfall in any applicable limit;

(2) The shortfall shall be used in the category in which the shortfall occurred.

(c) The total adjustment permissible under paragraph 7 for the first Agreement Year shall be seven percent consisting solely of carryforward.

8. (a) In the event that the Government of the United States believes that imports from the People's Republic of China classified in any category or categories not covered by Specific Limits are, due to market disruption, threatening to impede the orderly development of trade between the two countries, the Government of the United States may request consultations with the Government of the People's Republic of China with a view to avoiding such market disruption. The Government of the United States of America shall provide the Government of the People's Republic of China at the time of the request with a detailed factual statement of the reasons and justification for its request for consultation, with current data, which in the view of the Government of the United States of America shows

1) the existence or threat of market disruption, and

2) the contribution of exports from the People's Republic of China to that disruption.

(b) The Government of the People's Republic of China agrees to consult with the Government of the United States within 30 days of receipt of a request for consultations. Both sides agree to make every effort to reach agreement on a mutually satisfactory resolution of the issue within 90 days of the receipt of the request, unless this period is extended by mutual agreement.

(c) During the 90 day period, the Government of the People's Republic of China agrees to hold its exports to the United States of America in the category or categories subject to this consultation to a level no greater than 35 percent of the amount entered in the latest twelve month period for which data are available.

(d) If no mutually satisfactory solution is reached during these consultations, the People's Republic of China will limit its exports in the category or categories under this consultation for the succeeding twelve months to a level of 20 percent for man-made fiber and cotton product categories (and of 6 percent for wool product categories) above the level of imports entered during the first twelve of the most recent fourteen months preceding the date of the request for consultations.

9. To prevent inadvertent or fraudulent circumvention of the Agreement, to ensure accurate record keeping, and to facilitate proper entry into the United States of the products covered by the Agreement, a Visa System shall be established as soon as practicable as an administrative arrangement under the Agreement.

10. The Government of the United States of America shall promptly supply the Government of the People's Republic of China with monthly data on imports of textiles from China, and the Government of the People's Republic of China shall promptly supply the Government of the United States of America with quarterly data on exports of China's textiles to the United States in categories for which levels have been established. Each Government agrees to supply promptly any other pertinent and readily available statistical data requested by the other Government.

11. (a) Tops, yarns, piece goods, made-up articles, garments, and other textile manufactured products (being products which derive their chief characteristics from their textile components) of cotton, wool, man-made fibers, or blends thereof, in which any or all of these fibers in combination represent either the chief value of the fibers or 50 percent or more by weight (or 17 percent or more by weight of wool) of the product, are subject to the Agreement.

(b) For purposes of the Agreement, textiles and textile products shall be classified as cotton, wool or man-made fiber textiles if wholly or in chief value of either of these fibers.

(c) Any product covered by subparagraph 11 (a) but not in chief value of cotton, wool, or man-made fiber shall be classified as: (I) cotton textiles if containing 50 percent or more by weight of cotton or if the cotton component exceeds by weight the wool and the man-made fiber components; (II) wool textiles if not cotton and the wool equals or exceeds 17 percent by weight of all component fibers; (III) man-made fiber textiles if neither of the foregoing applies.

12. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to consult on any question arising in the implementation of the Agreement.

13. Mutually satisfactory administrative arrangements or adjustments may be made to resolve minor problems arising in the implementation of this Agreement, including differences in points of procedure or operation.

14. If the Government of the People's Republic of China considers that, as a result of a limitation specified in this Agreement, China is being placed in an inequitable position vis-a-vis a third country or party, the Government of the People's Republic of China may request consultations with the Government of the United States of America with a view to taking appropriate remedial action such as reasonable modification of this Agreement and the Government of the United States of America shall agree to hold such consultations.

15. At the request of either Government, the two Governments will undertake a major review of the Agreement at the end of the second Agreement Year.

16. Each Government will take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that the Specific Limits established for any categories under this Agreement are not exceeded. Calculations will be based on the date of export from the People's Republic of China. Neither Government shall act to restrain the trade in textile products covered by the Agreement except in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.

17. Either Government may terminate the Agreement effective at the end of any Agreement Year by written notice to the other Government to be given at least 90 days prior to the end of such Agreement Year. Either Government may at any time propose revisions in the terms of the Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the authorized representatives of the Contracting Parties have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Washington, in duplicate, in the English and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic, this seventeenth day of September, 1980.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

JIMMY CARTER

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

BO YIBO

ANNEX A

M and B = Men's and Boys'
W, G, and I = Women's, Girls', and Infants
n.k. = not Knit

Category	Description	Conversion Factor	Unit of Measure
YARN			
Cotton			
300	Carded	4.6	Lb.
301	Combed	4.6	Lb.
Wool			
400	Tops and Yarns	2.0	Lb.
Man-made Fiber			
600	Textured	3.5	Lb.
601	Cont. cellulosic	5.2	Lb.
602	Cont. noncellulosic	11.6	Lb.
603	Spun cellulosic	3.4	Lb.
604	Spun noncellulosic	4.1	Lb.
605	Other yarns	3.5	Lb.
FABRIC			
Cotton			
310	Ginghams	1.0	SYD
311	Velveteens	1.0	SYD
312	Corduroy	1.0	SYD
313	Sheeting	1.0	SYD
314	Broadcloth	1.0	SYD
315	Printcloths	1.0	SYD
316	Shirtings	1.0	SYD
317	Twills and Sateens	1.0	SYD
318	Yarn-dyed	1.0	SYD
319	Duck	1.0	SYD
320	Other Fabrics, n.k.	1.0	SYD
Wool			
410	Woolen and worsted	1.0	SYD
411	Tapestries and upholstery	1.0	SYD
425	Knit	2.0	Lb.
429	Other Fabrics	1.0	SYD
Man-Made fiber			
610	Cont. cellulosic, n.k.	1.0	SYD
611	Spun cellulosic, n.k.	1.0	SYD
612	Cont. noncellulosic, n.k.	1.0	
613	Spun noncellulosic, n.k.	1.0	SYD
	Other fabrics, n.k.		SYD
614	Knit		Lb.
625	Pile and tufted	1.0	SYD
626	Specialty	7.8	Lb.
627		1.0	SYD
		7.8	Lb.
APPAREL			
Cotton			
330	Handkerchiefs	1.7	Dz.
331	Gloves	3.5	DPR
332	Hosiery	4.6	DPR
333	Suit-type coats, M and B	36.2	Dz.

EDITOR'S NOTE:

DPR = dozen pair
SFT = square feet
SYD = square yards
SYE = square yards equivalent

Textile Agreement—A Summary

This agreement provides a framework for insuring the orderly development of textile trade between the United States and China in a manner consistent with the interests of both nations. It assures China secure market access while protecting the United States from the disruptive market conditions that could be caused by sharply rising or fluctuating trade levels.

The agreement applies to textile products exported from China during the period January 1, 1980, through December 31, 1982. It establishes agreed levels of trade for six textile products. It provides for some flexibility in the transfer of unused quota between categories and between years. The agreement also sets out a consultation mechanism for categories of textile products which are not subject to specific ceilings and for which levels may be established later upon agreement between the two governments.

This agreement supersedes the seven unilaterally imposed quotas now in effect. Details on this transition will be announced in the *Federal Register*.

China is now the number five supplier of textile products to the United States—accounting for 8% by volume of U.S. textile imports—and the number two supplier of cotton textile products to the United States—12% of U.S. imports.

ion, thus serving U.S. interests directly and indirectly. The United States must maintain a close working relationship with Jordan in the present and future interest of peace. This can only be done if we are prepared to respond in a reasonable way to reasonable Jordanian requests for cooperation in areas vital to Jordan's own security.

We have not provided all that Jordan has requested; however, close Jordanian-U.S. working relationships have reinforced the inclination of the Jordanian Armed Forces to look to the West, and the United States particularly, for advice, training, and military orientation. For the United States to turn away from this relationship would clearly diminish our capacity to influence Jordan's future policies, political and military, and to serve our broad, enduring national interests in an important region of the world.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S.-Jordan Relationship

by Morris Draper

Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on August 27, 1980. Mr. Draper is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.[1]

I welcome the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee on the historically close U.S.-Jordanian relationship as well as on the important role the United States expects Jordan to play in the region in the years ahead. To begin with, I would like to review briefly U.S. policies toward Jordan and U.S. interests in a moderate, stable government which remains ready to make peace on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242, Jordan's attitude toward peacemaking, and how our policies toward Jordan fit into the tumultuous period in which King Hussein has led his country, along with our expanding interests in the region and the changing circumstances there.

U.S. Interests in and Policies Toward Jordan

A succession of American Administrations has believed that we should work particularly closely with moderate and like-minded governments such as Jordan to preserve their integrity, to strengthen their abilities to pursue independent policies, and to expand their capacity to respond constructively to inevitable change. Our friends in turn expect us to respond positively and fairly to their legitimate concerns and interests, as well as to some of their honest grievances. We believe that the success of moderate policies will affect the political nature of the region in a useful way and will reinforce the concept of resolving problems—both internal and international—through negotiation and compromise rather than through conflict and confrontation.

American policy toward Jordan, particularly in the last decade, therefore, has been centered on the following major elements.

- We intend to assist Jordan in maintaining its independence, its integrity, and its freedom to make decisions of its own, despite influences and pressures exerted by other states.
- In return we will want a reasonable degree of Jordanian cooperation in seeking to realize our long-term policy goals of peace, stability, and security for the area.
- We will do what we can to reinforce Jordan's willingness and ability to join in a negotiated, comprehensive Middle East peace settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
- At the present stage, we will try to set the stage for Jordan's possibly more active involvement in the peace process at an early future moment. Such an opportunity could arise following a satisfactory completion of negotiations for a self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza.
- We will continue to encourage Jordan's determination to preserve peace along the long border with Israel and the occupied territories
- We will encourage Jordan in its useful role of helping to preserve stability in the gulf region, including Yemen, through its current programs involving the training of gulf military personnel and the seconding to certain gulf states of Jordanian military and security advisers. In this connection we have noted King Hussein's willingness to provide Jordanian forces on a limited scale for deterrent or defensive purposes—if called upon for help—in periods of challenge and tension.
- We will want to manage our economic and military assistance programs in such a way as to make it clear to Jordan it need not depend—to a possibly unacceptable degree—upon the assistance of states which might want to exact politically difficult demands.
- We will want to continue—through the military assistance program, training programs, and the Joint Military Commission—a relationship with Jordan's military establishment, based on mutual trust and confidence, which will reinforce and preserve Jordan's present major dependence on the United States and the West for weaponry, for training, and for military doctrine and orientation. It is reasonable to assist Jordan in satisfying its legitimate defensive needs.
- We will want to maintain a constructive economic assistance program which will advance the day when Jordan will be self-supporting and which, meanwhile, will contribute to the strengthening of Jordan's institutions and stability.
- We will encourage Jordan to maintain good cooperative relationships with the other moderate governments and to pursue foreign and domestic policies aimed at enhancing stability in the region.
- We will continue to acknowledge in appropriate ways the contribution Jordan has been making in providing opportunity—political and economic—to the Palestinian element of its total population.
- We intend to work constructively with Jordan for the fair and efficient use of vital water resources in the area.

Jordan's Attitudes Toward Peacemaking

King Hussein is a member of a small handful of Arab statesmen who have persistently applied real and serious thought to ways of securing a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on honorable terms. President Sadat of Egypt and President Bourguiba of Tunisia are others. All—Hussein included—have suffered bitter and unfair criticism, as well as political ostracism, for their courage and convictions. All have been ready to accept the reality of Israel and to recognize Israel's genuine security needs.

Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Jordan adhered to Security Coun-

cil Resolution 242 as the basis for a settlement and has stuck to that position ever since; it cooperated with U.N. Ambassador Jarring's mediatory efforts under that resolution; and it accepted the thrust of the so-called Rogers plan.

In 1972 Jordan floated a proposal for a "United Arab Kingdom" encompassing the West and East Banks. While it met strong opposition, the concept would have to be viewed by any objective observer as a serious effort to resolve one of the more sensitive problems in an overall Arab-Israeli peace settlement.

Following the 1973 war, Jordan supported the initial, limited disengagement agreements in the Sinai and Golan Heights; however, it made clear its reservations about the potentially divisive implications—in the Arab world—of the second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement. Jordan appeared ready, in principle, to explore a Jordanian-Israeli disengagement, but nothing materialized.

In 1978 Jordan decided it could not accept the invitation to join the process envisaged in the Camp David accords; in part it was worried about "partial and incomplete" settlements. We, of course, disagree with Jordan about the merits of the Camp David approach. But there is no misunderstanding between us on the fact that Jordan still wants a fair and just peace based on the principles of Security Council Resolution 242. King Hussein has made clear to us—as late as in his recent talks in Washington and in his address to the National Press Club—that he will remain skeptical about the Camp David process but open-minded about unfolding developments. Under certain circumstances, he will consider involving Jordan more actively in peacemaking efforts.

Consistently since Camp David, King Hussein has advised his fellow Arabs not to be bound by ideological arguments. He has, instead, urged them to develop an alternative to the Camp David route which, however, would be peaceful, pragmatic, and credible to all parties. He has stressed that the Arab states must exhibit an attitude of reasonableness in lieu of rigid negativism if an honorable end to the Arab-Israeli conflict is to be achieved.

We believe it is important to sustain this pragmatic and open-minded attitude until developments in the peace negotiations turn what we hope will be a new and fresh page and offer opportunities for accelerated progress.

What Kind of Jordan Do We Want?

It would be short-sighted and irresponsible of us to play down the potential role of Jordan in contributing to area peace and stability.

Jordan will be an indispensable partner to a comprehensive peace and to an accommodation to Israel's critical security requirements. Active Jordanian cooperation will be essential in dealing with the Palestinian problem, including its political and refugee dimensions, among others.

We want Jordan to continue its useful advisory and training activities in the gulf region and to continue to act as a responsive and responsible ally of moderate Arab leaders.

Broad American interests will be served well through a continuing, close partnership of the kind that has existed for most of the years of King Hussein's stewardship. This requires, however, that we continue our sound relationship in the military field and consult regularly and systematically about Jordan's legitimate defensive requirements. We cannot expect them to take decisions which they believe would compromise their national security, but we can work with them for prudent programs which will not upset the basic military balance.

In the conduct of our relationship, we should not try to force proven friends of the past into adopting our preferred tactics of the moment. This might be worth trying if we had fundamental differences over our ultimate goal, but the goal of a just and full peace is common to both Jordan and the United States. Our relationship must revolve about our common interests and our common, long-term objectives.

[1]The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Governmenting Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Arms Coproduction

by Matthew Nimetz

Address before the American Defense Preparedness Association in Arlington, Virginia, on July 15, 1980. Mr. Nimetz is Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.

I want to talk to you this morning about an evolution in one aspect of our security assistance relationship with other countries around the world, and that is the trend toward coproduction. I will emphasize at the outset that this trend is driven not only by military considerations but also by political and economic realities. Policies have not created the trends but are of necessity responding to them.

With our NATO allies we face the specific task of achieving the most effective combat forces possible, given limited resources and a relentlessly growing Soviet military power. The goals of rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) have been imposed to achieve the most effective mobilization of our Western defense assets, which on the battlefield may mean survival or destruction. So the overriding justification of RSI, with its cooperative development and production programs within NATO, is essentially military.

In the context of history, the trend toward coproduction is an evolution that has developed with the economies of our Western allies. It has been a long time now since we provided our ravaged friends Marshall plan economic aid and surplus military equipment from our World War II stocks. As you know, that grant program was followed by the development of foreign military sales (FMS) commercial and government-to-government transactions on either a cash or loan basis, with the gradual phasing out of the military assistance program (MAP). The war-torn economies we once bolstered have now become major competitors with us in the arms industry.

For U.S. manufacturers, the growth of European industry translates into a loss of assured markets and, especially in the aerospace industry, competition with international consortia of companies backed by European governments. This trend to consortia-produced systems reflects the high costs and technological complexity involved, among other factors.

Faced with the political and economic realities of modern Europe, we must conclude that we have two choices:

Securing the World's Common Future

by Secretary Muskie

Statement before the 11th special session of the U.N. General Assembly on August 25, 1980.[1]

I welcome this opportunity to address the U.N. special session on economic development. I intend to speak frankly. And I will suggest some specific obligations of the world's nations—including my own—to secure our common future on a fragile planet.

We meet because we are in the midst of a world economic crisis. We cannot escape it. We must respond to it. Millions of our fellow humans are starving, and millions more are malnourished, on what can be a bountiful planet. Soaring oil prices have crippled the developing world; even the strongest industrial economies are struggling. Infectious recession and inflation touch us all. Nations in desperate need of growth and development instead face worsening trade deficits, deeper debt, and diminishing prospects for meeting the needs of their people.

The work ahead is substantial. The time is short. But if we take an ambitious view, seasoned with realism, we can accomplish our main purposes at this special session. We can adopt a realistic international development strategy that will help improve development prospects. And we can agree on procedures and an agenda for a new round of global economic negotiations—serious work aimed at concrete progress where the need is urgent and consensus appears within reach. My country will participate constructively in these proceedings. Progress is essential for the world's interest and also our own.

We are encouraged that progress is possible because progress has been made. The fact is that over the past decade many people in developing nations have attained better lives. Per capita income in the Third World has risen by some 3% per year. Exports have increased by 8.7% annually. Manufacturing output is higher. Life expectancies and literacy rates have improved. Infant mortality rates have declined. Striking progress has been made, much of it recently, in adjusting the system to improve Third World prospects.

- The flow of aid to poorer nations has steadily increased. More than $100 billion in replenishments for the multilateral development banks and their affiliates have been agreed.
- Access to International Monetary Fund resources has been sharply increased. Terms are more flexible. New facilities are in operation. A major quota increase is in process. The World Bank has also launched an innovative program of lending for structural adjustment.
- The common fund negotiations have been completed. We have moved ahead on individual commodity agreements.
- On trade, last year's multilateral trade agreement will mean an average cut of 25% in tariffs on principal developing-country exports. Preferential tariff systems have been adopted by all Western industrial countries.
- Use by developing countries of world capital markets has increased fourfold—from $11 billion in 1970 to $44 billion in 1978.
- The effort to increase world food supplies has been advanced through the International Fund for Agricultural Development and through the concentration of World Bank resources. In the past 5 years the World Bank committed some $11.6 billion to agricultural projects.
- And in another urgent priority area—energy—the World Bank will be lending well over $10 billion for energy projects between now and 1985.

This partial listing is not the record of a world community frozen in shortsighted self-interest, rigidly divided by ideology or stalemated on methods. Those tendencies do afflict us. Yet in recent years we have also found the common sense and good will to move forward.

But our accomplishments are still far short of our needs. My government has just completed a major study of the world's population, resources, and environmental prospects for the year 2000—just 20 years away. Its conclusions remind us again why these debates must move from rhetoric to reality. Our "Global 2000" study begins with a harsh truth. In the year 2000, the world population will be more than half again higher than in 1975. Over the last quarter of this century, more than 2 billion people will be added—2 billion more mouths to feed, bodies to clothe, individual hopes to be fulfilled.

Given this fact, the study tells us what could happen if nations fail to act in time and with reason. Based on current trends, food production should nearly double. Still, the number of people going hungry will rise by millions. Many nations already hungry see their croplands and grasslands drying to desert—a loss each year equal to the size of my home State of Maine.

On energy, from the vantage of a precarious present, we could face a punishing future. Unless trends are changed, oil supplies will be insufficient and, for many, unaffordable. Wood, the main household fuel for over 1 billion people, will be found only at ever greater distances and in dwindling amounts.

We have become accustomed to warnings about the need to conserve, nonrenewable resources such as oil. But the "Global 2000" study also points up serious stresses on renewable resources—croplands and forests, fisheries, air, water, and land—resources we have taken for granted as endless.

Another central observation of the study is that protecting the environment and succeeding in economic development are not competing goals but complementary paths. Poverty worsens the most acute environmental dangers, such as the loss of forests and soil. Thus we will not save the environment unless we also solve the problems of the poor and move the global economy forward.

"Global 2000" is not a forecast. It is a projection of present trends. But it is another chilling reminder that our common future depends on our common success, here and throughout the complex of relations known as the North-South dialogue. We must work together to raise food production, to diversify energy sources and to use energy and other resources more efficiently, to protect our common environment, to restrain population growth, to deal effectively and equitably with mounting deficits, and to keep an open system of trade.

It falls to us to rewrite the future. It is within our power to do so. But it will require a change not only in the quantity but in the character of our effort. For as fast as we have run in recent years, the challenges still outpace us. Too often, as

the Brandt Commission reminds us, we have engaged in a "dialogue of the deaf," in which "we judge ourselves by our good points and the other side by their failings. The result is frustration and deadlock."

Global Responsibilities

That deadlock must be broken. The demands of our common future require it. They compel a new inquiry. We must ask not only what individual nations can take from the global system but what each nation must bring to it. Without exception, we must recognize that assigning responsibility for the future to others is not an answer but an abdication. Such excuses will not feed, nor clothe, nor heal, nor comfort our successors if we fail. And fail we will, unless all nations are fully engaged.

Industrial Countries. I do not by any means exclude my own country from this prescription. In suggesting what different societies, differently situated, should offer, let me begin with the industrial countries.

- First, we must reduce the rate of our domestic inflation. Spiraling prices restrain growth and make the world economy more vulnerable and less fair.
- Second, we should keep our markets open, particularly to products from developing countries.
- Third, the industrial nations must use energy more efficiently, increase domestic production, spur the development of new energy sources, and cut our reliance on imported oil.
- Fourth, despite the need for budget restraint to control inflation, we should increase our aid to the developing nations. This Administration has said many times to the American Congress and the American people that our present levels of assistance to lower income countries are not enough. I intend to keep doing all in my power to change that condition.
- Fifth, developed countries should continue to accept an increasing role for developing countries in international economic decisionmaking—a role commensurate with their growing importance in the world economy and their willingness to share international obligations.
- Sixth, we must increase the capacity of developing countries to apply science and technology for development. We must accelerate the transfer of information, technology, pollution-control strategies, and other skills.

Most of these steps will entail short-term sacrifice for the sake of long-term returns. I believe the American people will support those investments. But as a former practicing politician, let me speak frankly. The American people will insist that their contributions have an effect—that people's lives must actually be changed for the better. And we can assure that only if other nations are also prepared to do their part.

Oil-Exporting Nations. The oil-exporting nations have a unique responsibility. In recent years rising oil prices have been a ponderous drag on development and growth and a major cause of inflation. This year the oil-importing developing countries will have to spend—for that single commodity—almost double the amount they will receive from all sources in aid. Thus steps such as these by oil-exporting nations will be vital to our common goals:

The vision we share is a vision of opportunity and of peace. It is within our capacity to alter the future to fit that vision.

- First, they must adopt stable price and supply policies to avoid further trauma to the international economy.
- Second, the oil-exporting countries must increase their aid and recycle more of their surpluses directly to developing countries.
- Third, oil-exporting countries should join with consuming nations in working for rational global energy arrangements.

Developing Countries. Whatever the level, external assistance will always be a secondary factor. The major determinants are internal—the ability to use resources effectively, to encourage innovation, and to share broadly the benefits of growth. Thus, there are responsibilities that developing countries must shoulder.

- First, domestic and external resources must be used efficiently and fairly, with concentration on such priority areas as energy and food.
- Second, serious family-planning efforts are vital. Nine-tenths of the world's population increase in the next 20 years will be in developing countries. No other single factor does more to darken their future.
- Third, as their economic strength grows, individual developing nations should accept more responsibility for the common management of international economic problems.
- Fourth, as their development proceeds, they must open their own economies to free flows of world trade.

Centrally Planned Countries. The market economy countries have received dominant attention in the North-South dialogue. But the centrally planned countries have global responsibilities as well. Empty bellies will not be filled by polemics. No nation or group of nations has grounds to remain aloof from this struggle. World opinion looks to the centrally planned countries:

- First, to increase their assistance to developing countries;
- Second, to increase their unconditioned purchases of LDC [less developed country] products; and
- Third, to cooperate in international efforts to stabilize commodity markets.

Proposals

For all of us, the principles I have outlined must be the basis for practical action. For our part the United States is prepared to join with others to meet the global challenge.

Our most urgent task is to confront the specter of imminent famine haunting Africa. This summer alone the United States has provided an additional 235,000 tons for emergency African food relief. We strongly urge that all nations able to contribute foodstuffs or funds join under the leadership of the Food and Agriculture Organization to coordinate relief to drought-afflicted regions. I am happy to note that the Director General will convene a meeting of concerned governments and international organizations in the coming weeks.

Targets have been set for annual food assistance in the new Food Aid Convention and for emergency food aid through the international emergency food reserve. We encourage others to join us in the effort to reach those targets, to guarantee that food will be available to those in need. Further, we should develop reserves that are adequate to back up donor commitments and assure that food emergencies can be met. My government is working toward a 4-million-ton reserve of wheat to assure our food aid commitments.

Despite efforts to produce more food, many poor developing countries will still

PRESS RELEASES

August 25

Zimbabwe becomes the 153rd member of the U.N.

Eleventh U.N. General Assembly special session on North-South economic issues is held Aug. 25–Sept. 5.

Objectives of the special session are:

- To begin a series of global negotiations with attention on North–South issues;
- To adopt an international development system for the third development decade; and
- To receive reports from the Secretary General on economic progress.

August 26

The following newly appointed Ambassadors presented their credentials to President Carter: Filipe Nagera Bole of Fiji, Dr. Mohamed Warsame Ali of Somalia, Dr. Bhekh Bahadur Thapa of Nepal, Frank Gill, C.B.E., D.S.O. of New Zealand, Jan Hendrik Lubbers of the Netherlands, Anton Hegner of Switzerland, Dr. Joseph Kingsley Baffour-Senkyire of Ghana, and Dr. Elleck K. Mashingaidze of Zimbabwe.

August 27

Ambassador to Lebanon, John Gunther Dean, is target of an assassination attempt in Beirut.

August 29

Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations, visits Israel and Egypt to discuss the current status of the Palestinian autonomy negotiations Aug. 29–Sept. 5. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
209	8/5	U.S., Canada sign memorandum of intent on transboundary air pollution.
*209A	8/6	Memorandum of Intent Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution.
*209B	8/6	Muskie, Towe, Roberts, Costle: statements at the signing ceremony for the U.S., Canada memorandum of intent on transboundary air pollution, Aug. 5.
210	8/7	Zimbabwe becomes the 153rd member of the U.N.
211	8/11	Eleventh U.N. General Assembly special session on North-South economic issues is held Aug. 25–Sept. 5.
212	8/8	Muskie: address before the G.I. Forum, Los Angeles, Aug. 7.
213	8/11	Muskie: address before the Commonwealth Club and the World Affairs Council of Northern California, San Francisco, Aug. 8.
213A	8/12	The following newly appointed Ambassadors presented their credentials to President Carter: Filipe Nagera Bole of Fiji, Dr. Mohamed Warsame Ali of Somalia, Dr. Bhekh Bahadur Thapa of Nepal, Frank Gill, C.B.E., D.S.O. of New Zealand, Jan Hendrik Lubbers of the Netherlands, Anton Hegner of Switzerland, Dr. Joseph Kingsley Baffour-Senkyire of Ghana, and Dr. Elleck K. Mashingaidze of Zimbabwe.
214	8/13	Muskie: question-and-answer session following address in San Francisco, Aug. 8.
*215	8/13	Muskie: news conference following luncheon with hostages' families, San Francisco, Aug. 8.
*216	8/13	Muskie: interview on NBC's "Today" Show, New York.
*217	8/14	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, Sept. 3.
*218	8/14	Muskie: interview on ABC's "Good Morning, America," New York, Aug. 13.
*219	8/14	Muskie: interview for ABC News, New York, Aug. 13.
220	8/15	Muskie: interview for CBS News, New York, Aug. 13.
221	8/15	Muskie: interview for French television, New York, Aug. 13.
*222	8/19	Muskie: interview for French radio, New York, Aug. 13.
*223	8/21	U.S., Colombia sign treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.
*224	8/21	Frances D. Cook sworn in as Ambassador to Burundi (biographic data).
*225	8/21	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), panel on bulk cargoes, Sept. 9.
*226	8/21	SCC, SOLAS, working group on subdivision, stability, and load lines, Sept. 10.
227	8/20	SCC, SOLAS, working group on standards of training and watchkeeping, Sept. 24.
*228	8/22	Muskie: statement in the U.N. Security Council on the question of Jerusalem.
*229	8/22	Muskie: address before the United Steelworkers of America, Los Angeles.
230	8/25	Muskie: news conference following address in Los Angeles, Aug. 7.
*231	8/26	U.S., Canada agree on interim arrangement for albacore fishing.
*232	8/28	Muskie: statement before the 11th special session of the U.N. General Assembly.
*233	8/28	Hume Alexander Horan sworn in as Ambassador to Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea (biographic data).
*234	8/28	U.S., Philippines amend textile agreement, Sept. 4 and 12, 1979.
*235	8/28	U.S., China establish textile visa system, July 23 and 25.
*236	8/28	U.S., Singapore amend textile agreement, July 14 and 18.
*237	8/28	U.S., Mexico amend textile agreement, July 28 and Aug. 6.
*238	8/29	U.S., Malaysia amend textile agreement, July 23 and Aug. 8.
		U.S., Sri Lanka sign textile agreement, July 7.
		Theresa Ann Healy sworn in as Ambassador to Sierra Leone (biographic data).

*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

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(4) The designated airline(s) of each Party shall have the right to convert and remit to its country at any time on demand local revenues in excess of sums locally disbursed. Conversion and remittance shall be effected without restrictions at the prevailing rate of exchange in effect for current transactions and remittance and shall be exempt from taxation on the basis of reciprocity. Wherever the payments system between the Parties is governed by a special agreement, that special agreement shall apply.

ARTICLE 10

Personnel

(1) The crew members of the designated airline(s) of either Party on flights into and out of the territory of the other Party shall be nationals of the Party designating such airline(s). If a designated airline of either Party desires to employ crew members of any other nationality on flights into and out of the territory of the other Party, prior approval shall be obtained from that other Party.

(2) The staff of the representative offices of the designated airline(s) of each party in the territory of the other Party shall be nationals of either Party, unless otherwise agreed. The number of such staff shall be subject to the approval of the competent authorities of both Parties. Each designated airline shall be permitted such number of staff as is adequate to perform the functions described in this Agreement associated with the provision of the agreed services, and in no event shall be less than that permitted to any foreign airline performing comparable services. Each Party shall by diplomatic note notify the other Party of the authorities which shall be considered the competent authorities for purposes of this paragraph.

ARTICLE 11

Market Access

(1) Matters relating to ground handling pertaining to the operation of the agreed services may be agreed upon between the airlines of both Parties, subject to the approval of the aeronautical authorities of both Parties.

(2) The sale, in the territory of each Party, of air transportation on the agreed services of the designated airline(s) of the other Party shall be effected through a general sales agent(s). The designated airline(s) of each Party shall serve as general sales agent(s) for the designated airline(s) of the other Party unless such airline(s) is offered and declines such agency. The terms and conditions of each general sales agency agreement shall be subject to the approval of the aeronautical authorities of both Parties. The Parties shall ensure that, if either Party designates a second airline for provision of the agreed services, both designated airlines shall be given the opportunity to act as general sales agents for the designated airline(s) of the other Party on the same terms and conditions.

(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this Article, the designated airline(s) of each Party, in its representative office(s) in the territory of the other Party, may sell air transportation on the agreed services and on all of its other services, directly or through the agents of its own appointment. Any person shall be free to purchase such transportation in the currency of that territory or, in accordance with applicable law, in foreign exchange certificates or freely convertible currencies. In addition the representative office(s) may be used for management, informational, and operational activities of the designated airline(s).

(4) The general sales agent for a designated airline appointed in accordance with paragraph (2) of this Article shall be responsive to the preferences expressed by the traveling and shipping public regarding airline selection, class of services and other related matters.

ARTICLE 12

Capacity and Carriage of Traffic

(1) The designated airlines of both Parties shall be permitted to provide capacity in operating the agreed services as agreed by the Parties and set forth in Annex V of the Agreement. Within two and one-half years after the commencement of any agreed service under this Agreement, the Parties shall consult with a view to reaching a new agreement which shall apply to the provision of capacity.

(2) In keeping with the principles set forth in the Preamble to this Agreement, each Party shall take all appropriate action to ensure that there exist fair and equal rights for the designated airlines of both Parties to operate the agreed services on the specified routes so as to achieve equality of opportunity, reasonable balance and mutual benefit.

(3) The agreed services to be operated by the designated airlines of the Parties shall have as their primary objective the provision of capacity adequate to meet the traffic requirements between the territories of the two Parties. The right to embark on or disembark from such services international traffic destined for or coming from points in third countries shall be subject to the general principle that capacity shall be related to:

(a) traffic requirements to and from the territory of the Party which has designated the airline and traffic requirements to and from the territory of the other Party;

(b) the requirements of through airline operation; and

(c) the traffic requirements of the area through which the airline passes after taking account of local and regional services.

Significant Events Leading to the Agreements

WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET[2]

In the almost 2 years since normalization, several significant events have given impetus to the process of rapprochement between the United States and China.

• Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visited Washington, D.C., in January 1979 to begin the process of building a long-term structure for the relationship. All of the accords which have been and are being signed now result from initiatives taken at that time by the President and Deng. In particular, the Joint Economic Commission (JEC), which is holding its first regular meeting this week in Washington, was the result of the Carter-Deng talks.

• Secretaries [former Secretary of the Treasury, W. Michael] Blumenthal and [former Secretary of Commerce, Juanita] Kreps, [former] Special Trade Representative [Robert] Strauss, and others visited China in the spring of 1979 to broaden contacts on economic issues and to begin addressing, in detail, some of those matters which have now come to successful conclusion. Some of their Chinese counterparts, including Vice Premier Fang Yi, Trade Minister Li Qiang, Finance Minister Jiang Jingfu, and others have visited the US.

• Vice President Mondale's visit to China in August 1979 gave added impetus to the negotiations, particularly on civil aviation. The Vice President also formally opened the first U.S. Consulate in China in nearly 30 years when he cut the ribbon in Guangzhou (Canton) on August 31, 1979. Since that time, we have also opened in Shanghai and the Chinese have opened in San Francisco and Houston. The new Consular Convention spells out, in detail, the functions which consular officers may perform. Its signing will prepare the way for China to open three more consulates in the United States—in New York, Chicago, and Honolulu—and for the United States to open three more in China.

• Defense Secretary [Harold] Brown traveled to China in January of this year, and his Chinese counterpart, Vice Premier Geng Biao, came to the United States in May and June. The purpose of these visits was to establish a normal range of contacts between our respective defense establishments, corresponding to contacts in other fields. In March the Department of State published guidelines permitting the export to China of selected items of military support equipment. Many U.S. companies have sought and received licenses to make sales presentations to the Chinese, and a number of deals may be concluded in the coming months. The purpose of the current visit by Deputy Secretary of Defense [William J.] Perry and his delegation to China is to learn more about Chinese capabilities and needs. However, the United States does not sell arms to China.

(4) Each Party and its designated airline(s) shall take into consideration the interests of the other Party and its designated airline(s) so as not to affect unduly the services which the latter provides.

(5) If, after a reasonable period of operation, either Party believes that a service by a designated airline of the other Party is not consonant with any provision of this Article, the Parties shall consult promptly to settle the matter in a spirit of friendly cooperation and mutual understanding.

(6) If, at any time, either Party is of the view that traffic is not reasonably balanced, that Party may request consultations with the other Party for the purpose of remedying the imbalanced situation in a spirit of friendly cooperation and equality and mutual benefit.

ARTICLE 13

Pricing

(1) Each Party may require the filing with its aeronautical authorities of fares to be charged for transportation of passengers to and from its territory. Such filing shall be made sixty (60) days prior to the date on which the fares are proposed to go into effect. In addition, the aeronautical authorities of both Parties agree to give prompt and sympathetic consideration to short-notice filings. If the competent authorities of a Party are dissatisfied with a fare, they shall notify the competent authorities of the other Party as soon as possible, and in no event more than thirty (30) days after the date of receipt of the filing in question. The competent authorities of either Party may then request consultations which shall be held as soon as possible, and in no event more than thirty (30) days after the date of receipt of the request by the competent authorities of the other Party. If agreement is reached during consultations, the competent authorities of each Party shall ensure that no fare inconsistent with such agreement is put into effect. If agreement is not reached during consultations, the fare in question shall not go into effect, and the fare previously in force shall remain effective until a new fare is established.

(2) If the competent authorities do not express dissatisfaction within thirty (30) days after the date of receipt of the filing of a fare made in accordance with paragraph (1) above, it shall be considered as approved.

(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) above, each Party shall permit any designated airline to file and institute promptly, using short-notice procedures, if necessary, a fare for scheduled passenger services between a point or points in the United States of America and a point or points in the People's Republic of China, provided that:

(a) the fare is subject to terms and conditions as agreed in Annex IV to this Agreement, and such fare would not be less than 70 percent of the lowest normal economy fare approved for sale by any designated airline for travel between the same point or points in the United States of America and the same point or points in the People's Republic of China; or

(b) the fare on the specified route(s) (hereinafter, the matching fare) represents a reduction of an approved fare but is not below any approved fare or any combination of fares, whether or not approved, for the provision of international air service between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China (hereinafter, the matched fare), and is subject to similar terms and conditions as the matched fare, except those conditions relating to routing, connections, or aircraft type, provided that:

(i) if the matched fare is for services provided in whole or in part by a designated airline over the specified route(s), the designated airline(s) of the other Party shall be permitted to institute a matching fare over the specified route(s);

(ii) if the matched fare is for services provided in whole or in part by a designated airline over a route(s) other than the specified route(s), the designated airline(s) of the other Party shall be permitted to institute a matching fare over the specified route(s) which is not less than 70 percent of the lowest comparable approved fare, excluding discount fares;

(iii) if the matched fare is offered solely by a non-designated airline(s) over the specified route(s), a designated airline shall be permitted to institute a matching fare over the specified route(s) which is not less than 70 percent of the lowest comparable approved fare, excluding discount fares; and,

(iv) if the matched fare is offered solely by a non-designated airline(s) over a route other than the specified route(s), a designated airline shall be permitted to institute a matching fare over the specified route(s) which is not less than 80 percent of the lowest comparable approved fare, excluding discount fares.

The Parties shall review the practice of matching of fares before the end of three years after commencement of any agreed service.

Each Party also agrees to apply subparagraph (b), *mutatis mutandis*, to fares of the designated airline(s) of the other Party for the provision of international air service between the territory of the first Party and a third country.

If, under the terms of subparagraph (b), a designated airline institutes a lower normal economy fare than the fare, or fares, put into effect pursuant to paragraph (1) of this Article, the normal economy fare for the purpose of establishing the 30 percent zone of pricing flexibility set forth in subparagraph (a) shall remain unchanged absent mutual agreement of both Parties.

Nothing in subparagraph (a) or (b) shall be construed as requiring a designated airline to institute any specific fare.

(4) (a) Each Party may require the filing with its aeronautical authorities of rates to be charged for transportation of cargo to and from its territory by the designated airline(s) of the other Party. Such filing shall be made forty-five (45) days prior to the date on which the rates are proposed to go into effect. In addition, the aeronautical authorities of both Parties agree to give prompt and sympathetic consideration to short-notice filings of the designated airlines.

(b) The competent authorities of each Party shall have the right to disapprove cargo rates. Notices of disapproval shall be given within twenty-five (25) days after receipt of the filing. A rate which has been disapproved shall not go into effect, and the rate previously in force shall remain effective until a new rate is established.

(c) A Party shall not require the designated airline(s) of the other Party to charge rates different from those it authorizes for its own airline(s) or those of other countries.

(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of this Article, each Party shall permit any designated airline to file and institute promptly, using short-notice procedures, if necessary, a fare or rate identical to that offered by any other designated airline in accordance with the provisions of this Article for transportation between the same points and subject to comparable terms and conditions.

(6) Each Party shall by diplomatic note notify the other Party of the authorities which shall be considered the competent authorities for purposes of this Article.

ARTICLE 14

Customs Duties and Taxes

(1) Aircraft of the designated airline(s) of either Party engaged in the operation of the agreed services, as well as their regular equipment, spare parts, fuel, oils (including hydraulic fluids), lubricants, aircraft stores (including food, beverages, liquor, tobacco and other products for sale to or use by passengers in limited quantities during the flight) and other items intended for or used solely in connection with the operation or servicing of the aircraft, which are retained on board such aircraft shall be exempt on the basis of reciprocity from all customs duties, inspection fees and other national charges on arrival in and departure from the territory of the other Party.

(2) The following shall also be exempt on the basis of reciprocity from all customs duties, inspection fees and other national charges, with the exception of charges based on the actual cost of the service provided:

(a) aircraft stores introduced into or supplied in the territory of a Party and taken on board, within reasonable limits, for use on aircraft of a designated airline of the other Party engaged in the operation of the agreed services, even when these stores are to be used on a part of the journey performed over the territory of the Party in which they are taken on board;

(b) ground equipment and spare parts including engines introduced into the territory of a Party for the servicing, maintenance or repair of aircraft of a designated airline of the other Party used in the operation of the agreed services; and

(c) fuel, lubricants and consumable technical supplies introduced into or supplied in the territory of a Party for use in an aircraft of a designated airline of the other Party engaged in the operation of the agreed services, even when these supplies are to be used on a

334	Other coats, M and B	41.3	Dz.
335	Coats, W, G, and I	41.3	Dz.
336	Dresses (incl. uniforms)	45.3	Dz.
337	Playsuits, Sunsuits Washsuits, Creepers	25.0	Dz.
338	Knit shirts, (incl. T-Shirts, other sweatshirts) M and B	7.2	Dz.
339	Knit shirts and blouses (incl. T-Shirts, other sweatshirts) W, G and I	7.2	Dz.
340	Shirts, n.k.	24.0	Dz.
341	Blouses, n.k.	14.5	Dz.
342	Skirts	17.8	Dz.
345	Sweaters	36.8	Dz.
347	Trousers, slacks, and shorts (outer) M and B	17.8	Dz.
348	Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer) W, G and I	17.8	Dz.
349	Brassieres, etc.	4.8	Dz.
350	Dressing gowns, incl. bathrobes, and beach house coats, and dusters	51.0	Dz.
351	Pajamas and other nightwear	52.0	Dz.
352	Underwear (incl. union suits)	11.0	Dz.
359	Other apparel	4.6	Lbs.
Wool			
431	Gloves	2.1	DPR
432	Hosiery	2.8	DPR
433	Suit-Type coats, M and B	36.0	Dz.
434	Other Coats, M and B	54.0	Dz.
435	Coats, W, G and I	54.0	Dz.
436	Dresses	49.2	Dz.
438	Knit Shirts and Blouses, n.k.	15.0	Dz.
440	Shirts and Blouses, n.k.	24.0	Dz.
442	Skirts	18.0	Dz.
443	Suits, M and B	54.0	Dz.
444	Suits, W, G and I	54.0	Dz.
445	Sweaters, M and B	14.88	Dz.
446	Sweaters, W, G and I	14.88	Dz.
447	Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer) M and B	18.0	Dz.
448	Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer) W, G and I	18.0	Dz.
459	Other Wool Apparel	2.0	Lb.
Man-made Fiber			
630	Handkerchiefs	1.7	Dz.
631	Gloves	3.5	DPR.
632	Hosiery	4.6	DPR.
633	Suit-type Coats, M and B	36.2	Dz.
634	Other Coats, M and B	41.3	Dz.
635	Coats, W, G and I	41.3	Dz.
636	Dresses	45.3	Dz.
637	Playsuits, Sunsuits, Washsuits, etc.	21.3	Dz.
638	Knit Shirts (Incl. T-Shirts), M and B	18.0	Dz.
639	Knit Shirts and blouses (Incl. T-Shirts), W, G and I	15.0	Dz.
640	Shirts, n.k.	24.0	Dz.
641	Blouses, n.k.	14.5	Dz.
642	Skirts	17.8	Dz.
643	Suits, M and B	54.0	Dz.
644	Suits, W, G and I	54.0	Dz.
645	Sweaters, M and B	36.8	Dz.
646	Sweaters, W, G and I	36.8	Dz.
647	Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer), M and B	17.8	Dz.
648	Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer), W, G and I	17.8	Dz.
649	Brassieres, etc.	4.8	Dz.
650	Dressing gowns, incl. bath and beach robes	51.0	Dz.
651	Pajamas and other nightwear	52.0	Dz.
652	Underwear	16.0	Dz.
659	Other Apparel	7.8	Lb.
MADE-UPS AND MISC.			
Cotton			
360	Pillowcases	1.1	No.
361	Sheets	6.2	No.
362	Bedspreads and Quilts	6.2	No.
363	Terry and other pile towels	0.5	No.
369	Other Cotton manufacturers	4.6	Lb.
Wool			
464	Blankets and auto robes	1.3	Lb.
465	Floor Covering	0.1	SFT.
469	Other Wool manufactures	2.0	Lb.
Man-made Fiber			
665	Floor Coverings	0.1	SFT.
666	Other Furnishings	7.8	Lb.
669	Other man-made manufactures	7.8	Lb.

ANNEX B

SPECIFIC LIMITS

Category	Brief Description	First Agreement Year	Second Agreement Year	Third Agreement Year
331	Cotton Gloves	3,213,600 dozen pair 11,247,600 SYE	3,310,008 dozen 11,585,028 SYE	3,409,308 dozen 11,932,578 SYE
339	Knit Shirts & Blouses W, G, & I	720,000 dozen 5,184,000 SYE	912,000 dozen 6,566,400 SYE	865,280 dozen 6,230,016 SYE
340	Shirts, M & B, not knit	540,000 dozen 12,960,000 SYE	561,600 dozen 13,478,400 SYE	584,064 dozen 14,017,536 SYE
341	Blouses, W, G, & I not knit	381,300 dozen 5,528,850 SYE	455,100 dozen 6,598,950 SYE	443,456 dozen 6,430,112 SYE
347/348	Trousers	1,440,000 dozen 25,632,000 SYE	1,824,000 dozen 32,467,200 SYE	1,730,560 dozen 30,803,968 SYE
645/646	Sweaters	550,000 dozen 20,240,000 SYE	566,500 dozen 20,847,200 SYE	583,495 dozen 21,472,616 SYE

Maritime Transport Agreement

AGREEMENT ON
MARITIME TRANSPORT
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China

In conformity with the spirit of the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China of December 15, 1978; and

Recognizing the importance of maritime relations for both countries; and

In consideration of the significance of maritime transport in the development and facilitation of trade between both countries; and

For the purpose of strengthening their cooperation in the field of maritime transport; and

In accordance with the principle of equality and mutual benefit

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

For purposes of this Agreement:

a. The term "vessel" shall mean any merchant ship engaged in commercial maritime shipping or merchant marine training. The term "vessel" shall not include warships; vessels carrying out any form of state function except for those mentioned in the preceding sentence; or fishing vessels; fishery research vessels or fishery support vessels.

b. The term "vessel of a Party" shall mean a vessel flying the national flag of and registered in the United States of America or the People's Republic of China respectively.

c. The term "member of the crew" shall mean a person working on board a vessel of a Party who actually performs duties or services connected with the operation or maintenance of the vessel, holding appropriate identity documents issued by the authorities of that Party as provided in Article 5, and whose name is included on the crew list of the vessel.

ARTICLE 2

a. The Parties agree that when vessels of either Party, for the purpose of transportation of passengers and cargo, enter into or depart from the ports, mooring places and waters of the other Party, the latter shall adopt all appropriate measures to provide favorable treatment to such vessels with regard to servicing of vessels, port operations, the simplification and expedition of administrative, customs and all required formalities. The conditions under which vessels of one Party may enter the ports of the other Party are set forth in letters, exchanged between the competent authorities, which accompany this Agreement.

b. Each Party undertakes to ensure that tonnage duties upon vessels of the other Party will be as favorable as the charges imposed in like situations with respect to vessels of any other country.

ARTICLE 3

This Agreement shall not apply to the vessels of one Party in the transportation of passengers and cargo between the ports of the other Party. However, the right of vessels of either Party to engage in commercial passenger and cargo services in accordance with Article 2 shall include the right to pick up or discharge passengers and cargo at more than one port of the other Party if such passengers and cargo are destined for or are proceeding from another country on the same vessel.

ARTICLE 4

a. Each Party shall recognize the nationality of the vessels which fly the national flag of the other Party and hold certificates of their nationality issued according to the laws and regulations of the other Party.

b. Each Party shall recognize the tonnage certificates and other ship's documents issued by the competent authorities of the other Party to the extent permitted by applicable laws and regulations.

c. Each Party shall inform the other Party of any changes in its system of tonnage measurements.

ARTICLE 5

Each Party shall recognize the identity documents of crew members issued by the competent authorities of the other Party. Those issued by the United States of America shall be the "U.S. Merchant Mariner's Document", while those issued by the People's Republic of China shall be the "Seaman's Book". Should any change in the identity document of a Party occur, such change shall be communicated to the other Party.

ARTICLE 6

a. Members of the crew of vessels of either Party shall be permitted to go ashore during the stay of their vessel in the ports of the other Party, in accordance with its applicable laws and regulations.

b. Each Party may deny entry into its territory of a member of the crew of a vessel of the other Party in accordance with its applicable laws and regulations.

c. Members of the crew of vessels of either Party requiring hospitalization shall be permitted to enter into and remain in the territory of the other Party for the period of time necessary for medical treatment, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations of that Party.

d. Members of the crew of vessels of either Party holding documents as stipulated in Article 5 of this Agreement may enter the territory or travel through the territory of the other Party for the purpose of joining national vessels, for repatriation or for any other reason acceptable to the competent authorities of the other Party, after complying with the applicable laws and regulations of that Party.

ARTICLE 7

a. Should a vessel of either Party be involved in a maritime accident or encounter any other danger in the ports, mooring places and waters of the other Party, the latter shall give friendly treatment and all possible assistance to the passengers, crew members, cargo and vessel.

b. When a vessel of one Party is involved in a maritime accident or encounters any other danger and its cargo and other property is removed therefrom and landed in the territory of the other Party, such cargo and other property shall not be subject to any customs duties by that Party, unless it enters into its domestic consumption. Storage charges incurred shall be just, reasonable and non-discriminatory.

c. Each Party shall promptly notify the consular officials, or in their absence the diplomatic representatives, of the other Party when one of its vessels is in distress, and inform them of measures taken for the rescue and protection of the crew members, passengers, vessel, cargo and stores.

ARTICLE 8

a. Each Party recognizes the interest of the other Party in carrying a substantial part of its foreign trade in vessels of its own flag and both Parties intend that their national flag vessels will each carry equal and substantial shares of the bilateral trade between the two nations.

b. Each Party, where it directs the selection of the carrier of its export or import cargoes, shall provide to vessels under the flag of the other Party a general cargo share and a bulk share equal in each category to those vessels under its flag, and consistent with the intention of the Parties that their national flag vessels will carry not less than one-third of bilateral cargoes.

c. Whenever vessels under the flag of one Party are not available to carry cargo offered for carriage between ports served by such vessels with reasonable notice and upon reasonable terms and conditions of carriage, the offering Party shall be free to direct such cargo to its national flag or third flag vessels.

d. When bulk cargo is carried between the United States and the People's Republic of China such cargo shall be carried at a mutually acceptable rate. Each Party, where it has the power to select the carrier, shall offer such cargo to vessels of the other Party at rates, terms and conditions of carriage which are fair and reasonable for such vessels.

ARTICLE 9

Each Party recognizes the interest of the other, through domestic legislation or policy, in regulating the conduct of cross-traders in their respective foreign ocean commerce and agrees to respect each other's laws and policies in this regard.

Either we cooperate in some way, through licensing, shared research and development, and coproduction, or we try to go it alone on both sides of the Atlantic. The days of wholesale acceptance of American finished products, utilizing advanced and unmatchable technology, have just about ended in Europe and even elsewhere around the world. Everyone wants a piece of the pie and will strike the deal that gives him the biggest slice. But I would remind you that the pie is a large and expanding one—the NATO market accounts for over 60% of the free world total of military expenditures.

Allied Cooperation

Within a NATO context our recognition of the need for military effectiveness, along with these politico-economic realities, is incorporated in our cooperative arms projects, which range from licensing, through cooperative research and development to the projected "families of weapons" for the late 1980s and 1990s.

Have our cooperative projects been successful thus far? The answer to that is a qualified yes. RSI has not achieved the savings it might in an ideal world where all duplicative research and development would be eliminated, along with all duplicative production; nor has it achieved the complete rationalization of allied logistics. But coproduction has achieved improved battlefield compatibility and savings in both cost and development time. An example is the ROLAND air-to-air missile system, developed through Franco-German cooperation and bought by the U.S. Army in 1975. By agreeing to coproduce the ROLAND, the United States acknowledged that it would not spend the money to develop a comparable state-of-the-art weapons system when it had the capability to do so, but which perhaps would not have been within the desired timeframe.

From a general comparison of estimates, it would appear that the United States saved at least $500 million in development costs and several years in drawing board to production time, and these are conservative estimates. We have achieved general equipment commonality, which means interoperability and standardization on the battlefield. Euromissile, the Franco-German developer, received an infusion of licensing fees, and we received a share of the jobs and the profits. The families of weapons, the air-to-air missile systems, and the antitank guided weaponry now under development for the late 1980s are to use the best technology available in the alliance but will be coproduced on both sides of the Atlantic.

This means that U.S. industry will compete; we will not make all of the profits, but we will share in the profits as will our European partners. So our cooperative projects are very much a part of our planning for the future. In pursuing them we are conscious of the need to work with U.S. industry to insure fair procedures, good opportunities for investment and sales, and a better feel for the international competitive situation.

One reality of NATO arms cooperation is the Europeans' desire for third-country sales. For reasons which are familiar to you, such as the need for a large enough production run to justify initial investment and to maintain a viable industry, the Europeans believe they need to be able to sell coproduced weapons to non-NATO markets. In recognition of this, our effort is to channel, in full cooperation with the governments of NATO, those third-country sales into areas and to countries that will be consistent with our worldwide interests and those of our NATO allies.

We are conscious of our global responsibilities to restrain the arms trade and to maintain stability in troubled regions. On this issue, we and the Europeans differ somewhat in approach: Generally the Europeans desire to maximize third-country sales, while it is U.S. Government policy to temper the export drive with foreign policy-motivated restraint. It is not inconceivable that without cooperative projects the Europeans would go off entirely on their own. While they have this right, we believe that all our interests are better served through cooperation.

Another reality is that with cooperative development there may be less research and development to go around, certainly less for any one type of weapon system. We hope the research and development will be better, by virtue of focusing the dollars and talent on the priority areas—not diffused and poorly utilized. But because there may be less to go around, industry will have to do even better than in the past. We will assuredly see more coproduction, more licensed production, more cooperation with our allies and friends, even more offsets, which are all part of the growing competitiveness of the international production and sale of weapons today. We must all, government officials and industrialists alike, think as broadly and flexibly as is possible to meet the challenges of the decade ahead.

Impact on Developing Countries

I have spoken briefly about the problems and benefits of coproduction with our allies, which include Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and other special friends. Within these countries, economic and political pressures may work to create an overly large industrial capacity for the production of certain items, leading in turn to the inevitable pressure to find export markets. But the issue of coproduction has a new dimension when we examine its effects on lesser developed countries. We are now seeing our European friends and the United States, and even the Soviet Union, sharing technology and coproducing weapons with the less developed countries (LDCs).

Very simply, there is a worldwide trend of increased production of weapons by an increasing number of countries. Over 30 nations are now producing arms for their use, and the number is growing each year. This trend is not confined just to Western European and Warsaw Pact states and China but is spreading to middle-tier and lesser developed countries. Major combat systems are now being produced by Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia. Arms production by all LDCs is about 5% of the world's yearly total; it has grown from $1 billion in 1969 to a present figure of more than $5 billion. This is not a small sum, especially considering the demands for developmental resources.

Some of the industrialization in the lesser developed countries has been in high-technology civilian sectors, but for weapons they have mainly produced simple, rugged, reliable, and practically designed systems. Some of the weapons production, though, has become quite complex, reflecting a substantial infusion of advanced technology. Less developed countries are now building destroyers and frigates, jet fighters, antitank missiles, submarines, and main battle tanks. And some will soon be in the missile business.

Indigenous weapons production is considered important by some developing nations for a number of reasons. Among these are:

- Increasing their international prestige;

- Enhancing their security;
- Saving foreign exchange;
- Training workers for other industrial skills;
- Reversing the "brain drain";
- Moving from buying to assembling to producing to selling;
- Exerting a regional influence; and
- Ending their dependence on others.

Let me cite a couple of examples. India, after its independence, procured most of its weapons from abroad (the United Kingdom and the United States originally, then the Soviet Union) but soon joined the trend toward coproduction, primarily with the United Kingdom and France. In the late 1970s, the Soviets, in spite of their secretiveness, entered the coproduction scheme by way of competitive bidding against Western governments and industry. Recently, India signed a very large arms purchase agreement with the Soviet Union, which will probably lead to coproduction of some very sophisticated weapons. Incidentally, India's construction of a space-launch vehicle is a good example of the use of civilian technology which has applications for military systems.

Brazil is another good example. The Brazilians have improved their capability now to the point where, from totally internal sources, Brazil was able to produce and sell armored combat vehicles to several lesser developed countries.

The point I want to make here is that the so-called lesser developed countries are modernizing fast, and the combined growth of their defense industries and the accompanying growth of their infrastructure make it possible for many of them now to produce for export.

In looking at 10 major arms producers from among the LDCs which have received technological assistance, licenses, or coproduction agreements, we find that of 40 major weapons systems being produced by those 10 countries, 26 were accomplished with help from the developed industrial states.

The suppliers to these 26 projects were: four from the United States, six from the United Kingdom, five from France, four from West Germany, and seven from the Soviet Union. Interestingly, in a couple of cases one LDC helped another. In 10 cases the LDCs produced the major weapons systems themselves from internal resources, capabilities, and manpower.

You can see from this that a little assistance can go a long way—be it military coproduction or dual-use civilian technology. And major suppliers tend to at least seek to maintain their relationships by continuing to supply still more advanced technology and improvement packages to the LDCs.

In this competitive world we see this trend continuing—licensing and coproduction are a way to protect an exporting nation's economic interests, as well as the interests of a particular company. We must recognize that in many cases, unless one is willing to consider these types of arrangements, someone else will; or the LDCs will do it themselves.

The problem for the LDC in all this is to find a balance between civilian and military needs, and within the defense sector, between buying weapons and producing its own. This is not an easy decision when you consider:

- What are the LDCs' other societal and industrial needs? Will building an arms industry unnecessarily upset the precarious balance among economic sectors?
- Will an arms industry drain valuable cash and assets (people and raw materials) away from other priorities?
- Will an arms industry upset neighboring countries and contribute to regional instability?
- Will an internal arms industry really give a country prestige, regional dominance, and enhanced security? Might it not make for vulnerability instead?
- Will an arms industry create new pressures for exports in a highly competitive field? Is this not a competition in which the LDC is likely to fare badly, leaving the government the embarrassing and expensive choice between abandoning or subsidizing a failing domestic arms industry?

It is also clear that in weighing these factors, the country that opts for coproduction will not always make the most economically feasible choice between buying and coproducing. In fact, even a highly developed nation might pay twice as much per copy of a major item to gain the industrial development benefits from coproduction.

U.S. Concerns

In my view, we need to think about the policy issues we will all face because of the proliferation of conventional arms production. When we speak about "proliferation," we commonly refer to nuclear matters. But we must also be concerned about the security and destabilizing risks of conventional arms proliferation. This should be particularly on our agenda because we advanced countries supply the technology, the licenses, the turnkey factories, the education, and training that provides the lesser developed countries with the ability to go into large-scale arms production. But of the major suppliers only the United States has a comprehensive arms transfer policy.

We are most concerned that weapons and weapons-production proliferation could lead to increasingly unstable regions. While we support economic development and technology transfer generally, we take a somewhat more cautious approach to the flow of new or advanced technology with military applications except to allied countries; and we scrutinize carefully arrangements that significantly expand arms industry capabilities of others. We in goverment recognize these responsibilities and take the most sophisticated approach we can toward our arms transfer restrictions, to insure that their application fully accounts for the changing realities.

Another implication of the politically motivated decision by more and more countries to establish their own arms industries is that arms manufacturing capacity is likely to become excessive to real needs, leading in turn to untrammeled efforts to export, which will upset regional balances and affect our own security and foreign policy.

Another of our major concerns is the risk to U.S. or allied forces during military operations worldwide. We have heard of the problems of protecting the oil-shipping lanes from fast patrol boats armed with surface-to-surface missiles, but we must recognize that our carrier task forces could also be faced with threats from smaller countries and even terrorists, utilizing advanced weapon systems, possibly nuclear weapons. The growth of missile technology in these countries is also alarming. Earlier this year, China tested the intercontinental capabilities of its ballistic missile, and others no doubt will soon have this capacity. When the yearning and capacity to develop advanced delivery systems is added to the nuclear proliferation problem, we see real grounds for concern ahead.

This is a very complicated area. We have many friends around the world who have a legitimate security need for coproduction and a stable economic and political base on which to build. We want to accommodate them whenever possible, within reason. We also understand that some sales will be made anyway, and that coproduction is a requirement of the acquiring country. We

have to import substantial quantities over the next decade. We should consider new arrangements to assist those developing countries that are improving their own food production.

We should explore ways to channel more international funds, both concessional and nonconcessional, into food production. We, therefore, support rapid agreement on an equitable replenishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). We would also consider further measures to strengthen IFAD.

To help developing countries adjust to oil-driven balance-of-payments deficits, we favor continued improvements in International Monetary Fund facilities, including subsidizing the Supplementary Financing Facility. Such arrangements should receive strong support from those who prosper as oil prices climb. Private capital flows also will continue to play a critical role. We look forward to the Development Committee's report on proposals for increasing nonconcessional flows to developing countries.

We are committed to the stimulation of energy production worldwide and to the increased use of renewable fuels. The United States strongly supports an expansion of World Bank energy programs, to permit Bank participation in multinational risk-sharing ventures to discover and develop new energy sources. Here, too, as we agreed at the Venice summit, we are open to new institutional and financial arrangements. We will participate positively in the U.N. Conference on New and Renewable Energy Sources. We urge the U.N. Secretariat and member nations to make every effort to insure its success.

Coal is an attractive alternative to high-priced oil. We will expand our capacity to produce and ship coal, and we are ready to help developing countries establish coal-burning facilities and increase their use of coal.

We support discussions between oil-exporting and oil-importing nations on ways to insure orderly market conditions and on further assistance for non-oil developing countries.

Requests for population program assistance have outpaced the international community's ability to respond. We are ready to join an international commitment to double, in this decade, the availability and use of family-planning and related health services.

On trade, my country would support a pledge by all countries to restrain protectionism and ease adjustment. Such a commitment would provide more assured market access to developing countries. Also, beyond the sharp reductions in tariffs already agreed, we are prepared to increase the benefits of our generalized system of preferences for poorer developing countries.

These proposals reflect the positive approach we believe our common problems demand and this special session deserves.

Let me conclude with this observation. I am persuaded, to the depth of my being, that the challenges ahead are not beyond us. The "Global 2000" report has been described as a reconnaissance of the future. It describes the possibility. I believe it will not be the reality. The vision we share is a vision of opportunity and of peace. It is within our capacity to alter the future to fit that vision. The resources do exist. The solutions can be found. Together we can summon the will. Knowing what is at stake, we must not fail.

Jerusalem and the Peace Negotiations

Following are Secretary Muskie's statement before the U.N. Security Council on August 20, 1980, and the text of Security Council Resolution 478 adopted that day.

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT[1]

I come here today out of my deep respect for the United Nations and all it has represented for 35 years. It is a force for peace and reason in the world. It is a forum where nations may air their differences and seek out the common ground. We should all be grateful that this institution has worked so well, on so many issues, in its relatively short span of time.

Therefore, I also come here today with a feeling of sorrow, for I believe that in its work on the Middle East over the past 5 months the United Nations has been the focus of attempts not to advance the cause of peace but to restrain it, contrary to the ideals and purposes of this institution.

The succession of resolutions before this Council and the emergency special session of the General Assembly has neither aided the Camp David process nor offered a single alternative with the slightest chance of success. Eight times in these 5 months resolutions on the Middle East have come before us. For our part, the United States has joined the debate and the voting. We have done that because we respect this institution, and we honor those who have labored hard for a positive approach.

But eight times, those resolutions have failed the critical tests of reason, of balance, of accounting for the concerns of both sides, of genuinely serving the objective of peace. The resolution before us today is illustrative of a preoccupation which has produced this series of unbalanced and unrealistic resolutions on Middle East issues. It fails to serve the goal of all faiths that look to Jerusalem as holy.

We must share a common vision of this ancient city's future—an undivided Jerusalem, with free access to the holy places for people of all faiths. But how can that vision be realized? Certainly it cannot be realized by unilateral actions nor by narrow resolutions in this forum. Rather the question of Jerusalem must be addressed in the context of negotiations for a comprehensive, just, and lasting Middle East peace.

That is the position of my government. But it is more. The status of Jerusalem cannot simply be declared; it must be agreed to by the parties. That is a practical reality. It will remain so despite this resolution or 100 more like it. We have encouraged all parties to refrain from unilateral actions which seek to change the character or status of Jerusalem. In line with this position we will not vote against the resolution as presently written.

So there can be no mistake, let me note that we will continue firmly and forcefully to resist any attempt to impose sanctions against Israel under Chapter VII [of the U.N. Charter]. That step is contained in a draft resolution to be presented here but not to be voted upon. We are unalterably opposed to it. We will vote against any such resolution.

But if we do not vote against the version before us today, neither can we find cause to support it. For the resolution is still fundamentally flawed. It fails even to reaffirm Resolution 242 as the basis for a comprehensive peace. Israel, for example, is to be censured—yet there is no censure, indeed no mention at all, of

[1] Press release 230 and USUN press release 92. ■

violence against Israel or of efforts that undermine Israel's legitimate security needs. Further, the resolution before us calls upon those states that have established diplomatic missions in Jerusalem to withdraw them from the holy city. In our judgment this provision is not binding. It is without force. And we reject it as a disruptive attempt to dictate to other nations. It does nothing to promote a resolution of the difficult problems facing Israel and its neighbors. It does nothing to advance the cause of peace. On these specific grounds, we abstain on the resolution.

And on broader grounds, we ask that the United Nations return to first principles in addressing the Middle East. Let us resist useless pronouncements and resume the practical search for results—on Jerusalem and on all other issues.

There are few problems in the world today as much in need of resolution—and of patient, constructive effort to achieve it. Four cruel wars in 30 years—and the peril and suffering that remain—underscore the urgency of this task. And it is underscored again by recent fighting in Lebanon, renewing that violent cycle. For all those 30 years there was no peace. Plans were tried and abandoned. Partial solutions came apart. Modest, stablizing steps were the very most to be achieved; and they were all too fragile.

Then in November 1977, President Sadat of Egypt took the courageous step of going to Jerusalem in an inspired act of statesmanship to break the deadlock. With equal statesmanship the Israeli Government responded. At Camp David the next September, for 13 days, President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and President Carter joined to create a framework for peace in the Middle East. Thus was born the first real chance to bring the goals of Resolution 242 into being. Then, following President Carter's trip to the Middle East in February 1979, peace between Israel and Egypt—the first real peace—was achieved.

Even so, it was only a beginning. Camp David was designed not just for a limited settlement between Israel and one of its neighbors but as a framework for a truly comprehensive and final peace among all parties to the conflict. A year ago last May, the second stage of the Camp David process began—negotiations between Egypt and Israel, with the United States as full partner, to provide full autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. This is to be a transitional arrangement of 5 years. Not later than the third year after the start of that period, negotiations to settle the final status of the territories would begin.

This may be an imperfect process. But let me remind you of this. It is also the first time the twin issues of Palestinian rights and Israeli security—issues at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict—have been at the top of the agenda together. It is the first time there has been real hope—not a mirage or a wish—that a comprehensive settlement could be attained.

My government has stated many times in the past, and I will restate it again today: We are absolutely and firmly committed to the success of the process begun at Camp David and its ultimate goal of a just and lasting peace throughout the region. There is no issue on which President Carter has spent more time and effort than this great cause. And that will continue to be the case until the job is done.

This is difficult and painstaking work. It is precisely the kind of effort that inspired the creation of the United Nations. It is precisely the work to which the United Nations should now rededicate itself. We desire to work closely with the Islamic states in order that their legitimate goals set out in Resolution 242 may be attained in peace and honor.

It is vital that a political climate be preserved within which the hard work of peace can succeed. That is why we have urged all the parties not to take unilateral steps that could prejudice the outcome of the negotiations. That is why we have counseled patience and sought wider support for our efforts. And it is why events here in the last several months have been so profoundly disturbing. We do not expect everyone to support the Camp David process. We do, however, seek an end to efforts that work in the contrary direction—not just to undermine the Camp David process but to disrupt the search for peace itself.

Let me, therefore, repeat our belief that this constant recourse to debates and resolutions that are not germane to the peace process—and even harmful to it—should stop. Elsewhere in Southwest Asia and in Southeast Asia warfare is a present reality. The aggressor nations make no effort to find peace. Yet this Council is continuously drawn to the Middle East, where authentic work for peace is under way.

The United States will not be deterred from this historic enterprise. Indeed, I would like to reiterate our firm determination to finish what has so well begun. At Camp David, as a result of statesmanship and courage, the two parties with the help of the United States designed a framework for comprehensive peace. They agreed to start with a treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel. This was a goal which many thought to be utterly unattainable but which was achieved through negotiation and on the basis of Resolution 242.

As a further step toward a comprehensive peace, the parties agreed to launch serious negotiations aimed at providing autonomy for the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza for a transitional period. The final objective is clear: resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and, ultimately, peace treaties between Israel and all of its other neighbors—Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

We intend to persevere in this effort regardless of all distractions, diversions, and difficulties.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 478[2]

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980,

Reaffirming again that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible,

Deeply concerned over the enactment of a "basic law" in the Israeli Knesset proclaiming a change in the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, with its implications for peace and security,

Noting that Israel has not complied with Security Council resolution 476 (1980),

Reaffirming its determination to examine practical ways and means, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to secure the full implementation of its resolution 476 (1980), in the event of non-compliance by Israel,

1. *Censures* in the strongest terms the enactment by Israel of the "basic law" on Jerusalem, and the refusal to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions;

2. *Affirms* that the enactment of the "basic law" by Israel constitutes a violation of international law and does not affect the continued application of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem;

3. *Determines* that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and, in particular, the recent "basic law" on Jerusalem, are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith;

4. *Affirms also* that this action constitutes a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

5. *Decides* not to recognize the "basic law" and such other actions by Israel that, as a result of this law, seek to alter the character and status of Jerusalem and calls upon all Members of the United Nations:

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bulletin

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part of the journey performed over the territory of the Party in which they are taken on board.

(3) Aircraft stores, equipment and supplies referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article retained on board the aircraft of the designated airline(s) of either Party engaged in the operation of the agreed services may be unloaded in the territory of the other Party with the approval of the customs authorities of that other Party. The aircraft stores, equipment and supplies unloaded, as well as aircraft stores, equipment and supplies introduced into the territory of the other Party referred to in paragraph (2) of this Article, shall be subject to the supervision or control of the said authorities, and if required to fair and reasonable storage charges, up to such time as they are re-exported or otherwise disposed of in accordance with the regulations of such authorities.

(4) The exemptions provided for by this Article shall also be available where a designated airline of one Party has contracted with another airline, which similarly enjoys such exemptions from the other Party, for the loan in the territory of the other Party of the items specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article. The treatment by a Party of a sale of any such item within its territory shall be determined by agreement of the Parties.

(5) Each Party shall use its best efforts to secure for the designated airline(s) of the other Party, on the basis of reciprocity, an exemption from taxes, charges and fees imposed by state or provincial, regional and local authorities on the items specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article, as well as an exemption from fuel through-put charges, in the circumstances designated in this Article, with the exception of charges based on the actual cost of the services provided.

ARTICLE 15

Provision of Statistics

The aeronautical authorities of both Parties will consult from time to time concerning, and will provide, as agreed, statistics of traffic carried on the agreed services between the two countries.

ARTICLE 16

Consultations

(1) The Parties shall ensure the correct implementation of, and satisfactory compliance with, the provisions of this Agreement in a spirit of close cooperation and mutual support. To this end, the aeronautical authorities of the Parties shall consult each other from time to time.

(2) Either Party may, at any time, request consultations relating to this Agreement. Such consultations shall begin at the earliest possible date, in no event later than sixty (60) days from the date the other Party receives the request unless otherwise agreed.

(3) If any dispute arises between the Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement, the Parties shall, in a spirit of friendly cooperation and mutual understanding, settle it by negotiation or, if the parties so agree, by mediation, conciliation, or arbitration.

ARTICLE 17

Modification or Amendment

(1) If either of the Parties considers it desirable to modify or amend any provision of this Agreement or its annexes, it may at any time request consultations with the other Party, and such consultations shall begin within a period of ninety (90) days from the date of receipt of the request by the other Party unless both Parties agree to an extension of this period.

(2) Any modification or amendment to this Agreement or its annexes agreed upon as a result of the consultations referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article shall come into force when it has been confirmed by an exchange of notes through diplomatic channels.

ARTICLE 18

Entry into Force and Termination

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force for three years. Thereafter, it shall continue in force but may be terminated by either Party by giving twelve months' written notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate.

DONE at Washington, this seventeenth day of September 1980 in duplicate, each copy in the English and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

JIMMY CARTER

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

BO YIBO

ANNEX I

I. First Route

A. *For the United States of America:*

The first airline designated by the United States of America shall be entitled to operate the agreed services on the following route, in both directions:

New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Honolulu, Tokyo or another point in Japan, Shanghai, Beijing.

B. *For the People's Republic of China:*

The first airline designated by the People's Republic of China shall be entitled to operate the agreed services on the following route, in both directions:

Beijing, Shanghai, Tokyo or another point in Japan, Honolulu, Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York. Anchorage may be utilized as a technical stop in both directions on this route.

Civil Aviation Agreement—A Summary

Designations

Each side may designate one airline to operate on the agreed route. A second airline may be designated by either party 2 years after airline service begins.

Routes

The designated airlines may operate on a route to and from New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Honolulu, Tokyo, or another point in Japan, Shanghai, Beijing. A second route between China and the United States will be discussed during the first 2 years after the commencement of service by either side. If a second route is not agreed upon, a second designated airline may operate on the first route.

Capacity and Carriage of Traffic

The first designated airlines of each side may operate two round-trip frequencies a week on the agreed route. The second designated airline may operate two frequencies; or, if either side does not designate a second carrier, then its first carrier may operate an additional two flights a week. Both sides agree that there shall be a reasonable balance of traffic carried by the airlines of both sides.

Pricing

Both parties must agree on the initial fares for airline service. The designated airlines of either party may introduce lower fares without either government's approval if the new level is not less than 70% of the lowest normal economy fare approved for sale.

Charters

Charter flights may be operated by airlines of either party with prior approval on the basis of comity and reciprocity.

Entry into Force and Termination

The agreement enters into force upon signature and remains in force for 3 years. After the third year, the agreement may be terminated by either party giving 12 months written notice of intention to terminate.

II. Second Route

The Parties shall consult during the first two years following the commencement of any agreed service to decide on a route for operation by the second designated airline of each Party. If the Parties have been unable to agree upon a second route by the end of the second year, the second designated airline of each Party shall be entitled to commence operation of the agreed services on the first route in both directions, and to operate such services thereafter until the Parties agree upon a second route. In such circumstances, the Parties shall continue to consult and to exercise their maximum effort to reach agreement upon a second route, it being understood that the establishment of a second route is a mutually shared objective of both Parties. In the meantime, the Parties shall take overall review of the specified routes.

III. Extra Section

In case any of the designated airline(s) of either Party desires to operate additional sections on its specified route(s), it shall submit application to the aeronautical authorities of the other Party three (3) days in advance of such operation, and the additional sections can be commenced only after approvals have been obtained therefrom.

Notes

(1) On or after the effective date of this Agreement, each Party is entitled to designate one airline for operation of the agreed services. Beginning two years after the commencement of any agreed service, a second designated airline of each Party may also commence the operation of the agreed services. If either Party does not designate a second airline, or if its second designated airline does not commence or ceases to operate any service, that Party may authorize its first designated airline to operate the agreed services in all respects as if it were also designated as a second airline.

(2) Each designated airline may at its option omit any point or points on the above routes on any or all flights in either or both directions, provided, however, that the agreed service it operates begins or terminates at a point on the specified route in the territory of the Party designating the airline.

(3) Before operation of service through another point in Japan, referred to in Section I of this Annex, that point shall be agreed upon by the Parties. If a designated airline of either Party desires to change the point served in Japan, that airline shall furnish six (6) months' notice to the aeronautical authorities of the other Party. Such change shall be subject to the concurrence of that other Party.

(4) Subject to the provisions of Annex V, the designated airline(s) of each Party may make a change of gauge in the territory of the other Party or at an intermediate point or points on the specified route(s) provided that:

(a) operation beyond the point of change of gauge shall be performed by an aircraft having capacity less, for outbound services, or more, for inbound services, than that of the arriving aircraft.

(b) aircraft for such operations shall be scheduled in coincidence with the outbound or inbound aircraft, as the case may be, and may have the same flight number; and

(c) if a flight is delayed by operational or mechanical problems, the onward flight may operate without regard to the conditions in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph.

ANNEX II

Charter Air Transportation

(1) In addition to the operation of the agreed services by the designated airlines of the two Parties, any airline(s) of one Party may request permission to operate passenger and/or cargo (separately or in combination) charter flights between the territories of the Parties as well as between a third country and the territory of the Party to which the requests are addressed. Each Party may provide to the other Party by diplomatic note a list of airlines qualified under the laws of the first Party to provide charter air transportation.

(2) The application for charter flight(s) shall be filed with the aeronautical authorities of the other Party at least fifteen (15) days before the anticipated flight(s). The flight(s) can be operated only after permission has been obtained. Permission shall be granted without undue delay in the spirit of equality of opportunity for the airlines of both Parties to operate international charter air transportation, mutual benefit and friendly cooperation.

(3) The aeronautical authorities of each Party shall minimize the filing requirements and other administrative burdens applicable to charterers and airlines of the other Party. In this connection, the charterers and airline of a Party shall not be required by the other Party to submit more than the following information in support of a request for permission to operate a charter flight or series of flights:

(a) Purpose of flight;

(b) Nationality of registration, owner and operator of aircraft;

(c) Type of aircraft;

(d) Either (i) identification marks and call signs of the aircraft, or (ii) flight number;

(e) Name of captain and number of crew members;

(f) The proposed flight plan (the air route, date, hours and destination);

(g) The identity of the charterer or charterers;

(h) The number of passengers, and/or the weight of cargo, on board; and

(i) The price charged by the airline to each charterer.

The information contained in the application for charter flight(s) and required by subparagraphs (d), (e) and (h) may be changed, subject to notification prior to each flight. Such changes shall be contained in the flight plan.

(4) In the event that either Party should have reasons to disapprove a particular charter flight or series of charter flights, it shall, under normal circumstances, give timely notification of the reasons therefor, and the applicant may, where appropriate, resubmit an application for approval of the requested flight or flights.

(5) Neither Party shall require the filing by airlines of the other Party of prices charged to the public for charter transportation originating in the territory of the other Party, or a third country.

(6) The provisions of Articles 2(4), 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9(2) and (4), 10, 11(1), and 14 and Annex III of this Agreement shall apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to charter air transportation.

ANNEX III

Technical Services

I. Airports for Scheduled Service

(1) In accordance with Article 6, paragraph (1) of this Agreement, airlines designated by the Government of the People's Republic of China are assigned the following regular and alternate airports in the United States:

Regular Airports

New York, New York:
  JFK International Airport
Los Angeles, California:
  Los Angeles International Airport
San Francisco, California:
  San Francisco International Airport
Honolulu, Hawaii:
  Honolulu International Airport
Anchorage, Alaska:
  Anchorage International Airport

Alternate Airports

Baltimore, Maryland:
  Baltimore-Washington International Airport
Boston, Massachusetts:
  Logan International Airport
Newark, New Jersey:
  Newark International Airport
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania:
  Philadelphia International Airport
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania:
  Greater Pittsburgh Airport
Moses Lake, Washington:
  Grant County Airport
Oakland, California:
  Metropolitan Oakland International Airport
Ontario, California:
  Ontario International Airport
Stockton, California:
  Stockton Metropolitan Airport
Hilo, Hawaii:
  Hilo International/General Lyman Airport
Seattle, Washington:
  Sea-Tac International Airport
Kansas City, Kansas:
  Kansas City International Airport
Fairbanks, Alaska:
  Fairbanks International Airport
Washington, D.C.:
  Dulles International Airport

(2) In accordance with Article 6, paragraph (1) of this Agreement, airlines designated by the Government of the United States

Maritime Agreement—A Summary

The agreement's most important provisions deal with port access and cargo sharing. It also provides for facilitation of crew list visa procedures, assistance to vessels in distress, conversion and remittance of locally earned revenues, technical and information exchanges, and for an annual review of how the agreement is being implemented. The agreement will go into effect when signed and will run for 3 years.

Cargo Sharing

Article 8 of the agreement provides that the parties intend that their national-flag vessels shall each carry a substantial share—at least one-third—of bilateral cargo. In instances where one party carries more than one-third, the other party is entitled to carry an equal amount of such cargo, subject to the availability of ships. When national-flag vessels of one party are not available to carry cargo which is fairly offered, such cargo may be directed to the vessels of the other party or third-flag vessels. Carriage of bulk cargoes shall be at mutually acceptable rates.

Port Access

Article 2 and the accompanying exchange of letters set forth the following arrangements with respect to port access:

- For Chinese-flag vessels—access to 55 specified U.S. ports on a 4-day notice basis; entry into all other U.S. ports will ordinarily be granted upon submission of 7-day advance information to U.S. authorities and
- For U.S.-flag vessels—7-day notice access to 20 specified Chinese ports. The two parties will review both port lists periodically with a view to expanding them.

We expect that the agreement will officially foster expanded U.S. and Chinese shipping services linking the two countries and that it will provide further momentum to the growth of Sino-American trade.

Two-way trade between the People's Republic of China and the United States totaled $2.3 billion in 1979 and is expected to reach about $4 billion this year. By 1985 annual U.S.-China trade should reach at least $10 billion.

The United States has been exporting to the People's Republic of China about three times as much as it imports, according to Commerce Department figures.

ARTICLE 10

Payments for transportation services under this Agreement shall either be effected in freely convertible currencies mutually accepted by firms, companies and corporations and trading organizations of the two countries, or made otherwise in accordance with agreements signed by and between the two parties to the transaction. Parties to such transactions may convert and remit to their country, on demand, local revenues in excess of sums locally disbursed. Conversion and remittance shall be permitted promptly without restrictions in respect thereof at the rate of exchange applicable to current transactions and remittances. Neither Party may impose restrictions on such payments except in time of declared national emergency.

ARTICLE 11

The Parties agree to enter into such technical personnel and information exchanges necessary to facilitate and accelerate the movement of cargo at sea and in ports and to promote cooperation between their respective merchant marines.

ARTICLE 12

a. For the implementation of this Agreement the competent authority of the United States of America shall be the Department of Commerce while that of the People's Republic of China shall be the Ministry of Communications. Each Party shall authorize its competent authority to take action under its laws and procedures, and in consultations with the competent authority of the other Party, to implement this Agreement.

b. The Parties agree that representatives of the competent authorities will meet annually for a comprehensive view of matters related to the Agreement as may be desirable. Such meetings will be held at a time and place agreeable to both Parties. The Parties also agree to engage in such consultations, exchange such information, and take such action as may be necessary to ensure effective operation of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 13

This Agreement shall be in force for three years from the date of signing and shall expire on September 17, 1983. This Agreement may be extended, subject to negotiations between the Parties prior to the expiration date. The Agreement may also be terminated by either Party on 90 days written notice.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Washington, this seventeenth day of September 1980 in duplicate, each copy in the English and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

JIMMY CARTER

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

BO YIBO

ACCOMPANYING LETTERS

September 17, 1980

Mr. Dong Huamin
Director
Bureau of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Communications
Beijing, People's Republic of China

Dear Mr. Dong:

In connection with the Agreement on Maritime Transport concluded on this date between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China, and, in particular, Article 2 of that Agreement, I have the honor to confirm that the following conditions apply to the entry of vessels of each Party into the ports of the other Party:

1. Vessels flying the flag of the United States of America may enter all ports of the People's Republic of China which are open to international merchant shipping listed in Annex A to this letter subject to seven days' advance notice of such entry to the appropriate authorities of the People's Republic of China in accordance with regulations concerning entry by foreign vessels to China.

2. Vessels flying the flag of the People's Republic of China may enter ports of the United States of America in accordance with regulations concerning entry by foreign vessels. Entry into ports listed in Annex B to this letter will be subject to four days' advance notice of such entry to the appropriate authorities of the United States of America. Regarding ports not included in this Annex B, appropriate authorities of the United States of America will be informed not less than seven working days prior to an intended entry into such ports. It is understood that entry into these ports will ordinarily be granted, but that authorities of the United States may deny such entry for reasons of national security.

3. It is further understood that, in view of the expectation of both our governments that the relations between our countries will continue to grow, the list of ports contained in the Annexes to this letter will be reviewed periodically during the term of the Agreement with a view toward increasing the number of ports on these lists.

I request that you confirm these proposed conditions.

Respectfully,

SAMUEL B. NEMIROW
Assistant Secretary
United States Department
of Commerce

ANNEX A

List of Chinese Ports

1. Dalian
2. Qinhuangdao
3. Tianjin
4. Yantai
5. Qingdao

6. Lianyungang
7. Wenzhou
8. Shanghai
9. Ningbo
10. Fuzhou
11. Xiamen
12. Shantou
13. Shanwei
14. Huangpu
15. Guangzhou
16. Zhanjiang
17. Beihai
18. Haikou
19. Basuo
20. Shijiusuo (under construction)

ANNEX B

List of United States Ports

1. Portland, Maine
2. Boston, Massachusetts
3. Fall River, Massachusetts
4. New York (New York and New Jersey ports of the Port of New York Authority), New York
5. Albany, New York
6. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (including Camden, New Jersey)
7. Wilmington, Delaware
8. Baltimore, Maryland
9. Richmond, Virginia
10. Morehead City, North Carolina
11. Wilmington, North Carolina
12. Georgetown, South Carolina
13. Savannah, Georgia
14. Boca Grande, Florida
15. Port Everglades, Florida
16. Ponce, Puerto Rico
17. Tampa, Florida
18. Mobile, Alabama
19. Gulfport, Mississippi
20. New Orleans, Louisiana
21. Burnside, Louisiana
22. Baton Rouge, Louisiana
23. Orange, Texas
24. Beaumont, Texas
25. Port Arthur, Texas
26. Galveston, Texas
27. Houston, Texas
28. Corpus Christi, Texas
29. Brownsville, Texas
30. Anchorage, Alaska
31. Skagway, Alaska
32. Ketchikan, Alaska
33. Seattle, Washington
34. Bellingham, Washington
35. Longview, Washington
36. Everett, Washington
37. Tacoma, Washington
38. Portland (including Vancouver, Washington), Oregon
39. Astoria, Oregon
40. Coos Bay (including North Bend), Oregon
41. Eureka, California
42. Stockton, California
43. San Francisco (including Alameda, Oakland, Berkeley, Richmond), California
44. Sacramento, California
45. Los Angeles (including San Pedro, Wilmington, Terminal Island), California
46. Long Beach, California
47. Honolulu, Hawaii
48. Erie, Pennsylvania
49. Cleveland, Ohio
50. Toledo, Ohio
51. Bay City, Michigan
52. Chicago, Illinois
53. Kenosha, Wisconsin
54. Milwaukee, Wisconsin
55. Duluth, Minnesota/Superior, Wisconsin

Consular Convention—A Summary

The U.S.-P.R.C. Consular Convention is the first treaty concluded between our two governments. It establishes a comprehensive framework for our consular relations.

The 42 articles of the convention spell out the rights and duties of consular officers and expand consular protections and services for citizens of both nations. The convention is a major step in fully normalizing relations between the United States and China.

The convention amplifies and clarifies the general principles contained in the U.S.-China agreement on consular relations signed in Washington on January 31, 1979. These include the mutual obligation to notify consular officers of the arrest of one of their nationals, the right of consular officers to communicate with their nationals, and to attend trials and other legal procedures.

There are now American Consulates General at Guangzhou (Canton) and Shanghai and Chinese Consulates General at San Francisco and Houston. With the signing of the convention, the United States and China are each free to open three additional consulates general. These new offices will provide more convenient and accessible service to both peoples and further promote the development of bilateral trade.

The significance of the new convention lies not only in the specifics of the text but also in the placing of a keystone in the edifice of fully mature and normal relations between the United States and China.

September 17, 1980

Mr. Samuel B. Nemirow
Assistant Secretary
United States Department of Commerce

Dear Mr. Nemirow:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated today, the contents of which follow:

"In connection with the Agreement on Maritime Transport concluded on this date between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China, and, in particular, Article 2 of that Agreement, I have the honor to confirm that the following conditions apply to the entry of vessels of each Party into the ports of the other Party.

1. Vessels flying the flag of the United States of America may enter all ports of the People's Republic of China which are open to international merchant shipping listed in Annex A to this letter subject to seven days' advance notice of such entry to the appropriate authorities of the People's Republic of China in accordance with regulations concerning entry by foreign vessels to China.

2. Vessels flying the flags of the People's Republic of China may enter ports of the United States of America in accordance with regulations concerning entry by foreign vessels. Entry into ports listed in Annex B to this letter will be subject to four days' advance notice of such entry to the appropriate authorities of the United States of America. Regarding ports not included in this Annex B, appropriate authorities of the United States of America will be informed not less than seven working days prior to an intended entry into such ports. It is understood that entry into these ports will ordinarily be granted, but that authorities of the United States may deny such entry for reasons of national security.

3. It is further understood that, in view of the expectation of both our governments that the relations between our countries will continue to grow, the list of ports contained in the Annexes to this letter will be reviewed periodically during the term of the Agreement with a view toward increasing the number of ports on these lists.

I request that you confirm these proposed conditions."

I confirm the above contents of your letter as correct.

With my highest considerations,

Respectfully,

DONG HUAMIN
Director
Bureau of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Communications
People's Republic of China

Consular Convention

CONSULAR CONVENTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China,

Desiring to regulate and strengthen their consular relations, in order to promote the development of friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries, and thus to facilitate the protection of their national interests and the protection of the rights and interests of their nationals,

Have decided to conclude this Consular Convention and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries the following:

For the United States of America:
Jimmy Carter, President

also recognize that there is a difference between limited coassembly, partial coproduction, and wholesale transfer of sensitive technology.

We do not take a doctrinaire approach to this problem. Exceptions to our general policy against coproduction are possible. Each such arrangement is, of course, considered on its merits and for its contribution to the national interest. And national interest must be seen in the long as well as in the short term. We have found that some flexibility in our sales policy can work to our advantage. We are looking carefully at the goals we seek and balancing them against our policy of restraint.

The President alone can make exceptions and will do so if such an exception is in the national interest. In January he decided to make an exception to allow U.S. firms to develop a fighter solely for export—a quite major exception to Presidential Determination 13. In coproduction, he has made some 13 exceptions to our policy of no coproduction.

An important baseline to recall here is that the arms transfer limitations of our policy do not apply in any manner to NATO states, Japan, Australia, or New Zealand (a market encompassing close to 70% of non-Communist military expenditures); there are no dollar ceilings and no prohibitions on coproduction. The one limit that remains is that to which I have alluded earlier—third-country transfers. Just as with U.S. firms, if U.S.-origin technology goes into a weapons system, then the U.S. Government, for policy reasons and because of a congressional mandate, must carefully review proposed transfers. Some U.S. firms have argued that for the government to allow coproduction puts them at a competitive disadvantage, as the Europeans can more easily market, but I disagree. It is not our policy to permit European sales to countries to which we would we would not at the same time permit U.S. firms to sell. In other words, if one competes, we want everyone to compete on an equal basis.

Conclusion

Where, then, does this leave us? First, on the NATO side, we can see some trends. Rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) has a solid foothold, and I believe has solid public, congressional, and industry support. The family of weapons concept has taken hold, as have codevelopment, coproduction, and industrial teaming.

Ocean Development in the 1980s

by Thomas R. Pickering

Address before the National Ocean Industries Association in Washington, D.C., on March 11, 1980. Mr. Pickering is Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

It is a pleasure to be with you at your Eighth Annual Meeting. Your theme, "The 1980s: Decade for Ocean Development," is timely and places you in good company. As you know, last year 53 Members of the Congress broached the concept of the 1980s as a decade of ocean resource use and management in a letter to the President. The idea is now under study by the Administration and by the presidentially appointed National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere.

By whatever name we give to these endeavors—whether it be the decade of ocean development, the decade of ocean resource use and management, or a name yet to be coined—I believe we are all striving to attain a common goal. That goal is the development of marine resources, through the encouragement of private enterprise, in a manner that protects the marine environment and equitably accommodates the often competing demands on ocean space.

Certainly, that is a principal goal of the bureau which I head in the Department of State—the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. We are charged with handling a wide variety of international oceans issues pertinent to your theme. These include fisheries negotiations and ocean management matters concerned with marine scientific research, marine mammals, marine pollution, and polar affairs. We also have responsibilities with regard to the third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, which is

But our task is to take into account the realities of the trends in coproduction and adjust and channel our energies to the reality of what is happening in the world. We want to assure greater predictability to industry and cooperating governments. We have, therefore, in certain cases, established sales territories to allow sales to all NATO countries; this builds in stability and predictability which helps industry to plan. Additionally, where and when possible we are approving sales territories for sales to countries outside NATO.

In reaching our decisions we focus not on abstractions but on the sensitivity of technology that needs to be controlled. Does it make sense for us to control the sale of a tank because it has U.S. paint or even tank treads? We are considering waiving export reviews of items containing low-level technology. Similarly, we expect European governments to waive their restrictions on U.S. coproduced items containing European technology. We are more and more concerned about the economics of major arms sales, including the impact of offset arrangements on our balance-of-payments position.

With these trends in mind, it is up to both government and industry to adapt to the changing nature of global arms sales. Even with our NATO allies we must be aware of the problems involved in the difficult partnership ahead. And with regard to the less developed countries, we must keep in mind the host of new problems, as well as benefits, that arms coproduction brings. Given the trends in the world today, it is our task to work together in this country, government and industry, to channel these trends into productive endeavors to the United States and for the other countries concerned.

That is why we are attempting to fine-tune our arms transfer restraint policy, and why we are working with others in cooperative projects. We are looking not to short-term maximization but to the long-term health of our defense industry and American economic, political, and security interests. In fact, it is one of the accomplishments of this Administration that we have made such progress in developing cooperative weapons projects, as well as maintaining a responsible restraint policy. So I urge you to work with us in the coming decade to maintain the superiority of our industry, both qualitative and quantitative, in the context of a more competitive world and a period of heightened risks for our country. ■

presently meeting at the United Nations in New York. At the conclusion of the Law of the Sea Conference, my bureau will be responsible for the foreign policy followup and implementation.

During the past year we have been engaged in an analysis of likely trends and related national objectives in ocean affairs during the 1980s. I would like to share with you some of our thoughts on these matters, particularly as they relate to the development and management of ocean resources. I look forward to your comments on our analysis in the discussion period after these remarks.

We see that, whether or not a law of the sea treaty is concluded, principles are evolving that will be applicable to the development and management of ocean resources. Chief among these is the growing trend toward coastal state control over exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing both the living and nonliving resources of the seabed, subsoil, and superjacent waters out to 200 nautical miles from the coast. Coastal state control over other activities such as the production of energy from the water and winds would also be asserted. Because most of the presently exploitable resources of the oceans are found within 200 nautical miles of the coast, during the 1980s the majority of ocean resource activities will be carried out under the regulation and control of national governments, although we in the State Department will necessarily be involved because of the potential for dispute and conflict which these activities could engender.

Fisheries

The ocean resource activity with which the Department of State has had the longest association is fishing. Since the 1940s the Department has been concerned with the development and management of the living resources of the oceans as an important world source of protein. Looking ahead to the decade of the 1980s, we foresee a declining per capita world fisheries harvest. Despite a marked increase in investment in fishing fleets since 1970, the annual world catch has increased little beyond 70 million tons. At the same time the world's population continues to grow apace.

During the 1980s maximum sustainable yields will have been reached or surpassed in many regions unless more sophisticated management schemes are instituted to rebuild stocks. Better management might actually reduce world catch over the short run as overfishing in some regions is cut, but the end result should be a higher sustained catch over the longer term as depleted stocks recover. An increase in the world catch to 80 million tons by the year 2000 is a possibility. We also see a trend through the 1980s away from long-distance fishing fleets, as coastal states extend their control. Increased emphasis will be placed on new coastal fishing vessels and domestic shore-based or offshore processing operations.

We expect U.S. fisheries policy to continue to be set by the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, which established our 200-nautical-mile fishery conservation zone. Under the terms of that act, regional fishery management councils initiate the calculation of the optimum yield from each fishery and determine how much U.S. vessels are capable of harvesting. The Department of State allocates the balance to other nations with which we have governing international fishery agreements. In the past, the primary factor in the Department's determination of allocations has been the traditional or historical levels of foreign fishing.

However, sentiment also is growing in Congress, industry, and the regional councils to use U.S. fish allocations as devices or bargaining chips to open foreign markets to U.S. fisheries exports and to gain other economic benefits in the fisheries arena. We share this interest. As an example, we are now carrying on consultations with Congress, the Commerce Department, and industry prior to reallocating some 350,000 tons of fish we withheld from the Soviet Union in our reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These consultations will establish the basis for reallocation of this resource, including how we can use it to promote the exports of our own fish.

The Fishery Conservation and Management Act has encouraged significant new investment in the U.S. harvesting and processing capacity. During the 1980s we expect to see a continuing decline in the level of foreign fishing off our coasts. This will reduce the occasions to negotiate additional governing international fishery agreements except in cases where there are opportunities for either reciprocal access by U.S. vessels or where there is a potential for increased economic benefit in the U.S. fisheries sector, such as establishing new joint ventures and increased foreign trade. During the 1980s we will also be giving priority to negotiating arrangements with other countries to help maintain U.S. access to important distant water fisheries such as tuna and shrimp.

Mineral Resources

Turning from fish to mineral resources, during the past decade exploration for petroleum and natural gas from ocean areas has increased dramatically. The search for hydrocarbons on the Continental Shelf has accelerated at a pace that has exceeded all expectations. However, management of the increased recovery of petroleum from the Continental Shelf should not prove to be as difficult as the management of fisheries. Unless the seaward extension of a boundary between two countries happens to cross an oil pool, cooperative international management arrangements for the production of petroleum should not be necessary. Where the problem of a common pool occurs, a bilateral or multilateral agreement will have to be reached if it is to be exploited efficiently. In certain areas, cooperative arrangements concerning the landing or shipment of oil and gas may be desirable.

The increased exploitation of offshore petroleum in the 1980s will bring greater possibilities of blowouts and other pollution incidents. Of particular interest to my Department are the possible transboundary environmental impacts arising from offshore hydrocarbon development. The massive blowout and oil spill of the Ixtoc well in the Bay of Campeche is an example of the effect upon our nation of the activities on the Continental Shelf of another. The mutual vulnerability of coastal nations bordering the same body of water points to a clear need to harmonize safety and antipollution measures, including provisions for blowout prevention, control, and liability.

Working in close cooperation with other agencies such as the Coast Guard, the Department of Energy, and the Department of the Interior, we expect during the 1980s to negotiate with our neighboring nations new and additional contingency planning and other environmental agreements concerning offshore hydrocarbon development. Such initial agreements may well also

U.S. Relationship With the U.N.

by Donald F. McHenry

Address at the 35th Convocation of the U.S. United Nations Association on April 19, 1980. Ambassador McHenry is U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.[1]

I am very pleased to be here with you today on this important anniversary. In fact, there is no group of people with whom I would rather celebrate the founding of the United Nations than the members of the U.N. Association. You perform a valuable service for both the United Nations and the United States.

I wish there were more of you, that more Americans understood the role of the United Nations in the world and of the United States in the United Nations. The United Nations has never been more important than it is today. Multilateral initiatives and global cooperation are a crucial complement to our own efforts to resolve the pressing international problems that have such a profound effect on our economy and lifestyle here at home—energy, hunger, pollution, depletion of nonrenewable resources, protectionism, global economic affairs—these are all matters which only a generation ago we thought of as domestic affairs.

U.S. Attitude Toward the U.N. Since 1945

Yet American public support for the United Nations is muted today. The United Nations is a frequent target of attack—in some places where it counts—on Capitol Hill. A small but vocal group of legislators, who are critical of the Third World's occasional use of the forum to criticize or rebuff the United States, tends to hamstring our attempts to expand American participation in the U.N. system. These legislators have, obviously, tapped a wellspring of anti-U.N. sentiment among the American people; one based on several disquieting factors:

- Lack of understanding about the United Nations;
- Preoccupation with domestic concerns at the expense of foreign policy;
- Failure to understand the increasing interrelationships between domestic and foreign policy;
- Vain hope that complex problems can be resolved simply and quickly, and finally;
- What anthropologists would call an "ethnocentric" view of the world, in which everything that is not done the American way is automatically suspect.

At the core of the love-hate relationship our country has carried on with the United Nations since 1945 are some fundamental misperceptions and outmoded ideas. We must correct those wrong impressions and change American attitudes about the United Nations if we are to play the leadership role we wish and ought to play in the world organization.

American views about the United Nations are grounded in the Wilsonian idealism we brought to the organization at its founding. The U.N. Charter reflects an essentially American vision—a dream that the world could transcend political differences and, for some purposes at least, become the kind of melting pot our nation has turned out to be.

Almost from the beginning, the United Nations was less than we had hoped. In American eyes, its shortcomings stemmed from the intransigence of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, against whom we and our more numerous political friends were arrayed on most issues.

The United Nations did not transcend—it could not—cold war politics. It became a forum where confrontational scenarios between the world's two major blocs were acted out peacefully. Since the tally of pro-American votes outnumbered the opposition through the 1950s, we were on the winning side of most questions.

The United Nations thus vindicated our belief in the fundamental rectitude of American ideals and foreign policy. That the Russians could only make their presence felt by repeatedly exercising their veto simply reinforced our belief in Communist obstructionism. I grew up as a boy believing there was something viciously wrong in casting a veto. Every evening I heard Mr. Gabriel Heatter keep count of the number of vetoes the United States cast. I didn't know then that the idea was essentially American.

Ironically, it was the ultimate triumph of American ideals in the United Nations, and the fulfillment of one of the main objectives of the U.N. Charter, that fundamentally altered the organization and set it on a course many Americans disliked. I am speaking of the decolonization of Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean and the ability of those nations to express fundamental disagreements with our policy on the three most contentious issues facing the organization: the Middle East, southern Africa, and the North-South dialogue.

Third World Nations

Beginning in about 1960, the world underwent a transformation unlike any other in recorded history. In the last two decades almost a hundred new nations have emerged from colonial status to become full members of the world community and of the United Nations. Their presence changed what had been an essentially homogenous body, dominated by industrialized northern hemispheric states, into a pluralistic forum that reflects many different interests and ideologies.

On the whole, these new nations, imbued with a strong sense of nationalism, have little use for the politics of superpower confrontation. The United Nations is the one forum where they can speak out on what they see as an "equal footing" with older nations and deal with the issues that are important to them: an end to colonialism and racism, economic development, the reallocation of world financial resources, and noninterference by established powers in their internal affairs. Furthermore, they approach these issues from a radically different perspective than we do.

Unlike the United States, the Third World nations do not have to deal with broad, strategic considerations when they consider the merits of particular issues. Their interests are far narrower than ours. Their needs are great; their goals, immediate. They take support from whomever offers it. They are aware of John Kennedy's warning that he who rides on the tiger's back may end up in the tiger's stomach. They hope, however, that knowledge of

---

(a) to accept this decision;

(b) and upon those States that have established diplomatic Missions in Jerusalem to withdraw such Missions from the Holy City;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution before 15 November 1980;

7. *Decides* to remain seized of this serious situation.

---

[1] Press release 227 and USUN press release 89.

[2] Adopted by a vote of 14 to 0 with 1 abstention (U.S.). ■

the tiger's proclivities will enable them to avoid being maimed or devoured.

The United States, however, cannot ignore broad, strategic concerns in deciding its position on foreign policy issues. As a world leader that seeks friends on the basis of shared principles and interests, rather than by military intimidation, we must balance a number of factors every time we take a position on any issue. These include the wishes and sensitivities of our allies, economic considerations that arise from our free enterprise system, public opinion in democratic societies, and our overall strategic responsibility in the Western world. We also have honest differences of opinion about how the Third World can best achieve goals like economic development and fiscal responsibility and social and political equality.

Thus, even though we support the principles that the sponsors of many Third World resolutions seek to vindicate, the United States has been on the losing side of many U.N. votes.

The Soviets are not constrained by responsibilities like ours. They can support many one-sided initiatives that we must oppose because the positions they take mean nothing to them and have no consequences for them in their closed society.

Many Americans have thus come to believe that the United Nations is now an anti-American, if not pro-Soviet, organization in contrast to its former pro-American stance. The public seems convinced that American interests are threatened by the changing forces at a United Nations dominated by a Third World-Soviet bloc. Public support for the organization has fallen in the United States to alarming levels. The only consolation I have in my job is that the United Nations is still thought more highly of than the U.S. Congress.

U.S. Views Today

Public support reached its nadir in the mid-1970s. Too often the United States played confrontation politics at the United Nations. After he left, one of our permanent representatives called the organization "a very dangerous place" and belittled its abilities and objectives. As our national disenchantment with the United Nations grew, our influence and national prestige at the United Nations declined further.

I believe that beginning with Governor [William W., (Mar. 1976–Jan. 1977)] Scranton's tenure, we have seen a resurgence of American prestige and influence at the United Nations. At the root of this shift has been acknowledgment of Third World nationalism as an ideology independent of international communism.

We no longer view every issue and every vote through the lenses of East-West politics. We recognize that the developing countries can take positions that do not mirror ours without being either anti-American or pro-Soviet. Simply according the Third World nations fundamental respect for their independent interests, motives, and points of view has aided our image at the United Nations.

Furthermore, we have become more secure in dealing with the United Nations as the myth of Third World-Soviet solidarity has been exploded.

During the past few years, the developing nations and the United States have been on the same side of a number of politically sensitive U.N. votes. The Third World views any interference with national autonomy as intolerable, so it condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. The Third World supported the United States during the Iranian hostage crisis, even to the point of voting in favor of the imposition of sanctions against a state with whose revolutionary goals they are fundamentally in sympathy. This underscores its commitment to legal and moral principles that America has long espoused.

The developing countries also rebuffed a Cuban-inspired move to proclaim the Soviet Union as the natural ally of the nonaligned movement. And the ringing condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that came after the Islamabad conference demonstrated to the Soviets the political costs of their interference in Third World affairs.

The difference between America's view of the United Nations today and 5 years ago is simply summed up: Our government has reappraised what the United Nations was founded to accomplish and what the organization can accomplish in today's world. We have set our policy goals at the United Nations accordingly. And our position in the world forum has slowly but surely improved. The time has now come for the American people to bring their views of the United Nations into line with reality.

U.N. Role

The American people must understand that, for all the lofty ideals set forth in the U.N. Charter, the United Nations can do no more than its 152 [Zimbabwe became the 153rd member on August 25, 1980] sovereign members permit it to do.

The U.N. Charter may read like a supernational constitution, but the United Nations is not a supernational government. If we expect the United Nations to exercise governmental powers or prerogatives—and too many Americans do though they would object strenuously if they did—we will be sorely disappointed in what the organization is able to accomplish.

Yet despite the limitations that sovereignty inevitably imposes, U.N. members have conceded certain prerogatives to the organization and placed powerful tools in its hands.

The United Nations is the vehicle through which the collective weight of international political pressure can be imposed on states whose actions violate the tenets of law and comity enshrined in the U.N. Charter. Political censure can lead to real political costs by isolating countries that violate their charter obligations from the rest of the world community. Political censure can have indirect consequences as well, as Cuba learned to its sorrow when its failure to condemn the Afghan invasion cost it a seat on the Security Council and created such tensions within the nonaligned movement that Cuba has been greatly handicapped in its effort to use the platform of the nonaligned movement to pursue its political goals.

The United Nations also imposes moral pressure. It focuses the world's attention on crises that have political roots but human consequences—the plight of refugees, the seemingly insoluble problem of worldwide hunger, the repression of human rights.

The United Nations' most familiar role is that of mediator: The neutral third party that attempts to defuse volatile situations and find acceptable grounds for solving problems. We have become so accustomed to the United Nations in this role that we no longer think it unusual. Yet what a marvel it is that the world has fashioned an internationally accepted honest broker, to which resort in times of crisis is almost automatic.

The United Nations' record as a mediator in places like Cyprus, Lebanon, and the Middle East, and currently in Namibia or Iran, is alone a testament to the organization's importance. So is the performance of U.N. forces patrolling cease-fires in mediation areas. The United Nations seems even to have breached some of the hostility that Iran initially displayed toward it and is doing everything possible

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Cover photo:
Signature page of U.S. - China Agreements with Seals affixed

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Secretary of State

WILLIAM J. DYESS
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor

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of America are assigned the following regular and alternate airports in China:

Regular Airports

Beijing:
Capital Airport
Shanghai:
Hongqiao Airport

Alternate Airports

Guangzhou:
Baiyun Airport
Hangzhou:
Jianqiao Airport
Tianjin:
Zhangguizhuang Airport

II. Airports for Charter Air Transportation

Aircraft of the airline(s) of each Party engaged in the operation of charter air transportation approved by the aeronautical authorities of the other Party may utilize airports appropriately identified in the Aeronautical Information Publication of that other Party as available for international flights, and such other airports as may be approved by such aeronautical authorities.

III. Air Routes

All flight operations by aircraft of the designated airline(s) of one Party operated in the airspace of the other Party shall be over established airways/prescribed routes or as cleared by the appropriate air traffic control service. Each Party will make reasonable efforts to ensure that air routes entering and within their sovereign airspace are as direct as practicable in the interest of economy, efficiency and fuel conservation, including the establishment of arrangements with controlling authorities of adjacent airspace as appropriate.

IV. Aeronautical Information

(1) The aeronautical authorities of both Parties shall provide each other with their Aeronautical Information Publication.

(2) Amendments and additions to the Aeronautical Information Publication shall be sent promptly to the aeronautical authorities of the other Party.

(3) The International NOTAM Code shall be used in the transmission of Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs). When the NOTAM code is not suitable, plain English shall be used. Urgent NOTAMs shall be transmitted by the quickest available means to the aeronautical authorities of the other Party.

(4) Aeronautical information and NOTAMs shall be made available in the English language.

V. Meteorological Services

Mutually acceptable meteorological service shall be provided in accordance with standards and recommended practices, to the extent to which they are applicable, developed pursuant to the Convention of the World Meterological Organization and International Civil Aviation Organization.

VI. Radio Navigation and Communication

(1) For the operation of agreed services on the specified routes, the Parties recognize the requirement for the establishment of point-to-point aeronautical communications between the two countries. The Parties shall hold consultations as to the measures and procedures for the establishment of such communications.

(2) The English language and internationally accepted codes and procedures in force shall be applied in air-ground and point-to-point communications.

ANNEX IV

Conditions of Discount Fares

Discount fares within the zone of pricing flexibility described in paragraph (3) of Article 13 of this Agreement shall be subject to conditions of the type generally applicable to same or similar fares in other international air transportation markets. Such discount fares shall be subject to conditions in not less than four of the following categories:

- Round trip requirements;
- Advance-purchase requirements;
- Minimum-Maximum length of stay requirements;
- Stopover restrictions;
- Stopover charges;
- Transfer limitations;
- Cancellation refund penalties;
- Group size restrictions;
- Return travel conditions;
- Ground package requirements.

ANNEX V

Capacity and Carriage of Traffic

(1) The Parties agree that each designated airline shall have the right to operate two frequencies per week. If a Party does not designate a second airline, its first designated airline shall, upon the commencement of service by the second airline of the other Party or upon the passage of two years from the commencement of any agreed service, whichever is earlier, be entitled to add to its operation two frequencies per week. For purposes of this Agreement a frequency is: one (1) round trip flight of an aircraft having a maximum certificated take-off gross weight not less than 710,000 pounds but not more than 800,000 pounds; one and one-half ($1^1/_2$) round trip flights of an aircraft having a maximum certified take-off gross weight equal to or greater than 430,000 pounds but less than 710,000 pounds; and two (2) round trip flights of an aircraft having a maximum certificated take-off gross weight less than 430,000 pounds. If a designated airline uses only aircraft having a maximum certificated take-off gross weight of less than 710,000 pounds, it shall be entitled to one additional round trip flight of an all-freight configured aircraft having a maximum certificated take-off gross weight of less than 430,000 pounds for every two frequencies. All unused frequencies may be accumulated by a designated airline and used at its discretion at any time. Any increase in frequencies during the first three years after commencement of any agreed service in excess of the frequencies as mentioned above shall be subject to prior consultation and agreement between the Parties.

(2) With a view to realizing the objectives set forth in Article 12, paragraph (2), the Parties agree that there should be a reasonable balance of the traffic carried by their respective designated airline(s) on the specified route(s) in terms of number of passengers and tons of cargo taken up and put down in the territory of the other Party.

The consultations referred to in Article 12, paragraph (6) shall take place as soon as possible, and in no event later than thirty (30) days following the date of receipt of the request by the latter Party. The Parties shall undertake to reach agreement within thirty (30) days as to effective measures for remedying the imbalanced situation and fully implement such agreed measures. In considering the measures to be undertaken, the Parties shall take into account all relevant factors, including commercial decisions of the designated airlines, load factors and actions of third parties. In case the agreed measures fail to remedy the imbalance within three months after their implementation, the Parties shall meet together to look into the cause of such failure and agree upon measures for remedying the imbalanced situation. In case the Parties fail to reach agreement on effective remedial measures, they shall look into the cause of the imbalance and consider amendments to this Agreement which may be required to eliminate such cause.

(3) The provision of paragraph (2) of this Annex is valid for three years from the date of commencement of any service under this Agreement. Not later than six months prior to the end of this three-year period, the Parties shall consult with a view to agreeing to the means to achieve reasonable balance of traffic referred to in paragraph (2) of this Annex.

ACCOMPANYING LETTERS

Beijing
September 8, 1980

Mr. Lin Zheng
Leader
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government of China

Dear Mr. Lin:

I have the honor to refer to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China relating to Civil Air Transport initialed today by our two governments. During the course of negotiations leading to the initialing of the Agreement, both sides discussed questions relating to the conduct of business in the territory of the other Party and other operational matters of the designated airlines. I understand that agreement was reached that the designated airline(s) of each Party shall have, in the territory of the other Party, the rights and privileges as set forth below:

1. With respect to the representative offices(s) referred to in Article 11, paragraph (3) of the Agreement, the designated airline(s) of each Party shall have:

(a) the right to issue, reissue, reconfirm and exchange tickets for transportation on the agreed services, for connecting air services, and for transportation over any other route or routes outside of the agreed services which are operated by such airline(s); and

(b) the right to make, reconfirm, or change reservations for passengers wishing to travel over the routes of such airline(s) whether or not such reservations are for transportation on the agreed services.

2. The designated airline(s) of each Party shall also have the right to import, maintain, store, and distribute informational materials (including, but not limited to, time tables, schedules, brochures, sales and tour literature, calendars, displays, etc.) and to advertise in the same manner and through the same or similar media as the designated airline(s) of the other Party.

3. With respect to operational matters, the designated airline(s) of each Party shall have:

(a) the right to import, install, and operate telex, computer, VHF radio, and handheld radio sets (walkie talkie) and related equipment for reservations, load planning and management, and for other operational purposes, subject to the approval of the appropriate authorities, where necessary;

(b) the right to supervise load planning and actual loading and unloading of its aircraft through its own employees or representatives;

(c) the right to import company-owned vehicles and to operate such vehicles on airport roadways and aircraft servicing ramps, subject to the approval of the appropriate authorities, where necessary;

(d) the right to inspect fuel storage and fuel pumping equipment on a quarterly basis and take samples at each source for export and subsequent laboratory analysis; and

(e) the right to film, under whatever supervision is necessary, the aircraft approach view to the runways of all regular airports and alternate airports contemplated for the operation of the agreed services, for purposes of pilot training, subject to the approval of the appropriate authorities.

4. Each Party grants to the other Party the assurance that the following authorizations, permits, and information will be provided, on the basis of reciprocity, in a timely fashion to each airline designated to operate the agreed services:

(a) airport security permits for assigned foreign and locally employed company staff authorizing them to move freely beyond airport customs and immigration screens into the terminal loading areas and onto the airport ramp areas;

(b) written information on the procedures to be employed by the airport authorities at each regular airport and alternate airport contemplated for the operation of the agreed services in the event of an emergency such as a crash, a hijacking, or a bomb threat, establishing the order of action in a given situation for units responsible for tower control, firefighting, medical assistance and transportation, perimeter security and other emergency and security functions in effect; and

(c) written information on aeronautical laws, including the rules and regulations thereunder and amendments thereto, each designated airline is expected to follow.

5. The appropriate authorities of each Party shall use their best efforts to assist the designated airline(s) of the other Party to receive housing for the staff of such airline(s) comparable in cost and quality to the best obtained by or provided to other foreign airlines.

6. The designated airline(s) of each Party shall have the right to train the personnel of any appointed agent in the procedures of that airline for passenger, cargo, and aircraft handling and in procedures relating to reservations, ticketing, marketing, management, and sales promotion, subject to prior agreement.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

I would be grateful for your confirmation that this is also your understanding of the agreement we have reached.

Sincerely,

B. Boyd Hight
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of the United States

Attachment: Initialed Translation

Beijing
September 8, 1980

Mr. B. Boyd Hight
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation of
the Government of the United States

Dear Mr. Hight:

I have the honor to refer to the Civil Air Transport Agreement initialed today by our two governments and to your letter of today's date which reads as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China relating to Civil Air Transport initialed today by our two governments. During the course of negotiations leading to the initialing of the Agreement, both sides discussed questions relating to the conduct of business in the territory of the other Party and other operational matters of the designated airlines. I understand that agreement was reached that the designated airline(s) of each Party shall have, in the territory of the other Party, the rights and privileges as set forth below:

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(b) the right to make, reconfirm, or change reservations for passengers wishing to travel over the routes of such airline(s) whether or not such reservations are for transportation on the agreed services.

2. The designated airline(s) of each Party shall also have the right to import, maintain, store, and distribute informational materials (including, but not limited to, time tables, schedules, brochures, sales and tour literature, calendars, displays, etc.) and to advertise in the same manner and through the same or similar media as the designated airline(s) of the other Party.

3. With respect to operational matters, the designated airline(s) of each Party shall have:

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(b) the right to supervise load planning and actual loading and unloading of its aircraft through its own employees or representatives;

(c) the right to import company-owned vehicles and to operate such vehicles on airport roadways and aircraft servicing ramps, subject to the approval of the appropriate authorities, where necessary;

(d) the right to inspect fuel storage and fuel pumping equipment on a quarterly basis and take samples at each source for export and subsequent laboratory analysis; and

(e) the right to film, under whatever supervision is necessary, the aircraft approach view to the runways of all regular airports and alternate airports contemplated for the operation of the agreed services, for purposes of pilot training, subject to the approval of the appropriate authorities.

4. Each Party grants to the other Party the assurance that the following authorizations, permits, and information will be provided, on the basis of reciprocity, in a timely fashion to each airline designated to operate the agreed services:

(a) airport security permits for assigned foreign and locally employed company staff authorizing them to move freely beyond airport customs and immigration screens into the terminal loading areas and onto the airport ramp areas;

(b) written information on the procedures to be employed by the airport authorities at each regular airport and alternate airport contemplated for the operation of the agreed services in the event of an emergency such as a crash, a hijacking, or a bomb threat, establishing the order of action in a given situation for units responsible for tower control, firefighting, medical assistance and transportation, perimeter security and other

For the People's Republic of China:
Bo Yibo, Vice Premier

Who, having examined and exchanged their respective full powers, which were found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Definitions

For the purpose of the present Convention, the terms listed below shall have the following meanings:

1. "Consulate" means a consulate general, consulate, vice consulate, or consular agency;
2. "Consular district" means the area assigned to a consulate for the exercise of consular functions;
3. "Head of a consulate" means the consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent who is charged by the sending State to head a consulate;
4. "Consular officer" means any person, including the head of a consulate, who is charged by the sending State with the performance of consular functions;
5. "Consular employee" means any person who performs administrative, technical, or service functions at a consulate;
6. "Member of a consulate" means any consular officer or consular employee;
7. "Members of the family" means the spouse, minor children and other relatives of a member of a consulate who form a part of his household;
8. "Consular premises" means buildings or parts of buildings, as well as the grounds ancillary thereto, used exclusively for the purposes of a consulate, regardless of ownership;
9. "Consular archives" means all correspondence, codes and ciphers, documents, records, files, tapes and books of a consulate, as well as any article of furniture intended for their storage or safekeeping;
10. "Vessel of the sending State" means any vessel sailing under the flag of the sending State, in accordance with the law of the sending State, excluding military vessels;
11. "Aircraft of the sending State" means any aircraft flying under the nationality and registration marks of the sending State, in accordance with the law of the sending State, excluding military aircraft;
12. "Law" means

- for the People's Republic of China, all national, provincial, municipal, autonomous region and local laws, ordinances, regulations and decisions having the force and effect of law;
- for the United States of America, all federal, state or local laws, ordinances, regulations and decisions having the force and effect of law.

ARTICLE 2

Opening of Consulates

1. A consulate may be established only through agreement between the sending and receiving States.
2. The determination of the seat of the consulate, its classification, and its consular district, as well as any changes pertaining thereto, shall be through agreement between the sending and receiving States.

ARTICLE 3

Appointment of the Head of a Consulate

1. The sending State shall forward to the receiving State through diplomatic channels a written notification of the appointment of the head of the consulate. This notification shall contain the full name, nationality, sex and rank of the head of the consulate, a brief biography, the date on which he will begin to exercise his functions, the classification and seat of the consulate, and the consular district.
2. Upon receiving notification of the appointment of the head of the consulate, the receiving State shall, if there is no objection, confirm it in writing without delay. The head of the consulate may enter upon the performance of his functions only after the receiving State has provided such confirmation.
3. The receiving State may permit the head of a consulate to exercise his functions on a provisional basis prior to his confirmation by the receiving State.
4. The receiving State shall, immediately after granting recognition, including provisional recognition, take all measures necessary to enable the head of the consulate to exercise his functions and to enjoy the rights, facilities, privileges and immunities granted under this Convention and under the law of the receiving State.
5. If for any reason the head of a consulate is unable to exercise his functions, or if the position of the head of consulate is vacant, the sending State may place its consulate under the temporary charge of a consular officer of the same or of another consulate in the receiving State or a member of the diplomatic staff of the diplomatic mission of the sending State in the receiving State. The sending State shall notify the receiving State in advance of the full name of the person appointed as acting head of a consulate.
6. A person appointed as acting head of a consulate shall enjoy the same rights, facilities, privileges and immunities enjoyed by a head of a consulate under this Convention.
7. Entrusting a member of the diplomatic staff of the diplomatic mission of the sending State with the functions of head of a consulate does not limit the privileges and immunities to which such person is entitled by virtue of diplomatic status, subject to the provisions of Article 33, paragraph 4 of this Convention.

ARTICLE 4

Appointment of Members of a Consulate

1. The sending State may staff its consulate with the number of members of a consulate it considers necessary. The receiving State may, however, require that the number of such members of a consulate be kept within the limits which it considers to be reasonable, having regard to existing circumstances and conditions in the consular district and the needs of a particular consulate.
2. Consular officers shall be nationals of the sending State only, and shall not be permanent residents of the receiving State.
3. The sending State shall communicate in advance, in writing, to the receiving State the full name, functions and class of each consular officer other than the head of the consulate, his arrival, final departure or termination of functions, as well as all other changes affecting the person's status while assigned to the consulate.
4. The sending State shall also notify the receiving State in writing of:

(a) the designation of all consular employees, their full name, nationality and functions, their arrival, their final departure or termination of their functions, as well as other changes affecting their status while assigned to the consulate;

(b) the arrival and final departure of members of the family of a member of a consulate and when any such individual becomes or ceases to be a member of the family;

(c) the employment or dismissal of a consular employee who is a national or permanent resident of the receiving State.

ARTICLE 5

Performance of Consular Functions by a Diplomatic Mission

1. The provisions of this Convention relating to consular functions, rights, facilities, privileges and immunities shall apply in the case of consular functions being performed by a diplomatic mission.
2. The names of the members of the diplomatic mission entrusted with the performance of consular functions shall be communicated to the receiving State.
3. The members of the diplomatic mission referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article shall continue to enjoy the privileges and immunities granted them by virtue of their diplomatic status, subject to the requirements of Article 35, paragraph 4, of this Convention.

ARTICLE 6

Terminating Functions of Members of a Consulate

1. The receiving State may at any time, and without having to explain its decision, notify the sending State through diplomatic channels that the head of a consulate is *persona non grata* or that any other member of a consulate is unacceptable. In such a case, the sending State shall recall such person or terminate his functions in the consulate.
2. If the sending State refuses or fails within a reasonable time to carry out the obligation contained in paragraph 1 of this Article, the receiving State may either withdraw recognition from the person concerned or refuse to consider him as a member of the consulate.
3. The functions of a member of a consulate shall come to an end, among other things, upon the:

(a) notification by the sending State to the receiving State that his functions have come to an end;

(b) withdrawal by the receiving State of recognition; or

(c) notification by the receiving State to the sending State that the receiving State has ceased to consider the person as a member of the consulate.

ARTICLE 7

Facilities for the Operation of a Consulate and Protection of Consular Officers

1. The receiving State shall take all necessary steps for the establishment of the proper conditions for the normal operation of a consulate and shall accord full facilities for the performance of the functions of the consulate.

2. The receiving State shall afford appropriate protection to consular officers to prevent any attack upon their person, freedom or dignity and further shall take all measures necessary to ensure that consular officers are able to perform their functions and enjoy the rights, facilities, privileges and immunities provided them under this Convention.

ARTICLE 8

Acquisition of Consular Premises and Residences

1. The sending State or its representative shall be entitled to purchase, lease or acquire in any other way, land, consular premises and residences as appropriate for consular purposes, except residences for members of a consulate who are nationals or permanent residents of the receiving State, and to construct or improve buildings for such purposes.

2. In exercising the rights provided under paragraph 1 of this Article, the sending State shall comply with the law of the receiving State, including the law relating to land, construction, zoning and town planning.

3. The receiving State shall, in conformity with its law, facilitate a consulate of the sending State in the acquisition of suitable consular premises. When necessary, the receiving State shall assist the sending State in the acquisition of residences for members of a consulate.

ARTICLE 9

Use of the National Flag and Emblems

1. The sending State shall be entitled to display the national emblem and the designation of the consulate on the consular premises in the languages of the sending and of the receiving States.

2. The sending State shall be entitled to fly the flag of the sending State on the consular premises and on the residence of the head of the consulate, as well as on the means of transport of the head of the consulate used in the performance of his official duties.

3. In exercising the rights provided by this Article, the sending State shall observe the law and customs of the receiving State.

ARTICLE 10

Inviolability of Premises and Residences

1. The consular premises shall be inviolable. The authorities of the receiving State may not enter the consular premises without the consent of the head of the consulate or the head of the diplomatic mission of the sending State or a person designated by one of those persons.

2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all steps necessary to protect the consular premises against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the consulate or impairment of its dignity.

3. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall apply likewise to the residences of consular officers.

ARTICLE 11

Inviolability of Archives

The consular archives shall be inviolable at all times and wherever they may be. Documents and objects of an unofficial character shall not be stored in the consular archives.

ARTICLE 12

Freedom of Communications

1. A consulate shall be entitled to exchange communications with its government, with diplomatic missions of the sending State and with other consulates of the sending State, wherever situated. For this purpose, the consulate may employ all ordinary means of communication, including diplomatic and consular couriers, diplomatic and consular bags and codes and ciphers. The consulate may install and use a wireless transmitter only with the prior consent of the receiving State.

2. The official correspondence of a consulate, regardless of the means of communication employed, as well as sealed consular bags and other containers, provided they bear visible external marks of their official character, shall be inviolable. They may contain nothing other than official correspondence and articles intended exclusively for official use.

3. The authorities of the receiving State shall neither open nor detain the official correspondence of a consulate, including consular bags and other containers, as described in paragraph 2 of this Article.

4. The consular couriers of the sending State shall enjoy in the territory of the receiving State the same rights, privileges, facilities and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic couriers of the sending State.

5. If a master of a vessel or captain of a civil aircraft of the sending State is charged with an official consular bag, the master or captain shall be provided with an official document showing the number of containers forming the consular bag entrusted to him; he shall not, however, be considered to be a consular courier. By arrangements with the appropriate authorities of the receiving State, and in compliance with the safety regulations of the receiving State, the sending State may send a member of the consulate to take possession of the consular bag directly and freely from the master of the vessel or captain of the aircraft or to deliver such bag to him.

ARTICLE 13

Immunity of Members of a Consulate from the Jurisdiction of the Receiving State

1. Members of a consulate and their family members shall be immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State.

2. Members of a consulate and their family members shall be immune from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving State respecting any act performed by them in the exercise of consular functions.

3. The provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article shall not apply to civil procedures:

(a) resulting from contracts that were not concluded by a member of a consulate on behalf of the sending State;

(b) relating to succession in which a member of a consulate was involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee in a private capacity;

(c) concerning a claim by a third party for damage caused by a vessel, vehicle or aircraft;

(d) concerning private immovable property in the jurisdiction of the receiving State, unless the member of a consulate is holding it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the consulate;

(e) relating to any private professional or commercial activities engaged in by a member of a consulate in the receiving State outside of his official functions.

4. No measures of execution shall be taken against any of the persons mentioned in this Article, except in the cases under paragraph 3(d) of this Article, and then under the condition that these measures shall not infringe upon the inviolability of their person or residence.

5. Members of a consulate and their family members may be called upon to attend as witnesses in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings. In the event of the refusal of a consular officer or a member of the officer's family to give evidence, no coercive measure or penalty may be applied to such person. Consular employees and members of their families may not decline to give evidence except with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 6 of this Article.

6. Members of a consulate are under no obligation to give evidence concerning matters relating to the exercise of their official functions or to produce official correspondence or documents. They are also entitled to decline to give evidence as expert witnesses with regard to the law of the sending State.

7. In taking testimony of members of a consulate, the authorities of the receiving State shall take all the appropriate measures to avoid hindering the performance of their official consular duties. Upon the request of the head of a consulate, such testimony may, when possible, be given orally or in writing at the consulate or at the residence of the person concerned.

serve as a precedent for the negotiation of minimum safety and environmental standards within a broader international context. Our long-term goal will be the development of an internationally agreed upon policy for offshore resource activities which have possible transboundary impacts.

Antarctic Resources

Interest in ocean resources have directed man's attention to the farthest frontiers of our planet. The ongoing discussions within the Antarctic Treaty system to develop regimes for the management of the living resources in Antarctic waters and of Antarctica's mineral resources—primarily offshore hydrocarbons—testify to this interest. The United States has taken the lead in seeking solutions to these resource issues. Our objectives for this decade involve:

- Maintaining the Antarctic Treaty system which has successfully reserved Antarctica for peaceful purposes as an arena of free scientific research for the past two decades;
- Instituting an effective system of managing and harvesting its living resources so that the renewability of these resources and the health of the marine ecosystem of which they are a part will be insured; and
- Developing an international regime to determine the acceptability of possible mineral resource activities in Antarctica and to govern any such activities carried out there.

To achieve these objectives we must find imaginative solutions to differences of view over sovereignty in Antarctica and imaginative approaches to resource management. We are very close now to an agreement on a convention for the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources and have made a good start toward dealing with mineral resources. If we persevere on the basis of experience and in the spirit of the Antarctic Treaty system, I believe that we will achieve our goals in both of these important resource areas.

Renewable Energy Resources

Toward the end of the decade of the 1980s, renewable ocean energy sources, such as ocean thermal energy conversion, will become commercially attractive. By the middle 1980s the Department of Energy intends to inaugurate a power plant for ocean thermal energy conversion of about 10 megawatts for experimental and demonstration purposes. Successful demonstrations, combined with ever-increasing oil prices, could make this type of energy conversion a very interesting energy option during the 1990s for countries in a suitable geographic environment, especially if they must import oil for baseload electricity generation. We expect demonstration projects during the 1980s to receive a great deal of attention, especially with respect to their possible environmental impacts and with respect to the international legal regime under which ocean thermal energy conversion is to operate.

Environmental Concerns

In addition to possible injury from offshore energy production, the environmental health of the ocean in the 1980s may be threatened by greater pressures to use the oceans for dumping. Increasing environmental and political objections to the land-based disposal of highly toxic chemical wastes are making at-sea incineration of such wastes more attractive. During 1979, the ocean dumping convention was amended to take account of this emerging technology. Interim technical guidelines were endorsed by the parties at their fourth consultative meeting.

Disposal of nuclear wastes at sea is also likely to become a more visible issue in the 1980s. Quantities of low-level radioactive wastes being dumped at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's North Atlantic site have been increasing yearly, and the United States, while not a dumping country, has advocated proper monitoring and assessment of the site. The possible emplacement of high-level nuclear wastes in the deep seabed is also receiving increased attention. The United States is studying this concept as a backup option to our primary plans for land-based geological disposal of such wastes. But for countries having serious demographic, geographic, geologic, or hydrologic restrictions, the deep seabed option may be the only alternative short of shipping wastes to other nations. As further experimentation and development occur on the concept during the 1980s, international legal and policy issues are certain to arise.

The Department of State will also continue to be involved in the more traditional ocean pollution issues. Repeated accidents involving large supertankers will require us to be concerned with the development of standards which meet the needs of the international community. Because of our strategic interests in the freedom of navigation, the United States wishes to move the international community away from the concept of absolute coastal state control for pollution purposes in the 200-mile zone. We are instead in favor of other means of handling offshore pollution, such as agreements for joint pollution enforcement, contingency plans for containment and cleanup, information exchange regarding shipping, and port entry regulation.

Solving pollution problems resulting from ocean-based activities is, however, only part of the issue. At present, land-based activities are responsible for the bulk of ocean pollution through river runoffs and atmospheric transfers. With the continued growth of coastal populations and increased agricultural and industrial activity, the pressures on the oceans' absorptive capacities from land-based activities will increase.

The Department of State is working with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to develop methods for comparing strategies for dealing with coastal zone pollution on an international basis. It is essential that monitoring of the marine environment and scientific research to increase our understanding of marine pollution processes be carried out. The National Ocean Pollution Research and Development and Monitoring Planning Act of 1978 designates the NOAA as the lead agency for developing a comprehensive 5-year plan for Federal ocean pollution research and development and monitoring programs. This plan is to be revised and updated at 2-year intervals. In the coming years we expect also to work closely with NOAA and the other Federal agencies in determining how our national marine pollution monitoring, research, and regulation programs might complement similar activities of international organizations.

Rights of Navigation

While coastal nations are consolidating their control over resources within 200 nautical miles of their coasts, these same ocean areas will be used by other nations for navigation. The need to accommodate national and international rights and duties within 200-mile zones

will be one of the more difficult tasks facing us in this decade. My Department will work with other Federal agencies in developing national and international regulations safeguarding navigation in areas of resource activity. The negotiating text presently under consideration within the Law of the Sea Conference treats this subject to the satisfaction of the United States.

Another navigation issue which appears to be emerging as a major problem involves the safety of navigation in congested areas, such as international straits or entrances to harbors. These issues may well have to be addressed in international organizations such as the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization.

Conference on Law of the Sea

As you know, the third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea resumed its ninth session in New York on February 27. My bureau, along with Ambassador Richardson [Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference] and his interagency team, has worked long and arduously to develop a realistic negotiating posture in the hope of obtaining substantial progress, as we perceive it, in revision I of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text. As many of you are aware, we have tried to draw upon all the varied interests in the United States who will be affected by a comprehensive law of the sea treaty, including, most certainly, the industries represented by your organization.

At this time, while our representatives are deep in intensive negotiation of a terribly lengthy and intricate text, I cannot predict exactly what improvements we can anticipate at the conclusion of this session. Certainly our negotiators have serious concerns with the present text as it applies to the transfer of technology, a subject with which your organization has been so interested. We are hopeful that a number of changes will be accepted by the conference in the area of technology transfer with regard to seabed mining as well as in the related provisions pertaining to voting rights, assured access, financial arrangements, and other topics.

It would be less than candid if I left you with the impression that the United States negotiating team will obtain agreement from the conference on all the positions that we are proposing to protect the economic interests of the United States. We will do our utmost. Our goal is to obtain a treaty that, on balance, will be acceptable to the United States, including the firms represented by the National Oceans Industries Association.

The Senate has already enacted a bill on deep seabed mining and the House has a similar bill before it. Generally, we continue to believe that the legislation should:

- Be transitional or interim, pending international agreement on a regime for the deep seabed;
- Proceed on the legal basis that, notwithstanding future agreement on an international regulatory regime, deep seabed mining is a freedom of the high seas;
- Not contain investment guarantees against financial losses as a consequence of U.S. ratification of an international treaty;
- Provide for effective environmental protection, sound resource management, the safety of life and property at sea, and effective law enforcement;
- Establish an international revenue-sharing fund to be used for the benefit of developing countries;
- Encourage other deep-seabed-mining legislation patterned on our example through the mechanism of reciprocating state recognition of rights;
- Not require that vessels used in the recovery, processing, or transport of hard minerals from the seabed be exclusively constructed in or documented under the laws of the United States;
- Not require processing plants to be located in the United States; and
- Not issue licenses or permits for specific mine sites in a manner that could be misinterpreted as assertion of sovereignty over high seas areas on the seabed.

We believe that these elements are not only consistent with the establishment of an effective domestic seabed-mining regime, but also are fully compatible with the goals and position we have espoused in the law of the sea negotiations. ■

Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JULY 3, 1980[1]

The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, signed by the President on June 28, 1980, reaffirms this nation's commitment to both a law of the sea treaty and orderly development of a U.S. ocean mining capability. Our nation needs assured access to the nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese—metals important in steelmaking, high performance alloys, and many other industrial uses—found in seabed nodules. This legislation will further these domestic and international aims. The act establishes an interim regulatory procedure for ocean mining activities conducted by U.S. nationals that will be superseded when a law of the sea treaty enters into force for the United States.

Since 1974 many nations have been working through the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea to design rules governing the entire range of uses of the oceans. Arrangements for mining deep ocean minerals have constituted the greatest challenge to the conference. Both developed and developing nations see the opportunities for exploring new avenues of international cooperation and decisionmaking. The International Seabed [Resource] Authority being considered could become the first international organization with authority to manage a major natural resource.

The U.S. Government has been working with other nations at the conference to fashion a treaty acceptable to the world community and serving the best interests of the United States. We hope that substantive negotiations on the treaty can be concluded this year.

The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act will serve as a steppingstone to this broader, long-term international goal. It will fill the gap created by the pace of technological development and our need for minerals on the one hand and the slow, deliberate process of international lawmaking on the other. Without the national ocean mining legislation that we are enacting, the deep seabed provisions of the law of the sea treaty would be hollow, since private industry would not be able to deliver benefits to this nation and the world for many years.

to bring an end to the holding of American diplomatic hostages. Of course, the United Nations possesses no magic that would enable it to circumnavigate those obstacles that impede the resolution of international dilemmas. Despite its best efforts, the United Nations has not yet solved the Iran conundrum. The factors that have thus far frustrated U.N. attempts to find a solution are the same factors that have prevented our government from ending the crisis:

- A revolution that is not yet complete;
- A political scene presided over by a fanatic; and
- A struggle for power among the various factions that hope to inherit the Ayatollah's mantle of power.

But the United Nations has, through patient effort, demonstrated that a neutral party can command an audience in Iran that we cannot yet command. When the impasse in Tehran breaks, the United Nations will have played a leading role.

We also take for granted United Nations' coordination of international initiatives across a spectrum of activities. Global efforts to eradicate disease, poverty, hunger, and pollution commence frequently at the United Nations. The international monetary and trade system and much of the world's development funding is administered through U.N. agencies. Science and technology, arms control and disarmament, education and research are among the fields that U.N. agencies fund and coordinate.

I believe the United Nations performs one more important function which we should not belittle. It provides a place where the nations of the world can blow off steam. Much of the rhetoric and invective that receives so much publicity in the American press, and causes Americans to denounce the United Nations, is just that—blowing off steam.

Those who are critical of this facet of life at the United Nations view the organization as no more than a debating society.

Yet each of us has found it useful, in family life or business dealings, to explode verbally from time to time. It serves an equally useful purpose for nations grappling with tense issues. Indeed, strident speeches are often face-saving gestures that allow nations to compromise or soften their positions.

It seems apparent that, if the U.N. system did not exist, we would have to invent it. The interdependent world of 1980 simply could not exist without a global body to provide coordination, conciliation, and counsel on all fronts.

Given the importance of the United Nations, it is equally apparent that the United States ought to find it politically advantageous to play as much of a role in the U.N. system as we can. We ought to commit ourselves to enhancing America's image at the United Nations and to laying the political groundwork that helps build consensus in favor of our positions.

U.S. Support

Our efforts to bolster the American image at the United Nations are undermined by the United Nations' detractors in this country. Already, budget cuts and congressional opposition have forced us to withdraw budgetary support entirely from several innovative U.N. programs and to restrict our participation in others.

Yet the United States was assessed only $143 million by the United Nations last year. That amounts to about 65¢ per man, woman, and child in the United States—less than the cost of a package of cigarettes or an ice cream cone.

Ours is the largest single assessment in the $600 million U.N. budget. But when we take both assessed and voluntary contributions into account, our share is miniscule compared to the contribution of smaller nations. Norway's contribution per citizen is eight times ours; so is Kuwait's. Even tiny New Zealand pays more to the United Nations than we do on a per capita basis.

Obviously, cutting back on our contributions to the United Nations is not the way to win friends and influence there. It short-circuits the world body's ability to reach constructive solutions and reinforces a widespread belief that the United States can give short shrift to the rest of the world's needs or interests as long as we take care of ourselves.

Congress also has shown no reluctance to attach riders to our U.N. appropriations—a practice, heretofore, more typical of the Soviet Union. These special conditions bar the use of American contributions for particular projects. Obviously, such conditions exacerbate the United Nations' precarious financial position. They also impair our credibility and good will, particularly in the eyes of nations that do not withhold payment for programs or activities adopted by the majority of the membership, even though they oppose them.

Withholding American support for particular programs certainly calls into question our commitment to the democratic principles we espouse in our domestic affairs. And it has another unfortunate twist. It gives a congressional stamp of approval to the Soviet tactic of deliberately withholding funds from selected U.N. activities—a practice we have long opposed but which we are increasingly adopting.

Those of us who believe in the U.N. system must defend the organization and American participation in it loudly and vehemently. It is time for Congress and the American public to broaden their perspective on why the United Nations exists and how it can be used to advance our country's interests.

Of course, there will always be those who believe that U.S. support for the United Nations ought to be a function of U.N. support for the views and policies of the United States.

I believe this position has the elements of the function reversed. Our recent experiences in the United Nations indicate that there is plenty of support at the United Nations for American positions that are principled and consistent with our national ideals.

Support for American leadership at the United Nations will depend on the role America chooses to play at the United Nations and the attitude we display toward the organization. If we are supportive and cooperative, rather than abusive and confrontational, I believe we will see a strong impetus from Third World nations, as well as from our allies, for the United States to resume the preeminence that has recently eluded us at the United Nations.

And if Americans make an effort to understand and respect the motives of the many diverse members of the United Nations, I believe we can expect better understanding, at home and abroad, for the principles and positions that the United States espouses in its foreign relations.

[1] USUN press release 36 of Apr. 22, 1980. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy
Fourth supply agreement for the transfer of enriched uranium for a research reactor in Yugoslavia, with annex and exchange of notes. Signed at Vienna Jan. 16, 1980. Entered into force: July 14, 1980.

Agreement for the exchange of fuel elements, relating to the agreements of Dec. 18, 1963, and Oct. 4, 1972, for the transfer of enriched uranium for a research reactor in Mexico. Effected by exchange of notes at Vienna Mar. 6, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 6, 1980.
Signatures: IAEA, Mexico, U.S. Mar. 6, 1980.

Arrangement on research participation and technical exchange in a coordinated analytical and experimental study of the thermohydraulic behavior of emergency core coolant during the refill and reflood phase of a loss-of-coolant accident in the pressurized water reactor. Signed at Washington, Bonn, and Tokyo Jan. 25, Mar. 20, and Apr. 18, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 18, 1980.
Signatures: F.R.G., Mar. 20, 1980; Japan, Apr. 18, 1980; U.S., Jan. 25, 1980.

Cotton
Articles of agreement of International Cotton Institute. Done at Washington Jan. 17, 1966. Entered into force Feb. 23, 1966. TIAS 5964.
Declaration of intent to seek approval of the agreement deposited: Argentina, June 4, 1980.

Energy
Agreement on an international energy program. Done at Paris Nov. 18, 1974. Entered into force provisionally Nov. 18, 1974; definitively, Jan. 19, 1976. TIAS 8278.
Provisional accession deposited: Portugal, May 9, 1980.

Finance
Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into force Nov. 30, 1977. TIAS 8765.
Accession deposited: Grenada, July 25, 1980.

Human Rights
International covenant on civil and political rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.[1]
Ratification deposited: Australia, Aug. 13, 1980.

Load Lines
Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966, relating to amendments to the convention (TIAS 6331). Adopted at London Nov. 12, 1975.[2]
Acceptances deposited: U.S., Aug. 12, 1980; Yugoslavia, July 25, 1980.

Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 14, 1975.[2]
Acceptances deposited: Iceland, July 28, 1980; Morocco, July 25, 1980; Yugoslavia, Aug. 4, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 17, 1977.[2]
Acceptances deposited: Iceland, July 28, 1980; Morocco, July 25, 1980.

International convention on maritime search and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done at Hamburg Apr. 27, 1979.[2]
Signatures: France, Apr. 9, 1980;[3] U.K., May 22, 1980.[3,4,5]
Ratification deposited: U.S., Aug. 12, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 15, 1979.[2]
Acceptances deposited: Iceland, July 28, 1980; Morocco, July 25, 1980.

Nuclear Material—Physical Protection
Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Oct. 26, 1979.[2]
Signatures: Austria, Greece, Mar. 3, 1980; Belgium, Denmark, European Atomic Energy Community,[4] France,[6] F.R.G., Ireland, Italy,[6] Luxembourg, Netherlands, U.K., June 13, 1980; German Democratic Republic,[6] Paraguay, May 21, 1980; Guatemala, Mar. 12, 1980; Haiti, Apr. 10, 1980; Hungary,[6] June 17, 1980; Panama, Mar. 18, 1980; Philippines, May 19, 1980; Sweden, July 2, 1980; U.S.S.R.,[6] May 22, 1980; Yugoslavia, July 15, 1980.

Pollution
Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.[2]
Ratification deposited: U.S., Aug. 12, 1980.

Postal
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, with final protocol. Done at Vienna, July 10, 1964. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.
Accession deposited: Saint Lucia, May 16, 1980.

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964. Done at Tokyo Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for article V of the additional protocol which entered into force Jan. 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.
Accession deposited: Saint Lucia, May 16, 1980.

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.
Accession deposited: Saint Lucia, May 16, 1980.[6]
Ratification deposited: Mexico, Apr. 16, 1980.

Money orders and postal travelers' checks agreement, with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8232.
Ratification deposited: Mexico, Apr. 16, 1980.

Publications
Convention concerning the exchange of official publications and government documents between States. Adopted at Paris Dec. 3, 1958. Entered into force May 30, 1961; for the U.S. June 9, 1968. TIAS 6439.
Acceptance deposited: Sweden, June 10, 1980.

Convention concerning the international exchange of publications. Adopted at Paris Dec. 3, 1958. Entered into force Nov. 23, 1961; for the U.S. June 9, 1968. TIAS 6438.
Acceptance deposited: Sweden, June 10, 1980.

Refugees
Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.
Accession deposited: Upper Volta, June 18, 1980.

Rubber
International natural rubber agreement, 1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979.[2]
Signatures: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Liberia, Peru, Philippines, June 30, 1980; Belgium, F.R.G., Luxembourg, U.S.S.R., U.K., June 27, 1980; Morocco, Netherlands, June 26, 1980.

Telecommunications
Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), as revised, relating to the aeronautical mobile (R) service, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva Mar. 5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1979, except for the frequency allotment plan for the aeronautical mobile (R) service which shall come into force on Feb. 1, 1983.[1]
Approvals deposited: Argentina (with statement) May 16, 1980; Zambia, May 20, 1980.

Safety at Sea
Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 (TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.[2]



(White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)

Seated: President Carter and Chinese Vice Premier Bo Yibo sign U.S.-China agreements. Standing from left to right: Yang Xuziang, Head of Chancery, P.R.C. Embassy; Vice President Mondale; Secretary Muskie; Chai Zemin, Ambassador to the U.S. from China; Myron Klutznick, U.S. Secretary of Commerce; and Arthur Rovine, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Department of State.

U.S.-China Agreements

In a ceremony at the White House on September 17, 1980, President Carter and Vice Premier Bo Yibo of the People's Republic of China signed four agreements—civil air transport, textile, maritime transport, and consular.

Following are remarks made by the President and the Vice Premier on that occasion, texts of the agreements, a White House fact sheet on significant events leading to the agreements, and summaries of the four agreements.

REMARKS AT SIGNING CEREMONY[1]

President Carter

We are here today to share some good news with each other. With the four agreements that we are about to sign, the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China is at last complete.

That relationship is a new and vital force for peace and stability in the international scene. In addition, it holds a promise of ever-increasing benefits in trade and other exchanges for both the United States and for the People's Republic of China. I am personally committed to the proposition that our relationship will not be undermined but will be strengthened. Both the United States and China have made firm and written commitments which form the basis of this relationship. These commitments have the support of the people of my country and of your country, and, therefore, they will be honored.

What we have accomplished together since the beginning of diplomatic relations between our countries has been extraordinary. But as I said to Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping when he was here in January 1979, our aim is to make these exchanges not extraordinary but ordinary—in other words, to make the benefits of this new relationship a routine part of the everyday lives of the citizens of this country and of the People's Republic of China. That is exactly what these four agreements will do. Let me say a brief word about each of them.

First, the civil aviation agreement: This agreement will mean regularly scheduled, direct flights between the United States and China, beginning in the very near future. I have instructed the Civil Aeronautics Board to move quickly to name the first of the two U.S. airlines which, along with the Chinese carriers, will fly the new routes. At the airports in New York or Los Angeles or San Francisco or Honolulu a few months from today, we will hear flights announced for Shanghai and for Beijing, as well as London and Paris.

Second, the maritime agreement: For the first time in more than 30 years, all U.S. ports will be open to Chinese merchant ships, and American ships will have access to all Chinese ports of call. This will mean a stronger American maritime industry. It will mean revenue for U.S. shippers from the growing Chinese market for American goods, and growing trade and commerce will benefit the people of both China and the United States.

Third, the textile agreement: By permitting orderly marketing in this country of Chinese textile products, this agreement will benefit American retailers and consumers without damaging our own textile industry, which was fully represented in these negotiations.

The fourth agreement is the consular convention. It spells out the duties of consular officers in providing services to citizens of both our countries. One immediate benefit is to insure the protection of the rights and interests of American citizens in China. We have two Consulates in China already, and now we will open three more. These offices will promote trade, travel, and cultural and educational exchange. They will serve the needs of hundreds of thousands of Americans who will be visiting China in the next few years.

On this side of the Pacific Ocean, China now has two Consulates in the United States—one in San Francisco and one in Houston. Soon, thanks to this agreement, there will be new Chinese Consulates in New York, Chicago, and Honolulu as well.

These agreements, as you well know, are the fruit of some very hard work. A year ago, when Vice President Mondale visited China, both nations pledged an effort to complete the political and legal framework of normalization by the end of 1980. We have met that goal with 3½ months to spare. The negotiators on both sides deserve the thanks and the appreciation of us all.

I'm privileged to lead my great nation in taking this step. I consider it one of the most important achievements of my Administration—but it's an achievement with a bipartisan history. President Nixon concluded the Shanghai communique of 1972, and President Ford accepted and supported the principles of that communique. My Administration, working closely with the Congress, has taken the decisive steps which made that goal a reality.

One result has been the activity by private and public organizations on both sides to build human contacts between our peoples after 30 years of near-total mutual isolation. Another was the establishment of the Joint Economic Committee, which is meeting here this week under the chairmanship of Vice Premier Bo and Secretary [of the Treasury G. William] Miller. Our economic ties, like our cooperation in science and technology, grow broader and closer every day. Trade between the United States and China this year will be nearly four times what it was 2 years ago. China will buy some $3 billion worth of American goods. That means jobs for American workers and opportunities for American businesses. And it means help for China's efforts to modernize and to develop its economy.

Almost 700,000 American citizens trace their roots to China. There are strong bonds of blood kinship and history between the United States and China. Yet both countries have acted not out of sentiment but out of mutual interest.

In a few moments, normalization between our two countries will be a fact. We are building something together—a broadly based consultative relationship that will enable us to expand our cooperation as the years go by.

Both of us will gain from this relationship; so, I firmly believe, will the peace of the world. America and China, so recently at odds, will have shown the world something about the possibilities of peace and friendship. In a world that badly needs a good deal of both, this is an achievement of which we can all be proud.

Vice Premier Bo Yibo

[*as translated*]

Today, in the field of Sino-U.S. economic cooperation, President Carter and I have completed a task of major significance.

emergency and security functions in effect; and

(c) written information on aeronautical laws, including the rules and regulations thereunder and amendments thereto, each designated airline is expected to follow.

5. The appropriate authorities of each Party shall use their best efforts to assist the designated airline(s) of the other Party to receive housing for the staff of such airline(s) comparable in cost and quality to the best obtained by or provided to other foreign airlines.

6. The designated airline(s) of each Party shall have the right to train the personnel of any appointed agent in the procedures of that airline for passenger, cargo, and aircraft handling and in procedures relating to reservations, ticketing, marketing, management, and sales promotion, subject to prior agreement.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

I would be grateful for your confirmation that this is also your understanding of the agreement we have reached."

I have the honor to confirm that the above constitutes an agreed understanding between our two governments concerning the rights of the designated airline(s) of each Party in the territory of the other Party.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

Sincerely,
LIN ZHENG
Leader
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of China

Beijing
September 8, 1980

Mr. B. Boyd Hight
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government of the United States

Dear Mr. Hight:

I have the honor to refer to the Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America Relating to Civil Air Transport, initialed today by our two governments. During the course of negotiations leading to the initialing of the Agreement, both sides discussed questions relating to the utilization of full traffic rights at a point or points in Japan in the operation of the agreed services. It is my understanding that agreement was reached that the utilization of full traffic rights at Japan by the designated airlines of both sides shall be governed by the following terms:

(1) The first designated airline of each Party, unless otherwise agreed, shall be permitted to operate two frequencies[1] with full traffic rights at Japan immediately upon the commencement of the agreed services. Two years following the commencement of any agreed service, the second designated airline of each Party, unless otherwise agreed, shall be permitted to operate two frequencies with full traffic rights at Japan. These rights shall continue until otherwise agreed by the Parties.

(2) If, two years after the commencement of any agreed service, the United States does not designate a second airline, or if one of the United States' two designated airlines does not operate all of the Japan frequencies authorized by paragraph (1) above, the Parties shall consult with a view to agreeing on the utilization of the unused Japan frequencies by the United States.

(3) The designated airline(s) of the People's Republic of China shall operate more than two Japan frequencies only if, and to the same extent that, the designated airline(s) of the United States are operating singly or in combination more than two Japan frequencies.

(4) Not later than two and one-half years following the commencement of any agreed service, the Parties shall review their respective utilization of Japan frequencies. If, upon such review, the number of Japan frequencies operated by the U.S. designated airline(s) exceeds the number of Japan frequencies which the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan have agreed upon for the Chinese designated airline(s), the Parties shall consult with a view to agreeing upon an alternative opportunity or opportunities for the Chinese designated airline(s).

(5) If, by 90 days prior to the end of the third year following the commencement of any agreed service, the Parties have not agreed upon an alternative opportunity or opportunities, the People's Republic of China shall be entitled to select point services[2] for operation in the fourth year and thereafter equal to the difference between the number of Japan frequencies operated by the U.S. designated airline(s) and the number of Japan frequencies authorized for the Chinese designated airline(s). The Chinese designated airline(s) shall be entitled to operate such point services at one or more intermediate and/or beyond points selected at the sole discretion of the People's Republic of China. A list of intermediate and/or beyond points so selected shall be furnished to the Government of the United States through diplomatic channels not later than 60 days prior to the commencement of operations. The number of point services operated by the Chinese designated airline(s) shall be reduced by one for each new Japan frequency which the Chinese designated airline(s) is authorized to operate subsequent to the selection of point services.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

Sincerely,

LIN ZHENG
Leader
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of China

Beijing
September 8, 1980

Mr. Lin Zheng
Leader
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government of China

Dear Mr. Lin:

I am in receipt of your letter of today's date relating to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China Relating to Civil Air Transport initialed today by our two governments, and more particularly relating to the utilization of full traffic rights at a point or points in Japan in the operation of the agreed services. Your letter reads as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to the Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America Relating to Civil Air Transport, initialed today by our two governments. During the course of negotiations leading to the initialing of the Agreement, both sides discussed questions relating to the utilization of full traffic rights at a point or points in Japan in the operation of the agreed services. It is my understanding that agreement was reached that the utilization of full traffic rights at Japan by the designated airlines of both sides shall be governed by the following terms:

(1) The first designated airline of each Party, unless otherwise agreed, shall be permitted to operate two frequencies[1] with full traffic rights at Japan immediately upon the commencement of the agreed services. Two years following the commencement of any agreed service, the second designated airline of each Party, unless otherwise agreed, shall be permitted to operate two frequencies with full traffic rights at Japan. These rights shall continue until otherwise agreed by the Parties.

(2) If, two years after the commencement of any agreed service, the United States does not designate a second airline, or if one of the United States' two designated airlines does not operate all of the Japan frequencies authorized by paragraph (1) above, the Parties shall consult with a view to agreeing on the utilization of the unused Japan frequencies by the United States.

(3) The designated airline(s) of the People's Republic of China shall operate more than two Japan frequencies only if, and to the same extent that, the designated airline(s) of the United States are operating singly or in combination more than two Japan frequencies.

(4) Not later than two and one-half years following the commencement of any agreed service, the Parties shall review their respective utilization of Japan frequencies. If, upon such review, the number of Japan frequencies operated by the U.S. designated airline(s) exceeds the number of Japan frequencies which the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan have agreed upon for the Chinese designated airline(s), the Parties shall consult with a view to agreeing upon an alternative opportunity or opportunities for the Chinese designated airline(s).

(5) If, by 90 days prior to the end of the third year following the commencement of any agreed service, the Parties have not agreed upon an alternative opportunity or opportunities, the People's Republic of China shall be entitled to select point services[2] for operation in the fourth year and thereafter equal to the difference between the number of Japan frequencies operated by the U.S. designated airline(s) and the number of Japan frequencies authorized for the Chinese designated airline(s). The Chinese designated airline(s) shall be entitled to operate such point services at one or more intermediate and/or beyond points selected at the sole discretion of the People's Republic of China. A list of intermediate and/or beyond points so selected shall be furnished to the Government of the United States through diplomatic channels not later than 60 days prior to the commencement of operations. The number of point services operated by the Chinese designated airline(s) shall be reduced by one for each new Japan frequency which the Chinese designated airline(s) is authorized to operate subsequent to the selection of point services.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed."

I have the honor to confirm that the above constitutes an agreed understanding.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

Sincerely,

B. Boyd Hight
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of the United States

Attachment: Initialed Translation

Beijing
September 8, 1980

Mr. Lin Zheng
Leader
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government of China

Dear Mr. Lin:

I have the honor to refer to the Civil Air Transport Agreement initialed today by our two governments. With respect to paragraph (1) of Annex V to the Agreement, it is my understanding that in case the first designated airline of the People's Republic of China does not operate more than two B-747SP aircraft per week during the period of one year following its commencement of the agreed services, for this same period the designated airline of the United States of America will limit its available capacity to an average of 120 tons of payload per week, measured quarterly. Payload will be measured by the actual tons of passenger, cargo and mail traffic, embarked or disembarked in the People's Republic of China quarterly.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

Sincerely,

B. Boyd Hight
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of the United States

Attachment: Initialed Translation

Beijing
September 8, 1980

Mr. B. Boyd Hight
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation of
the Government of the United States

Dear Mr. Hight:

I am in receipt of your letter of today's date relating to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China relating to Civil Air Transport initialed today by our two governments, and more particularly relating to Annex V (1) setting forth a capacity regime to govern the operations of the designated airline of each Party during the first year following the commencement of the agreed services by the first designated airline of the People's Republic of China. Your letter reads as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to the Civil Air Transport Agreement initialed today by our two governments. With respect to paragraph (1) of Annex V to the Agreement, it is my understanding that in case the first designated airline of the People's Republic of China does not operate more than two B-747SP aircraft per week during the period of one year following its commencement of the agreed services, for the same period the designated airline of the United States of America will limit its available capacity to an average of 120 tons of payload per week, measured quarterly. Payload will be measured by the actual total tons of passenger, cargo and mail traffic, embarked or disembarked in the People's Republic of China quarterly.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed."

I have the honor to confirm that the above constitutes an agreed understanding.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

Sincerely,
Lin Zheng
Leader
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of China

Beijing
September 8, 1980

Mr. B. Boyd Hight
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation of
The Government of the United States

Dear Mr. Hight:

With reference to Annex V, paragraph (2) of the Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America relating to Civil Air Transport initialed today, I have the honor to confirm, on behalf of my Government, the following discussion between the civil aviation delegations of our two countries in the course of their negotiations.

In the operation of the agreed services on the specified routes by the designated airlines of the Parties, it is deemed that traffic will no longer be reasonably balanced whenever, on a semi-annual basis, the traffic carried by the designated airline(s) of one Party shall exceed 56.25 percent of the total traffic carried by the designated airlines of the two Parties.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

Sincerely,

Lin Zheng
Leader
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of China

Beijing
September 8, 1980

Mr. Lin Zheng
Leader
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government of China

Dear Mr. Lin:

I am in receipt of your letter of today's date with respect to Annex V, paragraph (2) of the Civil Air Transport Agreement initialed today by our two governments, and acknowledge the contents therein.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

Sincerely,

B. Boyd Hight
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of the United States

Attachment: Initialed Translation

September 17, 1980

Mr. Lin Zheng
Leader
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government of China

Dear Mr. Lin:

I have the honor to confirm that the Government of the United States of America is prepared, within its authority, to make clear in its official publications and statements that "China Airlines" is an airline from Taiwan and is not the national flag carrier of China.

Sincerely,
B. Boyd Hight
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of the United States

ARTICLE 14

Waiver of Immunity

1. The sending State may waive the immunity from jurisdiction of members of a consulate and of members of their families provided in Article 13 of this Convention. Except as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article, such waiver shall always be express and in writing.

2. In the event a member of a consulate or a member of his family initiates legal proceedings, with respect to which he would enjoy immunity from jurisdiction under this Convention, no immunity may be invoked with regard to any counterclaim directly related to the principal claim.

3. Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction with respect to civil proceedings shall not be held to imply waiver of immunity with respect to the execution of judgment, for which a separate waiver shall be necessary.

ARTICLE 15

Exemption from Services and Obligations

Consular officers and consular employees and members of their families who are not nationals of the receiving State and who are not aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the receiving State shall be exempt in the receiving State from obligations and services of a military nature, from any kind of compulsory services, and from any contributions that may be due in lieu thereof. They shall likewise be exempt from obligations relating to the registration of aliens, from obtaining permission to reside, and from compliance with other similar obligations applicable to aliens.

ARTICLE 16

Exemption of Real and Movable Property from Taxation

1. The sending State shall be exempt from all dues and taxes and similar charges of any kind in the receiving State, for which it otherwise would be liable, with respect to:

(a) the consular premises and residences of members of a consulate referred to in Article 8 of this Convention;

(b) transactions or documents relating to such immovable property.

2. The sending State shall be exempt from all dues and taxes and similar charges of any kind on movable property which is owned, held or leased or otherwise possessed by it and which is used exclusively for consular purposes, as well as dues and taxes in connection with the acquisition, possession or maintenance of such property.

3. The provisions of subparagraph 1(a) of this Article shall not apply to payment for specific services rendered.

4. The exemptions accorded by this Article shall not apply to such dues and taxes if under the law of the receiving State they are payable by a person contracting with the sending State or with a person acting on behalf of the sending State.

5. The provisions of this Article also apply to all immovable property used for the official purposes of the diplomatic mission of the sending State, including residences of diplomatic mission personnel.

ARTICLE 17

Exemption of Members of a Consulate from Taxation

1. Except as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article, a member of a consulate and members of his family shall be exempt from payment of all dues and taxes and similar charges of any kind.

2. The exemption provided by paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply with respect to:

(a) indirect taxes of a kind normally included in the price of goods and services;

(b) dues and taxes imposed with respect to private immovable property located in the territory of the receiving State, unless an exemption is provided by Article 16 of this Convention;

(c) estate, succession and inheritance taxes and taxes on the transfer of property rights imposed by the receiving State, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article;

(d) dues and taxes on private income earned in the receiving State;

(e) charges for specific services rendered;

(f) dues and taxes on transactions or on documents relating to transactions, including fees of any kind collected by reason of such transactions, except for fees and charges exemption from which is provided in Article 16 of this Convention.

3. If a member of a consulate or a member of his family dies, no estate, succession or inheritance tax or any other tax or charge on the transfer of movable property at death shall be imposed by the receiving State with respect to that property, provided that the presence of the property was due solely to the presence of the deceased in the receiving State in the capacity of a member of a consulate or a member of his family.

ARTICLE 18

Exemptions from Customs Duties and Inspection

1. All articles, including motor vehicles, for the official use of a consulate, shall, in conformity with the law of the receiving State, be exempt from customs duties and other dues and taxes of any kind imposed upon or by reason of importation or exportation.

2. Consular officers and members of their families shall be exempt from customs duties and other charges imposed upon or by reason of importation or exportation of articles intended for their own personal use, including articles for the equipment of their households.

3. Consular employees and members of their families shall be exempt from customs duties and other charges imposed upon or by reason of the importation or exportation of articles for their own personal use, including articles for the equipment of their households, imported at time of first arrival at a consulate.

4. Articles designed for personal use shall not exceed the quantities required for direct use by the person accorded an exemption by this Article.

5. Personal baggage of consular officers and members of their families shall be exempt from customs inspection. It may be inspected only in cases where there is serious reason to believe that it contains articles other than those mentioned in paragraph 2 of this Article, or articles the importation or exportation of which is prohibited by the law of the receiving State or articles which are subject to the law of quarantine. Such inspection must be undertaken in the presence of the consular officer concerned or member of his family or his representative.

ARTICLE 19

Immunity from Requisition

Consular premises as well as the official means of transport of the consulate are not liable to any form of requisition. If for the needs of the national defense or other public purposes expropriation of consular premises, residences or means of transport becomes necessary, all possible measures must be taken by the receiving State to avoid interference with the performance of consular functions and promptly to pay appropriate and effective compensation to the sending State.

ARTICLE 20

Freedom of Movement

Subject to the law of the receiving State concerning zones, entry into which is prohibited or regulated for reasons of national security, the receiving State shall ensure freedom of movement and travel in its territory to members of a consulate and members of their families.

ARTICLE 21

Exclusion from the Enjoyment of Rights, Facilities, Privileges and Immunities

Members of a consulate and members of their families who are either nationals or permanent residents of the receiving State shall not enjoy the rights, facilities, privileges and immunities provided by this Convention, except immunity from the obligation to give evidence concerning matters relating to the exercise of their official functions as provided in paragraph 6 of Article 13 of this Convention.

ARTICLE 22

Functions of Consular Officers

1. The functions of a consular officer consist of:

(a) protecting the rights and interests of the sending State and of its nationals, including juridical persons;

(b) rendering assistance to and cooperating with nationals of the sending State, including juridical persons;

(c) contributing to the development of

economic, commercial, cultural, scientific and tourist relations between the sending and the receiving States;

(d) promoting in various ways the development of friendly relations between the sending and the receiving States;

(e) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the political, commercial, economic, cultural, educational and scientific-technological life of the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the government of the sending State.

2. A consular officer shall, if authorized by the sending State, be entitled to carry out the functions described in this Convention, as well as other consular functions which are not prohibited by the law of the receiving State or to which the receiving State does not object.

ARTICLE 23

Execution of Consular Functions

1. A consular officer shall be entitled to execute his functions only within the consular district. A consular officer may execute his functions outside the limits of the consular district only with the advance consent of the receiving State given separately in each instance.

2. In executing his functions, a consular officer may approach orally or in writing:

(a) the competent local authorities in the consular district;

(b) the competent central authorities of the receiving State, if and to the extent allowed by the law and customs of the receiving State.

3. With the advance approval of the receiving State, the sending State may perform consular functions in the receiving State on behalf of a third State.

4. A consulate may levy in the territory of the receiving State consular fees authorized under the law of the sending State for consular acts. Any such sums levied shall be exempt from all dues and taxes in the receiving State.

ARTICLE 24

Representation Before the Authorities of the Receiving State

1. A consular officer shall be entitled, in accordance with the law of the receiving State, to take appropriate measures for the protection of the rights and interests of nationals of the sending State, including juridical persons, before the courts and other authorities of the receiving State, where, because they are not present in the receiving State or for any other reason, these nationals are not in a position to undertake timely defense of their rights and interests.

2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall cease as soon as the national appoints his own representative or the national assumes the defense of his rights and interests.

3. Nothing in this Article, however, shall be construed to authorize a consular officer to act as an attorney-at-law.

ARTICLE 25

Functions with Regard to Travel Documents

A consular officer shall be entitled to:

1. issue to nationals of the sending State passports or similar travel documents, as well as make amendments in them;

2. issue visas or other appropriate documents to persons wishing to travel to or through the sending State.

ARTICLE 26

Functions Regarding Citizenship and Civil Status

A consular officer shall be entitled to:

1. register nationals of the sending State;

2. accept applications and issue or deliver documents on matters of citizenship;

3. accept applications or declarations relating to civil status from nationals of the sending State;

4. register births and deaths of nationals of the sending State.

ARTICLE 27

Notarial Functions

A consular officer shall be entitled to:

1. receive and witness statements made under oath or affirmation, and, in accordance with the law of the receiving State, to receive the testimony of any person for use in connection with a legal proceeding in the sending State;

2. draw up or authenticate any act or document, as well as copies or extracts thereof, of a national of the sending State, including a juridical person, for use outside the receiving State or of any person for use in the sending State, or perform other notarial functions;

3. authenticate documents issued by competent authorities of the receiving State for use in the sending State.

ARTICLE 28

Legal Force of Documents Prepared by a Consular Officer

The acts and documents certified or legalized by a consular officer of the sending State, as well as copies, extracts and translations of such acts and documents certified by him, shall be receivable in evidence in the receiving State as official or officially certified acts, documents, copies, translations or extracts, and shall have in the receiving State the same validity and effect as the documents certified or legalized by the competent authorities of the receiving State, provided they have been drawn and executed in conformity with the law of the receiving State and with the law of the country in which they are to be used.

ARTICLE 29

Serving Judicial and Other Legal Documents

A consular officer shall be entitled to serve judicial and other legal documents in accordance with international agreements in force between the sending and receiving States or, in the absence of such agreements, to the extent permitted by the law of the receiving State.

ARTICLE 30

Notification on the Establishment of Guardianship or Trusteeship

1. The competent authorities of the receiving State shall notify the consulate in writing of instances in which it is necessary to establish a guardianship or trusteeship over a national of the sending State who is not of age or lacks full capacity to act on his own behalf, or over property of a national of the sending State when for whatever reason such property cannot be administered by the national of the sending State.

2. A consular officer of the sending State may, on matters mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article, contact the appropriate authorities of the receiving State, and may propose appropriate persons to be appointed to act as guardians or trustees, in accordance with the law of the receiving State.

ARTICLE 31

Notification Regarding the Death of a National of the Sending State

Whenever the competent authorities of the receiving State learn that a national of the sending State has died in the receiving State, they shall immediately notify the appropriate consular officer of the sending State and, upon his request, send him a copy of the death certificate or other documentation confirming the death.

ARTICLE 32

Notification Regarding the Estate of a Deceased National

1. Whenever the appropriate local authorities of the receiving State learn of an estate resulting from the death in the receiving State of a national of the sending State who leaves in the receiving State no known heir or testamentary executor, they shall as promptly as possible so inform a consular officer of the sending State.

2. Whenever the appropriate local authorities of the receiving State learn of an estate of a decedent, regardless of nationality, who has left in the receiving State an estate in which a national of the sending State residing outside the receiving State may have an interest under the will of the decedent or otherwise in accordance with the law of the receiving State, they shall as promptly as possible so inform a consular officer of the sending State.

ARTICLE 33

Functions Relating to Estates

1. A consular officer shall be entitled to take appropriate measures with respect to the protection and conservation of the property of a deceased national of the sending State left in

hemisphere countries largely in their development efforts.

I have been making these kinds of speeches, that is foreign aid speeches. I try to find a different phrase than "foreign aid." One of my table partners reminded me that I had said something about it that was picked up in *The Economist* to the effect that 80% of our foreign aid dollars are spent in this country and produce American jobs—and that is a correct fact.

Although that is correct and perhaps an inducement to people to support foreign aid, the importance of foreign aid to me is as a tool in influencing the future direction of human affairs on this planet. And it's the kind of investment we should be making in our own interest. Our own defense, our own security, our own prospects for a better future are enhanced to the extent that we can contribute to a meeting of those problems of the world's disadvantaged people that create instability.

We can't expect to be prosperous, peaceful, strong, and free of fears in an unstable world. The entire southern hemisphere of this planet is a potential powder keg in the sense that disadvantaged people will not take their situation permanently. Disadvantaged people can be, and are, exploited by those who seek power for that purpose. So that when we concentrate wholly upon—the speech should have been modified to have added that secret weapon because I think it is an important one.

With respect to the countries of Southeast Asia; those in the Indochina Peninsula are not all poor, of course. Indonesia and Malaysia have some of the prime resources of this planet available for their own development, but other countries do not.

Africa perhaps is the poorest in terms of resources, and development there and resources of the kind I am describing are important. Let's take Zimbabwe. I've mentioned Zimbabwe here is this speech. Zimbabwe, if it is to continue on its moderate course—its moderate racial course, its moderate internal political course—has got to meet the aspirations and the problems of its people. Zimbabwe is a rich nation in resources, so the potential is there. It is a country that has been torn by war for all these years. They need outside help to get started, investment to get started, and, frankly, there isn't a nickel in our foreign aid program available for that purpose. If they succeed, their success may well moderate the whole racial issue in the southern half of Africa.

To me, that is an investment worth consideration by the United States and by our people. There are other examples: Poland. We've all, I'm sure—unless you're different than the people I've run into up to now—have been cheered by the success of the Polish workers. Now, Poland has horrendous economic problems which have been exacerbated by that event.

We have announced some CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation] credits—$660 million, which is an addition of only $110 million over what we were going to provide anyway—but we don't have another penny available in our foreign aid program to be of assistance when they put together their economic plans and turn to us and other Western nations for help. These kinds of situations are situations which we cannot afford to ignore in our own interest, and yet, we tie our own hands by failing to respond to the opportunities. That's the best question I've been asked today.

Q. I have been doing a great deal of reading and have a great concern about the acceleration of new, modern airplanes and equipment, and yet not having the people power—I dare not say manpower or I'll be run out of town—to operate the highly-technical airplanes, where sometimes the less complicated, older vintage planes are becoming more effective.

What are we going to do when we keep on accelerating, developing, and exploring highly sophisticated planes with nobody to operate them? I think the attempt of the rescue mission in Iran is an exemplary, unfortunate experience. Would you address that?

A. The breakdown in Iran was not really due to an inability of the crew to operate the craft. It was just that they were extended to the outer limits of their capability, and there were not enough back-up helicopters assigned to that mission, so I don't think that incident gets at the first point that you made.

Secondly, I don't know of any way to stop the momentum of technological development.

Q. I think you misunderstood me. I will rephrase that. Who is going to operate the sophisticated planes if it appears we don't have enough people trained to do it?

A. But we are operating these sophisticated planes, and we can train them. To the extent that the manpower isn't being attracted into the military, you've got a point. But that has nothing to do with the complexity of the technology; it has to do with our failure to provide the inducements to attract people into the service, and we intend to so something about that, if that's your point.

It is the same point that was raised earlier with respect to our ships, and it is a very appropriate and valid point. If that's your point, I finally got it.

Q. I read recently in the newspaper that you had sent a message to the Iranian Foreign Minister concerning the hostages, and you had received a reply back. Could you kind of outline what that message said or if it was particularly optimistic?

A. I haven't received a reply yet.

Q. You haven't?

A. No.

Q. The newspapers said that you had.

A. No. Let me describe what has happened with respect to my letter. I sent it upon the election of the Prime Minister. It was delivered, through one of the channels that I referred to earlier, to the Prime Minister. He disclosed that he had received a letter from me; did not immediately disclose its contents but obviously regarded it as a serious matter, and he said that he would consider it and reply in due course.

Subsequent to that time, in what appeared to have been an impromptu speech, he read the contents of my letter, embroidered it with some of the usual rhetoric that we get in Iranian reactions to anything the United States does but in such a way to suggest, to me at least, that in due course I may get a formal written response.

We have gotten indications from other Iranian sources that they regard the letter as a serious contact and one to be dealt with seriously. Whether or not that will produce at some point a contact and the start of our negotiations, or talks, we will have to be patient and wait and see. I hope so.

Press release 262A of Sept. 19, 1980. ■

The United States and the World's Refugees

Secretary Muskie's address before the American Lutheran Church in Minneapolis on October 6, 1980.[1]

I want to talk today about refugees—about the new tidal wave of refugees that is sweeping across the world, impelled by war, famine, and by ruthless suppressions of the human spirit.

That wave of refugees has especially touched America—for our nation, as an historic haven of refuge, has traditionally been a beacon for the homeless and persecuted. But today the influx of refugees to the United States has become so heavy and constant that we face serious questions of refugee policy, questions that challenge both heart and head. These questions concern you—because you have, to your eternal credit, chosen to play a leading role in helping refugees.

Era of Refugees

Very accurately, and very sadly, ours can be called an era of refugees. In recent years, more than 15 million people worldwide have fled their homes as refugees—of war, civil unrest, persecution, and hunger.

- Roughly 6 million are victims of war in Indochina—boat people from Vietnam and refugees from war-ravaged Kampuchea.
- More than 1 million Afghan refugees are estimated to be in Pakistan, their numbers swelled by the Soviet aggression against that country.
- In Africa, the refugee population exceeds 3 million; the figure for the Middle East is roughly 2 million.
- And closest to home, we find that more than 1 million people in the Western Hemisphere have left their homes in recent years in search of asylum from strife of oppression.

Of all the world's people, these may be the most pitiable. For these migrant millions—most of them women and children—are cruelly cut off from home and country, their families often divided or destroyed. It has become commonplace, when discussing immigrants or refugees, to cite the words of Emma Lazarus carved on the base of the Statue of Liberty:

> Give me your tired, your poor,
> Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
> The wretched refuse of your teeming shore;
> Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me:
> I lift my lamp beside the golden door.

However commonplace they may have become, these words describe precisely the refugees of today. These helpless people are quite literally tired and poor; quite literally huddled—in crowded camps and holding centers around the world; quite literally wretched; quite literally homeless. And in the case of the boat people of Indochina and Cuba, they have been quite literally tempest-tossed—in rotting junks and leaking boats: vessels both of hope and of despair.

In a few cases, the sojourns of refugees have ended with their return home. The settlement of the Zimbabwe conflict this year, for example, made it possible for nearly 200,000 refugees to return home. And in our own hemisphere, a similar number of Nicaraguans returned home when the civil war there came to an end. But such reconciliations are all too rare.

More typically, the odyssey of a refugee is painful and protracted. And the impact of large refugee migrations on the world community and on individual countries is tremendous.

- Last year, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees collected more than $343 million for refugee relief and resettlement. The great bulk of these funds came from the industrial democracies of the West and Japan; the United States alone contributed more than $90 million. Yet these funds are inadequate to the task at hand.
- Countries of first asylum like Thailand, Pakistan, and Somalia, are increasingly hard-put to stretch their resources to accommodate refugees.
- Today, as large refugee populations swamp the inadequate machinery for dealing with them, more than 1 million refugees worldwide languish in camps and holding centers. They live under conditions that range from desperate to barely adequate.

And the United States especially has felt the impact of these recent refugee waves.

- In the past 5 years, our nation has received more than 600,000 refugees for resettlement—a number that dwarfs the figure for any other country.
- This year alone, we have received some 125,000 unexpected Cuban entrants in a swift and sudden influx between May and September.

Let me say here that the role of institutions like the American Lutheran Church in this effort is not simply worthwhile; it is crucial. In the past few years your church and its individual congregations have sponsored more than 35,000 refugees for resettlement. No one can compile statistics to quantify the endless compassion, the numberless acts of love and generosity that mark this effort; they are beyond all counting. It is part of

We are a nation of immigrants and their sons and daughters: No nation with such a history can turn its back on its own traditions without losing something of its soul.

my purpose today to thank you personally—you and all those like you across America who have done this service to your nation and to these people in need.

I also want to thank the citizens of Minnesota and the six Midwestern States who have extended their hospitality, their patience, and their resources to settle thousands of refugees over the past few years.

Practical Burdens

The practical burdens of helping refugees establish new lives in the United States are, as you know, enormous. The sheer numbers of recent years and the unpredictability of recent refugee waves have made careful planning difficult. They have given our national refugee programs an air of permanent emergency. The arrival of unorganized boat flotillas from Cuba over a short span of weeks last spring made it necessary, for example, to press widely scattered military reservations into sudden service as receiving centers.

Our social service programs—national, State, and local—have been hard

the things they're trying to do to deal with it. But at this point they expressed appreciation for CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation] credits but made no supplementary request at this point. Obviously they are going to do so at some point when they've got their own plans in place. I indicated we would look on with sympathy to the idea of being of help. Resources are limited as I've been saying publicly now for some time. But it was a very good meeting, and I thought he was very clear and forthcoming and practical on what they need to do.

Q. Did he give you any assurance that the accords would be carried out?

A. We discussed the legislation—I guess it's been passed now—the court processes that were being used and the standards that are being applied.

Q. Do you have any reason to believe that the Iraqis decided to launch this whole effort because they felt after Khomeini's letter that we and the Iranians might be on the verge of somehow working something out and that now was a good time to do it?

A. I've no reason to believe that.

OCT. 2, 1980[3]

I am completing what has for me been a most valuable 9 days of meetings with heads of governments and foreign ministers from countries on every continent. Many of them I have met for the first time. Such meetings have given me valuable insights into their personal and official points of view.

Through larger sessions with the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations], Africa, and Latin America, I have gained a glimpse of the strength and importance of regional cooperation in each of these areas. The war between Iraq and Iran has been at the forefront of concern in many of these conversations.

My being here was fortuitous in that it enabled us to meet directly with countries of the immediate area. I valued particularly my two meetings with His Highness Prince Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia, and my meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Bahrain and the representatives of Oman. My meeting with the Foreign Minister of Iraq was probably only possible because we both happened to be here in New York. I regret that I did not have a response from my offer to meet a representative of Iran.

The meeting with [Soviet] Foreign Minister Gromyko enabled us to continue our periodic sessions and to advance the talks on theater nuclear forces and arms limitations in Europe. I was able to have a series of meetings with our principal European allies. The various conversations gave me an opportunity not only to reiterate our interest in sound, bilateral relations with each of these countries but also to stress the continuing interest of the United States in maintaining a firm international stand against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and in furthering the process of peace in the Middle East.

I come away from this—my first extensive series of meetings with foreign ministers—impressed by the degree to which the role of the United States is important to each one, even when we may disagree on fundamental issues. While each recognized that we were in an election period, nearly all stressed their strong desire of continuity of U.S. attention to the needs of peace and development throughout the world.

Q. May we please have your overview of the current state of diplomatic efforts to resolve the war between Iran and Iraq?

A. The latest development is, of course, the proposed cease-fire offered by Iraq. I'm not sure if there has been a formal response from Iran at this point. My belief is that there has not. I would hope that that initiative, or other initiatives, might lead as soon as possible to a cease-fire and beginning of negotiations of the issues involved in those hostilities.

Q. Does it seem to be a substantive offer or a public relations move by Iraq?

A. No. I take it to be a response solicited by [Pakistani] President Zia representing the Islamic conference in response to that initiative.

Q. The United States is sending radar planes to Saudi Arabia. One of your deputies has said the United States cannot condone the dismemberment of Iran, and President Carter is talking about some sort of a naval task force to protect the Strait of Hormuz. In light of all that, is it not more difficult now for the United States to maintain its professed neutrality, particularly when the Iranians are saying, "Stay out of the war or we'll kill the hostages?"

A. I prefer to describe the situation as it appears to be at the moment and not speculate on hypothetical possibilities which one could frame in horrendous terms. Whenever hostilities begin in any part of the world, and especially in this one, the risks of escalation and the consequences of escalation obviously pose very difficult problems for all concerned.

At the present moment, hostilities seem to have diminished somewhat—the intensity of hostilities—the broader risks seem to have diminished somewhat, and I would hope that we would continue in that direction rather than the direction which your question suggests.

Q. Among oil analysts, some are saying now that there has been tremendous damage heaped upon Iraq and Iran by their bombing in the oil facilities. They are also suggesting that there is no end in sight perhaps to this war. They are also suggesting that unless Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi come in with maybe 2 million barrels of oil a day in extra production, that in 9 months to a year, the Western allies or the United States could begin to experience shortfalls in oil, higher prices, and greater inflation.

Has the Administration begun to put into effect any kind of plan that would offset or prepare us for the eventuality of oil shortfalls?

A. Obviously, in a situation of this kind, with all the uncertainties as to the future—and your question is made up of an exposition of uncertainties—it is difficult to project what the need for planning would be or what the goal of the planning should be.

I don't have any personal assessment or any assessment made by any authoritative person or body as to the extent of the damage that is being imposed upon the oil facilities of the two combatants, nor do I have any crystal ball as to how long the infliction of damage on each other's facilities will continue. Unless one has answers to those questions and to the additional question of what the production elsewhere in the world is likely to be in this period, it is very difficult to come up with hard and fast answers to questions like that.

Q. It was reported by the State Department that in your talks with Foreign Minister Hammadi [of Iraq] he brought up the issue of the hostages. There have been reports that he brought it up in the context of Iraqi

fears of some potential exchange of the hostages for military equipment. Do you confirm or deny that?

A. Do I confirm or deny what? That the subject was raised?

Q. The subject was raised. We know that because the State Department said it, but in what context was it raised? Why did the Iraqi raise the subject of the hostages?

A. They can characterize their concern better than I can. As far as I'm concerned, we have not indulged in speculation as to the basis upon which the hostages might be released. If and when the time comes that we are involved in negotiations on that subject in Iran—we are not involved in negotiations on that subject—one might speculate on a long list of possible requirements that might be presented by representatives of Iran. I don't think it is useful to do so here or with Mr. Hammadi, and I said the same thing to him.

Q. Yesterday the Iranian Charge characterized the AWACS [airborne warning and control system] presence as provocation and a demonstration that this country—the United States—is not really neutral. Today Saudi Arabia is quoted as boosting its production of oil for shipment to the West. Was there any negotiating going on between those two factors—the presence of the AWACS and the subsequent boost in oil production by Saudi Arabia?

A. No.

Q. After this enormous series of bilateral meetings, do you share the view of the President of the 35th session that this session might bring a contribution to disarmament and detente?

A. That, obviously, is a goal which fits within the Charter of the United Nations, and I would hope that the United Nations might be affected. One is not always reassured by actions taken here, but at least the existence of the institution with that objective always holds out hope, as far as I'm concerned.

Q. Governor Reagan has been very precise about what he is prepared to do were he is in power concerning the Islamic nations' attempt to expel Israel from the United Nations. What, precisely, are you prepared to recommend? A veto, if such an attempt is made?

A. When one is out of power, it is easy to be precise; when one is in power, one must consider not only public, but private, initiatives that one might take to avoid that result. We are just as strong in our conviction that Israel has a right to be a member of this body as Mr. Reagan is.

Q. In your talks with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, was there any progress made for the reintegration of Greece into NATO? Are the prospects now better than they were before your talks with the two Foreign Ministers?

A. Those discussions and negotiations are going on within the military structure of NATO. I am not a party to those negotiations, nor would it be appropriate for me to try to characterize them. As a matter of fact, I have deliberately stayed uninformed as to the details so that there be no question that what the issue involves is a military question rather than a political one.

Q. The Soviet Union has been asking that no country interfere in the Iraqi-Iranian crisis. Would you be able to shed some light for us about what deals the Soviet Union might take—what sort of steps might they take—if the war continues or was escalated? What is the U.S.S.R.'s position, in your estimate?

A. The U.S.S.R. position, as stated to me by Mr. Gromyko, is consistent with what I perceive its public position to be and that is to stand off and away from the conflict in a neutral posture. That was his position as stated to me, and as far as I can see, their actions have been consistent with that.

Q. Would you comment on reports from Tehran that the Iranian Parliament has formed a commission on the hostages and they are also refusing to address deals with the United States on Israel.

A. The commission idea was raised, I think, 2 or 3 weeks ago. I commented on it at that time as potentially a constructive step forward in that it appears to put in place an institution with authority to recommend, maybe to decide, the Iranian position on returning the hostages.

Q. What about the composition of that commission? We're told that they're all hardliners.

A. I don't think it is useful for me to speculate, to try to characterize persons as to views and positions and records. I am not fully informed.

Q. In your discussions with the foreign ministers, there has been a lot of talk about the United States being weak. Do you get that perception? Do they have that perception of the United States? Do they still believe that we are a world power?

A. I can't recall anyone raising any question about that. [Laughter]

Q. Do they have any fears that we are not maintaining our position as a world power, as a voice of democracy?

A. No. They expressed no such fears. I must say that I had no difficulty in arranging meetings with all those who came to meet with me; indeed, we were not able to fit in all those who wished. So I do not detect in their attitude for the prospects of meeting with the United States Secretary of State any lack of interest in our influence or power. As a matter of fact, from time to time I got the notion that they exaggerate our ability to influence the actions of other nations and especially to deal with the internal affairs of other nations.

Q. There have been rather interesting changes in the text of the address by President Zia of Pakistan—between the prepared text and the delivered text—particularly in relation to the remarks concerning the Soviet Union. Have you been made aware of these changes? Have you made any inquiries why they introduced these changes, and how do you assess these changes?

A. The ever-helpful press has brought those changes to my attention.

Q. Since the President goes to Washington tomorrow, do you feel that there is any connection between that visit and the changes?

A. I think it is better to try to make that determination after we have met with President Zia and his representatives than to speculate about it before I meet with them. He should be the best authority.

Q. Are we any closer to having a meeting with other countries on the problem of oil supplies in the Persian Gulf, as President Carter mentioned last week in his messages to other countries? And on the same point, do you think it is more or less likely that you would need some kind of international naval force to keep the strait open?

other side and, thus, we are able to read when they launch their weapons what performance capabilities they are testing and may be achieving. And they can do the same with us. Encryption scrambles those signals so the other side can't read them.

This treaty limits and restricts the ability of each side to use encryption with respect to those signals. Thus, this treay protects our ability to monitor what the Soviet Union is doing in developing new weapons and new capabilities in existing weapons—an important protection for us.

This treaty does not limit any ongoing program that we have underway, so that our programs like MX [missile experimental], cruise missiles, and the more advanced technologies that we have underway would not be limited.

In fact, this treaty would enable us to improve our capabilities within margins. We are interested only in survivable weapons; we are interested in increasing the lethal nature or character in total of our weapons, so that this treaty has a way of imposing restraints upon the Russians, stabilizing the arms race, and preparing the ground for SALT III and the final negotiations.

I was a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and, as such, I had to study this treaty carefully, and that is the conclusion I reached. I know that other Senators have reached other conclusions, but the point is, from my point of view, if we were to reject the SALT II Treaty on the ground that we should have gotten more than we got out of the negotiations for this treaty, we then face the formidable task of going back to the Russians and asking them to give up more than they have already yielded—but at the same time we retain what we got out of the treaty. Now that is a tough negotiation to try to get, even between two businessmen in this country, let alone between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Rejection of the treaty, especially in the present climate created following the invasion of Afghanistan, could well mean the end of the SALT process, and the cost to us in terms of an arms race would be horrendous.

Q. What would the State Department policy be if the security of South Africa were threatened at the present time, taking into account the possible Soviet interest that might be involved as well as the repressive nature of the present government of South Africa.

A. I don't see any conceivable circumstances in which South Africa's security would be threatened, except by its failure to open up its society to its own people.

It is a very self-sufficient nation with tremendous resources. It has developed them and industrialized. And indeed, one of the frustrations of the situation is that the strength of the South African economy is of importance to the front-line states adjoining, which are all black and which are a part of the movement of black majority rule in the countries north of South Africa. They feel that sanctions on South Africa would hurt them because they are so tied into the South African economy.

Now South Africa has seen this coming a long time and it is pretty self-sufficient economically. It is well able to defend itself against any foreseeable threats, and I can't see the Soviet Union targeting South Africa as a high-priority target from the Soviet's point of view.

Q. According to newspaper accounts, since the taking of our hostages in Iran almost a year ago, in addition to several thousand Iranian students and illegal aliens that have been deported from this country, newspaper accounts indicate that some 11,079 Iranian political exiles have been admitted to the United States since that time.

At the same time, the newspaper account indicates that there are an estimated 100 Iranian Jews who have asked for political exile to the United States who are being held in limbo in Paris and in London.

According to this newspaper report, the State Department says that it is not in the interest of the United States and the human rights interest to let them in. It is not part of our national interest, as we do not want to offend Khomeini's government.

I wonder how we can allow 11,079 Iranian refugees into the United States but cannot allow these 100 Jewish Iranian refugees in at the same time?

A. There are implications in your question, and I don't have the background of that particular figure or an analysis of what went into it. I find it very difficult to believe that the fact that those Iranians are Jewish is the reason why they are being denied—if they are in fact being denied—entrance into the United States.

Q. But this was a published article in the Memphis newspaper, and it's very clear.

A. Occasionally, I have read published articles in newspapers that I knew personally were not accurate. [Laughter and applause.]

But I will take your question seriously and pursue it, and if you will leave your name and address I will personally try to dig into that particular issue and find out what there is to the newspaper story and, if it reflects State Department policy accurately, why that policy was adopted. I will be glad to do that. [Applause.]

Q. Do you feel that our government has any real plans to develop credibility in the Arab world, in view of the fact that, to them, what we seem to be worrying about is Soviet aggression to Afghanistan, and what the Arabs are worried about, from their perception, is an Israeli aggression—and not deferring—hanging onto these lands taken in the 1967 war and the annexing of East Jerusalem.

They seem to have no success in extricating the Israelis from the West Bank or doing anything to reconcile the differences between Israel and Palestine. Do you think that there is any chance—since they regard one section is bad enough—that we could ever count on any support of the Arab world in resisting Soviet expansion? And perhaps then to Iraq—Iraq or Iran.

A. With respect to our general relations with the moderate Arab states, I think they are in a very healthy state at the present time, and I say that following 2 weeks which I spent at the United Nations, meeting some 47 Foreign Ministers over that period of time. This is an occasion which American Secretaries of State take to meet, within a short time, the Foreign Ministers of many countries who come for the General Assembly. I have had the opportunity to talk to the Foreign Ministers and, in some cases, to Prime Ministers of the moderate Arab states and some which are not so moderate.

But in any case, their interest in our views, their interest in being supportive, their interest and their concern about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are all at a high level.

They will all say, frankly, that they think we ought to be more effective in dealing with the Israeli-Arab issues, and all of them except Egypt are pessimistic—I think that is the accurate

word to use—about the prospects of the Camp David process. But nevertheless, they support us.

Some of you may have seen Prince Sau'd of Saudi Arabia on "Face the Nation" Sunday. I had two good talks with Prince Sau'd, and he represents the Royal Family of Saudi Arabia. There are aspects of our policy that they do criticize, and they do criticize some aspects of our Middle East policies, but, nevertheless, they have a strong identification with us in many other areas including their very deep concern about the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

If you will just look at your maps again, you will find that Afghanistan is not far removed from Iran as a threat to the Persian Gulf, and it is the Persian Gulf which is the heart of the oil resources of these moderate Arab states.

So they are very much with us on that policy, and they are frank with us and critical of us with regard to the Palestinian issues.

There is no question—and I say this as an American as well as Secretary of State—that a resolution of the Israeli-Arab issues is critical, not only from Israel's point of view and that of the neighbor states but that of the United States as well.

It is a block, in some ways, to the kind of rallying to our policies that we might otherwise get from nations which are concerned about this. Yes, that is true.

Q. Some of us can still remember the Kellogg-Briand treaty of the 1920s; its consequences in this country are, notably, many carriers in Japan as a result of our agreeing not to increase the number of battleships that we had—and regrettably—with friends who are dead as a result thereof.

Not that we are opposed to such treaties, but that we find, as I think some of the Senators, your former colleagues, are saying, that we haven't taken proper precautions.

And I know you have talked about SALT II before this evening, but it bothers us very severely that we aren't taking these precautions to prevent the Russians from spreading into new and novel fields where they can do what they intended to do outside the scope of the treaty. And that really seriously bothers us, those of us who have been through these periods.

A. With respect to your first point, there are two Kellogg treaties that I remember. There was a Kellogg treaty which undertook to limit naval ships—and I don't know that that had much to do, one way or another, with the outbreak of World War II or whether it existed or had not existed.

I think it had as much to do with the outbreak of World War II as the other, Kellogg-Briand treaty, which undertook to outlaw war. That was signed about 1928 or 1929, and we have had more wars since that time, and more people killed in wars, than in all the previous history of mankind.

So treaties do not necessarily achieve their objectives any more than some of the legislation that we enact.

But nevertheless, we are dealing, in the case of nuclear armaments, with a destructive force that man has never had to deal with before; to do nothing about restraining that force and to open the door to unlimited competition in developing nuclear technology for weapons—is simply to doom mankind to a hopeless future.

There are many difficulties involved: One is that the defense requirements of the Soviet Union and the United States are not the same. We don't have a long China border to defend. They do. Our NATO allies are next door to them. They have no allies except Cuba, which is not comparable, next door to us.

So undertaking to restrain American nuclear weapons that are located in Europe, which they fear are aimed at them just as much as our central systems located in this country, is a difficult negotiating problem, and we never did negotiate it. We sort of bypassed it on both sides. Now we are in the middle of it as we have agreed to negotiate those weapons in separate talks at this point.

So the question of weighing the relative benefits or shortcomings of the treaty from our point of view is not an easy judgment to make. Now that the prospects of SALT II are diminished so greatly because of the failure of the Senate to ratify it last year and because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, our military Joint Chiefs of Staff are increasingly supportive of the treaty because they see the consequences of a world in which there is no SALT treaty. So there is that problem to be concerned about.

In addition, there is the cost of escalation. These weapons cost in the billions of dollars. If we now unleash the scientists on each side—you know they constantly advance nuclear technology, make it more complicated, more sophisticated—then the problem of controlling such weapons becomes more complicated and more sophisticated and maybe impossible.

I can remember in 1969 or 1970 making a speech on the Senate floor urging that we not deploy the MIRV [multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle]. To those who don't know what the MIRV is, it is that launcher which can throw a multiple number of targets and individually target them when they arrive over targets. They are independently targeted warheads, so you can send a launcher with 10 warheads, and it could be put on 10 different targets, each precisely targeted.

We launched that before the Soviets had developed it. We deployed it before the Soviet had deployed it—before, indeed, they had tested it and achieved it.

I urged, at the time, that we not deploy it on the grounds that once we deployed it, we would never be able to persuade the Russians to do without it; so we would have escalated the arms race to a new level.

And that is what happened. The MIRV has done more to complicate negotiations over arms control than any other single technological advance.

Now if we suspend the SALT process for reasons that I have indicated and permit the technology to go forward, each side is going to go full speed. And if there is no control, we are going to put tens of billions of dollars into nuclear arms—more sophisticated, more advanced—so controlling it would be even more difficult.

Now as between the choices, I take the SALT II Treaty: given the restraints it imposes on the Soviet Union, the relatively less restraint it imposes on us; we can still go forward with the cruise missiles which we have developed; the Trident submarine which we have developed; we are now working on a new bomber—the Stealth bomber—which we have developed; we can go forward with all of those things, which may be a bad thing in the long run, but at least it does not put us behind the eight ball so far as new technology is concerned.

Conflict in Iran and Iraq

by Warren Christopher

Address before UPI editors in Boston on October 7, 1980. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.

The war between Iran and Iraq has entered its third week. I am grateful for this opportunity to set forth our views on this conflict.

Let me begin with some central observations. We have vital interests at stake in the Persian Gulf region, and as President Carter has made clear, we will defend them. Many of our allies and friends are even more vulnerable than we to disruptions in that region; and their well-being is vital to us. With other concerned nations, we have substantial military strength in the area. Our purpose is to defend our vital interests if they are assaulted. It is not to dominate the affairs of any nation in the region but to help buttress their independence.

Our dispute with Iran over the confinement of our diplomats is no reason for any American to welcome this war. We continue to hold the Government of Iran responsible for the safety of our hostages. International law and common decency require their release. The hostage issue makes peace all the more imperative.

As a final preliminary observation, let me note that we all should find in this crisis confirmation of the wisdom of the President's policies of promoting domestic energy production and reducing our oil consumption. We have made real progress in both respects. We must make more.

Sources of Conflict

With these thoughts as a preface, let me briefly summarize what we see as the sources of conflict, and then outline our views and interests more fully.

As you know, the fighting now underway began on September 22. It was preceded by several months of growing animosity and border skirmishes. In the middle of last month, Iraqi troops took two small strips in the central portion of the Iraq-Iran border. Iraq contends this territory was to have been restored to it under its 1975 treaty with Iran. After Iraq's attack, the fighting escalated, and on September 17 Iraq reacted by renouncing the 1975 treaty with Iran and claiming the entire Shatt al-Arab waterway.

Since September 22 Iraqi ground troops have advanced a considerable distance into Iran. Each side has sent air strikes deep within the other's territory. Bombs have fallen on both capitals, Baghdad and Tehran, as well as on other cities. The oil installations of both countries have been damaged. There have been significant civilian casualties. The intensity and scope of the fighting has almost certainly exceeded the expectations of anyone involved.

So once again we have seen how easy war is to start and how difficult to contain and conclude. If they have flared in recent days, the embers of this conflict have been smoldering for many years.

- Iran and Iraq have long been at odds over the demarcation of their common border, particularly near the Persian Gulf in the region of the Shatt al-Arab, the delta area of the Tigris and Euphrates River systems. The area in dispute is not large. But it has produced powerful emotions and persistent claims on both sides.
- Three times in this century attempts have been made to settle the frontier. Most recently, in 1975 the Algiers agreement affixed the boundary at the center line of the river channel for the entire length of the Shatt. To some extent each of these agreements reflected the relative power of the parties at the time. Thus the history of the dispute imparts this lesson: If a settlement is to endure, it cannot rely only upon a changeable power equation but must reflect a changeless reality—the mutual interest of the parties in their own security and stability in the region.
- This territorial dispute has been aggravated by religious and cultural differences. Iran, for example, has issued appeals to elements of the Iraqi population. Baghdad sees this as interference in its internal affairs, but it has also sought to undermine the authority of the government in Tehran. On both sides the propaganda has grown increasingly harsh.
- The combatants may also see themselves involved in a wider competition. Over the years each has asserted claims to recognition as a major influence in the region.
- Finally, the implications of the conflict are made more grave by the location of the hostilities. The major Iranian oil province of Khuzestan has been at the center of fighting. Iraq says acquisition of this province is not an objective. But the area and its major cities are under attack by Iraqi forces. If they take and attempt to keep this area, the nature of the conflict would be fundamentally altered and the danger dramatically sharpened.

U.S. Objectives

These, then, are some of the forces at work. What are the objectives of the United States? We have two principal aims.

The first is peace. The United States has not taken sides in this war, and we will not. But our refusal to take sides is not a signal of indifference. We are concerned about the human suffering. We are concerned about the devastating physical damage. We are concerned about the seizure of territory by force. And we are concerned about the wider implications.

Therefore, the United States has firmly supported the efforts of international institutions to move the dispute from the battlefield to the peace table as quickly as that can be done. And we will continue to urge restraint on the part of all external powers. All should stand for peace. All must respect the basic national integrity of the countries involved, both Iraq and Iran.

We expect the Soviet Union to exercise its own self-discipline. Soviet media have claimed, without the slightest foundation in fact, that the United States has taken a part in the conflict. Such fabrications can only inflame a situation that holds dangers for East and West alike. They do not reflect the degree of responsibility that is due from a great power.

At the same time the Soviets have associated themselves with the peacemaking efforts of the Security Council. They have behaved generally with caution. Our present understanding is that the Soviet Union, like the United States, supports an early end to the war. They should persist in that course. It is in our common interest to assure that a localized conflict does not take on a superpower dimension.

Our second broad objective is to prevent this conflict from spreading. Our aim is to assure, in cooperation with others, that it does not disrupt the peace of the region or the economy of the world.

The other states of the gulf and the Arabian Peninsula have grounds for deep concern. They deserve our help, when they ask for it, in deterring the

possibility of unprovoked attack. That is why President Carter responded promptly to the request that we dispatch U.S. airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) aircraft to Saudi Arabia.

These aircraft threaten no one. Their purpose in Saudi Arabia is strictly defensive—to provide warning time and to assist the Saudis in their own defense if there is such a need. Their presence has not altered in any way our neutrality in the present conflict.

We also wish to keep the conflict from endangering the flow of oil. In this context, we recognize the constructive position Saudi Arabia and a number of other producing countries have taken to maintain global oil supplies as the conflict continues. The availability of crucial oil supplies depends not only upon the willingness of the suppliers but upon the security of shipment. Recent developments have reminded us and other nations of the importance of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz—a choke point for the flow of petroleum to so many parts of the industrialized and developing worlds.

Iran has recently announced that it has no intention of obstructing traffic through the strait. This was a positive step. Important interests of all states—including both Iraq and Iran—are served by free navigation in the Persian Gulf.

Thus our intentions with respect to the Persian Gulf conflict are clear. Let me summarize.

First, the United States is neutral in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. We will not intervene on either side.

Second, we expect the Soviet Union to act with restraint.

Third, neutrality in this conflict does not mean American indifference. We will defend our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region.

- There must be no interference with free transit in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. We will do what is required to prevent such interference.
- To prevent the conflict from expanding in ways which threaten the security of the region, we will also respond to requests for assistance from non-belligerent friends in the area who feel threatened by the conflict.

Fourth, there must be an early end to the conflict. No one stands to gain from its continuation. We will support the efforts of international institutions to bring about a peaceful settlement.

(Map by Michelle Picard, Department of State)

These four principles guide our actions now. They will continue to do so. For they are based on a vision of this region—now so volatile—in which every state respects the rights of its neighbors and none is subject to coercion from beyond its borders. On such principles, an enduring peace can rest. ■

Iran-Iraq Conflict

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, SEPT. 24, 1980[1]

I've met this morning with my principal advisers to review the very dangerous situation created by the conflict between Iran and Iraq. Although the United States is in no way involved in this dispute—and charges to the contrary are obviously and patently false—it is important to make clear our position in this matter.

The fighting between Iran and Iraq is causing needless hardship and suffering among the people involved. It represents a danger to the peace and stability of the region. There should be absolutely no interference by any other nation in this conflict. The fighting should be promptly terminated. Any grievances between Iran and Iraq should be settled at the negotiating table and not on the battlefield.

We strongly support international efforts, both the statement made by the Secretary General of the United Nations and also by the President of the Security Council of the United Nations, to bring this fighting to a prompt end

the receiving State. In this connection he may approach the competent authorities of the receiving State with a view towards protecting the interests of a sending State national, not a permanent resident of the receiving State, unless such a national is otherwise represented. He may also request the competent authorities of the receiving State to permit him to be present at the inventorying and sealing and, in general, to take an interest in the proceedings.

2. A consular officer shall be entitled to safeguard the interests of a national of the sending State who has, or claims to have, a right to property left in the receiving State by a deceased person, irrespective of the latter's nationality, and if that interested national is not in the receiving State or does not have a representative there.

3. A consular officer of the sending State shall be entitled to receive for transmission to a national of the sending State who is not a permanent resident of the receiving State any money or other property in the receiving State to which such national is entitled as a consequence of the death of another person, including shares in an estate, payments made pursuant to employees' compensation law, pension and social benefits systems in general, and proceeds of insurance policies, unless the court, agency, or person making distribution directs that transmission be effected in a different manner. The court, agency, or person making distribution may require that a consular officer comply with conditions laid down with regard to:

(a) presenting a power of attorney or other authorization from such national residing outside the receiving State;

(b) furnishing reasonable evidence of the receipt of such money or other property by such national; and

(c) returning the money or other property in the event he is unable to furnish such evidence.

4. In exercising the rights provided by paragraphs 1 through 3 of this Article, the consular officer must comply with the law of the receiving State in the same manner and to the same extent as a national of the receiving State and, irrespective of the provisions of Article 13 of this Convention, shall be subject in this respect to the civil jurisdiction of the receiving State. Further, nothing in these Articles shall authorize a consular officer to act as an attorney-at-law.

ARTICLE 34

Provisional Custody of Money and Effects of a Deceased National of the Sending State

If a national of the sending State, not a permanent resident of the receiving State, dies during a temporary stay in or transit through the receiving State, and the deceased person did not leave a legal representative in the receiving State, the consular officer shall be entitled immediately to take provisional custody of the money, documents and personal effects that were in the national's possession for transfer to an heir, executor, or other person authorized to receive such property, to the extent permitted by the law of the receiving State.

ARTICLE 35

Communication with Nationals of the Sending State

1. A consular officer shall be entitled, in his consular district, to communicate and meet with any national of the sending State, and, when necessary, to arrange for legal assistance and an interpreter. The receiving State shall in no way restrict access between a consular officer and a national of the sending State.

2. If a national of the sending State is arrested or placed under any form of detention within the consular district, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall immediately, but no later than within four days from the date of arrest or detention, notify the consulate of the sending State. If it is not possible to notify the consulate of the sending State within four days because of communications difficulties, they should try to provide notification as soon as possible. Upon the request of a consular officer, he shall be informed of the reasons for which said national has been arrested or detained in any manner.

3. The competent authorities of the receiving State shall immediately inform the national of the sending State of the rights accorded to him by this Article to communicate with a consular officer.

4. A consular officer shall be entitled to visit a national of the sending State who has been arrested or placed under any form of detention, including such national who is in prison pursuant to a judgment, to converse and to exchange correspondence with him in the language of the sending State or the receiving State, and may assist in arranging for legal representation and an interpreter. These visits shall take place as soon as possible, but, at the latest, shall not be refused after two days from the date on which the competent authorities notified the consulate that said national had been placed under any form of detention. The visits may be made on a recurring basis. No longer than one month shall be allowed to pass in between visits requested by the consular officer.

5. In the case of a trial of, or other legal proceeding against, a national of the sending State in the receiving State, the appropriate authorities shall, at the request of a consular officer, inform such officer of the charges against such national. A consular officer shall be permitted to attend the trial or other legal proceedings.

6. A consular officer is entitled to provide to a national to whom the provisions of this Article apply parcels containing food, clothing, medicaments and reading and writing materials.

7. A consular officer of the sending State may request the assistance of the authorities of the receiving State in ascertaining the whereabouts of a national of the sending State. The authorities of the receiving State shall do everything possible to provide all relevant and available information.

8. The rights contained in this Article shall be exercised in accordance with the law of the receiving State. Nevertheless, such law shall be applied so as to give full effect to the purposes for which these rights are intended.

ARTICLE 36

Rendering Assistance to Vessels

1. A consular officer shall be entitled to provide any type of assistance to vessles of the sending State which are in the territorial or inland waters, ports or other anchorages of the receiving State.

2. A consular officer may board a vessel of the sending State as soon as permission has been granted the vessel to make contact with the shore. On such occasions, he may be accompanied by members of the consulate.

3. The master and members of the crew may meet and communicate with the consular officer, observing, however, the law relating to the port and the law relating to crossing the border.

4. The consular officer may request the cooperation of the authorities of the receiving State in carrying out his functions with regard to vessels of the sending State and with regard to the master, members of the crew, passengers and cargo.

ARTICLE 37

Rendering Assistance to Master and Crew

1. In accordance with the law of the receiving State, the consular officer shall be entitled:

(a) to investigate any incident occurring aboard a vessel of the sending State, to question the master and any member of the crew with reference to these incidents, to inspect the vessel's papers, to receive information in connection with the voyage and destination of the vessel and also to render assistance in connection with the entry, stay and departure of a vessel of the sending State;

(b) to settle disputes between the master and a crew member, including disputes concerning wages and employment contracts, to the extent that this action is authorized by the law of the sending State;

(c) to take steps connected with the signing on and the discharge of the master and of any crew member;

(d) to take steps for hospitalization for repatriation of the master or a member of the crew of the vessel;

(e) to receive, draw up or certify any declaration or other document provided for by the law of the sending State in regard to the vessel of the sending State or its cargo.

2. The consular officer may, if permitted by the law of the receiving State, appear together with the master or a crew member

before the courts or other authorities of the receiving State in order to render them any assistance.

ARTICLE 38

Protection of Interests in Case of Investigations

1. When the courts or other competent authorities of the receiving State intend to take compulsory actions or to start an official investigation aboard a vessel of the sending State which is in the internal or territorial waters of the receiving State, or on the shore with regard to the master or member of the crew, those authorities must notify the appropriate consular officer of the sending State. If, because of the urgency of the matter, it has not been possible to inform the consular officer before initiation of the actions involved, and the consular officer or his representative has not been present when the actions were carried out, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall promptly provide him with the full relevant particulars of the actions taken.

2. Except at the request of the vessel's master or the consular officer, the judicial or other competent authorities of the receiving State shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the vessel on questions of relations between the members of the crew, labor relations, discipline and other activities of an internal character, when the peace and safety of the receiving State are not violated.

3. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be applied, however, to ordinary customs, passport and sanitary controls, or, in accordance with treaties in force between the two States, to the saving of human life at sea, prevention of pollution of the sea, or to other activities undertaken at the request of, or with the consent of, the master of the vessel.

ARTICLE 39

Assistance to Damaged Vessels

1. If a vessel of the sending State is wrecked or grounded, or suffers any other damage in the internal or territorial waters of the receiving State, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall inform the consulate as soon as possible and inform it of the measures taken for saving the passengers, the vessel, its crew and cargo.

2. A vessel which has suffered a misfortune and its cargo and provisions shall be subject to customs duties on the territory of the receiving State unless they are delivered for use in that State.

ARTICLE 40

Functions with Regard to Aircraft

The relevant provisions of Articles 36 through 39 of this Convention shall also apply to civil aircraft on the condition that such application is not contrary to the provisions of any bilateral or multilateral agreement in force between the two States.

ARTICLE 41

Observing the Law of the Receiving State

1. All persons enjoying privileges and immunities under this Convention are obliged, without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, to observe the law of the receiving State, including traffic regulations, and to respect the customs of the receiving State, and may not interfere in the internal affairs of the receiving State.

2. Consular officers and consular employees who are nationals of the sending State may not carry on any profession or undertake any activity for personal profit on the territory of the receiving State other than their official duties.

3. All means of transportation of the consulate or of members of a consulate and their families shall be adequately insured against civil actions by third parties.

ARTICLE 42

Entry into Force and Renunciation

1. The present Convention shall be subject to ratification. The exchange of instruments of ratification shall take place as soon as possible at Beijing.

2. The present Convention shall enter into force after the expiration of thirty days following the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

3. The present Convention shall remain in force until the expiration of six months from the date on which one of the Contracting Parties gives to the other Contracting Party written notification of its intention to terminate the Convention.

DONE at Washington this seventeenth day of September, 1980, in duplicate in the English and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

JIMMY CARTER

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

BO YIBO

ACCOMPANYING LETTERS

September 17, 1980

His Excellency
Chai Zemin
Ambassador of the
People's Republic of China

Excellency:

I have the honor to confirm on behalf of the Government of the United States of America that in the course of negotiating the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, the two sides reached agreement on the following questions:

1. The two governments agree to facilitate the reunion of families and will process all applications as quickly as possible under mutually agreed arrangements and in accordance with each side's laws and regulations.

2. The two governments agree to facilitate travel between their respective countries of persons who may have a claim simultaneously to the nationality of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, but this does not imply that the governments of the two countries recognize dual nationality. Exit formalities and documentation shall be dealt with in accordance with the laws of the country in which such person rsides. Entry formalities and documentation shall be dealt with in accordance with the laws of the country of destination.

3. All nationals of the sending State entering the receiving State on the basis of travel documents of the sending State containing properly executed entry and exit visas of the receiving State will, during the period for which their status has been accorded, and in accordance with the visa's period of validity, be considered nationals of the sending State by the appropriate authorities of the receiving State for the purpose of ensuring consular access and protection by the sending State as provided for in Article 35 of the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. If judicial or administrative proceedings prevent the above-mentioned persons from leaving the country within the visa's period of validity, they shall not lose the right of consular access and protection by the sending State. Such persons shall be permitted to leave the receiving State without the necessity of obtaining documentation from the receiving State other than the exit documentation normally required of departing aliens.

4. Both governments agree that persons residing in one country who are entitled to receive financial benefits from the other country shall receive their benefits under mutually agreed arrangements and in accordance with each country's laws and regulations.

If your Excellency confirms the above by a note in reply on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, this note shall constitute an integral part of the abovementioned Consular Convention and shall come into effect simultaneously with the Consular Convention. At that time, the Annex on Practical Arrangements to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Mutual Establishment of Consular Relations and the Opening of Consulates-General, signed on January 31, 1979 will cease to be in effect.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

EDMUND S. MUSKIE
Secretary of State

(UNHCR photo by Bocon-Gibod/Sipa)

Afghan refugees at Pishin Camp, Pakistan.

pressed by this sudden surge of refugees. In the fiscal year which ended last month, the Department of Health and Human Services devoted more than $600 million to refugee activities—$36 million of which had to be requested in emergency supplemental legislation. And the State and local social-service machinery of Florida—to name the most affected State—has been severely tested by the influx of Cuban and Haitian entrants.

You who have served in refugee sponsorship programs know the challenge of finding jobs in stressful economic times for refugees who may not speak English and whose skills may not be readily transferable to our job market.

Perhaps because of such problems, public opinion is not always receptive to large waves of refugees and immigrants. This was true earlier in this century, and it is true today. For all too many of our citizens, the first impulse upon facing such problems is to pull up the bridge and lock the gates. I was disturbed, for example, to read the results of a recent poll, mentioned in the current issue of *Foreign Affairs*. It showed only 19% of respondents in favor of increasing the number of refugees received by the United States; 80% favored actually reducing the number of legal immigrants who can enter our country each year.

I find it easy to understand such frustration. But we must keep in mind that this question of refugees is one whose moral dimension is as compelling as its practical aspect. It is a question which penetrates to the heart of our history as a nation of immigrants and to the heart of our purpose as a nation which cherishes and upholds human rights.

We are a nation of immigrants and their sons and daughters: No nation with such a history can turn its back on its own traditions without losing something of its soul. And no nation which sees itself as a champion of human rights can keep its credibility unless it is willing to welcome—in the name of human rights—those who have been oppressed and persecuted.

For these reasons, I would argue that the difficulties we have encountered in receiving and resettling refugees are difficulties we must face and overcome—without reversing our long tradition of hospitality to refugees. I would argue also what is apparent in our national life: that we are richer, stronger, more talented and vibrant as a society because we welcome refugees and immigrants. Earlier waves of refugees and immigrants brought figures like Einstein and Toscanini, with their great gifts, to America. I have no doubt that recent arrivals, like the Indochinese and the Cubans, will make similar contributions—contributions that will richly justify our nation's generosity.

U.S. Approach

To agree that we should be open and generous, however, is not to say that the United States can accept—or should accept—unlimited numbers of refugees and immigrants or bear unlimited burdens. In fact, we cannot. And one of the most serious national debates of the next few years will be about refugee and immigration policy. What limits should we set and how? What shall we do about the problem of massive unlawful entry into the United States? How can we balance our traditions of openness with practical limits, and how can we enforce these limits fairly and equitably? How can we assure that our refugee and immigration policies are free of the taint of racial bias and equitable to people of all origins?

Finding answers to such questions will not be easy. But I have no doubt that our nation, which is both generous and practical, can find answers—and devise laws—which bring into balance our ideals, our interests, and our capabilities. A national commission on immigration and refugee policy, chaired by Father Theodore Hesburgh of Notre Dame University, is working toward this end.

Meanwhile, our government is working overtime to deal with refugee problems at home and abroad.

- We have worked closely with State and local governments, as well as private voluntary organizations, to minimize the disruption to communities and to the lives of the refugees themselves. I am proud that we have successfully resettled from temporary camps some 105,000 of the nearly 125,000 Cubans who have fled to the United States since April.
- We are working to prevent heavy concentrations of refugees in already hard-pressed communities. To this end, the Federal Government has established refugee receiving centers at widely dispersed locations over the country, so that no one State or community need bear too heavy a burden.
- The Department of Health and Human Services and its Office of Refugee Resettlement have launched a massive effort to help states and communities with the costs of resettling refugees. In this fiscal year, for example, the department has channeled more than $20 million to the State of Minnesota for cash assistance, medical care, and social services to refugee families. And the six Midwestern States of this region—Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana—have received $52 million in Federal assistance for refugee programs. This is a national challenge to which the nation's government is responding.
- More needs to be done, however, to help areas which have borne the brunt of refugee emergencies. For that reason, the Administration has supported the Stone-Fascell proposal before the Congress to reimburse States and communities for up to 100% of the cost of their refugee relief efforts.

• Diplomatically, through the United Nations and elsewhere, we continue to stress the need for broad international efforts to deal with refugee problems. We have stressed as well the responsibility of all nations to help in the search for long-term solutions to the political problems which lie behind the global refugee crisis.

• Here I would also mention the importance of strong and generous foreign assistance efforts. Especially in Africa and Latin America, our efforts to help solve human problems and build strong economies can help alleviate the conditions which create refugees. We can either export more of our assistance or import more refugees.

Which brings me to my final point. Ultimately, we and the world can deal with the human tragedy of refugee migrations only by removing their root causes—by overcoming poverty, by ending abuses of human rights within nations, by resisting military aggression, and by building peace among nations.

We are a long way from having a world that is so just, so humane, so prosperous and stable that no person is forced to flee from home and country. But surely the effort to build such a world deserves your contribution and mine—and deserves the work of all people who cherish human dignity and the sanctity of human life.

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[1] Press release 272. ■

U.S. Nuclear Strategy

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 16, 1980. [1]

I am pleased to have this opportunity to join Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to discuss our nuclear targeting strategy with you. When I was a member of this committee, I strongly believed we had a responsibility to concern ourselves with issues of strategic nuclear policy. Over the years, I probed a series of Administration officials and outside experts on how changes in our nuclear doctrine, forces, and strategy affected our security and international stability. I did not leave those concerns behind when I became Secretary of State. Indeed, it is a central part of my responsibilities to insure that foreign policy consideration—in the broadest sense—are taken into account in decisions about defense programs and doctrine.

As Secretary of State, I am particularly concerned with the ways in which our strategic doctrine bears on our overall foreign policy toward our allies and adversaries. To support our basic foreign policy and national security objectives, our nuclear strategy should satisfy the following conditions.

• It should insure that potential adversaries are fully convinced of our determination to resist nuclear aggression on any scale, at all times, and in all circumstances.

• It should avoid stimulating a cycle of superpower misperception and miscalculation that could undermine strategic stability.

• It should be fully consistent with our arms control objectives, so that we preserve the opportunities to strengthen security and stability by means of equitable and verifiable arms control agreements.

• It should encourage and justify the willingness of our friends and allies to link their security with our own.

I believe the countervailing strategy meets these tests.

The countervailing strategy underscores and unmistakably communicates to the Soviets two fundamental truths. First, they could derive no conceivable benefit from initiating the use of nuclear weapons, no matter how limited or extensive the attack and no matter at what stage in a conflict they might be launched. Second, nuclear conflict cannot be an instrument for achieving national policy goals, either for us or the Soviet Union; there surely will be no victor in a nuclear war.

Our strategy and our capability to inflict massive destruction in retaliation provide the bases for convincing the Soviets of both propositions. The countervailing strategy builds on and complements this traditional doctrine. It enhances our ability to launch selective as well as massive retaliatory attacks and to cover the full range of targets the Soviets value. It makes clear our capacity to respond to any Soviet nuclear attack—whatever its magnitude and form—at an appropriate scale, intensity, and focus. We have moved in this direction in order to insure that the Soviets—whatever their notions about nuclear war or the utility of nuclear weapons—do not mistakenly conclude they could achieve some advantage by initiating the use of nuclear weapons or by launching limited strikes.

As such, the countervailing strategy is not a radical departure from previous policy. It is rather the result of a gradual evolution of our doctrine over a period of years in response to changing conditions and new knowledge. The credible capacity to devastate the Soviet Union under any circumstances remains its cornerstone. Thus, we will continue to include the full spectrum of political and military, as well as urban-industrial, targets in our planning. Presidential Determination 59 does not signify a shift to a warfighting strategy nor to a first-strike doctrine. It does underscore—and I believe strengthens—the credibility of our capability to retaliate against any nuclear attack under any circumstances, be it a massive strike against the United States or a more limited one against our forces or our allies.

The public reaction of the Soviets is what one would expect. They claim the countervailing strategy is a warfighting strategy and a U.S. effort to achieve a first-strike capability that would undermine strategic stability. They also charge that Presidential Determination 59 is the real explanation for NATO's decision on theater nuclear forces (TNF) modernization and reflects a U.S. intent to confine any nuclear war to Europe while the United States remains immune from attack. These claims are neither surprising nor true.

But we should expect the Soviets to try to use Presidential Determination 59 to split us from our allies and deprive us

A. With respect to the first part of your question, discussions at the technical level and on a contingency basis are under way. With respect to the possibilities of such a contingency arising, they seem to have diminished in the last couple of days, and there has been no interruption of shipping and no apparent effort in this period to interrupt, and, indeed, some evidence of deliberate restraint with respect to that. So it may well be that the risk of that exact contingency arising has diminished.

Q. The United States has a military presence in the Middle East crisis area. Is Turkey expected to contribute to these efforts of the United States with its armed forces or with its bases on its soil?

A. I have heard no such expectations.

Q. If Iran this afternoon accepted the cease-fire, what would be the next step? Would there be a U.N. peacekeeping force along that line?

A. Of course the initiative that has been taken, which triggered the Iraqi proposal of the cease-fire, was taken by the Islamic conference, and I would expect that the Iranian response might be to that initiative. If so, it could well be that the negotiations still might be taken under the same initiative. That is not inconsistent, of course, with the action taken by the Security Council, but it may well unfold in a parallel way.

Q. Radio Oman reported yesterday that a top-level Soviet military mission had completed several days of conferences with Jordanian leaders and had met directly with the King. Radio Oman went on to say that the meeting was directed toward better bilateral relations between Moscow and Oman and might lead the way toward Soviet munitions being supplied to King Hussein's forces. If that takes place, wouldn't that be a major setback for the United States in that region?

A. King Hussein was in the United States recently for similar discussions at some length, and no such developments followed. I think to speculate along the lines of your question, or to suggest that I speculate, would be counterproductive, counterinfluential.

Q. In your meeting with Prince Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia, how do you describe his country's security needs at the moment?

A. My discussions with Prince Sa'ud were on a confidential basis, so I feel that you would have to put that question to him if you have an opportune time.

Q. Did you in any way, or has the U.S. Government in any way, asked the Saudis and Abu Dhabi to increase their oil production in the West?

A. No. Obviously, the question would occur to them as it has to us, and this is evidently in the public press. There have been no direct discussions.

Q. Were you informed that the Saudis were going to increase the oil, or is there any other confirmation of that report which, as far as I can tell, just comes from the Japanese news stories?

A. That is a question to be put to the Saudis. It is their decision, not mine, and I'm not in a position to answer.

Q. Did the last event show that the opening of negotiations, among other things and energy, is even more important after your bilateral meeting? Is there any chance that the United States would change its position toward global negotiations?

A. With respect to global negotiations, I, myself, discussed that in my speech to the General Assembly, and I refer you to that for a complete answer. May I say that we are interested in contributing to a constructive resolution of the issues raised in that debate. But we are also rather concerned that the integrity of the specialized agencies be preserved. We think it ought to be possible to achieve both objectives.

Q. Suppose Iran releases the hostages very soon. Is the United States ready to negotiate supplying Iran with spare parts and ammunition for the fighters and the American-made machine guns, or whatever?

A. I have no way of knowing what may be on the Iranian agenda for negotiations dealing with the release of the hostages. I have not found it useful in the last 4 months to try to speculate about such agenda items publicly, and I see no reason to change that position now.

Q. Did you meet the Foreign Minister of Poland?

A. I did not. [The Secretary corrected this, stating that he did, in fact, meet with the Foreign Minister of Poland during his New York visit.]

Q. Was there a reason why it did not take place? Was there no request from the Polish, or no request from you?

A. I have met with the representatives of Poland in Washington before I came to New York. This isn't the only place the Secretary of State meets with representatives of other countries. It may just seem that way this week.

Q. Are you satisfied with the way that the Security Council has proceeded on the Mideast war question? Do you think that it looks as though they've got any handle on it at all?

A. Do you mean the Iraqi-Iranian war?

Q. Yes.

A. There has been a lot of discussion. Members have not been inactive. It has been difficult to find a handle in all of the considerations that affect the interests of various members, and they finally chose to pursue an Islamic initiative before the Security Council really acted. It is a difficult one to get a handle on, but I would like to emphasize that the effort over all of those days was constant as members sought a way to get a handle on the problem.

Q. A top-level Iranian diplomat this morning linked the Iraqi plan of what he called "aggression on Iran" with a U.S. plan to invade Iran. He referred to recent articles that were banned by the Carter Administration, including Jack Anderson's article, about an American plan to invade Iran. He says that, indeed, that plan of aggression by Iraq against Iran is linked generally to the American plan of aggression of invading Iran. And, therefore, he said that the United States is involved in the Iraqi-Iranian conflict. What is your comment on that?

A. Number one, that I couldn't detect much logic in your question. And, number two, I would say that the United States does not have, has not had, and will not have any intention of invading Iran. Our concern is the release of the hostages. We respect the right of the Iranian people to establish their Islamic Republic. We recognize the fact that they have done so, and we are perfectly willing to discuss our future relationships on any basis that they wish.

So all of those reports are false. There is absolutely no substance to any accusation that we were involved in collusion with Iraq in connection with this current fighting. There never has been; no basis for it; and, as a matter of

fact, there is a lot of basis for the opposite conclusion.

Q. When you met Mr. Gromyko, did you discuss Poland?

A. No, we did not. May I say that with respect to the talks with Mr. Gromyko, we did not cover all of the items in an informal way that we had indicated that it would be desirable for us to discuss. Time did run out on us. The fact that Poland was not discussed did not reflect a lack of interest on both sides in discussing it.

Q. Did you receive any answer from Iran for your offer to give them equal time like you gave the Iraqis to hear their position in the Iranian-Iraqi crisis?

A. As I said in my opening comments this afternoon, I have not heard.

Q. Through any intermediaries have you been in touch with Iran and received any assurances that they will not move to try and attempt to blockade the Strait of Hormuz?

A. We have had no contact with Iran. As I say, I made observations earlier of the fact that there has been no attempt by Iran to block that shipping or to harass the shipping. The closest they came to it was to hail one or two ships to determine their cargo and destination, and that was several days ago. So I have no evidence to indicate that they intend to try to interrupt those shipping lanes.

Q. Do you have intention to meet with Mr. Gromyko before he leaves? Is there any specific date for another meeting with Mr. Gromyko?

A. No. There is no specific date, but we did agree that these meetings from time to time could be useful and that the two we have had were useful. We have only one agreement out of it at this point, but at least I think we used the time frankly and even bluntly with each other to explain our respective points of view on the issues which have created problems for us.

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[1] Press release 270.

[2] At their meeting on Sept. 25, Secretary Muskie and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had an exchange of views regarding the beginning of discussions on questions of limiting nuclear arms which were raised in previous contacts between the parties. As a result, an agreement was reached that representatives of the United States and the U.S.S.R. would meet in Geneva the week beginning Oct. 13, 1980, in order to begin the discussion of this question.

[3] Press release 271. ■

Deputy Secretary Christopher Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

Following are excerpts from Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher's interview on September 28, 1980, with George Herman, CBS News (moderator); Robert Pierpoint, CBS News; and William Beecher, The Boston Globe.

Q. Considering all the facts in the Iran-Iraq dispute and fighting at the moment, is it your opinion and that of the State Department that this is likely to be a long-term war, or is it something which is likely to wind down or peter out in a matter of a week or two?

A. We can't tell for sure, but our strong hope and our aim is that there would be a cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible time.

Every interest of the United States is served by that—our interest is stability in the area, our interest in keeping the oil flowing, our interest in the safe return of the hostages. So we're working to try to have an early cessation of the hostilities. We hope that will be the situation, but since the parties have not shown any desire at the present time for a cease-fire, I couldn't confidently predict that it will end at an early date.

Q. Is it your impression at the State Department that this fight—this war—between Iran and Iraq is a long-term battle in the sense that either side is pressing for something like unconditional surrender, or is it a limited war to gain certain very small limited objectives?

A. We hope it is a limited war, but it's been a classic case of escalation so far. What began as a ground skirmish escalated into air exchanges and then that escalated into air attacks on civilian targets, on economic targets. And the way it's gone, we can't confidently predict how long it will go.

An analysis of yesterday's activities indicates that the Iranian Air Force is still flying, still fighting. Today's activities indicate that the Iraqis are being very effective in Khuzistan Province having either taken or coming close to taking several important cities there. So the conflict continues at a pace that is a fairly strong one.

Q. Is there any danger that now the war has gone beyond the point where American analysts thought Iraq had met its initial war objectives, that it will broaden those objectives and decide to try to annex the oil fields of Iran in Khuzistan Province?

A. I think that is one of the possibilities that has to be considered. That is one of the reasons why we think it's in all the world's interest for there to be a very early cessation of the hostilities—a cessation and then negotiation between the parties. We certainly couldn't condone any taking of the land or territory of another government by force.

Of course the conflict in that area is ages old. It's gone on for centuries. It's gone on recently. But we think the time has come for a cease-fire there—cessation of hostilities and a negotiated settlement between the parties.

Q. The President of Pakistan has been in Iran and now I believe is in Iraq trying to get some agreement on mediation or cessation of hostilities. Does the State Department have any indication of any degree of success by President Zia or any other individual or institution that might be calming down this situation?

A. No. We're following his trip with a good deal of hope. We think that it's desirable that an Islamic leader is meeting in both of those capitals. He may have a special capacity to deal with the parties involved, but we don't have any indication that he's yet been successful.

Q. What do you think it's going to take in a military sense or strategic sense for one side or the other, or both sides, to come to the bargaining table and talk about peace?

A. I hope that they will come to a realization that the war is not serving their purposes, that their oil fields—their main asset—are being injured very severely, that the civilian casualties are mounting and come to their

And so you have got to strike that balance. It's a judgment call, and it may not work because frankly, if SALT II were to be ratified, each of us could still destroy the other.

So SALT II is justified: One, as a restraint, and secondly, as a step that would lead to the third step—SALT III—which hopefully would reduce the level of nuclear arms and, thus, reduce the danger. SALT II doesn't really reduce the ability of either side to destroy the other.

Q. Do you feel that there is a possibility that the nations of the world will ever come to trust each other so much that they will stop completely the race for armaments; that they will believe in the treaty of the people of the other country; that you feel you can have a dream you can build a future world where the people of all the nations can live happily and freely, can live with complete brotherly love; where all the people of the world can grow and develop themselves in complete freedom without being attacked for their personal liberty or their personal beliefs?

A. I am not sure I understand what you are asking.

Q. Do you feel that we can—that you can believe that we can build a future world where all the people of the world can live—

A. Happily together?

Q. Yes.

A. Let me make one observation—the tremendous obstacle that stands between us, where we are, and that world.

There are 15 million refugees in the world today. Fifteen million are scattered over this globe—all of them people who have fled their homes and their country for one reason or another—oppression, lack of liberty, lack of opportunity, hunger, persecution—what else?

From Cambodia to Somalia to Pakistan to Latin America to Africa—millions of people on the march away from home, away from conditions they find unacceptable.

It's those marching feet that tell us more about the disturbed nature of this planet and the lack of circumstances which human beings find acceptable than anything else I could say. I spell out that as one number.

If we can find a way to create circumstances all over this planet from which people do not find it necessary to flee, then we may be approaching the ideal state which you describe.

That doesn't mean that all people must live in the kind of style that Americans have gotten used to. Many of them can be happy with much, much less, but they cannot live in circumstances where children have hunger, where the life span is less than 40, where most people do not get a full meal as much as once a day, and where their children have no better prospects for the future than themselves.

Human beings are not going to accept life at that level. Not only will they flee from it, but there are always those who seek to exploit that dissatisfaction and mobilize them behind violent movements to bring change—mobilize them behind wrong-headed policies to bring change.

So, it's a very, very challenging task that lies ahead of us.

But on the other hand, my optimism, at the age of 66, tells me that we have made enough progress in enough places toward alleviating circumstances like that—so that if we simply, by our will, add a prayer, use our resources wisely, we can make more progress.

We are not going to achieve it in my lifetime. The great religious leaders didn't in their lifetime, but they left behind them a legacy of ideals and objectives, and practical suggestions for everyday living that still work when we practice them—and I think they can work again.

Press release 273A of October 11, 1980. ■

against whatever our policies are in the Middle East.

How can the United States—is it not a no win situation? Are we not involved in that sense that no matter which side wins—Iran or Iraq—it's going to denigrate American interests in the whole area?

A. As I said to you, we do have strong interests in that area. President Carter was not wrong early this year when he emphasized the importance of the Persian Gulf to the United States.

It happens at the present time that the furtherance of those interests is best pursued by seeking a cessation of hostilities. It also happens at the present time that it's not helpful for us to choose sides between the two parties, but being neutral doesn't mean that we're being passive. We're working through diplomatic means to try to bring the hostilities to a conclusion. I think that out of this situation can come a cessation of hostilities and I hope a return to a kind of normality in that part of the world.

Q. You spoke earlier about the escalation of the war aims of Iraq as seen by our analysts here.

What is the danger that if Iraq starts to carve up Iran that Iran's northern neighbor—the Soviet Union, which after World War II had troops in the northern provinces of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan—should decide to join in this carving up process? And what would that mean for the United States? Might we get involved at that point?

A. We certainly would be strongly opposed to any dismemberment of Iran. We think it's in the interests of the world for Iran to maintain a basic territorial integrity.

As far as threats from the north, I think the Soviets understand that the United States would regard any effort by them to move into Iran with the utmost gravity.

Q. Does this understanding come out of the Muskie-Gromyko talks in New York?

A. They've understood it well before that, and I think that they understand it especially at the present time.

Q. Would they be able, in fact, to do anything in a military sense in view of the problems they have in Afghanistan and also in a more vital area perhaps to them, Poland? What is the Soviet posture right now, militarily?

A. Certainly they have some difficulties around the world. Afghanistan has turned out to be a very difficult military endeavor for them; 80,000 troops are tied down within the country of Afghanistan, about half that many on the border. In addition, they have to look west of them in Poland and recognize a very difficult situation there.

I hope that they will understand their own self-interests in restraint with respect to Iran.

Q. Speaking of the Soviet Union on the flanks of Poland, we are aware from stories that Soviet divisions both in East Germany and in the western part of the U.S.S.R. have, in recent days, been increasing their capability to move if called upon. Did Mr. Gromyko in his talks with Secretary of State Muskie the other day give any assurances that the Soviet Union did not intend to invade Poland to crush the nonviolent worker revolt there?

A. I don't want to get into the details of those conversations. The Soviet Union up to this point has shown considerable restraint with respect to Poland. The courage of the Polish workers, fortunately, has been matched by restraint by their government and by the Soviet Union.

There have been some movements near the Soviet-Polish border. We're watching those very closely. There's not any indication at the present time that they intend to move in, but we will be very watchful.

Q. Do you take seriously the repeated Kremlin warnings to the workers of Poland that unfriendly and hostile forces are financing them and taking control of their movement?

A. Yes. I think that we have to be watchful about that. There's been a major change in Poland—a major reform and advance. It's very desirable from the standpoint of the West that there be peace in the Polish situation and that those reforms be accomplished in an atmosphere of tranquillity. We can only hope that the Russian Government and the others involved will exercise the restraint that they have up to the present time.

Q. Is the Russian monolith big enough to handle trouble in Poland, trouble in Afghanistan, trouble in Iran, Iraq, all at the same time, militarily speaking?

A. Let me put it to you this way. My feeling is, and I can't prove this, but my strong feeling is that one of the reasons for the Soviet restraint with respect to Poland is the firm stand that the United States took in Afghanistan and the way that they are tied down in Afghanistan.

I don't want to try to assess their total military capability, but the problems that they're having there in Asia, I think, are one of the reasons for their restraint in Europe.

Q. If 1 month from now or 6 months from now or 8 months from now the Soviet Army should move into Poland, what options are available to the United States and its allies in that kind of crisis?

A. I think the Soviet Union recognizes that if they would take an action of that kind, it would have the most profound effect on the whole set of relationships in Europe.

I certainly think it would mean the end of what the Europeans call detente. Once they're on notice of that, I think the Soviet Union will recognize in their own interests that they should not try to invade a country with the sense of independence that Poland has.

I don't want to speculate on the contingencies of their effort to do that, but I do express the strong hope, indeed perhaps feeling, that they will show restraint with respect to Poland and continue to show restraint with respect to Poland.

Q. Apparently the U.S. Government has decided to send a representative—and I don't know whether it's an official and I don't know who it is and maybe you can tell us—to Hanoi to talk to the Vietnamese Government. And not only would I like to know who he is and what he's doing, but what subjects is he going to bring up?

I know that he's going to talk about American soldiers who may have died there. I thought that subject was pretty well over. What is this about?

A. To the best of my knowledge that's a limited endeavor to talk purely about the MIAs [missing-in-action]. It

and to obtain a negotiated settlement.

Secretary Muskie, in New York, has consulted with a number of foreign ministers in the last several days, and he's continuing these contacts this afternoon and tonight. I am also in contact with other nations, through our embassies abroad and directly between me and the leaders of some of those nations. We will continue to work vigorously with as many nations as possible and also with international institutions who seek, as we do, a speedy end to the conflict.

I know that the conflict has caused considerable concern that world oil supplies might be severely reduced, therefore driving up oil prices and endangering the economic security of the consuming nations. This concern is not justified by the present situation. It is true that oil companies and shipments relating directly to Iran and Iraq have been interrupted or suspended during the outbreak of the hostilities. But even if this suspension of Iranian and Iraqi shipments should persist for an extended period of time, the consuming nations can compensate for this shortfall.

Oil inventories in the world's major oil-consuming nations are now at an all-time high. The world's margin of oil supply security is much greater today than in the winter of 1978 and 1979, when the Iranian revolution reduced oil supplies at a time when reserve oil supplies were very low.

Our greater security today is due, in part, to energy conservation and also the substitution of other fuels for oil, both in the United States and in other consuming nations. This has facilitated the building up of reserve stocks to much more satisfactory levels than did occur in 1979. Hence, there is no reason for a repetition of the shortages or the price escalations that resulted in 1979.

Of course, a total suspension of oil exports from the other nations which ship through the Persian Gulf region would create a serious threat to the world's oil supplies and, consequently, a threat to the economic health of all nations. Therefore, it's important that I add my own strong support and that of my nation to the declaration which the nine European Community nations made yesterday. Freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf is of primary importance to the whole international community. It is imperative that there be no infringement of that freedom of passage of ships to and from the Persian Gulf region.

Let me repeat that we have not been and we will not become involved in the conflict between Iran and Iraq.

One final point, very important to Americans, is, in our concern for the dangerous situation created by this conflict, we have not forgotten for one moment the American hostages still held captive in Iran. We continue our work for their prompt and safe release, and we continue to hold the Government of Iran responsible for the safety and the well-being of the American hostages.

Q. Would you do anything to keep the Gulf open? Would you take any actions if necessary?

A. We're consulting the other nations about what ought to be done to keep the Strait of Hormuz open and, therefore, access to the Persian Gulf.

Q. If Iran asked for spare parts in return for releasing the hostages, would you go that far?

A. We're consulting through every means with Iran, as we have been for many months, to try to seek the release of the hostages, but that particular point would perhaps be better for me not to single out from the others.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, SEPT. 26, 1980[1]

Over the past several days, as the President noted in his statement of September 24, the President and the Secretary of State have exchanged views with key friends and allies on a wide range of issues related to the conflict between Iran and Iraq. We have consulted with a number of friendly nations about the status of oil supplies and international shipping in the Persian Gulf area.

In view of the importance of minimizing the economic effects of the conflict on international shipping and world petroleum markets, the United States has indicated that it would be willing to host a meeting to review these issues if that should seem desirable. If it is determined that a meeting of experts is required, we will work out timing and location. No such meeting has been set. In the meantime, our consultations are continuing.

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 29, 1980. ■

AWACS Aircraft to Saudi Arabia

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, SEPT. 30, 1980[1]

The U.S. Government, in response to a request from the Saudi Arabian Government, has initiated the temporary deployment of AWACS [airborne warning and control system] aircraft to Saudi Arabia. This deployment is purely for defensive purposes. It is designed to track aircraft and thus to provide additional warning for Saudi defenses.

The U.S. Government unequivocally reaffirms its position of neutrality. We are committed to as rapid a termination as possible of the conflict between Iran and Iraq, in accordance with U.N. Resolution 479, or other peaceful initiatives. These aircraft are being deployed consistent with these peaceful objectives.

[1] Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman John Cannon. ■

U.S. Hostages in Iran

LETTER TO IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER RAJAI, AUGUST 20, 1980[1]

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I write to you as one who in my position as Secretary of State has only newly been confronted with the problems which currently beset relations between our two countries. I know that these problems will be but one aspect of the heavy new responsibilities you will be assuming as Iran's first Prime Minister under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. It is my earnest hope that we, together with the Foreign Minister you will appoint, will be able to work towards constructive solutions to the difficulties between our nations.

With the death of the former Shah, a chapter of Iran's history is now definitely closed. With the establishment of your Government, a new chapter is opened. I believe this is the moment to take a fresh look at the problems between Iran and the United States.

The United States recognizes the reality of the Iranian Revolution and the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. In a series of

successive steps, the Iranian people have had the opportunity to participate in the process of creating new institutions. I assure you that the United States has had no wish to interfere in that process. We believe that no outside power should interfere with the right of the Iranian people to make their own political decisions.

Fifty-two of my fellow Americans remain held in Iran after nine months of captivity. I have met with their families. I cannot express to you adequately the deep and desperate suffering these innocent people have experienced. Americans of all political persuasions and strata of society are united in concern for their early release. I hope that you will agree with me that it is time now to bring an honorable end to their ordeal and to send the hostages home to their families.

I recognize that Iranians have suffered, too. The continuance of the impasse can only lead to further bitterness and suffering on both sides. The cups of anguish are now full. Let us empty them and begin anew. I assure you that we will show the fullest respect for your independence, your territorial integrity and for the principle of non-interference.

We recognize that the decision on dealing with the hostage crisis has been entrusted to the Iranian parliament as representatives of the Iranian people. We also recognize that in Iran, as in the United States, there are deep feelings as a result of grievances perceived in the past. There are many difficult issues between the United States and Iran. For our part, we are willing to proceed fairly and to approach each of these issues on a basis of mutual respect and equality.

In order to begin the process of understanding each other better, I think it would be useful to establish a regular channel of communication. I would personally prefer that this be done directly, very discreetly if you wish, between representatives of our two Governments. Speaking frankly and directly is the best way of removing hostility and suspicion. If you would prefer, however, we would be pleased to deal through third parties who could transmit messages between us on a regular basis. The Swiss or the Algerian Embassies could play this role as they are already the protecting powers. Other persons, either official or private intermediaries, could perform the same function.

I would hope that you would be prepared to give us your thoughts on points which might be usefully discussed in such an exchange.

I look forward to hearing from you in the interest of our two peoples.

Sincerely,

EDMUND S. MUSKIE

[1] Made available to news correspondents by Department spokesman John Trattner on Sept. 9, 1980. ■

Iran Chronology, September 1980

September 1

In a letter to Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Rajai, the first direct high-level contact between the U.S. and Iran since the aborted rescue mission last April, Secretary Muskie asks the Iranian Parliament to act in order to bring an early release of the hostages.

Responding to a letter from 187 members of the U.S. House of Representatives who appealed 2 months ago for the release of the hostages, the Foreign Affairs Commission of Iran's Parliament calls for the U.S. to acknowledge its past role in Iran and return Iranian assets frozen in U.S. banks since November 14, 1979.

September 3

Cynthia Dwyer, U.S. freelance writer who was taken into custody by Iranian authorities on May 5 with charges for alleged spying, is said to be held in Evin prison in Tehran. Formal charges have not yet been placed and the Swiss Embassy has not been allowed to visit her despite repeated requests.

September 8

Hostages' families send letter to Speaker of Iran's Parliament, the Ayatollah Hashemi, asking him to find a solution to the crisis.

September 9

In a public speech, Iranian Prime Minister Rajai responds to Secretary Muskie's letter stating that the U.S. would have to "repent" before there is a compromise.

September 10

Iranian Parliament approves 14 candidates approved by President Bani-Sadr on September 7 for 21-member Cabinet.

September 12

Khomeini sets four conditions on which the hostages are released:

- Late Shah's property returned;
- Cancel claims against Iran;
- Unblock frozen assets; and
- A promise not to intervene politically or militarily in Iran's affairs.

Khomeini does not mention a previous demand for an apology and leads U.S. to see a possible resolution to the situation.

September 14

Parliament begins open discussion of hostage issue with Foreign Affairs Commission.

September 15

The Ayatollah Hashemi states that in listing conditions on release of the hostages, Khomeini simply neglected to include the demand for an apology. The U.S. will "definitely" have to apologize.

September 16

Parliament delays hostage issue but agrees to set up a commission to study the issue.

September 17

Department officials announce a message is sent to Iran stating U.S. willingness to have a commission investigate past U.S. policy in Iran.

September 18

President Carter rules out an apology to Iran as a prerequisite to releasing the hostages.

September 21

U.S. orders 12,000 Iranian students, who are in the country illegally, to leave after deportation hearings.

September 22

Members of Iran's Parliament make a 3-hour visit to occupied U.S. Embassy to observe alleged U.S. espionage equipment and to prepare for chambers debate on the hostages.

September 25

At the Revolutionary Guard headquarters in Tehran, a spokesman states that the Iraqi attacks on Iran have not endangered the hostages lives.

September 28

Parliament again postpones discussion on the hostage issue, the third time in a week. ■

Nuclear Fuel Shipments to India

Following is an exchange of letters between Secretary Muskie and Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and a White House statement.

SENATOR CHURCH'S LETTER

September 9, 1980

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Foreign Relations Committee will consider on September 10 what recommendation it wishes to make to the Senate regarding Executive Order 12218 of June 19 authorizing nuclear exports to India. This is an extremely difficult issue that has caused me personal concern. I would like to

September 17, 1980

The Honorable
Edmund S. Muskie,
Secretary of State.

Excellency:

I have today received a note from Your Excellency, which reads as follows:

"I have the honor to confirm on behalf of the Government of the United States of America that in the course of negotiating the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, the two sides reached agreement on the following questions.

1. The two governments agree to facilitate the reunion of families and will process all applications as quickly as possible under mutually agreed arrangements and in accordance with each side's laws and regulations.

2. The two governments agree to facilitate travel between their respective countries of persons who may have a claim simultaneously to the nationality of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, but this does not imply that the governments of the two countries recognize dual nationality. Exit formalities and documentation shall be dealt with in accordance with the laws of the country in which such person resides. Entry formalities and documentation shall be dealt with in accordance with the laws of the country of destination.

3. All nationals of the sending State entering the receiving State on the basis of travel documents of the sending State containing properly executed entry and exit visas of the receiving State will, during the period for which their status has been accorded, and in accordance with the visa's period of validity, be considered nationals of the sending State by the appropriate authorities of the receiving State for the purpose of ensuring consular access and protection by the sending State as provided for in Article 35 of the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. If judicial or administrative proceedings prevent the above-mentioned persons from leaving the country within the visa's period of validity, they shall not lose the right of consular access and protection by the sending State. Such persons shall be permitted to leave the receiving State without the necessity of obtaining documentation from the receiving State other than the exit documentation normally required of departing aliens.

4. Both governments agree that persons residing in one country who are entitled to receive financial benefits from the other country shall receive their benefits under mutually agreed arrangements and in accordance with each country's laws and regulations.

If your Excellency confirms the above by a note in reply on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, this note shall constitute an integral part of the above-mentioned Consular Convention and shall come into effect simultaneously with the Consular Convention. At that time, the Annex on Practical Arrangements to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Mutual Establishment of Consular Relations and the Opening of Consulates-General, signed on January 31, 1979 will cease to be in effect."

On behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, I have the honor to confirm the above contents.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

CHAI ZEMIN
Ambassador of the People's Republic of China

September 17, 1980

His Excellency
Chai Zemin
Ambassador of the
People's Republic of China

Excellency:

I have the honor on behalf of the Government of the United States of America to confirm that during the course of negotiations concerning the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, both sides reached agreement on the following matter:

Aside from the consulates whose opening has already been agreed upon, the United States and Chinese Governments agree to the establishment of three additional consulates general in each other's territory.

If your Excellency by return note confirms the above on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, this note and your Excellency's note in reply will constitute an agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China which shall take effect from the date of the Embassy's note in reply."

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

EDMUND S. MUSKIE
Secretary of State

September 17, 1980

The Honorable
Edmund S. Muskie,
Secretary of State

I have today received a note from your excellency, which reads as follows:

"I have the honor on behalf of the Government of the United States of America to confirm that during the course of negotiations concerning the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, both sides reached agreement on the following matter:

Aside from the consulates whose opening has already been agreed upon, the United States and Chinese Governments agree to the establishment of three additional consulates general in each other's territory.

If your excellency by return note confirms the above on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, this note and your excellency's note in reply will constitute an agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China which shall take effect from the date of the Embassy's note in reply."

On behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, I have the honor to confirm the above contents.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

HIS EXCELLENCY
CHAI ZEMIN,
Ambassador of the
People's Republic of
China

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 22, 1980.
[2] Press release 257 of Sept. 17, 1980.
[3] Text from White House press release of Sept. 17, 1980.
[4] For the purposes of this understanding, "frequency" shall have the same meaning as that set forth in Annex V, paragraph (1) of the Agreement.
[5] The term "point service" means one weekly frequency with full traffic rights at a point. ■

U.S., China Sign Civil Aviation Agreement

The agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China relating to civil air transport signed on September 17,

1980, is an agreement between the governments of our two countries, which established diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. As stated in the joint communique issued by the two governments in anticipation of establishing diplomatic relations, the United States recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China.

Under this agreement, air services will be provided on the Chinese side by China's national carrier, the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), those aircraft will bear the national flag of the People's Republic of China. "China Airlines" (Taiwan) continues to provide service between the United States and Taiwan, under a nongovernmental arrangement between two private entities, the American Institute in Taiwan and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs. The United States does not recognize the flag of Taiwan as the flag of a sovereign state but regards it as an insignia or marking identifying an aircraft as coming from Taiwan.

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[1] Press release 257A of Sept. 17, 1980. ■

News Conference of September 18 (Excerpts)

Although attention is naturally focused on domestic politics, events around the world and here at home still demand my attention and action in ways that affect the well-being of American citizens.

Yesterday we completed the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China with four agreements—for trade, for consulates, for normal airline service, and for textiles. We've opened a new era of normal relationships now between our two great countries.

Also yesterday, the second anniversary of the signing of the Camp David accords, I met with Israeli Foreign Minister [Yitzhak] Shamir and Egyptian Foreign Minister Hassan Ali as efforts continue in our quest for a lasting peace in the Middle East, which is so important to the future of Americans and to the entire world. They have been, since that meeting with me, conducting negotiations or discussions with our own Ambassador [Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations] responsible for the discussions for peace.

We're preparing now for preliminary exchanges with the Soviet Union on the control of theater nuclear weapons in Europe. These talks should begin next month, and Secretary Muskie will be addressing this important subject in his discussions with Foreign Minister Gromyko of the Sovet Union in New York in the near future.

We've also been concentrating on the slow, difficult, diplomatic effort to free our hostages in Iran.

. . . .

Q. Earlier this week you raised expectations on the release of the hostages, and then you seemed to back off. What is today's prospect for an early release of the hostages, and aside from the Shah's assets over which we have no control, are all of the latest Iranian demands negotiable?

A. I've not changed my position on the prospects for the hostages' release. I do not predict an early resolution of the issue, because it's not in my hands, unilaterally. It has to be done through very careful negotiations with the Iranians and quite often because of unilateral decisions to be made by them.

One of the major obstacles to progress, in the past, has been the absence of any viable government in Iran. Only in recent weeks—in fact in some instances in the last few days—have they had a Parliament or a speaker of the Parliament who could speak for them or a Prime Minister. They have had a President for a long time. The President himself, Bani-Sadr, has been consistently in favor of the hostages being released.

Now that their government is intact and now that the Ayatollah Khomeini has made a public statement for the first time outlining to some degree the demands to be pursued by Iran, obviously the situation has improved.

Our position has been consistent. We have two goals in mind that have not changed since the first day the hostages were taken. One is to preserve the honor and integrity of our nation and to protect its interests. That's never changed. And the second goal has also never changed, and that is not to do anything here in this country that would endanger the lives or safety of the hostages nor interfere with their earliest possible release back to freedom.

This is an issue that's been constantly on my mind and on the minds of the American people.

Q. Does an apology rule out the question of honor?

A. Yes. The United States is not going to apologize.

We have long said that there would be a legitimate forum provided for the Iranians, who consider themselves to be aggrieved in many ways, to present their case. We encouraged the U.N. mission to go to Iran, to investigate the situation there, to have hearings in

of European support for our post-Afghanistan efforts. We can expect the Soviets to focus their energies on undermining the NATO consensus in favor of TNF modernization.

These Soviet accusations, in fact, ring hollow in view of their own doctrine, their attention to nuclear warfighting, and the size and character of their strategic nuclear forces. Moreover, they have never been particularly comfortable with what they regard as our "city-killing" philosophy of nuclear deterrence. I do not believe they genuinely regard this evolution in our nuclear strategy as a move to a first-strike, warfighting doctrine. The central purpose of our deterrence policy is to underscore the consequences for the Soviets if they should ever initiate the use of nuclear weapons.

We want to make sure the Soviets get that message. But we also want to insure that they get the message right. We need to remain fully alert to the risks of misperception and miscalculation, to the danger that the Soviets may see provocation where we intend none. I do not want anyone to wrongly conclude that we suddenly have become confident about our ability to orchestrate nuclear exchanges and control escalation or that we have become complacent about the use of nuclear weapons.

We will continue to emphasize to the Soviets that our intentions are peaceful and that we pose no threat to their legitimate security interests. At the same time, we will continue to insist that they respect the interests and rights of others and remind them of the consequences if they resort to nuclear weapons.

In this connection, I need hardly add that we do not regard the countervailing strategy as in any way a substitute for arms control or as a symptom of disenchantment with the arms control process. On the contrary, the countervailing strategy is fully consistent with the SALT II Treaty and our longer term arms control objectives. Nothing in the countervailing strategy changes or challenges our belief that nuclear arms control can make a significant contribution to our security and to international stability. Nothing in the evolution of our nuclear doctrine has led us to reassess the benefits of equitable and verifiable arms control agreements with our chief adversary. In particular, I continue to believe strongly that SALT II would make a crucial contribution to our national security. We will ask the Senate to act on ratification at the earliest feasible time.

The allies share our concern about the need to deter the full range of Soviet nuclear threats as well as our continued commitment to arms control and to the maintenance of strategic stability. By reinforcing allied confidence in the credibility of our nuclear guarantee, the countervailing strategy will strengthen alliance cohesion and solidarity as well as directly reduce the likelihood of conflict. The countervailing strategy reflects and supports the NATO strategy of flexible response by underscoring the availability of a full spectrum of nuclear responses.

We have discussed the evolution of our nuclear strategy and its relationship to flexible response in the normal course of consultations with our allies. The detailed discussion of the countervailing strategy in Secretary Brown's annual report to the Congress last January provided an excellent basis for our dialogue this year. Secretary Brown also gave an extensive briefing to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group this past June.

In the course of these consultations and in the aftermath of press reports about Presidential Determination 59, the allies have indicated they understand the countervailing strategy and appreciate the ways in which it strengthens the U.S. strategic linkage to their security. I do not want to leave the impression that we take their support for granted: It has to be earned and then protected in the face of Soviet efforts to undermine alliance solidarity. I do want to emphasize, however, that the allied leaders appreciate the rationale behind the countervailing strategy. I am confident that, in the course of our continuing consultations, their support will be sustained.

Nuclear strategy and doctrine are properly sober subjects. This should not, however, obscure the important positive contribution that the countervailing strategy makes to our most basic foreign policy objectives.

I am confident that the countervailing strategy not only strengthens deterrence but also establishes a firmer basis for our diplomacy with the Soviets. It underlines our determination to respond to any challenges to our vital interests, at the same time it confirms that we pose no threat to the legitimate interests of other states. As such, it leaves the Soviets no room for doubt about our will or our peaceful intentions.

The countervailing strategy, of course, will not transform the basically adversarial relationship we have with the Soviets. But it reduces the chances for superpower miscalculation and increases Soviet incentives to cooperate on managing and containing the competition between us. It therefore contributes to the prospects for reaching arms control agreements that limit the dangers of war.

For like reasons, the countervailing strategy reaffirms to our allies and friends that the United States is committed—in equal measure—to protecting our mutual security interests and to international stability. I expect it will serve to solidify our relationship with them and to strengthen our role as leader of the Western alliance.

Let me conclude my opening statement by briefly addressing the question of the involvement of the State Department and the Secretary of State in the formulation of the countervailing strategy. I have carefully reviewed the record. I have concluded that Secretary Vance and the State Department were involved as the major concepts of the policy were being developed and were in a position to make their views known.

The development of the main lines of the strategy was substantially completed well before I took office, and it had already been outlined in public statements, especially in Secretary Brown's January 1980 report to the Congress. Given my Senate responsibilities, I was, of course, aware of the direction of the Administration's strategic thinking. In fact, I had addressed some of the same concerns and concepts in a speech I delivered last year.

That said, the preparation and issuance of a presidential determination that codifies our nuclear strategy is itself an important action that has a significant foreign policy dimension. It, therefore, is clear that I, as Secretary of State, and the State Department should have been appropriately involved in the action.

I consider the situation that developed here to be an unintended exception to this Administration's record of substantially increased State Department involvement in national security issues. I have discussed this episode with the President as well as with Secretary Brown and Dr. Brzezinski [Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs]. The President has assured me that I and others at the Department as needed will be fully consulted on the foreign policy implications of such major national security policy decisions.

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[1] Press release 259. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

The Challenge of Peace

Secretary Muskie's address at Notre Dame University in South Bend, Indiana, on October 11, 1980.[1]

Peace is the absence of war among nations. But it is much more. Nations are composed of people. Meaningful peace must also be found in their lives. A nation whose government lives peacefully with its neighbors but wars on its own people is not a nation at peace.

Preserving the working for peace is thus a challenge of extraordinary complexity. Alexander Hamilton once wrote that hostility among nations is caused by their love of power or their desire for preeminence and dominion; the competitions of commerce; or the personal attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of national leaders.

Human nature has changed little in the 200 years since. But human technology has changed dramatically. And today peace has never been more fragile. It can be destroyed, and with it our collective future, in the miscalculation of a single moment.

To preserve peace, and to expand it, requires more than our best efforts. We need also to understand the ways in which a peace is built and the ways in which it can be shattered. There is no doubt that in a dangerous world, the first requirement of peace is military strength —the strength to assure our allies and deter our adversaries; the strength to prevent attack or, if necessary, to defeat it; the strength to resist coercion.

But too many voices would have us believe that military power in itself can protect our interests and bring order to an unruly world. So much more is needed. Peace also requires prudence. It is gained through patient and persistent diplomatic efforts. And it is secured through human progress. Let me tell you why each is so important.

Military Preparedness

The bedrock of our security is most certainly our military strength and the strength of our alliances. We live in a hard world which requires hard measures. For almost two decades, our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, has been building its military strength by 4% or more every year. Yet for much of that period, American defense expenditures decreased.

President Carter has reversed that decline. We are now carrying out the most comprehensive military modernization program since the early 1960s.

Each element of our strategic nuclear forces is being sharply improved to make sure that we can deter any level or kind of nuclear attack. The new Trident submarine and Trident missile will dramatically increase the firepower of our underwater nuclear forces. The area of the ocean in which they can hide will expand tenfold. The new mobile MX missile will render any plan for a disabling first strike against the United States even more hopeless than it already is. Our bomber forces, with new air-launched cruise missiles, will be able to remain safely beyond the range of Soviet defenses and deliver massive explosive force with extraordinary accuracy.

We are strengthening our other capabilities as well. We are enhancing the preparedness of our ground forces; modernizing our tactical air forces; building a larger and more capable navy; increasing our sea and airlift capabilities so we can respond more quickly to emergencies wherever they arise. And with the leadership of Birch Bayh as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, America's intelligence resources are being strengthened.

Our alliances are growing stronger. Through American leadership the NATO alliance is committed to a new defense improvement program, to an annual 3% increase in defense expenditures, to modernize our theater nuclear forces in Europe. The United States also seeks to strengthen the alliance by supporting strongly the early reintegration of Greek military forces into NATO.

Plainly, any notion that we are neglecting our defense posture is absurd. American and allied military forces—today—are a match for any adversary or combination of adversaries. And through these new programs, our forces will remain that way, despite the Soviet buildup. Our defenses will remain the foundation of peace.

But as we do what is necessary to protect ourselves, let us not be so blinded by the importance of power that we forget what else is necessary to build a more peaceful world.

Prudent Policies

First, we need the perspective of prudence. It is prudent to make sure that our purposes are clear. We are determined to defend our vital interests—in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, in this hemisphere. But we must be clear—to ourselves and to others —that we seek no dominion, no control over the affairs of other peoples.

Nor must we pretend that we can recapture the military superiority we once held over the Soviet Union. Such superiority may sound grand in speeches. But the Soviets will no more allow us to gain such a position than we will allow it to them. A search for superiority would simply create a massive, dangerous new arms race. Peace lies in maintaining a prudent balance.

It is this sense of prudence that should also lead us to ratify the SALT II Treaty and pursue further balanced arms control agreements. What prudent person would want a world without SALT?

- A world in which the Soviets can deploy 750 more nuclear weapons systems that allowed under the treaty;
- A world without restraints on the number of nuclear weapons each of those missiles and bombers carries;
- A world where we have to spend tens of billions of dollars on nuclear weapons that could go to our conventional forces—or to the needs of human beings in this country and abroad;
- A world of greater tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.

I think the answer is clear. That is why we will seek ratification of the SALT II Treaty as soon as possible next year. And that is why we must always make it clear to the Soviet Union that while we will continue to oppose aggression in Afghanistan or elsewhere—and we will—our purpose is to help establish patterns of mutual restraint that allow an improved relationship between us. We and the Soviets, as the two superpowers, have a responsibility to all humankind: Even as we compete, we must always be willing to pursue, as well, the works of peace.

Peace also depends on the prudence of statesmen when conflicts erupt—when crises require cool thinking as well as strength. At such times, we need to understand that the use of force is a last resort. Our first recourse must be to the instruments of diplomacy.

And we need to be clear on the difference between threats to our vital interests and foreign internal strife that may affect our interests but is not susceptible to the use of American force. American forces are in the Persian Gulf, for example, to defend vital interests of the United States and our allies in the region. They are not there to interfere in the domestic affairs of any nation.

I raise this point because the air is

senses and stop this aggression, stop this war, and come to the bargaining table.

Q. You talk about the escalation, of strikes against civilian targets and air targets. Are you of the belief that this war is accidental, that it was not planned by one side or the other but just happened accidentally?

A. I think what started out to be a more limited war has escalated perhaps beyond the initial intention of the parties. Now we don't know for sure what the intention of the Iraqis may have been when this commenced, but I have a strong feeling myself that the skirmishes and then the airstrikes did escalate very rapidly.

And, of course, that is the danger and that is why we work so hard to prevent skirmishes between countries because we know that the escalation can go back and forth to the danger of the economy of the country and to the danger of the citizens.

Q. Everyone is concerned about the continued flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. So far the war has not threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz through which that oil must travel, but President Carter has said that come what may, those straits will be kept open.

Let's be clear on this. Is he saying that the U.S. Navy, with or without support of the British and French fleets in the Indian Ocean, is prepared to keep that strait open if someone tried to close it?

A. What the President has said and what he meant is that the Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway through which nations are entitled to send their ships through the right of free passage. We intend to keep that strait open. We think that other nations have a very strong interest in doing so. Actually, the European countries have a stronger interest in that oil than the United States does. But working with our allies, we intend to see that what is necessary is done to keep that strait open.

Q. But both the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia have suggested that they would be very unhappy about a Western military fleet acting as policemen in the Persian Gulf. How does that affect our thinking, if at all?

A. Of course we would want to consult with the nations in the gulf, such as Saudi Arabia, but it is in their interests as well as in the interests of the West that the strait remains open. After all, they are the sellers of the oil which passes through that strait just as we're the purchasers of the oil.

Q. Is there a possibility that an allied force can be made up without the United States because of the feelings against the United States which run so strongly both in Iran and Iraq?

A. The French have very significant assets in that area as do the British. Of course the United States is the predominant naval power in that area. We have capacity beyond that of any other country or any combination of countries.

Q. But the other countries have need beyond what we have there for this oil.

A. Yes. Western Europe is more dependent upon the oil from the gulf than the United States is. I believe we get only about 11% of our oil from the gulf.

Nevertheless, the oil from that area is extremely important to the world's economy as a whole. The United States, Western Europe, countries of South America are all dependent on that area for major imports of oil.

Q. What have our allies said? The Japanese and the West Germans have indicated because of constitutional problems that they could not join in a military action with the United States to keep the straits open. But what have the French and what have the British, for example, told us?

A. We've been consulting with them, and I think we all recognize a common need to keep that strait open. I've been at the Department since early this morning, and there is no indication that ships are not passing through there in a normal and customary way at the present time. We'll deal with the contingency of somebody trying to block it when that comes up.

Q. What about the implications of this war on the 52 American hostages in Iran? For 10 months the leaders of Iran appeared to think that they had more to gain than lose by holding on to those hostages, but given the defeat they're having in the war, the effect on the economy of their oil fields being in flames, the Russians continuing to build up along their northern border, perhaps their perception of what their interest is might be changing. What do you think about that? Is there a chance now that they might be disposed to settle the hostage issue?

A. I certainly hope so. It seemed to me that in the last few weeks the Iranians have been coming to the point where they've been getting ready to address the hostage issue. One of the many reasons why we're working so hard and so strongly believe in the early cessation of the hostilities is to enable the Iranians to turn back to addressing the hostage issue.

I think we have to recognize that the Iranian Government now is probably preoccupied with the war itself. There are some objective reasons why they ought, in their own self interests, immediately to solve the hostage crisis. But I think we ought to look for them to do that in the context of a cessation of hostilities.

Q. Is there any discussion at any level between the Iranian Government and the U.S. Government or through third parties which it would have to be now, I presume, of military aid for Iran, particularly in the area of spare parts and ammunition which we know they're using up at a great rate in return for the hostages?

A. We've said for a long time that in the context of and in conjunction with the release of the hostages, we would be prepared to talk with the Iranians about a resumption of more or less normal commercial relations, of lifting the sanctions. Unfortunately, that subject is not under negotiation at the present time.

Q. So the answer to my question basically is, no, there has been no discussion of that?

A. That's correct.

Q. President Carter said that the United States is not involved in this war between Iran and Iraq, but in an indirect sense, of course, we are because Iran, for example, is strongly anti-American, Iraq is strongly

Dealing With the World's Realities

Secretary Muskie's remarks before the Economic Club of Memphis and the Memphis in May International Festival, Inc. in Memphis on October 6, 1980. [1]

This event is called a "town meeting," and I look forward to an exchange every bit as questioning and lively as the town meetings in my native New England.

Before we get to the most interesting part of our meeting—our discussion of issues you wish to raise—let me make a few remarks about a basic question before us: how our nation will deal with a world of rapid change and new challenge. For more than 200 years, America has thrived and prospered, not by recoiling from change in the world but by working to shape it. We have known that change is the necessary companion of human progress. We have moved ahead by seeing the world as it is and as it can be, not by looking back to a simpler world we remember. The beginning of wisdom is understanding—understanding that we are living today at a time of the most extensive change in human history.

Let me begin by mentioning some of these changes and challenges.

- The Soviet Union has become—and intends to remain—a military superpower. Soviet use of its military power, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, has created new risks to world peace.
- In less than a half a generation, we have seen the birth of more than 100 new nations. Each is struggling to meet growing, sometimes violent, demands by its people for rapid economic and political progress.
- Regional rivalries have taken on new danger with the spread of sophisticated weapons and the willingness of the Soviets, Cubans, and others to exploit them.
- Our domestic economy, to a greater extent than ever before, is part of a global economy. Nations with new economic power are exerting new influence on our daily lives.
- And while the prosperity of our traditional allies in West Europe and Japan adds tremendously to our collective strength, it also has increased the potential for strains among us.

Some of these new realities are threatening. Others have the potential for good or for harm, depending in no small measure on how we seek to shape their direction. But all of them are realities. We cannot wish them away. We cannot reverse them with rhetoric. We must address them, all of them, creatively and without illusion.

For a few moments this evening, I want to talk about how the United States is dealing with these new realities—about where we are and where we are headed.

First, we are building our military strength.

For nearly two decades the Soviet Union has been building its military strength by 4% or more each year. Meanwhile, our underlying military base declined.

Today, the United States is engaged in the most far-reaching military modernization since the early 1960s. We are upgrading each arm of our strategic nuclear forces—land, sea, and air. The President has ordered full development of a powerful new land-based missile—the MX. The first of our sophisticated new Trident submarines was launched this year. We will start equipping our B–52s with new cruise missiles in 1982.

At the same time, we are building the defense forces of our alliances. In 1978, at American initiative, we and our NATO partners launched a long-term military improvement program. That program is well underway. In late 1979, we and our NATO allies agreed to a program for modernizing our nuclear weapons in Europe in order to meet a decade-long Soviet buildup. We will proceed with that program while we seek fair and verifiable negotiated limits with the Soviet Union. And we are building our military capacity to respond swiftly to serious crisis wherever it might arise, including the vital Persian Gulf area.

There should be no mistake. This modernization program involves heavy costs. In the past 4 fiscal years, the United States has increased defense expenditures by 10%. The President's defense program will increase expenditures by another 17% over the next 4 years. This modernization program is necessary to assure that we maintain a military balance with the Soviet Union in the years ahead. It is a steady and reliable American defense program, not a wasteful and wanton effort to achieve an unachievable "superiority"—an effort that would only produce the dangers of a massive new arms race.

Secondly, the United States today is exercising its leadership to strengthen the international stand against Soviet aggression.

The Soviet effort to destroy the national independence of Afghanistan through military force must be sternly resisted by the international community. It is an attempt to use naked military power to deny a people and a nation their freedom. By precedent and by proximity, it increases the Soviet threat in a region of the world vitally important to the United States, to the industrialized democracies, to the entire world.

By the stands we have taken—on grain, on the sale of technology, on the Olympics—we have conveyed, clearly and concretely, the seriousness of the American people. Most Americans support the steps we have taken. For they understand that we cannot express our national resolve without individual sacrifice—from farmers, from businessmen, from athletes, from all of us. Yet we see, in the Senate and elsewhere, efforts to reverse the grain embargo.

There is a short answer. We cannot fight Soviet aggression more by sacrificing as Americans less. The firm actions the United States has taken in recent months are intended not to provoke confrontation but to avoid confrontation by discouraging future Soviet adventures. These actions are taken to preserve the only basis on which a relaxation of tensions can proceed—demonstrated Soviet restraint. As the President has said, we must be prepared to sustain those measures as long as Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan.

We must also seek Soviet restraint through balanced and enforceable agreements that limit the growth of arms. Now that the Soviets have dropped their preconditions, we will move ahead this month with preliminary talks to limit long-range theater nuclear forces.

And we will work for ratification of

is an endeavor that has gone on for some time. We have reports of people who have said that there are bodies there that have not yet been returned to the United States. There is an occasional report of somebody who perhaps is still living, and we investigate those, and we follow them up as well as we can. But I wouldn't attach great significance to this report. It does not have political overtones. It is not a political negotiation.

Q. But is there, in fact, an American representative who is going to go?

A. That's what I've been told.

Q. And is he going to go before the election?

A. I don't know the timing of it.

Q. I just wonder if it doesn't have political overtones in the domestic sense and if it isn't a move by the Carter Administration to show once again that we're still trying to do something in an area where it's been pretty well proven we can't do anything.

A. Those efforts with respect to the MIAs have gone on rather continuously and for a long period of time. So I wouldn't attach political significance domestically to it either.

Q. What do you make of Fidel Castro's move to cut off the flow of refugees to the United States, which has been a political thorn in the side of the Administration for some time?

A. I'm glad it's happened.

Q. How about the timing of it?

A. As to the timing of it, I would have to say that Fidel Castro, like other leaders of their country, generally do things when it's in their own self-interest. And I assume that there was some combination of factors that caused him to feel that at this point in history he wanted to cut off that flow.

Obviously there's a real problem for a closed society when that many people want to leave. Obviously there's a real problem for a country in its internal control when that many people want to leave.

So I don't know what was in Mr. Castro's mind, but I do think it will be helpful here so we can get some sense of regularity about immigration from Cuba to the United States and also handle the Cuban refugees who are now here.

Q. Is it some kind of harbinger of improved relations with the Castro government?

A. It certainly removes a very thorny issue between us. On the other hand, there's a long way to go before the United States has normal relationships with Cuba.

Q. Aren't we having discussions with the Cuban Government? I think that Mr. Watson, the President's Chief of Staff, said that for the last several weeks we had been discussing some problems, apparently including this one.

A. Yes, that's correct. We have an interest section in Havana—an active interest section, and they've been discussing with the Cubans a number of issues, mainly refugee issues.

If you recall, we had about 400 refugees who were in our interest section. Little by little, they've been able to leave, and that part of the problem has been resolved. Now perhaps it appears that the Mariel problem—the boat people problem—is on the way to being solved.

Q. What about the return of criminals?

A. That problem is also under discussion.

Q. The Senate voted the other day to stop the grain embargo to the Soviet Union on the basis that American farmers were punished more than the Russians. Is the President prepared to veto any legislation calling for an end to the embargo?

A. Let me say that I am deeply disappointed with that vote, and I hope that the House of Representatives will not go along with it. One doesn't predict too early a Presidential veto, but I will say to you that no one should misunderstand the President's determination about carrying forward the grain embargo.

It's been a very successful part of our effort. Nine months ago on this program I emphasized the importance of our endurance with respect to our position on Afghanistan and I emphasize it again. We should maintain the embargo. It's hurting the Russians. It's hurt them very badly with respect to their livestock production.

The 17 million tons that we deprived Russia of last year—they've been able to replace only about half of it and at greater costs and with considerable shipping difficulties.

So I'm disappointed in the Senate vote and I hope the House will reverse it and the President, I would say, is determined on the issue.

. . . .

Q. Is the United States leading the attempt to mediate, or are we leaving that to others in Iran-Iraq?

A. We are certainly trying very hard to use the forces that we can find. On the other hand, other countries have some special ability in this area that we lack because we don't have good relations with either of the countries involved. ■

Report on CTB Negotiations

On July 31, 1980, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom presented the following progress report to the U.N. Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on their tripartite negotiations on a comprehensive test ban (CTB).

1. This report on the status of the negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments and its protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes has been jointly prepared by the three parties to the negotiations.

2. The three negotiating parties are well aware of the deep and long-standing commitment to the objective of this treaty that has been demonstrated by the Committee on Disarmament and its predecessor bodies. They recognize the strong and legitimate interest of the Committee on Disarmament in their activities, and they have reported to the Committee on Disarmament previously, most recently on 31 July, 1979. They welcome the opportunity to do so again, just as they welcome the continued support and encouragement that their negotiations derive from the interest of the Committee on Disarmament.

3. Since the last report to the Committee on Disarmament, the three delegations have completed two rounds of negotiations. The negotiations reconvened on 16 June, 1980.

4. The negotiating parties are seeking a treaty that for decades has been given one of the highest priorities in the field of arms limitation, and the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States continue to attach great importance to it. The desire to achieve an early agreement, which is so widely shared by the international community, has been repeatedly expressed at the highest level of all three governments.

5. Global interest in the cessation of nuclear weapons tests by all states has been recorded by a succession of resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and by the final document of the Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly. It has been stated in the preambles to a number of international arms limitation treaties now in force, and its significance will again be underlined in the forthcoming second Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

6. The objectives which the negotiating parties seek to achieve as a result of this treaty are important to all mankind. Specifically, they seek to attain a treaty which will make a major contribution to the shared objectives of constraining the nuclear arms race, curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and strengthening international peace and security.

7. Given the importance of these objectives, it is understandable that the international community has repeatedly called for the earliest possible conclusion of the treaty. At the same time, it is important to note that this treaty is, in many respects, a difficult one to negotiate. Many of the issues are novel, sensitive and intricate. The treaty directly affects vital national security concerns and the process of negotiation requires considerable and painstaking work.

8. In spite of these challenges, however, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States have made considerable progress in negotiating the treaty.

9. The negotiating parties have agreed that the treaty will require each party to prohibit, prevent and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control in any environment; and to refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion anywhere.

10. The negotiating parties have agreed that the treaty will be accompanied by a protocol on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which will be an integral part of the treaty. The protocol will take into account the provisions of Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the protocol, the parties will establish a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and accordingly will refrain from causing, encouraging, permitting or in any way participating in the carrying out of such explosions until arrangements for conducting them are worked out which would be consistent with the treaty being negotiated, the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Without delay after entry into force of the treaty, the parties will keep under consideration the subject of arrangements for conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, including the aspect of precluding military benefits. Such arrangements, which could take the form of a special agreement or agreements, would be made effective by appropriate amendment to the protocol.

11. To ensure that the tready does not detract from previous arms limitation agreements, there will be a provision stating that the treaty does not affect obligations compatible with it that have been assumed by parties under other international agreements. Such other agreements include the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The three negotiating parties have agreed that the treaty will provide procedures for amendment, and that any amendments will require the approval of a majority of all parties, which majority shall include all parties that are permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations. They have also agreed that, as in other arms limitation agreements, there will be provision for withdrawal from the treaty on the grounds of supreme national interests. They have also agreed that the treaty should enter into force upon ratification by twenty signatory governments, including those of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

12. The parties are considering formulations relating to the duration of the treaty. They envisage that a conference will be held at an appropriate time to review the operation of the treaty. Decisions at the conference will require a majority of the parties to the treaty, which majority shall include all parties that are permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations.

13. The negotiating parties, recognizing the importance of verification, have agreed that a variety of verification measures should be provided to enhance confidence that all parties to the treaty are in strict compliance with it. Such measures in the treaty itself,

support the President on this matter of national security significance. I recognize the nuclear non-proliferation and foreign policy benefits of the course of action taken by the President.

I am concerned, however, that a less than adequate case has been made by the Administration that both fuel shipments really are needed by India at this time. In this regard, as you know, during the past weeks our staffs have discussed in depth the non-proliferation and foreign policy issues related to the President's June 19 decision. In those discussions, several matters were identified on which I believe further administration assurances would make it easier for the Committee and the Senate to support the President's decision.

First, I would like to request your assurance that the Administration will not permit the second fuel shipment to be exported before it is needed to ensure the efficient and continuous operation of the Tarapur Power Station. I understand the time period involved is about a year. This will provide additional time for the Administration to continue to seek to narrow U.S. non-proliferation differences with India.

Second, I would appreciate your commitment to consult with Congress well in advance of permitting the second shipment to be made. We would expect to review with you the progress that is being made in discussions with India on safeguards and other non-proliferation objectives at that time. This will help Congress to determine whether India is willing to strengthen its non-proliferation policies and commitments.

Third, I would like your assurance that the second fuel shipment will not be permitted to occur at all if the President finds India has exploded a nuclear device, is preparing to explode a nuclear device, or is engaging in other activities that would require termination of exports under section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act. In other words, I seek a commitment that, if these sanctions become applicable, the President will not propose to the Congress that these particular provisions be waived in order to permit the second fuel shipment.

I think both the Administration and the Congress must agree that approval of these exports will not constitute a precedent for treatment of future export license applications. Therefore, I request that you provide me your assurance that the Administration will regard the full-scope safeguards licensing criterion as set forth in section 128 a (1) of the Atomic Energy. Act as applicable to any future license applications for the export of fuel to Tarapur.

It is my belief that the Administration should provide the Committee these commitments in writing. This will demonstrate our seriousness of purpose in working together to find a solution to this difficult issue, a solution that will serve the national interest and be widely supported.

Sincerely,

FRANK CHURCH

The Honorable Edmund S. Muskie
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRETARY MUSKIE'S LETTER

September 10, 1980

Dear Frank:

Thank you for your letter of September 9 concerning the Foreign Relations Committee's consideration of the President's Executive Order authorizing the export of two nuclear fuel shipments to India. I understand the concerns you raised in your letter and appreciate your desire to find a mutually acceptable solution. The course you propose is acceptable to the Administration.

During the past weeks we have discussed in depth with the members of Congress the non-proliferation and foreign policy benefits we see in proceeding with these exports. As you point out, questions have been raised as to whether the two fuel shipments are both needed in India at this time. In this regard, the Hyderabad fuel fabrication plant in India, which fabricates fuel for Tarapur, is currently out of fresh fuel and urgently needs the first shipment. Once the first export is received the fuel fabrication plant will be able to operate for approximately one year before it is ready to begin work on the second shipment. Since air transport of the fuel is much more expensive than the normal surface transportation, the second shipment should be released in sufficient time to allow India to arrange for surface shipment of the second export (although it will certainly need to air ship the first).

In this light, I wish to assure the Congress that, while the first shipment of Tarapur fuel should leave the United States as promptly as possible after the Executive Order becomes effective, the Administration will not permit the second shipment to leave the United States until it is needed to assure continuity of operations at the Hyderabad fuel fabrication plant, which has consistently been considered by both India and the United States as necessary for the efficient and continuous operation of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. We will consult with Congress well in advance of the date of the export of the second shipment on the progress that is being made in discussions with India on safeguards and other non-proliferation objectives.

I want to further assure the Congress that export of the second fuel shipment will not be permitted to occur at all if the President finds that India has exploded a nuclear device, is preparing to explode a nuclear device, or is engaging in other activities that would require termination of exports under Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act. The President will not propose to Congress that these provisions be waived in order to permit the second fuel shipment.

I agree that approval of these exports will not constitute a precedent for the treatment of future export license applications. The full-scope safeguards export licensing criterion as set forth in Section 128 a (1) of the Atomic Energy Act will apply to any future license applications for the export of nuclear fuel to Tarapur.

The foregoing conditions are intended to demonstrate the continued strong commitment of the United States to the policy of nuclear non-proliferation. I hope you will agree that these conditions will ensure that the exports here at issue will be carried out in a manner that is fully consistent with that commitment.

The proposed exports will assure the continuation in force of important safeguards applicable to Tarapur. We will use the time gained by these exports to seek to reduce our non-proliferation differences with India. I believe it is essential that the Congress not deprive the President of the opportunity to pursue constructive negotiations on this subject.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

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Honorable Frank Church, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate ■

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT SEPT. 24, 1980[1]

We are pleased that the Senate, in a display of bipartisanship, has supported the President's decision on shipment o fuel to the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. The Senate action will help further the administration's policy of seeking to prevent nuclear proliferation and adds support to our discussions with the Government of India toward bringing all of that nation's nuclear facilities under international safeguards.

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 29, 1980. ■

Obligations of Peace

by Secretary Muskie

Address before the 35th session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York on September 22, 1980.[1]

I come today to express anew the U.S. commitment to the United Nations. I come also to express our hopes for its future at a moment when the world is deeply troubled by tension and uncertainty. Peace is threatened by smoldering regional conflicts, by assaults of the strong upon the weak. Nations large and small are buffeted by steeply rising oil prices and serious economic strains. Within many countries, poverty and oppression form an explosive combination.

A few weeks ago, I spoke to this Assembly about the international economy. I stressed the obligation of nations to cooperate in facing world economic problems: payments imbalances, energy inflation, slowed growth in many developing countries, the specters of environmental decay and even famine.

Our inability to reach a consensus on procedures for global negotiations is a pause in the process, not a failure in our objectives. I do not mean to say that the differences that have kept us from finding a formula for global negotiations can be glossed over. They are real. They are substantive. But we are prepared to use the span of this General Assembly to continue discussions that can lead to procedures, to an agenda, and to a negotiating structure that will foster broad agreement among all the nations here represented.

Today I want to look beyond economic problems to the one condition that is a prerequisite to all material progress: peace. If we truly care about building a world in which peace and justice prevail, the world's nations—and this organization—cannot ignore certain political and legal obligations also; obligations every bit as compelling as the economic obligations I spoke of earlier.

These responsibilities are not new. They are proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations. But dangerous new circumstances require that we stress them anew lest we betray the very purpose the United Nations is designed to serve.

Refraining from Aggression

Our first obligation is to refrain from aggression and to deal with it vigorously. The first article of the U.N. Charter provides for "the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." The second article prohibits "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."

Accordingly, the United Nations must confront the continuing assault upon Afghanistan. I raise this issue not to set off a rhetorical exchange—not in the interest of polemics but in the interest of peace.

Today, more than 1 million refugees attest to the human toll of the violence in Afghanistan. And more is at stake then the independence of one country. If this assault continues, the independence and integrity of every small, defenseless nation will be called into question.

. . . more than 1 million refugees attest to the human toll of the violence in Afghanistan. . . . If this assault continues, the independence and integrity of every small, defenseless nation will be called into question.

Last January an emergency special session of this Assembly condemned, by a large majority, the assault upon Afghanistan. We strongly believe that the 35th General Assembly also must work under the charter to reinforce the principles of the United Nations. We must work for a total withdrawal of Soviet troops and a political settlement. We must support the principles of nonintervention, self-determination, and nonalignment for Afghanistan.

In Kampuchea, as well, armed aggression continues. We welcome reports of some progress made under the leadership of the U.N. Secretary General and international organizations in relieving the conditions of deprivation and disease so prevalent a year ago. The threat of renewed starvation requires significant further contributions from the international community.

Despite some improvement in Kampuchea's desperate human situation no progress whatsoever has been made toward securing withdrawal of occupying Vietnamese forces and the restoration of self-determination to the Kampuchean people, as called for by last year's resolution on Kampuchea sponsored by the nonaligned nations. We strongly support the basis for a settlement—including the concept of an international conference—contained in that resolution, which was passed by a large majority.

Above all, let us keep in mind two basic purposes for which this body exists: to oppose armed aggression and to assuage its consequences. No achievements can be more important to the future influence and effectiveness of the United Nations; no failure could be more damaging than a failure to deal firmly with these issues.

Peacefully Settling Disputes

Our second obligation, proclaimed by our charter, is to settle international disputes by peaceful means. Achieving this goal remains urgently important in two key regions: the Middle East and southern Africa.

In the Middle East, the United States is committed to a comprehensive peace—an enduring peace based on the principles of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. We are determined to pursue to a successful conclusion the peace process begun at Camp David 2 years ago this month. Already that process has achieved something once thought impossible: peace between Egypt and Israel. Now the negotiations are focused upon a second goal: taking a significant first step toward resolving the Palestinian problem. The current autonomy talks have as their goal arriving at interim arrangements to establish full autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza. After that, the process will proceed to negotiations which will determine the final status of those areas.

As we seek to resolve this conflict, we are committed to finding a solution to the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and at the same time to permanent security for the State of Israel. We have no illusions about the difficulties of this

Iran, and to let there be a public exploration of Iran's claims or complaints. At the time we filed our suit in the World Court, in The Hague, we also invited Iran to participate with us—not in a combative way, but in a friendly way—to give them that forum, which would have been well covered by the world press, to express their concerns or their complaints about us or others in the past. So, this is not a new development at all. Our position has been very consistent.

I cannot predict what will happen in the near future, but we are pursuing every possible legitimate avenue—as we have for many months—to reach some agreement with Iran—with those two constraints that I described to you concerning our nation's honor and the safety of the hostages—to relieve this problem between us, which is obviously damaging to the United States and also very damaging to the people of Iran.

. . . .

Q. In the context of your decisions about the MX missile and Presidential Directive 59, I'd like to ask if it's realistic for any American President to believe that he could limit his response to a Soviet nuclear first strike against U.S. missiles if that first strike incurred, let's say, 20–50 million casualties. Could you limit your response under those circumstances, or would you have to fire off everything that was left?

A. When anyone decides to run for President of our country with any expectation of being elected, the question of the use of atomic weapons has to be addressed, because it's crucial for our nation, for our allies, and for our potential adversaries to know that, if necessary, atomic weapons would be used to defend our nation. And that knowledge is the deterrent that would prevent a potential adversary from attacking our country and, therefore, destroying 100 million or more American lives.

I have done everything I possible could, as President, not only to maintain peace—and I thank God we've been successful so far—but to lay the groundwork for continued maintenance of peace and the avoidance of ever having to use atomic weapons.

There is a likelihood—I can't say how strong it might be; it's not an inevitability, but it's certainly a likelihood—that if an atomic exchange of any kind should ever erupt, it might lead to a more massive exchange of intercontinental and highly destructive weapons that would result in tens of millions of lost lives on both sides. That very knowledge, which I have very clearly in my mind, is shared by the Soviet leaders, and I have discussed this common knowledge with President Brezhnev in Vienna when we signed the SALT II Treaty.

The policy of our two countries ever since President Eisenhower and President Truman were in office and everyone since then, Democratic or Republican, has been to try to reduce the dependence on atomic weapons and to have balanced atomic forces and, lately, to reduce constantly on an equal basis the arsenals that we have.

I cannot tell you what would happen if an exchange should take place. I would try to defend my nation's integrity and its security and the integrity and security of our allies without resort to atomic weapons, but if necessary to defend the freedom and security of Western Europe and this country, then I would use atomic weapons. I pray to God that that time will never come, but it's important for our people, our allies, and the Soviet Union to know that, if necessary, those weapons will be used. The best weapon of any kind is one that's never used, and the best soldier is one that never dies in war.

But the only way I know to maintain peace for my country and for those who depend on me is to be strong and to let potential attackers know that if they should attack us, their attack would be suicidal.

. . . .

Q. Yesterday, after meeting with Dr. Burg of Israel [Yosef Burg, Israeli Minister of Interior and Chief Negotiator for the Palestinian autonomy negotiations] and [Foreign Minister] Hassan Ali of Egypt, you said, without elaboration, that unanticipated progress had been made in restarting those trilateral talks here in Washington on Palestinian autonomy.

But Dr. Burg said today those initial discussions would not include the issue of Jerusalem. Given the importance of that issue, what progress has been made this week, and what's the cause of your optimism?

A. When Sol Linowitz went to Jerusalem and to Egypt a few weeks ago and met with Foreign Ministers Shamir and Gen. Hassan Ali, and also with Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat, we were pleasantly surprised, after a fairly long dearth of direct contacts between Israel and Egypt, to find both nations eager to get back to the negotiating table.

Yesterday, after they left my office, Sol Linowitz, Mr. Shamir, and Gen. Ali sat down to continue top-level negotiations to try to find a basis for carrying out the comprehensive peace.

Following Sol Linowitz' trip to the Middle East, President Sadat announced, both before and after he arrived, that he was eager to see a summit conference later this year. Prime Minister Begin had not, until that time, made that statement. Prime Minister Begin called me on the telephone to say that the Linowitz mission had been remarkably successful, to thank us for what he had contributed, and to say that he would be eager to meet with me and President Sadat at a summit conference either before or after the American elections were concluded.

We will work that out. I am determined that the prospect for a summit meeting will not interfere with the substantive negotiations that must precede it. And I think the fact that yesterday and today the Foreign Ministers of the two countries are negotiating again in the presence of the American Ambassador assigned that task is, indeed, encouraging in itself.

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[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 22, 1980. ■

Essentials of Security: Arms and More

Secretary Muskie's address before the World Affairs Council in Pittsburgh on September 18, 1980.[1]

In recent months the atmosphere has been unusually thick with pronouncements about an American military decline. We cannot let such funereal forecasts go unanswered. They are wrong on the facts, and they can be dangerous in their effect.

I am here today to take sharp issue with the evangalists of American weakness—to affairm that America today is strong and growing stronger. If our nation truly was neglecting its defenses, it would be the duty of all informed people to sound the alarm. But false declarations of weakness only intensify the dangers we face. They can cause our friends to doubt us and our enemies to discount us. They can distract us from other work necessary to make our society stronger and our world more secure.

The Defense Record

So let us evaluate the defense record, but let us evaluate it fairly. Let us weigh the East-West balance realistically. And let us give due regard to our own strength as well as that of our opposition.

Our allies are stronger, our alliances sturdier than those of the Soviet Union. In economic power, the United States and our NATO allies outstrip the Warsaw Pact more than two to one. Taken together, we devote more to defense than the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union. Our alliances have the added dependability that is derived when values and purposes are truly shared. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, NATO members and Japan are allies by choice. The purpose of our alliances is not to camouflage the ambitions of one member but to defend the freedom of all.

At least one-fourth of the Soviet Union's ground combat forces are tied down on the long common border with China. The nations on our borders are friends.

Technology is another American advantage. "Faster," "more accurate," "more advanced"—these generally are terms that apply to American weapons and American systems. Soviet technology has lagged behind.

And our security is also advanced by the content of our foreign policy—by the international principles we support. On a global basis, we stand for essential precepts of national sovereignty and human rights. Certainly we live in a tumultuous world, characterized by the unremitting nationalism and surging human aspirations of more than 100 new nations. But if such an environment is unsettling to us, it will prove to be even more perilous for nations seeking to dominate others and dictate their systems. Such imperial concepts are the wave of the past. They collide head-on with the historic trends now underway virtually everywhere in the world—from the patriots in Afghanistan to the nationalists in every nation of the Third World, from the democratic forces in Zimbabwe to the gallant workers of Poland who have inspired us all.

In sum, our technology, our solid security partnerships, our identification with national independence and human freedom—all of these assets should strengthen our confidence as we assess the sufficiency of our defenses.

They do not, however, give us cause for complacency. Our military posture continues to require our diligent attention. In the Soviet Union, we face a rival that has engaged for more than a generation in a steady buildup of its military forces, both conventional and strategic. In strategic nuclear forces the Soviets have attained a rough equivalence. In the conventional area they have increased the danger to our Asian and European allies. They have aimed for the status of global power—the capacity for direct involvement even in distant regions. And now in Afghanistan they have shown no hesitancy in applying their power in a brutal attempt to crush a sovereign neighbor.

The question facing Americans is not whether we should respond to these developments; all agree that we must. The real question is whether we will continue with a well-conceived and measured response tailored to the actual threats we face or whether we will run off wildly in all directions at once, spending vastly greater sums to little, if any, effect.

Let me briefly survey what the response thus far has been. In overall terms our arms spending is no longer dropping. It is growing. Our defense spending declined in 7 of the 8 years just before President Carter took office—a total drop of more than 37%.

Since President Carter's inauguration, however, defense spending has increased 4 years in a row—for overall growth of 10% after inflation. And if the President's 5-year plan is carried out, the increase by 1985 will exceed 27%.

To make it absolutely clear that we are not proposing to squeeze our Armed Forces, let me just note here that this 5-year defense program calls for appropriations of over $1 *trillion* between now and 1985.

Even so, there are those who pronounce that effort insufficient. They insist upon a still larger arms budget. They will not tell us what it would contain. They leave those decisions for later. They simply want "more"—of whatever, as if shoveling out the taxpayer's money is a desirable end in itself. That is a formula not for greater security but for guaranteed waste—a failing to avoid in defense just as much as in any other part of the budget.

Instead we need a carefully structured defense program that responds effectively to specific dangers. And that is what we have. In conventional forces, the Carter Administration began promptly in 1977 to address the military deficiencies of NATO—matters which previously had received abundant discussion and precious little concrete attention.

Today the NATO Long-Term Defense Program, an American initiative, is in its third year. Problems ranging from readiness and prompt reinforcement to integrating air defenses are no longer simply being studied; they are being solved. These NATO improvements are underwritten by an alliance agreement to increase defense spending by at least 3% each year—another initiative of the United States.

We are engaged in a broad modernization of the Army's weapons and equipment. We have begun the first full-scale modernization of tactical air forces since the Vietnam war. And our shipbuilding program will produce 97 new ships over the next 5 years, building toward a newer and more capable fleet of 550 ships, in contrast to 476 in 1977.

With these programs moving forward, we have also begun bolstering our ability to respond to emergencies outside the major alliance regions—including the vital Middle East-Persian Gulf area. Our naval presence there today is the strongest ever. We have negotiated new agreements for access to ports and airfields. We are prepositioning equipment and supplies in the Indian Ocean area. A new cargo aircraft is being developed. The elements of a rapid deployment force have been designated, and exercises are underway.

Our programs in the area of nuclear

now filled with after-the-fact prescriptions of belligerence. We are told that greater American military might could have prevented the course of events in Iran or in Nicaragua. But the fact is that in the world as it is, American military forces cannot provide a satisfactory solution to the internal problems of other nations. If we tried to order the affairs of other nations by force, we would be endlessly at war all over the globe. And how would we then differ from the Soviet Union and its actions in Afghanistan or Ethiopia?

In dealing with disputes both among and within nations, our wisest course is to work to resolve crises before they erupt—through patient and persistent diplomacy and through support for human progress.

Peace Among Nations

Today, the people of Israel and Egypt live in greater security than at any point in a generation. Certainly, both face threats from beyond their borders. But they live at peace with each other.

The Camp David accord that produced this historic peace treaty was an act of courage and statesmanship by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin. And especially, it was the product of President Carter's determined, persistent efforts to find a formula that could encompass the concerns of both sides.

Now, we are engaged in the next step—negotiations on the fundamental issues of a comprehensive peace in the area. Progress has been slow. It will continue to be. But there is progress. The talks continue. There can be more progress, if we persist.

In this region, and in others, we must recall the words of John F. Kennedy. "We can push a button to start the next war," he reminded us, "but there is no push-button magic to bring a just and lasting peace." That peace will only come if we are as patient as we are determined; if we are steady in our course, because it is the only course that offers practical progress.

Peace Within Nations

We must also recognize the unbreakable connection between peace and human progress. A nation cannot be at peace if its people are not at peace—if their political, economic, and social rights are not protected and advanced. No person who cherishes his or her own rights can rest comfortably when the cancer of discrimination persists or spreads, as we have seen recently with an alarming increase in ugly incidents of anti-Semitism in various countries. This is a development that all people of decency deplore. It is a denial of the most fundamental human rights.

There is a very practical connection between human rights and our own security. People around the world are demanding that they see in their own lives the benefits of national economic growth. In many countries, they are insisting on greater participation in the affairs of their governments. These are facts. We welcome them for they match our own national traditions.

These demands for progress are demands for change—demands that can create instability. But when they go unmet, governments can lose legitimacy in the eyes of their people. Vicious cycles of violence and repression and radicalism are too often the result.

This is why no one should automatically equate stability and the status quo. We must come to grips with the currents of change in the world. Contrast, for a moment, the peace within such democratic nations as Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Nigeria, and Ghana to the events we have seen in Iran and Nicaragua, where repression and economic inequities led to an agony of violence. It is, therefore, in our national interest to support human rights and democracy.

Nowhere, in recent years, has the wisdom of this approach—the direct connection between peace and progress—been better demonstrated than in our policies toward Rhodesia. Despite the pressures in this country to support the minority regime there, President Carter held firm for a settlement based on free elections and racial justice. Because of the efforts of many nations, such a settlement was achieved. And today, after free elections, the new nation of Zimbabwe knows more peace than anyone had imagined possible. Our challenge now is to support the economic, human progress there that can preserve this peace in the years to come.

Conclusion

Every American cherishes peace. In such difficult and complex times, it is not surprising that there are different views on how peace is to be nurtured and preserved. Here is what I believe.

- Peace is hard. It will require great sacrifice and courage in the years ahead—the strength to deter aggression and the will to tend to our defenses.
- Peace is also fragile. Without prudence it can easily be shattered. Without care and patience and steadiness, its web cannot be spun.
- And peace is a human condition, not merely the technical absence of war among nations. So long as injustice exists, peace will only hold if there is constant, visible, tangible human progress.

I believe that on our understanding and application of these points will depend our nation's contribution to peace in the difficult decade ahead and thus our own future safety and success.

[1] Press release 282. ■

News Conferences in New York

SEPT. 25, 1980[1]

I assume you have distributed the announcement we have on the TNF [theater nuclear forces] talks.[2]

Let me say with respect to the Gromyko meeting that Mr. Gromyko emphasized the importance of complete confidentiality, of being able to speak freely, and I don't want to prejudice the dialogue which ought to continue. So I am going to have to be cagier than I usually am about that, and I may even be noncommunicative. We did not cover as many subjects as I thought we might, which suggests that we discussed some of them more comprehensively than I had expected we might. It was, I think—both sides were relaxed—a hard-hitting discussion. One recalls the two speeches we made to the General Assembly. One would expect them to be hard-hitting but not abusive in any sense—verbally abusive or physically. I think it was a chance for both of us to get points before the other that we found disturbing, and we did so, both using frankness and candor to make clear the depth of our concerns about the other's policies and actions.

Q. Can you address yourself more than you did in the statement outside the Soviet mission this morning about we're both neutral to how the two of you approached the Iraqi-Iranian problem and where either our individual efforts or their individual efforts or our collaborative efforts stand at trying to defuse that fighting?

A. Since I opened up that subject that much, I ought to say this much more about it lest there be some confusion. We really each stated what we

said publicly about our positions.

Ours is clear, that we are neutral in this matter, that we think urgently that the hostilities should cease, and that the parties take their differences to the negotiating table. We welcome a meeting of the Security Council to support such for the purpose of calling for cease-fire negotiations and also to pursue our respective diplomatic channels to seek to influence both Iraq and Iran in any way we can—our influence in Iran is obviously limited—to influence them to implement a cease-fire. Mr. Gromyko stated their position which is similar: It did not respond to or reject the Security Council or the diplomatic offensive idea. Whether as events unfold, we do pursue parallel lines, only time will tell.

Q. Since the Soviet Union is the largest supplier of arms to Iraq and since, therefore, presumably it would have some leverage by stating its neutrality, in effect, the Soviets are allowing the fighting to continue. They're not exerting a positive influence and, therefore, in effect they are taking sides on the side of Iraq. Is that a correct analysis?

A. I think there are competing analyses, but I don't think it is useful for me to get into them. I think you ought to take that up with Mr. Gromyko.

Q. Let me put it another way. Would you have preferred that the Soviets become less neutral and fall in behind the U.N. effort?

A. The problem of undertaking to influence the course of action other countries may take in this situation, given the pressures they may feel in this situation, can be a counterproductive proposition.

I stated my view to Mr. Gromyko as I did my government's view, which is my view, because I regarded that as representing the maximum that I should do in trying to influence his actions. His actions he'll decide. I don't think it is useful for me to try to speculate beyond what he said to me.

Q. Trying to conceive, trying to imagine what advantage the Soviets would gain from the war ending, if we can assume there's a lot we have to lose—or the West has to lose—in the war continuing, from your point of view what possible interest do they have in helping to end the war? Why should they? Where do they stand to lose if the war continues? We stand to lose, the West stands to lose oil supplies. What do they stand to lose?

A. The whole world stands to lose in this area, which is such an unstable area, so potentially explosive. Hostilities erupt which could escalate. It could even escalate to the point where the ultimate, unthinkable hostilities may take place.

We have discussed the Middle East in these terms since the invention of the nuclear weapon, and we have always regarded the Middle East as the most sensitive and the most unstable area, therefore the most dangerous. I doubt that the Russians have lost that perception. I am sure we haven't. And the whole Middle East conflict has been put in this context. Nobody gains. That's the way in which it ought to be viewed. Nobody gains. I don't believe even the Iraqis and the Iranians have gained from the outbreak of hostilities of this kind. If that isn't the perception, then I don't understand why there appears to be widespread understanding in this institution that action ought to be taken, although there is reluctance about taking the initiative. Nevertheless, there is widespread understanding. It must be there's widespread appreciation of the fact that nobody, including the Soviet Union, gains from the continuation of these hostilities.

Q. Can't the Soviets gain by fragmentation of Iran? Isn't there some dividend in that for them, that and, of course, isn't there for us?

A. I don't believe they've gained very much at this point from their intervention in Afghanistan. And, if the situation that has developed is tempting them into a similar situation, you know they have already had a world reaction to their Afghanistan intervention. Would it be in their interest—I doubt it—to confirm that the world's interpretation of their intervention in Afghanistan is justified?

Q. If the premise is that the Soviet Union sees the danger of escalation in that part of the world as clearly as we do and that their views of nonintervention and neutrality are parallel with our own, why shouldn't it be comparatively easy to achieve a joint statement to that effect which would have considerable effect—a joint Soviet-American statement that neither side will intervene and that there should be no other intervention in Iran, that a cease-fire should take place, should be encouraged between Iran and Iraq? We seem to be operating through a pane of glass.

A. That's true. I'm learning, as perhaps you are, that that's the nature of this institution. It operates through panes of plate glass.

But, with respect to your suggestion, in the first place our position in this conflict is a very delicate and sensitive one given our problem in Iran. Their perception, at least as they have announced it, of our involvement in it is totally false and unfounded. Nevertheless, for us to be perceived as taking an initiative, which if executed at a given moment would find them at a disadvantage, surely would not be helpful to our interests. How the Soviets might interpret the impact of their joining in such an initiative, I would not undertake to define. But there is that problem. We are not in a position to take the lead here at this point. That's not misunderstood around here. So we're undertaking to move as we have for so long now in the Iranian situation—quietly, through diplomatic channels and private consultations, to achieve our objectives. We can't do it by beating the drum or shouting from the rooftops.

Q. Will you be meeting Mr. Gromyko again or will he be going to Washington to discuss this with the President?

A. No. This morning's meeting went beyond the time that was scheduled so that each of us could raise what we regarded as the highest priority items. If there had been others, I think we would have continued longer. There was the possibility that we might have adjourned to come back this afternoon if we hadn't finished.

Q. You've now had two meetings with Mr. Gromyko over several months' period. How would you now describe the state of relations?

A. I think our two speeches to the General Assembly do that. We each find fault—serious fault—with the other's policies to the point where we each question the other's intentions and have doubts about it. Yet I think it's important that we are able to express those questions and doubts to each other face-to-face, to do it in a reasonable, if hardened, way. We've slipped back from the days of maximum accommodation as a result of Afghanistan from our point of view, and as a result of U.S. actions which they identify as a cause of their disillusionment. And it's going to be a slow process to climb out of it, to climb back up to a more normal relationship. We both, I think, indicated today that that is our objective. Each of us would prefer normal relationships. But we see problem A, B,

the SALT II Treaty—an agreement that is strongly in our national interest—when it is feasible early next year. Rising tensions do not weaken the case for SALT; instead they remind us why arms control is essential—to curtail the arsenal aimed at us, to avert a futile arms race, to lessen the chance that a fatal miscalculation will reduce both nations to rubble.

For we strengthen our long-term security, not through rhetoric, but through a clear and lasting demonstration that we have the national will to oppose aggression. And we also strengthen our security through a willingness to seek concrete agreements that limit the nuclear threats we face.

Third, the United States today is deeply engaged in the search for peaceful, negotiated solutions to potentially explosive regional disputes.

For the first time since its creation, Israel and Egypt—its most powerful Arab neighbor—live not in fragile truce but in solid peace. And for the first time, negotiations are underway on the basic issues that must be resolved to achieve a broader peace in this part of the Middle East.

The agreement we reached with Panama, after 14 years of negotiation, has provided a sounder future for the canal and has improved our position throughout Latin America.

Our unwavering support for negotiations in Rhodesia helped bring an end to a bloody civil war there, a majority rule government, and a decent hope for peace free from outside interference.

Each step we take today toward easing these international tensions is a step toward preventing broader conflict tomorrow. I believe the American people want us to persist in these efforts.

Fourth, the United States today is working to strengthen our economic position in the world, for the sake of our consumers and businessmen, our farmers and our workers.

We have reached a major international trade agreement that makes sure we can compete fairly. We are pursuing a program for increased American productivity. More than ever before, through summits and constant consultations, we are coordinating our economic policies with our major allies, for the benefit of all.

And perhaps most important, we have improved our energy position. U.S. oil imports are down 25% since 1977; our domestic energy production is up; and, with our allies, we have improved energy-sharing arrangements in case of serious world shortages. We must go further down the road of conservation and increased production. But the thin margin of safety we have achieved, and need during the Iran-Iraqi conflict, shows that we are on the right road.

Fifth, the United States today has a foreign policy that is asserting our national commitment to human rights.

America's strength in the world not only depends upon our military power. It rests more on what we stand for as a nation. We stand for human freedom. Human freedom unites us as a people. Human freedom distinguishes us from our adversaries. And standing for human freedom is deeply in our national interest.

As we Americans know, freedom and stability strengthen each other. Repression can break the ties between a government and its people, increasing the potential for violent change. We have seen how the turmoil of convulsive change—as in Iran—can directly affect our own nation. We will not rest until all of our people are home from Iran, safe and free. This has been a dark chapter for those throughout the world who value human rights.

But as we look at the world clearly, we also see a resurgence of the democratic values we support. In Portugal, Spain and Greece, in Nigeria and Ghana and Zimbabwe, in Ecuador and Peru, democracy has restored to the people control of their own destinies. We should find in this movement renewed confidence that the current of democracy and human freedom continues to run strong in the world, and that it is in our interest to support it and be a part of it.

Sixth and finally, the United States today is building stronger relationships with countries of growing importance on the world scene.

One out of four of the world's people live in China. And today we are building a new relationship with their government, based upon normalized relations.

In less than 20 years, four out of five people in the world will live in the developing world. The economic progress and long-term stability of developing nations is increasingly important to our own daily lives. We cannot expect to have their support on matters important to us if we are not prepared to provide practical support on issues of importance to them —defending their national independence and building their economies and societies.

Thus, in our own interest, the next several years must be a time when we move ahead—not slide backward—in developing our relations with the nations of Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East.

These policies, and these accomplishments, are helping to shape a world of change. There inevitably will be debate about specific decisions that have been made. But I am firmly convinced that, for all the frustrations in dealing with this new world, America is on the right road —the road of engagement and progress, not isolation and reaction.

Our course makes sense. We need to continue, not turn back. As an American novelist once put it, "We cannot walk backward into the future." If we try, the future will belong to others. With a steady increase in American strength, with American pragmatism harnessed to American ideals, we will continue to move forward into a future we help create.

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[1] Press release 273. ■

Question-and-Answer Session Following Memphis Address

Q. You indicated that one of your greatest concerns was the lack of passage for the foreign assistance appropriations bill, and you indicated that you felt this was a significant alternative to increased defense spending.

I would like to know what the current status is of many of the problems that you brought up at that time in terms of Nicaragua, the Cambodian refugees, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, disaster relief—have those been dealt with, or is that still a real problem?

A. Let me cite two rather current situations in which America could use its resources in the pursuit of our own national interest and stability in the world: One is Zimbabwe, and the second is Poland.

In Zimbabwe we have seen years of war converted into peace and the responsibility for maintaining that peace placed in the hands of a government which, a few months ago, might have been regarded as extreme but which has proven in practice to be moderate. But the challenge of this government is to justify its policies of moderation with its success or failure in dealing with the needs of the people of a war-ravaged country, for economic development and opportunity.

Zimbabwe is a country of great resources, but the infrastructure has been largely destroyed; so investment is needed—capital from the world's private sector and also government. The unfortunate fact is that in terms of our budget for foreign assistance, the resources which we have available to be of assistance are largely in the form of a prayer at the present time. If we could help make the Zimbabwe experience work, we might then be able to move on to convert the South Africa problem into one of peaceful change for justice and equality.

The Libya problem: The whole southern area of Africa could be converted peacefully rather than in a violent, revolutionary way, but the importance of the investment should be clear.

Poland: I suppose most Americans have cheered at the courage and the persistence and the willingness to take risks on the part of the Polish workers in seeking to change their system sufficiently to give them a voice and an influence.

The government is struggling with enormous economic problems, and whether or not they are dealt with effectively could well make the difference in the struggle of the Polish workers for a greater measure of freedom and influence over their own lives, or slipping back into the period from which they have tried to emerge.

There are examples of this all over the world. I see them as doors of opportunity; opportunity to help influence the course of human events in those areas—those countries and others—toward the kind of world that measures up to the American view of what brings stability and peace to a people.

If you were to sit in my seat in the State Department on a day-to-day basis you would be as frustrated as I at the number of times we have to turn away from similar doors of opportunity. We have not had a foreign aid appropriations bill since 1979. We have been operating throughout this fiscal year with a continuing resolution which means that we are permitted the amounts that were provided in the 1979 appropriation, or the amount requested by the Administration for 1980—whichever is the smaller figure.

We never did get a 1980 appropriations bill, and there is a question as to whether or not we will get a 1981 appropriations bill.

Now the Congress and the American people find it relatively easy to support tens of billions of dollars of increases in defense spending. Some of this, of course, is necessary. But we completely overlook this much cheaper route to bringing stability and order to the world.

Q. I understand we still have deployed in Europe roughly 225,000 men in the forward areas as part of the overall NATO force. How long will this deployment be required?

Now it's my understanding that the original bill passed by the Congress in 1951 called initially for a U.S. SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe] who would, at the end of 5 years turn the command over to either a German or a Frenchman or a Turk or an Italian. And, of course, I think we have a dynasty of 31 years of American SACEURs, and these troops have remained in place for about the same length of time.

Also, the German deployment now are about 490,000–500,000 troops. I think there is a lot of comment, countrywide—or criticism of that fact at least, to have to continue to maintain those troops in Europe.

A. I think the number of troops in Europe is closer to 300,000, and the figure which you mentioned is lower. They are an essential part of our common defense in Europe.

There was a point, which you will recall at which there was considerable pressure to withdraw our troops from Europe. Senator [Michael J., now Ambassador to Japan] Mansfield sponsored an amendment that I think came within one or two votes of passing, 1 year to that effect.

But then we began to develop a different perception of the Soviet Union, the nature of its threat, and the importance of restraint upon the Soviet Union. So our common effort as a NATO alliance has grown and strengthened in recent years—especially the last 3½–4 years—so the presence of American troops is now—

I am not sure that it wouldn't be sufficient if they had been at 150,000–200,000 at the beginning, and were still at those figures. But to sharply reduce American troops in Europe would be a signal—not only to our European friends but to the Soviet Union—that we were becoming less interested, less concerned about defense of Europe than we were. That kind of shift, I think, would have a very negative effect upon our own security interests.

Now we are undertaking, through the mutual and balanced force reduction talks, to bring about a reduction of both Soviet and allied troops in Europe—and that means principally Americans. We have been stalled on a couple of issues that are somewhat technical, and I won't take the time, unless further questions seek the information, to discuss those technical points.

Our view, at the moment, is that the best chance—due to the tensions in Europe and the risks of war with the Soviet Union in Europe—is to work toward a mutual reduction of forces and

and the additional measures under negotiation to facilitate verification of compliance with the treaty, must first be agreed in principle, and then drafted in detail, which is of course a laborious process. It must be done with care because the implementation of these measures will have important impact not only on ensuring compliance with the treaty, but also on political relations among its parties.

14. It has been agreed that the parties will use national technical means of verification at their disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law to verify compliance with the treaty and that each party will undertake not to interfere with such means of verification.

15. It has long been recognized that cooperative seismic monitoring measures can make an important contribution to verifying compliance with the treaty. The Committee on Disarmament and its predecessors have played a leading role in developing such measures. On the basis of the work done in the past few years under those auspices, the negotiating parties have agreed to provisions establishing an international exchange of seismic data. Each treaty party will have the right to participate in this exchange, to contribute data from designated seismic stations on its territory and to receive all the seismic data made available through the international exchange. Seismic data will be transmitted through the global telecommunications system of the World Meteorological Organization or through other agreed communications channels. International seismic data centers will be established in agreed locations, taking into account the desirability of appropriate geographical distribution.

16. A committee of experts will be established to consider questions related to the international seismic data exchange and all treaty parties will be entitled to appoint representatives to participate in the work of the committee. The committee of experts will be responsible for developing detailed arrangements for establishing and operating the international exchange, drawing on the recommendations of the ad hoc group of scientific experts, which was established under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and has continued its work under the Committee on Disarmament. Arrangements for establishing and operating the international exchange will include the development of standards for the technical and operational characteristics of participating seismic stations and international seismic data centers, for the form in which data are transmitted to the centers and for the form and manner in which the centers make seismic data available to the participants and respond to their requests for additional seismic data regarding specified seismic events.

17. In addition to its role in setting up the international exchange, the committee of experts will have ongoing responsibility for facilitating the implementation of the international exchange, for reviewing its operation and considering improvements to it and for considering technological developments that have a bearing on its operation. The committee will serve as a forum in which treaty parties may exchange technical information and cooperate in promoting the effectiveness of the international exchange. The committee of experts will hold its first meeting not later than ninety days after the entry into force of the treaty and will meet thereafter as it determines.

18. The negotiating parties have agreed to other cooperative measures as well. There will be provision in the treaty for direct consultations, and on the exchange of inquiries and responses among treaty parties in order to resolve questions that may arise concerning treaty compliance. If a party has questions regarding an event on the territory of any other party, it may request an on-site inspection for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the event was a nuclear explosion. The requesting party shall state the reasons for its request, including appropriate evidence. The party which receives the request, understanding the importance of ensuring confidence among parties that treaty obligations are being fulfilled, shall state whether or not it is prepared to agree to an inspection. If the party which receives the request is not prepared to agree to an inspection on its territory, it shall provide the reasons for its decision. Tripartite agreement on these general conditions with regard to on-site inspections represents an important achievement by the negotiating parties in resolving issues regarding verification of compliance with the treaty.

19. The three negotiating parties believe that the verification measures being negotiated—particularly the provisions regarding the international exchange of seismic data, the committee of experts and on-site inspections—break significant new ground in international arms limitation efforts and will give all treaty parties the opportunity to participate in a substantial and constructive way in the process of verifying compliance with the treaty.

20. The treaty will also contain a provision permitting any two or more treaty parties, because of special concerns or circumstances, to agree by mutual consent upon additional measures to facilitate verification of compliance with the treaty. The three negotiating parties have agreed that it is necessary to develop such additional measures for themselves in connection with the treaty under negotiation.

21. The additional measures to facilitate verification of compliance with the treaty, while paralleling those of the treaty itself, will specify in greater detail the procedures under which on-site inspection would be conducted, and will incorporate a list of the rights and functions of the personnel carrying out the inspection. They will also contain a description of the role to be played by the host party during an inspection.

22. In addition, the three parties are negotiating an exchange of supplemental seismic data that would involve the installation and use by the three parties of high-quality national seismic stations of agreed characteristics.

23. Despite significant accomplishments, there are important areas where substantial work is still to be done.

24. The three negotiating parties have demonstrated their strong political commitment to completion of this treaty by achieving solutions to problems that for many years made a treaty difficult to attain. Most notable in this regard are the agreements concerning the prohibition of any nuclear weapon test explosion in any environment, the moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the general conditions with regard to on-site inspections and a number of important seismic verification issues.

25. The negotiating parties are mindful of the great value for all mankind that the prohibition of nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments will have, and they are conscious of the important responsibility placed upon them to find solutions to the remaining problems. The three negotiating parties have come far in their pursuit of a sound treaty and continue to believe that their trilateral negotiations offer the best way forward. They are determined to exert their best efforts and necessary will and persistence to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion.■

CSCE Review Meeting in Madrid

by Rozanne L. Ridgway

Statement before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 16, 1980. Ambassador Ridgway is Counselor of the Department of State.[1]

I would like to speak briefly about the manner in which the United States will pursue its foreign policy objectives at the Madrid review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which opens on November 11. I will give special attention to our human rights goals but will also point out the other important areas of the Helsinki Final Act, such as military security and economic cooperation, which will be of concern to us.

The Helsinki Final Act, signed in 1975 by the heads of state or government of 33 European countries, the United States, and Canada, was a diplomatic milestone.[2] In this document, 35 countries, East and West, made a solemn pledge to work for the furtherance of security and cooperation in Europe. They knew full well that wide differences still divided them but sought consciously to narrow those differences.

The particular genius of the Final Act was that it recognized the need to base international cooperation on the foundation of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Final Act thus gave rise to new hopes among the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Some formed groups to monitor their own countries' compliance with the Helsinki accords. Such groups were formed in the United States and other Western countries, but in the East they have been severely repressed, contrary to the intent of the Final Act.

The Final Act established a wide-ranging agenda for cooperation between East and West. We have barely begun to accomplish the tasks the Final Act envisioned for the participating states. These include the full observance of human rights and improvement of human contacts. They also include cooperation in military security, economics, science, culture, and other fields.

The fundamental, long-term U.S. goal in CSCE is the full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. The Final Act's drafters showed remarkable foresight in establishing periodic review meetings like the Belgrade conference and the upcoming gathering in Madrid. These provide the opportunity to examine how well or poorly the CSCE countries have carried out their commitments. The fact that their performance will be discussed among 35 countries is an important stimulus to do better.

Now let there be no mistake. We are not satisfied with the record so far, particularly in the area of human rights and human contacts. There have been failures and violations of the most serious sort. But they are failures which must now be measured against an international standard, to which even the countries most guilty of violations have subscribed. The fact of violations does not make this standard less important. So the United States will go to Madrid determined to press for progress in implementation and in strengthening of the Final Act. We are under no illusions that achieving full implementation of the Final Act is an easy job or that it can be accomplished overnight. On the contrary, it will require persistence and patience. But we are prepared to pursue this goal consistently and continuously. At Madrid, we will present our views forcefully, as we will in various bilateral meetings under CSCE auspices.

Human Rights Obligations

The Madrid CSCE review conference will have human rights as a central topic. Let me outline some of the major human rights provisions of the Helsinki accords and how the United States intends to approach the subject at Madrid.

Principle seven of the Declaration of Principles [Guiding Relations between Participating States], the first section and guiding light of the Final Act, obligates the signatories to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all—including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief—without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. This provision also confirms the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field. This latter point underscores the fact that the Final Act was designed not only to promote better relations among nations but also to facilitate contacts among private citizens and improve the lives of ordinary people.

Basket 3 of the Final Act—Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields—contains specific provisions to facilitate the freer flow of ideas, information, and people among the participating states. Of special note are the sections which call on all the CSCE signatories to:

- Facilitate the reunification of families and family visits across national borders;
- Make it easier for people to enter or leave their country for the purpose of marrying citizens from other participating states;
- Reduce barriers to travel for personal and professional reasons;
- Improve the circulation of information and access to it, including filmed and broadcast information as well as printed material; and
- Improve the working conditions of journalists from the participating states.

It is primarily in the area of basket 3, rather than principle seven, that there has been some progress in fulfilling the human rights goals of the Final Act. We note, for example, that the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia have made notable efforts to resolve divided family cases. In other individuals areas, however, there have often been little or no progress and even some backward steps. The arrest and continued incarceration of Helsinki monitors, the exile of Dr. Sakharov, and many similar occurrences are violations of the Final Act which we cannot and should not ignore. The recent resumption by the Soviet Union of jamming the Voice of America and other foreign broadcasts is another case in point.

Despite results which are mixed to date, we consider CSCE to be a valuable instrument for advancing our human rights policy. We will go to Madrid with the aim of seeking frank and serious discussions of the problems in implementation of all the areas mentioned above. Because of the Final Act and the process which it has set in motion, the Eastern European governments in particular have become more sensitive to outside opinion about their human rights records. This sensitivity may act as a brake on more egregious violations of their own laws and the accepted Western norms.

Aside from human rights, which will continue to be the major area of interest for us, there are other CSCE areas which are also of concern. CSCE is a balance of interests—between East and West, between alliance members and neutral and

quest. We are dealing with a conflict of long duration and intense feelings. There can be no shortcuts.

So today I call on all members of this Assembly to lend their support to these negotiations. Camp David has proved so far, and remains for the future, the most hopeful and productive avenue to peace in the Middle East. There is no alternative to negotiations except further conflict. Let us remember that differences are rivers to be crossed, not reasons to turn back.

That persistence can bear fruit—that negotiations can yield peace—has been reaffirmed in recent months in southern Africa. Through arduous negotiations, the new nation of Zimbabwe has been born in peace. Today we have reason to celebrate not only this accomplishment but also the way in which nations worked together to achieve it. And for the future, the Zimbabwe settlement offers hope—and a model—for peaceful settlements in southern Africa and elsewhere.

The United States will continue its strong efforts to advance the U.N. plan for Namibia. There are no major substantive issues left to be resolved. I am convinced that the U.N. plan would be implemented fairly. All that remains is for South Africa to act in its own interest, in the interest of peace in the region, and in the interest of the Namibian people—to accept implementation of the U.N. settlement. If that does not happen soon, this chance for peace could be lost, and we would face a bitter future of protracted conflict and tragic human suffering.

The settlement in Zimbabwe can also provide a precedent for peaceful change in South Africa. We will continue to urge the Government of South Africa to abandon the repugnant policy of apartheid. We consider it urgent that talks among representative leaders begin on the issue of peaceful, orderly change in South Africa—while there is still time.

We must continue our search for peace and restoration of respect for international law in other parts of the world as well. In Lebanon, in Cyprus, and elsewhere, we will lend our full support to the peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations.

And although the holding of American hostages in Iran is not an item on the agenda of this Assembly, it remains a matter of extreme urgency that this tragic impasse be resolved—resolved in a way that strengthens peace and restores respect for international law. The continuing situation in Iran contributes to uncertainty about security and stability in Southwest Asia. The security of Iran itself and the stability of the area depend on a united, strong, and independent Iran living at peace with its neighbors.

With the end of the former regime and the death of the late Shah, a chapter in Iran's history has closed. As a new chapter opens, we emphasize that we recognize the reality of the Iranian revolution, and we respect the right of the Iranian people to choose their own form of government without intervention of any kind. With the emergence of a new constitution and governmental structure and the gradual consolidation of authority, the Islamic Republic of Iran can assume its obligations and independent role in this community of nations.

An indispensable step will be the safe return to their families of the American hostages in Iran. Throughout the 324 days of their captivity, the members and institutions of the United Nations have expressed their concern for the hostages in numberless ways and channels. With their safe release, as repeatedly called for by the Security Council and the International Court of Justice, Iran could end its isolation from those nations that live in accordance with international law, and sanctions would be terminated.

Today I urge the nation of Iran, its Parliament, and its people also to consider the human face of the hostage problem. These innocent people and their families have experienced acute suffering. I ask this community of nations to join us in urging that their ordeal be brought to a safe, honorable, and prompt end. We also know that in Iran, as in the United States, there are deep feelings as a result of grievances and suffering perceived in the past. We are prepared to do our part in resolving fairly the issues between us.

The Iranian Parliament has announced that it will name a commission to deal with the hostage question. We hope that this positive step will bring the Government of Iran closer to a decision on release of the hostages.

The United States shares many common values with the people of Iran. When the safe return of all the hostages to their families is assured, we are prepared to deal on a basis of mutual respect and equality with all the outstanding issues and misunderstandings between Iran and the United States and to reach understandings on the principles which will govern our relationship.

As we look to the future, I urge the United Nations, as soon as possible, to take firm and effective measures to counter the global menace of attacks upon diplomats and others. The danger it poses to civilized international life is growing; no institution of peace can afford to ignore it.

For our part, the United States seeks peace with all nations. Whether it be with Iran or with the Soviet Union, we are eager to reduce tensions and to restore productive relations as soon as their actions allow. In all cases, our policies will reflect our commitment to noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations. As President Carter has affirmed, we will not interfere in Poland's affairs, and we expect that others will also respect the right of the Polish nation to resolve its own problems in its own way.



(U.N. photo)

Secretary Muskie consults with U.N. Secretary General Waldheim.

Controlling Arms

Another obligation of nations is the control and limitation of arms. A period of heightened tension in the world makes this obligation more difficult to fulfill but also more urgently important. For this reason, let me underscore anew today the commitment of my government to arms control—to practical measures that contribute to world peace and enhance international stability. President Carter voiced this basic commitment when he was sworn in as President in January 1977. It remains equally valid today.

Let me give you several concrete illustrations of this commitment. Some of the arms control efforts I will mention involve active participation by the United Nations; others involve negotiations outside the U.N. framework. But all are of intense concern to the international community—for an unrestrained arms race would darken the horizon for all humanity.

First. It is President Carter's intention to move forward as speedily as possible toward ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Accordingly, the President intends to consult with the leadership of the U.S. Senate soon after the election with a view to resuming the ratification process as soon as feasible.

We consider it of cardinal importance to ratify SALT II and move forward with the SALT process. The Soviet Union, however, must recognize that for many Americans, recent Soviet actions have called into question the Soviet Union's commitment to international peace and cooperation. Accordingly, we call upon the Soviet Union to act in ways that will enhance, not damage, the prospects for SALT II and for other arms control efforts.

Second. We are committed to the pursuit of meaningful and equal limitations on theater nuclear forces in the framework of SALT III. We are ready to begin talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister this week to discuss this subject and to seek agreement on the arrangements for beginning these talks promptly.

Third. We are committed to seeking an effective and verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty. Substantial progress has been made toward this goal, and we are determined to continue pursuing these efforts vigorously.

Fourth. The United States is committed in the Vienna talks to achieving mutual and balanced force reductions and limitations to diminish the risks inherent in the massive presence of military forces in central Europe.

Fifth. We are prepared to develop further the security aspects of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). If the international situation permits and if there is balanced progress in all areas at the CSCE review conference in Madrid—including the human rights area—we are prepared to consider a post-Madrid European conference of the CSCE signatory states on developing militarily significant confidence-building measures.

Sixth. We support the effort of the newly expanded Committee on Disarmament to develop the provisions of an international convention on radiological weapons. We also support its work toward a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, and we continue to pursue our bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on an effective prohibition against chemical weapons.

Finally, the further spread of nuclear weapons would constitute a serious threat to international peace and security. We firmly support efforts, therefore, to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. The Nonproliferation Treaty is a cornerstone of these efforts. We strongly urge nonparties to embrace the treaty for it enhances the security of all nations, nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states alike. At the recently concluded Nonproliferaton Treaty review conference, there was unanimous agreement on the fundamental soundness of the treaty and the desirability of universal adherence to it. For those non-nuclear-weapon states that have not joined the treaty, we attach particular importance to the goal of achieving comprehensive, full-scope international safeguards coverage. We believe that acceptance of such coverage should become a condition of new nuclear supply commitments to such states. We will continue to work for a world in which all nations can share in the peaceful use of nuclear energy without the danger of spreading nuclear weapons.

Before I leave this subject, let me emphasize our deep concern over another arms control matter. If arms control is to be successful, agreements must be fully honored. Questions such as those raised by persistent reports that chemical weapons have been used in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea cannot be ignored by the international community. To do so would undermine both arms control and international law. The United States, therefore, welcomes the emphasis placed by the Committee on Disarmament at its most recent session on the need for international efforts to determine the facts behind these reports. We believe that an impartial investigation into these reports could most appropriately be launched under the auspices of the United Nations.

Important as they are, the obligations I have mentioned by no means exhaust the responsibilities which rest upon us as nations, and as a community of nations, if we are to secure peace. By peace, I mean not the fragile, artificial stability that comes with repression of a people by their government. I mean the true stability of societies that are at peace with themselves because the rights of their citizens are protected and nurtured.

Upholding Human Rights

So let me close by underscoring another obligation of nations: our obligation to uphold human rights and to concern ourselves compassionately with fundamental human needs. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the community of nations has nobly defined the concepts of human rights and human dignity—just as in the U.N. Charter we have outlined the precepts of peaceful cooperation.

The failure of nations to live up to these human rights obligations is a continuing tragedy made painfully manifest

U.S. Delegation to the 35th U.N. General Assembly

Representatives

Donald F. McHenry
William J. vanden Heuvel
Hannah D. Atkins
Jacob K. Javits, U.S. Senator from the State of New York
Paul E. Tsongas, U.S. Senator from the State of Massachusetts

Alternate Representatives

Nathan Landow
Barbara Newsom
Richard W. Petree
Joan Edelman Spero
H. Carl McCall

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 29, 1980.

weapons reflect this same commitment to the deterrence of war through the assurance of strength. Last year, NATO adopted our recommendations for modernizing theater nuclear forces in Europe. On intercontinental or strategic nuclear forces, the hard decisions have been made. A sweeping modernization of all three parts of our nuclear triad—land, sea, and air—is moving ahead.

- For the strategic bomber forces, President Carter took the soundest course, even though it meant also taking some political heat. Instead of sinking billions of dollars in a B–1 bomber with a doubtful future, he decided to equip our existing bombers with air-launched cruise missiles. In place of an old concept highly vulnerable to Soviet countermoves, he selected an array of advanced technologies that can surmount foreseeable Soviet defenses.
- At sea, the Trident submarine program was put back on track. The first of those modern submarines will join the fleet next year. Portions of the existing fleet already have the Trident I missile, with major improvements in range and power.
- And on the land, the new MX missile, with mobile basing, will overcome the chief source of potential nuclear instability—the growing vulnerability of missiles fixed in silos. As with our bomber forces, President Carter rejected second-best suggestions and made sure we had the best plan before construction began, so we would not have to waste time and money later fixing the mistakes.

SALT II

Along with these programs—cruise missiles, Trident, the MX—there is a fourth program I want to mention—a "secret weapon," if you will. Let me list some of its capabilities. By itself, this secret weapon would knock out about one-fourth of all long-range Soviet missiles and bombers that we project for 1985. It would do that without launching a nuclear war; indeed, without even firing a shot. In the process, it would eliminate thousands of individual warheads and bombs that the Soviet arsenal could otherwise have aimed at our country. The secret weapon has surveillance capabilities. With it, we will be able to keep better track of Soviet forces and programs.

For all of its military effectiveness, there is no incompatibility whatsoever between this secret weapon and our other strategic programs. MX, Trident, and air-launched cruise missiles can all go ahead as planned. Adding this weapon will not require massive new appropriations. In fact, in the long run, money will be saved. Nor does it worry our allies. On the contrary, they know about it, and they strongly support it. Their only concern is that we might not adopt it.

Of course the weapon I am referring to is not a weapon at all. It is an agreement—the SALT II Treaty. But it, nonetheless, will make all the contributions to our security I have just described. There is nothing soft or innocent about it. It is an integral part of a hardheaded strategy of American defense. And it should be recognized as such. Indeed, it may well be that some of those who oppose SALT II would support it—even insist on it—if it were a defense expenditure that could buy the same results.

The contribution of SALT to our defense underscores the second of two messages I want to leave here today. The first, as I have suggested, is that our defense—alone and in combination with our allies—are second to none. We are determined to see that they remain so. That determination is not just stated in words; it is backed up in the budget. The second message is that simply spending more money and building more arms—even accumulating vast military power—will not be enough to assure our security in today's world.

Enhancing U.S. Security

Even our defense posture itself depends upon other international assets and skills. Recall NATO's Long-Term Defense Program, its agreement on greater defense efforts, the decision on theater nuclear forces, our access to facilities in the Indian Ocean. Actions such as these cannot be manufactured out of either unilateral announcements or unspecified new spending. They are the products of careful negotiation and steady leadership—endeavors every bit as vital to our defense as arms.

And those endeavors have other applications indispensable to our security. True security in a nuclear age demands steps that lessen the risk that war will happen. That is the mandate of arms control—in combination with a strong defense, to help achieve a stable balance and to avoid miscalculation by either side. For we know that nuclear war would mean catastrophe for every side. In such times it would only jeopardize our security to reject arms control and embrace doctrines—including the chimera of nuclear superiority—that invite a nuclear arms race.

Our security is also advanced by a vigorous diplomacy—fashioning a mature, stable basis of cooperation even with countries, such as China, that have different systems from ours. We must not retreat from those efforts, confuse them, or be confused by them.

Our security has been enhanced by the success of peacemaking in Zimbabwe. That effort deprived our adversaries of a conflict to exploit. Some Americans wanted to disrupt the peace process by prematurely ending our participation in international sanctions. We can all be grateful they did not prevail.

Our security is still more deeply involved in the Middle East, where the Camp David process has produced the first real peace agreement since Israel came into being. Only patient, persistent, and imaginative diplomacy can reconcile the remaining issues—the same kind of diplomacy that hammered out the accords at Camp David. Bellicose pronouncements or assaults on the negotiating process that offer no concrete alternatives neither advance that enterprise nor serve the cause of peace.

And our security is affected by a broad range of economic issues that arms cannot touch. We could never have blasted a new trade agreement into being. We cannot threaten stagnating economies to make them prosper or intimidate hungry people into health.

Yet our fate ultimately turns on such questions, even as it rests on the balance of power. If we neglect such challenges, our fate may be to slide into oblivion, rather than being blown there. But we will get there all the same.

In short, our security in the future requires the same priorities that have marked our foreign policy in the recent past. On defense, we must continue the steady, prudent improvement of our Armed Forces. We must specifically repudiate the false message that ours is a frail nation. And our security requires something more. It requires a realistic understanding of the nature of the world we share, a commitment to peace as well as power, a capacity to work constructively with others to advance common purposes and meet the full range of challenges ahead.

I am convinced that the American people understand the need for such a balanced American approach to the world. I believe they support a defense posture of strength and confidence and a foreign policy of construction and hope.

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[1] Press release 262. ■

Question-and-Answer Session Following Pittsburgh Address

Q. You mentioned that in the next 5 years our shipbuilding program will produce 97 new ships, bringing the fleet to 550 ships in contrast to 476 in 1977.

A. Yes, those are the numbers.

Q. How does the Navy plan to provide manpower for the extra 97 new ships when they cannot now not get enough people to operate and maintain the present 475 ships?

A. This Congress, with the support of the Administration, has acted, or is in the process of acting—I haven't followed the appropriations process that closely—to increase the compensation and benefits of people in the military.

Our lack has been in the skilled areas, those who have been in the service awhile and the Warrant Officer grades—people whose skills are highly desired and salable in the private sector—and there has been a tendency for us to lose those skills. The Congress has recognized that it is terribly important that we improve the attractions, the benefits, and the prerequisites for those jobs. I hope we can turn that one around. It is a problem, a serious problem, but it is not being neglected.

Q. Do you see the stockpiling of U.S. military hardware in Norway to strengthen the northern flank of NATO to counter any possible Soviet expansion into this area for the oil-rich North Sea?

A. You're referring to the stockpiling of military supplies and equipment in Norway? That is part of the prepositioning exercise that I described in my formal presentation; that is to equip the rapid deployment force to move quickly into action in the event of difficulties in the Persian Gulf-Middle East area. We have adopted the policy of stockpiling, and Norway has indicated its willingness to participate in that program.

Q. If the "Swiss connection" is not successful in communicating with the Iranian Government, what avenue would the United States investigate? And would the Vatican, through Archbishop Capucci, be an acceptable alternative?

A. We have not been limited to any one channel in the 4 months that I've been Secretary of State. There are a number of channels, and it is not useful for me to try to identify them. Only recently, of course, have we supplemented the indirect channels that we've used to get information, to communicate views to the various Iranian leaders as they emerge in their developing political institutions. But recently on the election of a Prime Minister, I sent a letter of my own, which is the first direct contact between our government and theirs, in the hope that with their political institutions falling into place that we might be approaching the time when direct contact and negotiations might emerge. You've mentioned two channels of communication, possible communication, and there are several, if not many, others.

Q. Jimmy Carter is seeking to be reelected President this year. Do you see any alterations of the policy on the security of Israel?

A. I don't think the election will make any difference. Events may.

As you know, the Camp David process has been under assault from a number of quarters—those who wish to see it fail and those who might wish to see it succeed but doubt that it will—so that the process is constantly under pressure and attack. There is an inclination on the part of both Israel and Egypt to respond to these outside pressures and attacks in ways that can undermine the continuing nature of the negotiations.

It has been our effort to keep both parties focused on the process and to continue with it. The important point to remember, that I've made all over the world, is that it is the only negotiation that has ever been put in place with respect to the Middle East since the creation of the State of Israel. More than that, it's the only negotiation with both Palestinian rights and Israel's security at the top of the agenda.

A great deal of work has been accomplished by these negotiations. The obvious one, of course, is the Treaty of Peace with Egypt which 3 years ago would have been regarded as an impossibility. And in addition, with respect to the autonomy talks for the West Bank and Gaza, which started about 16 or 18 months ago, a lot of the work, a lot of the authorities with respect to the self-governing authority contemplated for the West Bank and Gaza, have been agreed upon.

They are now down to the really tough issues, involving land, water, security, the powers of the self-governing authority, and so on, and it has been agreed that the talks will be resumed. Therefore, we think that the process that has already demonstrated that it can achieve results should be continued to be supported and will be, whatever happens in the election, so far as I know.

Q. To set my question in context, I would like to tell you that I'm a resident of Hawaii, studying at Pitt. Recently, a number of people who are representatives of the emerging countries of the South Pacific met in Honolulu because of the overriding concern about the American desire to store nuclear waste in the Pacific.

I would like to know what the present posture is of our country regarding this issue. And secondly, what is the current Administration's posture regarding the development or involvement in the development efforts of the emerging countries of the South Pacific?

A. With respect to the disposal of nuclear waste, I guess we're going to have to find another planet. Nobody wants it. None of the 50 States do; other countries do not, so I guess the honest answer to your question is that we don't know what the answer is at this point. We continue to search for it.

The second part of your question had to do with development and what role we are playing. Let me say that your question touches upon one of my great frustrations as Secretary of State, and before that as a member of Congress for 22 years. That has to do with the failure of the American people to understand—largely because nobody has tried really effectively to give them the facts—and the failure of the Congress to adequately support assistance programs aimed at helping southern

and C stand in the way of acquiring action by the other, and this is basically the nature of the discussion. We cannot influence changes in policy on the other side in one discussion or two. That has never been the nature of the discussions between the Soviet Union and the United States, even in the most halcyon days.

Q. Is it correct that the United States wanted and would like to see an urgent Security Council meeting, and is it correct that the Soviet Union doesn't want it?

A. I don't believe either of those formulations is a precise statement.

Q. How would you answer it?

A. By asking me to respond to your formulation of our position would put me in one of two uncomfortable positions. If I were to say yes, I can see the headlines now putting us out front. If I was to say no, then I can see the headlines saying the United States doesn't want a Security Council meeting. There's no way for me to answer that question.

I have already stated what our position is. I said that we cannot be out front at this point. We are supporting the idea of a Security Council meeting. We are working hard at undertaking to encourage it. But we think the initiative has to come as a result of what I think is a widespread consensus here in the General Assembly that that's what ought to come. And I do not believe from the reports I get that the Soviets are resisting it. It's when you put adjectives in front of these things that I have trouble with your questions.

Q. Did Gromyko lay down any circumstances, ground rules, or conditions under which the Soviet Union would participate in the Security Council action or resolution?

A. We didn't go beyond what I've already told you.

Q. Did you get in any discussion at all of contingencies should the gulf be closed to tanker traffic?

A. We did not.

Q. Then the subject didn't come up? Either from you or—

A. In our general discussion we stated conditions here in this area of the world in general. We identified the sensitive areas in an overview sort of way, including this one. Obviously, in the two discussions I have had with him, Afghanistan, because of its geography related to the gulf, is the reason why we're concerned. So that point was repeated, and I don't think the repetition necessarily related to this, but obviously it had a connection with the present hostilities.

Q. Actually, what I'm trying to find is whether you attempted to make clear to him the seriousness with which the United States regards keeping open the free navigation.

A. Oh, yes. Well—

Q. [Inaudible]

A. You reporters ask code questions, too, as well as we give code answers. But obviously this is a sensitive area of the world and was in May in Vienna, not only because there's oil here but because there are sea lanes that carry it to the outside world. That is the geopolitical fact in this area. But if what you are trying to get out of me with that question is whether or not we specifically discussed particular threats involved in these hostilities to the gulf, then no.

Q. Can you describe what you and Prince Sa'ud [of Saudi Arabia] talked about, and why the meeting was moved up? I mean, did they have an obvious concern about the hostilities that are going on? Did he want us to do something or did you want him to do something or did you just discuss the general state of affairs out there?

A. I assume he came here because there was action here that affects his country. And his previously scheduled visit was scheduled at a time when that action hadn't occurred. But we didn't discuss why he came. I rather understood why, and he rather understood that he didn't have to explain. But with respect to what we discussed, that's confidential. He asked me to keep it confidential. It is confidential.

Q. Did the Saudi King today endorse Iraq? Did you two discuss that? The wires are reporting that King Khalid said that Saudi Arabia is fully supportive of Iraq.

A. Having said that the conversation was confidential, there's no way I could answer your question.

Q. Is there any other way you can verify that for us outside of this channel?

A. No.

Q. Maybe we can ask about a *New York Times* article that says here that most Arabs at the United Nations favor an Iraqi victory? That's the headline. Do you get that impression?

A. I find it very misleading to draw my intelligence from newspaper headlines.

Q. No, I'm trying to make it convenient for you to share your intelligence with us.

A. And if my intelligence were shareable with the *New York Times* headlines, it wouldn't be intelligence.

Q. Are we concerned that the Arabs are going to get themselves lined up behind Iraq and thereby make it more difficult to resolve the Iraqi-Iranian issue because the potential—at least Islamic mediators are all lined up behind Iraq—and is there any hope for some kind of Islamic peacekeeping effort out there?

A. It's never useful to assume the worst. People can be for one side or another in a conflict—and still the conflict is a bad thing in and of itself—and seek to end it. It's different in a football game. A football game is fun to watch whether you are for one side or the other, but not a war.

Q. Can you tell us what you have talked about with your Western colleagues in connection with assuring the security, the best you can, of the Strait of Hormuz and the gulf and traffic through it?

A. We've shared our perception of the seriousness of the matter. As a matter of fact, the EC [European Communities] Nine communique clearly identifies their concern and matches our own.

Q. What about doing something about it? I mean, there has been a lot of talk of contingency plans, on consultations on contingencies for defense and international naval forces and the rest. What is there to all this, if anything?

A. There are at least three levels of which obviously anyone in a position of responsibility needs to consider a problem of this kind. One, what are the possible options? At that level one considers—sometimes considers—ideas that are viable and ideas that are not. It's not particularly useful if one wants constructive, creative dialogue to reveal necessarily the range of ideas that are discussed at that level.

The next level of discussion involves a narrow list of options usually, but on an as-if basis. In other words, I think it's inappropriate and negative to

be talking in many cases about possible actions that might be taken in situations which have not yet occurred.

And then finally there's the decisionmaking level of which circumstances may have evolved to the point where some action is needed. I just really don't think it's useful to speculate on the first two levels.

Q. Can you talk about the TNF business? Is there something more than just that announcement? Is there an agreement on what weapons systems can be discussed?

A. I think what will happen—as you know, the U.S. position is that the subject of discussion ought to be long-range theater nuclear missiles. The Soviet position is that we ought to discuss medium-range theater nuclear weapons in organic connection with forward-based systems. I think this announcement indicates that each side will present its view of what the scope of the discussions ought to be.

Q. Has presented it already?

A. No, will. This is not a substantive discussion.

Q. Was there an occasion at today's meeting where these two well-known positions were restated?

A. Of course. It was on that basis that this formulation was agreed to so that it's clearly open to each side to press whatever case it wishes to press. In other words there's no point in trying to achieve a partial agreement in advance as a precondition. The talks wouldn't have started.

So what we've said to each other is, look, we can make our arguments after the talks start; and that's what will happen. What progress will be made remains to be seen. We both thought it was important to get the talks started, to begin to get the tires gripping, and to see where we go. This is an important agreement in my judgment. I think it identifies the fact that both sides, even at a time of relatively deteriorated relationships, agree on the importance of arms control. That's a very important point to make. Just how far we move from this is a question. How this might affect SALT II ratification is a question. And you ought not to forget that both sides in their formulations of the issue that ought to be discussed here have related it in different ways to the ratification of SALT II. So that even if we should reach agreement in this area on limitations on some systems, implementation of that agreement will rest on ratification of SALT II.

Q. Awhile ago you referred to the possibility that if this conflict in the Persian Gulf continued, it might eventually get to the final unthinkable. Looking back on what you learned in the past few days and in your discussion today, do you feel that at least at this point things between the two of us—the two sides that have the power of this final unthinkable—are going along about as can be expected at this stage, and do you see a tangible danger rather than a general philosophical danger of this crisis moving toward that kind of a final point?

A. No, I do not at this point see any tangible danger. I don't know whether I would want to use that particular phraseology. But your thought I would agree with; that is, that we must always worry, especially in this kind of area, that a minor—this isn't minor—that a conflict of this kind might escalate to a war. I don't think that's going to happen on the basis of my present perceptions of the attitudes of the member nations and my perception of attitudes of the Soviet Union and ourselves and on the perception that I gather that all nations see a need for a cease-fire and/or limitation of this war. So I think that at this moment, at this point, I do not see that danger as materializing. If that changes, then we have different—

Q. You mentioned the three levels of responsibility. Did you mean to suggest that the—you said that the first two weren't proper subjects for speculation. Do you mean to say that what is operating now in those two levels are not in the third level of decision?

A. All we've had in the gulf up to this point—and on this I'm not up to speed on the latest intelligence; I may not be—is, first, that Iran declared the waters within its 12-mile limit a war zone, with the result of a dramatic escalation of insurance rates which itself is an inhibition on shipping. Secondly, the Iranians have gone so far as to hail a couple of ships to ascertain their destination and cargo, seeking presumably to create uncertainty that would inhibit other shipping.

Those two actions which are known, if no more, would operate as a restraint on shipping. Obviously that's not sufficient to generate—to trigger—a military response. So you have to watch what happens. The Iranians may go no further than they have gone. That's what I'm saying. And so we're watching carefully their ability to go beyond that. One ought not to escalate the expectations of what might happen or what the response ought to be, because to indulge in that speculation sometimes has the force of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Q. Do you mean to leave us with the impression that out of this meeting today there was no kind of agreement by the two of us to work together on any sort of effort to make peace between Iraq and Iran?

A. One never knows. By sharing views, sometimes two people follow parallel courses of action without reaching agreement; that is one of the possible benefits of ongoing dialogue. But in the present state of relations between us, reaching explicit agreements involves a lot of it and requires time-consuming discussions that may not be productive, so you do the best you can. But here, at this point, I'm not going to try to prejudge what the Soviets' position is or what ours is with respect to whatever actions may or may not be taken by the Security Council. I'm simply indicating that both have started out so far as I know from similar positions. And what particular tactics or means each uses to implement positions taken, we'll have to wait to see.

Q. Are you ruling out the possibility that the Soviets were behind what is happening, that, in fact, they were the incitement behind the Iraqis?

A. I have no evidence to suggest that they're behind the Iraqis.

Q. There's an Iraqi thing floating around that Bazargan—that the Iranians, through Bazargan—are offering to release the hostages for spare parts. The Iraqis are putting that out. And I wondered if you wanted to escalate it to a Secretary of State denial? Have you got a message from Iran?

A. No such message has been received, and no answer to a nonmessage has been given

Q. On Poland?

A. I had a meeting with the Polish Foreign Minister today. At this point it's only an outline of the situation in Poland, their economic situation, and

not a unilateral reduction of forces by the United States.

Our European allies have committed themselves, as I indicated in my prepared remarks, to a strengthening and modernizing of our defense, so that it can truly match the Soviet military presence in Europe and establish a stability which will insure deterrence and at least a nonwar climate.

Q. Many citizens in Memphis are concerned for the nearly one-quarter of the world's population that are desperately hungry.

The President's Commission on World Hunger recently brought forward their final report and identified this as a crucial national security issue. They also recommended that the United States place as its primary focus the elimination of hunger in developing nations.

In view of what you said about our great difficulty in providing foreign assistance at this time, I think a situation which places us in a place behind 10 or 12 other nations in the world in the percentage of gross national product which are devoted to that aid would be [inaudible].

In view of the commission's recommendations about the seriousness of the situation, do you have some specific proposals, or dreams perhaps, of what you would like to see happen?

A. There are three main objectives that we seek to pursue with our foreign aid programs. One of them is food, not only the direct provision of food through the PL 480 program and other means but also that technical assistance to enable or to help countries to develop their own food production and to become self-sufficient. And those programs, the latter ones, have been enormously successful.

India is one of the most successful examples of that. With the so-called miracle rice we have enabled India to reach the point where it can provide for its own food needs—not at our standard of consumption but at a standard which avoids the kind of starvation that other countries are faced with, and it even, from time to time, exports food.

So there are ways that we emphasize in our foreign assistance programs to help countries produce their own food. That is a very important part of it.

The same is true with education. We see education as the way of increasing the ability of these countries to govern themselves.

I was interested in one of my meetings with the foreign ministers—well, I shouldn't mention a country because I don't want to be too negative in my public comments about them—but it's a young black country in Africa, and the issue I raised with him was this: We are about to accredit an American Ambassador to his country and our Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate takes the position that if we are going to send an Ambassador to his country, his country ought to accredit an Ambassador to ours.

And do you know what his answer was? They didn't have enough young people, college educated, in order to staff an embassy in Washington D.C. They were a slave country until they achieved independence, so they do not have the trained personnel in order to provide the leadership, the technical know-how, and expertise to govern their domestic agencies and at the same time send trained representatives and competent staff to represent their interests abroad. That is just a little, I think, down-to-earth and moving example of what these emerging countries are struggling with, and we need to be able to help them.

He was not apologizing. He said: "Given the level of your concern and your interests, we will try next year to find somebody, and it will be somebody young, recently educated, to send to Washington as our Ambassador." But he said: "If we send somebody as Ambassador, we want to be able to send him sufficient staff to represent our country effectively."

So food, education, the ability to produce their own food—these are among the highest objectives of our foreign assistance program.

Q. In your remarks before, you spoke about a world that is changing and a challenge for peace—and that calls to mind the United Nations. You spoke of, as I said, a challenge and a change and a peace—and this calls to my mind the United Nations.

What do you think, or what do you see as the future of the United Nations in the light of its many difficulties in settling international disputes? And would you comment on what, if anything, the United States can or should be doing to strengthen the United Nations and to insure that it carries out the mandate in its original charter?

A. The United Nations, to many, has been a disappointment because it has not developed as the peacemaking and peacekeeping organization that many hoped it might become. I suspect that the public support in this country for the United Nations is at a low point compared to the high point of our expectations.

The United Nations is a forum—and perhaps the only forum—available to many of these small, developing countries to express their frustration, not only about the kind of world in which they find themselves struggling to advance the objectives of economic and political developments of their own peoples but, also, it's the only place where they can be heard. If the U.N. forum did not exist, where would countries like Belize or some of the other 150-odd countries—where else would they be heard? Where could their voices be raised? Where could their problems and their frustrations be spelled out?

Now the diversity in this world, especially on the North-South axis—the Northern Hemisphere being by and large the industrialized part of the world and the Southern Hemisphere being the developing part of the world--the issues as between these two hemispheres are now becoming, increasingly, the focus of attention, not only of the developing countries but of the industrialized North as well.

The United Nations has been engaged this year, in a special session just a few weeks ago, in an effort to create what is called "global negotiations"—a mechanism within the U.N. framework which makes it possible for the developing nations and the industrialized nations to work out an accommodation of their objectives, which takes into account the limitation of the planet's resources, the desperate circumstances in which so many of the world's people live, and ways of accommodating and closing that gap.

The United Nations is beginning now an evolutionary process which may be its most significant development, if we look back on this period 10 years from now, because this is at the heart of it.

In 20 years four of every five persons on this planet will live in those developing countries, and if we haven't by that time put in place institutions that will enable them to deal with the human problems of their people, then our own will be in jeopardy.

So the United Nations, although it has been a disappointment in a sense, is on an evolutionary path—beginning

with the high hopes following World War II which never fully materialized for some of the reasons that I outlined as taking place on this planet since then through this period where these emerging nations are beginning to take advantage of this forum, express their concerns, their opinions, and their views, and to vote in the United Nations, often in ways that give us frustrations and run counter to our own objectives—to perhaps a new era in which a better balance of view, of resources and opportunities will emerge.

Now I am not going to be living in that world. You are, and others are, but that is what we must be pointing toward.

I think of energy, air, water—all of these, the precious and limited resources, opportunities—freedom—all of this is what everybody born on this planet strives for, and I think the United Nations is the only means available to us, with all of its shortcomings, to harness our energies and our ideals and move in that direction. So I hope we will stick with it, but I must say, I get frustrated when I see the United Nations doing some of the things it does. But what it is doing is not that much different from our own national legislature. It doesn't always make sense either. [Laughter and applause.]

Q. In view of the fact that Israel will never be secure until the Palestinians have a homeland too, why isn't the U.S. Government working with a large number of Israelis and a large number of Palestinians who have formed a peace movement and are ready to live side by side in peace—this instead of continuing military support of Israeli settlements which we admit are a deterrent to peace?

A. I am not sure I accept the assumptions that underlie your question. What we undertook to do—and when I say "we," I was not a part of that process; it began in previous Administrations and was continued by President Carter—is to create a negotiation and a negotiating process in which these opposing sides might find a way to accommodate their conflicting interests.

Now, unfortunately, that process is opposed by moderate and radical Arab countries, and it is attacked by others.

Interestingly enough, it is the only negotiation that has ever been created in that part of the world with respect to the Israeli-Arab conflict since Israel became a state. It's the only negotiation going in which both Palestinian rights and Israel's security are at the top of the agenda. It is the only negotiation going which, by its terms in the Camp David accords, invites all other interested parties to be participants.

The Palestinians are not excluded from this negotiation. They are specifically invited to be part of it, as well as other Arab states in the area—Jordan and so on.

And so what we are trying to do with the Camp David process is to work out as much by way of agreement between the three parties to it—Egypt, Israel, and the United States—and to accomplish enough to attract the other parties to it, and at some point to thrash out its provisions for Palestinian rights.

I don't know of any other way to do it. I've had to deal these last 5 months with U.N. resolutions—I think eight of them in all—the aim of which has been to frustrate the Camp David process, if not destroy it, by offering simplistic resolutions which offered no substitutes. I mean, these resolutions are not self-implementing or self-executing; they offered no solutions.

If they succeeded in killing the Camp David process, I don't know who else, or where, another negotiation could be created. And without that kind of a negotiation I would foresee simply an escalation of the emotions in the conflicts of the Middle East.

You have to begin somewhere. Camp David was such a beginning. That doesn't mean that it's ordained to be successful. It's an uphill struggle, and it may go down to defeat. If it does, somebody is going to face very difficult problems.

As far as the settlements are concerned, this Administration is opposed to the settlements. We have said so clearly and for the reasons that you suggest.

Q. I believe many people share with me in my confusion about the place of the SALT II Treaty that's signed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Does it agree and meet with the interests and security of the United States and the world or not?

If it is wise? It's not approved. And if it is not wise, and we don't say it gladly, we will not approve it. In such a case we can find some other peaceful alternative rather than this [inaudible] waste.

A. I am not sure I understood all of your question, but I gather that you are confused, and you say you are joined by others who are equally confused about the SALT II Treaty and whether it's good or bad in terms of our national security interest.

Q. Yes, and what is the fate of this treaty? Is it going to be approved or not?

A. And so the second question is whether or not the treaty is going to be approved or not.

With respect to the treaty, one must see it as part of the process which began with the SALT I Treaty and is seen as part of a process which will culminate in a SALT III treaty.

The objective of the entire process is to stabilize the arms race, preferably at some lower level of armament than the two superpowers are now building with respect to nuclear arms.

SALT II is a complicated treaty, and I can't dispose of it in 2 or 3 minutes. But let me give you three or four specific benefits. It imposes restraints upon the Soviet Union which are important to our national security interests. It forces them to dismantle, I think, 150 or more systems that are now in place. It limits the number of warheads that they can place on a given launcher.

Why is that important? Through almost an accident of the decisionmaking process in both countries, the Russians have built much bigger missiles than we and, as a result, they could place upon their launchers many more warheads than we can on ours—it might be the difference between 10 and 30—so that without building more launchers, without the restraint of SALT II, they could add warheads. It's warheads that kill, not launchers.

So by 1985, without a SALT treaty, they could double the number of warheads on their launchers. Now this treaty limits them to 10 and it limits us to 10. That is a very important restraint.

This treaty requires, that for the purpose of enabling each side to verify the nuclear weapons of the other side and their development and capabilities, that encryption be limited.

What do I mean by "encryption?" That is, as these missiles are tested on each side, the other side can read the signals that are transmitted back from the missile to their launch points so that the launching country can read its capabilities and performance. These signals can also be picked up by the

Coup d'Etat in Turkey

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, SEPT. 12, 1980[1]

At 4:00 a.m. local time in Ankara, Gen. Kenan Evren, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, announced that Turkish military authorities were taking control of the country. The announcement stated that the civilian government and Parliament had been dissolved. Our Embassy reports that the country appears calm, that there has been no bloodshed, and that American citizens and property are not in danger.

The United States must be concerned about the seizure of power from any democratically elected government. We note that, in taking power, the Turkish military has stated that it does so to restore a functioning democratic government. For the last several years, Turkey has been beset by increasing politically motivated terrorism and severe economic difficulties. We have admired the Turkish people for their persistent efforts to deal with a deepening economic and political crisis through a democratic system of government. The United States, along with Turkey's other NATO allies and friends, has provided significant levels of assistance to help stabilize its economy and provide for the common defense. This assistance will continue. We look forward to the early restoration of democracy in Turkey and to the establishment of economic and political stability.

[1] Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman John Trattner.

nonaligned states, between large and small countries. It also provides an invaluable framework for enhancing our relations with Eastern and neutral states in Europe. All these varied interests come together in a careful mix. The CSCE process preserves its vitality because it retains elements of interest to all 35 participating states. We cannot afford to let any one aspect predominate to the detriment of others.

Our allies and others among the CSCE states are strong supporters of human rights. They fought tenaciously to have human rights included in the Final Act. But they also tend to put considerable emphasis on the security and economic aspects of the Final Act. These are important aspects of the Helsinki process, and we should take their interest seriously.

Security and Economic Issues

The European interest in security issues, for example, became manifest late last year in widespread support for a post-Madrid meeting to discuss confidence-building measures. Confidence-building measures are designed to increase stability and confidence by requiring, for example, that states notify the other CSCE participating states of planned military maneuvers, exchange information on the size and location of military units, and perhaps limit certain kinds of military activity. There are some confidence-building measures already in the Final Act, including one which requires notification in advance of maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops. But many believe that the potential of confidence-building measures has not yet been fully explored.

A conference to discuss confidence-building measures has great attraction in Europe for a number of reasons. For one thing, it promises creation of a security forum in which neutral countries and smaller allies would have full participation. Some of these countries believe they have been excluded from European security discussions, and the French proposal offers a greater opportunity for them to have their voices heard. In addition, many Europeans believe that there is much to be gained by expanding and strengthening confidence-building measures beyond those already included in the Final Act. We agree with those who believe there might be security benefits in expanding confidence-building measures, and we have been working with allies to design measures that will promote our security.

At the same time, there are potential difficulties for us in proposals for post-Madrid meetings on security. Chief among these is the possibility that security could be broken out of the CSCE framework into a separate forum, disrupting the balance among human rights and economic and security measures which we believe necessary to the health of the Final Act. We have, therefore, told our allies and others that we cannot consider any post-Madrid meeting which is not firmly and explicitly part of the CSCE process. Then, too, we are concerned lest this strong and public initiative in the security area distract attention from human rights and shift the focus we believe must be maintained in CSCE. So we take the position that activity in the security area must be part of a balanced outcome at the Madrid meeting. I am happy to report that there is an emerging consensus on both of these issues in favor of our position.

I need not stress that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan only added to our cautions about a security meeting. But the invasion did not foreclose the idea from our point of view. Negotiations which are clearly in our interest should continue through this period of East-West tension. On this basis we have continued our efforts on mutual and balanced force reductions and negotiated limitations of theater nuclear weapons. We have also kept open the possibility of moving to a negotiation of confidence-building measures in some forum, whether Madrid or a post-Madrid meeting, but it would be fair to say we are determined to scrutinize this idea with great care.

The Final Act also envisions increased cooperation among participating states in economics, science and technology, and the environment. These provisions of the Final Act have become known as basket 2. Basket 2 covers issues of interest to us, and particularly to our business community, in the field of East-West trade. These issues include the availability of timely and complete economic and commercial information, access to Eastern buyers and decisionmakers, and working and living conditions for business representatives in Eastern Europe. Analogous issues in the field of science and technology are also a concern of basket 2. There have been gradual improvements in some areas of basket 2 in some countries, while in other areas implementation has deteriorated. The CSCE process gives us an opportunity to continue to press for further improvements.

At Madrid we intend to pursue a thorough review of implementation of the provisions of basket 2 that will advance our interests, especially in the area of facilitating profitable trade. We expect to press the Communist countries to provide

more and better information of use to Western business organizations seeking to develop trade with the East, and to ease barriers to contacts between commercial and industrial representatives in East and West. We believe Madrid can also help improve relations with those countries of Eastern Europe which seek a closer and more productive relationship with us. We believe it important, in addition, that basket 2 receive careful and constructive attention in order to maintain the integrity of the CSCE as a whole.

U.S. Goals

Our goals at Madrid are straightforward.

First, we seek a full and frank review of the implementation of the Final Act as a means of bringing world attention to Final Act violations and, hopefully, bringing pressure to bear for implementation improvements. The generally poor Eastern record on human rights will be a particular concern for the United States. We and our allies take the human rights aspects of the Final Act very seriously. We will not seek to hide deficiencies, even our own. Rather, we will approach this task in a spirit of candor but without polemics. We will pay special attention to principle seven and basket 3.

In this connection, I should note that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will receive prominent—and critical—mention from the United States and its allies during the review of implementation phase of the Madrid meeting. The invasion was a blatant violation of key principles of the Final Act—fundamental precepts of accepted international conduct such as refraining from the threat or use of force and nonintervention in internal affairs. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has had a profound, negative impact on security and cooperation in Europe because it has severely shaken the confidence on which the development of true security and cooperation depends.

Second, the Madrid meeting will also afford an opportunity for consideration of concrete new proposals for enhancing the fulfillment of the Final Act's provisions. We are working closely with our allies on a number of specific ideas which we hope will form the nucleus of proposals negotiated and agreed on in Madrid. At Madrid, we would like to see proposals for:

- Increasing the consideration of human rights in CSCE and enhancing the human rights of individuals;
- Reaffirming and developing the role of private citizens in CSCE;
- Developing specific ways to ease travel and promote family reunification; and
- Improving access to information and effecting greater freedom for journalists to pursue their profession without hindrance.

These topics could be the subject of agreement at Madrid itself as well as further followup activity within the CSCE context.

These proposals address important Western CSCE concerns in areas which the East finds sensitive. Meaningful forward steps will not be easy to negotiate with the Soviets, who will certainly sponsor competing and perhaps unacceptable ideas.

In addition, of course, we will have the goal at Madrid of preserving the CSCE process, which we believe serves our interests as well as the interests of human rights. This can be done essentially by making sure the meeting agrees on the date and place of the next review meeting before it adjourns. In order to maintain the momentum of CSCE and the attention it needs to retain its freshness and importance to the participating states, we would project that a new meeting should be held about 2 years after the conclusion of the Madrid meeting. The CSCE process is also furthered by having a forthright dialogue on the implementation by all signatories of their commitments under the Final Act. Such a review, if not done as a sterile polemic, enhances the value of the entire process.

On September 9, the 35 CSCE countries met to lay the organizational groundwork for the main Madrid meeting which starts in November. The purpose of the preparatory meeting is to determine the procedures and agenda for the main meeting. I am confident that we will achieve our principal aim at the preparatory meeting, which is to develop a format for the main conference which, as at Belgrade, provided ample opportunity for a thorough exchange of views on implementation as well as time for consideration of new proposals.

We hope the preparatory meeting will complete its work in the next few weeks.

We are working very closely with our allies on all aspects of the preparations for the Madrid CSCE meeting. There is close agreement in NATO on what Madrid should achieve. Our allies played a central role in the attainment of the human rights component of the Final Act, and, given the values we all share, the allies need bow to no one on the issue of human rights. They will support a vigorous and specific review of the human rights performance of the participating states. They also will make presentations at Madrid on the subject of human rights and humanitarian concerns which will leave no doubt that they are intensely interested in this area and disturbed about human rights violations. Though no country's presentations will be identical—nor would we expect them to be so—taken together they will convey to the Soviets and others a clear message of common concern and the intention to press for improvement.

We cannot now predict with any certainty what the outcome of the Madrid followup meeting will be. At a minimum, we expect a frank and full review of the implementation records of the participating states. This is a valuable achievement in itself, because it draws attention to areas where serious deficiencies exist. An international spotlight on these dark areas is one powerful incentive for cleaning them up. We should not, however, draw the hasty conclusion that we will get instant or dramatic results on sensitive issues like human rights. Still, concerted pressure from the United States and other Western countries for implementation improvements will help further establish the Final Act as a standard by which the actions of all civilized nations should be judged.

We are confident that the CSCE process will continue beyond Madrid because it so well reflects the balance of interests, East and West, which have been incorporated in the Final Act.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

[2] For text of the Final Act, see BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323. ■

United Nations Day, 1980

A PROCLAMATION[1]

This year marks the 35th Anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, an organization dedicated to maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations, and achieving international cooperation in solving global problems. Today 153 nations work within the United Nations framework to resolve some of the most crucial problems of our time.

Never has the United Nations been more important to the United States and to the world than it is today. The past year has seen momentous international events. Many have not yet run their full course but have already changed the way we see the world around us. We have become more conscious of the risks of war and more aware of the urgent tasks of peace.

Today, peace is threatened in many ways. There are the visible threats like the invasion by a super power of an innocent, defenseless land. And, there are the more subtle threats of hunger, spiraling inflation, inadequate health care, and depleted natural and monetary resources. These threats have filled the United Nations with a strong sense of the urgency of creating an international system based on active and equitable, social and economic cooperation among the countries of the North and South.

The United Nations, through the work of its specialized agencies and programs, its regional organizations and international conferences, has become an indispensable frontline defense against the events and forces that threaten world stability. It has played a central role in setting the pace and direction for international cooperation in an interdependent world.

The United States has always been an active and dedicated supporter of the United Nations. As President, I have been proud to carry on and expand this tradition. My Administration continues to be firmly committed to a strong United Nations system.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JIMMY CARTER, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Friday, October 24, 1980, as United Nations Day. I urge all Americans to use this day as an opportunity to better acquaint themselves with the activities and accomplishments of the United Nations.

I have appointed Mr. Charles L. Brown to serve as 1980 United States National Chairman for United Nations Day, and the United Nations Association of the United States of America to work with him in celebrating this special day. I invite all the American people, and people everywhere, to join me in expressing sincere and steadfast support for the United Nations on its thirty-fifth anniversary. It is only through multilateral institutions like the United Nations that the solutions to our ever more urgent global problems will be found.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-ninth day of August, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and fifth.

JIMMY CARTER

[1] No. 4789 of Aug. 29, 1980 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 1, 1980). ■

in the waves of refugees now sweeping across the world. These suffering people present a dramatic challenge to the international community represented by this Assembly. Over the past 5 years, the United States has welcomed more than 600,000 refugees—from Africa, from Asia, from Europe, from the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere. In the past 5 months alone, we have received more than 120,000 people driven from Cuba to our shores—an influx which has presented extraordinary challenges to our resources.

In recognition of the human need implicit in this worldwide wave of refugees, President Carter has made known the intention of the United States to accept an additional 217,000 refugees over the next year. Our country, of course, is only one of many which have welcomed and helped refugees. More than 1 million Afghani refugees have fled to Pakistan; 400,000 Indochinese are in Thailand; more than 3 million are homeless in sub-Saharan Africa. Clearly this is a global problem; it requires a global response.

The refugee resettlement efforts agreed upon at Geneva last year demand our energy and our generosity. We must strengthen the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. The humanitarian programs of the United Nations and of other agencies require a renewed commitment from all of us—to their support and to their strengthening.

But ultimately, this human tragedy can be dealt with only by removing its root causes: by overcoming poverty, by ending the abuse of human rights within nations, and by establishing peace among nations so that no person need be forced to flee from home and country. This is why my nation supports the growth of democracy and personal freedom in the Americas and in Africa and in every region of the world.

Conclusion

Achieving these ultimate purposes remains a supreme challenge for the United Nations. Making progress toward them must be the work of this 35th General Assembly.

Let us not ignore facts. Ours is a moment of worldwide economic difficulty and a time of tension between great powers. At such moments, peaceful cooperation becomes even more difficult than usual. At such moments, our obligations as members of this assembly of nations take on new importance. At such times, when a cloud of troubling events darkens our aspirations for ultimate peace, we can light our path by adhering faithfully to our charter, to the international law that binds us, to the standards of international conduct that protect us. Let us hope that the light we generate by doing so will dispel the clouds of tension and discord that darken the world today.

The United States will do its part. We will live up to our obligations to oppose aggression, to build peace, to limit arms, to support human rights and foster economic justice. For us and for other nations, these endeavors can immeasurably improve life on Earth and build the just and lasting peace for which all our peoples yearn.

[1] Press release 267; USUN press release 100. ■

Iran-Iraq Conflict

Following is a statement made by Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, in the Security Council on September 28, 1980, and text of the resolution unanimously adopted by the Council that day.

AMBASSADOR McHENRY[1]

The United States has historically supported a strong and effective Security Council. President Carter has, himself, taken a deep interest in the work of this Council. In 1977, at the start of his Administration, the President advanced for consideration a number of suggestions for strengthening the conduct of Council business. Many other member states have joined in this effort, and I invite the attention of members to the statement concerning the Council's work of Foreign Minister [Knut] Frydenlund of Norway when addressing the General Assembly on September 22.

The charter is clear. Article 24 states that:

> In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

The Security Council usually experiences difficulty in bringing to a rapid end a serious outbreak of hostilities. On occasion we fail. But the Council cannot abdicate the heavy responsibility which the charter has given it and to which the entire membership of 154 independent nations has agreed.

In common with other members of the United Nations, the United States supports the initiative undertaken by the organization of the Islamic conference. We are heartened that President Zia [Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq] of Pakistan has been willing to undertake his present mission. He should know that the United States stands ready to assist him in any way that may be appropriate.

At the same time that we support the Islamic conference mission we, here in this room, are obliged to act in fulfillment of our own responsibilities. We are bound by treaty; we are bound by 35 years of history to do so.

The United States has supported the resolution just adopted as it will support any reasonable action by the Security Council that may help bring these extremely serious and tragic hostilities to the earliest possible halt. Too many lives have been lost, and we are gravely concerned that more lives may be in jeopardy. We share with many others the opinion that the Council must raise its collective voice to this end. We believe that the Security Council can discharge its duties in a way that is entirely compatible with the mission that has been undertaken by the Islamic conference.

The President of the United States has set forth the principles which guide the U.S. position on the Iranian-Iraqi dispute.

First, the United States will continue to observe a strict and scrupulous attitude of neutrality in this dispute. We have not been and we will not become involved in the conflict except to assist, to the extent of our power to do so, the efforts which are made by the international community to bring the conflict to an end.

Second, we expect the other nations will follow the same policy of neutrality and noninterference in the dispute. In particular, we expect all concerned to resist the temptation to exploit this conflict for their own purposes.

Third, the freedom of navigation to and from the Persian Gulf, which is of primary importance to the international community, must not be infringed upon in any way.

Fourth, this dispute must be settled at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield, and there must be an immediate cessation of hostilities.

The Security Council began informal consultations on this violent conflict 6 days ago. On September 23, the President of the Council [Tunisian Permanent Representative to the U.N. M. Taeib Slim], speaking in the name of all the members of the Council, underlined our grave concern that armed activity must cease forthwith. The President appealed to both sides to cease all threats and acts of violence against one another. It is a matter of deep regret that this appeal has not yet been heeded. We urge the Security Council, together with the Islamic conference and all others who may be in a position to assist in the restoration of conditions of peace, to act to help Iran and Iraq find a way to bring the fighting to an end and to begin the long and difficult task of seeking a resolution of their dispute by peaceful means.

Throughout the week of this grave conflict, the Secretary General [Kurt Waldheim] and his staff have labored with high intelligence and devotion to assist in bringing the hostilities to an end. Indeed, the Secretary General has shown great initiative in this regard. He and his staff have given of themselves untiringly. We believe that they deserve the warm thanks of the community of nations for their efforts. We look forward to the report of the Secretary General as called for in the resolution just adopted.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 479[2]

The Security Council,

Having begun consideration of the item entitled, "The Situation between Iran and Iraq",

Mindful that all Member States have undertaken the Charter obligations to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered,

Mindful as well that all Members are obliged to refrain in their international relations from the threat of or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,

Recalling that under Article 24 of the Charter the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Deeply concerned about the developing situation between Iran and Iraq,

1. *Calls upon* Iran and Iraq to refrain immediately from any further use of force and to settle their dispute by peaceful means and in conformity with principles of justice and international law;

2. *Urges* them to accept any appropriate offer of mediation or conciliation or to resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice that would facilitate the fulfillment of their Charter obligations;

3. *Calls upon* all other States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict;

4. *Supports* the efforts of the Secretary-General and the offer of his good offices for the resolution of this situation;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within forty-eight hours.

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[1] USUN press release 101.

[2] Adopted unanimously on Sept. 28, 1980. ■

services and the like, it being clearly understood that the special strategies are designed to correct imbalances and discrimination and will be phased out when such imbalances and discrimination no longer exist.

1. *National development plans and policies*

51. Governments should undertake the following:

(a) The establishment of qualitative and quantitative targets for the second half of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace; projections for the planning cycles of 1985–1995 should be made where appropriate, and reviews conducted in 1985 and 1990. These should especially seek to remove the gap between the attainments of men and women, between rural and urban women and between all women in underprivileged population groups, and other women in all sectors and particularly in the sections of employment, health and education;

(b) Systematic and sustained linking of efforts to integrate women into national development planning and policies, particularly in the sectors of employment, education and health, and in the allocation of adequate material, technical and personnel resources within each sector of national development;

(c) The establishment of appropriate provisions for monitoring and evaluating the extent to which women participate in and benefit from both general and sectoral development programmes. Reliable data should be collected and technical services provided for periodic reviews of the progress made at all levels of society in every major sector of the national development programmes; targets should be established along with the allocation of physical and financial resources in every development programme, in order to ensure a more just distribution of benefits to women;

(d) The development and improvement of infrastructural technology, basic services and incentives, particularly for the rural sectors of the population and the urban poor; women should be given equal rights of land-ownership, equal access to credit and financing, basic sanitation, safe water and energy resources and the skills to maintain and build community self-reliance. Special attention and additional services should be given to women in the area of health;

(e) Initiate where necessary, as a result of socio-economic conditions, processes of integral agrarian reform, which will subsequently make it possible to implement measures to promote the development of women in rural areas:

(i) To mobilize women, particularly poor women, in rural and urban areas;

(ii) To organize learning and productive activity and access to needed developmental services and inputs (e.g., education, primary health and child care, skill development, credit and marketing facilities);

(iii) To organize working women, including in the unorganized sectors, for protection against exploitation, for socio-occupational mobility through education and training and necessary supportive services for children;

(f) Systematic efforts to promote and assist grass-roots level organizations as one of the instruments of development;

(g) The establishment of incentives and concrete programmes for increasing the participation of women in decision-making processes at all levels and in all spheres of national development;

(h) Wherever possible time-tables should be established for the achievement of particular objectives;

(i) Where appropriate initiate consultations between government and employer and employee organizations as well as community groups to examine and improve conditions for women workers.

2. *National machinery*

52. Where it does not exist, national machinery preferably at the highest level of government, where appropriate, should be established. By national machinery should be understood not only the establishment of central institutions at the national level but furthermore, where appropriate, the establishment of a comprehensive network of extensions in the form of commissions, offices or posts at different levels, including the local administrative level because of its better capacity for dealing with specific local situations as well as working units in the relevant branches of administration, in order to ensure the effective implementation of action programmes ensuring the equality of men and women with a view to:

(a) Upgrading its capacity and role in national development plans;

(b) Achieving a more central location within the existing institutional arrangements for the formulation and planning of and strict compliance with, policies and programmes and for monitoring their implementation and evaluation;

(c) Conceptualizing women's problems in an integrated manner within each sector of development and at the same time developing effective methodologies, policies and mechanisms for affirmative action, where appropriate, to ensure an integrated approach;

(d) Ensuring the full participation of women in measures taken by government or other agencies.

53. Effective institutional links between national machinery and national planning units as well as national women's organizations, should be established with a view to:

(a) Increasing their decision-making powers;

(b) Increasing their technical, financial and personnel resources;

(c) Advising on new approaches to accelerate the full participation of women in every sector of the development process, according to national priorities;

(d) Drawing up national programmes for women in the priority areas of employment, health and education so as to make possible their full participation at the national level. These should also aim at intensifying overall efforts towards the implementation of technical co-operation among countries and development in the areas of science and technology, water and energy resources among others, in line with the strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade and the programme of action for the New International Economic Order.

54. Women should be represented on the basis of equality in all bodies and institutions dealing with development so as to be able to influence national policies at their inception—all this with a view to advancing the status of women and their participation in development.

55. The national machinery should increase the participation of grass-roots organizations, such as women's and youth associations, rural workers' organizations, community organizations, religious groups, neighbourhood associations, as well as trade unions, both in decision-making and in the implementation of projects and in this regard should serve as a liaison unit between appropriate government agencies and grass-roots organizations.

56. The national machinery should implement effective programmes aimed at ensuring that women participate in and benefit from the implementation, at the national, regional and international levels, of the relevant recommendations of such major conferences as the World Employment Conference, the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development, and the International Conference on Primary Health Care.

57. The national machinery should also provide appropriate channels of communication between women's organizations and other organizations, in order to:

(a) Help women's groups to obtain financial and technical assistance from international and bilateral funding sources;

(b) Provide reliable data on the socio-economic and political participation of women to both governmental and non-governmental organizations, including those that act as formal and non-formal educational agencies, with a view to sensitizing society to the importance of the contribution to be made by women to development and informing the public of the obstacles to equality of opportunity.

58. To ensure that the national machinery serves its purpose, it is advisable to carry out studies and interdisciplinary research on the actual status of women, drawing on the experience already acquired in some countries with women's studies programmes.

3. *Legislative measures*

59. All remaining discriminatory legislative provisions in the social, economic and political spheres and in penal and civil codes

should be examined with a view to repealing all laws and regulations discriminating against women with regard to rights concerning nationality, inheritance, the ownership and control of property, the freedom of movement of married women, the custody of children and the like, or which inhibit their effective participation in or planning, implementation and evaluation of economic transactions.

60. Governments should develop programmes to inform women of their legal rights and should point out ways in which women can use these rights. Where appropriate, Governments should establish commissions to assess women's legal rights and the establishment of priorities for legislative measures and to identify, specify and classify the necessary legislative measures that have not yet been enacted.

61. In countries where large sections of the population are governed by customary law, Governments should carry out investigations into the degree of protection or oppression and amount of discrimination experienced by women under customary law, in order to deal with or reject such practices by statutory legislation at an appropriate time.

62. Governments should implement the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

63. Procedures should be provided—or, where they already exist, strengthened—for effectively implementing social legislation, especially that affecting parents.

64. The protection of the social function of parenthood and of maternity must be guaranteed in legislation. Both in the public and in the private sector, the definition of maternity leave should be understood to be the period which is required by expectant mothers for the protection of their health before childbirth and by mothers for the recovery of their health after childbirth. Recognizing that the raising of children is a joint responsibility of parents and the community at large, efforts should be made to provide for parental leave, available to either parent.

65. Legislation should also be enacted and implemented in order to prevent domestic and sexual violence against women. All appropriate measures including legislative ones should be taken to allow victims to be fairly treated in all criminal procedures.

66. Educational and informational programmes on the socio-economic implications of laws should be launched among various professional groups, especially the legal and judicial professions, in order to prevent, where possible, the law from being applied inequitably.

67. Programmes of counselling and legal aid should be developed and implemented to enable women, especially those from the disadvantaged sectors, to have effective protection through legislation. Broad programmes to publicize legislation should also be implemented to make women and, in particular, those from the poorest sectors aware of their rights and obligations and of the institutional guarantees therefor.

68. The necessary steps should be taken to ratify or accede to all international instruments of the United Nations and its specialized agencies that deal with women's rights, in particular the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Those affecting the poor, such as those concerning the rights of rural and agricultural women workers, are particularly important.

4. Participation in the political and other decision-making processes, and participation in efforts to promote international co-operation and strengthen peace

Participation in the political and other decision-making processes

69. Every effort should be made to enact, before the end of the Decade, legislation guaranteeing women the right to vote, to be eligible for election or appointment to public office and to exercise public functions on equal terms with men, wherever such legislation does not already exist. In particular, political parties should be encouraged to nominate women candidates in positions that give them the possibility equally with men to be elected.

70. Governments and the organizations concerned should foster knowledge of civil and political rights, promote and encourage political organizations which carry out programmes involving the participation of women and implement broad programmes for the training of political officials.

71. Governments and political parties should, where appropriate, establish goals, strategies and time-tables and undertake special activities for increasing, by certain percentages, the number of women in elective and appointive public offices and public functions at all levels, in order that they be equitably represented.

72. Special governmental instructions should be issued for achieving equitable representation of women in the different branches of Government and in departments at the national, state and local levels. Special activities should be undertaken to increase the recruitment, nomination and promotion of women, especially to decision-making and policy-making positions, by publicizing posts more widely, increasing upward mobility and so on, until equitable representation of women is achieved. Reports should be compiled periodically on the numbers of women in public service and the levels of responsibility in their areas of work.

73. Women should be equitably represented at all levels, especially the senior levels, in delegations to international bodies, conferences and committees dealing with political, economic and legal questions, disarmament and other similar issues. Governments should encourage and support increased employment of women at all levels, technical and professional, in the Secretariat of the United Nations and its subordinate organs and specialized agencies.

74. Where special qualifications for holding public office are required, they should apply to both sexes equally and should relate only to the expertise necessary for performing the specific functions of the office.

75. Special attention should be given to ensuring that formal or informal practices which result in *de facto* discrimination against women in the selection of candidates for political office or in their exclusion from formal decision-making, particularly in bodies such as public councils, boards or informal committees, should be eliminated.

Participation of women in efforts to promote international co-operation and strengthen peace

76. Women of the entire world should participate in the broadest way in the struggle to strengthen international peace and security to broaden international co-operation and develop friendly relations among nations, to achieve detente in international relations and disarmament, to establish a new economic order in international relations, to promote guarantees of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and in the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, *apartheid*, foreign domination, foreign oppression, foreign occupation. High priority should be given to providing training and educational opportunities at all levels. These might include university or college courses, lectures on international affairs, panel discussions, conferences, seminars and other educational activities.

77. Solidarity campaigns with women struggling against colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, racial discrimination and *apartheid* and for national independence and liberation must be intensified; such women should receive all possible assistance including support from agencies of the United Nations system as well as other organizations.

78. The efforts of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to strengthen international peace and security must be intensified in every way. The active participation of women in the activities of such organizations must be supported. Exchange between the national organizations of different countries in favour of international co-operation and the strengthening of peace should be promoted.

79. Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations must examine more comprehensively the consequences of disarmament for social and economic development in general and for improving the status of women in particular. The results of such studies must be made available to as many women and men as possible and must be given practical effect.

80. In view of the importance of eliminating international inequities, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations should continue to study the impact of the activities of transnational corporations on the status of women and to make use of the results of such studies in practical programmes.

81. Governments should also be made

rural women with a view to assisting Governments to revise national and international policies concerning wage and labour policies as well as trade agreements and prices of those commodities where women's and men's wages are adversely affected by and also affect the exchange earnings of the developing countries as obtained from the export of such commodities. UNESCO, in co-operation with other relevant United Nations organs and organizations, should continue to prepare studies and sponsor projects with a view to assisting Governments to assess progress made and obstacles that women face in gaining access to and enjoying primary, secondary and post-secondary educational opportunities and to contribute to the development of research and teaching about women at the university level and in non-formal education. WHO, in co-operation with other relevant United Nations organs and organizations should continue to assess progress made and obstacles women face in gaining access to health care, particularly progress in the development of primary health care.

225. The United Nations Secretariat should undertake the compilation of comparative national legislations which are aimed at promoting sex equality. Such a compilation would assist in the introduction of new laws designed to integrate women into all fields of activities, by way of generating ideas and exerting persuasion. The compilation should be issued within the framework of the United Nations Legislative Series.

226. International and regional organizations should provide assistance, if requested, to national machineries for women, for improving their capabilities and resources to accelerate integration of women in the development process and take up programmes and projects for them.

227. In the framework of bilateral development co-operation efforts should be made, in conformity with national priorities, to strengthen national programmes aimed at the full participation and integration of women in all aspects of development, including participation of women at the grass-roots level. In all bilateral development activities women should participate in the preparation and implementation of programmes and projects.

228. The special session of the United Nations General Assembly on economic development should take into full account the women's role in economic development; the forthcoming United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, the programmes for the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade and other forthcoming international conferences should also take into account issues of particular interest to women.

229. The United Nations and its organizations should, in co-operation with national Governments, develop strategies to increase women's participation in the social, economic and political life, to ensure full and effective participation of women in all sectors and at all levels of the development process, including planning, decision-making and implementation, and in order to facilitate this, seek to:

(a) Reduce the burden on women of tasks traditionally performed by them in the home and in food production and child care through appropriate technology and a fair division of labour between women and men;

(b) Counteract factors which tend to keep girls and women out of schools and training centres;

(c) Create new employment and occupational mobility opportunities for women;

(d) Increase the economic returns to women for their labour, and implement the principle of equal pay for work of equal value;

(e) Recognize the important contribution of women to economic development, raise the productivity of women's labour for their own benefit and the benefit of their own families and at the same time undertake appropriate structural changes to prevent women's unemployment;

(f) Recognize the vital role of women in agriculture and guarantee them equitable access to land, technology, water, other natural resources, inputs and services and equal opportunities to develop their skills;

(g) Promote equal participation of women in the industrialization process, counteract possible negative effects of industrialization and ensure that scientific and technological development will benefit both women and men;

(h) Ensure women's active participation in and access to primary health care, considering their specific health needs.

230. International programmes and policies—including regional ones—are grouped into five areas. Each is covered below in a separate section.

A. *Technical co-operation, training and advisory services*

231. Technical co-operation programmes for women should be conceived in the context of over-all development and not as welfare programmes.

232. Technical co-operation activities should be directed towards assisting and complementing Governments' efforts aimed at enhancing the development of human resources particularly among the most disadvantaged groups of population with a special emphasis on women.

233. All organizations of the United Nations system including the regional economic commissions should:

(a) Review existing and proposed plans and projects in this area with the aim of integrating the issues of concern to women in all programmes and projects in order to improve the effectiveness of those projects as well as to improve the status of women;

(b) Encourage and support Governments and non-governmental organizations, including research institutions, in elaborating appropriate technology projects and in identifying ways in which women can participate in and contribute to the effectiveness of development projects and improve their own economic and social condition;

(c) Organize seminars and workshops on the issues related to women and development and ensure that the topic of women and development be included in the substantive discussions of international conferences;

(d) Assist Governments in organizing more training courses with the assistance of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) for improving women's planning, technical and managerial skills in different fields, especially of functionaries implementing programmes and policies for women. Promote fellowships and other special educational and training programmes to increase the capacity of women workers and planners so that they can gain better occupational and social status;

(e) Assist national and regional programmes benefiting women in rural areas. Programmes for women should be viewed as an investment in the process of development and women should be included as active participants in the design, planning and implementation of projects in all sectors and not simply as beneficiaries of services;

(f) Ensure that technical co-operation, training and advisory services by the organizations of the United Nations system should be in accordance with country objectives and with policies outlined in the world plan of action and the programme for the second half of the Decade.

234. UNDP should intensify its efforts to encourage and assist Governments to find innovative approaches to achieve their development goals through incorporating and benefiting women by:

(a) Continuing its support for the Voluntary Fund for the Decade for Women;

(b) Continuing to promote regional, subregional and national projects through regional commissions, national machineries for women and research and training centres, especially activities enabling the innovation and development of new programmes in order to achieve the integration of women in development;

(c) Instructing resident representatives to include issues of particular interest to women in the country programming cycle, and to regularly monitor existing programmes and promote project development, co-ordination and co-operation among United Nations and other programmes which will contribute to the achievement of the goals of the Decade.

235. Governments should formulate, as part of their development co-operation policies, guidelines for the implementation of the programme of action for the second half of the United Nations Decade for Women.

Mobilization of human resources

236. Efforts should be intensified within the programmes of organizations of the United Nations system to involve more men in programmes for attitudinal change in all the relevant sectors, particularly employment, health, education, rural development and political participation. Men should be involved in health programmes to ensure that the responsibility of improving conditions of their families and communities is not the sole responsibility of women.

237. The effective participation of women particularly in the developing countries in the programmes of organizations in the United Nations system should be encouraged, including their participation in interregional and regional seminars and meetings.

238. Women at all levels especially those from grass-roots organizations should be encouraged to play a more effective role at the decision-making level in international organizations.

239. United Nations organizations and member States are urged to take the necessary measures to increase the proportion of women by nominating and appointing women, particularly from developing countries, for posts in decision-making levels in secretariats and expert bodies. Member States are also urged to increase the proportion of women on their delegations to all United Nations meetings, including meetings of Preparatory Committees for International Conferences and to prepare women to take an active role in such Conferences. In this regard, Member States in co-operation with United Nations bodies should provide arrangements for developing items on women's issues to be included in the agendas of such conferences.

240. Reinforce efforts of Member States, with particular emphasis on developing countries, for the development and strengthening of endogenous capabilities and capacities for the elaboration of policies for science and technology and for their application for the solution of problems of development, with special emphasis on the disparities in the access of women to scientific and technical education and training.

Assistance to women in southern Africa

241. The recommendations are addressed to United Nations organizations, the specialized agencies, Governments, international and regional intergovernmental organizations, women's and anti-*apartheid* groups, non-governmental organizations and other groups.

242. The assistance provided will be channelled through the southern African liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity. It is divided into the following categories of assistance:

(a) Legal, humanitarian, moral and political assistance to women inside South Africa and Namibia persecuted under repressive and discriminatory legislation and practices and to their families and to women in refugee camps;

(b) Training and assistance to integrate women into positions of leadership and support within the national liberation movements in the struggle for liberation;

(c) Training and assistance for women to play roles in all areas after liberation in the reconstruction of their respective countries;

(d) International support for and co-operation with the southern African women's struggle;

(e) To disseminate information about *apartheid* and racism and its effects on women in southern Africa in particular, and to involve all women in efforts to eradicate *apartheid* and racism and to promote and maintain peace;

(f) To assist in the strengthening of women's sections where they already exist in the national liberation movements and the creation of such sections where they do not currently exist as a means of accelerating the achievement of equal opportunity for women and their full integration in national life. Such women's sections through the national liberation movements should, in consultations with the United Nations organizations, the specialized agencies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, determine and make known their policy and programme priorities.

243. To call on Member States of the United Nations which have not yet done so to ratify the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*.

Assistance to the Palestinian women inside and outside the occupied territories

244. The United Nations organizations, its specialized agencies, United Nations organs and funds, Governments, international and regional intergovernmental organizations and other groups are called upon to provide assistance in consultation and co-operation with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people:

(a) To undertake studies and research pertinent to the social and economic conditions of the Palestinian women with a view to identifying their specific needs and to formulate and implement relevant programmes to meet their needs and to develop resources and potentialities of women;

(b) To provide legal, humanitarian and political assistance to Palestinian women in order to allow them to exercise their human rights;

(c) To establish, expand and diversify educational and training programmes for Palestinian women with particular emphasis on expanding technical and vocational training;

(d) To safeguard and promote the Palestinian heritage and values as the core of the educational content with a view to preserving the Palestinian national identity;

(e) To eliminate all restrictive legal and social measures that hinder Palestinian women from having access to available employment opportunities and equal pay for equal work, and to provide them with equal training and employment opportunities so that they can contribute effectively to the formation of an integrated Palestinian labour force;

(f) To assist materially and technically women's organizations and associations, and to provide support to the General Union of Palestinian women with a view to develop their institutional capabilities to undertake extension programmes, adult education and literacy programmes for women and child care services;

(g) To formulate and implement integrated health and nutrition programmes; to train Palestinian women in the various medical and paramedical professions and to strengthen existing health services provided by the Palestinian Red Crescent, particularly those related to maternal and child care;

(h) To collect and disseminate information and data about the effect of Israeli occupation on the social and economic conditions of the Palestinian women and their struggle for achieving self-determination, right of return and right to national independence and sovereignty.

Assistance to women refugees and displaced women the world over

245. Humanitarian assistance to and resettlement of refugees, regardless of sex, race, religion or national origin, and wherever they may find themselves, is an international responsibility which all nations concerned should help bear. Because the overwhelming proportion of refugees are women, who generally suffer more radical changes in role and status than male refugees, the United Nations and other international organizations are urged to address themselves specifically to the problems and vulnerabilities of women.

246. The following recommendations are addressed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and, within their competence or special interest, the organizations of the United Nations system, specialized agencies, international, regional and intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, women's groups and all other relevant institutions, competent associations and Governments.

247. The United Nations High Commissioner and other bodies mentioned in paragraph 184, as appropriate, in assisting women refugees, are requested to formulate specific programmes relevant to them in all phases of refugee life: relief, local integration, resettlement and voluntary return to their homes. All Governments concerned are invited to help do this, thereby easing the burden on countries of first

Chronology

September 12

Government of Turkish Prime Minister Demirel is overthrown in a military coup d'etat.

September 15

Soviet enlisted man enters U.S. embassy in Afghanistan and initially asks for asylum.

September 16

35th session of the U.N. General Assembly opens in New York. St. Vincent and the Grenadines becomes 154th member of the U.N.

September 17

A State Department debriefing is held for representatives of nongovernmental organizations to discuss the results of the 1980 World Conference of the U.N. Decade for Women held in Copenhagen last July.

Former Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza Debayle is assassinated in Asuncion, Paraguay.

U.S.-China sign four bilateral agreements—civil air transport, textile, maritime transport, and consular.

September 18

Secretary Muskie visits Pittsburgh, Pa. to address the World Affairs Council.

Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito makes official visit to the U.S. Sept. 18–25 and to Washington, D.C., Sept. 18–22.

U.S. House of Representatives votes 298 to 98 to reject proposed shipment of 38 tons of low-enriched uranium to India.

September 21

Soviet enlisted man, after meeting with the Soviet Ambassador at the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan, decides to depart.

September 22

Secretary Muskie visits New York City to address the 35th session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Ten Iranian airfields are attacked by Iraqi fighter-bombers; Iran confirms the raids and announces a retaliation raid on two unidentified Iraqi bases, further escalating the long-time conflict between the two countries.

September 24

U.S. Senate approves by a vote of 48 to 46 the sale of 38 tons of low-enriched uranium to India defeating the House vote opposing the shipment.

Iran and Iraq halt shipment of oil from Persian Gulf region taking out of international circulation some 2.7 million barrels of oil a day.

September 28

By unanimous vote, the U.N. Security Council approves a resolution calling for a cease-fire in the Iranian-Iraqi conflict. ■

PRESS RELEASES

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*239	9/3	International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), study group 1, Oct. 8.
*240	9/3	CCIR, study group 6, Oct. 9.
*241	9/3	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC) Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on radio communications, Sept. 18.
*242	9/3	SCC, SOLAS, working group on safety of fishing vessels, Sept. 23.
*243	9/3	SCC, SOLAS, national committee for the prevention of marine pollution, Nov. 5.
*244	9/4	Allen Clayton Davis sworn in as Ambassador to Guinea (biographic data).
*245	9/5	Peter Jon De Vos sworn in as Ambassador to Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde (biographic data).
*246	9/5	Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Advisory Committee, U.S. National Section, Sept. 25.
247	9/8	Secretary Muskie interviewed on CBS-TV's "Face the Nation," Washington, D.C., Sept. 7.
*248	9/10	Barbara Watson sworn in as Ambassador to Malaysia (biographic data).
*249	9/9	International North Pacific Fisheries Commission Advisory Committee, U.S. Section, Oct. 2 (partially closed).
*250	9/11	Results of Copenhagen World Conference for Women: discussion at State Dept. Conference, Sept. 17.
*251	9/12	U.S., Colombia amend bilateral textile agreement, July 31 and Aug. 20.
*252	9/12	U.S., Mexico Trade Group meeting, Sept. 10 and 11.
*253	9/12	U.S., China initial textile agreement, Sept. 11.
254	9/15	Secretary Muskie's news conference.
*255	9/3	Walter C. Carrington sworn in as Ambassador to Senegal (biographic data).
256	9/15	Review and assessment of U.S. participation in the World Conference of the U.N. Decade for Women.
*257	9/17	U.S., China sign bilateral textile agreement.
*258	9/18	Advisory committee to the U.S. national section of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Oct. 15 and 16.
259	9/16	Muskie: statement on nuclear targeting strategy.
*260	9/18	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, working group on U.N./OECD investment undertakings, Oct. 8.
*261	9/18	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, working group on preparations for U.N. Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, Oct. 14.
262	9/18	Muskie: address before World Affairs Council, Pittsburgh.
262A	9/19	Muskie: question-and-answer session following Pittsburgh address.
*263	9/19	U.S., Korea amend textile agreement, Sept. 8.
*264	9/22	SCC, SOLAS, working group on fire protection, Oct. 7.
*265	9/22	SCC, Oct. 16.
*266	9/22	SCC, SOLAS, Nov. 19.
267	9/22	Muskie: address at opening of 35th U.N. General Assembly, New York.
†268	9/23	U.S., Canada agree on monitoring arrangement for the Poplar River.

*Not printed in the Bulletin.
†Held for a later issue. ■

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the world market loss of oil from Iran and Iraq. And our careful cooperation and planning with our allies in Europe and Japan give us reason to hope that together we can face future emergencies—even serious supply interruptions—with a measure of confidence and a minimum of disruption and panic.

Since President Carter signed the National Energy Act of 1978—the first comprehensive energy law in our national history—our dependence on foreign oil has been dramatically cut. Oil consumption has decreased in both of the last 2 years. Our net oil imports have declined steadily: During the first 9 months of this year, for example, our imports declined by 25% from the same period in 1977.

President Carter's energy policy—which includes a windfall tax on oil profits to pay for new fuel development—will also encourage stepped-up energy production here at home. The evidence is already apparent. Coal production is up 16% over last year. A new synthetic fuels corporation has been established. And we are aggressively promoting solar energy and other new technologies.

We have a long way to go. But the United States and our allies have demonstrated that we are serious about overcoming our dependence on foreign oil supplies and about dealing skillfully with potential interruptions of supply. The Iran-Iraq conflict demonstrates the importance of these efforts.

Conclusion

My purpose in citing all these efforts—military, diplomatic, and economic—is to underscore our progress, not to claim that the job is done. It is to suggest that we are on the right road, not that we relax our efforts to foster peace and security in this crucial region of the world.

Achieving our purposes will never be easy. The region is a tangle of ancient hostility, of religious rivalry, of competition for territory and influence. Its wealth and strategic importance have long made it an arena of competition among outside powers.

Our own interests in the region are complex and may sometimes seem contradictory. We want good relations, for example, with several nations which are adversaries to one another. The variety of our interests guarantees complexity and difficulty in shaping our policies. And we must be aware that the nations of this region are fiercely independent. This sense of independence is very much in our interest. They adamantly resist domination by anyone, but their strong feelings may cause them to misinterpret even friendly gestures as interference.

Faced with such intricate challenges, it would be wrong to rely solely on our military forces, impressive as they may be, or on diplomacy alone. Because the challenges we face are military and diplomatic and economic, this Administration has always believed that our responses must be equally varied. I cannot warn strongly enough against one dimensional approaches to this or any other area of international tension.

Great as the dangers and uncertainties are in Iran and Iraq—in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia—I believe our policies are wise and prudent. I believe we are on the right track. And while the times may not permit an easy optimism, I do have faith—faith that with time and patience and wisdom, we can achieve a compelling American objective: to help build peace in this troubled region and a greater measure of peace in the world.

[1] Press release 285. ■

The Frontier of Development

Secretary Muskie's address before the Peace Corps rededication ceremony in Ann Arbor on October 14, 1980.[1]

I am delighted to share this celebration with you. And I'm honored to stand where John Kennedy stood 20 years ago this evening and gave life to the Peace Corps idea: that the energy and the idealism of individual Americans could be harnessed in a practical way to the needs of those living in the deepest poverty around the world and that, in the process, both we and they could benefit.

The idea of a Peace Corps was not new. It had been germinating in the fertile minds of people like Hubert Humphrey and Henry Reuss for some time. But John Kennedy ignited that idea, and the spark was set here that evening.

There were a number of early skeptics. But they were quickly tamed—if not by the extraordinary public response, then eventually by the determination of Sarge Shriver.

The Peace Corps idea seized us for a number of reasons. Clearly, there was an element of East-West competition involved. It has been said that the Peace Corps "took root between the horizons of hope and of fear." But hope was far the stronger force, for the Peace Corps struck a chord of compassion and decency deep within the American character, a core of human values that has been—that still is—among our most powerful national assets.

And the Peace Corps captured the spirit that John Kennedy helped awaken—the energy, the dedication, the faith in our purpose, the confidence of success. It was a powerful vision that enlisted the commitment of thousands, including many former volunteers here today—a vision of poverty erased, of hunger tamed, of disease alleviated, of human potential more fully realized.

The buoyant optimism of that time has been tempered in the years since by our experiences and by tides of change that have swept the world, both developing and developed.

- Some 50 nations that were colonies in 1960 have become independent nations, determined to preserve that independence and to chart their own course.
- A growing sense of common cause has emerged among developing nations. It has found expression in regional and international groupings—in the United Nations and the nonaligned movement, in the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of American States, in the Association of South East Asian Nations, and elsewhere.
- At the same time, we have seen a growing diversity among developing nations. The boundary between "developing" and "developed" itself has eroded. And we have come to understand that there is no single path to development, that the past and the future must be reconciled in a uniquely local blend.
- New problems have emerged to compound the old—the shocks of energy inflation, the consequences of urbanization, the surge of population, the impact of rapid growth on the ecological balance—on tropical forests and farmland and available water.
- And over this same period, we have also come to recognize the scope of our own challenges here at home—to build a growing, competitive U.S. economy, to break our own costly and dangerous energy dependence, to open new opportunities for Americans who have been left behind while we maintain the promise of a better future for all Americans.

Our nation, like many Peace Corps volunteers serving in the field, has come face-to-face with the enormity and complexity of the challenge. We have been sobered by our understanding. For some, that experience has given birth to despair. "We can't make a difference on global poverty even if we try," is the lament of some. "Our money and energy should be spent here, not in countries half way around the world," is the refuge of others.

I am here today for one purpose—to say to you, and to others who hear these words: We must reject that defeatism. We have no room for that despair. We have made a difference. And for our sake as well as for others, we must continue the battle—against world poverty and hunger and hopelessness.

I have rarely spoken to a returned Peace Corps volunteer who did not believe that he or she, in some way, had made a contribution—however more modest than their original expectation. And that remains true for today's Peace Corps.

- In Malaysia, a new Peace Corps project is helping small cattle farmers increase milk production through better veterinary practices and new marketing approaches.
- On the small island nation of Montserrat in the eastern Caribbean, which now imports half of all its food, volunteers are helping build farmer cooperatives and better irrigation to increase domestic production.
- Upper Volta faces the need to increase the wood available for fuel tenfold in the next 20 years. Peace Corps volunteers there are helping rural villagers plant and grow the new forests they will need for the future.
- In Malawi, where 3 out of 10 children do not live to see the age of five, volunteers are helping rural villagers increase local water supplies and improve local health care.

These are just a few examples. But they reflect a larger fact: Peace Corps today is making a difference, in the only way that matters—on the daily lives of individuals whose daily lives are harshest.

And when we look from the village to the globe, we can also see that, for all that remains to be done, progress has been made.

- In 1950 average life expectancy in the lower income countries was only 35 years. Today it has risen to 50.
- For the first time in human history, and through the work of thousands of dedicated health workers, the ancient scourge of smallpox has been eradicated from the world.
- Twenty years ago primary school education was not available to most children in developing countries. Today 6 out of 10 children in the developing world attend school.
- Since 1950 real per capita income for the people of the developing world has doubled.

I cite these figures, not to mask the staggering dimensions of the human suffering that remains; for it is also true that 600 million people in the world today live in the most desperate poverty. Nor am I for a moment suggesting that we can claim even primary credit for these developments. But the fact is that outside assistance has made a difference. It is important that we clearly see the difficulty of the road ahead. But it is also important that we know the distance that has been traveled. For the progress that has been made is evidence that further progress is possible.

I refuse to accept the dispirited voices for another reason—not only is progress possible, America's genuine commitment to that progress is vital to our own future. To a far greater extent than when Peace Corps was launched, what happens in the developing world is important to us here.

It is important to our security. Whether we look at the Middle East or Southeast Asia, at Africa or the Caribbean, at Central or South America, we see our stake in peaceful development. For hopelessness breeds frustration; and with frustration can come violence, radicalism, and the ingredients for broader confrontations. We have a direct national interest in helping developing nations reconcile the combustible disparity between a privileged few and an embittered multitude.

The jobs of 1.2 million American workers today depend on exports to developing countries. Developing nations are our fastest growing markets. They supply us with critical materials that turn the wheels of American industry. We cannot expect those patterns to continue unless we continue to demonstrate, in practical and concrete ways, our responsiveness to the needs and priorities of developing nations.

Finally, what happens in the developing world is important to the quality of our own lives. A recent study by our government, called "Global 2000," carried some stern warnings about what our world could look like in just 20 years if we fail to see our stake in the progress of others. We could see an increase in the world's population in the next 20 years that equals the entire population of the globe in 1950. Will there be adequate food and shelter and jobs and education for a world of 6 billion people? Or will we see hunger and despair grow; brutal competition for scarce resources increase; violent disruptions multiplied many times over?

These stormclouds are not so distant in either time or place. They will shape our lives, just as certainly as they shape the lives of others. For all of these reasons, our efforts to help developing nations solve their problems are not "give-away" programs. They are not international charity. They are investments we make in the future of others, and thereby in the future of ourselves:

- Investments in the long-term stability that comes when governments are meeting the basic needs of their people;
- Investments in an expanding international economy that can open new opportunities for all of us;
- Investments in growing cooperation on long-range global problems that can be solved only through common action.

This new reality—this growing together of our future with the futures of peoples in the developing world—needs to be made clearer to the American people. Their support for the human and material resources we need to help shape the currents of change in the developing world depends upon that growing public understanding.

I am committed to do all in my power as Secretary of State to help build that understanding and to enlist that support. For unless the American people better understand how important these efforts are, the plain fact is that Congress will not fund our requests.

Those of you who have served with Peace Corps around the world have a first-hand appreciation of the histories that separate the world's peoples and the destiny that unites us. You have a continuing responsibility to build and share that understanding in your own communities. And so today I ask you to volunteer again, for a task that sends you home not abroad: to build a broad national constituency for an active and constructive American engagement with the developing world and for the resources to support it.

The past 20 years have made us more sober, perhaps, in our views of what

World Conference on the U.N. Decade for Women Held in Copenhagen

The world conference of the U.N. Decade for Women was held in Copenhagen July 14–30, 1980. The U.S. delegation was cochaired by Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and Sarah Weddington, Assistant to the President.

Following are statements made by Ms. Weddington in plenary sessions on July 16 and July 30, the text of the Programme of Action adopted by the conference on July 30, a review and assessment of U.S. participation, and a list of the resolutions adopted at the conference.

MS. WEDDINGTON,
JULY 16, 1980

Madame President [Lise Ostergaard of Denmark], distinguished delegates, and concerned women who have gathered here in this great city: For all our delegation, it is an honor to join in this conference with the remarkable delegates who have done so much in their nations' quest for equality among men and women. It has been a joy to make new friends and to learn much of our countries as well as to share something of our own.

The next 2 weeks are ours—all of ours—to make of them what we can—what we must—for women around the world. How right that we meet in Denmark—a country which has made progress its tradition and where equality, justice, and dignity are the common heritage of all.

Madame President, your election to the presidency of the conference is a recognition of your special diplomatic talents and of your country's achievements. We look forward to working with you.

Events of importance continue even while we are here. Only yesterday our President sent a note of sadness upon the death of Sir Sretse Khama of Botswana noting that not only the people of that nation but also people around the world share the sadness in his passing.

Just 5 years ago in Mexico City, the world learned that women could no longer accept being excluded from the decisions which affect their lives. Since then time and again we have seen women demonstrate the will to direct the forces of change. This is the message we hear—this is the message we bring you from the people of the United States. It is their hope that the delegates meeting here will focus upon the problems, aspirations, and goals that unite women throughout the world. Recognizing our diversity, we emphasize our unity. Let our deliberations be an example of goodwill to all who seek to improve the lives of women, men, and children—everywhere.

We come here to evaluate the progress of women in our respective countries in accordance with the World Plan of Action.[1] We are here to rededicate ourselves to complete the unfinished agenda of our times in the firm belief that to advance the cause of women's rights is to advance the cause of human rights.

Here in Copenhagen we will further that cause if we use our energies, our wisdom, and our compassion to study and explore what we and our countries can do to combat the age-old enemies of humankind—poverty, illiteracy, disease. These problems are the special lot of women because for centuries women and their children have been the principal victims of inequities, oppression, and conflict. Their plight and their progress is the principal issue before us—the overriding economic issue, the overriding political issue, and the overriding social issue.

But since Mexico City we know that things will not change unless we, the women of the world, have the will to change things. Since Mexico City we know that the prejudice enshrined in our minds in past millenia cannot be abolished in a single decade. But since Mexico City, too, we know we must try. We know that no amount of sloganeering and finding of scapegoats can change the fact that one of the root causes of our present predicament is the continuing domination of woman by man. The solution lies in the full and active involvement of women in all affairs of life.

This is a fact recognized by U.N. Secretary General Waldheim who minced no words when he told us July 14 that "if the quest for solutions of the world's problems is to emanate from the popular level, as it must, it demands as much involvement from women as from men." All of us were impressed by his fervor. Over and over from this podium we have heard Her Majesty, the gallant Queen of Denmark; the Prime Minister; the Secretary General of this conference; and you, Madame President, rallying us. Therefore, we women must play the crucial role of confronting these problems in pursuing the goals of this conference—equality, development, and peace.

The task before us will not be easy. The United States has encountered special difficulties in reaching our own objectives, and we've had disappointments in spite of the progress we have made. For example, we have proposed an equal rights amendment, which, if adopted, would become part of our national Constitution and would guarantee equality of rights of women and of men. It yet remains an unfulfilled promise, although seven Presidents have supported it. The majority of men and women in both our political parties support it. The President of the United States is working most vigorously for it. It has passed the U.S. Congress twice. Thirty-five of our fifty States have passed it. But we have to have 38 States. In the few States that remain to ratify, there are a few voices of frightened people who oppose equality for women. Hopefully, the next time we meet in such a conference, we of the United States will have strengthened the Constitution of our nation. The women of our country and the men who join us will not rest until we have overcome.

Now let me speak about our progress. The President of the United States, who has made equality of women before the law a personal commitment, has instructed me to sign the Convention Eliminating All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. I do this with pride and with the prayer that the promise of the covenant will become a reality for all women—everywhere. I will sign the convention with pride because, in the fields of health, employment, and education—the specific themes of this conference—we have made significant progress in our country.

In the area of health, the life expectancy of women has risen to 77

years. Women have become more active participants in the nation's health care system. Our Cabinet post for health is held by a woman. There are more women doctors today than ever before—but still not enough. Infant mortality and maternity death rates have dropped—but not enough. The incidence of high risk and unwanted pregnancies has been reduced through family planning—but not enough. There is more research on women-related health problems—but not enough. We will continue our efforts.

Women in our nation in recent years have exposed to the public many issues and problems previously ignored—domestic violence, rape, unnecessary use of drugs, unnecessary surgery, occupational hazards such as dangerous exposure to chemicals, and the mental stress caused by dual responsibilities in the home and workplace without the necessary support services. The many efforts now underway to deal with these problems owe much to the public concern and persistence of women. The conference in Mexico City also made a difference. It was a catalyst pushing us on.

Working women present a special challenge: 60% of all women between 18 and 64 years are employed, and it is estimated that by 1990, this figure will rise by 35%. It will be our task to better prepare them for employment and confront the endemic problems of occupational segregation and low wages. It is the task of those women who are taking their place among the leadership of unions and of corporations to assure that the laws which forbid discrimination in employment are fully observed.

Our government has been striving to strengthen the role of women in public life. Women have been appointed to the Cabinet and to key positions in government agencies. The Voice of America is now the voice of a woman—and she is here in our delegation. I, myself, a product of the woman's movement, am honored to be part of an Administration which has named 38 of our 44 women Federal judges. We are witnessing an increase in the number of women elected to public office at the State and Federal levels. Two of these women leaders are with us here, both members of the U.S. House of Representatives. Our entire delegation is proof that increasing numbers of women have attained distinction in our nation. We are far from crowding the halls of power in Washington, but the fact is that since the Mexico City conference, our numbers have increased, and our collective voice is stronger and it is heard.

In education, American women have made significant progress since we last met. Most women now complete 12 years of schooling and roughly half of college and university enrollments are women. Today there has been a tremendous increase in the number of women who study to be lawyers, doctors, engineers, and business leaders.

Largely because of efforts of our women's movement, Federal legislation has been passed making it illegal to discriminate against women in the educational system. These laws affect admission of students, hiring and promotion of teachers and administrators, and the apportionment of funds and facilities between male and female students.

Enforcement of these laws is not perfect but our new Department of Education, headed by a distinguished woman, and our voluntary women's organizations are actively monitoring progress and insisting upon full compliance with the laws. They are working, for example, to eliminate tender-role stereotypes from textbooks and to demonstrate that girls and women are active participants of society. Women's study courses have been added to the curricula of many universities.

We know that our progress at home is inextricably linked to the advancement of women everywhere. It is truer today than ever before.

Since Mexico City in 1975, our quest for equality has been hampered by the wrenchings of a world in which tradition as well as modernization often subject women to new degrees of vulnerability. We have seen the process of development place additional burdens on women and create stress within the family structure. We have seen revolutions relegating women to passive roles. And we have witnessed the flight of millions of families from their lands—forced into statelessness by the lawlessness of states.

We are deeply concerned about the special problems of women in southern Africa who must live and attempt to raise their families under apartheid. The documentation prepared by the Secretariat on this item leaves no doubt about the plight of the nonwhite women in South Africa and Namibia. Their sufferings stretch the limits of human tolerance, for not only does apartheid separate the races, it separates families and places a particular burden on women. We will examine measures to ease those burdens. And we are especially concerned by the plight of refugee women who suffer the multiple pressures of homelessness, discrimination, and despair.

If these are troubled times they must not sway us from our determination that the "Decade for Women" be a time for progress and achievement. For our part, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie has, therefore, reaffirmed that "a key objective of United States foreign policy is to advance worldwide the status and condition of women." The United States is conscious of its obligation to remain an important participant in the economic progress of the developing countries particularly as it affects women. In this area of diminishing resources and growing scarcity, women will bring new vitality to the process of economic and social development. It is their right to do so, and it is our responsibility here at the conference to see that these rights are honored.

The U.S. delegation commits itself to work with you in the days to come to pursue this goal. Just as we have contributed to the voluntary fund for the U.N. Decade for Women, we will also support proposals for a third conference for women to be held in 1985 to assess further progress.

I think the statements of the Cuban representative and the Syrian representative yesterday about the United States were objectionable and unwarranted, but they were particularly offensive because of the urgent objectives which bring over 147 nations to this city. The work of this conference is so important to the achievement of justice for half the world's population that we must not permit it to be jeopardized by the rash polemics unrelated to our purpose here. Because diversion from this purpose is diversion from the unique opportunity to consider crucial improvements in the often-ignored needs of women.

We are convinced that the remainder of this Decade for Women must prepare the next century of peace, a century that insures full equality among all people. But the path to peace lies through mutual tolerance and through the search for permanent and comprehensive solutions. It holds true for the North and the South, for the East and the West, in all corners of the globe, in Southeast Asia as well as in the Middle East. To end the sufferings of women, we must cease the human conflicts. Therefore, it would contribute

aware of the results of such studies so that they realize and prevent the negative effects on the status of women which are caused by the activities of transnational corporations, as is the case in South Africa where transnational corporations sustain the system of *apartheid* by their investments.

82. Support should be provided by all women of the world in proclaiming solidarity with and support for the Palestinian women and people in their struggle for their fundamental rights. Moral and material assistance should be extended by the United Nations system to help Palestinian women. Specific programmes and projects should be carried out to fulfill that aim.

5. *Measures relating to education and the dissemination of information*

83. Independent organizations, including women's organizations at the national, regional and international levels, should study the ways in which the mass communications media, including the news media and advertising, treat the status of women and women's issues. Evidence that women are being treated in a sexist or demeaning way should be brought to the attention of the relevant media for correction.

84. Every effort should be made to encourage the fullest and most active participation of women at all levels of policy-making and decision-making within media organizations. Governments should use the opportunities they have by way of appointments, to regulatory bodies and broadcasting networks, to ensure that women are equally represented in senior decision-making.

85. Special efforts, for example, training programmes to sensitize media personnel at all levels, should be made to ensure that women are portrayed as persons in their own right and that the portrayal of women and women's issues reflects women's rights, needs and interests.

86. Educational programmes and campaigns using the media should be instituted in order to eliminate prejudices and traditional attitudes that limit the full participation of women in society. Such campaigns should also inform women and men of their rights and ways of exercising them. Women's organizations and other non-governmental organizations, political parties and trade unions should play an active role in the process of educating women politically in order to increase their capacities for participation in decision-making bodies. Special attention should be given to the role the media can play to reach the migrant women. Women should also have access to training in the use of various forms of the media, in order to be able to present to as wide a public as possible their own perceptions of their needs, ideas and aspirations.

87. Governments should encourage the mass media to support the increased involvement of women in efforts to strengthen international co-operation and peace and to broadcast programmes to make women more aware of the activities and positions of their Governments in vital questions of international affairs, thus enabling them to fulfill their roles towards strengthening international peace and security and against colonialism, racism, racial discrimination, foreign aggression and occupation and all forms of foreign domination.

88. Special campaigns should be undertaken to encourage the increased participation of women and girls in rural community and youth development programmes and in political activities.

89. The mass media should *promote* the Programme of Action for the second half of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, as well as other international, regional and national programmes for women, so that the public is made aware of such programmes and thus participate to a greater extent in their implementation.

90. Bearing in mind the fact that one of the impediments to promoting the status of women lies in social attitudes and re-evaluation of women in society, the mass media offer great possibilities as one means of promoting social change. They can help remove prejudices and stereotypes, accelerate the acceptance of the new role of women in society and promote their role as equal partners in the process of development.

91. In all fields of activity, the mass media should become one of the basic means in society of overcoming the contradiction in, on the one hand, the presentation of women as passive, inferior beings having no social significance and, on the other hand, an accurate picture of their increasing role and contribution to society at large. The mass media should also recognize that both parents have equal duties and responsibilities for the training and education of children and for household duties. Governments, as communicators, in preparing communications to or about their countries should ensure that output will reflect government commitment to status of women's issues and concerns.

6. *Improvement of the data base*

92. All data-collecting agencies should give a sex and age breakdown of any information they gather, wherever relevant.

93. Some of the concepts and analytical tools of research, particularly those relating to economic processes—evaluation, labour, work, employment, social productivity, household, family and the like—should be re-examined so as to improve tools for the analysis and conceptualization of the economic and social roles of women within the home and outside.

94. Priority should be given to research concerning those groups of women that have been neglected in social research—namely, rural workers in agriculture and allied activities and working women from the underprivileged sectors of society. These are women who, far from being the dependents they have generally been assumed to be, have always had to perform multiple roles in order to ensure the survival of their families. For better evaluation of development programmes, access to and utilization of data need to be ensured.

95. National and regional indicators should be developed and improved for determining the degree to which women have actually been participating in development, as a means of measuring their actual contribution to the development process. A set of statistical indicators should be established by which progress towards equality between the sexes can be monitored. In establishing such a set of indicators, Governments will need to take into account the current state of their country's statistical development as well as their individual policy priorities. A system should be devised to place a monetary value on unpaid work to facilitate its reflection in the gross national product.

96. The level of economic growth in general and the sectoral structure of that growth, should be established so as to determine employment openings. Data on the composition of populations (e.g., age structure and the relation between rural and other sectors of a population) must be collected so that the need for employment openings, health services and education can be identified.

97. Current statistical operations and practices should be reviewed to ensure that they are free from sex-based stereotypes.

98. Where appropriate, permanent advisory committees to national statistical authorities should be established to improve the quantity and relevance of data pertaining to the situation of women, their participation in development and equality between the sexes. The work of such advisory committees may be supplemented from time to time by the organization of larger meetings of users and producers of statistics to address specific issues of mutual concern.

99. Research and testing of new or revised concepts and classifications should be designed or expanded to improve the usefulness and relevance of the statistics needed to describe the role and status of women, their participation in the development process and equality between the sexes. Such research and testing, whether carried out by the national statistical services or by university or other research groups, would need to involve both the users and producers of such statistics and would need to encompass both methods and procedures for data collection and those for the analysis and presentation of data.

7. *Role of non-governmental organizations*

100. There should be mutual co-operation between Governments and non-governmental organizations, women's and youth groups, employers and workers unions, voluntary agencies, community organizations, including religious groups, the mass communication media, political parties and the like, in implementing the programme of action for the second half of the Decade.

101. Governments should take account

of the activities of non-governmental organizations and should support where appropriate the efforts of all relevant organizations, institutions and other associations concerned with the welfare and status of women.

102. Governments should recognize the importance of the role of women's organizations, encourage and assist them and provide them with financial and other assistance, particularly at the grass-roots level, to enable them to perform their functions which include activities such as:

(a) The mass mobilization of women and, in particular, poor women in rural and urban areas;

(b) The provision of all development services and facilities (education, health and child care, expansion of credit and marketing capabilities and facilities, information on social, political and economic rights, etc.);

(c) The establishment of organizations for women workers in non-trade union occupations both in rural and urban areas as a means of protecting them against exploitation and providing the necessary auxiliary child care services.

103. With regard to the follow-up of the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women, Governments should:

(a) Make possible the publication and dissemination of the results of the World Conference and of the NGO Forum;

(b) Enable non-governmental groups to become involved in the realization of the programme of action for the second half of the Decade;

(c) Consider the role and resource of non-governmental groups in the implementation of international, regional and national plans for improvement of women's conditions;

(d) Consider as a plan for the future, and establish strategies for implementation, the input and particular recommendations of non-governmental groups;

(e) Give financial resources to non-governmental groups so that these groups can render a contribution towards the implementation of the programme of action.

104. Non-governmental organizations should support governmental efforts by:

(a) Investigating the problems of different groups of women;

(b) Assisting *and promoting* organizations of women at the grass-roots level, especially those established among poor and uneducated women, to promote learning and productive and other developmental activities;

(c) Providing liaison services for such groups with educational and other development agencies;

(d) Promoting attitudinal change among men and women;

(e) Promoting solidarity among women's groups;

(f) Influencing and informing the mass media and political groups;

(g) Developing new analytical methodology;

(h) Launching programmes and activities to serve, in particular, rural women;

(i) Promoting public acceptance of family planning, including sex education;

(j) Informing their members of government policies and development plans as well as the international standards and programmes for improving the situation of women.

8. *Grass-roots organizations*

105. In accordance with the Regional Plans of Action and with a view to implementing the World Plan of Action, Governments and agencies on other levels should, where appropriate, promote the establishment of grass-roots organizations of women as an integral part of their over-all development efforts and should provide adequate financial and personnel resources for such efforts to succeed. Such grass-roots organizations of women will serve as forums for women to develop self-reliance and will eventually enable women to obtain real access to resources and power and to shoulder greater socio-economic and political responsibilities within their communities and their societies.

B. Objectives and priority areas for action taken in connexion with the subtheme of the World Conference, "Employment, health and education"

Introduction

106. The objectives and priority areas of action for improving the employment, health and education status of women in every country have to be promoted within the over-all context of national planning and development for the whole population. Improvement in the condition of women in these areas is also instrumental in the development of the country. Furthermore, the improvements in any one of these sectors also affect the situation in other sectors. Recognition of this interrelated nature of the programmes is essential if their effectiveness is to be maximized. Socio-cultural values should not suffer as a result of physical economic development. Therefore, integrated and innovative programmes and new methodologies should be explored.

107. The programmes should also invariably include measures for building the capacities of women themselves by their training and information programmes and by their organizing themselves, with the assistance of Government and other socio-political forces, to make full use of new opportunities, policies and programmes.

108. To ensure that labour policies and action taken in favour of women workers form part of over-all employment policies and measures for the entire working population, men and women alike, with a view to overcoming the problems that affect women only and preventing measures of protection which discriminate against them. To include in employment policies for underprivileged population groups, such as urban fringe groups, the low-income sector and indigenous population groups, references to the specific situation of women workers.

1. *Employment*

Objectives

109. To promote full and equal opportunities and treatment for women in employment, bearing in mind that this requires that both women and men have the possibility to combine paid work with household responsibilities and the caring for children. To ensure that women and men receive equal remuneration for work of equal value and equal educational and training opportunities in both rural and urban areas, so that women might secure more highly skilled employment and become integrated into the development of their countries with a view to more rapid and balanced growth in agriculture, industry and other non-traditional sectors, with the aim of ensuring better over-all working conditions for women, in order to achieve more rapid and balanced growth in both agriculture and industry in order to integrate women in development.

110. To increase and promote employment opportunities for women as part of national efforts to bring about a more just international economic order, with a view to achieving national self-reliance, increasing economic and technical co-operation among developing countries and the full utilization of the labour force for their own benefit and to promote the socio-economic development of their own countries.

111. To improve the working conditions and occupational mobility of women workers in the lower and middle levels of the sectors in which the majority of women work.

112. To ensure equal rights and opportunities for the gainful employment of rural women both in agricultural and non-agricultural jobs under proper working conditions, improve the capabilities and productivity of rural women workers, increase food production, diminish migration in countries where this is necessary and whose population policies contain explicit provisions to this effect, promote rural development and strengthening of self-reliance programmes; to extend labour and social security legislation to women working in agriculture.

113. To promote effective policies to increase employment opportunities, to improve existing ones and enable women to obtain jobs involving more skills and responsibility, particularly at the managerial level, in all sectors of the economy to promote occupational mobility for women, in both rural and urban areas, by encouraging the provision of maternity protection, child-care facilities, technical training and health protection, with a view to achieving the industrialization targets for the third United Nations Development Decade.

114. To facilitate paid employment of women by encouraging increased involvement of males in sharing domestic and child care responsibilities.

115. To take measures for the implementation of legislation relating to working conditions for women.

116. To formulate and implement national and local training and employment

asylum in particular. Third countries should be urged to receive refugees for resettlement without discrimination on the basis of sex or lack of qualifications. There is a particularly urgent need for senior level responsibility for the special needs of refugee women, including monitoring, in the UNHCR and other agencies and organizations involved in refugee relief. These programmes should also apply to displaced women, wherever appropriate.

248. It should be recognized that in refugee situations and of displaced persons, women and children form the bulk of the refugees and have particular needs. Therefore special efforts are necessary to ensure their survival and well-being, and to prevent their abuse and exploitation. The traditional disadvantages of many women in society are intensified in refugee situations as well as for displaced persons. This must be recognized in formulating any programmes of assistance. The assistance provided through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or through bilateral intergovernmental channels as far as resources permit should include the following categories of assistance:

(a) Legal, humanitarian and moral assistance to women refugees ensuring for them the fullest respect for their human rights in accordance with the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to prevent exploitation of their ignorance of their rights and of their comparatively weak positions;

(b) Special relief efforts directed to refugee women and children, and particularly to handicapped persons, to ensure that available aid reaches them;

(c) Assistance and counselling to women refugees at an early phase of their arrival in the country of asylum, with emphasis on the development of self-reliance;

(d) Special health care measures and health counselling including family planning services on a nationally acceptable and voluntary basis for women refugees, as well as supplemental feeding programmes for pregnant and lactating women, provided through means relevant to their culture and traditions, and by women medical workers where necessary;

(e) Training and educational programmes, including orientation, language and job training, designed to facilitate the necessary adjustments of women refugees to their new life and the preservation of their cultural links with their country of origin;

(f) Special efforts to facilitate family reunion and support for tracing programmes;

(g) Skill development programmes for refugee women so that they may learn to employ their potential for income-earning activity;

(h) The UNHCR should encourage Governments in whose territory abuses of women refugees take place to bring to justice the perpetrators of such abuses. Host country Governments should be encouraged to allow sufficient international personnel in refugee camps to discourage exploitation or any attacks upon women refugees.

249. Assistance should be provided in strengthening the counselling programme for women refugees, both in rural settlements and urban centres, and the design of special social work programmes to reach women refugees, where such programmes do not at present exist. Special orientation programmes should be provided for women refugees awaiting resettlement in third countries.

250. The role of women refugees in the operation and administration of refugee camps should be substantially expanded, including distribution of food and other supplies, and the design of training and orientation programmes. The UNHCR is urged to develop policies which actively involve refugee women in self-help programmes in an effort to fully utilize their skills and talents.

251. The United Nations system should give high priority in its public information activities to the need to assist refugee women and children the world over.

B. Elaboration and review of international standards

252. Every effort should be made by the United Nations and organizations in the United Nations system to encourage Governments:

(a) To sign and ratify or accede to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 34/180, of 18 December 1979, so that it will come into force at an early date within the period of this programme;

(b) To sign and ratify or accede, if they have not yet done so, to all conventions of the United Nations and specialized agencies which relate to women.

253. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women should keep under review the reporting systems under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women once it comes into force. The Commission on the Status of Women should keep under review the reporting system for the implementation of the World Plan of Action and the implementation of the Programme for the second half of the Decade.

254. The United Nations and organizations in the United Nations system should, in the formulation of international standards in areas where they do not exist, take into account the needs of women.

255. The specialized agencies should submit reports on the implementation of the Convention in areas falling within the scope of their activities, when requested to do so, and should attend the meetings of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women when invited to do so.

256. Measures should be taken by bodies and organizations in the United Nations system, particularly UNCTAD, UNIDO, the Centre on Transnational Corporations, the International Labour Organisation and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations to include specific provisions relating to women in the International Code of Conduct for transnational corporations and on the transfer of technology aimed at diminishing any adverse effects of redeployment of industry and technology.

C. Research, data collection and analysis

257. The United Nations, the specialized agencies and the regional commissions should give high priority to undertaking multisectoral and interdisciplinary action-oriented research in relevant and important areas where information does not already exist on the ways of integrating women in development, with a view to formulating development objectives, strategies and policy measures responsive to the needs of women and men. Such research should utilize existing institutions such as the United Nations Institute for Research and Training for the Advancement of Women as well as more use of joint institutions which deal with questions concerning status of women. The research should be aimed at developing effective methodologies of planning for women's development and at evaluating the participation of women in the informal sectors of the economy; the health status of women, the double burden of working women and data on the degree of absence of women because of maternity, educational opportunities or lack thereof for women, in particular factors contributing to illiteracy, full access of women including drop-outs among the female population to all types and all levels of education, the conditions of the female-headed household, the participation in the formal sectors of the economy, political participation and the nature of the contributions of women's organizations. Emphasis should also be given to fuller and more systematic analysis of all the interrelationships between women's roles in development and demographic phenomena. Research should also be conducted on employment opportunities projected for a period of five or ten years after the Decade for Women, and on training/educational programmes that will meet the need for the specific work force so identified.

258. Taking into consideration that international migration has become an enduring process in the labour market, the special problems of migrant women, as related to their economic functions, legal and social status, difficulties arising from language barriers and the education of the second generation deserve special attention. The ILO, in co-operation with relevant bodies such as UNESCO, FAO and WHO should continue and develop studies

to assess the employment, health and educational conditions of migrant women with a view to assist Governments in viewing their national and international policies concerning employment, social security, housing, social welfare policies and the preservation of the cultural heritage as well as the impact of mass media for supportive channels of information for migrant women.

259. The United Nations, in close collaboration with specialized agencies and regional commissions and on the basis of the work done by INSTRAW, should prepare and make available compendiums of statistics on women, containing the most recent data, time-trend analysis where available, as well as national and international measures designed to improve the situation of women. The *Directory of International Statistics*, prepared by the Statistical Office, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, should include a special section indicating where relevant data exist by which progress toward equality between the sexes can be monitored.

260. The Sub-Committee on Statistical Activities of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, in agreement with INSTRAW, should, as soon as possible, include in its programme of work consideration of statistics relating to women and develop short- and long-range goals for improving the quality and relevance of data pertaining to the conditions of women. Such discussions should include plans to update data concerning women with a particular emphasis on the development, evaluation and updating of estimates and projections of the participation of women in all areas of national life.

261. The United Nations should, in close collaboration with the specialized agencies, the regional commissions and national Governments encourage statistical operations and practices that are free from sex-based stereotypes and appropriate research methodology that would have relevance to the participation of women in development and equality between the sexes.

262. The United Nations, with the concerned specialized agencies, should pay special attention to the industries in which the overwhelming majority of employees are female, analyse the causes of their existence and the possibilities of new technological patterns leading to deep changes in the respective branches.

263. At the regional level the regional commissions in collaboration with the specialized agencies should:

(a) Assist the countries of the region to establish indicators by which progress toward equality between the sexes can be monitored. In establishing such a set of indicators, Governments should be advised to take into account the social and cultural realities of the country, the current state of the country's statistical development as well as their individual policy priorities;

(b) Prepare for each region an inventory of social, economic and demographic indicators relevant to the analysis of the status of women in the region. For a better evaluation of development programmes, the utilization of and access to, such data should be ensured;

(c) Assist countries in the development of surveys carried out as part of the national household surveys capability programme including batteries of questions of special relevance to the participation of women in development and equality between the sexes;

(d) Increase their level of investment in long-range fundamental research on women and development, without violation to national priorities, so as to provide a sound scientific base for development planning.

D. Dissemination of information and experience

264. The respective specialized agencies of the United Nations, during the second part of this Decade, should give special consideration to the conditions of work of women, including the problems of working hours and working norms for women, and bring their conclusions to the attention of member States.

265. The United Nations and UNESCO should ensure the inclusion of women in the current work undertaken in preparation for the new international information order as both recipients and participants in information systems in which their problems and issues are considered. In the definition of new communication policies the participation of women and their positive and dynamic image must be emphasized.

266. The United Nations system should ensure that women's issues form an integral part of the existing international information systems and data banks (such as AGRIS, INRES, INTIB, DIS), particularly ISU information system unit within the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, in order to facilitate free exchange of experience and knowledge among international organizations and their member States.

267. The Joint United Nations Information Committee (JUNIC) in carrying out its responsibilities for programmes of social and economic information should:

(a) Ensure that the annual JUNIC plans of action take into consideration issues and topics of particular interest to women, matters which particularly affect women, as well as their participation in information activities such as press, publications, radio programmes, film and television projects, reportage of field trips, seminars, etc.;

(b) Advocate that an information component be built into projects such as those assisted by the Voluntary Fund for the Decade and by other organizations of the United Nations system, and which would be disseminated by the Department of Public Information, specialized agencies, etc.;

(c) Ensure that guides and directories of the United Nations Information Centre contain relevant data and information about programmes and activities of the United Nations relating to women.

268. The United Nations and other organizations in the United Nations system such as UNCTAD, UNDP, UNFPA, UNEP, UNIDO, UNICEF, UNITAR, the ILO, FAO, UNESCO, WHO and WFP should include in their publications, media support activities, training programmes and seminars etc., specific guidelines on issues and topics of particular interest to women and those in which women could be successfully integrated. In particular, United Nations agencies concerned with development, education, employment, health, population, food production etc., should increase their information output on matters affecting women especially in developing countries with emphasis on reaching mass audiences in rural and isolated regions and countries where women tend to be cut off from the main media channels.

269. In its programme on major political, economic and social issues as well as on human interest stories, United Nations radio should include contributions and participation of women in all these areas. The present weekly radio programme on women should be continued through the Decade or longer as the need may be with adequate provision being made to adapt it in different languages and distribute it more extensively. Co-production agreements between United Nations visual service and local networks to expand the number of films on United Nations topics should include co-production with women producers in developing countries on films related to women's issues.

270. The United Nations should issue booklets, pamphlets and publications with periodic progress reports on Decade activities and encourage the exchange of information and experience between women in Member States through study visits and the distribution of publications. The United Nations Handbook on the New International Economic Order should include data and information on aspects of women's participation. The *Development Forum* and other publications should contain items related to the Decade. The United Nations information centres should improve their library materials on women and disseminate information on women more actively, especially in developing countries. Information on women should be on the agenda of the meeting of the UNIC directors for the duration of the Decade.

271. The United Nations and organizations of the United Nations system dealing with development should strengthen their information component relating to women

SALT and the Future of Arms Control

Secretary Muskie's address before the Women's National Democratic Club in Washington, D.C., on October 16, 1980.[1]

I want to spend a few minutes at the outset talking about something that is very much on my mind: the future of the SALT II Treaty and, indeed, of arms control itself. As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year, I listened carefully to the debate over the treaty. I reached a clear and firm conclusion: that ratification of this treaty, in its present form, is strongly in the interest of this nation.

Nonetheless, as a proponent of the treaty, I supported the President's decision to seek a postponement of full Senate debate on the treaty in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan last December. It was clear that our attention—as a government and a people—needed to be focused on the significance of the Soviet action and on a strong U.S. and international response. And it was also clear that the Soviet invasion made the road to ratification even steeper.

The Soviets remain in Afghanistan. That is a fact we cannot afford to ignore. As a nation that cherishes our freedom, we must be concerned about the freedom of the Afghan people from military aggression. And we cannot ignore the threat that the Soviet invasion poses to a region vital not only to the United States but to the world. We must be fully prepared to protect those vital interests.

So long as Soviet forces remain there, Afghanistan cannot be permitted to recede from our attention or from the international agenda. The Soviet leadership must understand that aggression will be resisted and that the only basis upon which an improvement in our relations can proceed is one of mutual restraint.

It is precisely because SALT II assures an appreciable measure of restraint on Soviet capabilities—restraint that almost certainly will be lacking without the treaty—that we should ratify the SALT II Treaty as soon as possible. This is not something we should do for the Soviets; it is something we must do for ourselves, for the treaty reduces the threats we would otherwise face over the next 5 years.

Concrete Benefits of SALT

Let me very briefly give you some examples of what I mean by that.

- Without the treaty, the Soviets can deploy 25% more strategic bombers and missiles by 1985 than they can if the treaty is in force.
- Without the treaty, we estimate that they will have several thousand more individual nuclear weapons on those bombers and missiles by 1985 than they could under the treaty. Each of their heavy missiles alone could carry 20–30 nuclear weapons instead of the 10 permitted under the treaty.
- Without the treaty, there is no prohibition on either party concealing their strategic programs, from putting the signals from their missile tests in code, or simply hiding their programs from our satellites and other technical monitoring.
- Without the treaty, we would, in effect, know less about more. Our ability to observe Soviet military efforts could be severely impaired at a time when there were no agreed limits on what they could do. In such an unrestrained environment, our own defense planning becomes more difficult, less certain, more costly.
- Without the treaty, we could be forced to spend more of our dollars on strategic programs than now planned, at the expense of social programs and our conventional military forces or through new tax burdens.

The treaty achieves these restraints on Soviet capabilities without significantly interfering with our own strategic modernization programs. The MX missile, cruise missile, our new Trident submarine and missile—all of the programs we have undertaken in the past several years to assure that we maintain a stable nuclear balance in the 1980s—can and will proceed on schedule under the SALT agreement.

Clearly, this treaty does not mean an end to the arms race or the risk of a nuclear catastrophe. The dangers inherent in two massively armed nuclear states will persist. But the treaty reduces those dangers by making the nuclear balance more stable, by reducing the uncertainties that can lead to a fatal miscalculation by either side, by avoiding the risk of pouring new billions into a stepped-up arms race that will buy us less, not more, security.

That is why the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously support early ratification of the SALT II Treaty. That is why all of our European allies strongly urge us to ratify it promptly. That is why the President has made clear that when the Senate reconvenes, he will consult with the leadership with a view toward resuming Senate consideration and bringing the treaty to a vote as soon as that is practical, for we must understand a critical fact about this treaty: We can lose its benefits not only through rejection but also through inaction. In the months since the treaty was signed, both we and the Soviets have avoided actions that would be inconsistent with the terms of the treaty. As time goes on, however, such voluntary self-restraint may become less tenable.

The agreements involve timetables—schedules that were an integral part of the bargain. Those timetables are running. There are specific actions called for in 1981; the Soviets, for example, must dismantle systems that would place them above the new limits. And while the treaty itself does not expire until 1985, there is a separate protocol that expires at the end of 1981. As the protocol shrinks, the bargain could unravel. In short, as lawyers like to say, time is of the essence of this agreement. And time is running out. We must make our decision or it will be made for us—by default.

Future of Arms Control

I have stressed the concrete, immediate benefits to us of the SALT II Treaty, because I believe they constitute an over-

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can be accomplished and how soon. But we have also learned that much can be accomplished. We have learned, in the past 20 years, that our resources are limited. We have also learned that we must, therefore, use our resources with greater sensitivity and effectiveness. We have learned that the developing world may not always welcome the enthusiasm of crusaders. But it does want the expertise and the cooperation of partners.

Twenty years ago, John Kennedy proclaimed a new frontier. By doing so, he reminded us of something unique in our American view of the world. In other, older cultures the word "frontier" means a boundary—a place to stop. But for us, the word has meant ever-beckoning horizons, new challenges, new obstacles to overcome. That is one thing that has not changed in the past 20 years. Today, as then, the frontier of development beckons. Today, more than ever, that frontier must be explored.

[1] Press release 283. ■

whelming case for ratifying the treaty at the earliest possible moment. But there is something even more far-reaching at stake in our decision on this treaty: It is the future of arms control itself.

Seven American Presidents have pursued, with the deepest conviction, the effort to control humankind's most terrifying creations. That process has been painfully slow, failing to keep pace with the technology we seek to limit. But it has produced a series of agreements that have made a dangerous world less dangerous:

- The ban on poisonous nuclear explosions in the atmosphere;
- The ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty which headed off a perilous and costly race in these defensive weapons;
- The SALT I agreement which froze the level of strategic missiles at a time when the Soviets were building up and we were not;
- And now this SALT II agreement.

If we turn our back on this treaty, we will not only jeopardize the progress we have made; we will enter an uncertain new world—an indefinite period without the binding restraints of SALT II or even the expired SALT I agreement. And while we try to pick up the pieces and start again, the technology of modern strategic weapons will not stand still. It will move ahead. We will have to reach even further to seize control of the arms race, without the foundation we have already built. What is already hard could become hopeless—to gain control over an arms race that imperils the future of all humanity.

Our allies understand this reality. Each of them strongly supports the treaty, because they see their stake in a stable nuclear balance and because they see SALT II as a necessary step on the path to further limits and further reductions. In particular, they see ratification of SALT II as a prerequisite to full-scale negotiations on limiting long-range theater nuclear systems in SALT III. Withdrawal of this treaty would be a profound blow to the alliance.

And it would severely undermine our ability to work for arms control elsewhere. Our ability to seek restraint from nations on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons would badly suffer if our own commitment to mutual restraint is called into question. For the United States to be seen as the opponent of arms control would be a propaganda coup of enormous value to our adversaries. Our credibility —our standing in the world as a nation of peace—also rests on the fate of this treaty.

The Foreign Policy of Human Rights

Secretary Muskie's address before a public forum at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee on October 21, 1980.[1]

My purpose tonight is to listen as well as to speak—to give you an opportunity to ask questions. So I will be deliberately brief. But I do want to begin with a few formal, stage-setting words about the root purposes of our American foreign policy.

A few years ago, in a toast he delivered at the White House in President Kennedy's Administration, the French philosopher Andre Malraux observed that America was the first nation on Earth consciously organized around an idea. That idea, of course, was the idea of human freedom: the idea of unfettered individual expression, of respect for the sanctity of the individual; the idea of full play for the citizen's political rights.

That idea, of course, remains central to our political union. It is what makes America the wellspring of the world's contemporary human liberation movements, from the civil rights movement to the crusade for women's rights. And that idea of human freedom is one of the motivating forces of our nation's foreign policy.

Tonight I want to talk briefly about the foreign policy of human rights. And I want to touch specifically on a forthcoming event of great significance to all of us who care about human rights: this year's Madrid conference of 33 European nations, the United States, and Canada. In November these nations will begin to review compliance with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The Helsinki Final Act established CSCE—the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—as a continuing process, and it made fidelity to certain human rights standards a matter of joint obligation and concern to all 35 signing nations.

Let me begin with an observation or two about the emphasis placed by President Carter and his Administration on human rights as a major theme of Ameri-

The Basic Choice

Some suggest that we can preserve the arms control process and obtain a better treaty by reopening the negotiations. I am convinced that is a prescription not for progress but for breakdown. This treaty is a product of 7 years of negotiation by Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter. Like all complex agreements, it is a series of smaller bargains tied together in an overall balance both sides see to be in their interest. Can we reasonably expect to extract greater concessions from the Soviets while giving no concessions in return? That would not be a formula for negotiation but for stalemate, while the Soviets acquired arms this treaty would deny them.

And if at the same time, our nation were proclaiming a new strategic doctrine—a doctrine of "superiority"—the prospects of those negotiations would evaporate. Whether it is called "superiority" or "margin of safety," this doctrine rejects the central principle of this treaty —that the greatest safety comes from an overall balance in our forces. It proclaims, in effect, that we would accept no treaty unless it is unbalanced, unless an edge for the United States is locked in.

That is the unmistakable meaning of the terms. If one party requires "superiority," the other must accept inferiority; if one demands a margin of safety, the other must accept a margin of peril. As a practical matter, we could not negotiate or renegotiate arms control agreements on that basis, for they would not be negotiable.

Our nation faces a basic choice: whether we will secure the benefits of this treaty and move on to further limits in SALT III, or whether we will tear up this agreement and try to start over at square one. In my 35 years in public life, I can think of few national decisions with more profound consequences. The path we take on this fateful question will shape our future for years to come.

Nuclear weapons are the invention of man. They cannot be uninvented. But just as we met the earlier challenge of splitting the atom, we must summon the same determination, the same unfaltering commitment to the task of bringing these instruments of self-destruction under sensible control. SALT II is at the heart of that quest. I know that ratification will be difficult, but I also know that it is necessary.

[1] Press release 290. ■

greatly to the success of this conference if we demonstrate our unity to the world—the unity of women—and our will—the will of women in seeking peaceful solutions to international problems.

But we must do more than demand peace, seek peace, pray for peace. We ourselves must build peace—step by patient step. There is a song in my country which begins this way: "Let there be peace on Earth, and let it begin with me. . . ."

Our conference will be an even greater success if we translate that noble sentiment into action—here, now in Copenhagen. In our deliberations let us demonstrate to the world our will to act in a spirit of compromise to achieve agreements peacefully and with principle and to respect honest differences of opinion. Let there be peace on Earth—and let it begin with all of us.

MS. WEDDINGTON,
JULY 30, 1980

I remember how our delegation felt as we left Washington for Copenhagen. We were excited; we were eager; we were looking forward to joining you here.

Our educators, health specialists, and labor experts came to discuss the substantive areas of health, education, and employment—the subthemes of this conference as determined by the preparatory committee. Our rural women, our disabled, and our displaced homemakers came to address creatively the special problems they face. Our foreign aid and refugee experts came to advise on those important aspects of the agenda here. Our delegation came to Copenhagen to discuss the complex and painful problems of over half of the world's population. We came here determined to contribute to a program of action that would speak directly to women wherever they are in the world by developing appropriate national, regional, and international guidelines to improve the conditions of the world's majority. And, in spirit, our delegation carried the goodwill and hope for the future of millions of American women, hundreds of organizations and diverse constituencies across the United States.

Sadly, our mutual efforts have fallen far below their potential accomplishments. Those efforts have been subverted by those with a different agenda. The focus on women here was pushed aside and became a victim of those who choose instead to focus on the political polemics of the Middle East situation. We are denied a consensus not by questions of how to help women in developing areas, not by questions of what education women need, not by questions of how to support women who are discriminated against on the basis of race and sex, not by any question uniquely pertaining to women or issues viewed from a woman's perspective. We are denied a consensus by those who want to focus a statement against Zionism, by those who want to advance their special interests in the Middle East—knowing full well that a special session of the U.N. General Assembly is already working on the highly complicated and difficult problem involved. They have not compromised as they claim; they have denied women whatever their race, religion, or national origin a unique opportunity to contribute solutions to their own issues in their own way. And the intemperate and abhorrent attacks against Israel and the Camp David process are completely false and regrettable.

We recognize the difficulties of this conference, but we are disappointed that the collective will of women here at this middecade conference of the U.N. Decade for Women has not been sufficiently strong to overcome the forces operating here and to refocus this conference on the issues and problems we came to discuss.

This disappointment does not negate the contribution that the decade and this conference has made to the cause of women. More women are serving on their countries' delegations in Copenhagen than in Mexico City in 1975. Seventy-five countries (68 of them represented by women) signed the Convention for Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Networks among women have been strengthened here among the 2,000 government representatives participating in this conference and among the 8,000 women attending the forum. The documentation published by nations, the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and other participating programs, as well as numerous nongovernmental organizations, is extremely valuable. And we are pleased that such initiatives as those on the disabled, the elderly, on refugees, and on women in the U.N. system have achieved wide consensus.

Nevertheless, we return to our country with heavy hearts because women have been denied the time they deserved on the world's center stage and have been denied the opportunity to accomplish all that they hoped to achieve. However, we will also return to our country with undaunted determination to continue to work for the cause of women.

We return to pursue ratification of the convention that the U.S. delegation signed here. We will pursue ways to implement a number of important initiatives taken here. We will go home to find ways, working within the government and with the women of our country, to apply our maximum collective influence and strength toward our mutual goal: equality, development, and peace.

TEXT OF PROGRAM OF ACTION[2]

PROGRAMME OF ACTION FOR THE SECOND HALF OF THE UNITED NATIONS DECADE FOR WOMEN: EQUALITY, DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE

Part One: Background and framework

INTRODUCTION

A. Legislative mandates

1. The mandates for the Programme of Action for the Second Half of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace are as follows:

(a) General Assembly resolution 3520 (XXX) of 15 December 1975, in which the Assembly decided that in 1980, at the mid-point of the Decade, a world conference would be convened to review and evaluate progress made in implementing the recommendations of the World Conference of the International Women's Year, held in 1975, and to readjust programmes for the second half of the Decade in the light of new data and research;

(b) Economic and Social Council resolution 2062 (LXII) of 12 May 1977, in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to prepare for the consideration of the Commission on the Status of Women, at its twenty-eighth session, a report outlining a programme of concrete action for the second half of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace;

(c) General Assembly resolution 33/185 of 29 January 1979, in which the Assembly decided upon the subtheme, "Employment, Health and Education", for the World Conference and recommended that the Conference should place emphasis on elaborating action-oriented plans for integrating women into the developmental

process, particularly by promoting economic activities and employment opportunities on an equal footing with men, through, *inter alia*, the provision of adequate health and educational facilities;

(d) General Assembly resolution 33/191 of 29 January 1979 by which it was decided that the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace would be held in Copenhagen.

B. Objectives of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace

2. In 1975, International Women's Year, a World Conference was held in Mexico City which adopted the World Plan of Action for the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace are still 1985, and the Declaration on the Equality of Women and their Contribution to Development and Peace. The principles and objectives proclaimed at the Mexico City Conference for the Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace are still relevant today and constitute the basis of action for the Decade. They were further reaffirmed by a number of United Nations regional, sectoral and international meetings as well as by the social and economic recommendations of the Conference of Non-Aligned and Developing Countries on the Role of Women in Development held in Baghdad in May 1979, which were endorsed by the sixth summit of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries.

3. Equality is here interpreted as meaning not only legal equality, the elimination of *de jure* discrimination, but also equality of rights, responsibilities and opportunities for the participation of women in development, both as beneficiaries and as active agents. The issue of inequality as it affects the vast majority of women of the world is closely related to the problem of underdevelopment which exists mainly as a result of unjust international economic relations. The attainment of equality presupposes equality of access to resources and the power to participate equally and effectively in their allocation and in decision-making at various levels. Accordingly, it must be recognized that the attainment of equality by women long disadvantaged may demand compensatory activities to correct accumulated injustices. The joint responsibility of men and women for the welfare of the family in general and the care of their children in particular must be reaffirmed.

4. Development is here interpreted to mean total development, including development in the political, economic, social, cultural and other dimensions of human life as also the development of economic and other material resources and also the physical, moral, intellectual and cultural growth of the human person. The improvement of the status of women requires action at the national and local levels and within the family. It also requires a change in the attitudes and roles of both men and women. Women's development should not only be viewed as an issue in social development but must be seen as an essential component in every dimension of development. To improve the status of women and their role in the process of development, such development must be an integral part of the global project for the establishment of a New International Economic Order based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all states.

5. Without peace and stability there can be no development. Peace is thus a prerequisite to development. Moreover peace will not be lasting without development and the elimination of inequalities and discrimination at all levels. Equality of participation in the development of friendly relations and co-operation among States will contribute to the strengthening of peace, to the development of women themselves and to equality of rights at all levels and in all spheres of life, as well as to the struggle to eliminate imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, zionism, racism, racial discrimination, *apartheid*, hegemonism, and foreign occupation, domination and oppression as well as full respect for the dignity of the peoples and their right to self-determination and independence without foreign interference or intervention and to promote guarantees of fundamental freedoms and human rights.

C. Nature and scope of the Programme of Action

6. In compliance with the mandates given above, the present Programme of Action has been drawn up for the second half of the Decade, 1980–1985, to promote the attainment of the three objectives of equality, development and peace, with special emphasis on the subtheme—namely, employment, health and education as significant components of development taking into account that human resources cannot achieve their full potential without integrated socio-economic development. The Programme aims at strengthening comprehensive and effective strategies to obstacles and constraints on women's full and equal participation in development including actions to solve the problems of underdevelopment and of the socio-economic structure which places women in an inferior position and to increase their contribution to the strengthening of world peace.

7. The following Programme of Action, formulated at the mid-point of the Decade, recognizes that considerable efforts have been made by the majority of countries in furtherance of the objectives of the Decade, but that progress has been insufficient to bring about the desired quantitative or qualitative improvements in the status of women. On the assumption that the three main objectives of the Decade—Equality, Development and Peace—are closely interlinked with one another, the purpose of this Programme of Action is to refine and strengthen practical measures for advancing the status of women, and to ensure that women's concerns are taken into account in the formulation and implementation of the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade.

8. The present Programme focuses on ensuring women's increased participation in the realization of the objectives of the World Plan of Action. The recommendations seek to indicate the interrelated nature of actions that need to be taken simultaneously on several fronts such as those related to world economic issues for the International Development Strategies for the Third United Nations Development Decade and the implementation of the Programme of Action for the New International Economic Order thus elaborating the approach adopted in the World Plan of Action. In particular, the World Plan of Action gives high priority to improving the conditions of the most disadvantaged groups of women—especially the rural and urban poor and the vast group of women workers in the tertiary sector. This Programme gives high priority to improving the conditions of the most disadvantaged groups of women, particularly those disadvantaged because of socio-economic and historic conditions, with emphasis on rural and urban poor and on the subtheme: employment, education and health. An attempt has also been made to recommend practical measures to be incorporated in all aspects of the development of society.

9. Although the World Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Objectives of the International Women's Year already contains a comprehensive list of measures necessary to achieve those objectives, it is evident, and has been further borne out by the review of progress made over the past five years, that they cannot be achieved in such a short span of time and that periodic reviews are needed to strengthen the strategies and objectives of the Plan in line with major world developments. Therefore, the possibility of a second decade could be envisaged for the period 1985–1995. The recommendation to hold another conference in 1985 has already been made by two of the regional preparatory meetings—those of the Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA) and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).

I. Historical Perspective

A. The roots of inequality of women: the problems of development and equality of participation of women and men in development

10. The causes of the inequality between women and men are directly linked with a complex historical process. They also derive from political, economic, social and cultural factors. The form in which this inequality manifests itself is as varied as the economic, social and cultural conditions of the world community.

11. Throughout history and in many

programmes and projects, which take particular account of the need to give women access to gainful economic activity and to improve their employment situation in priority areas for the economic and social development of their countries.

117. To adopt measures to ensure that women's entry into certain sectors of the labour market does not result in lowering the working conditions, remuneration and status of those sectors.

118. To promote technology to improve the labour productivity of women while decreasing their work time and to guarantee that women workers are the ones who benefit from such an improvement.

119. To review implicit and explicit job evaluation criteria with a view to overcoming difficulties and obstacles to the job advancement and careers of women.

120. To ensure that, in all sectors, the economic returns from women's work accrue directly to them.

Priority areas for action

121. Special action should be taken to institute programmes which would inform women workers of their rights under legislation and other remedial measures. The importance of freedom of association and the protection of the right to organize should be emphasized, this being particularly relevant to the position of women in employment. Special measures should be taken to ratify and implement in national legislation the relevant conventions and recommendations of the International Labour Organisation concerning the rights of women as regards access to equal employment opportunities, equal pay for work of equal value, working conditions, job security and maternity protection.

122. Information programing should be instituted aimed at making women, especially in the rural areas and from socio-economically disadvantaged groups, aware of employment opportunities and of the opportunities for education, training and skill acquisition.

123. Measures should be taken to ensure that development agencies in different sectors of national planning include larger numbers of women in their staff as a matter of policy and, as part of that policy, allocate resources to programmes for women's employment and training, the provision of supporting services and other essential inputs.

124. Legislative and/or other measures should be adopted and implemented which guarantee women protection against any sexually-oriented practice that endangers a woman's access to or maintenance of employment, that undermines her job performance and thus threatens her economic livelihood.

125. Legislative and/or other measures should be adopted and implemented to secure for men and women the same right to work, to unemployment benefits as well as to prohibit, through *inter alia* the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital status. Legislative and other measures should be adopted and implemented to facilitate the return to the labour market of women who have left it for family reasons and to guarantee the right of women to return to work after maternity leave.

126. Measures should be taken to ensure on a basis of equality of men and women the right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction. Special protection should be provided to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to be harmful to them.

127. Measures should be taken to ensure that migrant workers enjoy equal treatment and access to vocational training as nationals of the host country, and to improve the status of women who, in the process of migration, accompany the migrant workers as members of their family.

128. Ways should be investigated in which the unpaid work in the household and in agricultural tasks which women and men do in all fields can be recognized and reflected in official statistical data collections.

129. Urgently needed infrastructure services should be developed and provided such as adequate housing, safe water, energy and child care centres, for families and poor communities in rural areas and urban slums, in order to alleviate the workload traditionally imposed on women in their performance of tasks essential for the survival of their communities, and to increase their levels of gainful employment and productivity, it being understood that the benefits of higher productivity should accrue to women workers and their families.

130. Where appropriate, flexible formal or informal training programs should be designed and implemented for women in non-traditional areas in order to widen their employment opportunities and to enable them to generate income through production of goods and services.

131. The access of women to special technical training programmes should be increased and women so qualified should be helped to obtain jobs suited to their individual skills; legislative measures should be enacted and appropriate legal assistance provided to prevent exploitation based on sex, race, age, marital status or motherhood in both the traditional and modern sectors. In addition, measures should be taken to ensure that women are introduced, on the same footing as men, to new types of training in the advanced technologies which are now being widely developed.

132. Measures should be taken to provide for part-time workers levels of remuneration and social security benefits which are proportional to those of full-time workers, and the same levels of working conditions and standards of protection.

133. Where necessary, measures should be taken to develop and/or accelerate much-needed changes in policies in the tertiary sector, which includes the informal subsectors of small-scale trading, domestic services and the like in both urban and rural areas, especially by (a) extending the coverage of labour legislation in particular for domestic services workers; (b) guaranteeing the right to organize trade unions and other appropriate organizations such as credit and marketing co-operatives controlled by the women concerned; and (c) increasing access to managerial and technical training and to financial resources, credit facilities and other inputs in order to improve the working conditions of women and increase their occupational and educational mobility as well as their productivity and economic returns.

134. Measures should be adopted which guarantee that, when transfers of technology take place, account is taken of the factors of production available in the country to which the transfers are made in order to avoid any labour force disruptions, which usually affect women more severely. Promote research on appropriate endogenous technology which takes account of national characteristics and, in particular, those of developing countries. Develop new programmes and appropriate policies with regard to industrialization and the transfer of technology aimed at maximizing benefits and preventing adverse effects from the transfer of technology on both the employment, training, health and nutrition of women and over-all development. Standards should be instituted to ensure that technologies transferred are safe for utilization, and recipient countries be alerted of the hazards of particular forms of technology.

135. Studies should be carried out on the policies, programmes of action and expanding operations of transnational corporations to ensure that they offer greater employment opportunities for women and to prevent their negative effects.

136. The access of women workers to recreation and culture should be increased since their double workload prevents them from having enough necessary free time; it is therefore essential that household chores and family care should be shared by men and special emphasis should be placed on the obligation of couples to share household tasks with a view to facilitating the access of women to gainful employment.

137. Measures should be taken to ensure that in economic recessions the employment market is not less accessible to women than to men. Measures taken under social legislation concerning unemployment should not directly or indirectly lead to inequality between women and men. Retraining facilities should be provided for unemployed women, preferably in growth sectors.

138. To ensure that women and men are able to harmonize their occupational activities with their family life, child care facilities and amenities for adolescents should be provided, the length of the working day be reduced and flexible working hours introduced.

139. The number of women at the decision-making level in both national and

international workers' organizations and advisory bodies should be increased at least until the proportion corresponds to the number of women exercising a profession.

140. Equal employment opportunity programmes should be developed to promote the access of women to all levels of management and decision-making positions and to devise effective programmes to promote the access of women and girls to non-traditional skilled trades.

2. *Health*

Objectives

141. To improve the physical and mental health of all members of society through:

(a) An improvement in the health status of girls and women, as a necessary aspect of over-all socio-economic development;

(b) Formulation of demographic policies;

(c) An improvement in health care for women throughout their life cycles;

(d) The increased participation of women and men, not only as beneficiaries of the promotion of health but also in the formulation and implementation of policy decisions regarding health at community and national levels;

(e) Studies of the causes of diseases, the establishment of clinical and epidemiological research programmes and the organization of services to deal with national problems;

(f) The development of policies and programmes aimed at the elimination of all forms of violence against women and children and the protection of women of all ages from the physical and mental abuse resulting from domestic violence, sexual assault, sexual exploitation and any other form of abuses;

(g) Training human resources for health programmes of the required quantity and quality;

(h) The inclusion of the mental health aspect as well as alcoholic and drug programmes as part of over-all health programmes for women.

Priority areas for action

142. Promote primary health care with the participation of the communities as the overriding health priority and as a fundamental vehicle for achieving the health goals and objectives of the World Plan of Action.

143. Give high priority to meeting the health and needs of women within primary health care, with particular attention to the special needs of women in rural and depressed urban areas and monitor health programmes in order to secure that women's health needs are properly met.

144. Formulate official policies to involve women in planning and carrying out health programmes at all levels particularly to increase the participation of women at decision-making levels.

145. Ensure accessibility for all women to maternal health care (including care during pregnancy and childbirth and post-natal care), nutrition (including measures to control nutritional anaemias), family planning, prevention and treatment of infectious diseases—including sexually transmitted and non-communicable diseases—and parasitic diseases, through the establishment of a comprehensive family health, nutrition and health education network, in order to give women better access to health care.

146. Develop, implement and strengthen child welfare and family planning programmes and family planning information for inclusion also in school curricula for girls and boys on safe and acceptable fertility regulation methods so that both men and women can take the responsibility for family planning to promote the health, safety and welfare of mothers and infants and to enable women to exercise the right to decide freely and responsibly for the number and spacing of their children. Family planning should be facilitated as one means of reducing maternal and infant mortality where high risk factors prevail, such as high parity, too frequent pregnancies, pregnancies at the extremes of the reproductive age and the frequency and danger of secretly performed abortions.

147. To promote the physical and mental well-being of women, make provision for additional research over the next few years to facilitate analysis and assessment of the status of women.

148. Develop programmes to improve the training and utilization of community health workers, especially women, traditional medical practitioners and birth attendants and elderly village women; support women in their contribution to primary health care both within the family and the community particularly with reference to self-care and self-reliance in health.

149. Draw the attention of doctors and other health professionals to the health needs of women in general, not only in relation to pregnancy and childbirth; emphasize preventive medicine and the need to share responsibility and decision-making with professionals in other disciplines and with women themselves.

150. Establish official incentive policies to give women greater access to training in the medical professions and in health-related research in accordance with local and national needs.

151. Develop simple economic, social and cultural indicators in order to obtain better data on trends in morbidity and mortality among women and their access to and utilization of health services. Establish a national basic health information system to provide up-to-date and reliable indicators of prevailing conditions, future trends and resource productivity.

152. Give high priority to the formulation and implementation of food and nutrition policies based on the needs of women, particularly pregnant and lactating women, and those of women and children of lower socio-economic status in both rural and depressed urban areas; establish educational programmes through professional schools and community agencies to improve the quality, availability, preparation, preservation, rational use of and distribution of food, especially locally grown food.

153. Protect the health and safety of women and their families from contamination, spoilage and adulteration of foods, harmful additives and preservatives, mislabelling, deceptive packaging and irresponsible promotion of foods of low nutritional value and of breast milk substitutes. High priority should be given to the enactment and enforcement of comprehensive legislation, where appropriate, and the creation of appropriate standards of safety, health, product information and quality, including standards for the preparation, preservation, packaging and labelling of foods and other products sold in the markets. Women and men should be instructed as to the right and hygienic use of such products. Information as to the right to such protection should be widely disseminated through schools, the media, and village and community organizations.

154. Develop explicit programmes at national and local levels to improve hygiene, sanitation and access to safe water supplies and shelter as fundamental bases for good health.

155. Develop policies to ensure a safe working environment both in the home and in the work place and provide appropriate technology to relieve the workload of women. Carry out specific studies on labour hygiene and safety, particularly in branches of activity in which the health of women might be affected.

156. Introduce legislation aimed at eliminating occupational health hazards likely to affect reproductive functions, reducing environmental pollution, and controlling disposal of toxic chemicals and radioactive waste.

157. Promote extensive health education programmes, including special efforts to encourage positive traditional practices, especially breastfeeding, and to combat negative practices detrimental to women's health.

158. Formulate specific programmes for the prevention of maternal and infant mortality, giving priority to depressed rural and urban areas and to most vulnerable population groups.

159. Encourage formulation and implementation of social support measures such as maternity and parental leave, child care, breastfeeding breaks, etc. to enable women and men to carry out parental roles in the most optimal and healthy manner.

160. Direct special attention to the needs of elderly women, women living alone and disabled women.

161. Establish programmes giving full medical attention to adolescent women, since adolescence is a critical time in women's biological and psychological development and also involves a change in their relationship to the social environment in which they live.

162. Prevent mutilation practices

in development and highlight the communication component of development projects. Well-documented and built-in communication components should be included in all development programmes or projects for the integration of women in development and more adequate evaluation of the uses of media in development support to spread knowledge and increase the possibility of transfer. The United Nations and organizations of the United Nations system should collect and disseminate information on training programmes in development communication with special reference to programmes for women.

272. Information including detailed bibliographies of studies and other materials produced by the United Nations and its specialized agencies on women in the development process should be widely distributed to member nations and appropriate private research organizations to facilitate access to such information.

E. Review and appraisal

273. The United Nations system should continue to carry out a comprehensive and critical biennial review and appraisal of progress achieved in implementing the provisions of the World Plan of Action and of the programme of the second half of the Decade. The central role in the carrying out of this review and appraisal should be played by the Commission on the Status of Women. The reporting system as well as the measures for dissemination of information should be designed for the effective use of the result of monitoring by all bodies concerned.

274. The Commission on the Status of Women and the Branch for the Advancement of Women should be strengthened by resetting priorities within existing budgetary resources. The integrated reporting system should be improved, as should the Commission's ability to consider communications and the capacity for publicizing its work.

275. With a view to achieving the full integration of women into the over-all development planning of the United Nations, the review and appraisal of progress made in implementing the World Plan of Action and the Programme of Action for the second half of the Decade should be part of the procedures for the review and appraisal of progress made in the implementation of international development strategy for the third United Nations Development Decade.

276. The specialized agencies and organizations of the United Nations system as well as other relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations should consider the Plan of Action for the second half of the Decade and assist in its implementation.

277. The existing special mechanisms within the United Nations bodies and existing specialized agencies should be strengthened to implement the Plan of Action, to increase the incorporation of women's needs into all their programmes and activities and also to increase women's participation in and benefit from those programmes and activities.

278. The secretariats of all organizations within the United Nations system as well as of relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations should amend their recruitment, training, promotion and remuneration policies as necessary in order to ensure equal treatment and status for men and women employed by the organizations whether as temporary, fixed-term or permanent employees or as consultants. Such organizations should, when requesting data on women's employment from member countries with a view to publication, provide and publish comparable data on the situation as regards women's employment within the organization concerned.

279. Guidelines should be established wherever they do not already exist for the study of programmes and projects in respect of their likely impact on women, and measures for monitoring and evaluating such programmes with respect to their benefits to women should be taken.

280. Co-ordination and co-operation among the specialized agencies and United Nations bodies should be effected by increasing use of the Inter-Agency Programme for the Decade of Women and of the Branch for the Advancement of Women.

281. The regional commissions in their periodic reviews and appraisals submitted to the Economic and Social Council should report fully on specific aspects of the situation of women in every sector of their development programmes based on replies to the questionnaire on the implementation of the World Plan of Action and the Programme of Action for the second half of the Decade. These should be supplemented by appraisals of specific sectors undertaken by the regional commissions and specialized agencies, reports of relevant regional meetings of the United Nations and other documents and independent research.

282. Regional commissions should submit reports regularly to the Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat on this programme as part of the over-all review and appraisal of the World Plan of Action. There should be a close co-ordination of the regional programmes for the advancement of women with United Nations Headquarters to ensure a better use of resources.

283. Regional commissions should ensure that the high-level regional intergovernmental and expert meetings which they periodically convene should include their over-all periodic appraisal, an assessment of the situation of women as a fundamental prerequisite for planning action programmes to meet the objectives of the third development decade and the New International Economic Order.

284. Special efforts should be made by the United Nations and regional commissions to provide assistance to Member Governments which have difficulty in providing resources to complete the questionnaire and submit data required for review and appraisal.

VI. Regional Policies and Programmes

285. The international policies and programmes outlined above have clear application at the regional level and should also be regarded as regional priorities. In addition, the regional commissions in co-operation with the regional offices of the specialized agencies have specific responsibilities to provide assistance to Governments and non-governmental organizations for developing policies, strategies and programmes for the second half of the Decade in the light of the review and appraisal of progress achieved in the first half.

286. The strengthening of appropriate regional action programmes for women should be based on the development of co-operation between the countries of the region with the aim of promoting the principle of self-reliance. The formulation of regional policies and programmes is a multidimensional process requiring the adoption of action-oriented measures that are both bilateral and multilateral in scope and which require an increase in financial, technical and personnel resources to implement effectively regional programmes and priorities. To this end, regional commissions should adopt the following measures:

(a) Integrate the recommendations of this programme into the work programme of their respective sectoral units so that its implementation contributes to the development strategy of the third United Nations Development Decade;

(b) Promote fellowship and other special training programmes, particularly in the tertiary sectors which comprise the majority of the female labour force both in rural and urban areas, so that they can also improve and/or gain better occupational and socio-economic status;

(c) Strengthen the information and data collection systems with a view to providing better analysis of data on the situation and work of women, including, in particular, improved national, regional and subregional reviews of progress achieved in the implementation of this programme of action; and providing a basis for more effective advisory services to Governments regarding programmes for women;

(d) Intensify their activities in promoting adequate national social infrastructure allowing women and men to discharge their dual role in the family and in society;

(e) Undertake "skilled womenpower" inventories at national, subregional and regional levels so that trained women can have equal opportunities to be recruited in jobs related to main areas of the development process at national, regional and international levels.

Institutional arrangements

287. Measures should be taken for:

(a) Strengthening the offices of the regional commissions by recruiting women for posts at a high level of decision-making and responsibility. Such posts should include those of programme officers provided for in regular budgets and not only from extrabudgetary sources, and charged with implementing the programmes for the second half of the Decade. The regional commissions should establish posts at a high level to co-ordinate and implement policies and programmes relating specifically to the status of women;

(b) The reinforcement of the regional centres for research and training.

REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF U.S. PARTICIPATION[3]

The mid-decade World Conference of the U.N. Decade for Women, held in Copenhagen, Denmark, July 14–30, 1980, now is part of the long history of women's struggle for equality. Its declared purpose, and the objective of the U.S. delegation, was to address the inequities that exist between women and men world wide by developing for the second half of the decade a Programme of Action that could be adopted by consensus. The meeting fell short of its goal, for although a Programme of Action was adopted, the United States, Israel, and other major Western nations voted against the plan, and no consensus adoption was reached.

The 1980 World Conference for Women was convened as a result of a resolution passed at the 1975 International Women's Year Conference in Mexico City calling for a mid-decade reassessment of women's progress. The Copenhagen conference had two goals: first, to assess progress in the first 5 years of the decade in the implementation of the World Plan of Action within nations, as well as regionally and internationally; and second, to develop strategies and action programs for the remaining 5 years of the decade through a Programme of Action.

The United States prepared for the conference by establishing a Secretariat to organize its national outreach effort and to develop, in conjunction with the Department of State, the policy positions that would guide the U.S. delegation.

The members of the U.S. delegation successfully addressed some of the major inequities faced by women; and this is reflected in the program that resulted. However, that program, in spite of much positive content, was seriously impaired for the United States by three additions related to Israel and the Middle East.

Contained in three separate paragraphs, these additions include references to U.N. documents which question the Camp David accords; list zionism with imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, and racism, as an impediment to world peace and cooperation among states; and call for financial assistance for Palestinian women by U.N. organizations, specialized agencies, and organs and funds to be provided "in consultation and cooperation with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people."

Major efforts were made to eliminate such language from the program, but they failed. Consequently, on July 30, 1980, the United States, Canada, Australia, and Israel voted against the adoption of the Programme of Action. The final conference vote was 94 yes, 4 no, and 22 abstentions. One hundred and forty-four nations sent official delegations to Copenhagen.

Several delegations, including those who had voted for the program, took the floor to voice their protest against the intrusion of politics on subjects which were outside the authority of the women's conference called to address women's concerns and which were allowed to overshadow those concerns. Discussions which focused on political issues that the conference could not resolve drew attention away from other important issues on which delegates could effect change and have major impact.

Speaking on behalf of the U.S. delegation, cochair Sarah Weddington pledged that although the United States did not support the program in its entirety, the United States would continue to move forward on women's rights. Weddington emphasized: "We will . . . return to our country with undaunted determination to continue to work for the cause of women. We return to pursue ratification of the convention [against discrimination on the basis of sex] that the U.S. delegation signed here. We will pursue ways to implement a number of important initiatives taken here. We will go home to find ways, working within the government and with the women of our country, to apply our maximum collective influence and strength toward our mutual goal: equality, development, and peace."

U.S. Secretariat Director, Vivian Lowery Derryck observed: "Although we do not endorse the Programme of Action in its entirety, there are many positive recommendations in the document that we hope to implement both nationally and regionally. In addition, women's roles and responsibilities in foreign policy decisionmaking were highlighted at Copenhagen, and we hope to continue to build on that awareness within the United States."

As both Weddington and Derryck noted, there were important initiatives taken at Copenhagen; initiatives to which the U.S. delegation contributed significantly and successfully. For example, among the resolutions sponsored by the United States and adopted by the conference are those on battered women and family violence, elderly women, rural women, women refugees, safe drinking water, women and the U.N. system, and female sexual slavery. The United States also introduced a resolution on discrimination based on race; however, that resolution was withdrawn because of efforts by some nations to amend the resolution in ways that would have changed its original meaning. Nevertheless, its concepts have been discussed and introduced into the U.N. lexicon.

- The Copenhagen meeting served to heighten the awareness of women nationally with respect to the importance of their participation in U.S. foreign policy positions and decisions.
- More women served as delegates of their countries to the Copenhagen meeting than did delegations attending the first World Conference for Women in Mexico City in 1975.
- The draft Programme of Action listed imperialism, racism, colonialism as barriers to women's equality but did not mention sexism. The inclusion of sexism was resisted by many nations (Latin American, Asian, African, and East European), which insisted that sexism did not exist in their countries. After extended debate "discrimination based on sex" was added finally to the program qualified by a footnote—"which in a group of countries is called sexism"—the first time the concept has been specifically mentioned in a U.N. document. (The word sexism did not appear in the World Plan of Action

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Secretary Muskie
Matthew Nimetz
Ralph Earle II
Elliot L. Richardson
Donald F. McHenry

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EDMUND S. MUSKIE
Secretary of State

WILLIAM J. DYESS
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor

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can foreign policy. President Carter clearly signalled that new emphasis in his inaugural address. "Because we are free," he said, "we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere." From the beginning, President Carter was determined that our foreign policy should give active, explicit support to three important categories of human rights:

- The right to be free of violations of the human person—torture, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment, summary execution, and denial of due process;
- The right to fulfillment of vital economic needs such as food, shelter, education, and health care; and
- Civil and political rights—freedom of thought, expression, assembly, travel, and participation in politics.

In the past 3½ years, human rights has become an active issue on our diplomatic agenda. Serious discussions of human rights now take place between us and the nations with which we deal. And human rights performance has become one of the key criteria we use in determining whether and how we deal with other nations.

We do all this not out of a naive idealism and not only because it is right. We do all this because we have domestic and international legal obligations to promote respect for human rights. As signatories of the U.N. Charter and by our own laws, we are required to work for increased observance of human rights by all countries. We also are convinced, in the most hard-headed, practical sense, that emphasis on human rights serves our national interests.

We are convinced, first of all, that emphasis on human rights serves our long-term interest in peace and stability.

We have learned that the heavy silence of repression is not stability: It is too often the ominous calm before a storm. We are convinced that by alleviating the sources of tension and discard before they erupt into violence, nations can help build real stability. We are convinced that the United States, by encouraging this process, can help prevent damage to its long-term interests and can help remove the inviting target that social unrest presents for intervention by our foreign adversaries.

There are several cases I could cite as illustrations, but I need mention only one: the new nation of Zimbabwe. There, a process of negotiation and a free election—which we unswervingly supported —ended a violent civil war, gave new credibility to U.S. policy in Africa, and frustrated the hope of the Soviet Union to exploit racial violence to its own ends.

Second, we are convinced that the United States will be more secure in a world where more governments respect the rights of their people.

We believe that countries which respect human rights make stronger allies and better friends. Our allies in Western Europe, the Andean pact nations, Japan, and Israel underscore this point. Because they strive to respect human rights, they have an inner strength and resilience that helps them stand with us against the challenges we face together. And to the extent that our other friends in the world commit themselves to human rights, we believe they will gain the same kind of inner strength—inner strength which enhances their security and ours.

Third, we are convinced that our support for human rights enhances the influence of the United States in important world arenas.

I can attest, for example, from my own recent conversations with the President of Nigeria, that our visible support for human rights in Zimbabwe and southern Africa have improved our standing on that continent. And I believe that our emphasis on human rights—here at home and in our foreign policy—will strengthen us at the forthcoming Madrid conference. We will go to the table at Madrid armed not just with rhetoric but with a solid record of devotion to human rights and human dignity.

Fourth, our visible devotion to human rights underscores the dramatic differences—differences of philosophy and behavior—between us and the Soviet Union.

We uphold human rights fundamentally because to do so is right: Because to do so comports with our own best ideals. But it is inescapable that human rights and closed societies are incompatible. And today, around the world, the contrast between our system and the closed societies of our adversaries is dramatically visible. The Soviets dislike and fear our emphasis on human rights, because they know what a powerful attraction freedom has for millions of people everywhere on Earth.

Few people could have predicted in the early 1970s that the Helsinki conference would have such far-reaching effects. For years, the Soviet Union had been calling for a conference on security in Europe which would exclude the United States. In the early 1970s, as part of an effort to improve East-West relations, and with firm understanding that such a conference must include the United States and Canada, we and our allies accepted the idea. And we insisted further that the conference must cover a full range of issues involving individuals as well as nations.

The conference began in 1973, and in 1975 the 35 nations represented in Helsinki signed a document which, among other things, proclaimed 10 principles to guide relations between them. Those principles—to which the signatories freely obligated themselves—included respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, of conscience, and of religion or belief.

The Helsinki Final Act has three subdivisions, or "baskets." One basket concerns military security and cooperative efforts to reduce military tensions. Another concerns cooperation in economics, science, technology, and the environment. Basket 3 deals with important humanitarian issues. But it is principle 7 —the declaration concerning human rights—that has become perhaps the most famous and controversial single feature of the Helsinki Final Act. This principle requires signatory states to abide by the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other international human rights agreements. It has been our policy to consider the human rights principles of the Helsinki Final Act as solemn and important as all its other provisions.

Our goal has been, and is, to bring our influence to bear, as effectively as we know how, to insure that all the signatories, including the Soviet Union, live up to the obligations they have themselves freely undertaken—including the human rights obligations proclaimed in principle 7. That is emphatically our goal as we approach the conference in Madrid.

In the 5 years since their signing, the Helsinki accords have become a real force in the world. They have become an international benchmark for human rights performance. And they have improved day-to-day life for thousands of Eastern Europeans, enhancing opportunities to visit loved ones, offering the chance for many to emigrate as their nations seek to live up to the provisions of the act. Even before the workers' movement of 1980, for example, there was a slow but visible improvement in the human rights situation in Poland. Romania's emigration

policies have become more flexible since Helsinki. Hungary has been more cooperative in resolving family reunification problems.

Unfortunately, it is also clear that there are dark corners where Helsinki obligations are ignored. In the Soviet Union, Andrei Sakharov has been banished to exile. More than 40 other individuals—men and women who were members of Helsinki monitoring groups and took seriously the Soviet commitments at Helsinki—have been arrested; their only crime was to monitor Soviet compliance with the accords. Emigration by Soviet Jews has been severely restricted again this year. Pentacostalists face innumerable obstacles in leaving the Soviet Union as well. We see these restrictions as contrary to the spirit of the Helsinki provisions concerning freedom to travel and emigrate. So clearly, there is a long way yet to go toward full compliance with all the principles proclaimed in Helsinki.

The United States will not go to Madrid to make propaganda. Nor will we neglect other aspects of the Helsinki accords. But to ignore human rights violations that are clearly contrary to the Helsinki accords would be to weaken that agreement and to diminish the force and power of the Helsinki Final Act. The United States will make clear in Madrid that we are serious about human rights—whether at home or in Europe, whether in Afghanistan or East Asia, whether in South Africa or the Soviet Union. And we will strongly oppose procedural restrictions—such as arbitrary limits on discussion and other artificial curbs—designed to prevent a full discussion of all issues at the conference in Madrid.

Our goals at Madrid are threefold.

First, we will press for progress on human rights. Our approach will be forthright as we assess the records of compliance of the participants.

Second, we will work at Madrid for an increase in contacts between ordinary people in Eastern Europe and in the West. We will seek specific progress, for example, in resolving emigration problems and reuniting families. We also will seek progress in the cases of those persecuted or imprisoned for their political or religious beliefs or for monitoring the Helsinki accords.

Third, in the security field, we will explore the possibility of further measures which can reduce military tensions. We believe these confidence-building measures should apply to the entire Continent of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. But we are not interested in cosmetic measures or talks which go nowhere. And we will not permit discussions of security at Madrid to overshadow or in any way diminish the attention paid to human rights.

The chairman of our delegation to Madrid, former Attorney General Griffin Bell, put it this way not long ago. Our delegation to Madrid, he said, will be a bit like twin-faced Roman deity Janus, who looked both forward and back. "We shall focus our gaze on the Eastern record and speak plainly about it," Judge Bell said, "leaving no doubt of our concern for the Helsinki monitors, for Andrei Sakharov, and other champions of human rights. We shall also look to the future and attempt to negotiate concrete steps forward in all the major areas of the Final Act."

By displaying this spirit, in my judgment, the United States can best serve both the cause of human rights and our own interest. And in the process, we can help build a world in which freedom, the dream of all people, becomes a reality for more people.

Secretary Muskie Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"

Secretary Muskie was interviewed on ABC's "Issues and Answers" on October 19, 1980, by Bob Clark, ABC's chief correspondent, and Barrie Dunsmore, ABC-TV's diplomatic correspondent, and again on November 2 by Mr. Dunsmore and Ted Koppel.

OCT. 19, 1980[1]

Q. Iran's Prime Minister indicated yesterday that the prospects for the release of the American hostages would improve if we removed our radar planes from Saudi Arabia and kept Jordan from helping Iraq in the war between Iran and Iraq. He also said that Iran's Parliament would set the conditions for the release of the hostages very soon. Where does this all leave us? Does it give us any cause of optimism about the hostage issue?

A. With respect to the prediction that the Majlis [Parliament] may act soon, we have heard statements like that so many times over recent weeks, indeed, that we've learned not to raise our expectations. I hope it does act soon, and there are some indications that it may.

With respect to the AWACS [airborne warning and control system] and Jordan issues, I think first that they ought to be put in the perspective of two principles which the President announced early in the hostage crisis:

- One is that we would, of course, pursue the safe and prompt release of the hostages as soon as possible.
- The second principle was that we would do nothing that was not consistent with our national interests and national honor.

Having said that, with respect to the two issues which Mr. Rajai raised yesterday, I consider them to be expressions of concern by Iran on the two points—AWACS and the posture of the Government of Jordan. With respect to AWACS, we deployed AWACS to Saudi Arabia at the Saudis' request. They are friends; we share mutual interest in the uninterrupted flow of oil through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. We are interested in preserving the territorial integrity of the Saudis. The AWACS is a purely defensive piece of technology that has the radar capacity to see longer distances than any capability which the Saudis had at the time. It has no offensive capability. The information which is produced by AWACS goes only to the Saudis. It does not go to either of the belligerents, as suggested by Mr. Rajai yesterday; and we have indicated this through appropriate channels to the Iranian Government directly.

With respect to Jordan, we have said to Jordan, as we have to all nations—you will recall that I had some 50 or more bilateral meetings at the United Nations just 2 or 3 weeks ago—that we are impartial, that it is in our interests and the interests of all nations to bring the hostilities to an end and to do nothing which would have the effect of widening it or prolonging it. We have said that to Jordan as we have said it to other nations. Jordan, of course, is a sovereign nation and will have to make its own decisions. But our own view with respect to any actions which would have the effect of widening or prolonging the war is clear to Jordan and other countries.

[1] Press release 298. ■

societies women have been sharing similar experiences. One of the basic factors causing the unequal share of women in development relates to the division of labour between sexes. This division of labour has been justified on the basis of the childbearing function of women, which is inherent in womanhood. Consequently, the distribution of tasks and responsibilities of women and men in society have mainly restricted women to the domestic sphere and have unduly burdened them. This has led to women often being regarded and treated as inferior and unequal in their activities outside the domestic sphere and to a violation of their human rights. It has given them only limited access to resources and participation in all spheres of life, notably in decision-making, and has also resulted in many instances in institutionalized inequality in the status of women and men.

12. The inequality of women in most countries stems to a very large extent from mass poverty and general backwardness of the majority of the world's population caused by underdevelopment which is a product of imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism and also of unjust international economic relations. The unfavourable status of women is aggravated in many countries, developed and underdeveloped, by *de facto* discrimination on the grounds of sex.

13. It can be argued that the predominant economic analyses of labour and capital insufficiently trace the linkages between production systems in world economics and women's work as producers and reproducers; nor is the subjection, exploitation, oppression and domination of women by men, sufficiently explained in history. Women are not simply discriminated against by the productive systems, but subject to the discrimination that arises by virtue of being the reproductive force

14. While women's childbearing function and their traditional nurturing roles are respected, in many countries there has been little recognition of women's actual or potential contribution to economic activity. The role of women within the family combined with a high level of unemployment and under-employment of the population in general often results in priority being given to the employment of men in economic activities outside the family household.

15. These cumulative processes of discrimination within and outside the family characterize the dual oppression that women suffer on the basis of their sex and social class. Poverty and underdevelopment have sharpened and continue to sharpen these inequities.

16. The effects of these long-term cumulative processes of discrimination have been accentuated by underdevelopment and are strikingly apparent in the present world profile of women: while they represent 50 per cent of the world adult population and one third of the official labour force, they perform for nearly two thirds of all working hours and receive only one tenth of the world income and own less than 1 per cent of world property.

B. Review of progress achieved in the first half of the Decade: lessons for the future

17. The review and appraisal of progress achieved during the past five years indicates that the integration of women into development has been formally accepted by most Governments as a desirable planning objective. Many countries have made significant efforts, undertaken a number of activities and measures and established institutional and administrative mechanisms to integrate women in development.

18. The accomplishments of the first half of the Decade include sensitizing planners and decision-makers to women's needs and problems, conducting research and building a data base on women and promoting legislation safeguarding women's rights. However, with the general exception of the countries with advanced social services, serious problems, such as inadequate financial allocation, lack of skilled personnel and so on, continue to exist in many countries. This constraint is to a considerable extent—especially in developing countries—due to the general economic problems such as scarcity of resources and/or under-utilization of existing resources. In many cases it reflects the priority Governments accord to issues concerning women. Another major constraint facing such mechanisms is their limited mandates. Thus, several existing mechanisms do not have strong executive and implementing authority. Similarly, the terms of reference given to such mechanisms tend to restrict them to welfare activities traditionally associated with women and thereby reinforcing stereotyping of women's roles and attitudinal prejudices. The sensitizing task of these special mechanisms has, as yet, insufficiently resulted in an actual integration into policy planning and implementation by Governments and international organizations, of the question of sharing between the sexes of all responsibilities.

19. The review of legislative enactments and provisions reveals that a significant number of Governments reported new constitutional and legislative provisions which guarantee or promote equal rights of women and men. However, legislative provisions are not always matched by adequate enforcement measures and machinery. In many countries specific measures have been taken to redress past discrimination and to promote equal opportunities for women, especially in the fields of education and employment.

20. In the developed market-economy countries significant progress has been made in establishing national machineries, while achievements in the subtheme areas of education, health and employment are impressive. In many countries, new legislation has ensured the legal rights of women in social, economic and political aspects of national life. The percentage of women in positions of policy formulation has increased significantly. Women have joined the labour force in increasing numbers; enrolments have achieved parity in secondary, university and graduate education in many nations, and expansion of primary health care has reached most rural areas of the various market-economy countries. Current studies on work of comparable value, occupational segregation and valuation of household work are positive signs of further progress in the second half of the Decade. Acknowledgement of the double burden has enabled women and men to move forward to challenge existing stereotypes and to develop social programmes aimed at effecting full equality of women and men.

21. In the developing countries, despite their resource constraints and the adverse effect of the world economic structure and the world economic situation, initiatives have been taken for integrating women into development, including the establishment of national machineries and legislative enactments and efforts to overcome prejudices against women. The economic contribution of rural women to agriculture and national development is increasingly being recognized in national and rural development plans and policies. Research and studies have been undertaken to identify the critical needs of women and to formulate and implement programmes and projects for them. In many developing countries efforts have been made in the public sector to increase the participation of women and representation at the decision-making levels. There has been an increase in the enrolment of girls in educational institutions at different levels, an increase in the availability of health care to women and efforts have been made to improve the work conditions and the employment needs of women.

22. In the countries with centrally planned economies a further advancement of women took place in various fields. Women in those countries actively participated in social and economic development and in all other fields of public life of their countries, including the active struggle for peace, disarmament, detente and international co-operation. A high level of employment, health, education and political participation of women was achieved in countries with centrally planned economies, in which national mechanisms are already in existence with adequate financial allocations and sufficient skilled personnel.

23. Women in all countries love peace and women all over the world have conducted active struggles for peace, disarmament, detente and international cooperation against foreign aggression and all forms of foreign domination and hegemony. Women have and can play an active role at the national and international level to strive for detente and to make it a continuing and universal process of an all-embracing scope so that the goals of the Decade might be achieved.

24. The review and appraisal of progress achieved during the past five years indicates that in many countries the situation of women from the so-called "backward" sectors has worsened. In particular, it has worsened with respect to the conditions of employment and education for women in the rural and the so-called marginal urban sectors. In many countries the actual number of female illiterates is increasing. In fact, illiteracy rates for the female population appear to have increased and are projected to increase for several countries. In terms of the percentage of enrolment that women constitute of the total enrolment, at the first, second and third levels of education, progress in the participation of women has been made in most countries; however, declines have been reported by several in female participation at the second level. It appears that, in many countries, only in the higher and middle socio-economic strata did women gain some significant increases in educational opportunities. However, this improvement has not been followed by a parallel increase in levels of employment, even in certain developed countries and in those developing countries with higher industrialization rates. In employment, there is evidence of increasing numbers of women being forced into unemployment or being transferred outside the formal sectors of the economy into the peripheral labour market in the developed countries and into the informal sectors of subsistence agriculture, handicrafts and so on. This move from the formal to the informal market is evidenced by estimates of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and projections for overall activity rates in the economies of the developing countries.

25. In many instances transfer of inappropriate technology has worsened the employment and health conditions of women; displacement of labour occurs, and foreign models of consumption accompany such transfer. In certain large industries, sometimes operated by transnational corporations, new discriminatory labour practices have appeared in both rural and urban areas, while in the urban areas increases in the employment of women have been largely the result of an increase in the exploitation of cheap, semi-skilled labour of young and unmarried women, related to increases in the migration of young women to the cities.

26. In many countries, women have not been integrated into national development plans. Where special programmes have existed, they have failed for the most part in achieving significant results, owing to their narrow focus on stereotyped sex roles which have further increased segregation based on sex.

27. Finally, the current world economic crisis has contributed to the worsening situation of women in general. Women's employment in industries which have high levels of female labour participants, has been negatively affected by protectionist measures. In developing countries the negative impact on women is even greater than in developed countries.

28. There have been some significant achievements in the implementation of a number of recommendations of the World Plan of Action both at the regional and global levels in the first half of the Decade. Of particular significance was the establishment of the Voluntary Fund for the Decade for Women and the preparatory work leading to the establishment of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women. A joint interagency programme for the advancement of women was prepared and regional programmes were implemented in accordance with the regional plans of action adopted in Mexico. Several United Nations organizations were involved in these activities, including the United Nations, regional commissions, UNICEF, UNDP, UNCTAD, UNIDO, UNFPA, ILO, FAO, UNESCO and WHO. It is apparent that such programmes can be strengthened and that greater efforts could be made to introduce a more multidisciplinary approach in these programmes. In a number of conferences held under the auspices of the United Nations system, linkages were established between women's status and the priority areas of concern including population, food, water, primary health care, education, rural development and agrarian reform, employment, industrialization and over-all development.

29. The review of implementation of the objectives of the second United Nations Development Decade as well as the progress of negotiations on the establishment of the New International Economic Order shows that hopes and expectations in connexion with the International Development Strategy and establishment of the New International Economic Order have not been fulfilled. Instead of a gradual resolution of the world economic situation and encouragement of accelerated economic development of developing countries, the crisis in the world economy has become more acute. This has affected developing countries in particular and bearing in mind the real economic and social situation in these countries, it is women who are most adversely affected. The international development conditions have deteriorated and become an even more limiting factor for the development of developing countries specially restricting the implementation of the objectives of the Plan of Action.

30. The lessons for the future to be drawn from this review are many. First, it proves that any measures for women isolated from the major priorities, strategies and sectors of development cannot result in any substantial improvement in attaining the goals of the Decade. Second, legislative and developmental action, unless they are accompanied by positive and concerted action to change attitudes and prejudices cannot be fully effective. Third, mere provision of equal rights, development services and opportunities will not, by themselves, help women to avail of them, without simultaneous special supportive measures, e.g. legal aid, earmarking of benefits, information and knowledge, institutional innovation, etc.

31. The three main objectives of the United Nations Decade for Women—equality, development and peace—are closely interlinked with one another. Progress in any one of these has a beneficial effect on the others. In turn, failure in one sphere has negative impact on the others. Since the primary objective of development is to bring about a sustained improvement in the well-being of the individual and of society and to bestow benefits on all, development should be seen not only as a desirable goal in itself but also as a most important means of maintaining peace and of furthering equality of the sexes. However, the present world is by no means tranquil and there exist factors detrimental to peace. Women in some countries are still suffering from wars of aggression.

32. Thus, the universal strengthening of world peace and international security, struggle against foreign interference, aggression and military occupation, respect for national independence and sovereignty, the curbing of the arms race, the achievement of the goals of a general and complete disarmament and reduction of military budgets, the achievement of detente, the establishment of the New International Economic Order and the increased co-operation among States, on the basis of equality, will advance the economic, social and cultural development of countries and the situation of women, while still recognizing their special vulnerability. Consequently, it is only under conditions of peace that it is possible to move forward in the full implementation of the other two objectives of the Decade.

33. In accordance with their obligations under the Charter to maintain peace and security and to achieve international co-operation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, bearing in mind, in this respect, the right to live in peace, States shall help women to participate in promoting international co-operation for the sake of the preparation of societies for a life in peace.

34. Similarly, a close relation exists between the world economic situation, development and the strengthening of international peace and security, disarmament and a relaxation of international tension. It is imperative that resources released as a result of disarmament be used for promoting the well-being of all nations and contribute to bridge the gap between developed and developing countries, thus increasing favourable conditions for improving the situation of all members of society. In this context particular attention shall be

which damage women's bodies and health.

163. Promote research into the extent and the causes of domestic violence with a view to eliminating it; take measures to eliminate glorification of violence against and sexual exploitation of women in the mass media, literature and advertising; provide effective help for women and children who are victims of violence, e.g., by the establishment of centres for treatment, shelter and counselling victims of violence and sexual assault.

164. Formulate a plan of action for the protection of women against abuse of alcohol, tobacco and drugs and also excessive use of certain medicaments, principally by informing them of the hazards these substances present for them and their children.

3. Education and training

Objectives

165. To provide equal access to educational and training opportunities at all levels of all types for girls and women in all sectors of society, thus enabling them fully to develop their personalities and to participate on an equal footing with men in furthering the socio-economic aims of national planning and to achieve self-reliance, family well-being and improve the quality of life.

166. To contribute to a change in attitudes by abolishing traditional stereotypes of men's and women's roles and stimulating the creation of new and more positive images of women's participation in the family, the labour market and in social and public life.

167. To take into consideration in educational programmes and methodologies the special perspective of education for non-violence, mainly with regard to relationships between women and men.

168. Include in educational programmes and methodologies a special emphasis on education against violence, particularly violence in relationships between women and men.

169. To provide for women and girls innovative programmes and methodologies which stimulate creative development, promote the right to freedom and develop the ability to communicate for the eradication of illiteracy, while at the same time upgrading functional skills and basic information about employment and health-related matters as well as their political, economic and social rights.

170. To establish transitional links between school life, apprenticeship and working life, whenever possible, in order to insure for women and girls better interaction between education, training and employment.

171. Formulate and implement education programmes with final-year courses adapted to the specific needs of the economic and social development of the country, designed to improve and increase the access of women to gainful employment and give them opportunities to take part in non-traditional activities.

172. To increase the opportunities and facilities which promote participation of women in science and technology through education and training in these fields.

173. To devise means to encourage girls to stay at school longer and to ensure that courses chosen by girls are in a range of fields including the professions, management, economics and the sciences which will enable them to achieve positions of influence in the decision-making process.

Priority areas for action

174. Education, specifically literacy, being a key to national development and a major requisite for improving the status of women, efforts should be made to establish targets for the abolition of differentials in the literacy and educational attainment rates for girls and boys within over-all national efforts to increase literacy and education for the whole population.

175. To promote national educational accreditation and equivalency programmes designed to encourage the return of women and girls who have dropped out into the formal education system.

176. Promote education programmes for children, particularly those of pre-school age, as well as young people, aimed at strengthening women's contribution to society and at changing the traditional roles assigned by social and cultural norms to women and men.

177. Establish targets for the expansion of educational opportunities and facilities for women, including courses and institutions with adequate personnel and materials, for which resources have been earmarked.

178. Provide new formal and extracurricular education to enable women to combine their household duties with the opportunity to improve their educational level.

179. Encourage, through legislation, free and compulsory education for girls and boys at the primary level, with the provision of assistance to establish co-education when possible. Provide trained teachers of both sexes and, if necessary, transportation and boarding facilities.

180. Increase the enrolment of female students in education courses and, in particular, in science, mathematics and technical courses, and in management training courses in the areas of science and technology, especially by encouraging them to enrol in such courses.

181. Provide for equal access to all levels of general education, vocational education and training for all types of occupations, including those traditionally accessible to men, and to new training schemes and other facilities such as on-the-job training, scholarships, inexpensive boarding and lodging facilities and accessible child care arrangements, ensuring equal job opportunities after completion of vocational education or training for both entry and re-entry, after a period of absence, into professional life.

182. Examine curricula and learning materials with a view to removing sex-bias and the stereotyped portrayal of the roles of girls and women and promote the development of non-sexist resources and curricular materials.

183. Establish targets for the nation-wide implementation of the learning materials developed to optimize the potential of women for countries which have started the work since 1975.

184. Include courses on women's issues in university degree programmes.

185. Develop programmes at the secondary, tertiary and adult education levels to encourage a basic understanding of human rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant instruments. Such courses should stress the fundamental importance of the elimination of discrimination on the basis of race and sex.

186. Train guidance counsellors and teachers to assist girls and boys in choosing professions according to their personal capacities and not according to stereotyped sex roles.

187. Design and promote teacher training courses to alert teachers to the stereotyped assumptions which inhibit choice in school subjects and to the need to widen the options available to women and girls in their future training and occupational choices. Provide, whenever possible, counselling services for the benefit of parents, teachers and pupils as well as for workers and employers.

188. Encourage parity of men and women in teaching and administrative positions at all levels of education.

189. Identify the situational constraints on different culturally or socially underprivileged target groups (e.g., girls of school age who are not attending school, illiterate adults or adults who are engaged in home responsibilities and need additional or diversified education, working women of different age groups in rural and urban areas, mature women and immigrant women) and formulate and implement programmes for such groups.

190. Monitor programmes and take measures to improve the data on drop-out rates of girls and women and causes, course content and levels of skills acquired, in order to facilitate the introduction of remedial or accelerated measures and to generate greater commitment to the policy objectives within the system.

191. Where appropriate, provide for particular target groups, giving priority to those needing them most, counselling and supportive services and certain necessities (childcare, earning and learning schemes, transport, clothing, books, supplementary nutrition reading centres, special tuition in basic subjects such as mathematics, scholarships and stipends and the like), based on situational analyses, and include resources for such services as priority items in educational budgets.

192. Provide for education for women in the context of life-long education in all major development sectors, in developed and developing countries, and take specific

measures for the necessary funds and personnel.

193. Promote instruction and interdisciplinary research on women and the implications of the goals of the Decade as an input to the educational process, particularly in institutions of higher and teacher education, in order to draw on the experience already acquired in some countries with women's status and to eliminate all attitudinal and conceptual biases and prejudices, especially those relating to class, that hinder understanding of the role and situation of women.

194. Urge Governments to encourage women to enrol in all their technical institutes and to promote, through every means available to them, the establishment of intermediate technical courses.

C. Priority areas requiring special attention

1. *Food*

Objectives

195. To enhance and stimulate the key role performed by women in all phases of the process of food production and their contribution to the economic and social development of their countries, at the same time raising their status.

196. To ensure proper planning of the agricultural production sector so that the agricultural output covers as a matter of priority the supply of products that are socially and nationally necessary for the nutrition and food requirements of women in rural areas.

Priority areas for action

197. Governments should adopt the necessary measures to:

(a) Promote the incorporation of women in all phases of the agricultural productive process, including post harvesting processing, up to and including the marketing of products;

(b) Provide women with the necessary skills and appropriate technology to enable them to participate better in the process of subsistence food production;

(c) Establish a link between food production and food consumption processes by providing information on the nutrients required for the development of the population and in particular of children and by making rural women aware of the need for proper nourishment. Eliminate inappropriate consumption patterns which have developed as a result of ignorance or manipulation by commercial advertising;

(d) Promote the participation of women, especially in rural areas, in agricultural policy-making, leading to the production of basic foods for family and national consumption;

(e) Ensure access to and use of appropriate technological model of agricultural production for both sexes without distinction;

(f) Stimulate the participation and full voting rights of women in co-operatives and other forms of organization relating to the production, processing, distribution, marketing and consumption of basic food products;

(g) Ensure access for women in conditions of equality with men to financing mechanisms covering all phases of production, up to and including the marketing of food products;

(h) Support forms of marketing of basic foods for family consumption which will be conducive to the opening up of priority markets for the sale of their products.

2. *Rural women*

Objectives

198. Enhance the effective contribution of rural women to the economic and social development of their countries who are hampered by reason of their inadequate access to appropriate technology; by the inadequate social infrastructures in rural areas; as well as by the double workload they bear through their participation in working the land and their performance of household duties.

199. Improve the living conditions of women in rural areas, and to this end:

(a) Acknowledge the contribution which women make to the economic and social development of their countries, and take steps to ensure that rural women participate equally and effectively in the development process as beneficiaries and as agents for change by affording them participation as policy-makers, organizers and implementers of development programmes;

(b) Give rural women at all levels access to formal and non-formal courses in leadership and decision-making, as well as to programmes that teach skills appropriate to their lifestyle and skills which could be utilized, if necessary, for paid employment;

(c) Provide rural women with basic human needs including clean water supplies, effective sanitation, adequate food and nutrition, basic health services, shelter and appropriate fuel supplies. They should have access to formal and non-formal education programmes, which should be available at minimum cost and inconvenience to already overburdened women. They should also have assured access to technology at all levels, particularly in relation to food storage and preservation, transport and marketing and labour-saving tools and devices;

(d) Provide rural women access to improved transport and communication systems, and to all forms of media;

(e) Extend to all rural women free and equal access to credit facilities where these are available;

(f) Aid donor countries and recipient Governments should consult on ways of developing programmes at the village level to involve local women in their planning and implementation. Care should be taken to ensure that development assistance programmes do not exclude women from technological training.

Priority areas for action

200. Governments should adopt the necessary measures to:

(a) Eliminate from legislation on rural development, where necessary, provisions that discriminate against women;

(b) Make rural women aware of their rights and duties so that they can exercise and benefit from them;

(c) Ensure access for rural women to the use, enjoyment and development of land, in conditions of equality with men, by according to women the same practical and legal rights as those of men in access to ownership and the use and management of land, in the production of goods from land by means of agriculture or grazing and in the disposal of any such products or of the land itself;

(d) Allocate sufficient financial resources to carry out research, especially field research, which will provide a sound basis for initiating, expanding and strengthening concrete and integrated actions aimed at promoting the development of rural women and their integration in economic and social activity in rural areas;

(e) Examine carefully the possibility of devising statistics which measure rural women's contribution on an equal basis with men's, including labour in the sphere of agricultural production, unpaid family labour and food production for family consumption, as well as to monitor the impact of development so that negative and unforeseen consequences, such as increased workload and loss of income earning opportunities, can be identified;

(f) Provide rural women with the appropriate technology and suitable training to enable them to improve and promote their traditional small-scale in-home industries;

(g) Encourage the participation of rural women, in all forms of social organization of labour, with a view to their achieving, *inter alia*, control over their wage levels participation in the production process and greater equality in working conditions;

(h) Foster the effective participation of rural women in the cultural, political, economic and social activities of the community;

(i) Create and strengthen the necessary infrastructure to lighten the workload of rural women, through, *inter alia*, the application of appropriate technology but ensuring that such measures do not result in occupational displacement of women;

(j) Design and carry out literacy and training campaigns for specific rural areas promoting the effective participation of women in such campaigns;

(k) Improve employment opportunities for women in agricultural and non-agricultural jobs in rural areas by providing training and ensuring an adequate allocation of material, technical and financial resources, so as to provide an alternative to

adopted by consensus in Mexico City.)

• The conference also acknowledged that female subjugation is due far more to women's reproductive function than to their relatively minor role in economic productivity.

• Women in the U.S. delegation gained an in-depth knowledge and understanding of the working of the U.N. system—knowledge that will be shared with other U.S. women and to benefit the United States at future U.N. conferences and meetings.

• The conference expanded opportunities for networking among women. The U.S. delegation, for example, met eight times in Copenhagen with U.S. representatives to Forum 80, the nongovernmental organizations meeting which took place during the first week of the U.N. meeting. The U.S. delegation meetings brought together nearly 500 women and men to exchange ideas and information about events occurring both at the conference and the forum.

• On July 21 and July 28, *Dateline Copenhagen* held its teleconference, linking women in Copenhagen with women in the United States via satellite for discussion on women's concerns in health, education, and employment—the subtheme of the world conference. This was the first time this technology was used by women, for women.

• The conference served as a catalyst to the Departments of Health and Human Services, Education, and Labor in reassessing programs on health, education, and employment from the perspective of women's special needs and concerns.

The U.S. delegation reflected the full diversity of the nation. The 37-member U.S. delegation, cochaired by Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and Sarah Weddington, Assistant to the President, included representatives respectively of rural women, minority women, disadvantaged women, labor unions, industry, education, leaders in health and employment, women in communications, handicapped women, environmentalists, American Indians, Americans of Asian origin. Twelve persons—women and men—served as advisers to the delegation. Representative Thomas P. O'Neill, Speaker of the House of Representatives, named Congresswomen Barbara Mikulski and Mary Rose Oakar as congressional delegates; and they participated with congressional staff advisers.

In 1985 the U.N. Decade for Women will conclude with another world conference, now scheduled to be held in Nairobi, Kenya.

[1] For text of the World Plan of Action adopted on July 2, 1975, in Mexico City, see BULLETIN of Aug. 18, 1975, p. 242.

[2] Adopted by the conference on July 31, 1980, by a vote of 94–4 (U.S.), with 22 abstentions.

[3] Press release 256 of Sept. 15, 1980. ■

RESOLUTIONS (WITH VOTES) ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE

Family planning (consensus)
Improving the situation of disabled women of all ages (consensus)*
Migrant women (consensus)
Elderly women and economic security (consensus)*
Battered women and violence in the family (consensus)*
Review and evaluation of progress made in the implementation of the World Plan of Action at the national level (consensus)
The role of women in the preparation of societies for life in peace (97–0–30)
Gathering of data concerning women through census questionnaires (consensus)
Intensification of drought control in the Sahel (consensus)
Assistance to Lebanese women (112–0–9)
Women's participation in the strengthening of international peace and security and in the struggle against colonialism, racism, racial discrimination, foreign aggression, and occupation and all forms of foreign domination (77–6–35)
The situation of women refugees and displaced women the world over (consensus)*
The situation of displaced and refugee women the world over (97–0–29)
Integrated approach to the health and welfare of women (consensus)
International Center for Public Enterprises in Developing Countries (consensus)
International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa (25–7–22)
International legislation to prevent the abandonment of families (75–0–35)
Situation of women in Chile (69–8–39)
Situation of women in El Salvador (55–11–46)
Control of illicit traffic in drugs (consensus)
Strengthening the women's programmes and appointment of women in the Secretariat of the regional commissions and agencies of the United Nations (consensus)**
Co-ordination of issues relating to the status of women within the United Nations system (consensus)**
Question of missing and disappeared persons (consensus)
Women in the United Nations Secretariat (consensus)
International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (consensus)*
On the right of all countries to seek development assistance from any and all sources, free from threats and attacks (65–0–42)
Special measures in favour of young women (consensus)
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (consensus)
Women living in conditions of extreme poverty (consensus)
Promotion of equality in education and training (consensus)
Women and discrimination based on race (78–3 (U.S.)–39)***
Condemnation of South African aggression against the People's Republic of Angola (100–0–17)
Question of convening another world conference on women in 1985 (consensus)
Assistance to Sahrawi women (51–10–38)
International assistance for the reconstruction of Nicaragua (consensus)
Women and development assistance programmes (consensus)
Health and well-being of the women of the Pacific (consensus)
The International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (consensus)
Establishment and strengthening of machinery for the integration of women in development (consensus)
Strengthening the role of the Commission on the Status of Women (consensus)
Women and nutritional self-sufficiency (consensus)
Voluntary Fund for the United Nations Decade for Women (consensus)
Exploitation of the prostitution of others and traffic in persons (consensus)**
Women in agriculture and rural areas (consensus)*
Apartheid and women in South Africa and Namibia (63–4–24)
The situation in Bolivia (63–2–30)
Implementation of the goals of the United Nations Decade for Women within the framework of the United Nations efforts to achieve the New International Economic Order (92–0–11)
Expression of thanks to the host country (acclamation)

* Initiated by the U.S.
** Cosponsored by the U.S.
*** U.S. sponsorship withdrawn because of efforts by some nations to amend the resolution in ways that would have changed its original meaning. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture
Convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences. Done at Washington Jan. 15, 1944. Entered into force Nov. 30, 1944. 58 Stat. 1169.
Adherences deposited: Grenada, May 7, 1979; Suriname, Aug. 28, 1980.

Convention on the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at Washington Mar. 6, 1979.[1]
Ratifications deposited: El Salvador, July 10, 1980; Guyana, July 1, 1980; Panama, Aug. 13, 1980; Peru, July 17, 1980.
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Sept. 17, 1980.

Arbitration
General treaty of inter-American arbitration and protocol of progressive arbitration. Signed at Washington Jan. 5, 1929. Entered into force Oct. 28, 1929; for the U.S. Apr. 16, 1935. 49 Stat. 3153.
Notification of denunciation: Venezuela, Sept. 8, 1980.

Inter-American convention on international commercial arbitration. Done at Panama City Jan. 30, 1975. Entered into force June 16, 1976.[2]
Signature: Dominican Republic, Apr. 18, 1977.
Ratification deposited: El Salvador, Aug. 11, 1980.

Aviation
Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to the precautionary attachment of aircraft. Done at Rome May 29, 1933. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1937.[2]
Accession deposited: Togo, July 4, 1980.

Conservation
Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 1973, on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249). Adopted at Bonn June 22, 1979.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Sept. 17, 1980.

Convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources, with annex for an arbitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20, 1980.[1]
Signatures: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, F.R.G., G.D.R., New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S., Sept. 11, 1980.

Consular
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Ratification deposited: Finland, July 2, 1980.[3,4]

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Ratification deposited: Finland, July 2, 1980.

Cultural Relations
Protocol revising the convention of Nov. 22, 1928 (TIAS 6548) relating to international expositions, with appendix and annex. Done at Paris, Nov. 30, 1972.
Accession deposited: Japan, June 9, 1980.
Entered into force: June 9, 1980.

Judicial Procedure—Letters Rogatory
Inter-American convention on letters rogatory. Done at Panama City Jan. 30, 1975. Entered into force Jan. 16, 1976.[2]
Signature: U.S., Apr. 15, 1980.
Ratification deposited: El Salvador, Aug. 11, 1980.[3,4]

Additional protocol to the Inter-American convention on letters rogatory, with annex. Done at Montevideo May 8, 1979. Entered into force June 14, 1980.[2]
Signatures: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,[5] Venezuela, May 8, 1979; El Salvador, Aug. 11, 1980; U.S., Apr. 15, 1980.
Ratifications deposited: Peru, Uruguay,[5] May 15, 1980.

Load Lines
Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331). Adopted at London Oct. 12, 1971.[1]
Acceptances deposited: South Africa, Nov. 13, 1979; Yugoslavia, July 25, 1980.

Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 14, 1975.[1]
Acceptance deposited: U.S., Aug. 28, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 17, 1977.[1]
Acceptance deposited: U.S., Aug. 28, 1980.

International convention on maritime search and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done at Hamburg Apr. 27, 1979.[1]
Signature: Greece, Aug. 20, 1980.[3,7]

Nationality
Convention on the nationality of women. Signed at Montevideo Dec. 26, 1933. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1934. 49 Stat. 2957.
Adherence deposited: Dominica, Aug. 21, 1980.

Oil Pollution
International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.[2]
Ratification deposited: Iceland, July 17, 1980.

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068.
Ratification deposited: Iceland, July 17, 1980.

International convention on the establishment of an international fund for compensation for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels Dec. 18, 1971. Entered into force Oct. 16, 1978.[2]
Accession deposited: Iceland, July 17, 1980.

Pollution
Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.
Ratification deposited: Honduras, May 2, 1980.

International convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973.[1]
Accession deposited: Norway, July 15, 1980.[6]

Protocol relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of pollution by substances other than oil. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973.[1]
Accession deposited: Norway, July 15, 1980.

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.[1]
Accession deposited: Norway, July 15, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Dec. 29, 1972, on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter (TIAS 8165). Adopted at London Oct. 12, 1978.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Sept. 17, 1980.

Property—Intellectual
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Accession deposited: Guinea, Aug. 13, 1980.

Amendments to various treaties administered by the World Intellectual Property

Department of State Bicentennial 1781–1981

The Department of State will celebrate its 200th anniversary on January 10, 1981.

To commemorate the occasion, the BULLETIN will carry in January a short history of the Department of State. Written by the Department of State Historian, David F. Trask, the article will trace the development of the State Department's domestic and overseas operations.

The Editors

President Addresses World Bank Group and IMF Representatives

Following are the remarks President Carter made on September 30, 1980, at the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the International Development Association, and the International Finance Corporation.[1]

It's a special pleasure for me as President of our country to welcome you again for this meeting, which is so important to the entire world. This is the 35th annual meeting of its two great institutions. And it's also a special pleasure for me to welcome the new members.

Your presence here symbolizes a commitment of more than 140 countries to a dynamic system of international economic cooperation and to its central institutions, as you well know, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Your commitment strengthens the prospects for a lasting peace, because peace cannot be assured if hundreds of millions of people are offered no hope of escape from hunger or poverty or economic instability or deprivation. The Bank and the Fund provide that hope.

Both institutions are rapidly adapting to new circumstances and new changes and also new challenges. We support this process of adapting to change. The response of a changing world can best be charted within these institutions, acting in your own fields of competence and experience. Your work should not be diverted by extraneous political disputes. And as you mold and adapt, you must be assured that your decisions will not be determined or renegotiated in some other meeting. Your record of success justifies this vote of confidence. Any political pressure or unwarranted influence from any international forum which might undermine your integrity would be neither necessary nor desirable.

The Fund is the world's principal official source of balance-of-payments financing. So far this year, Fund programs of more than $5.5 billion have been arranged; even more is needed. An action is underway to expand these resources. The IMF is also adopting important changes in policy, making it more responsive to changing needs and the concerns of its members.

During the last 12 months, the World Bank group has lent more than $12 billion to developing member countries. Nearly $4 billion of that was provided on concessional terms to the poorest nations.

The Bank is mounting initiatives to enable developing countries to find and produce more energy, while also carrying out other important bank functions. An enlarged World Bank program for energy exploration and development would benefit all of us. The World Bank has also launched a program of lending and advisory services to help developing nations and to help them make the structural adjustments required by higher energy prices.

It's not possible for me to discuss the role of the World Bank without paying personal and professional tribute to the leadership and the dedication of Robert McNamara over the last 12 years. Under Bob McNamara's outstanding leadership, the Bank has become the focus of world cooperation to improve the human condition and a fine example of how such cooperation can be effective. Bob, you will leave to your successor a high standard and a firm foundation for the future, based on an open heart, sensitivity about people's human needs, and the sound economic judgment that has maintained the integrity of the World Bank.

U.S. support of the Fund and the Bank reflects both our fundamental humanitarian principles and also our own economic interests. Legislation enabling our participation in the IMF quota increase passed the House of Representatives last week. I'm now pressing for a passage of this legislation in the Senate, and I will sign it as soon as it reaches my desk. Moreover, I will urge the Congress of our country to give high priority to the sixth IDA [International Development Association] replenishment later this year. Next year we will submit legislation for our subscription to the general capital increase of the World Bank. Both the Fund and the World Bank group must have all the resources they need for their crucial work.

Let me also mention several other steps the United States has taken that will help to stabilize the world economy. We've adopted a strong anti-inflation program of fiscal and monetary restraint. We've begun a nationwide program to revitalize our own industrial base and to accelerate productivity growth. This new program would increase the portion of our own gross national product devoted to investment in new industry and in new jobs and in new production. The program will reduce inflation. It will restore innovation and vigor to our economy. And we've also put into place a comprehensive program to rebuild my country's energy base.

This new program is already paying rich dividends; it's already bearing fruit. In the last 3 years, for instance, we've reduced oil imports by 24%. This year we are drilling more oil and gas wells than any other year in history. And this year we are producing more coal in my country than in any previous year in history. We are acting to insure that the United States can meet much of the world's need for coal. We've started a massive investment program to increase production of synthetic fuels. We're spending $4 billion per year on energy research and development and additional billions of dollars on incentives to use energy more efficiently in our homes, in our industries, our commerce, and our transportation.

Because of sustained oil production and because of worldwide conservation measures, the world's oil stocks are now at an alltime high, and these reserves will help to offset the effect of temporary reductions in supply, such as that which has been caused by the present conflict between Iran and Iraq. However, we are keenly aware that some nations are seriously threatened by even a temporary interruption in normal oil supplies. Thus we are working with your countries in the United Nations and through other public, international fora to end this conflict as quickly as possible.

Our energy program is part of a far-reaching effort to which we pledged ourselves at the recent Venice economic summit conference. Our common goal there, as expressed by the seven na-

Q. Just talking about the AWACS or radar planes for a moment, you give the impression that there is no room for compromise in our position on this; that if this was intended to be a condition set for release of the hostages, it is a condition that is unacceptable to us. Is that the impression you meant to leave?

A. First, I don't think there is anything in what Mr. Rajai said to indicate it is a condition. He has said, indeed, as you reminded us in your question, that the Majlis will lay down what it conceives as the conditions. So I think to treat it as a condition would not serve a useful purpose. I have chosen to treat it as a concern of the Iranians, and with respect to that we consider our decision to deploy the AWACS as being in our national interest, consistent with the principle laid down by the President earlier.

Q. You have indicated that the United States doesn't want to see anything happen which would have the effect of expanding the war or prolonging the war. However, last week you also said that if Iran would release the hostages, the embargo—the sanctions—would be automatically lifted, which would seem to indicate that we would then provide them with some of the military equipment which was paid for by the Shah some time ago. Is there some inconsistency there? Or, in fact, did we get the wrong message?

A. The point I sought to make there was that the trade sanctions, which are multinational in nature—you will recall the effort we made to persuade our NATO allies and the European Community to impose trade sanctions, which they did. And it's clear that the trade sanctions were related to the release of the hostages. I would, therefore, expect, and I would think it a reasonable expectation, that if the hostages were released those trade sanctions would be lifted.

Now with respect to other aspects of the situation involving the hostages, we took a number of steps at that time on our own related to the seizure of the hostages and the refusal to release them. I would think that all of those would be on the table if at some point we establish a negotiating contact with the Iranians. Just how they would be dealt with I think is highly speculative, and I don't think it's productive to try to pick out one or another of them to deal with them.

Q. But the issue of spare parts is a major issue; and if the United States did provide military spare parts and missiles and tanks and so on to Iran in the middle of a conflict, certainly that would make it very hard for us to claim neutrality.

A. With respect to the actions taken by the United States in connection with the hostages, those actions were taken long before the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq. It would seem to me that that is one issue to be dealt with separately from the war.

With respect to the war, our position is one of impartiality. That may have to be adjusted as circumstances develop. The AWACS deployment, as I said, raised some questions which I think we carefully considered; and I think our response produced a decision which was consistent with impartiality.

Q. It seems to me a clear line has to be drawn here as to how far we might be willing to go if the hostages were released. We would clearly resupply military parts, spare parts for planes and that sort of thing. Is it conceivable that we might move beyond that to rebuild our former military relationship with Iran or to supply Iran with new weapons—new tanks or planes or anything of that sort?

A. Let me make it clear that I don't think this program is the place to negotiate for the terms of the hostages' release. In the first place, we are not in contact with Iran; we are not in negotiations with them; we do not yet know what requests they might make or what terms they may lay down. To try to anticipate them and give them a response in anticipation I don't think would be useful. That's the first point I would make.

The second point I would make is that a number of Iranians have spoken out on what they think ought to be the terms of release. Since they have not yet appeared to agree with each other, again I don't think it's useful to set up hypothetical situations. I do emphasize the point that the hostage issue arose long before this war broke out. We were not consulted by Iraq and Iran with respect to the date for hostilities to begin. The hostage situation was pending then; the actions we had taken with respect to it had been taken then. The hostages were still being held; and it is in our national interest, and we've announced it, that we're going to proceed when the time is right, when the Iranians are ready, to discuss the terms for their release, consistent with the two principles which the President has laid down.

Q. Granting all that you have said, when you do not say that we would not move beyond the resupply of spare parts, don't you leave the door open to our doing something else, to our taking a more active role in supporting Iran in the war?

A. I do not think that refusing to discuss hypothetical situations with respect to the conditions which the Iranians might ask us to consider in order to release the hostages ought to lead to any conclusions with respect to the question you've just asked.

Q. What about the war itself? How is it going? Is there a danger that Iran could be dismembered permanently as a result of it?

A. Whenever hostilities of this kind break out, of course, the possibilities of a wider war, a deepening war, and the impact on the combatants are uncertainties which are difficult to put a cap on in advance. The Iraqis have said—and the Foreign Minister of Iraq has said to me directly—that their aims are limited to the disputed territory over which they claim jurisdiction and that they have no interest in any piece of Iranian territory. If that is the case, then the question of how far they may seek to penetrate into Iran seems to be limited by that statement of Iraq's war aims.

With respect to the impact upon the political situation in each country—and each country has political vulnerabilities, from the perception of outside analysts—whether or not those vulnerabilities would produce instability in either country depends to a great extent on the intensity of the war, how long it continues, and the ability of each to sustain the fighting with the support of the people. My impression, with respect to Iran, is that the people are pretty solidly behind this war effort. Indeed, it seems to have had a unifying effect, at least in the first 30 days. Khomeini seems to still be in control of the situation. President Bani-Sadr is in control of the war effort, and there is every indication that the Iranians do not feel vulnerable in their ability to sustain the fighting and seem determined to continue it. That's true also of the Iraqis.

Now whether, indeed, they both continue it to the point where it threatens to widen and to deepen and to

involve an ever-increasing risk of intervention by other countries is an uncertainty that we need to guard against by pressing for an end to the hostilities through the United Nations, through the Islamic conference, through other multinational groups which may be influential.

Q. Would you be afraid more or less now of possible Soviet intervention at this stage?

A. The Soviets have told us that their posture is one of impartiality. To the best of our knowledge they are maintaining that posture. We are maintaining the same restraint. We each do it in the light of what we perceive to be our national interests. I'm sure we are each conscious of the fact that the other is carefully monitoring our stated policy with respect to our actions.

Q. In the past few days you seem to have been determined, if you could, to make SALT and the treaty itself, its benefits to the United States, and so on a major political issue in the Presidential campaign. It seems you are determined to try to get the treaty ratified very soon. Do you think realistically that that can happen as long as the Soviets are in Afghanistan?

A. I think it depends upon our success in presenting the merits—indeed, the crucial importance—of the SALT II Treaty in terms of our national security interests. I am determined not so much to make it a political issue as I am to make it a substantive issue which will attract the attention of the American people, because I think it is critical. Time is running out on it. There are provisions in the SALT II Treaty requiring the Soviet Union to dismantle certain systems; the time for dismantling is running out. If that time runs out, the Soviets would be in a difficult position to implement that provision of the treaty within the time constraints of the treaty. That may then require reopening the treaty; and if it's reopened, great uncertainties are created. So I think it's terribly important that we focus on this issue, that the American people focus on it; and I can't think of a better time for them to do so than in a Presidential campaign when they are more alert to issues of this kind than they are otherwise.

Q. In your speeches you almost never mention Ronald Reagan or the Republican Party by name, but certainly the inference is there. Do you feel that, if Mr. Reagan were to be elected, the treaty would effectively be finished and that arms control as we know it might be very, very difficult to ever put together again?

A. If I understand what the Republican platform says and what Mr. Reagan has said, the two together say (1) the SALT II Treaty is not satisfactory, they would not support it—which means, in effect, tearing it up and going back to square one, and (2) Mr. Reagan has said and the Republican platform has said that we must first achieve superiority over the Soviet Union before we negotiate. I don't see any way in which either we or the Soviet Union would accept superiority on the part of the other as the basis for an arms control treaty.

Now both those points are very clear. If my interpretation of them is not an accurate reflection of Mr. Reagan's views, then I hope that, having raised the issue, he will have an opportunity to modify his views or give his own interpretation. But I think those points need to be clarified because they have to do with the question of whether or not SALT II will be ratified and, if we do not, the effect of that upon arms control of any sort. That has to be debated.

I realize there are those who think that by participating in that debate I am somehow becoming part of the politics of this campaign. I find that an incredible notion—that, with foreign policy being shaped by this campaign, the principal spokesman of this Administration on foreign policy should not be speaking it. If I were to follow that line, I shouldn't be sitting here with you two gentlemen discussing foreign policy. I'm getting a bigger audience through this program than I would in speaking to a foreign policy council in Chicago, and yet somehow that's described as political and this is not. I should not have appeared on "Face the Nation" or "Meet the Press," to mention a couple of other well-known programs. So I think it's rather incredible, this point that the Secretary of State ought not to be debating foreign policy.

I don't think that I ought to be involved in partisan gatherings or that I should be out doing some partisan cheerleading. That kind of politics I should not be engaged in, and I have not.

Q. Let me quote the sort of language that you have used that has enraged or infuriated or incensed the Reagan camp. In your speech at Notre Dame, as I recall, a week or so ago, you said that the Reagan defense policies could keep the United States endlessly at war all over the globe. Should the Secretary of State be involving himself in domestic politics to that extent with that kind of language?

A. Of course not. And I never said that. That's the worst presentation of a speech by a wire service that I've seen in this campaign. I have the text of the speech. It's available. You'll find no such language in the speech; you'll find no reference to Mr. Reagan. The only thing I said about Mr. Reagan on the Notre Dame campus was this: I said: "I didn't come here to urge you to win one more for the Gipper." That's the closest that I came to mentioning Mr. Reagan or his policies. That quotation you've just given me is a wire service version, totally distorted and inaccurate, of what I actually said on the Notre Dame campus.

Q. Let's explore for a moment what you did mean. As I recall the wire service story, it said that the pursuit of Reagan version defense policies, or some such phrase, could keep the United States "endlessly at war all over the globe." Is that what you meant to say?

A. I did not say it, and I did not mean to say it.

Q. You never used the phrase "endlessly at war all over the globe"?

A. In connection with Mr. Reagan or anything that he has said or any foreign policy he has announced, absolutely not. You're free to have a copy of the text. And if I am misstating to you what I said on the Notre Dame campus, you would be free to challenge my veracity. But that statement does not in any way reflect what I said on the Notre Dame campus.

Q. Perhaps we would serve a more useful purpose by just asking you whether you think that Ronald Reagan as President would be dangerous if he pursues his defense and foreign policies as they are now perceived.

A. I don't believe that he has policies designed to take us to war. Now whether or not his policies might raise the risk of war is a question that I think is the subject of legitimate debate between those who have the responsibility of political debate in this campaign. He has criticized President Carter's policies as leading into a position

given to the advancement of women and the protection of mother and child.

35. The lack of progress in the establishment of the New International Economic Order has had a direct effect on the socio-economic situation of the women of the world. Recent studies on the impact of international economic problems on the employment and working conditions of women show that in fact their adverse effects on the wage levels and job stability of women are more extensive than on those of men. For example, women are the first to lose their jobs on plantations that produce crops for export and in the textile, clothing and electronics industries, which are more sensitive to price fluctuations and to protectionist measures, recently introduced by some developing countries.

36. Realization of all above-mentioned aims would provide new possibilities for a more intensive promotion of the status of women. Improvement in the status of women is of over-all national importance and responsibility for this rests upon the State and all sectors of society. Such an improvement can be realized only if it is carried out in accordance with national needs and conditions, as a sovereign right of each country, without any country imposing its own model.

37. In the traditional and agricultural sectors, the effects of such factors, when associated with rapid displacement and changes in women's basic tertiary activities and a lack of appropriate compensatory measures and especially with the lack of corresponding efforts for the integrated development of rural areas and more intensive integration of women in such development are even more detrimental. In other words, the lack of access to land, credit and financial and technological resources worsens the impact of rapid displacements in the work activities of women.

38. On the one hand, the recent expansion of capital- and technology-intensive and large-scale agricultural estates, often operated by transnational corporations, adversely affect women's work in basic tertiary activities, such as those related to small-scale urban, semi-rural and agricultural trade, which are crucial income-generating activities and are essential for community self-reliance. Indeed, in many cases this process has actually jeopardized food production and the distribution of food and basic subsistence goods. On the other hand, in the modern sectors of developing economies, although the expansion of industries operated by transnational corporations has in certain cases increased employment opportunities for women, it has nevertheless also brought new problems both for women and for over-all development. Care must be taken so that the redeployment of industry in the developing countries is not used as a means of providing cheap labour force, especially the women, or that the redeployment of obsolete and "dirty" industries is not carried out in the developing countries. Industrialization should be carried out in accordance with the over-all national aims, priorities and aspirations of the developing countries, as a part of a process which will contribute to the transfer of technology in the developing countries. Women's right to participate in and benefit from the industrialization process on equal terms with men must be secured.

39. In fact, there has been some concern about future trends in expert oriented industries and their impact on employment in developing countries. Such industries are said to be more sensitive to the needs of the international market than to those of the host countries. Although important for creating employment and providing foreign exchange earnings, in other respects their impact on the domestic economy is minimal, since virtually all their input is imported and all their output exported. The Governments of host countries seem to view such enterprises, for the most part, as short-run solutions to the problem of generating employment but for development over the long run, Governments prefer industries that will engage highly skilled workers. If such long-term plans are actually realized, the employment of women in labour-intensive manufacturing might only be a temporary phase in the industrialization of developing countries.

40. As part of the industrialization and development process, activities of indigenous companies and corporations also have an impact on women and their employment options. Although, in some cases, cottage industries and other forms of small industry are replaced or absorbed by larger entities, these corporations often have a multiplier effect on female employment. Under some circumstances the employment options on women are narrowed by corporate development, while in other instances women thus displaced are eventually absorbed into the newly established larger industries.

41. The processes described above demonstrate that, while traditions, customs and practices greatly hinder the advancement of women, some serious constraints to the economic participation of women in national development are international in nature and derive from the pattern of relationships between developing and developed countries.

42. In many countries at the national level, a comparison of the performances of men and women in every sector of economic and social development shows that the wide gap between the economic opportunities available to men and those open to women has not been reduced in proportion to the increases achieved in over-all economic growth, regardless of the levels of development which vary from country to country, the intensity of the world economic crisis increasingly affecting working people in general. Even in countries where significant increases in general wage employment were obtained, women have failed to share equally in this increase, while men, due to greater job security, have developed opportunities for sustained employment in the labour force, learned skills and increased their relative wages. Women constitute a substantial and growing proportion of the underemployed sector of the population, especially in the area of intermediary services and activities of the so-called tertiary and informal sectors. In those sectors women workers, like men workers, are often underpaid and receive for the most part extremely low wages; they are also subjected to a high degree of job instability and have, in most countries, no legislative protection and existing labour organizations do not always pay sufficient attention to their needs and demands. Moreover, in most countries, new incentives designed to improve their commitment to the labour force, such as occupational mobility, education or training and infrastructure assistance in the areas of credit and finance, have been inadequate.

II. Conceptual Framework

A. The need to include new data and strategies concerning the participation of women in development in the Third United Nations Development Decade

43. The sharpening of the world economic crisis in many countries during the latter half of the Second United Nations Development Decade requires an in-depth reassessment of established strategies and imposes the need for undertaking additional and comprehensive measures, at national and international levels, with a view to the strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade. The shortfalls of the Second United Nations Development Decade have been linked to major problems related to external debts, insufficient increases in food production (a factor that has also affected industrialization) and inadequate levels and patterns of industrialization. Those failures were said to be further intensified by the low capacity of many countries, particularly developing countries for absorbing their constantly increasing unemployment. Moreover, the major failures in productivity have been linked not only to key international factors but also to inadequate and/or non-existent national policies aimed at maximizing the capacitation and utilization of human resources. In this respect, the need for an in-depth reassessment of strategies concerning the mobilization of women (approximately 50 percent of the adult world population) has been consistently emphasized in recent studies and policy-oriented analyses, particularly at the regional and local levels. The discussion of women's issues at a recent United Nations conference on an area of priority in the new international economic order—namely, the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development—has forged a new consensus and action proposals in this area

44. These new developments are of particular relevance in overcoming the

alarming shortfalls in the agricultural sector, where women constitute a large proportion of the labour force. In order to promote integrated rural development, to increase productivity in food and other agricultural commodities, the wages, conditions of employment and training of women, as well as their access to credit, land and infrastructural technology in rural areas, should be significantly improved; technologies adapted to the needs of rural areas should be developed and made accessible to women. Conditions where undermigration is the only possibility for employment could be eliminated by generating productive employment and development through more uniform geographical distribution of economic projects and social services. To this end, such adverse effects of technology transfer to rural women as may exist and such effects of migration as are adverse to women should be diminished.

45. The International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade should formulate goals, objectives, and policy measures which could contribute to the solution of international economic problems and sustained global economic development including the accelerated development of developing countries and reduction of the existing gap between developing and developed countries. It is therefore necessary to expedite the establishment of the New International Economic Order. This goal cannot be achieved unless the inequality between men and women is eliminated. In the formulation and review of strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade, full consideration should be given to the conceptualization and review presented in the present Programme of Action as well as in the background documents before the World Conference. Furthermore, this new strategy should also include ways and means of developing new data that can more adequately measure the participation of women in the development process in every sector and at every level in order to provide a systematic and effective basis for the establishment of new national, regional and international policies to maximize and evaluate the utilization of the resources of women and the involvement of women as equal participants in social life and economic development—this being a precondition for the successful development of each and every country.

B. The interrelationship of the objectives of the United Nations Decade for Women and the subtheme of the World Conference: "Employment, Health and Education"

46. The experience of the Decade has clearly revealed that the objectives of equality and peace cannot be realized without an unequivocal commitment at national, regional and global levels to women's integration in all aspects of development. The objective of development, which incorporates the principle of socio-economic and political equality is closely related to stability and peace, which is more than an absence of violence within or between countries. In selecting the subtheme of the World Conference—employment, health and education—it was recognized that these interrelated aspects of development are of crucial concern to the advancement of women. The principles of the right of women to work, to receive equal pay for work of equal value, to be provided with equal opportunities for training and education were clearly stated in the World Plan of Action. It was also stressed that the full participation of women in development required that they should be given adequate and equitable access to health, nutrition and other social services including family planning and child care facilities. In all countries there is need for continuing attention to the implementation of these principles. For the remainder of the Decade, they should be given a high priority in Government planning and programmes. The level of development depends upon international conditions and national efforts towards integrated development particularly in the fields of employment, health and education, being fields of exceptional significance for the under-developed sectors, of which women constitute the major segment. In fact, the sectors of employment, health and education, especially for women workers in the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy, offer a stark index of the levels and quality of development in any given country. As reproducers of the labour force, women's socio-economic and health conditions are crucial determinants of the prospects for development. Their employment and educational opportunities not only reflect the extent to which a given society offers women the possibility to develop their full potential and eliminates inequalities but also the extent to which countries are maximizing their endogenous technical and economic resources, especially in times of acute economic crisis which threaten world stability. The strengthening of regional commissions by adequate institutional arrangements which would also ensure intersectoral programming and co-ordination of activities for women is essential. The improvement of linkages among the organizations of the United Nations system with a view to co-ordinating implementation where there are separate programmes is also essential.

Part Two: The Programme of Action at the national level

III. National Targets and Strategies for the Full Participation of Women in Economic and Social Development

A. National strategies for accelerating the full participation of women in economic and social development

47. The improvement of the status of women requires action at the national, local and family levels. It also requires a change of men's and women's attitudes towards their roles and responsibilities in society. The joint responsibility of men and women for the welfare of the family in general and the care of their children in particular must be reaffirmed.

48. Governments should explicitly state their firm commitment to accord high priority to legislative and other measures for accelerating the equal and full participation of women in economic and social development with a view to eliminating the existing inequalities between men and women in all sectors.

49. National strategies should as a matter of urgency integrate women into their efforts towards the New International Economic Order and a new international development strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade by:

(a) Studying and identifying new areas for national projects that would accelerate socio-economic growth and at the same time enhance the socio-economic participation of women by fostering economic and technical co-operation among countries;

(b) Providing advisory services for accelerating national self-reliance in co-operation with United Nations organizations; also ensuring that women assist in determining that technology transfer has a positive impact on the socio-economic situation and health of women, as well as on their working conditions;

(c) Providing women from the most disadvantaged sectors of the population with the ways and means of increasing their access to infrastructure, basic services and appropriate technology in order to alleviate the heavy workload imposed by the basic requirements and demands of their families and communities, women should also be provided with opportunities to gain new skills and with job opportunities in the construction and maintenance of the above-mentioned services, as well as in other sectors;

(d) Adopting measures to make equal opportunities for development and services available to women in rural areas and to women in urban areas by reversing processes of unequal economic growth, implementing special investment and incentive programmes in disadvantaged sectors, controlling mechanisms for the transfer of resources from one sector to another and, where possible, preventing the rural sector from being impoverished to the advantage of the urban sector.

50. Governments should, where appropriate, design certain special transitional strategies and establish, compensatory mechanisms aimed at achieving equality of opportunity in education, employment and health as a means of overcoming existing inequalities in national administration, the educational system, employment, health

migration to urban areas, ensure a balanced development in the other social services with a view to narrowing the existing development gap between rural and urban sectors thereby preventing migration and its harmful consequences.

(l) Examine and strengthen rural women's participation and contribution in and benefit from development and diversification of the forest economy;

(m) Establish special schemes to provide basic education for children and adults in remote, sparsely populated or very underprivileged rural areas, for example, by setting up children's hostels which provide board and lodging;

(n) Increase rural women's access to rural services by broadening the range of agricultural training and extension programmes to support women's roles in activities of agricultural production, processing and marketing and by increasing the number of women in the training and extension programmes of development agencies at all levels;

(o) Promote the processing of agricultural products by national, community, State or mixed enterprises; create jobs for rural women and families in the agro-industrial sector; and design and implement national plans for the development of the agro-industrial sector and rural industries.

3. *Child care*

Objectives

201. To develop or extend government-supported early childhood services appropriate to the individual family's needs.

202. Enable women, and especially working women, to discharge their responsibilities with regard to their children, and combine their work outside the home with their responsibilities as mothers. Special efforts should also be made to enable fathers to assume their share of family responsibilities.

Priority areas for action

203. Governments should adopt the necessary measures to:

(a) Include provision of community-based, work-based and work-related child care services, out-of-school hours and holiday care, crisis care and care for those families engaged in shift work;

(b) Improve the existing services by improving the competence of the persons providing them, the quality of the services provided, health conditions and the material aspects of the services;

(c) Create new services suited to the needs and conditions of working women and undertake the necessary studies to determine the real nature of those needs;

(d) Provide the necessary services at the lowest cost so as to match the resources and possibilities of women with limited incomes;

(e) Involve mothers in the planning of those services, and in their provision and assessment on a continuous basis so that they can be developed;

(f) Encourage child care centres in shopping centres to cater for occasional care needs.

4. *Migrant women*

Objective

204. Migrant women, including wage earners and the family of migrant workers, should have the same access to education, training employment and support and health services as the national population.

Priority areas for action

205. Governments should adopt the necessary measures to:

(a) Provide language and literacy training facilities in the community and at the work place. Access to these courses must be facilitated by income maintenance and child care services;

(b) Provide orientation and information programmes, including information on employment and training to all migrant women, in their own languages where necessary, to assist them to settle into the host country;

(c) Establish vocational training and counselling programmes, where necessary, including interpretation services;

(d) Ensure that social support and health services provide interpreters or bilingual workers;

(e) Encourage and assist union and employer organizations to inform migrant women about industrial legislation, procedures and rights;

(f) Provide culturally appropriate child care services to meet the needs of migrant and minority children and their families;

(g) Ensure migrant women, on a basis of equality with the national population, general education and vocational/professional training. Measures should be taken to improve the level of education and training of migrant women through languages and literacy courses upon arrival in the host country. Special education and training facilities should be provided for marriageable daughters of migrant workers who are of compulsory school age but who for various reasons do not attend school in the host country. Special attention should be given to reaching migrant women, for instance through the mass media, notably radio. Supplementary training and special guidance is necessary for social workers and teachers. In most cases these will, of necessity, have to be women;

(h) Ensure, on a basis of equality with the indigenous population, equal health care for migrant women. Measures should be taken to improve the health status of migrant women, paying special attention to stress-related ailments caused by differences in cultural, social and religious conditions. Provide additional training for domestic health care workers on the differing cultural and religious attitudes migrant women may have towards health and ill-health.

5. *Unemployed women*

Objective

206. Governments should take steps to ensure that unemployed women have access to secure employment.

Priority areas for action

207. Governments should adopt the necessary measures to:

(a) Provide formal and non-formal training and retraining to equip unemployed women with marketable employment skills. Such training should include personal and vocational development programmes;

(b) Guarantee to unemployed women social security benefits, adequate accommodation and medical services on the basis of individual need.

6. *Women who alone are responsible for their families*

Objective

208. Governments should ensure that women who alone are responsible for their families receive a level of income sufficient to support themselves and their families in dignity and independence.

Priority areas for action

209. Governments should take the necessary measures to:

(a) Provide training and retraining for secure employment through programmes which must include income maintenance, child care, parental leave and personal and vocational development programmes;

(b) Assist women who alone are responsible for their families to obtain secure and appropriate accommodation;

(c) Guarantee favourable access to finance and credit, medical and health services.

7. *Young women*

Objective

210. Promote specific Government policies for the education, health and employment of young women so that, in view of the role they play in revitalizing and carrying on systems of behaviour, attitudes and values, they receive the guidance and support they need, during the time when they are planning their future lives, to act wisely in crucial situations, such as the adoption of values and attitudes; the choice of a husband, the birth and raising of their first child; access to their first job; and election to office.

Priority areas for action

211. Governments should take the necessary measures to:

(a) Give special attention to the education of young women, who are the only human resource with a possibility of bringing about change in the future, with a view to ensuring that they are consciously involved in social and political development; that they enjoy and exercise the right responsibility, deliberately and willingly to found a family; and that they are given more and better opportunities to take part in the process of production;

(b) Give priority attention to young

women in matters relating to food and health in general in order to improve the living conditions of present and future generations and to permit the exercise of the right to health.

Part Three: The Programme of Action at the international and regional levels

IV. International Targets and Strategies

212. International targets and strategies both at the regional and the global levels must be based on a clear recognition that peace, security and national independence are essential prerequisites for an environment wherein the rights, responsibilities and roles of women can be promoted and the three objectives of the Decade—equality, development and peace—can be attained.

213. The perpetuation of global economic inequalities and economic dependence, which are the product of an economic system that is unfair and incompatible with the development of countries, slows down the process of development of all nations, particularly of the developing countries, and inhibits the full utilization of the material and human potentials of those countries, including women. The elaboration of an international development strategy for the third United Nations Development Decade, formulated within the framework of the New International Economic Order and directed towards the achievement of its objectives, is thus of fundamental importance for the achievement of the goals of the United Nations Decade for Women. It is essential to establish goals aimed at the assumption by women of full economic, political, cultural and social responsibility.

214. Progress towards disarmament can greatly contribute to the achievement of an adequate economic, social and cultural environment and enhance the development process through the reallocation of resources, particularly to the developing countries.

215. One of the concerns of the international community has been the need to restructure and reformulate the policies of the economic and social sectors of the United Nations system so that it can help speed up the establishment of the New International Economic Order, the development of developing countries and the promotion of the goals of the United Nations Decade for Women.

216. The restructuring has taken into account the need for decentralization of certain activities and the strengthening of regional programmes, particularly in the areas of economic and technical co-operation, in advisory services and training and research, data collection and analysis. The past few years have also witnessed the formulation by the regional commissions of regional plans of action for the integration of women into development and programmes aimed at implementation of some of their provisions. Of utmost importance however is the need to integrate women at both regional and global levels into the priority areas mentioned above in a programme of concerted and sustained international action for the second half of the Decade and beyond, until the plans to attain women's integration in development are fully implemented.

217. Member States are increasingly looking to the United Nations and to organizations in the United Nations system to take more dynamic international action in promoting women's full and equal partnership in development, both as contributors and beneficiaries. This is evidenced by the increasing number of resolutions, plans and policy declarations. Commensurate with the need for more dynamic programmes and policies is the need for co-ordination of activities of the various organizations in the United Nations system as well as the appropriate institutional arrangements, within them, involving wherever necessary, structural transformations. There is also a need for the development of relevant methodologies for integration of women in all their programmes and activities. In line with the integrated nature of the development process itself and with the need to reduce both isolated actions and overlapping of activities, the Programme of Action aims also at greater cohesiveness and co-ordination of efforts between its various organizations.

218. The Programme seeks to outline essential strategies and broad areas for international action. International action in this context includes regional action. However, some recommendations are addressed specifically to regional commissions and to other relevant organizations in the United Nations system for action at the regional and subregional and national levels in order to assist Governments and supplement national programmes.

V. International Policies and Programmes

219. All organizations in the United Nations system, in closer co-operation with relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, should support efforts towards establishing, strengthening and implementing national, regional and global programmes aimed at women's integration in development, revising and redefining if necessary development concepts, objectives and policies to achieve it. These programmes at the international level should take into full consideration the essential linkages in the development process at national, subregional and international levels, and with adequate feedbacks between institutions and machineries related to women and major planning units at all these levels.

220. In order to achieve the targets prepared for the third United Nations Development Decade, all development planning should take due account of the potential contribution and the interests of women. This consideration will lead to more appropriate development programmes which will increase productivity, whilst at the same time guarding against the possibility of any adverse impact which the transfer of technology and the redeployment of industry may have. Development projects should strongly emphasize the indigenous capabilities of the developing countries and enhance their creative capacity.

221. New approaches should be developed for increasing the mobilization of women's resources both for advancing their socio-economic status and increasing productivity. To this end, they should offer, *inter alia*, special incentives to develop co-operative movements particularly among women of the poorer sectors of society aimed at developing co-operative technology enterprises for community self-reliance in water, energy, health, sanitation and housing, day care centres and other basic services.

222. Multilateral and bilateral development and other organizations as well as non-governmental organizations working in the field of development should continue to provide development assistance to programmes and projects of developing countries which promotes women's integration and participation in all aspects of the development process, also within the framework of technical co-operation among developing countries. In this connexion efforts should be made to fully utilize locally available expertise to project design and implementation and to ensure greater quality in the project results through, among others, flexible implementation procedures. These programmes and projects should, *inter alia*, focus on efforts to strengthen developing countries' capabilities to plan and implement programmes for women including capabilities to develop alternative technology, including research and application of renewable sources of energy.

223. The United Nations Voluntary Fund for the Decade for Women should continue to intensify its efforts to give special support to women most in need, and to encourage consideration of women in development planning. Contributions to the Voluntary Fund will need to be greatly increased during the second half of the Decade if demands now being made on its resources are to be adequately met. Adequate development funds should be available for activities specific to the acceleration of the full participation of women in economic and social development at national, regional and international levels.

224. Studies should be undertaken by the relevant United Nations organizations to identify new ways and means of facilitating the integration of women, especially of the poor sectors of society, into the mainstream of development including women workers in agriculture and industry. The ILO, in co-operation with pertinent bodies such as UNCTAD, UNIDO and FAO, should develop studies to assess the working and employment conditions of

Treaties

Organization (WIPO) changing the budgetary cycles from triennial to biennial. Adopted at Geneva Sept. 28, 1979. Enters into force 1 month after written notifications of acceptance have been received by the Director General of WIPO from three-fourths of the states entitled to vote when the amendment was adopted.
Acceptance deposited: U.S., June 2, 1980.

Rubber
International natural rubber agreement, 1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979.[1]
Provisional application: Australia, Sept. 9, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Indonesia, Aug. 28, 1980.

Safety at Sea
Amendment to chapter VI of the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London Nov. 20, 1973.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Yugoslavia, July 25, 1980.

Satellite Communications System
Convention on the international maritime satellite organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605.
Ratifications deposited: France, Oct. 18, 1979; F.R.G., Oct. 23, 1979; Iraq, July 21, 1980.

Operating agreement on the international maritime satellite organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605.
Signature: Iraq, July 21, 1980.

Seals
Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, with annex and final act. Done at London June 1, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 11, 1978. TIAS 8826.
Accession deposited: Poland, Aug. 15, 1980.

Telecommunications
Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), as revised, relating to the aeronautical mobile (R) service, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva Mar. 5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1979, except for the frequency allotment plan for the aeronautical mobile (R) service which shall come into force on Feb. 1, 1983.[2]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Sept. 17, 1980.

Terrorism
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532.
Accession deposited: Haiti, Aug. 25, 1980.

Tonnage Measurement
International convention on tonnage measurement of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 1969.
Accession deposited: Turkey, May 16, 1980.
Acceptance deposited: Japan, July 17, 1980.
Enters into force: July 18, 1982.

Treaties
Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969. Entered into force Jan. 27, 1980.[2]
Accession deposited: Haiti, Aug. 25, 1980.

United Nations
Convention on the privileges and immunities of the U.N. Adopted at New York Feb. 13, 1946. Entered into force Sept. 17, 1946; for the U.S. Apr. 29, 1970. TIAS 6900.
Accession deposited: Seychelles, Aug. 26, 1980.

UNIDO
Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.[1]
Ratification deposited: Niger, Aug. 22, 1980.

Wheat
Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.[8]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Sept. 17, 1980.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.[8]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Sept. 17, 1980.

Food aid convention, 1980 (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971, as extended (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Mar. 11, 1980. Entered into force July 1, 1980.[8]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Sept. 17, 1980.

Women
Inter-American convention on the granting of political rights to women. Signed at Bogota May 2, 1948. Entered into force Apr. 22, 1949; for the U.S. May 24, 1976. TIAS 8365.
Signatures: Bolivia, Mar. 10, 1980; Dominica, Aug. 21, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Dominica, Aug. 21, 1980.

Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Adopted at New York Dec. 18, 1979.[1]
Signature: Romania, Sept. 4, 1980.

BILATERAL

Cameroon
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. international military education and training (IMET) program. Effected by exchange of notes at Yaounde Mar. 3 and June 19, 1980. Entered into force June 19, 1980.

People's Republic of China
Arrangement relating to a visa system for exports to the U.S. of cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products from the People's Republic of China. Effected by exchange of letters at Beijing July 23 and 25, 1980. Entered into force July 25, 1980.

Agreement relating to civil air transport, with annexes and exchanges of letters. Signed at Washington Sept. 17, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 17, 1980.

Consular convention, with exchanges of notes. Signed at Washington Sept. 17, 1980. Enters into force after the expiration of 30 days following the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Agreement on maritime transport, with exchange of letters. Signed at Washington Sept. 17, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 17, 1980.

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with annexes. Signed at Washington Sept. 17, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 17, 1980; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Colombia
Agreement relating to cooperation to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogota July 21 and Aug. 1, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1980.

Agreement extending the agreement of Apr. 22, 1976, (TIAS 8244) concerning procedures for mutual assistance in the administration of justice in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation matter to include the Bethlehem Steel Corporation and its subsidiaries or affiliates. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Aug. 28 and Sept. 10, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 10, 1980.

Egypt
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Cairo Aug. 24, 1980. Enters into force 30 days after the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.

Grant agreement for a basic village services project, with annexes. Signed at Cairo Aug. 31, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 31, 1980.

France
Convention for the avoidance of double

taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates, inheritances, and gifts. Signed at Washington Nov. 24, 1978.
Proclaimed by the President: Sept. 9, 1980.

German Democratic Republic
Consular convention, with exchange of notes. Signed at Berlin Sept. 4, 1979.[1]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Aug. 7, 1980.

Hungary
Parcel post agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Washington May 11, 1979. Entered into force provisionally May 11, 1979.
Entered into force definitively: Aug. 8, 1979.

Japan
Agreement concerning Japan's financial contribution for U.S. administrative and related expenses for the Japanese fiscal year 1980 pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agreement of Mar. 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo July 29, 1980. Entered into force July 29, 1980.

Memorandum of understanding on participation and cooperation of Japan in the international phase of ocean drilling of the deep-sea drilling project. Signed at Tokyo and Washington Aug. 5, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 5, 1980; effective Oct. 1, 1980.

Jordan
Agreement concerning the grant of defense articles and services under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Amman Aug. 14 and 30, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1980; effective Aug. 28, 1980.

Malaysia
Agreement amending the agreement of May 17 and June 8, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9180, 9763, 9602, 9718), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and New York July 23 and Aug. 8, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1980.

Mexico
Agreement amending the agreement of Feb. 26, 1979, as amended (TIAS 9419), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington July 28 and Aug. 6, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 6, 1980.

Nepal
Project grant agreement for resource conservation and utilization. Signed at Kathmandu Aug. 31, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 31, 1980.

Project grant agreement for integrated rural health-family planning services. Signed at Kathmandu Aug. 31, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 31, 1980.

Netherlands
Agreement relating to express mail service. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and The Hague Mar. 17 and Aug. 3, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 3, 1972. TIAS 8903.
Terminated: Sept. 1, 1980.

International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at The Hague and Washington May 19 and June 10, 1980.
Entered into force: Sept. 1, 1980.

Oman
Agreement relating to the provision of technical assistance and services to the Directorate General of Civil Aviation of Oman, with annex. Signed at Washington and Muscat Dec. 14, 1979, and May 18, 1980. Entered into force July 1, 1980.

Agreement to establish a joint commission on economic and technical cooperation. Signed at Muscat Aug. 19, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 19, 1980.
Economic and technical cooperation agreement. Signed at Muscat Sept. 4, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 4, 1980.

Panama
Agreement relating to the status of the Cardenas (FAA housing) area under the agreement in implementation of Article III of the Panama Canal Treaty. Signed at Panama Aug. 29, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1980.

Philippines
Agreement concerning the grant of defense articles and services under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila Aug. 12 and 22, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 22, 1980.

Portugal
Agreement concerning the grant of defense articles and services under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon Aug. 12 and 28, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 28, 1980.

Singapore
Agreement amending the agreement of Sept. 21 and 22, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9214, 9610, 9719, 9774), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington July 14 and 18, 1980. Entered into force July 18, 1980.

Sudan
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Dec. 22, 1979. Effected by exchange of notes at Khartoum Aug. 7, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 7, 1980.

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of payments due under PL 480 Title I agricultural commodity agreements. Signed at Khartoum Aug. 18, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 18, 1980, for 1979–80 debt; for 1980–81 debt, upon receipt by Sudan of written notice referred to in Article III, paragraph 1 of May 17, 1980, debt rescheduling agreement.

Switzerland
Agreement on social security, with final protocol. Signed at Washington July 18, 1979.
Entered into force: Nov. 1, 1980.

Administrative agreement for the implementation of the agreement on social security of July 18, 1979. Signed at Bern Dec. 20, 1979.
Entered into force: Nov. 1, 1980.

United Kingdom
Memorandum of agreement concerning exchange of personnel. Signed at Washington Aug. 29, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1980.

Venezuela
Maritime boundary treaty. Signed at Caracas Mar. 28, 1978.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Sept. 17, 1980.

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[1] Not in force.
[2] Not in force for the U.S.
[3] With reservation.
[4] With declaration.
[5] With statement.
[6] Does not accept optional Annex IV.
[7] Subject to ratification.
[8] In force provisionally for the U.S. ■

September 1980

Events pertaining to Iran may be found on page 55.

September 3
Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz, the President's Personal Representative for the Middle East Peace Negotiations, announces that Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat agree to resume talks on Palestinian autonomy and to join with the U.S. in a summit meeting before the end of the year.

September 10
Trade Working Group of the U.S.-Mexican Consultative Mechanism meets in Mexico Sept. 10 and 11. U.S. delegation is headed by Coordinator for Mexican Affairs and the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Ambassadors Robert Krueger and Robert Hormats, respectively.

September 11
Felix Garcia Rodriguez, a member of the U.N. Cuban Mission, is assassinated in New York.

tions involved, is to conserve more oil and to produce the equivalent in alternative fuels of 15–20 million barrels of oil per day by the end of this decade. This will ease pressure on world oil markets. It will alleviate balance-of-payments problems and will let developing countries obtain a larger share of the world oil supply now and in the future.

The common purpose of all countries, in both our domestic and international energy actions, should be to strengthen the world economy and to assure fair treatment for all nations. Our common goal should be to minimize the threat of abrupt changes in the price of oil, to assure a reasonable, predictable level of supply of energy, to avoid compounding inflationary pressure that robs us all. The oil-importing countries and the oil-exporting countries as well can all contribute to this effort. We all have a stake in its outcome.

This meeting comes at a crucial time for us all. The world has come to place enormous confidence in your judgment, in the judgment and the services of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. That confidence, down through the years, has never been misplaced, and I'm certain that it will be even more justified by your actions and your services in the future.

On behalf of the United States of America, I assure you that we intend to remain active in the decisions made within these two institutions and supportive of the work which lies ahead of us all. Congratulations on what you've accomplished. My full support and best wishes now and in the future.

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[1] Made in the Plenary Hall at the Sheraton Washington Hotel (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 6, 1980). ■

U.S. Position in the Persian Gulf

Secretary Muskie's address before the General Pulaski Association in Buffalo on October 14, 1980.[1]

Over the past 5 months, I have made it one of my prime purposes to speak to the American people about our nation's foreign policy. Everywhere in my travels I have found people eager to be informed and warmly hospitable. But this occasion, for me, is special. You and I share a common heritage. We are, first of all, Americans. But we are Americans who trace our roots back to the same land—another land whose people work hard, revere God, and cherish human freedom.

For you and me—and for other people of Polish ancestry—the past year has brought some stirring moments. Pope John Paul II has inspired the whole world with his radiant character and with his simple but compelling message of human brotherhood and peace. The Nobel Prize for literature has been awarded to Czeslaw Milosz, whose writings have voiced what lives in so many Polish hearts.

And most of all, in recent weeks, our hearts have gone out to the brave people of Poland, as they have confronted one of the most difficult—and perhaps most pivotal—moments in their recent history. Poland's entire history has been a history of challenge. The land of our forefathers was partitioned three times. Indeed, for over a century, while America was becoming the great nation that it is, there was no Poland on the map.

But the Poles are more than a brave and a civilized people; they are a resilient people. They came back from partition to independence. They are trying now to come back from a period of economic, political, and social troubles that would test the will and the skills of any nation—even a nation of 35 million people occupying a key position in Europe.

It will not be easy for Poland to resolve its problems, and it will take time. We will not interfere in Poland, and neither should others. But Poland's people and Poland's leaders can be assured, as they face the formidable tasks that lie ahead, that our own people and government will want to offer them both our sympathetic understanding and, where this is feasible and proper, our assistance.

War in Iran and Iraq

On this Pulaski Day, when we celebrate the memory of a man who helped us gain our own independence, I want to speak to you about another region of the world in which the independence of nations, our interests, and peace itself are at stake. I want to tell you what your government is doing to secure peace, to guard our interests and thus to help insure that the values we cherish will survive and prosper in the world. I am speaking about the war between Iran and Iraq and more generally about our position in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia.

The war between these two Persian Gulf states is in its 4th week now. Behind this brief conflict lie years of bitterness and rivalry. But it would be a mistake to view this conflict only as a local flareup between two rival states. Its implications are far broader. If not contained and resolved, it could do severe damage to our nation's vital interests.

Several things are at stake—first among them the peace and stability of the Persian Gulf. In the tensions and instabilities of that area, even small wars threaten to become larger ones. Also affected are the safety and independence of our friends in the area who look to us for support and help to safeguard their own independence. And potentially at stake in this conflict are vital economic interests of the United States.

We buy less than 1% of our oil from Iraq and none from Iran. But our European allies, Japan, and many developing countries are major buyers of oil from Iraq: Iraq is the world's second largest supplier of oil after Saudi Arabia. Clearly, if the economies of our allies are disrupted, our own vital interests will suffer.

Moreover, the war could spread to interfere with shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. And it is through this vital chokepoint that 16 million barrels of the world's oil must pass each day, not only oil from Iraq and Iran but also oil from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other producers in the gulf—a significant share of the world's daily oil supply.

Finally, in the light of Afghanistan, we must be concerned about the possibility of new intervention presented by any such instability in the region.

U.S. Goals

The United States has nothing to gain by taking sides in this conflict, and we have

refused to do so. But to be impartial is not to be inactive; to declare that we will not take sides is not to declare that we have no interests at stake. In fact, the United States has been working steadily, since the war broke out, in pursuit of three goals.

First, we are working for an end to the fighting between the two nations. We have strongly supported international efforts, in the United Nations and elsewhere, to end the fighting and to bring Iran and Iraq to the negotiating table. The President has been in contact with foreign leaders, and I have worked with Secretary General Waldheim of the United Nations and with other diplomats to pursue an early end to this conflict.

Second, we are working to keep the conflict from spreading beyond Iran and Iraq. To this end, for example, we are helping our nonbelligerent friends in the area who are threatened by this conflict. The President's prompt decision to send advance warning-and-control aircraft to Saudi Arabia underscores our determination to strengthen the defenses of such friends—so that they can guard their own independence and territorial integrity.

We are also urging all other nations —in the region and beyond—to avoid involvement and to work to limit and resolve the fighting. It is in no one's interest to see the hostilities widen. We have exchanged views with the Soviet Union. Each of us has assured the other of impartiality in the conflict. We will continue to exercise restraint and expect the Soviets to do likewise.

And third, we have pledged to do what is necessary to protect free shipping in the Strait of Hormuz from any interference. We believe that the oil-producing nations must be free from external coercion or control and free to ship their oil safely through international waters. We and our allies do not seek to dominate the oil production decisions of the oil-producing nations. But all nations —not only industrial but the world's developing nations as well—have a profound interest in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf.

U.S. Steps

Today, we are in a position to pursue this policy of firm but prudent action. Our capacity to pursue our goals—and our capacity, in particular, to make a credible pledge to protect free shipping in the Strait of Hormuz—are no accident. Our position is the result of careful, deliberate steps by President Carter and his Administration.

As the President said last January in his State of the Union message, ". . . we are prepared to work with other countries . . . to share a cooperative security framework that respects differing values and political beliefs, yet . . . enhances the independence, security, and prosperity of all."

That is a tall order. But no one should doubt our determination or our ability to fulfill it. We, and our allies, have both the power and the will to defend our interests and to sustain our friends in the region. Our allies are playing an essential role in strengthening the defenses of Europe itself and through their own military, diplomatic, and economic position in Southwest Asia.

Let me review with you some of the specific steps we have been taking—singly and with others—to build and strengthen that vital security framework of which the President spoke. Our actions have been taken on three broad fronts: military, diplomatic, and economic.

Military Actions. I will mention our military actions first, because our ability to defend our interests, if they are assaulted, is absolutely basic.

- We have moved to strengthen our peacetime military presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Since early 1979, the United States has had on station the most powerful naval force ever deployed to the Indian Ocean. And our Mideast naval force inside the Persian Gulf itself has been increased from three to five ships. We will maintain a substantial military presence in the area, composed primarily of off-shore naval forces but including also periodic deployment of air and ground units for training and exercises.
- We are improving our ability to add quickly, during a crisis, to that continuing military presence. We have organized and are developing a rapid deployment force which will be available for dispatch worldwide on short notice. And we are increasing our ability to move ground, air, and naval forces to potential trouble spots. This effort includes programs to improve the reach, mobility, and strength of our airplanes and to procure new, fast, sealift ships.
- We are working with friendly nations in the area to improve their self-defense capabilities and military facilities. And we have expanded our access to needed facilities in the region.

All these steps, let me emphasize, are taken in the interests of defense and peace. They threaten no one whose purpose is peace. They are designed to buttress the independence of the region and rights of free passage in its waterways. Our actions will remain carefully calibrated to these goals, so we neither create new, needless tensions with the Soviet Union nor appear to threaten the freedom of decision of our friends in the area.

Diplomatic Efforts. On the diplomatic front, two specific efforts are especially important.

The Camp David accords stand as a major achievement. Peace between Israel and Egypt is now a reality. And the ultimate aim of the peace process—a settlement between Israel and its other Arab neighbors—will, if we can achieve it, serve Israel's security interests, the strategic interest of the United States and its allies, and indeed the interest of all states in the region. It will not assure stability in the Middle East. But the absence of a serious effort to achieve this peace will assure continued danger.

The sanctions levied by the United States and our allies in the wake of the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan are also highly important for they are a strong signal that we will firmly oppose armed aggression; that we support the independence of nations in this region and elsewhere.

Our other major diplomatic efforts have been in pursuit of better ties with nations in the region with which we have shared interests. In several cases, notably Egypt and the moderate Arab states, we have had considerable success. In other cases, such as Iran, we have made it clear that, while we will never yield on matters of principle, we stand ready to compose our differences. But we will not rest until all our captive citizens are home and free. We are continuing, through every avenue available, to seek their release.

Economic Measures. The third front on which we have moved to protect our interests is the economic front. And here the measures taken by the President and the Congress over the past 3 years to guard our energy security assume key importance. These energy-security steps have been taken in two directions—toward conservation and toward increased production of energy here at home. They are working.

In large part because the United States and our allies have reduced our consumption of oil, we are weathering

of weakness which could lead to war, so policies and their implications for war or peace are important things to discuss. But I don't regard Mr. Reagan as a war-like man who intends to take us to war, and I certainly never made the kind of reference to him or to his policies that was contained in that wire service story.

Q. Do you think the Reagan policy of seeking military superiority for the United States before there is any new SALT agreement or the conclusion of a new arms control agreement would be likely to increase the risk of American involvement in wars somewhere in the world?

A. I've already said, in response to Mr. Dunsmore's question, that with respect to SALT, as I understand both the Republican platform and Mr. Reagan's position, we must have nuclear superiority before we will negotiate, and we must have that superiority after negotiations are finished. If that's the case, there will never be an arms control treaty because, as I said a moment ago, I can't conceive of either the United States or the Soviet Union accepting a treaty which freezes itself into a position of nuclear inferiority and freezes the other into a position of nuclear superiority. If that is a correct prognostication of what would happen following the policy that I've just described, then what we would have is an arms race as each side sought superiority, and the whole basis of the SALT process, the whole basis of arms control—which has been supported by President Nixon, President Ford, President Johnson, and by President Carter—would be out the window. The whole basis of arms control was that an arms race increases the possibility of war, that arms control would diminish that possibility. The risks of war associated with the two differing policies are appropriate issues to raise and to discuss.

Q. On the subject of differing policies, we have read of late of your future and differences that you may be having with the National Security Adviser—once again a rather old story. But I think you have taken the position that you will come back if, indeed, Mr. Carter is reelected, and he has said that he would love to have you. Did those stories make that decision for you? Or is, indeed, that your decision?

A. I've been perfectly happy in this job, and, indeed, I get along very well with Mr. Brzezinski. On a day-to-day basis, we couldn't have a more amicable relationship.

With respect to my future in this job, there is no job I'd rather have after January 20 than this one.

Q. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was in Poland today, conferring with the new leaders there. Do you think the danger of Soviet military action to back up the Polish Government in its dispute with labor unions has passed?

A. I think that the Polish Government, the Polish workers, and the Polish people ought not to be insensitive to Russian reactions to how they finally achieve and resolve the issue which is before them. I think that the Soviets have been restrained up to this point. Indeed, I gather in one story I read today that there was even a Soviet almost approval of the agreement that was negotiated between the Polish Government and the workers. Implementation of that agreement is still a difficult challenge; it obviously is, as we read the day-to-day reports. But I think that the Polish people ought not to be insensitive to pressures from outside, not only from the Soviet Union but from other countries in the Eastern bloc.

NOV. 2, 1980[2]

Q. You heard the conditions that appeared to have been stated by the Iranian Parliament, and among those conditions is a conditional phasing of the release of the American hostages. In the past that has always been unacceptable to the U.S. Government; you've always insisted that there has to be an all-or-nothing release. If they want to let a few go without condition, that's fine. Has that changed?

A. That is still our position.

Q. Therefore, if, in fact, this were conditional, there is no such thing, as far as the American Government is concerned, as one condition being met and a group of hostages being let out, if all the conditions are not met and all the hostages are not released?

A. Whether or not all the conditions are met or can be met is the first question. The predicate is not should there be a staged withdrawal, but whether or not all the conditions can be met and are met. And if they're all met at the same time, I gather all the hostages will be released.

Q. All right. I stand corrected. Let me pose to you your own question. Can they be met?

A. No decision has been made on that point at this time.

Q. In your news conference yesterday you strongly suggested that it would require negotiations once the Majlis had made the decision. Could you give us some indication as to how things are going to proceed now?

A. First of all, let's get a little chronology established here. At this point what we've received are unofficial reports of what the Majlis has laid down. As I listened to the first half hour of this program, some of the oral descriptions coming from Tehran are modifications and significant changes of what we have achieved up to this point. So it is very difficult to respond definitively to what we have in hand at this point. Secondly, the four points that have been described in the first half hour of this program and which have been covered by the information we've received from other sources seem to fit within the framework of the Ayatollah Khomeini's four points which I think he stated sometime in September.

So we know generally the areas within which we have to make decisions. But until we see the fine print, or understand more clearly the fine print, we cannot be sure precisely the limits within which we are being asked to act by the Majlis. And I say that not to suggest a nonexistent problem. I think some of the problems have already been indicated in the first half hour of this program. And so we must deal with the actual problems once we know whether there are some and what they are.

Q. Does the U.S. Government have the legal power to free all Iranian assets frozen by President Carter, including those under attachment by the courts?

A. The legal answer to that is a complicated one. But what is involved is not only the legal answer but also what would be the wise answer, and, at this point, in what we are being asked to do. We're not entirely sure about that at this point.

Q. You have had some time now to study the Ayatollah's four points, and we understand that the American Government lawyers have been very busy trying to figure this out. Do you think that that's going to be a stumbling

block, the unfreezing of the assets and also the elimination of all claims?

A. The difficulty with trying to answer a question like that at this point, before we know specifically—before we can be sure what, specifically, the Iranian Majlis is requesting, is that we might suggest a negative attitude about what they've proposed before we've determined whether or not a negative attitude is required. And to suggest a negative attitude to an Iranian Parliament which has labored to come to this decision, obviously with great difficulty, might well create an environment entirely negative to the prospect of achieving release of the hostages. You could tick problems off with respect to the four points which may not be problems in the context of what the Parliament has said and means.

Secondly, the Iranian Parliament has said, as we understand from our reports, that the executive is to present us with an official translation—Persian text and English text—of what the Majlis has said. And there is some ambiguity as to what additional authority the executive may have. It may have some additional substantive authority, at least to the point of clarifying language, that has been at least contained in whatever the Majlis has enacted into law.

So until we've got that, I don't find it useful to indicate either positive or negative attitudes about specifics. It's very difficult to do. Bear in mind that these unofficial reports of what has taken place in the Majlis have come to us in the wee hours of the morning. We've had 5 or 6 hours at most to consider them.

There are obvious technical complications of the kind that you are raising with your questions that have to be evaluated in terms of specific language by our experts. That analysis is underway. Contrary to the impression that some would make about this Administration's attitude, we are not waiting to just leap at just any proposition. We have to study it; we have to evaluate it and evaluate it in terms of principles which the President has laid down.

Number one, that what we do is consistent with American interests and American honor; and, secondly, whether or not what we're being asked to do is in accordance with American law and American principles. It has to be evaluated in those terms, and that evaluation cannot take place quickly.

Q. It seems to me the bottom line of what you're saying, then, is that it's absolutely unrealistic to expect that the hostages will be out before Tuesday or by Tuesday.

A. I haven't found absolutes in this business, but this is obviously going to be time consuming. And you heard Mr. Ghotbzadeh's evaluation of the time that it might take. He said it might take as much as 10 days from their point of view. So they must also envision some complexities that have to be worked out.

Q. You've alluded to two different sets of problems. One, the diplomatic problem, but also there is the political problem. Could you take us behind the scenes a little bit and let us know how you and the President, in resolving those two conflicting issues, how do you handle this issue politically and diplomatically, being true to both the demands that are upon you. The President has to get reelected, from his point of view.

A. I can speak only for myself. I would presume to speak only for myself on each of those questions. With respect to the politics of it, I never could see how this could be manipulated for political purposes. If there were such a way, we've certainly not used it. I don't think that this thing breaking on the Sunday before Tuesday, election day, is a maximum political resource for anybody.

It's a very delicate question, I would think, from both sides. What is involved are 52 Americans—52 American lives—and what is also involved are our national interests. And we must make sure that they do not conflict with each other. We've got to serve both objectives. And that's been the President's attitude about this ever since I joined his Administration as Secretary of State. He's not regarded it as a political resource since that time. Of that I can assure you.

Q. Insofar as you can, would you walk us through the four points? For example, noninterference in Iran's internal affairs—not really a problem, is it?

A. I think we've said that publicly, in effect, over and over again. Whether or not they're asking us something more than we've already said publicly, we can't be sure until we are sure that we have the precise proposal before us.

Q. All right. Unfreezing of the Iranian assets in this country. More complex.

A. It is complex. In effect, what this, and other provisions which I'm sure the Iranians are interested in, is this: When they seized our hostages, we retaliated with some specific actions, including the freezing of Iranian assets, trade sanctions with our allies, condemnation of the seizure in various places—the United Nations, the World Court, the Islamic conference, and so on—so that we've taken a number of steps. And implicit from the beginning has been this point: That if they undo what they did, we would undo what we did. The passage of time and attachments which have been placed on Iranian assets have complicated the question, obviously.

Q. What about U.S claims? That's, I believe, the third point.

A. We must understand precisely what U.S. claims they mean.

Q. All right, the final point, then, the issue of the Shah's wealth. Can that be returned?

A. With respect to the report from your correspondent in the early part of this show, what that means, as he understands it—and he was in Tehran, I was not—was that it seems to me an identification of the Shah's assets now. If it means nothing more than, that is something different than you suggest by your question, confiscation. To which point should I reply? You see, I can reply to neither until I know which is which.

Q. The Majlis made no mention of spare parts for its army from the United States. However, the whole issue of the United States sending military supplies, that were supposedly bought and purchased by the Shah, to Iran in the midst of its war with Iraq is one which has been kicking around for the last 10 days. Could you clarify for us what the American position is vis-a-vis those spare parts?

A. You have made the point which is obvious in all reports that we've had, about action taken by the Majlis that spare parts are not mentioned. We do know there has been a divided view in Iran about spare parts. There are some who rejected the notion that they should accept spare parts that they need from "the great Satan," as they like to refer to us, and there are others who think they should [accept spares]. That is another clarification that needs to be made.

On this whole point of whether undoing what we did in retaliation for taking of the hostages represents a tilt in this Iraq-Iran war, let me make this point: that the hostage crisis emerged months before the Iraq-Iran war. The hostages were seized months before that war; and our retaliatory actions were taken months before the Iran war. And the fact that

son, because, after all, one of those three might be the person he has to deal with. So I think that is unproductive.

I think that even those who are using the hardest rhetoric publicly against us are considering how to get this crisis behind them.

They are obviously far more isolated from the world, and they surely must feel isolated in the course of this war. And they would resent my saying that. But nevertheless, by their own account, the sanctions we have imposed have added 25% to the cost of things which they import when they can get them.

They see sentiment in the area turning against them and toward Iraq, for whatever reason. They find problems in replenishing their military supply and equipment and maintenance. So even in war, they must feel the isolation that this crisis has visited upon them. We believe now, and we think time will support this belief, that in due course they will decide that their own interests are better served to get this hostage crisis behind them.

And when they do, and when they find somebody in a position to make that decision and not lose his job doing so, they will make that decision. And we will know what the terms are, and we can negotiate those terms perhaps and finally reach that objective we have all been agonizing about for almost a *year*.

Q. In light of that, though, do you think because of the economic penalties being put on Iran by the United States and also the loss of all their oil fields during the war—do you think that that government can withstand? Or do you foresee a revolution there?

A. They have withstood a great deal. They are people motivated by religious fervor—a belief that they are doing something ordained from on high—and when people have that kind of motivation, they can withstand a great deal. Already, they have done much better in this war in sustaining their effort than a lot of outside observers and impartial observers thought them capable of doing.

Q. What were you doing in Memphis when you said that you got the call here earlier to serve as Secretary of State?

A. I came here, as I recall, to speak to a water conference of some kind—water pollution conference.

Q. Was that in last spring—or was that in May?

A. It was in May.

[1] Press release 280 of Oct. 10, 1980. ■

Somalia and the U.S. Security Framework

by Matthew Nimetz

Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee on September 16, 1980. Mr. Nimetz is Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.[1]

I welcome the opportunity to testify before you today. Although the specific subject is the reprograming of foreign military sales (FMS) funds for Somalia in FY 1980, the issues are obviously broader ones. Is our relationship with Somalia in our national interest? How does it relate to our broader strategy in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region? What role will Somalia and its facilities play in that context? My statement will address these points. I will also address the general situation in the Horn of Africa and, in particular, the Ogaden, for it is essential to see clearly exactly what this reprograming action will mean to our policy direction, what it will permit us to do, and what are the limits of its effect. It is, by itself, a small step, but as so often in the conduct of foreign policy, it is an important one both symbolically and in real terms. Let us begin by looking back for a moment over what will be familiar ground for some of you *to see what its* origins are, what it means, and why so many of our key policy objectives in relation to the Soviet Union, to the defense posture of the United States, to our relations with our allies in Europe and Asia, to our purposes in the Middle East, to our energy policies are involved in this action by our government. As always, we must at the same time ask ourselves what would be the effect of our not taking this action.

Our attitudes and our perceptions of American interests in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area have come a long way in the past year or two and, indeed, since the oil embargo of 1973. The vital significance of oil supplies from the region for the economic well-being of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan helps to define our interests in the area. And the value of those supplies, along with their vulnerability to a variety of threats, has both attracted Soviet attention to the region and brought increased stresses and pressures, from within and without, to the societies and states in the area.

The Soviet Challenge

Throughout the 1970s it became possible to distinguish a clear trend in Soviet strategic moves related to the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. I will not go into detail about those actions which established the trend, because you are familiar with them. Broadly, they include the major new pattern of Soviet naval activity and presence; Soviet support for, and encouragement of, subversive forces in key nations, as well as for those regimes openly aligned with the Soviet Union, such as South Yemen and Ethiopia; and the appearance of surrogate Cuban forces in the region.

Parallel to this Soviet-managed pattern and not necessarily related to it, a rising level of discontent developed within some of the regional states. Events in Iran—whatever their origin and whatever their eventual outcome—brought a dramatic shift in alignment in the region and played on forces which also exist in other regional states, among them some of the most significant oil producers.

I have sketched this longer term background briefly because I think we must bear in mind that our original steps to improve our military forces for possible deployment into the area and our actions seeking greater access to facilities in Somalia, Kenya, and Oman came about in response to the trends well established before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan shed dramatic new light on these trends. In response to the wider Soviet threat symbolized by this aggression, the President, in his State of the Union message, declared that: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an

assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." Thus Afghanistan lent powerful emphasis and powerful force to the rationale we believe supports our policy. That policy responds to the clear, inimical, long-term trend in power relationships which had developed in the area, and it is thus best understood as part of a long-term effort on our part to protect our vital interests and those of our allies and friends.

These interests are threatened. Not only has the Soviet Union engaged in a steady building of military capabilities, but the Soviet leadership has shown that they are not hesitant to use either their own power or that of others. South Yemen's attack on North Yemen, the introduction of Cuban combat forces into Angola and Ethiopa, and the Soviet buildup in the Indian Ocean were all cause for concern even before Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has underscored that concern by placing the Soviets within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean, and it has demonstrated that we cannot rule out direct Soviet aggression.

Our strategy for Southwest Asia is thus based on the interests we share with our allies and the friendly states of the region. Both we and our allies have an important interest in preventing Soviet domination or interruption of our access to the region's oil. Thirty percent of the oil we import comes from the Persian Gulf. The percentages are even higher for our friends: 66% for Western Europe and 75% for Japan. We must also insure that the countries of the region are not compelled to make their political and economic decisions under the shadow of preponderant Soviet power or the threat of aggression.

In response to the global challenge posed by the Soviets:

- We have in recent years increased our real annual expenditures for defense, and we will continue to do so;
- We are helping to strengthen NATO and our other alliances;
- We are working to achieve a peaceful solution to the problems of the Middle East;
- We are engaged in a positive dialogue with nations of the Third World on economic and political issues of concern to them and to us; and
- Through political initiatives and economic sanctions, we and other members of the international community are making the Soviets pay a substantial cost for invading Afghanistan.

Today, however, I will be talking primarily about our steps to deal with a Soviet military threat to Southwest Asia.

It is a fundamental given that only the United States can directly deter, or counter, a direct threat from the Soviets. We recognize the concerns of the regional states that they not be drawn into a superpower confiict, but we expect them to recognize that the alternative to a countervailing U.S. Policy—expressed in concrete terms—would be greater Soviet boldness, both politically and militarily.

Our ability to deter and defend against such a threat will not by itself guarantee peace, security, and economic development in this region. We must and will encourage cooperation, moderation, and stability through political and economic means. However, in the absence of a militarily and politically credible counterweight to the Soviet Union, there can be no real security for regional states, no stable, nonthreatening framework within which these other aims can be achieved. Without that kind of environment, these states become hostages to fortune or prisoners of hope and trust in Soviet benevolence. We believe they know this, and that is why we believe we have much in common. It is also why we are improving our capability to project *substantial* power into the region quickly so that the Soviet Union cannot count on achieving their objectives through military action or the threat of military action.

I will not minimize the size of the task nor leave the impression that it can be accomplished overnight. The interests that engage our efforts are vitally important to the well-being of our country, and a sustained commitment of attention and resources over several years will be required. Nevertheless, we have embarked on a course that is bringing us nearer our goal.

We are taking three broad steps to improve our military capability in the region.

First, we have increased our peacetime military presence. This presence is largely naval—two carrier battle groups and a marine a.nphibious unit are deployed in the region. From time to time, these forces may be supplemented by tactical Air Force training missions.

Second, we are improving our capability to introduce our rapid deployment forces into the area, if needed to meet a Soviet military challenge, by prepositioning military equipment on ships in the region and procuring fast sealift and strategic airlift which can move forces rapidly.

Third, we are obtaining access to facilities in the area, to support both our expanded presence and our ability to move forces rapidly to the area. As you know, we have secured access to the facilities in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. Elsewhere in the region, we are improving our facilities on the British Island of Diego Garcia and are encouraged by President Sadat's offer of temporary and limited access to facilities in Egypt.

Finally, recognizing that U.S. efforts cannot alone meet the threat, we are strengthening regional countries by providing security and economic assistance to help them develop their own defensive capabilities.

In developing our strategy, we recognize the political implications of our military actions—especially, as I mentioned earlier, the sensitivity of regional nations about being drawn into a superpower confrontation—and we have sought to minimize the adverse effects. Thus, we do not envisage a large U.S. presence on the ground; instead, we have emphasized peacetime naval presence so that we can reassure our friends without the political problems that a large ground presence would entail. By arranging for access to facilities in several different nations we reduce the political exposure of any one and minimize the presence of U.S. forces in any one location. Moreover, we have not asked the countries of the region to accept U.S. bases. Instead, we have sought access to their own facilities with minimal U.S. presence so that we can more effectively meet our mutual security interests.

The concept of facilities we have developed for this region is critical. If we are to be in a position to deter or defeat a Soviet threat to our interests in the region, in whatever form it takes, we, in fact, need access to a network of facilities, a network which will enable us to provide logistical and combat support to our forces in the area and, if necessary, to bring in additional people, equipment, and supplies. Such a network must provide the flexibility and redundancy necessary to respond to a variety of contingencies.

U.S.-Somali Relationship

It is in this context that, in order to enhance our capabilities in the region and to strengthen regional stability and

concern to those who share our common objectives. In each case, these nonparties have sought to avoid commitments —of the type contained in articles II and III of the NPT—not to acquire nuclear explosive devices and to accept international safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities. And several of them have built or are building unsafeguarded facilities of types capable of yielding weapons-usable material. In the view of the United States, it should be a prime objective of this conference to deal with this increasingly urgent problem.

As participants at this conference are well aware, non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT are already required by the treaty to accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities. Nonparties are not, and, consequently, they have been able to obtain nuclear cooperation while retaining unsafeguarded facilities. The 1975 review conference sought to rectify this discrimination against NPT parties—and to reduce the serious proliferation risks inherent in it—by urging that: " . . . in all achievable ways, common export requirements relating to safeguards be strengthened, in particular by extending the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing states not party to the Treaty."

Since 1975 there has been movement toward that objective by a number of states. But the objective will not be realized until truly concerted action is taken. The United States, therefore, strongly recommends that this conference promote the objective of full-scope IAEA safeguards in a way that can most realistically be expected to have the desired effect—by calling on members of the nonproliferation regime to enter into new nuclear supply commitments only with those states that undertake to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities.

At the same time, we expect this conference to review in depth the progress that has been made in carrying out the other recommendations of the 1975 review conference with respect to safeguards and physical protection and to make recommendations with respect to the further improvement of safeguards implementation. On this subject, I am gratified to be able to report two noteworthy recent developments:

First, the unanimous approval by the U.S. Senate last month of the treaty implementing the U.S. offer to permit the IAEA to apply its safeguards to civil facilities within the United States. This demonstrates that we are not asking others to accept safeguards that we are unwilling to accept for ourselves.

Second, the opening for signature of the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material. The United States signed this convention on March 3, 1980 and is proceeding with the steps necessary to ratify it. We believe this conference should encourage the widest possible adherence to this convention.

Articles VI and VII

An objective of equal importance to preventing the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons is that of curbing the nuclear arms race. The United States is acutely aware of its undertaking under article VI of the treaty "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament."

Having spent more than 6 years as an active participant in the SALT negotiations, I am personally aware of the vast amount of determination and effort that went into achieving the SALT II agreements. Since the 1975 review conference, these negotiations were successfully completed and the agreements signed by the heads of state of the United States and the Soviet Union. We regard SALT II as a major step in the ongoing process contemplated by article VI and believe that SALT II agreements themselves will make an important contribution to international security and stability. It has not been feasible in recent months to complete ratification of agreement. But we are determined to do so and to refrain from actions inconsistent with that objective. Further, we are determined to resume efforts to achieve more substantial reductions and further qualitative limitations in the period ahead.

We have also made marked progress since 1975 toward achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Trilateral negotiations began in 1977. As demonstrated in their recent detailed joint progress report that will be made available to this conference, the negotiating parties have overcome many difficult hurdles—hurdles that at our last review conference appeared to some as insurmountable barriers to agreement. We recognize the importance of the comprehensive test ban (CTB), particularly to the subject matter of this conference, and we will continue our efforts to conclude a comprehensive test ban at the earliest possible date.

Since 1975 we have also taken an important further step in support of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America—the treaty of Tlatelolco. Earlier, we ratified protocol II of that treaty—under which we undertook to respect the Latin American nuclear-weapons-free zone, not to contribute to its violation, and not to use or threaten to use force against the Latin American parties adhering to that treaty. In 1977 President Carter signed additional protocol I to that treaty, under which U.S. territories within the zone will become subject to the treaty's regime. This protocol has been submitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent, and we are hopeful that the Senate will be able to complete action on it in the near future.

At the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, we took another significant step in response to the call by a number of NPT parties at the 1975 review conference for negative security assurances. We announced the following declaration by the President of the United States, which he has instructed me to reaffirm at this conference.

> The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies by such a state allied to a nuclear-weapon state or associated with a nuclear-weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.

This U.S. formulation—which gives special recognition to adherence to the NPT—was designed to benefit those countries that are the most appropriate recipients of such assurances.

We have also been striving to achieve mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. We have offered to negotiate mutual limitations on long-range theater nuclear force systems in the region.

We believe that all of these arms control achievements should be recognized and supported for what they are—important steps forward in what is an arduous, ongoing process. My government wishes that more rapid and extensive progress would have been possible by now, and I am sure that no one here will disagree. But it is essential to keep in mind that we are dealing here not with abstractions but with ac-

tual military capabilities that are acquired in support of what are perceived as vital national security interests. Consequently, the task of constraining this process—of limiting and reducing arms—cannot be treated as an abstract matter, divorced from strategic and political realities. Diverse military capabilities must be carefully balanced; verification measures must be devised to promote confidence in compliance. Every step of the way, the process is fraught with technical complexities and political sensitivities of an unprecedented nature.

But I can pledge today that the United States will not be deterred or discouraged by these difficulties. While there may be setbacks and delays along the way, we will persevere in the effort to achieve a more secure and peaceful world. We are determined to do so not only because we are formally committed to this endeavor under article VI of the NPT—although we attach great importance to that obligation—we are determined to do so because balanced and verifiable arms control can make a major contribution to the security of the United States and of the entire world.

Finally, we are determined to pursue this objective because there is no rational alternative. As President Carter stated on June 18, 1979, on the occasion of the signing of the SALT II Treaty in Vienna: "If we cannot control the power to destroy, we can neither guide our own fate nor preserve our own future."

Article IV

A third main goal of the NPT is to facilitate the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The United States takes very seriously its undertaking in article IV of the treaty.

Nuclear Power Programs. Since the beginning of 1975, the United States has licensed for export to NPT parties, nuclear power reactors representing a total of 11,000 megawatts of electric generating capacity. In the same period, we have licensed for export to such parties over 9 million kilograms of enriched uranium, having an energy value equivalent to 3 billion barrels of oil. To generate the electric power used to produce this amount of enriched uranium, we have used the equivalent of some 33 million tons of U.S. coal.

During that period we have not denied a single license for the export of power reactor fuel to an NPT party. And most such licenses in the past year were issued within 1 month after receiving the application.

To help NPT parties finance these exports, we have furnished over $3.5 billion of financial assistance to such parties through the Export-Import Bank. In 1978 we reaffirmed our willingness to provide such financial assistance for appropriate nuclear projects in countries that meet our nonproliferation requirements, with preference for NPT parties.

Research and Technology Sharing. Turning to the record on nuclear research, technology sharing, and other nuclear cooperation, we find that:

- All recipients of U.S. research reactors exported in the past 5 years are NPT parties;
- The 17 principal nuclear research and development agreements entered into by the U.S. Department of Energy since 1970 are all with members of the nonproliferation regime, as are all U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission agreements for research in nuclear safety;
- Since the beginning of 1975, over 4,000 persons from 51 NPT countries—representing all regions of the world—have participated in peaceful nuclear research programs of the U.S. Department of Energy or its contractors; and
- In the same period, we have provided over 18½ million separative work units of uranium enrichment services to NPT parties and exported to NPT parties over $80 million worth of isotopes, heavy water, and other nuclear-related materials.

We are in the forefront of all nuclear suppliers in the amount of information we have published on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Since the beginning of 1975 we have contributed over 100,000 abstracts and nearly 40,000 technical reports to the IAEA's international nuclear information service. In the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, we shared our most advanced ideas and research results on reactor improvement and better fuel utilization. And we are making every effort to make available to all, the results of our research on nuclear safety, bearing in mind the significance of Three Mile Island.

Technical Assistance to Developing Countries. We have significantly increased our funding and support for technical assistance to developing countries through the IAEA. Since the beginning of 1975, our voluntary cash contributions to the IAEA's technical assistance program have totaled nearly $11 million. We have also provided over $2 million in the form of training courses. In addition, in keeping with the recommendations of the 1975 review conference, we have earmarked for NPT parties over $2 million of gifts in kind and gifts of special nuclear material totaling $300,000.

At the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, the United States pledged that it would provide increased technical assistance for NPT parties and would provide uranium for use in research reactor fuel and related fuel cycle services. I am pleased to inform the conference that in 1980 the United States increased support of technical assistance provided through the IAEA by 14% over 1979. Included in this support is over $1 million of extra budgetary assistance to 19 NPT countries in the field of nuclear power plant safety, medical and agricultural applications of nuclear science, and in uranium exploration.

In connection with our program to develop fuel substitutes for the highly enriched uranium used in some research and test reactors, the United States has made specific offers to provide nearly $800,000 worth of uranium for use in research reactor fuels to nine NPT countries which might have an interest in collaborating with the United States on research designed to reduce enrichment levels. And more recently, in connection with this same program, the United States has indicated that it is willing to provide additional low enriched uranium without cost to seven NPT countries.

NPT Preferences. In many ways we have reflected the special importance we attach to NPT adherence in decisions upon nuclear cooperation.

- Since 1975, all new U.S. agreements for cooperation have been with NPT parties and all U.S. materials supplied through the IAEA have gone to NPT parties. (In the past year, we have agreed to initiate new cooperation through bilateral agreements with Morocco and Peru and with Malaysia through the IAEA.)
- We recently passed legislation removing the ceilings on low enriched uranium transfers under agreements for cooperation with NPT parties, thereby allowing the supply of additional fuel for power reactor programs

The U.S. and Its Allies: Building Essential Unity

by George S. Vest

Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 15, 1980. Mr. Vest is Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.[1]

It has now been almost 9 months since the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and even longer since Iran descended into chaos. We are moving into a new period of diplomatic activity with the U.N. General Assembly and the intense round of consultations that take place on its margins.

There can be no doubt that we are facing a more complex world in the years ahead. A quick recounting of recent developments indicates that we have moved out of the period which was characterized as detente—a relaxation of tensions between East and West—and into one that will see more chill and more competitiveness in East-West relations; one that will be more uneasy and difficult to manage.

Consider the following:

- The extraordinary growth of Soviet military power beyond purely defensive requirements as we can perceive them;
- Its demonstrated willingness to use this power beyond Soviet borders in Afghanistan—the continued occupation of that previously nonaligned country and the maintenance of an illegitimate regime in Kabul;
- The recent labor crisis in Poland, the uncertain future there, the incalculable effect that its resolution may have on the rest of Eastern Europe, and the impact on relations between the Soviet Union and its neighbors; and
- Continued economic problems in the West: inflation, recession, and the spiraling cost of imported oil.

All these events and issues give us cause to consider how to respond to what lies ahead.

Achieving Common Goals

Within the NATO alliance these developments and others have sparked an unprecedented series of consultations of both a multilateral and bilateral nature. Herein lies the basic strength of the North Atlantic alliance—the opportunities provided for frank exchanges of views on the entire gamut of issues affecting the security of all the allies. This has led to essentially a common assessment of the problems confronting us. There continues to be a clear recognition of the need to pull together to achieve agreed major policy goals. The allies are committed, therefore, to crafting and implementing a rational and equitable division of labor which would respect the special possibilities of each ally.

In working to achieve these objectives, we must be reminded of the democratic diversity which marks the alliance and which often results in differing perspectives being brought into play on crucial issues. The realities of European life, politics, and economics cannot be avoided. The proximity of the Soviet Union, a continental superpower, to our European allies; the greater role of Marxist social theory in the intellectual histories of most countries and the existence of Communist parties in many European countries; the still fresh memory of two World Wars fought on Europe's territory—all of these factors interact to create a strong belief in the need to maintain a dialogue with the Soviet Union and a strong impetus toward arms control and disarmament.

Growing economic and trade relations with the Eastern countries, including, in recent years, an increasing role for Soviet energy supplies, are factors of unquestionable importance to Western Europe which must be weighed in considering measures to meet even a commonly perceived Soviet threat. But finally, and most importantly, the Europeans, conscious of the Soviet military power to their east, place a primary emphasis on being prepared militarily to meet potential direct thrusts by Soviet force.

U.S. Role

When they consider the necessary division of labor, it is natural for them to look to the global superpower, America, to take the largest role in protecting the vital Western interests in areas such as Southwest Asia. Suffice to say that defining concrete actions to meet these threats while meeting the needs of 15 allied democracies has never been, is not, and will not be an easy task. It requires U.S. leadership but also patient, effective consultation and dialogue.

Taking into account these various perspectives, the allies have reached important agreement on a series of defense responses to the Soviet challenge in Afghanistan and to the major buildup of Warsaw Pact military forces.

- They have in most cases taken the difficult economic and political decision of a 3% real annual growth in defense expenditures.
- They have agreed to the Long-Term Defense Program and to steady progress in armaments cooperation and rationalization, standardization, and interoperability of allied equipment.
- They agreed last December on a program of long-range theater nuclear force modernization coupled with arms control negotiations.
- They are cooperating with the United States in several aspects to increase Western security in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia area.
- They have agreed to speed up modernization of NATO conventional forces in Europe and pick up more of the slack caused by redeployment of U.S. forces elsewhere.

While seeking to redress the military balance, at the same time, we and our allies continue to express a willingness to pursue arms limitations negotiations with the Soviets as being in the best security interests of the alliance and contributing to world peace and stability. Afghanistan has made arms control more difficult; it has delayed the ratification of SALT II. We have made it clear to our allies that we remain committed to its ratification and to the maintenance of the arms control negotiating process. Through the course of our response to the Soviet military intervention, we have made clear, to friend and foe alike, that the purpose of a firm, measured Western response was to preserve the possibilities for eventually returning to sound relations when the Soviet Union demonstrated a readiness to act with restraint. This will require patience on the part of all of us.

We recognize that the structure of East-West relations, built up with difficulty over past decades, has evolved slowly but surely to bring daily benefits to the people of Europe. We are committed to preserving this structure. For example, the U.S. delegation led by Ambassador Max Kampelman is presently in Madrid participating in a

conference to prepare procedures for the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] followup meeting which is to take place in November. At this major conference in November we are also prepared to do our part to work for a constructive outcome—one which would produce measures designed to improve the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and thus enhance real security and cooperation in Europe. In our view this can be achieved only through maintenance of a proper balance in the treatment of human rights and security issues at the Madrid meeting.

Conclusion

Through these and other efforts, we are sending a message to the Soviets that the alliance remains united against the threat posed by actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere, while at the same time preserving that structure of East-West relations which we find useful for facilitating a return to better relations. Such a return is vital to all.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

21st Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, SEPT. 21, 1980[1]

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the following report on progress made during the past 60 days toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem.

Intercommunal talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots resumed in Nicosia on August 9 under the auspices of Ambassador Hugo Gobbi, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General on Cyprus. At the August 9 session, Ambassador Gobbi read a statement outlining the Secretary General's understanding of the common ground between the parties and the matters which will be discussed in the negotiations. (A copy of the opening statement is attached.)

The parties agreed to meet on a weekly basis with the following major subjects to be dealt with in rotation:

(A) Reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices;

(B) Initial practical measures to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and normal conditions;

(C) Constitutional aspects;

(D) Territorial aspects.

The first substantive meeting was held September 16 to address the issue of Varosha. The meeting was characterized as having been a good beginning on this issue. The negotiations will return to this topic after having dealt in turn with the other three major subjects noted above in weekly sessions. The next meeting will take place on September 24.

I welcome the resumption of the Cyprus intercommunal talks. The painstaking efforts of the Secretary General and United Nations' Secretariat officials are to be commended. We hope that the resumed talks will be conducted on a serious, sustained and productive basis and will lead to a just and lasting settlement of all outstanding issues.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

OPENING STATEMENT AT INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

BY AMBASSADOR HUGO GOBBI

August 9, 1980

I note that both parties have indicated their readiness to resume the intercommunal talks, which were recessed in consultation with the parties on 22 June 1979, and to do so within the framework of the good offices mission entrusted to me by the Security Council and on the basis of the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979.

Both parties have, in this regard, signified their intention to carry out the resumed talks in a continuing and sustained manner, to get down to concrete negotiations, discussing constructively, and giving full consideration to, all aspects of the Cyprus problem.

In this connection, I should like to outline the Secretary General's understanding of the common ground that was worked out in the course of consultations which took place over the past several months:

(A) Both parties have reaffirmed the validity of the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979;

(B) Both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federal solution of the constitutional aspect and a bizonal solution of the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem;

(C) Both parties have indicated that the matter of security can be raised and discussed in the intercommunal talks. It is understood that this matter will be discussed, having regard to certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community, as well as to the security of Cyprus as a whole;

(D) Both parties have appealed to the Secretary General for the continuation of the intercommunal talks.

The practical implementation of the concepts in (B) and (C) above will be dealt with in the context of the substantive consideration of the constitutional and territorial aspects and will be reflected in the substantive positions and proposals of the parties concerning the various items of the agenda.

Concerning the matters to be discussed, the Secretary General understands, on the basis of the 19 May agreement, that these will include the following subjects:

(A) Reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices, in accordance with the provisions of point 5 of the 19 May agreement;

(B) Initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions, in accordance with the provisions of point 6, which states that special importance will be given to this matter;

(C) Constitutional aspects;

(D) Territorial aspects.

Concerning procedure, it is understood that the four items above should be dealt with concurrently in rotation at consecutive meetings. At an appropriate early stage, committees or working groups will be set up by the interlocutors.

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[1] Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 29, 1980). ■

I discussed with the President and with the Secretary of State what my thoughts are about how we proceed, but I am in charge; I have undertaken responsibility for formulation of the document, for the timing of its presentation, for the effort to amplify it, and for the decision to put it before the parties—all this with the knowledge and approval of the President and the Secretary.

Q. You said that President Sadat, as well as Mr. Begin, recognized the danger of war, and this prompted them to resume the negotiations.

War between who and who? Between Egypt and Israel, or between Israel and its neighbors, or between Israel and the Palestinians?

A. I said war, broadly, because you know, every bit as well as I, that in the explosive part of the world, it doesn't take very much to set off violence. Violence in turn begets further violence, and we don't know when something erupts with enough intensity so it becomes a Middle East shooting war and then involves the possibility of a worldwide conflagration.

We have seen enough already—for example, on the West Bank—about the dangers of shooting and killing. We've seen it in Lebanon, we've seen it in other places, and we know that what we have there is a dangerous situation for the world.

But the issue is war and peace, not only in that part of the world but even more broadly. And I think it's a very sobering, serious awareness of that which led President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to feel that they must put aside whatever minor skirmishes they have had on issues and focus on their major goals as statesmen: How can we move toward peace; how can we negotiate; how can we resolve this issue in a manner that will lower the temperature and lessen the danger of an outbreak?

Q. Would the purpose of the summit be to complete this interim agreement, or would you have to complete the interim agreement before you would go to the summit? Would that be preferable?

A. Again, I don't know how to answer that because what we're going to try to do is move with this interim agreement as best we can in the course of our negotiations.

I don't know where it will stand at the end of 3 weeks or 4 or a month or so. I don't know what the right time might be for approval of it and issuance.

All I am saying is that it is now the next step, and, by the way—maybe worth underlining—one of the reasons I personally think that there is perhaps a better prospect for advancing negotiations now—when we get back to the negotiating table—than there would have been a few months ago is because we now have a document, such as this one, on which to focus our attention and to see what progress we can make in resolving the disputes.

Q. Let me go back to my basic question, which is the war. So now we expect to see a lower temperature in the area and the ceasing of the Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon and the dangers of outbreak on that side. Am I correct in my understanding or—

A. I didn't say that.

Q. So how, then, does the resumption of negotiations affect the outcome of war and peace?

A. Let's wait and see.

Q. You said we're talking about autonomy, and autonomy had been designed for the Palestinians—the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Up to now those people had been refusing this outfit, this dress, they want different ones.

Have you through your visit—recent visit to that part of the world—come out with the sort of feeling that they might accept whatever you're preparing for them? Do you have more chances now that they're going to accept, or are we going to witness a continuation of the refusal of what you have been designing?

A. I can't say to you that I know with certainty what the reaction will be. I can tell you that we have some reason to believe that, if we are able to make progress—substantive progress in the negotiations—the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are going to be very interested and are going to look at it carefully.

Whether this will be enough to attract their participation, I don't know. But we are cognizant of the fact that what we are doing is negotiating a document which should be, must be, attractive to the Palestinians to be effective. Therefore, we have that very much in mind, hindered as we are by the absence of the Palestinians, themselves, from our negotiating table.

Q. You have said that actions which focused a lot of publicity on Jerusalem are disruptive and that the settlement issue is also a factor which makes the autonomy talks difficult. You have exchanged impressions between the two presidents on the subject.

Can you say whether the resumption of the autonomy talks is based now on a clear understanding that there should be no innovation on Jerusalem and on the settlements issues?

A. No innovation?

Q. No new changes. None of these factors that are disruptive.

A. I am going to repeat again: I can't tell you that I got firm assurances.

Q. Could you go through the timing of this interim agreement one more time? Did you have this in hand on this trip, or is this something you put together as a result of your latest round of discussions with Sadat and Begin?

A. The interim agreement?

Q. Yes.

A. Most of it I had in hand when I left, as a document which we would put forward if there were encouragement on the earlier, shorter document and if the results of our separate conversations led us to believe there might be a welcome for this.

I think I've said before, in your presence, that I've tried to be very careful not to appear to come with an American plan; therefore, I felt it only appropriate to put this forward when this was welcomed and we were encouraged to do it and when I was able to give it to them with the knowledge that they would read it carefully and would regard this as a helpful contribution.

Q. When did they accept the earlier plan?

A. Received it, rather than "accept it." I want to be sure you—

Q. Right.

A. Yes. They received it about 3 or 4 weeks ago, I would say.

Q. There had been reports from Israel that four more settlements are going to be approved tomorrow at the Cabinet.

Did the Prime Minister of Israel inform you of this, and do you think

if they go ahead with it, that will help the constructive atmosphere you have been trying to create? Has he told you that they plan to build four more settlements near Hebron?

A. Yes. I knew it, and I discussed this with him at length. I conveyed the substance of that discussion. I think that's all I ought to say.

Q. You've sketched a scenario in which we're going to have—the talks are going to increase in intensity, perhaps climaxing a week or two before the election, and then the sort of unfortunate interruption of the election before Mr. Begin comes here and the summit is held.

Do you interpret, yourself, the agreement of Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat to this process as a vote of confidence in your work and in the Carter Administration?

A. I think I interpret it as an affirmation of their strong commitment to negotiation, of their reaffirmation of their strong confidence that the way to peace is through the Camp David process, and that it is the only viable path toward that peace.

It's not a matter of vote of confidence in a person or in a particular government; it is unquestionably true, because both of them have asserted to me their deep appreciation to the President for the part he had played at Camp David and for his continued commitment to the process.

But I would not want to put it in personal terms. I think neither of these men would have undertaken this statement and undertaken these commitments if he did not believe that move was in the best interests of his own country and in the interests of peace. And that's why I think they did it. ■

Prospects for Middle East Peace

by Sol M. Linowitz

Address before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., on September 18, 1980. Ambassador Linowitz is Personal Representative of the President to the Middle East Peace Negotiations.

Just 2 years ago yesterday an event took place which was as dramatic as it was historic. After 13 days of arduous and intensive negotiations, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menahem Begin of Israel, having met with President Carter at Camp David, announced to the world that they had reached agreement on the so-called Camp David framework for Middle East peace. In a moving ceremony at the White House, the Camp David accords were signed, and a new chapter in the history of the Middle East was opened.

Today I want to talk with you about where that process stands 2 years later. I want to report to you on my recent discussions with Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat and to affirm to you that the Camp David peace process has managed to survive its premature obituaries and is once again moving forward.

Before discussing with you details of my recent trip and our current negotiating efforts, I would like to focus on some of the most significant elements of the present situation--elements that give us reason for hope that the way to comprehensive peace in the Middle East will yet be found.

Elements of the Present Situation

First, there is today a growing global awareness of the stakes involved in peace in the Middle East. It is trite, but undeniably true, that the greatest impetus for peace is the constant danger of war. And the stark fact is that another Middle East war would invite global disaster.

Our own unrelenting efforts for peace between Israel and its neighbors proceed from an unshakable commitment to the security of Israel and a recognition that Israel's long-term security is best assured by the achievement of a stable peace throughout the region. Moreover, our work for peace in the Middle East is an essential element of our strategy for maintaining and defending our vital interests in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf.

Clearly, the strategic importance of this region has never been greater. It is equally manifest that the threats to peace in the region have multiplied as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And the danger that the spark of local conflict could ingite a major conflagration has never been more serious. So today the world understands, perhaps better than ever before, the vital significance of finding the way to peace in the Middle East.

The United States, Israel, the Arab states, our allies outside the Middle East —all have a strategic interest in a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. And each of us can find in peace the possibilities of bountiful new progress—in our relations with one another, in our economies, in our efforts toward the resolution of disputes in other areas.

Second, there is reason for hope and satisfaction in what has already been accomplished in the search for the Middle East peace. For over 30 years, the Arab-Israel conflict provided fertile ground for the congenital nay-sayers and the traditional prophets of doom. Except for such historic moments as the visit of President Sadat to Jerusalem or the signing of the Camp David accords, the problems always loomed larger than the possibilities. Yet the most important fact is that since Camp David there has been very significant progress.

We have only to think back to the situation in 1947—or 1967—or even 1977 and compare it with the situation now.

- Then there was a formal state of war and, on occasion, its terrible reality. Now we have a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.
- Then there was a gulf of hostility and distrust and suspicion. Now there is real and evident determination in both Egypt and Israel to find a larger peace.
- Then the mechanism for achieving a peaceful settlement did not exist. Now it does in the Camp David process.

The treaty between Egypt and Israel marks a peace without victor or vanquished, entered into by two nations determined to reject a legacy of hostility and warfare. The terms of the Peace Treaty have been scrupulously followed. Israel has given up on schedule not only most of the Sinai—won and defended at such cost in blood—but also the Alma oil fields from which it had derived the majority of its energy needs. Egypt, for

these various sanctions were in place when the Iraq-Iran war emerged was, in effect, to tilt in the direction of Iraq.

If these sanctions had not been in place, Iran would not have been as vulnerable to the Iraqi attack as it was with the sanctions in place. Yet, nobody has accused us of tilting against Iran by maintaining the sanctions. It seems to me that one needs to put the two problems in perspective. What is involved is not the opening of a new military supply line, in any case. What is involved is undoing what we did—if spare parts are indeed involved in the Iranian proposal—and doing what we did months before the Iraq-Iran war began.

Q. But if we send any military equipment to Iran in the middle of a war, we will find ourselves in an unholy alliance with Iran, Syria, Libya, and North Korea, against our traditional friends in the Persian Gulf, and even against our own planes that are protecting Saudi Arabia. How can we possibly rationalize that?

A. What I just said to you is this; that by withholding months before this war, spare parts that belong to Iran, we put them in a vulnerable position with respect to Iraq. So, you know, you have to put it in that perspective. At this point we don't know whether or to what extent that may be an issue in what the Majlis has done. But I think that if that issue arises, as we examine their proposal, that we need to put it in the context which I have suggested and not the other context which assumes that we should have known that the Iraq-Iran war was coming, and that, therefore, whatever actions we took—releasing the frozen assets, billions of dollars—strengthens Iran's position in this war. I can't see making these 52 people hostages not to Iran but to Iraq's war aims.

Q. One senior official has suggested that we might be prepared to send weapons but nonlethal weapons only. Is that a distinction which we may draw?

A. It's been drawn, as Secretary Kissinger has pointed out earlier in this program.

Q. On other occasions?

A. Yes.

Q. Might it be brought out on this one?

A. We exclude no possibilities. That doesn't mean that we include them all, until we know what we are dealing with.

Q. I would like to ask another question now about the possible release of the hostages. Let me use one of those horrible diplomatic words—modalities. How do you now go about negotiating what you and the Iranians still have to resolve?

A. There are indirect channels available to us that we've been using for months, as I pointed out.

Q. Do you still have to reply on those, sir?

A. We may or we may not. I indicated in my letter to Prime Minister Rajai at the time of his selection that we would be glad to deal with him directly or indirectly, whatever suited their purpose. The Majlis, presumably, directed the executive to make an official translation of the Majlis action available to us. That would seem to presume a direct contact. If in fact it is a direct contact, I would assume that we would respond in the same way.

Q. Forget about whether it is or is not; would this not seem an appropriate time for the United States to make a direct contact? It almost seems irrelevant to be arguing now about whether there should be direct contact or whether we still need to go through third parties. Would you not, personally, prefer that it be direct at this point? Wouldn't that make it easier, clearer, simpler?

A. It would make it easier for us. Whether it would for them is yet to be determined. What you're asking is, shouldn't we answer their message before we get it? That's what you seem to be suggesting.

Q. No, what I'm asking is—

A. There is no requirement for determining the nature of the contact until we've got the message.

Q. Perhaps I could put it this way: On your schedule right now is a trip to Latin America, which I believe you are supposed to start on Wednesday. Is it possible that you will postpone that trip so that you could be available to participate in some kind of direct contacts with Iran?

A. Of course, that's possible.

Q. Is it likely?

A. Again, you're asking me to try to predict a timeframe. I think the odds are that it is likely.

Q. Would you participate in negotiations personally in some other place, other than Washington?

A. That depends on whether there are negotiations.

Q. What role is the United Nations playing at the moment, or what role would the United States like it to play?

A. The United Nations has indicated a willingness to play any role which would be useful to us. I talked to Mr. Waldheim this morning, and he reported to us the situation in Tehran as he had learned it through his representative there, and he indicated every willingness to be useful in any way that might serve our interests.

Q. I think there is a voracious hunger by the American public to know as much as possible, understandably. Could you just take us through the night? How did the news reach you? How did the news reach the President? In what form did the news reach you? Through whom?

A. We have been watching the developments in Iran through many eyes for months, and, of course, the wire services are available to us. When the Majlis assembled, about 1:00 a.m. our time, it was clear that a quorum was going to be present, unlike 2 or 3 days ago, and so we knew that there was going to be some kind of action. Whether or not they would resolve the issues today wasn't necessarily assured from our perspective at the beginning. I think it was about 4:00 or 4:30 a.m. that the news of the vote came to us and the first news about the content of what the Majlis had done came to us.

The President was called, I think, within 15 minutes of that time so that he would know what had taken place, and within a few minutes, made the decision to come back to Washington—left Chicago sometime between 6:00 and 6:30 this morning. We assembled in the Cabinet room about 8:00 at his arrival and were in session together until shortly after 10:00, when I had to get ready for appearance on this show.

We had to put in motion certain decisions that were taken, and we are to meet again at 2:00 this afternoon in the Cabinet room.

Q. Will there be any direct contact with those three Ambassadors—the Algerian, the Syrian, and the Libyan? Are they playing a useful role?

A. I'm not sure that we've gotten to those three specifically today, but we are establishing contact with every useful channel that we have used over the past few months, to get whatever supplementary information, or even analytical in-

Secretary Muskie's News Conference of November 1

Q. Can you bring us up to date on the hostage crisis? When do you expect to see it end and do you expect to see it end soon?

A. With respect to the first part of the question, I have no basis upon which to set a timeframe for a final resolution of the hostage question. Perhaps it might be useful if I were to briefly review the nature of our efforts up to this point, and in the context of that review, try to answer your questions. I have been hit with questions on the run—on the road so many times—and have not succeeded apparently in putting it in perspective.

Our efforts have been directed toward three circumstances which we regarded as essential to a final resolution of the problem.

• First, to contribute to a growing awareness on the part of the Iranians that it is in their interest to put the hostage issue behind them. The actions that we took almost a year ago were part of that effort: the freezing of assets, trade sanctions, and so on; the resolutions adopted by several international institutions including the actions taken by the United Nations, the World Court, the Islamic conference, and so on; and then with respect to diplomatic initiatives through all of the various channels to which I've referred before by which we could get messages to the Iranian people from their natural trading partners, from other countries; to develop that sense of isolation which we think is essential—economic isolation, diplomatic isolation, and so on, that we think is essential to the development of that awareness on the part of the Iranians.

• Secondly, we learned rather early on that they would have to develop political institutions, governmental institutions with authority and responsibility, before we could hope to have a decision on the hostage question, and we have seen those institutions develop. A parliament has been put in place. It has been elected by a good turnout of Iranian voters; a prime minister selected, court put in place, and so on, so now that circumstance has been realized.

• Then, finally, the question of how we get the hostages out and on what terms, that is the stage at which we now find ourselves. There has been and is a growing awareness on the part of the Iranians, including Iranian leaders in all segments of their political environment—a growing indication that it is in Iran's interest to get the issue behind them. We get statements of that kind every day; we read them in our press now, in addition to getting them in reports through the various channels through which we try to communicate.

Now that the Majlis [Parliament] is engaged in the process of answering that question, how do we get them out, on what terms? Until they decide what terms they think are in their interest, it is difficult for us to respond to those terms. We have tried to prepare ourselves to deal with whatever terms they may propose; and it is no secret what the range of options is. I mean, the first range of options is the actions we took in retaliation to the seizure of the hostages.

Another range of options is found in the various statements made by Iranians over these past months as to conditions that one or more of them think indispensable. Khomeini is perhaps at the top of the list because he is the supreme authority in Iran, so his four-point proposal of 2 or 3 months ago is one that we've looked at and undertook to analyze and prepare ourselves to deal with.

There have been others, and there may be some surprises because, for the first time, the Majlis has been dealing with it—they have been dealing with it in secret—and we don't really know what they may propose if they take a decision tomorrow. So when you speak about a timeframe, one must take into account how long it will take for the Majlis to reach a decision; whether or not the boycott of the Majlis meeting will continue, and that's hard to read from where we are. It may very well be that they will have a quorum tomorrow and then start debating.

Secondly, it may take them as long to debate an issue as it takes our Congress to debate issues from time to time, so we don't know how long that will take. Then, presumably, that debate will conclude with a decision on terms. And then we will have to evaluate those terms, whether we are prepared to meet those terms in the light of preparation that I have already described, or whether or not they will require further consideration and even negotiation with the Iranians. That could be a very time-consuming process, going through what is not yet finished in the process. It could be, depending upon what they are prepared to suggest to us.

Q. On that point of the conditions, the other night in the debate, President Carter said the United States would be prepared, and is prepared, to send those arms which Iran has already bought and paid for. Is that not inconsistent with our other policy which is that we don't send arms to countries which support terrorism, since the taking of the hostages, I think, has been defined as an act of terrorism by this government?

A. I don't think it is useful to discuss possible terms. We don't know what the Majlis is going to propose. There are some of them who have said that they would not trade their freedom for spare parts. If they released the hostages, they would reject the notion of spare parts. Others have said that the spare parts ought to be part of the deal. Until we get their proposal, I'm not inclined to try to shape their proposal by speculation on what we may or may not do.

What the President was saying in effect is that these are two steps that we took almost a year ago when the hostages were seized, and we're prepared to undo what we did in retaliation—that's the general proposition. But with respect to the details, I think we are better off responding when we know what we have to deal with.

Q. I was going to ask you to peer into your crystal ball, and have a look at Poland, but your exposition of the Iranian situation, I think, calls for at least one question. Are you suggesting the arms question has always been an open question—but I thought the President had dealt straight out and resolved the question of lifting the sanctions. In other words, I thought it was a simple matter, that if the hostages were freed, the sanctions would be lifted. You are speaking of our seeing what they do before we really decide

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formation that we could get with respect to what the Majlis has done.

We do that every day, as a matter of fact. Our Iran watch group operates on a 24-hour basis and has since the taking of the hostages, so that every morning, predating this, whenever I'm up, there is a report at my home of what has taken place in Iran the day which is just ending in Iran.

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[1] Press release 292.
[2] Press release 313. ■

security, we have established a cooperative relationship with Somalia in addition to those with Oman and Kenya. Our analysis of the many factors at work leads us to the firm conclusion that there are substantial benefits to the United States of this closer relationship with Somalia.

Facilities in Somalia are an important part of the network we have planned, primarily because of their location and their capability. I would simply suggest that you will grasp the essentials of the Somali situation if you look at the location of other facilities to which we have access and the distances between them—and between them and areas of potential concern. You can see that Somalia occupies an important position; Somalia is also strategically located along our two most important sea lanes into the Persian Gulf area. Clearly then the Somalia facilities, properly utilized, can play a pivotal role.

Capabilities are as important as location. We are primarily interested in access to facilities at Berbera and, to a lesser extent, to those at Mogadishu, and the recently concluded access agreement provides for our use of those Somali facilities. At Berbera, there are an airfield and a sheltered port already in existence. With relatively limited improvements, permitted by our agreement with Somalia, they will be quite adequate for our needs.

A second element of the relationship involves economic and security assistance to Somalia. Somalia is one of the world's poorest nations, with a per capita income of less than $100 annually. We are aware of the many problems which face Somalia's economy, including a need for improving agricultural productivity and meeting short-term balance-of-payments difficulties. To help meet these needs, we have told the Somalis that we will seek nearly $53 million for development assistance over the next 2 years and $5 million in economic support fund (ESF) assistance.

Somalia's problems are, as you know, compounded by a massive influx of refugees. The government has taken some 750,000 destitute inhabitants of the Ogaden region into refugee camps, and we estimate that an equal number of refugees remains outside of the camps. Most of these are women and children fleeing the fighting between Somalis and Ethiopians in the Ogaden. We have provided about $50 million in emergency refugee assistance this year to help alleviate this tragedy, and we have also encouraged other donors, public and private, to assist in meeting the humanitarian needs of these unfortunate people.

Finally, the third major element in our relationship is based on our recognition that Somalia has a legitimate right to provide for its own defense. We will soon discuss with the Somali Government the type of military equipment they will acquire with the limited loan funds we hope to have available through reprograming. I can assure this subcommittee that we will scrutinize their requests carefully to insure both their suitability to Somali defense needs and the appropriateness of the equipment and services requested for defensive purposes.

We have informed the Somalis of our intention to seek $20 million in FMS credits in each of FY 1980 and 1981 to enable them to purchase from us defensive weapons and equipment.

We have transmitted a formal reprograming notice to the Congress for FMS financing in FY 1980. We have also informed the Somalis that we will provide $5 million in ESF funds and $300,000 in international military education and training in 1981. We have informed the Congress that we will be reprograming $5 million in ESF funds this fiscal year to cover the transportation costs of 60,000 metric tons of grain provided under PL 480 to help overcome serious shortages that currently exist in Somalia.

It is appropriate to review the agreement which we have concluded with Somalia in the context of the situation in the Horn of Africa, and I would like to present to the subcommittee a brief survey of recent events there and our role in them.

Recent Events in the Horn of Africa

Bitter tensions have existed in the Horn of Africa for a very long time indeed. They are rooted in intense nationalism, differing interpretations of history, and centuries-old religious and

Nigerian President Visits U.S.

President Alhaji Shehu Shagari of Nigeria made an official visit to Washington, D.C., October 7–8, 1980, to meet with President Carter and other government officials. Following is the White House statement issued on October 7.[1]

President Carter and President Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the Federal Republic of Nigeria met this morning at the White House for a comprehensive and cordial discussion of bilateral and international issues of mutual concern.[2]

In reviewing bilateral relations, the Presidents discussed the U.S.-Nigerian Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee, which was established as a result of the fifth bilateral economic talks in Lagos in July 1980. President Shagari will meet tomorrow, October 8, with the American members of this committee, which was created to encourage joint investment in Nigerian agriculture. Both Presidents expressed satisfaction with the progress in this field and reaffirmed their commitment to promote further extensive agricultural cooperation. In addition, they explored other means of diversifying and strengthening bilateral relations in trade, investment, science, and technology.

President Carter and President Shagari also discussed priority items in African and international affairs, with particular attention to the hostilities in the Sahara and the continuing effort to bring about a peaceful transfer of power to majority rule in Namibia and South Africa, as well as the impact of events in the Middle East.

President Shagari and President Carter

(White House photo)

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 13, 1980, which also carries the texts of the two Presidents' remarks made at the welcoming ceremony on Oct. 7 and their dinner toasts that evening.

[2] List of other officials attending the meeting is not printed here. ■

ethnic rivalries. These factors took a more tangible form during the last quarter of the 19th century. In the Somali view of the history of the region, Ethiopia acquired the Ogaden at that time as the traditional Somali homeland was being divided up by the major European powers, principally Britain, France, and Italy. Given the fact that the majority of Ogadeni people are ethnic Somalis, the Somali concept of nationhood embraces them and rests on the argument that the process of decolonization and self-determination should apply to the Ogaden as well as to the former European colonies. In contrast, the Ethiopian concept of the nation rests on territorial boundaries—a principle firmly established in international law and endorsed by the Organization of African Unity in its opposition to altering internationally recognized borders by any but peaceful means, regardless of the colonial origin of such borders.

U.S. views on the contradictory claims by Somalia and Ethiopia are clear. We believe the issue should be resolved peacefully by the parties. We have never wavered in our support for the sovercignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia, and we oppose the introduction of Somali military forces into territory outside Somalia's internationally recognized borders. We are willing to utilize our diplomacy in efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the problem.

Let us then, given this historical context, review quickly U.S. relations with Somalia in recent years. In mid-1977, as you know, the Soviet Union was well established in Somalia, as it had been since 1969 when the present Somali Government came to power. Although U.S. relations with Somalia were then minimal, the Siad government approached the United States with a formal request for military aid. The United States in return informed the Somalis that we were agreeable "in principle" to help Somalia meet its defensive military needs.

There the matter stood in July 1977, when the Somalis launched an attack in the Ogaden and sent in regular Somali military units to aid the Western Somali Liberation Front. Discussions with Somali officials regarding U.S. military assistance were not pursued.

Then in November 1977, President Siad abrogated the Somali friendship treaty with the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union promptly began a massive airlift into Ethiopia, bringing in more than $1 billion of military equipment and nearly 20,000 Cuban combat troops in the course of the ensuing year. By March 1978, the Somali forces in the Ogaden had been effectively defeated.

We believed it necessary, in these circumstances, to avoid being drawn into a pattern of response and reaction to the ups and downs of Somalia's intermittent strife with Ethiopia and to build a long-term policy which recognized the key fact that Somalia had broken with the Soviets. I believe we can show that, in practice, this policy has been prudent and responsible. We have paid very special attention to the political issues involved to insure that the Somali leadership and Somalia's neighbors understand clearly that our military cooperation is for the purpose of strengthening Somalia's defense capability and not directed at Ethiopia or any other neighbor of Somali.

In March 1978, after Somali regular units withdrew from the Ogaden under Ethiopian and Cuban military pressure, we sent an emissary to President Siad to discuss the question of U.S. defensive assistance. We told the Somalis that we would consider supplying defensive equipment but only following assurances from the Somali Government that it would not use force against any country nor permit equipment supplied by the United States to be used for any purposes other than preserving internal security and for the defense of the internationally recognized territory of Somalia. Such assurances were provided, but it again proved impossible to agree on the specifics of the defensive arms that the United States might supply.

In 1979, however, in view of the challenge posed by the growing Soviet presence and regional tensions, the President decided to seek U.S. access to military facilities in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. An agreement with Somalia was concluded on August 22, 1980, allowing our military forces increased access to port and airfield facilities in Somalia.

In developing this new relationship, we have been alert to take every advantage of our new association with the Somalis to urge moderation in the Ogaden and to promote a peaceful resolution of Somalia's dispute with Ethiopia. In this regard, negotiations on the agreement provided an occasion for frank discussions between them and ourselves on this specific issue. We have carefully pointed out to the Somalis, both orally and in writing, that we are opposed to the presence of regular Somali forces in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. They were informed that such activities could jeopardize our cooperative relationship. We also reviewed for them the conditions imposed by law on the provision of security assistance.

For their part, senior Somali officials have acknowledged our concerns and have declared that it is the policy of the Somali Government to avoid the presence of any Somali units in the Ogaden. They have also provided written and oral assurances of their intention to comply with the conditions imposed by law on our military supply relationship with Somalia. During our recently completed negotiations the written assurances to this effect given by the Government of Somalia in 1978 were explicitly reaffirmed.

We take the Somali assurances seriously. I believe that they represent, first, a net gain over the situation which pertained prior to our discussions with Somalia, and second, that they are a token of the further progress which we believe could be made as a result of our relationship with Somalia. We certainly intend to take them in a positive sense and to do what we can to reduce tension in the Horn and improve the prospect of a political settlement. Moreover, we will continue to assess our relationship, seeking opportunities to promote a peaceful resolution of differences. At the same time, it is important not to lose sight of the compelling reasons that brought us to the decision in the first place. Those reasons involve important aspects of U.S. national security, given the importance of the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region and the heightened Soviet activities there.

We should also bear in mind, as I suggested earlier, that the judgment of cost and benefit must be applied to a decision *not* to take advantage of those facilities whose use is part and parcel of the relationship we seek to develolp with Somalia. We have all seen how, in crisis and in conflict, foresight and planning can make the difference between success and failure. I will not sketch for you today any of the possible scenarios that might involve the use of U.S. forces, or positioning of U.S. forces, to secure or defend our interests and those of friendly countries in the critical area of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. You can imagine as well as I how such a scenario might develop. What is clear, though, is that if and when a crisis develops, there will not likely be time or opportunity to provide ourselves with the facilities we may desperately need. We will have to rely on what we have

to such states without amending such agreements.

• Our laws governing participation in international financing institutions instruct the U.S. representatives to consider, in carrying out their duties, whether the recipient country is a party to the NPT.

• We have recently made available to NPT parties that meet our nonproliferation requirements the benefit of multiple reload licensing—under which a single export license covers up to five reloads of reactor fuel over time periods of up to 10 years.

• We have also decided to eliminate the need for individual licensing of exports of components for U.S. supplied reactors in a number of NPT countries and streamlined the licensing procedures for export to NPT parties of dual use items, such as computers.

• We are initiating a program to assist several NPT parties in the manpower training needed for their establishment of a viable nuclear power program.

We recognize that there are some problems still requiring resolution and that new issues may arise as the nuclear industry evolves. Clearly many countries believe that greater confidence and predictability needs to be restored to the field of nuclear trade. But I believe that the facts I have cited underscore the strong continued commitment that the United States has to civil nuclear cooperation and to the participants in the NPT in particular.

Conclusion

I have tried in my statement to point out the many ways in which the United States has been implementing the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to provide our thinking on how well the treaty has operated during its first decade, and especially since the last review conference.

We recognize, of course, that each of us will have somewhat differing assessments of how successfully the treaty's various provisions are being carried out and how rapidly its goals are being realized. This is only natural. With a membership of well over 100 nations, the community of NPT parties cannot possibly reflect anything like an identity of national perspectives on such critical matters as national security and energy needs. We fully expect our deliberations during the next several weeks to reveal this diversity of opinion, and we look forward to a full and animated exchange of views.

At the same time, we should not lose sight of the very strong tie that binds us together as parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Each of the parties to the NPT, in reaching a decision to join the treaty, made its own careful calculation of national self-interest. Each came to the conclusion that its national security interests, as well as its civil nuclear energy goals, were better served by membership in the NPT regime than by avoidance of its obligations—and that those national objectives could be severely jeopardized by the acquisition of nuclear explosives by additional states. These conclusions are more valid today than ever.

We continue, individually and collectively, to have a vital stake in the preservation and strengthening of the NPT regime. Consequently, we all have a common interest in a successful review conference—one that underlines the continuing value of the treaty, that reviews its 10-year record in an objective and balanced way, and that outlines a series of realistic recommendations for strengthening its future operation. Each delegation, I am sure, has its own thoughts on what is needed to strengthen the NPT. But what we need to do in the weeks ahead is to make every effort to forge a common approach, including a practical series of effective recommendations that can and will command the broad support of the parties.

The impact of the first review conference is instructive in this regard. When one looks systematically and fairly at the record of the last 5 years in implementing the consensus recommendations of that conference, I believe the inescapable conclusion is that those recommendations were taken seriously as a program of action and were followed conscientiously. As a result, considerable progress has, indeed, been made. And I would submit that the success of those recommendations in stimulating concrete actions can be attributed in no small degree to the fact that the program of action was realistic and based on consensus.

I have no illusion that the work ahead of us will be easy. But we are confident that, if we all approach our task in a constructive and cooperative spirit and if we keep in mind our strongly shared and overriding interest in an effective NPT regime, we will be able to achieve the outcome I know we

U.S., Canada Agree on Power Plant Monitoring

JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, SEPT. 23, 1980[1]

The United States and Canada have agreed on a cooperative monitoring arrangement for the Poplar River. The arrangement was developed in response to U.S. concerns about possible environmental effects in Montana from the Saskatchewan Power Corporation power plant at Coronach, Saskatchewan.

The arrangement was made public on September 23, 1980, by Montana Lieutenant Governor Ted Schwinden and Saskatchewan Environment Minister Ted Bowerman at a ceremony in Coronach.

The United States and Canadian Federal Governments developed the arrangement in close consultation with the governments of the State of Montana and the Province of Saskatchewan. It provides for the exchange of data collected from the monitoring programs in both countries in the Poplar River area at or near the international boundary. It will also insure that this information is made available in both countries and that any definitive changes in water quality, water quantity, and air quality are detected and reported. Implementation of the arrangement will be carried out by a newly established Poplar River Monitoring Committee.

The arrangement results from recent efforts by both countries to cooperate in assuring that there is no significant environmental impact on the United States from the Saskatchewan Power Corporation project as it goes into operation. The monitoring arrangement will enable both governments to detect at an early stage any unforeseen effects should they occur. It will also help to insure that the mitigation measures being required by the Saskatchewan and Canadian Federal Governments are providing adequate protection.

[1] Press release 268. ■

all seek. We will be able to say that the Non-Proliferation Treaty examined at the second review conference enjoys the continuing support of its parties, is capable of attracting even wider adherence, and can be relied upon in the future as a mainstay of global efforts to reduce the terrible threat of nuclear war.

SEPT. 7, 1980[3]

This conference has fulfilled its purpose of providing the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty an extended opportunity to review together the operation of the treaty and progress toward achieving its objectives. We have all devoted the past 4 weeks to an intensive analysis and exchange of views on these matters.

In this review, there was virtually no criticism of the treaty itself or of its objectives. The parties continue their strong dedication to both and share a common desire to convince states that have not yet joined it to do so. They recognized the value of international safeguards and the importance of achieving full scope safeguards coverage in non-nuclear-weapon states not party to the treaty.

There were, of course, serious concerns expressed at this conference. The first was a strong desire for greater and faster progress toward fulfilling the objectives of article VI, relating to nuclear arms control and disarmament. This is a concern that is broader than the NPT and which is the focus of discussion in many other important fora. One could hardly have expected to settle it here. But the conference did provide useful impetus to the ratification of SALT II, the initiation of SALT III, and completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The other principal concern was over the state of peaceful nuclear cooperation and special attention to the needs of developing countries. On these subjects the conference provided a much needed opportunity to reduce misunderstandings and recommend improvements. Progress was made in this area which should not be ignored simply because it was not reduced to the form of an agreed conference document.

One thing we did not achieve in this period was the completion of a single document that reflected the important discussion and progress I have just described. There were difficulties in reconciling differences over how the various views should be reflected, on how a proper balance could be struck, and on how far the recommendations should go. As did most delegations, the United States demonstrated its willingness to negotiate on the text of a final document and made every effort to arrive at mutually acceptable wording. We regret, however, that a few took extreme positions insisting on an "all-or-nothing approach" which prevented consensus. I think it is obvious that this type of intransigence does not help to advance our common objectives nor does it promote realistic arms control.

But there was nothing in the mandate of the conference that required production of a negotiated document, desirable as that might have been. The actual mandate—which was the review by the parties and consideration of ways in whch the treaty's implementation could be improved—was fulfilled in a manner that we consider constructive.

[1] Text from ACDA arms control report.
[2] For documentation on the first review conference held in Geneva May 5–30, 1975, see BULLETINS of June 30, 1975, p. 921, and Aug. 4, 1975, p. 193.
[3] Text from ACDA arms control bulletin 80–8 of Sept. 8, 1980. ■

U.S. Economic Relations With Japan

by Harry Kopp

Statement before the Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 18, 1980.[1]

Thank you for the opportunity to review with this committee the important matter of our economic relations with Japan, including the automobile problem.

Japan is the most important trading partner of the United States, after Canada. Our bilateral trade last year exceeded $40 billion. While we compete worldwide for markets in many major industrial sectors, we share a common commitment to the maintenance of a trading system in which all may compete fairly and openly. As allies, we have joined together in imposing economic sanctions on the Soviet Union and Iran. Moreover, we cooperate closely in areas of mutual economic concern, such as energy and aid to developing countries.

Japan's External Balance

There is a common misconception about Japan—a persistent view of Japan as a mercantilist supereconomy driven by a relentless quest for export markets around the world while being extremely reluctant to import. Economic trends during the last 2 years belie this perception. Japan's trade surplus, nearly $25 billion only 2 years ago, has been replaced by a trade deficit this year projected at $3.5 billion. Likewise, Japan's current account, in surplus by almost $17 billion in 1978, has deteriorated markedly. It is projected to be in deficit $16.5 billion by the end of the year.

Contributing to this turnabout, first and most obviously, is Japan's nearly complete dependence upon foreign oil for its domestic energy needs. Japan depends on foreign suppliers for 90% of its primary energy requirements. Japan's oil import costs have rapidly risen from $23 billion in 1977 to a projected $63 billion this year. In response, the Japanese Government has established long-term energy security as the highest national priority and has proposed a program to diversify energy sources.

Other factors are of nearly equal importance. Sluggish growth in the world economy has reduced foreign demand for Japanese goods. The appreciation of the yen vis-a-vis the dollar, almost 15% during the last 18 months, makes Japanese exports more expensive. Finally, the Japanese Government has instituted measures to sustain the country's economic performance by stimulating domestic demand rather than encouraging exports, which had been a key source of Japanese economic growth during the last decade. This new policy orientation should result in more consumption by Japanese consumers of both foreign and domestic products.

Bilateral Trade

In our economic relations with Japan, trade is the most volatile element. Frictions sometimes overshadow the fundamental interests our countries share as the world's two largest and most advanced free-market economies. Nevertheless, we have been able for the most part to contain and resolve trade disputes in the context of our common interests.

Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Plans for FY 1981

by Victor H. Palmieri

Statement before the House Judiciary Committee on September 24, 1980. Ambassador Palmieri is U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.[1]

I am pleased to have this opportunity to consult with you on the Administration's proposed plans for refugee admissions and resettlement in FY 1981, as required by the Refugee Act of 1980. I look forward to hearing your views on our refugee programs, which I will transmit to the President for his consideration before he makes his final determination on the level and allocation of refugee admissions for the coming fiscal year.

We have attempted to keep this committee informed on a regular basis of the development of all of our refugee programs, as well as the arrival of undocumented Cubans and Haitians. Nonetheless, this set of consultations, the first under the terms of the Refugee Act covering our plans for an entire fiscal year, provides a convenient means of reviewing the steps we have taken in recent months both to respond to the tumultuous and tragic refugee situations around the world and to implement the spirit of the Refugee Act of 1980.

In the 6 months since the act came into effect and we consulted with this committee on refugee programs for FY 1980, refugee problems have continued to deteriorate on practically every continent, with particularly alarming developments in the Horn of Africa, Pakistan, and along the Kampuchean border in Thailand. At the same time, we faced the unexpected, disorderly, and unsafe arrival of nearly 125,000 Cubans directly on our shores, without the benefit of the overseas screening and processing required by our laws for refugee admissions. In addition, thousands of Haitians have continued to arrive in south Florida in a similar fashion. Both groups have challenged our legal system and strained communities already burdened with the need to care for other illegal aliens, refugees, immigrants, and disadvantaged Americans.

Efforts to respond to this crisis—combined with the planned admission of some 230,000 refugees and support for ever-increasing international relief programs—have tested our resources, our humanitarian commitment, and our patience. Under the circumstances, I feel we as a nation have met the challenge well. However, this is obviously a long-term process with many complex problems to resolve along the way. With continued cooperation from the American public, private voluntary agencies, State and local governments, Federal agencies, and the Congress, I am convinced that the resettlement of refugees here will remain a source of pride and long-term benefit to this country.

Despite the growing refugee challenges we face overseas and at home, we have made progress toward establishing the comprehensive and more equitable system of admitting and assisting refugees that the Refugee Act envisages. As you know, the act eliminates the outmoded ideological and geographic restrictions on refugee admission in past legislation. As a consequence, we are authorized to consider applications for admission of needy refugees wherever they find themselves and regardless of country of origin. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs have worked closely in recent months to develop interim guidelines and provide sufficient personnel in order to extend refugee processing to areas where refugees are likely to apply, while assuring that the requirements of our immigration laws are upheld.

As a result of these efforts, for instance, it is now possible for refugees to apply for admission to the United States from many first-asylum countries in the Middle East and Africa. In the past, few refugees from those areas were able to meet our admission criteria or to travel to Europe for processing at an INS post. As we work up the procedures necessary to implement the Refugee Act, the allocation of our proposed admission numbers is beginning to reflect broader access to refugees in urgent situations around the world.

This year there are significant increases in the numbers allocated for refugees from areas that were essentially ineligible before. We expect that the pattern will continue to change incrementally. But frankly, we do not foresee dramatic changes immediately or an equalizing of numbers for various regions. Our policy remains one of responding to the need for third-country resettlement of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States, rather than an arbitrary system of quotas for regions or ethnic groups. And fortunately, there are areas where millions of refugees whose prospects for voluntary repatriation or local settlement in first-asylum countries eliminate the need for third-country resettlement. In the last year our increasing support for international relief efforts has helped encourage solutions to refugee problems that are often more humane and less costly than resettlement in the United States. And in pursuit of solutions to the fundamental conflicts that give rise to refugee problems, we continue to rely on active diplomacy, economic and security assistance programs, and practical support for progress in human rights.

In the short run, however, we must be realistic about the persistent needs of existing large groups of refugees, the impact of refugee populations on countries of first asylum—particularly in the developing world—and the prospects for further deterioration of refugee situations on every continent.

While strengthening our contribution to immediate humanitarian relief, we are also offering resettlement to refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States who have no other chances of resettlement or voluntary repatriation. We hope that our dual approach will not only relieve human suffering and promote stability in regions of concern but also encourage other countries to do their share in supporting humanitarian relief and providing resettlement opportunities. Today refugee problems are truly international in scope and implication, and their solutions must, therefore, be the product of international cooperation and commitment.

As this committee knows well, we face a serious challenge in trying to strike a balance between overseas refugee assistance and refugee admissions, as well as between foreign and domestic policy concerns. The problem has become even more acute in the last few years, in the face of growing numbers of refugees seeking resettlement in the United States and increasing claims on domestic resources necessary for resettlement. In determining our proposed levels and allocations of refugee admissions for FY 1981, we have carefully considered the specific circumstances in each case, but we have also used some of the following guiding principles.

• We continue to give priority to refugees with close ties to the United States through relatives in this country or past employment with the U.S. Government.

• Where the United States has stood uniquely as a symbol of freedom from oppression for particular groups, we seek to respond to their aspirations for safe haven.

• We are mindful that refugee resettlement efforts can advance broader foreign policy objectives, in particular to promote stability in democratic countries of first asylum.

• We have also taken into consideration the opportunities for resettlement in other countries and the practical limits on U.S. resources.

Refugee Admissions

For FY 1981, we propose to admit to the United States a total of up to 217,000 refugees, including 168,000 Indochinese, 33,000 refugees from the Soviet Union, 4,500 from Eastern Europe, 4,500 from the Near East, 4,000 from Latin America, and 3,000 from Africa. The FY 1981 total is 14,700 fewer admissions than FY 1980.

Indochina. With regard to the Indochinese program, our proposal calls for continuing the 14,000 monthly level President Carter pledged to establish in June 1979. The situation in Southeast Asia continues to be fraught with uncertainty and hardship. There are still approximately 230,000 Indochinese refugees in first-asylum countries, some of whom have been waiting for resettlement offers for more than 5 years. In addition to the very real and pressing humanitarian concerns, the political problems in the region and the need to maintain stability and support the Association of South Eas Asian Nations are in the forefront of our concerns.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In addition, we propose to admit 37,500 refugees from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, areas that have long been of concern to the United States. Emigration from the Soviet Union has, unfortunately, been subject to more stringent controls than usual in the past year, but we expect that the departure rates will rise again this coming year.

Near East. Our proposal for the Near East is set at 4,500. Numbers will be allocated to various groups depending on the emergence of special conditions or needs. Afghans, Iraqi-Assyrians, and Iraqi-Kurds have applied for admission as refugees from this area of the world. In addition, large numbers of people are still fleeing the chaotic conditions in Iran, and while there is not yet a clear pattern of persecution, we are prepared to consider applications for refugees admission on a case-by-case basis.

Latin America. The recommendation for Latin America is for 4,000 refugee admissions, including 2,500 Cubans and 1,500 other Latin American refugees. Approximately one-half of the Cubans would come from Madrid before we terminate that program, and the remainder would be Cubans who have already been processed and who were ready to travel to the United States prior to the mass exodus from Mariel. Our first priority for the Latin American program will be given to political prisoners and their families and to former political prisoners.

The Latin American figure represents the biggest reduction of any of the groups for FY 1981. The FY 1980 proposal was for 20,500, of which 19,500 was to be for Cubans. The reduction reflects the massive influx of Cubans to the United States in contravention of both U.S. law and our guiding principle

U.S. Government Costs of Refugee Assistance, FY 1981 (est.; million US $)

Department of State	
Care and maintenance of refugees abroad	169.0*
Admissions processing	14.75
Transportation to U.S.	132.4
initial reception and placement grants	105.95
Administrative and operational	5.0
Other international programs	105.2
Subtotal	532.3
Department of Health and Human Services	
Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR)	
Cash assistance	269.4
Supplemental security income (state supplementation)	(5.0)
Aid to unaccompanied minors	(4.8)
Medical assistance	139.4
Social services	93.7
State administrative costs	49.6
Educational assistance**	44.3
Voluntary agency program (aid to non-Cuban, non-Indochinese)	26.0
Preventive health	7.8
Center for Disease Control	(3.0)
Health Service Administration	(4.8)
Applicants for asylum	12.0
Federal administration	6.5
Cuban phasedown program	44.8
Subtotal	**693.6**
Aid to families with dependent children	41.0
Supplemental security income (Federal)	17.4
Medicaid	26.5
Subtotal	**84.9**
Department of Agriculture	
Food stamp and other programs	175.0
Department of Education	33.0
Immigration and Naturalization Service	2.5
Agency for International Development	
Food for Peace	87.1
Department of Defense	4.0
Department of Commerce	0.3***
Department of Housing and Urban Development	17.6***
Department of Labor	53.0***
Department of Justice	1.0***
Security clearance	1.5
ACTION	1.5***
Grand Total	**$1,687.3**

*This figure may overstate the cost of care and maintenance for refugees resettled in the U.S. in FY 1981, since it represents U.S. contributions to international and private organizations whose caseloads also include refugees not destined for the U.S. However, in some areas, such as Southeast Asia, the majority of the refugees resettled leave for the U.S., yet third country contributions account for 70% of the UNHCR budget.

**Administered by the Department of Education.

***These figures are based on estimates by Federal agencies as of Feb. 15, 1980. Funding is generally not earmarked specifically for refugees nor is an estimate available of costs for 1981 arrivals v. prior arrivals.

its part, has proceeded to normalize its relations with Israel in the face of the strong, even fierce, reaction of its Arab neighbors and former allies.

Embassies have been opened, ambassadors exchanged. In civil aviation, in agriculture, in tourism, in other areas—Egypt and Israel have signed agreements that will enable their relations to move forward in defiance of their history of antagonism. Today the flag of Israel flies in Egypt and the flag of Egypt flies in Israel.

As important as these achievements are, they are not, in my judgment, the most important result of this new era of peace between two old enemies. More significant are changes of attitudes—on both sides. Everytime I sit down with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin and with my colleagues in these negotiations, I am reminded that these shifts in perception are deep and genuine and permanent. Neither Egypt nor Israel is willing to return to the situation as it was before President Sadat's electrifying initiative in the fall of 1977. Both have set their feet on the road to peace and cooperation. Both understand that there can be no turning back. And both are determined that they will not turn back.

The third reason for hope in these negotiations is the fact that we have launched and are pursuing a practical process for future progress. In saying this I do not in any respect underestimate the immense difficulties before us. By the same token, however, none of us can overlook the opportunities.

Significant as it was, the treaty between Israel and Egypt was not the most far-reaching accomplishment of Camp David. Recognizing the potential vulnerability of their own treaty if left to stand alone, Egypt and Israel committed themselves to work as partners to achieve a comprehensive peace. And they decided that the next logical step toward that broader peace would be an agreement assuring Israel's security and well-being while providing full autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza during a transition period.

These are the negotiations in which we are now engaged—negotiations which for the first time place on the same agenda the security of Israel and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. The agreed objective of these negotiations is to provide for the free election of a self-governing authority by the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza and for transitional arrangements not to exceed 5 years in duration.

No one at Camp David in September 1978 believed that this process would be easy. The Camp David accords call on the negotiating parties to translate the words "full autonomy" from a verbal concept to a practical reality. Never before had there been an attempt to define "full autonomy" in similar circumstances. So it is small wonder that progress has been slow—sometimes agonizingly slow.

But the fact is that there has been progress in the past 2 years—considerable progress. The parties have already agreed upon a very substantial number of powers and responsibilities to be transferred to the self-governing authority. They have also made very significant progress in agreeing on the modalities—the mechanisms—for the free election in which the members of the self-governing authority will be chosen. And both parties remain determined to reach their common goal.

Recent Egyptian-Israeli Agreement

Clear and gratifying proof of that lies in the agreement reached 2 weeks ago between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin—an agreement few anticipated. After my meetings with them earlier this month, Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat authorized me to announce a joint statement of agreement on their behalf. The agreement is short in length but its importance should not be underestimated.

It contains four major points and I would like to focus on them separately.

First, it states: "Both parties are agreed that they are and remain firmly committed to the Camp David accords and process and are convinced that they offer the only viable path toward comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Both are determined to see the process through to a successful conclusion regardless of temporary difficulties that may arise along the way."

All of us involved in the negotiations recognize that we have in the past—and surely will again in the future—encounter temporary difficulties. By the same token, we recognize that frustrations and disappointments are to be expected in these as in any other negotiations. I can assure you that as the President's Personal Representative since last December, I have often felt firsthand that disappointment and frustration.

In recent weeks our frustrations have been intensified by a myriad of external disturbances and disruptions—matters that have diverted attention from the issues actually under negotiation. Such developments as violence on the West Bank, the seemingly endless stream of U.N. resolutions, and the various statements and actions touching on the status of Jerusalem—all have buffeted the negotiating process at the very time the parties have been trying to focus on the most difficult and complex issues. For example, the deeply sensitive issue of Jerusalem suddenly was pushed from the wings onto center stage, bringing with it predictable storm clouds and thunderclaps.

The leaders who met at Camp David knew that the problem of Jerusalem would need time for solution, and they agreed not to try to solve it in the current negotiations. They understood that Jerusalem touches the very souls of hundreds of millions of people—Jews, Muslims, and Christians alike. This is the reason for our belief that the city should remain forever undivided, with free access to the Holy Places for believers of all faiths. Its final status, however, can only be resolved at the right moment, in an atmosphere of deep trust, cooperation, and understanding among all the parties. And that moment has not yet come.

Until it does, there are other important issues to be dealt with. Recognizing this, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have once again committed themselves to the Camp David accords and process as the only—let me repeat only—available path toward comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

Some will say—and indeed some already have—that this is merely a reaffirmation of commitment to an inadequate process. They point out—correctly—that the Camp David accords do not settle the Jerusalem problem; they do not answer Palestinian questions about the final status of the West Bank and Gaza; they do not guarantee permanent Israeli security. Some outside the present negotiations, seduced by the illusion of easy answers and quick solutions, contend that the pace of the negotiations evidences their ineffectiveness and ultimate failure.

But these arguments miss the central point. The genius of the negotiators at Camp David was that they understood that past efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East had failed precisely because they had grasped for too much too soon. They recognized that the issues in this region are so complex, the emotions so deep, the contending forces so many, the stakes so great that the problems defy shortcut solutions. The wisdom of Camp David was to recognize this fact, to understand that bitterness dies hard while trust grows slowly. The key to

Camp David was its recognition that the best hope for enduring peace lay in a phased process—one in which agreements attainable at one stage become building blocks for future progress on more difficult issues.

So by abandoning the quest for comprehensive "breakthroughs," Camp David itself become a breakthrough. By deciding to pursue peace in relatively modest steps, the parties at Camp David took a giant step.

What was sensible then remains sensible today. Our goal remains not dramatic breakthroughs but steady incremental progress.

With full awareness of this, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have now reaffirmed their belief in the soundness of this approach. They have recommitted their countries to see this process through to success.

The second point in the recent agreement between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin was their joint recognition that "for the negotiations to succeed, they must rest on a firm foundation of mutual trust and friendship." Not only did they concur in the statement of principle; they affirmed their intention to act in order to strengthen that foundation during the coming weeks.

The most profoundly disturbing aspect of the period between May and August of this year was the growing rift between Israel and Egypt. Exchanges between them had become increasingly sharp; tensions were exacerbated; and each side began to see in the other's actions and inactions cause to doubt the other's good faith. This deteriorating situation invited the critics and opponents of the Camp David process to intensify their rhetoric and essential negativism.

Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat both recognized the dangers in this situation. Both are aware that their mutual trust and respect and friendship —today as at Camp David—remain the cornerstones for progress. They know that in any negotiation the opposing parties must develop and maintain mutual trust and respect if they are to be able to work together constructively in an effort to bridge their differences and that this is especially true in negotiations such as those in which we are now involved, where the issues are so complex and arouse such strong emotions. Both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat know that to fulfill their continued commitment to the Camp David process, each must be sensitive to the concerns of the other and responsive to the opportunities to reassure the other. And this awareness is already reflected in their very recent actions.

Third, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin agreed to resume the autonomy negotiations at a mutually agreed date. Prior to this agreement, there had been some who doubted whether Egypt or Israel were truly committed to meaningful progress in the coming weeks. Others doubted whether such resumed negotiations could be productive prior to the U.S. elections. The present undertaking to go back to the negotiating table next month indicates the seriousness of the commitment by all parties.

Given the difficulty of the issues with which we are now grappling, there is a natural temptation to seek to avoid coming to grips with the formidable problems. Consider the questions the parties are trying to resolve.

- How can Israel be assured that its security interests will be fully preserved and protected under the new autonomy arrangement?
- How can the water resources of the region best be fairly and equitably shared?
- How should we deal with the public lands in the West Bank and Gaza areas during the 5-year transitional period?
- What powers should be exercised by the self-governing authority during the transitional period, recognizing that the final status of the territories will later have to be determined by agreement among Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians?
- And should the Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem participate in the election of the self-governing authority?

At the direction of President Carter, I made clear in my talks with both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat that the United States is prepared to work intensively and actively with them during the weeks ahead to help them resolve the key issues that still separate the parties. In other words, they are assured that the United States stands ready to play its role as a full partner.

In that spirit of full partnership, I gave both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat a document we had prepared in an effort to help the parties bridge the differences between them. In accepting our document and agreeing to study it, both parties reaffirmed their continuing commitment to serious exchanges on the outstanding issues. And both welcomed the active and substantive participation by the United States.

Finally, in their joint statement, Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat agreed that a summit meeting with President Carter could contribute significantly to the peace process. Accordingly, they agreed to consult about when and where such a summit might be held later this year, and preparations will soon begin to lay the groundwork for the summit.

This recent agreement gives me as a negotiator new reason for hope and even optimism that the way to a broader Middle East peace will one day be found. Indeed, I remain today—2 years after Camp David—convinced that despite the frustrations, anxieties, and disappointments, the prospect of achieving a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between Arabs and Israelis is still better than at any time in the past 30 years.

As a negotiator I cannot allow myself the temptations of impatience or discouragement. Pessimism at this important time does not serve our nation's interests or the interests of peace. It does not serve the interests of those—both Arab and Israeli—who have the most at stake. It holds in cheap regard the historic accomplishments of the leaders of Egypt and Israel. It ignores the overriding fact that seemingly intractable obstacles have been overcome before. And it overlooks the fact that what was considered merely a dream but 2 years ago is today a reality.

Because we care about Israel's security, because we care about a more promising future for the Palestinians, because we care about continued progress for Egypt and Israel and the entire region, and because we understand our strategic interests as well as our moral obligations, we must continue to be resolute in our efforts to fulfill the promise of Camp David.

In the Chinese language, the word crisis is written by combining two symbols—the symbol for the word "danger" and the symbol for the word "opportunity."

In the Middle East, the danger is great and we know it. But the opportunity is also great—and that we also know. At this extraordinary moment in history, we are determined that this opportunity not be lost. ■

what we do. Is there any problem on lifting the sanctions if the hostages are released? Isn't that pretty much a straight-forward reflex action on our part?

A. Obviously, with the passage of time—I think it is obvious, because it has been discussed in the press—our flexibility in dealing with this issue has been somewhat constrained by developments beyond our control. There have been attachments; there have been other developments, and I am not going to go into those in detail. I'm not technically qualified to go into all the technical details. What the President was laying down was a general policy, which to be implemented would require an evaluation of the developments that have taken place since then; that may limit our ability to respond.

Q. I would like to follow that up. One of the legal constraints against acting on what Carter put forward as his negotiating position at the Tuesday debate is Section 3F1 of the Arms Export Control Act. State Department sources now say that the President would waive this restriction against arming terrorist countries, or terrorist-supporting governments, by claiming overriding national security interests.

Could you discuss what the overriding national security interest is in getting the hostages out by election day, and what implication does this definition of national security have for our future credibility in dealing with terrorists, military deterrence, and also the possibility of embroiling ourselves in the anti-Arab side of the gulf war?

A. You see, your question is an excellent demonstration of the reasons why I don't think it is useful to speculate about a proposal which hasn't yet been presented. You've already made judgments about actions we haven't taken, and I don't think that's useful. All you do by that sort of thing is risk stirring up emotions in Iran or stirring up emotions here, and I don't think that's very helpful.

Q. A question about taking action to prepare yourself to meet the conditions that might be imposed by the Iranians, can you describe what preparations have been made?

A. To do that would be to do what I just said I wouldn't do.

Q. Could you tell us whether you have had any informal or formal warning from the Soviet Union that the provision of arms to Iran would be a breach of the neutrality that you have agreed on with the Soviets?

A. No. No, we have not. We have taken no action yet. We have have no proposal yet. Obviously, since we took certain actions in retaliation for the taking of the hostages, there are certain issues, areas, and problems which we expect Iran will ask us to deal with. And until we know specifically what they propose, it's not helpful to try to shape their proposal by responding to hypothetical questions as to how we would respond to hypothetical propositions.

Q. Are you concerned at all that any provision of even spare parts to Iran will be interpreted in the rest of the Arab world—in Saudi Arabia, in Jordan, and in other countries—as an American tilt toward Iran?

A. That's a concern of which we are fully aware, bearing in mind that the hostage crisis and our actions in response to their taking, preceded the Iraq-Iran war by months, and taking into account that from the beginning it was clear that if the Iranians undid what they did, that we would undo what we did, as a general proposition. It seems to me that anyone reacting to whatever we may be asked to deal with and whatever our response may be ought to take that into account.

As I told the Iraqi Foreign Minister, they didn't consult us on the timing of their invasion of Iran, and they were quite aware that we were involved with Iran in this very delicate hostage problem. They weren't deterred by that from following their interests as they perceived them. And we really have to be very careful, of course, about the implications of what we find it possible to do. But, on the other hand, we don't want to put ourselves in the position of making these 52 people hostages to Iraq.

Q. As you evaluate the situation in general now, do you think it will require negotiations with Iran to have the hostages released, or do you think it's possible they might just put all or some of them on an airplane and start shipping them out?

A. We try to evaluate all of those proposals without coming down hard on any of them.

Q. In other words, you're not sure in your own mind that negotiations will be required? You think the other is a possibility?

A. Having dealt with Iran and their leaders for 6 months now, I exclude nothing from the range of possibilities. But that doesn't mean I thank they are possible.

Q. The question is interesting in particular because in, I think, your last news conference in this room, if I remember correctly, you said you thought negotiations would be necessary and made a poirt of the fact that none had been started. I just wondered if your evaluation of that had changed.

A. There are some complicated questions, conceivably. But again, I don't know what the proposal will be. I don't exclude negotiations. I don't state that they are essential. I think that they are a probability because of the complexity of the issues.

Q. The leading Iranian newspaper today had an editorial which advocated releasing the hostages, or at least taking that decision before the American election day, on the grounds that Iran would be able to get better concessions —that's their word--before election day than it would after election day. A similar viewpoint has been expressed, I think, by some political opponents of the President who have been charging, either directly or insinuating, that the President is ready to make a much softer arrangement because of the impending elections.

I don't want to be prolonging this question unduly, but I just want to ask another point: In April, the President did say, when he broke diplomatic relations with Iran, that inventories of Iran's assets were being drawn up as well as American claims, with an aim toward possibly submitting legislation to make Iran pay for the damages it had inflicted upon the hostage families as well as the Embassy. More recently, nobody in the Administration has talked about securing claims from Iran. I just wonder, are those still on the table? And what about the charges about concessions before election day?

A. If that is really the President's objective, his timing isn't very good. It, obviously, would have been much better to get the hostages home 1 week ago, 2 weeks ago, 3 weeks ago, 1 month ago. To wait until the last day is to minimize the prospects. I mean, if we could really control the Majlis, their decisionmaking process, and the time within which they would do it, anybody with an ounce of political brains or instincts wouldn't wait

until the Sunday before the Tuesday of election. I find that an incredible proposition. In a political campaign, I expect anything, responsible or irresponsible.

Our objective has been to get the hostages home and to do it consistent with their safety, their well-being, and consistent with the national interests and national honor. The President has said that from the beginning, and that is the test we are trying to meet. We are not dragging our feet. We have no way of knowing when it will come to fruition, and I certainly am not going to contribute to delay for political reasons. The question of whether or not it is done earlier than later is in the hands of the Iranian Majlis, not us.

Q. The second part of that question—I'm sorry--as to whether the United States would still expect Iran to pay some kind of damages for what it has inflicted on the hostages and on the American Embassy.

A. I think that if you will reread Khomeini's four points, you will see that one of them could conceivably cover that issue, and so I would expect that the Iranian proposal may touch on it either directly or indirectly.

Q. His proposal of course, is that the United States waive all claims and the implication from the statements in the last 2 weeks is that that's agreeable to the United States, and I was just trying to check the guiding factors of the case.

A. I know what you are trying. You're trying to do what several questions have tried to do, to get me into a discussion of the specifics of our response to a proposal we have not yet received.

Q. There is a report out of Paris this morning, saying that the Iranian public will be able to go inside the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on Tuesday at the end of a major nationwide demonstration on the anniversary of the taking of the hostages. Every Iranian will be allowed inside. What's the State Department's reaction to that?

A. It's difficult, one, to characterize the demonstration until it takes place. There's nothing in the story that indicates it's intended to be a violent demonstration or an antihostage demonstration. Secondly, we don't know whether the hostages are in the Embassy, so that that's a question.

So we have the same questions and concerns about the welfare and well-being of the hostages. We'd like to know more about it; we don't. I can't conceive that if the Majlis is debating a proposal to submit to us for the purpose of releasing the hostages, that the Majlis at this point would condone a demonstration that might be harmful to the hostages. So I think at this point, although the situation there is often unpredictable, that there is no reason to assume that at one and the same time they're considering ways to release the hostages and also to harm them.

Q. Could you tell us about a report that is out that the United States is going to try to settle the conflict between Iran and Iraq through the good offices of the United Nations in another new effort? And could you give us your evaluation of that conflict at the present time?

A. I notice that the story leaked the speech I gave 2 weeks ago as the basis for that speculation. That's the first time I've ever had a speech leaked. [Laughter.] Maybe that's the best way to get attention to a speech. But, no, we are and have been since the beginning of that war working constantly with the United Nations, with countries in the nonaligned and Islamic movements in an effort to produce a Security Council action that would be effective in dealing with the crisis.

We think that some additional time, obviously, is going to be required before both parties are as receptive as they need to be to those kinds of initiatives. We'll continue to do that. What the story this morning suggested is that we were going to take a more visible role, but I'm not sure that more visibility to our role is necessarily helpful in this situation since our relations with both of the combatants are not of the best. And I think we still need to proceed as we have been, which is a major effort, which is a continuing effort, and hopefully we can eventually get a Security Council resolution that will have some effect.

Q. Do you have a timeframe in mind at all for when—you said some additional time would be required before the two parties would be ready—do you have any idea when that will be?

A. It will be some time, I expect, although there are internal pressures on both of them, political and also economic. But they seem to be digging in for a low-level war of attrition at the moment. If that proves to characterize their military posture, whether or not that also is designed to create an opportunity to end the conflict, we can judge only after we have pursued opportunities with them.

Q. Could you please tell us what standards our government uses for defining a terrorist government? And do you stand by President Carter's characterization Tuesday night of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a terrorist organization?

A. I stand by the State Department's characterization of the PLO which, I think, is essentially what the President intended to say.

Q. Could you elaborate on that definition for me, please?

A. The PLO is an organization, elements and individuals of which have performed terrorist acts. That's different than characterizing the organization as a whole.

Q. You and the President, in your speeches of the last few weeks, have made SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] into an effective referendum issue in the election next Tuesday. In the context of polls which show that the President is now given an even chance of losing—

A. Does that mean he has an even chance of winning, too? [Laughter.]

Q. I'm wondering if you've considered that this may have been a risky approach, because if the President loses, it may be taken, at least in the terms that you and the President have set, as a defeat for SALT II, as an indication the American people do not want this kind of arms control?

A. It may have another effect, if I listened to the debate accurately. It may have produced a change in the other candidate's position.

Q. Can you please elaborate on that? What change do you see in Mr. Reagan's position?

A. You've given me a very tempting opening, but—[Laughter.] You know how reluctant I am to be political. Tease me a little. [Laughter.]

Q. Could you address yourself to the various reports that the United States and Iran have actually reached some kind, or at least a secret understanding of some sort, on the terms for release of the hostages and that what's really going here is an attempt by the Iranians to bring their side of it into line with some kind of agreement that's alleged already to have been made between the two countries?

had the foresight to negotiate and put in place ahead of time.

The facilities we have been seeking in Oman, Kenya, Somalia, and elsewhere, in the judgment of the President and his military advisers, are necessary to the kind of flexibility and reach we are likely to need. Thanks to the common interests which we and these nations share in circumscribing the forward thrust of Soviet influence, those facilities are available to us at what we believe to be acceptable costs and costs which in the event of crisis may seem very small indeed. I cannot prove to you today that facilities in Somalia will make the difference between our ability to deal effectively with, or to remain impotent before, contingencies that may develop in that area. Without the Somali facilities, though, it is our considered judgment that we would be deprived of an important element in our long-term position. For these reasons, we believe this agreement, taken together with those signed with Oman and Kenya, is of great benefit to our country and that the reprograming of $20 million in FMS credits to Somalia is very much in our national interest.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S. Policy Toward Liberia

by Richard M. Moose

Statement before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations on August 19, 1980. Mr. Moose is Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.[1]

As you know, we have submitted proposals for reprograming FY 1980 economic support, development assistance, and foreign military sales funds in order to support U.S. policy toward Liberia in the wake of the April coup. We seek the committee's approval of these extraordinary steps because of Liberia's pressing needs, particularly in the economic sphere, and because of the importance of Liberia to our interests.

I recently returned with Ambassador [to the United Nations Donald F.] McHenry from my second visit to Liberia since the coup and would like to discuss with the committee what has happened in that country, the nature and significance of our interests there, and the actions we have taken and propose to take in pursuit of those interests.

What Happened

Liberia is Africa's oldest independent black republic. It had long been one of the most politically stable countries on the continent. On April 12, a small group of enlisted men broke into the Presidential Palace and killed President Tolbert. There was little support for the Tolbert government or resistance to the coup from any quarter. Overnight Master Sergeant Doe and his colleagues found themselves in charge of a country.

These soldiers come from the rural areas of Liberia. Most have no experience outside the military and none outside Liberia. Prior to the coup, they were not organized politically and had no particular ideological orientation.

They did, however, share a strong sense of grievance toward the Americo-Liberian elite who had ruled the country since 1847. They were resentful of the corruption in the Tolbert government and of the general indifference of the ruling elite to the plight of the people at large. In particular, the sergeants had lost all respect for the military leadership, which permitted ill treatment, low pay, and slum-level housing for enlisted personnel.

The coup leaders established an all-military People's Redemption Council (PRC) as the country's supreme ruling body. Sergeant Doe is Chairman of the 17-member body and has been named Head of State. The PRC appointed a cabinet composed of four military members, three ministers from the Tolbert government (two of these have since left the country), and six members representing the two political groups which had been in opposition to the previous regime. Despite the changes, there is substantial continuity of personnel. In most of the government departments, career staffs remain in place. The ministries enjoy substantial autonomy, although the PRC decides matters of key importance.

The post-coup government is a diverse mixture of ideologies, levels of sophistication, political ambitions, and tribal identification. They are far more concerned about economic, social, and political equities than their predecessors but are decidedly not "radical."

Immediately after the coup, the soldiers arrested upwards of 150 persons closely associated with the overthrown government—politicians, officials, businessmen, and members of the Tolbert family. Without proper trial and despite numerous forceful interventions by our Ambassador, 13 prominent officials of the former government were publicly executed on April 22 in one of the most shocking spectacles in recent memory.

The executions provoked sharp outcry not only from us but from European and African governments. International criticism of the human rights abuses of the new regime has had some impact. On April 29, Sergeant Doe announced there would be no more executions, and to our knowledge there have been none.

The new regime faces urgent financial and economic difficulties, which in large measure predate the coup. Liberia enjoyed a 5% rate of economic growth during the decade ending in 1974. Since then, real growth has been virtually stagnant, and at the time of the April coup the treasury was all but empty.

Major causes of the stagnation remain beyond the government's control. The prolonged recession in the world steel industry has adversely affected iron ore exports, which account for up to two-thirds of the country's export earnings in a good year. Import costs, led by oil prices, have increased sharply. Rubber sales have declined with weakening demand by the U.S. automobile industry.

The April coup further damaged business confidence, which had already been shaken by the Easter 1979 riot over rice prices. Investment continued to stagnate, capital flight intensified, and commercial credit lines were frozen. The new government, unaware of the serious state of the Liberian economy, made things worse by granting wage increases to the military. The business climate further deteriorated as a result of unauthorized arrests, harassment, and other arbitrary actions by members of the PRC and the military against individual businessmen. These actions have resulted in emigration of businessmen and professionals, both foreign and domestic, which has had a significant negative impact on the Liberian economy.

All of these factors increased government expenditures precisely when revenues were depressed. The government now confronts a critical cash-flow problem. Its ability to pay salaries and

meet debt service payments, owed primarily to U.S. banks, is in jeopardy. With $40 million in obligations due in this month, the Liberians now face a crucial watershed. Since the country's currency is the U.S. dollar, the Liberians cannot simply print money. They must either earn or borrow the funds they need.

U.S. Interests

The United States has extensive interests in Liberia:

- A Voice of America transmitter that broadcasts to all of Africa, the Middle East, and the southwestern part of the Soviet Union;
- A telecommunications relay station that transmits the diplomatic traffic between Washington and almost all of our Embassies in sub-Saharan Africa;
- An OMEGA navigation station, one of seven in the worldwide network, which enables ships and aircraft to calculate continuously their exact positions;
- Approximately 3,500 American citizens residing in Liberia;
- Private investment of $350 million, with a replacement value of up to three times as much. (This investment includes Firestone, Goodrich, and Uniroyal rubber plantations; an iron mine in which Bethlehem Steel has a 25% interest; and local branches or affiliates of Chase Manhattan, Citibank, and Chemical Bank. Liberia is a principal stopping point for Pan American, which also has a management contract for the airport.); and
- American bank loans outstanding aggregate about $100 million; the Agency for International Development (AID) has outstanding loans of $76 million; and Export-Import Bank exposure amounts to nearly $12 million.

Because of our interests in Liberia and our historically close relationship with that country, other leading donors and our friends around the globe, as well as U.S. banks and business enterprises, look to us to take the lead in helping Liberia meet its immediate financial problems and begin the long process of restoring international confidence. Our ability and willingness to help Liberia may well affect our prestige generally throughout Africa.

Meanwhile, other countries have begun to take an interest. The PRC has announced a policy of genuine nonalignment and indicated a willingness to accept assistance from various quarters. It has reportedly received offers of military and possibly financial assistance from Libya and Ethiopia. The Soviets have invited Sergeant Doe to visit Moscow.

U.S. Policy

We have maintained an active, frank, and open dialogue with the new Liberian Government. While deploring the manner in which the new government came to power and dealt with its predecessors, we sympathize with the goals of the revolution. For its part, the new government has affirmed its desire to continue close association with the United States. It turned to us first for assistance. On our side, we are pursuing four objectives with the new government with some measure of success.

First, we are trying to avoid economic collapse that could lead to instability and hardship for the Liberian people. The government has reached agreement, in principle, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a 2-year stabilization program that gives them access to $85 million during this period. However, the government has not yet reached agreement on a budget that would meet the IMF's deficit ceiling. We have urged them to act quickly on this to insure access to the IMF first drawing in early October and more favorable consideration of loan requests by commercial banks.

Second, we are strengthening our representations for a return to civilian rule, release or fair trials for the remaining political prisoners, and fair treatment for businessmen and others. Sergeant Doe indicated to Ambassador McHenry and me last month that—assuming satisfactory progress toward social and economic goals—he contemplates return to civilian rule prior to the elections scheduled for 1983.

We have stressed to the Liberians that the protection of human rights is a crucial factor in our continued support in normalizing relations with their neighbors and the rest of the world and in rebuilding foreign investor confidence in the country. Recently defense counsel has been provided those charged with attempting a countercoup, prison conditions have improved, some lesser politicians have been released, and the house arrest of female members of the Tolbert family has been lifted. There remain, however, over 100 political prisoners.

Third, we want to assure the government of our attention to and support for their basic security considerations. The new government is genuinely worried about a possible countercoup and fears that further release of prisoners could threaten its security. They remain concerned that a neighboring country might launch an attack, perhaps in conjunction with some of the former elite. They have repeatedly requested increased military assistance from us to allow for purchases of weapons, trucks, and radios. Our provision of ongoing basic infantry training during this period has maintained contact with the military and responded to one of their most urgent requests. They have stated that once the armed forces are better equipped, they will move ahead on prisoner releases.

Fourth, we want to support the long-term development of the country. The government has announced its intention to pursue economic and social development more vigorously than the previous government. We hope this will be the case. We have continued our AID projects which are primarily in the areas of health, agriculture, and education—all target sectors of the new government. Long-term development is, of course, dependent on finding solutions to the immediate financial and economic problems.

We have developed a modest but important package of increased FY 1980 assistance for Liberia to further our objectives. We have notified Congress of our intention to grant $5.2 million from the economic support fund and to reprogram $5.5 million in development assistance and $1.07 million in foreign military sales (FMS) credits. A PL-480 Title I rice program agreement was signed on August 13. I would like to describe in specific terms what these reprograming proposals will do in relation to the broad objectives I just outlined.

Economic Improvement. Our proposed $5 million in economic funds for budgetary support will, together with our other aid, demonstrate to the Government of Liberia and to other prospective donors our commitment to helping Liberia. Without our participation there would be little hope for an early improvement in the economy. Commercial banks have made clear the need for such a sign of official U.S. resolve and confidence before they are prepared to act.

Perhaps it would be useful to mention some areas of dispute in the recent past where satisfactory solutions have been achieved—admittedly, in most cases, only with great effort and with the expenditure of some political capital. Applied Japanese tariffs on industrial goods were cut in the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) by 47%, to a final average of 4.0%. (By contrast, U.S. tariffs were cut by 32%, to a final average of 4.6%.) Japanese tariffs on color film, computers, and computer peripherals were cut by more than the average; the tariff on automobiles was eliminated, and negotiations after the MTN eliminated the worst of the barriers that Japanese standards posed to auto imports. In agriculture, Japan with great reluctance has expanded its imports of U.S. citrus products and high-quality beef and has resolved a dispute of nearly a decade's standing on the treatment of oranges with fungicides needed to retard spoilage during shipment. We have recently reached an understanding on Japanese surplus rice disposal that should prevent disruption in traditional U.S. markets. Japan accepted U.S. quotas on imports of Japanese color TVs and specialty steels (both now terminated) and tariff increases on CB [citizen band] radios. The Japanese Government and Japanese steel companies cooperated fully with the U.S. Government in the introduction and administration of the trigger-price mechanism for steel.

The bilateral trade deficit with Japan remains a difficult and persistent source of tension. The deficit this year is projected at close to $10 billion, not markedly different from last year's level; we have improved our trade balance with Japan by $3 billion since 1978. It is interesting to note, however, that we are currently running a trade surplus with the European Community which is similar in size to our deficit with Japan. This illustrates the danger of overemphasizing the bilateral perspective in analyzing our trade performance. The right approach, I think, is to look at U.S. trade in a global context and to deal with specific trade barriers and sectoral problems in ways which will expand trade, enhance our competitive strengths, and contribute to efficient use of scarce resources.

Still, it is fair to question why this large trade deficit persists. Many Japanese contend that U.S. companies do not make genuine efforts to penetrate the local market. In their eyes, potential U.S. exporters appear unwilling to invest the time, effort, energy, or funds to establish a profitable and permanent presence in the Japanese market. This is probably true to some extent. However, American exporters of some important and potentially very competitive products still experience difficulties in achieving fair market access in Japan. They have complained of being frustrated by Japan's still elaborate system of nontariff barriers and restrictive measures: intricate customs procedures, apparently arbitrary product-approval procedures, restrictive government-procurement practices, rumored "administrative guidance," and the complex internal distribution system.

The U.S. Government has sought to expand American exports by negotiating with the Japanese to reduce or eliminate nontariff and tariff barriers and to encourage U.S. manufacturers to sell competitive products to Japan. Substantial progress toward realizing these goals has been achieved during the last few years. More needs to be done.

In some areas where the U.S. competitive position is strong—most notably, in telecommunications equipment—Japan maintains unreasonable barriers to imports as a matter of national policy. Such policies must end. I will not here discuss the details of our negotiations with Japan about the procurement policies of the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, the public corporation which is the only important buyer of telecommunications equipment in Japan. Powerful Japanese political interests and large amounts of potential trade are involved, and no one is surprised that the talks are difficult. I hope Japan will understand the benefits to Japanese society of opening this sector to international competition; I am certain that Japan does understand the consequences of failure to do so—denial to Japanese companies of the opportunity to bid on U.S. Government procurement covered by the government procurement code negotiated in the Tokyo Round.

Similarly, the practices of another Japanese Government corporation—the Japan Tobacco and Salt Monopoly—that prevent fair market access for our manufactured tobacco products are the subject of hard negotiations.

If we are to retain domestic political support for an open trading system, we must show American firms and workers that we have a fair chance to export products in which we are competitive.

Automobile Trade

We have seen over the last 20 months in our domestic automobile market both a cyclical downturn in overall demand and an unprecedented shift in consumer preference from larger to smaller cars. Japanese imports of the suddenly more popular, fuel-efficient cars in which they specialize have grown mainly at the expense of the larger models produced by domestic manufacturers. Last month Japanese autos captured 22.5% of our auto sales, up sharply from the 16%–17% levels of the summer of 1979 but down slightly from July's record of 23.8%. Although sales by U.S. automakers are now at the lowest rate in nearly two decades, industry analysts believe that sales will pick up sharply with the introduction of new fuel-efficient model lines next month by Ford and Chrysler and in the spring by GM.

It is not self-evident that import restrictions would provide significant stimulus to sales or production of additional U.S.-built cars. As you know, the U.S. International Trade Commission is conducting an intensive investigation to determine whether increased imports are a substantial cause or threat of serious injury to the U.S. industry. We await its conclusions in November.

In a related sector, the U.S. decision to change the customs classification applied to certain light trucks, imported almost solely from Japan, has the effect of increasing the tariff on these trucks from 4% to 25%. Before the decision took effect August 21, imports of these trucks from Japan were running at an annual rate of about $2 billion. Japan is raising its objections to the decision in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and we will respond to Japan in that context.

Cooperative Elements

Although the fascination lies always with the problems and conflicts of our economic relations with Japan, we must not lose sight of the cooperative elements of that relationship and of the vast potential for expanding our cooperation.

Together, Japan and the United States are seeking complementary and mutually beneficial relationships with developing countries in the Asian-Pacific area which will enhance the security and stability of the region. Last year, Japanese official development assistance surpassed ours on a per capita basis for the first time. Japanese foreign aid is in-

creasingly extended, untied, to countries where Japan and the United States have shared security interests—to Turkey, to Pakistan, to Thailand. This year, Japan began an untied concessional aid program to assist the modernization of China, and thus far—would you believe it?—a majority of the contracts under that aid program have been won by non-Japanese firms. Japan has also assumed heavy financial burdens for the care of refugees from Indochina.

Even more important, and holding enormous promise for the future, is U.S.-Japanese cooperation in energy. The United States and Japan are working together in international planning for conservation and resource sharing and in research and development of the alternative energies that one day will lessen our dependence on uncertain sources of overseas oil. For example, the Japanese Government is contributing $350 million toward the development of a coal liquefaction plant in West Virginia. This project, one of the first under the synfuels program, will help develop a new technology that could increase U.S. and Japanese energy security and stimulate U.S. exports of the coal (and coal-processing equipment) that we have in abundance.

I would like to conclude by making some general points about the U.S.-Japanese trade relationship.

Through the mid-1960s, Japan followed a relatively protectionist course to spur development of major industrial sectors—autos, steel, heavy machinery. Starting with the Kennedy Round and continuing through the Tokyo Round, and in various bilateral agreements, Japan, in hard negotiations, has notably reduced its official trade barriers. We expect Japan to continue this course.

But even if all official trade barriers were removed, there would remain formidable impediments to U.S. access to the Japanese market. There are the structural barriers of the Japanese distribution system—complex, layered, and fragmented; costly to the Japanese consumer; and baffling to the non-Japanese, would-be exporter. There is the strong cultural bias of Japanese consumers for Japanese goods. And there is the question of the real competitiveness of American goods.

I cite these factors to emphasize that the U.S. trade deficit with Japan cannot be attributed solely, or perhaps principally, to Japan's commercial policy. I believe the Japanese Government is sincere in its efforts to resolve trade issues with the United States and to prevent trade frictions from having repercussions on other aspects of U.S.-Japanese relations. I am convinced that Japan understands and is responding to the efforts of this Administration, of this Congress, and of many private parties to explain U.S. concerns and political realities and to preserve and strengthen the economic ties that link our two great industrial democracies across the Pacific.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

World Economic Crisis in the 1980s? An American Viewpoint

by Richard N. Cooper

Address before the Alpbach European Forum in Alpbach, Austria, on September 1, 1980. Mr. Cooper is Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

My assignment is to give an American perspective on the world economy in the 1980s. I will begin with two caveats. First, it is always difficult to foresee a decade ahead. One thing we can be sure of: Any current forecast will be wrong, partly because new and unforeseen developments intervene, and even more because our collective behavior will be influenced by the forecast and our reactions to unwanted outcomes will negate the forecast. Second, the United States is an extremely diverse, pluralistic society, so there is no such thing as a single American view. Rather, we have a cacophony of views, even—some foreigners observe critically—from government officials. What I offer is, therefore, one American view, although I know it is shared by many other Americans.

I will answer the question in the title in the affirmative: I do see economic crisis in the 1980s unless we act decisively to avert it. I see economic events in the 1980s driven largely by two factors—rapid growth of world population and inadequate supplies of oil at existing prices. Many other developments flow from these two factors. Rapid urbanization, congestion, famine, deforestation, severe competition for water, large-scale migration, urgent calls for more foreign aid—all these and more will flow from vastly increased population, unless we do something about it. Inflation, economic stagnation, higher unemployment, imbalances in international payments, and instability in exchanges rates—all these and more will flow from the shortage of oil, again, unless we do something about it. I will focus my remarks first on population growth and then on energy.

Population Growth

On current projections, as reported in a recent U.S. Government study, *The Global 2000 Report*, world population in 1990 will be 5.3 billion, nearly 1 billion in excess of what it is now, reflecting a growth equivalent to nearly half the total world population when I was born. Even at that time, some political leaders were complaining of congestion and calling for more *lebensraum*. This increase, 90% of which will occur in developing countries, is truly staggering. We may be tempted to respond: out of sight, out of mind. And if the developing countries have their way with a new world information order, they may contribute to that temptation, as when, due to concealment, we failed to appreciate the full gravity of the Ethiopian famine several years ago until it was too late to save thousands of people. But, more likely, this vast population growth will impinge on us in a variety of ways—some direct, some indirect, none fully predictable.

First of all, there will be population pressure against agricultural land. This will lead to domestic and international conflict such as caused the Central American football war more than a decade ago. This pressure against land will also lead to deforestation—forests are even today being eliminated annually at the rate of 18–20 million hectares, roughly one-third the size of France—which, in turn, will lead to floods, loss of soil, reduced rainfall, and loss of biological species. (An estimated 500,000–1,000,000 species will be driven to extinction by 2000, with possibly important loss of genetic material. The losses will be predominantly in the wet tropics.)

Second, increased population growth will lead to greater urbanization and human congestion, which, in turn, will lead to political unrest, open conflict, greater terrorism, and possibly localized anarchy within many countries. (By the year 2000, 10 cities in developing coun-

of refugee admissions—orderly processing and departure to the United States from abroad.

Africa. The proposal calls for admission of 3,000 African refugees, a number double the FY 1980 level. This represents our best estimate of the number of eligible refugees who may wish to apply for admission to the United States. The largest proportion is likely to continue to be Ethiopians, but Africans from other regions of the continent are also expected to seek resettlement.

Resettlement

In addition to the refugee groups and numbers I have outlined, the act authorized adjustment to permanent resident alien status of up to 5,000 persons in the United States who have been granted political asylum in previous years. The adjustment of these 5,000 brings to 222,000 the total number of admissions and adjustment to permanent resident of refugees for FY 1981.

We estimate that the cost to the Federal Government of processing, transporting, and initially resettling the 217,000 refugees we propose to admit in FY 1981 will be about $712 million. This compares with the projected total cost of U.S. refugee assistance in FY 1981 of approximately $1.687 billion, which includes aid for millions of refugees and displaced persons overseas who may never come to the United States, as well as assistance to refugees who entered this country in prior years. In consultation with my office, the Department of Health and Human Services administers the bulk of Federal assistance to refugees, and it is the lead Federal agency in domestic resettlement.

The Federal commitment to refugee assistance is substantial, particularly at a time of economic stress and competition for limited resources. We should keep in mind that these funds allow us to reach out to millions of people around the world—to save their lives and ease their suffering until conditions permit their voluntary repatriation or resettlement in peace in countries of first asylum—and to bring some of those of greatest need and concern to us to begin new and productive lives in this country. Although the costs of resettlement are high in the United States, we should remember that we are actually making a long-term investment in the futures of people who in turn will enrich our nation as a whole, as have generations of immigrants and refugees before them.

We should also remember that the Federal Government is not alone in making a commitment to refugees and helping them become contributing members of society as soon as possible. Refugee resettlement has traditionally been the primary responsibiiity of private groups in this country, and the relationship between the government and the voluntary agencies remains the centerpiece of our refugee efforts. Resources and expertise available to the voluntary agencies supplement the Federal contribution and allow us to help many more people of different backgrounds and talents than would otherwise be possible.

In addition, in the last few years we have seen a remarkable growth in the number of State and local agencies that have become involved in various aspects of refugee resettlement. One of the major priorities of my office since I took up the position of U.S. Coordinator last November has been to encourage this developing network of public and private-sector agencies. I believe we have considerably strengthened the entire system by meeting on a more regular basis with officials of voluntary agencies and State and local governments, setting up conferences on regional problems, and providing monthly reports on projected refugee arrivals to help communities plan needed services. In an effort to lessen the burden of assisting new arrivals, we have also instituted a program in camps throughout Southeast Asia of English-language training and orientation for refugees destined for admission to the United States.

These steps have made it possible to meet President Carter's pledge to double the admission rate of Indochinese refugees within a very short period of time. Clearly there have been strains on many communities, and maintaining our programs at projected levels will require continued commitment, generosity, and coordination. But the framework for this system is now solidly in place, thanks in large part to the support and vigilance of Congress. We will be seeking your continued support as we move ahead to implement our planned programs.

As you know, we have submitted detailed information to this committee on our proposals for FY 1981, as required by the Refugee Act. I should point out that we now have revised budget figures, which I would like to submit for the record to replace those in the copy of the consultation document you received.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Iran's Proposals for Release of American Hostages

Following are the U.S. translation of the original Farsi text of the Iranian Government's proposals for the release of the American hostages issued November 2, 1980, President Carter's statement of November 2, and Secretary Muskie's statement of November 3.

IRAN'S PROPOSALS

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful: The special commission investigating the issue of the American spies submits the following proposals to the Islamic Consultative Assembly, according to the guidelines of the Imam:

1. Since, in the past, the American Government has always interfered in various ways in Iran's political and military affairs, she should make a pledge and a promise that from now on she will in no way interfere, either directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in the affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

2. Unfreeze all of our assets and to put all these assets and all the assets and capital of Iran which are in America or which are in organizations belonging to America and to American subjects in other countries at the disposal of Iran in such a way that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran can use them in any manner it wishes. And that the decree of the American President dated 14 November 1979 and subsequent decrees concerning the blocking of Iranian assets will be declared null and void. To return to the normal conditions prior to 14 November 1979 regarding all the financial relations between the two sides. To annul all consequences resulting

from this decree, such as all the transactions which have been carried out. To carry out all the necessary legal and administrative actions by the American President to cancel and annul the decrees by all the American courts regarding the blocking. To guarantee the security and free transfer of these assets regardless of all American or non-American individuals or legal persons in America.

3. Abrogation and cancellation of all economic and financial decisions and measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran and implementation of all the necessary administrative and legal measures with regard to cancellation and abrogation of all claims by the U.S. Government and U.S. companies and institutions against Iran in any form and for any reason. Implementation by the American Government of all necessary administrative and legal measures with regard to not raising any form of new legal or criminal or financial measures by official and unofficial and legal persons. Should any claim be made against Iran and Iranian nationals in any court in connection with the Islamic revolution or the question of occupying the center of the U.S. plot or those arrested in it, or any verdict issued convicting Iran or Iranian nationals, then the U.S. Government should undertake and guarantee to be answerable. It is also to undertake and guarantee to pay any compensation resulting from this.

4. Return of the assets of the cursed Shah, while officially recognizing the measures taken by Iran and their effectiveness in asserting its sovereignty in confiscating the assets of the cursed Shah and his close relatives, whose assets, according to Iranian laws belong to the Iranian nation. The U.S. President should issue an order concerning the identification and seizing of these assets and take all the necessary administrative and legal measures to transfer all these assets and property to Iran.

According to this recommendation, the Islamic Republic Government will release all 52 U.S. criminals in return for the fulfillment of these conditions by the U.S. Government. However, should some of these conditions require more time, then when all conditions are accepted by the U.S. Government, with the fulfillment of each condition a number of criminals will be released at the discretion of the Islamic Government.

The Government is required to prepare the said recommendation in two languages, Persian and English, and communicate it to the U.S. Government for implementation. Should any differences between the two texts emerge, the Persian version is valid.

The Islamic Republic Government is required to enforce this recommendation, after ratification by the Islamic Majlis, while taking into account the Islamic independence and the general policy of neither east nor west. Should the U.S. Government fail to comply with all or some of the conditions, then the judicial system, in accordance with its required duty, will carry out its duty and punish the criminals.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, NOV. 2, 1980[1]

The Iranian Parliament today has finally taken a position on the release of our hostages. This is a significant development. We have long been aware that there would be no resolution of this problem until the new Iranian Government was in place and the Parliament had acted.

Many months ago we made clear the steps that we would be prepared to take when the hostages are released. Ever since the American hostages were illegally seized in Iran, I have affirmed that our policy is based on two fundamental objectives—protecting the honor and the vital interest of the United States and working to insure the earliest possible safe release of the hostages. As we understand the Parliament's proposals, they appear to offer a positive basis for achieving both of these objectives. We are pursuing the matter through diplomatic channels. Any action taken by our government will be in full accordance with our laws and with our Constitution.

I know that I share with the hostages, with their families, and with the people of this country the desire for a prompt return of those for whom we have waited so long. I know also that all Americans will want that return to be on a proper basis, which is worthy of the suffering and sacrifice which the hostages have endured.

Let me conclude with a final comment. We are within 2 days of an important national election. Let me assure you that my decisions on this crucial matter will not be affected by the calendar. We are in contact with the bipartisan leadership of the Congress, with Governor Reagan, with Congressman Anderson, and we will keep the American people informed.

I wish that I could predict when the hostages will return. I cannot. But whether our hostages come home before or after the election, and regardless of the outcome of the election, the Iranian Government and the world community will find our country, its people, and the leaders of both political parties united in desiring the early and safe return of the hostages to their homes but only on a basis that preserves our national honor and our national integrity.

Iran Chronology, October 1980

October 2

Iran's Parliament names seven Islamic fundamentalists to serve on a special commission to debate on the fate of the hostages. The debate, however, is postponed because of disputes over whether Iran should agree to direct talks with the U.S.*

October 29

U.S. informs Iran that once the hostages are freed it would be willing to consider the release to Tehran of military equipment Iran purchased from the U.S. during the Shah's reign but which was frozen, along with other Iranian assets, when the hostages were seized.

October 30

Parliament again holds open debate on the hostage issue and again fails to make any progress because a quorum cannot be assembled. A boycott, organized by hardline-legislators opposed to a settlement before U.S. elections on Nov. 4, blocked the quorum, and the debate is again delayed until Nov. 2.

October 31

Despite the numerous delays by Iran's Parliament, Administration officials appear optimistic that Iranian authorities seem to have committed themselves to releasing the hostages.

In Cairo, the late Shah's son, Crown Prince Riza Pahlavi, assumes title to his father's throne, proclaiming himself Shah Riza II.

* During the period of Oct. 2–29, Iran's Parliament holds a series of open and closed meetings to debate on the hostage issue but fails to gain any significant progress. ■

U.S. Interests in the Middle East

Addresses by Secretary Muskie and Sol M. Linowitz before the Economic Club of New York on October 28, 1980. Ambassador Linowitz is Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations.

SECRETARY MUSKIE[1]

Tonight I will make some general observations about our broad interests in the Middle East. Ambassador Linowitz will discuss the status of the autonomy talks between Israel and Egypt. That is our division of labor here tonight. It is not a distinction of issues. These topics—our interests and the quest for peace—are inseparable.

Let me begin with a partial listing of Middle East challenges during the years of this Administration.

- A peace between Israel and Egypt has been agreed, and a framework for the next stage is in place. But the task of building a comprehensive peace between Israel and all of its neighbors lies ahead.
- Today Lebanon is caught up in a web of violence, struggling to escape the ravages of civil war.
- In Iran, social and political upheaval has created a stark new reality with global implications and an affront to law and decency in the captivity of American citizens. We are pursuing every avenue to achieve their release. We will not rest until they are home.
- Hostilities along the border between North and South Yemen have threatened the stability of the Arabian Peninsula. They highlight the potential for mischief of a Soviet client state in a vital place.
- And last month Iraq and Iran went to war—a classic case of a local conflict harboring danger for nations throughout the world.

This brief survey underscores fundamental realities about the Middle East. One is that the region is a mosaic of many peoples, with rivalries reaching back to antiquity. Ethnic and religious divisions in the Middle East long predate our own creation as a nation. Indeed, some struggles—including that between Arabs and Persians, as well as that of the Jewish people to find a secure existence—predate the beginning of modern Western civilization.

Another reality is that those ancient animosities now exist in the context of rapid and profound change. The region holds some of the richest nations of the world and some of the poorest, some adaptive cultures and some deeply traditional. The process of modernization inevitably strains the social order. Often the result is instability and turmoil.

So we have two sets of influences—ancient tensions and new ferment—both contending for disorder. These influences are facts. We can neither ignore them nor wish them away. Rather we must take them fully into account as we design our policies and carry them out. With this as background, let us examine the nature of our interests in the region.

Nature of U.S. Interests

First, we want to see local disputes in the region confined, to avoid wider threats to peace. The region's tangle of internal tensions makes it all the more vulnerable to outside powers seeking to exploit local disputes. The same characteristics that make the region a challenge to peacemakers make it a magnet for troublemakers. The Soviet Union has a tradition of ambition in the Middle East. Now its effort to crush a sovereign neighbor, Afghanistan, has added a grave new dimension.

Facing these circumstances, our best course is to work tirelessly for peace and steadily to build our strength. We will play whatever role we can to resolve local conflicts peacefully. Thus we have remained impartial in the hostilities between Iraq and Iran. We have supported the United Nations and Islamic conference efforts to end the fighting.

But there must be no mistake on another count: We are prepared to do all that is necessary, together with other nations of similar purpose, to assure that this conflict does not disrupt the flow of petroleum from the Persian Gulf and thereby rupture economies all over the world.

A second overriding American interest is in the security, the strength, and the well-being of the State of Israel. The commitment of the United States to Israel is irrevocable. It has been sustained and intensified by President Carter. Let me express that commitment in a personal way. With so many Americans, I have found inspiration in the vision, the energy, the boundless courage of the people who endured the pogroms, who suffered the darkest episodes in human experience in the holocaust, who then came to found a nation and make it prosper.

I recall the sense of awe and the sense of history I felt in 1971 in the presence of David Ben Gurion on his kibbutz. I remember vividly my conversations in Jerusalem with Prime Minister Golda Meir on Israel's security needs. I remember then going to the Soviet Union and pressing on Soviet leaders the case for free emigration. And I recall, in 1975, joining in the Senate effort that effectively put a stop to the so-called reassessment of our policy toward Israel during the negotiations underway half a decade ago.

A commitment to Israel has been a part of my public life for 35 years. And it is from that perspective that I say: America has a President deeply committed to the security and the prosperity of Israel. That is not only my opinion. It is something I know to be true. I know it in the surest possible way—not because I have heard it pledged but because I have seen it happen, time and time again, both before and after I became Secretary of State.

As a Senator, and chairman of the Budget Committee, I saw President Carter seek from the Congress over $10 billion in economic and military aid to Israel. In the past 4 years, we have provided almost half of the American aid Israel has received in all of its 32 years. I saw an Administration insist that Israel should have the most advanced and effective defenses we could supply—including modern surface-to-air missiles, the M–60 tank, and the F–15 and F–16 aircraft. And I was there when President Carter returned from his trip to Israel and Egypt—a mission that many thought was far too risky, far too difficult.

Yet we saw him devote himself—day after day—to the painstaking search for peace. At Camp David with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, he labored to hammer out an agreement once thought impossible to achieve. As a result there is a first peace—a treaty between Israel and Egypt. That treaty means that Israel, today, knows more real security than ever before. As Moshe Dayan has said, President Carter "has done more and gone farther to bring peace than any other president." And that may be the clearest demonstration of all of the President's commitment.

We intend to help maintain Israel's strength. We intend to persevere in the Camp David process, to seek a broader

peace that will provide a greater measure of long-term security for Israel and for its Arab neighbors. And we are determined to stop the abuse of international bodies—from UNESCO [U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] to the U.N. General Assembly itself—as forums for unjustified attacks upon Israel. All the world must know our position on such issues.

- We will veto any attempt to impose sanctions upon Israel.
- We will veto any change in Resolution 242.
- By all available means we will reject any effort to deny Israel its place in the United Nations; as the President has said, such action would raise the gravest doubts about the future of the General Assembly itself and our own participation in it.
- And I pledge here today, on behalf of President Carter, that whenever, in the future, the United Nations is misused and abused on Arab-Israeli issues, with malicious, unfair, or one-sided resolutions, we will oppose them and, in the Security Council, veto them.

Our support for Israel is founded most of all on this truth: Israel's security is a matter of America's national interest. We know that no great power can long retain greatness if it deals loosely with its closest friends. And Israel's security is essential to us because it is indispensable to the achievement of a comprehensive Middle East peace—for Israel must have confidence that agreements made will be kept. Such a peace, in turn, is central to all of our interests in the region and many beyond. So there is the most direct relationship between Israel's strength and our ability to pursue our most basic interests.

Third, we also have a vital interest in sound relations with the peoples of the Arab world. The Arab nations include more than 150 million people. They live along the shores of crucial waterways—the Strait of Gibraltar, the Mediterranean Sea, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. We have long shared and supported their aspirations for independence and progress.

We have an abiding interest in assuring that the balance of power and influence in the gulf region and the Indian Ocean does not turn against the West. The ability of the United States and its Western allies to defend our interests in that area will depend greatly on the quality of our relationships with the Arab states in the region. The vast majority of Arab states share our interest in the stability of the region. They share our desire for a comprehensive peace. Thus far the United States and most of the Arab countries have differed on how best to achieve that goal. Nevertheless, it is important to have the kind of relations within the Arab world which allow us to discuss the quest for peace in an atmosphere of common purpose rather than in one of hostility. In the final analysis, an agreement which is unable to achieve widespread support in the Arab world is an agreement which cannot endure.

In recent years the energy issue has made Americans more sensitive to our relationship with Arab countries. But even if that issue could be resolved overnight—and it cannot be—the quality of our relations with the Arab world would still be of crucial importance to us, to them, and to international peace.

Comprehensive Strategy

Clearly there are few areas of the world where so many American interests intersect. Because each of our interests in the Middle East is so important, the only sensible national policy is one which enables us to pursue all of those interests at once and to neglect none.

This explains why no prudent Middle East policy can be proclaimed in a single ringing phrase but must attend to a range of challenges. That is the character of our strategy now. It must remain so. We must work to help our friends in the Middle East build their strength in ways that do not threaten other friends. We must work to advance the cause of human development—in ways that are sensitive to cultural realities and respectful of tradition. We must reflect the concerns of other nations with similar interests in the region—including our European and Asian allies—but always recognizing that the American role is unique and that we have a particular responsibility for leadership. And above all, we must continue to sustain, as the centerpiece of our policy, the search for a comprehensive peace. For it is this element of our policy which most clearly serves every one of our interests.

The surest test of our strategy is how it serves our interests in times of rising uncertainty, such as the present. The war between Iran and Iraq deeply concerns us. But imagine how much greater the peril would be if there were no treaty of peace between Israel and Egypt. Clearly when progress is being made toward achieving agreement, Israel enjoys greater security. At the same time, such progress enhances our ability to build our relations with other key states in the region and reduces the pressure on them to look elsewhere for support. With each practical step toward peace moderate forces are strengthened, the momentum toward peace grows, and our vital interests reinforce each other more.

At the beginning of my remarks I listed sources of uncertainty and turmoil in the Middle East. The region fully reflects Whitehead's phrase: "It is the business of the future to be dangerous." But these are also times of opportunity in the region. That is true in major part because of the courage of three national leaders—President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and President Carter—and the hopeful new reality they have created. Our task for the future is clear. We must resist impatience. We must not give way to the lure of simple answers, to those who think slogans are solutions. We must hold to the course we are on. As we do, we will help define the fate of the Middle East, our role there, and the well-being of much of the world—for the rest of this century and beyond.

AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ

Against the backdrop of Secretary Muskie's overall picture of the Middle East and its uncertainty, instability, and conflict, I want to talk with you about the negotiations in which we are now engaged with Egypt and Israel, trying to fashion an autonomy arrangement for the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza.

The Secretary mentioned that these are times of opportunity in the Middle East. Let me start by setting forth my conviction: that despite the complexities and frustrations, the United States has a real opportunity in these peace negotiations. The opportunity for enhanced American influence in the region, the opportunity to achieve lasting peace for Israel and its neighbors, the opportunity to move forward the whole peace process in the Middle East. And I submit to you that despite the frequent premature obituaries for the Camp David process, the prospects for achieving a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between the Israelis and the Arabs are still better today than they have been for 30 years. And I would like to talk with you about why that is so.

Two weeks ago I met with the representatives of Egypt and Israel in Washington for formal resumption of the autonomy negotiations after a troublesome suspension of several months. I am pleased to be able to tell you that these talks were both satisfying and construct-

A. You don't have much respect for parliaments. I don't see how you make a deal with Iran without getting Parliament in on the deal. No, there is no deal. We don't even know what terms the Parliament is debating. Until we know, we can't tell you whether there's been a deal.

I think one of the stories was to the effect we've shaken hands on it. I haven't shaken hands with Parliament. I don't know of anybody else who has, and so you can't have any deal. I think that's a story that's been floated in this election season to prejudice the political climate.

Q. Quite apart from the Parliament, is there an understanding, as far as you know, with the other authorities in Iran? Have we reached any agreement with them?

A. No. We haven't reached any agreement with them. They are not inclined, obviously, to reach agreement with anybody until they've consulted with each other and reached agreement. They're having quite considerable difficulty in reaching agreement, and we would be foolish, indeed, to be committing ourselves to something to which they're not prepared to commit themselves.

Q. A couple weeks ago you cautioned the Polish people to demonstrate an awareness of Soviet sensibilities. Is it your impression over the past couple weeks they have done so, and do you find anything particularly ominous in recent events there, including a fast trip by the Polish leadership to Moscow?

A. The word I used, I think, was "sensitive," that they should be sensitive to what is going around. The alternative to that, of course, is to be insensitive, which I would not think would be wise. To answer your question directly, the agreement which the workers and the government appear to have reached, following the visit of Kania and Pinkowski to Moscow, appears to have moved the Poles away from the kind of confrontation that everybody was worrying about.

I don't know whether that is a premature judgment. I think we have to wait to see what the reaction to it is. But certainly there's a little more comfortable feeling about the situation today than there was a couple of days ago.

Q. You keep telling us here today that you've got to wait to see what the Parliament does. But since you're so emphatic on the point of waiting to see what the Parliament does before we see what the United States does, can you be forthcoming to the degree possible about the succession of indirect contacts that may fall short of semantic precision about a deal being made, but to the effect that we, in fact, have been in a nonnegotiation, but indirect communication, working out the terms that may be acceptable to Iran and to us?

A. The President has made statements today to which you people have made reference, which I'm sure the Iranians have read, and it may be that they regard those statements as concessions. There have been all sorts of indirect communications through many channels with them, and I wouldn't be able to characterize them. For instance, they said at one point that they thought we had made an apology. I'm not aware of any apology we've made, but in my letter to the Prime Minister, I acknowledged that we each had perceived grievances against the other. And I got some indirect report that he thought that was by way of a partial apology.

I don't regard that as such, but if he does, and if that eliminates that issue, I'm ready to accept his characterization of it. So I don't know what kind of leads have led them to what conclusions. Khomeini, obviously, on the basis of somebody's judgment, listed four points, and you know what they are.

Mr. Reagan, incidentally, responded to those very positively at the time. And that may be a basis for working out an agreement. I mean, if the two Presidential candidates could find a way to agree on terms, within the framework of Khomeini's proposals, you may have something to work on. And so it's that sort of preparation that we make, you know, what is within the realm of possibility; so that when we are asked to respond to a proposal, we may be as prepared as we can be to respond to specifics.

Q. But you have, in fact, through the indirect communication, I take it, responded. It isn't something that you're doing in-house to be ready for any possible negotiations; you've let the Iranians know about this.

A. We've let them know about it publicly. We said, the President has said, you have reminded me of what the President has said, what would be involved is the unfreezing of the assets and the lifting of sanctions and military spare parts.

With respect to an apology which is, was, at one time another condition, I've tried to give you the best I can on that. The question of trials has sort of dropped out of their rhetoric for some time now, so we don't have as much concern about that.

The question of a staged release—we've said publicly that we want all the hostages, and all at once. Whether or not that has been impressed on them, I can't be sure until we hear tomorrow. I don't know how I could go any further than that.

Q. I know you don't like to answer hypothetical questions, as you made clear—

A. It depends on whether it's useful.

Q. Yes. But, if by Thursday of this coming week, the hostage situation is still in a state of flux, but shows signs of possible imminent movement, do you still plan to go ahead with your trip to Latin America?

A. I'm not sure about that. The hostage thing could delay the trip. We would try to find another timeframe. There's always a possibility of events that would require me to reconsider a trip of that kind or any other kind. This could happen.

Q. Mr. Rajai is quoted to have said that one condition among the other conditions—additional conditions to the Khomeini four—which was the bringing back of the AWACS [airborne warning and control system] planes from Saudi Arabia. In what circumstances are you ready to pull these planes out of Saudi Arabia?

A. I'll answer what I think you asked, and if I don't touch your point, please repeat. As I said on "Issues and Answers" [on October 19, 1980], I had read Rajai's statement; and, as I read it, he was not imposing it as a condition for the release of the hostages but simply expressing a concern. It's still conceivable, I suppose, that the Majlis might add that as a condition. I have no way of knowing, but as of now I don't see that emerging as a condition, but it might.

Q. This is a hypothetical question: Would you be prepared to bring these planes out if they asked for it as a condition?

A. Would we consider it?

Q. Yes.

A. I doubt it. I'll say a flat no.

Q. You have stated your reluctance to talk in hypothetical terms to any possible proposal, but does the United States have any objections in principle to swapping the hostages for war materiel that Iran may need to carry on the war against Iraq?

A. Just another way of trying to get me to do what I've said all morning I'm not going to do.

Q. Could I ask you another question on another area, please? There's been a debate, I understand, within the last few days within the Department over whether to forward the request to Congress, the President's decision to Congress, to sell arms to Morocco, tanks and planes, with some of your closest advisers urging you to do it and some of your closest advisers opposing it.

My understanding is that unless it goes to the Senate by the 12th of November, the deal will be dead and that has angered the Moroccans to a great extent. Can you give us any idea how you feel about this, whether you are going to follow through on the President's decision to, in fact, sell these planes and tanks to Morocco?

A. The question is still under consideration.

Press release 310. ■

Secretary Holds Press Briefing in Memphis

The following is a press briefing Secretary Muskie held in Memphis on October 6, 1980.[1]

Q. What is your response to a report in the *Washington Star* about having no interest in a second term in the Carter Administration.

A. A report absolutely without foundation. I think I was in Memphis when the President called me to invite me to take this job. I am as enthusiastic about it now as I was that day and sufficiently enthusiastic to continue in it as long as the President wishes me to.

Q. Referring to that *Washington Star* report that said, I believe, that you had become weary of the bureaucracy in the State Department and the fact that the President did not draw a line between your responsibilities and those of National Security Adviser Brzezinski, is there any sort of friction there with the National Security Adviser and yourself?

A. We have different opinions from time to time, but as far as the President is concerned, he has been completely supportive of my efforts. He has indicated quite clearly that my role is what I understood it to be when I took the job.

That report spoke of my complaining to alleged friends that I was bitter about my relations with the President. I don't know who these alleged friends are. I have not expressed such thoughts to myself or to my wife or to anybody I know, so there is absolutely no foundation whatsoever to any suggestion that my relations with the President are anything different than he promised me and that he assured me of when I took this job.

Now, there seems to be a misunderstanding among members of the press as to the character of the foreign policy decisionmaking in the executive branch. We are not all of the same opinion about particular issues. If we were, there would only be a need for one of us, not for several of us. There are several Agencies which have foreign policy implications—the Department of Defense, National Security Council, State Department, Department of Commerce, Treasury Department; there are many of them.

It is the role of the National Security Council to serve as a coordinating agency, which gives the National Security Adviser an influence on foreign policy across the board, and one has to understand that when one is involved in the process.

The President is a man who likes to be challenged by ideas and differences of opinion, and I can assure you that he is challenged and he makes up his own mind. The Constitution makes him "the" foreign policymaker. I have found myself comfortable in that role. I have found myself given every opportunity to express my views, and I have found the President supportive when he thought I was right. He often seeks to balance views. So it's a living kind of process into which many people have an input, and my role is no less than the President said it would be. I like to work with him, I find him knowledgeable, and I find him prudent and careful but I find him tough.

He makes up his own mind about what course this nation ought to follow, and I like people like that. I like leadership like that. So he has my support now, as he did then; and as I said a few moments ago, I am willing to serve as long as he wants me to.

Q. About the relocation of Cuban refugees in Puerto Rico, I understand that they don't want the refugees there. They have filed suit in a hearing today in Federal court about it. Where would those refugees come—if there's any chance—where would the relief come as far as overcrowding refugees here? Do you have any idea?

A. I don't know of any plans to bring them here.

Q. No, but what I mean is is this to relocate refugees from this country to Puerto Rico?

A. What we are trying to do is to consolidate the refugee centers and also to disperse them as widely as possible so that the burden doesn't fall too heavily on one community or on one State—which I think is reasonable. We must find someplace for them.

It's a burden, I suppose, for any place if that is the way they perceive it in the first instance. But you know, I am an immigrant. My father, in a sense, was a refugee, and he found a place in this country for himself—and for me—and I think it is in this spirit that Americans generally, I think, will recognize that although there are practical problems in receiving and resettling these refugees, doing so is in the American tradition. I think we have to share the burden and share the load, and that is what we are trying to do in locating these resettlement centers.

May I point out also that it is not simply an American responsibility; it is an international responsibility. There are some 15 million refugees around this planet, and we are not bearing the total load of that responsibility. But somebody is and the international community is responding and must continue to respond. These people are fleeing repression, they are fleeing hunger, they are fleeing all sorts of conditions that cause people to leave their homes and their nations ever since the world began. That's why 40 million Europeans came to this country, including my father and others at the turn of the century—fleeing oppression, fleeing lack of opportunity, and so on—and they continue to do so and we must find a way.

Our means are not unlimited, and we cannot ask intolerable burdens of our people in dealing with the problem. But surely we can find a way to deal with it.

The wave of Cuban refugees was unexpected. It was the result of a deliberate decision on the part of Cuba,

We view the grant as a catalyst and a beginning to what we expect will be a long process. It will help lessen the government's sense of insecurity, encourage private credit flows, assist the government in adhering to the IMF stabilization program, and encourage other donor assistance.

We will give the government these funds once they have drawn up a budget that is acceptable to the IMF. We have established sensible guidelines for the use of this grant. It will be used for salaries at the development ministries (agriculture, health, education, etc.) and will involve an undertaking by the Liberians to expend a like amount on development projects over the next 12–18 months. Thus, ongoing U.S. development projects in the country will not have to be curtailed or abandoned.

Security Considerations. With respect to FMS, under the already existing FY 1980, $1.40 million program, Liberia is acquiring vehicles and small quantities of ammunition and replacing obsolete or wornout equipment. The proposed additional $1.07 million will allow purchase of much needed cargo trucks and communications equipment. We have, in the meantime, acceded to the Liberian request to purchase a small quantity of weapons and communications equipment through commercial channels. Willingness to help on the military side will also counter the temptation to accept the reported offers of military assistance by such countries as Ethiopia, Libya, and the Soviet Union.

Human Rights. This military help is intended not only to give evidence of support but to respond especially to the new government's insecurity about its ability to handle a possible countercoup, which has caused it to hesitate in adjudicating the cases of political detainees. We hope that once the troops are better equipped, there will be further progress in the human rights areas. The prisoners are an issue which, as I have mentioned, has inclined other countries to isolate Liberia in the present critical period.

Long-Term Development. The reprogramed $5 million in development assistance will be for a rural information system. It will be the first new development aid since the coup and will demonstrate our support for the new government's particularly strong commitment to economic development. The project will provide the rural poor with access to information by radio on government health, agricultural, and education services. Looking ahead to FY 1981, we are contemplating further development assistance, another PL-480 agreement, FMS, and international military and education training programs.

But U.S. help alone will not be enough. We and the Liberians are in close touch with other sources of help—the IMF, U.S. commercial banks, the World Bank, and other donors. The World Bank appears prepared to extend new loans to Liberia. We are urging a number of African and European governments to normalize relations with Liberia and to assist the new regime. I personally have been consulting with American banks about bridge finance pending access to IMF drawings, which should be available in October. I have conferred with officials of a number of West African governments about possible measures to bring Liberia back into the African fold.

Our immediate purpose is to enable Liberia to meet its most urgent obligations and encourage it to take the necessary political and economic steps to restore the country to good standing in the world community. We believe that such action is essential to facilitate long-term aid and private trade and investment flows, which will in turn assist Liberia to return to the growth and development it earlier enjoyed.

Prospects

Liberia is at a critical juncture. Responsible, constructive leaders are in the ascendancy, popular support for the new government is holding, and life outside the capital city remains essentially normal. The government is experiencing internal tensions, however, and external temptations could weaken U.S.-Liberian ties, frustrate economic recovery, and undermine prospects of progress toward restoration of civil and political rights.

Predicting what will happen in Liberia in the immediate future is venturesome. Much depends on the determination and ability of the new leaders in insuring fiscal responsibility and justice for all. If they meet this challenge, then the future will turn on whether the country receives prompt assistance and is able to restore internal and external confidence. The reprograming proposals before you are crucial in this regard.

If we act promptly, we will be in a position to be of assistance at a relatively modest cost and to exercise influence on the course of events. The situation is uncertain and fragile. There is no assurance our proposed strategy will succeed. Our failure to act, however, would likely result in the loss of one of our longest standing African friendships, our credibility in the eyes of Europeans and Africans, and important economic and strategic assets.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

The United States and Angola

by Richard M. Moose

Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 30, 1980. Mr. Moose is Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.[1]

The events of 1974 and 1975, including our action in the Angolan civil war, continue to cast a long shadow over our relations with Angola. We are engaged in a process of reconciliation with a government with which we have differed on some issues and collaborated on others. That process takes time; it is complicated by the presence of large numbers of Cuban combat troops in Angola. Our policy is designed to encourage the reconciliation process, while taking account of the broad range of American foreign policy interests and objectives.

The United States continues to look forward to the eventual establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of Angola. While we have not normalized relations, we have sought to work with the Angolan Government on issues of mutual concern and in ways designed to avoid isolating ourselves from that government.

U.S. and Angolan interests have proven compatible in the resolution of regional disputes. Most notably, Angola has played a leading role among the front-line states in working with the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and in developing initiatives

to further the Namibia negotiations. Angola will continue to play a major role in the way that Namibia's independence and other future changes in southern Africa are brought about—whether by armed struggle or through peaceful processes. In addition, in June 1978, President Neto of Angola and President Mobutu of Zaire agreed to stop supporting movements based in their respective countries opposed to the government of the other. That agreement has endured, and both nations have sought to strengthen the provisions of the accord.

We have also promoted our commercial relationship with Angola, potentially one of Africa's richest nations. The United States purchases a substantial portion of Angola's present oil production of about 140,000 barrels per day. The Angolans have sought to do business with U.S. firms in a number of sectors where these firms offer the best products or service. Primary among these have been petroleum firms, such as Gulf and Texaco. Boeing and Lockheed have established good relations with the Angolan airline, TAAG. The Angolans have negotiated Export-Import Bank financing for major projects and are planning to purchase additional reputable or high technology U.S. products in the near future. Both the Angolans and U.S. firms have indicated that trade and investment would probably increase substantially with the establishment of diplomatic relations.

The Cuban Issue

The United States has not established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of Angola because of our concern about the presence of 15,000–21,000 Cuban troops in Angola, the role they play, and our opposition in principle to Cuban intervention in regional conflicts for purposes that serve Soviet objectives.

We believe the Cuban military presence fulfills three functions.

A Deterrent Role. Both the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government and the Cubans have maintained that the Cuban combat forces will remain in Angola as long as they are needed to defend the country from outside attack. It appears the presence of Cuban combat forces in substantial numbers is intended primarily to play a deterrent role against the threat of a large-scale South African invasion such as that of 1975 which was designed to bring about or contribute to the fall of the MPLA government.

Support and Advice to FAPLA. The Angolans assert that the Cubans no longer have a combat role against UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and that the Cuban role is evolving from a combat function to that of supporting and advising the FAPLA (Angolan Armed Forces). Although the FAPLA appear to be assuming a larger share of Angola's defense burden, the evidence suggests that the Cubans apparently still provide garrison, logistical, artillery, and air support to the FAPLA.

Protection of the MPLA Leadership. The Cuban presence also probably provides a deterrent to coup attempts. In 1977, the Cubans played an important role in putting down a coup attempt against the Neto government from an MPLA faction.

The Cubans have enjoyed some access to other African liberation movements which have elements based in Angola but do not appear to have gained substantial influence with these groups. Although incomplete evidence suggests that the Cubans may have had a role in encouraging or supporting the two Shaba invasions in 1977 and 1978, they do not appear to be playing an important role with the Katangans at present. The Cubans trained some Zimbabwe (ZAPU-Zimbabwe African People's Union) guerrillas in eastern Angola. We hear little about Cuban contacts with SWAPO in Angola, although the Cubans are believed to provide some training and advice.

The evolution of the Cuban role inside Angola and the restraint on Cuban involvement in other regional conflicts suggest that the Angolans both want to and do exercise control over the Cubans and intend gradually to diminish the Cuban military role.

In fact, the Angolan Foreign Minister stated publicly on June 30, 1980, that with a Namibia settlement Angola would be in a position to inform the Cuban Government that Angola is able to dispense with the Cuban military presence.

However, it is our opinion that a Cuban military presence may be prolonged as long as the UNITA insurgency continues. We regard the continued presence of large numbers of Cuban combat troops in Angola as inimical to Africa's own interests in not becoming an East-West battleground. We continue to work to create conditions, such as a Namibia settlement, that would promote the early withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia and Cuban combat troops from Angola.

In the meantime, we are aware that the lack of formal diplomatic relations constrains our ability to pursue other important U.S. interests in Angola and the region. Ironically, our absence from Luanda because of our concerns about Soviet and Cuban adventurism gives the Soviets greater flexibility to extend their influence over the MPLA and makes it more difficult for Angola to pursue a truer nonaligned course and better relations with the West. Moreover, our absence from the Angolan scene handicaps our ability to encourage effectively a peaceful settlement of the internal hostilities between the MPLA and UNITA.

Angolans have indicated to us that trade with the United States would in all likelihood increase substantially if there were diplomatic relations. Similarly, there are American businesses which are reluctant to pursue existing opportunities in Angola absent an official U.S. presence there. Finally, we are unable to offer consular services to Americans in Angola, including those who are in prison there.

Current Situation in Angola

Since the death of Angola's first President, Agostinho Neto, in Moscow following surgery in September 1979, the Angolan Government of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos has continued to pursue the policy guidelines laid down by Neto. The Angolans have continued their active pursuit of a negotiated Namibia settlement and, in general, sought to establish a truer nonaligned policy by establishing diplomatic relations with Western countries.

In anticipation of an MPLA party congress in December of this year, and given the provisional nature of Dos Santos' appointment as President, the MPLA is reviewing the policies it has followed to date. Future policy will be influenced by MPLA reactions to pressures emanating from five sources.

The South African Attacks. The South Africans frequently conduct cross-border military strikes against SWAPO bases in Angola, where some 5,000 SWAPO guerrillas are said to be located. While the primary objectives are SWAPO installations, the South Africans have increased their attacks on the Angolan infrastructure, including targets such as bridges, key railroad links, trucks, factories, and other

tries are expected to exceed 15 million people, with Mexico City leading the way at 30 million on current projections.)

Third, increased population will lead to vast increases in demand for food and paid employment to sustain life. On current projections, there will have to be over 300 million more jobs by 1990—three times the current U.S. labor force—and 750 million more jobs by the year 2000. Food imports by developing countries will rise sharply and so must their exports of manufactured goods in order to pay for food and energy. There will also be periodic famine and increased calls—some plaintive, some threatening—for much greater economic assistance, especially to pay for food. Demand for oil by developing countries will rise to fuel growing industry, to substitute for the declining availability of wood, and to intensify agricultural production, especially through increased use of fertilizers.

Finally, increased population will lead to increased international migration, partly as political refugees escaping from anarchy or terrorism or repressive governmental reaction to both of those, partly as economic refugees seeking to better conditions of life, just as Europeans moved to America in the last century. There will also be international appeals, both for financial assistance to refugees and for provision of places for permanent settlement. (There are already several million international refugees today.)

Can anything be done about population growth, or should we simply turn a deaf ear and put up the barricades?

Turning a deaf ear is not possible because of humane sentiments within our own societies. Fortunately, there is something we can do, both about population growth and about food production. The rate of population growth has been falling slowly but surely in developing countries. This decline in fertility is attributable, in part, to active family planning programs in many countries. Much more can be done. Family planning accounts at present for only 2% of foreign economic assistance. These sums could be effectively doubled and could be increased further during the course of the decade.

With actions that can be taken between now and the end of the century, it is estimated that world population could be reduced from a projected 6.3 billion people to 5.9 billion people. We will be faced with substantial population growth, but it will be consequentially reduced. Moreover, the impact cumulates over time. Because of the momentum built into population growth, it takes several generations for stable conditions to be established throughout the population, even after the birth rate has been reduced to a level that permits long-run stability. Thus, the difference between 6.3 billion and 5.9 billion in the year 2000 generates a difference of over 2 billion people by the year 2100, assuming that the underlying conditions for population stability (i.e., each woman has only two children on average) has been established by the year 2000.

Beyond extension of existing programs and dissemination of existing techniques, we can productively spend more money on fertility research, especially in the area of temporary and reversible sterilization.

It is important to note that population control is not these days an issue of North-South contention. Increasingly, developing countries recognize that population growth is a powerful drag on their economic development. Government leaders from many countries—Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, to name only a few—have made strong statements supporting the need for population control. And other governments, where the issue is still somewhat sensitive, have nonetheless mounted effective family planning programs. Moreover, strongly supportive language can be found in numerous international resolutions, most recently from the U.N. Conference on Women at Copenhagen.

Even with larger efforts on this front, population growth will necessarily remain substantial. We, therefore, also need to support programs to increase food production. Projections in *The Global 2000 Report* suggest that grain imports by food-importing developing countries will grow from a level of 45 million tons in 1973–75 to 90 million tons by the year 2000 and that the real price of food will rise 45%–90% during this period. This last figure, of course, has a direct bearing on our own economies and our ability to contain inflation. Growth in food production will diminish pressure on food markets. The 1974 World Food Conference target of a 4% per annum increase in food production in developing countries was not achieved in the late 1970s. But it could be achieved during the 1980s. There is much more room for intensive production—some through small-scale programs involving information on new agricultural techniques, new seeds, and the use of fertilizers, combined with modest amounts of agricultural credits; some through large-scale, often multinational projects entailing control and distribution of water, as in northern India and western Africa. Large water projects have the not incidental advantage of generating substantial amounts of hydroelectric power, thus helping to alleviate the world oil shortage. (Harnessing the water running off the southern slopes of the Himalayas alone is estimated to be capable of generating as much hydroelectric power as there is in all of North America.)

Finally, some of the remaining increased food imports will necessarily have to be on concessional terms. For a start, we should strive to meet the agreed World Food Council target of 10 million tons of grain a year in food aid, perhaps conditioning some of it on improvements in indigenous agricultural programs. But over time the target will undoubtedly have to be enlarged.

Oil Scarcity

On past trends, but allowing for price increases that took place in 1979, projections of demand for oil over the next decade suggest that by 1990 the industrialized countries will import about 27–28 million barrels a day to meet this demand. Oil supply to satisfy this demand, in contrast, is likely to amount to only 21 or 22 million barrels a day. These projections, of course, involve many assumptions, which we can be confident will not be realized. They show an emergent "shortage" of oil at existing prices. The one thing we can all be sure of is that we will not consume more oil than is available. The question is not whether these projections will become true, but rather what adjustments will take place to eliminate the projected shortfall between supply and demand.

The adjustment can take place through higher prices for oil, through lower economic growth in consuming nations, or through conscious action by governments and citizens to reduce their demand for imported oil—or, of course, some combination of all these. But, if we do not rely on the third possibility, we will find that inflation is aggravated in all our countries. For each 10% increase in oil prices, the general price level is raised an estimated 0.3% in the first year and 0.8% after 4 years in the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. And in the absence of conscious action

to reduce demand for imported oil, economic growth will be slowed both directly—growth rates are reduced by 0.25% for every 10% price increase in oil—and indirectly, because of restrictive monetary and fiscal policies governments pursue in their struggle against inflation. Unemployment will grow and remain higher under these circumstances.

Indeed, economic policymakers in industrialized countries, taken together, face an acute dilemma. If our policy actions are keyed to maintaining moderate growth and employment, we will put pressure on the world oil market that will force us to trim back. But that, in turn, leads to what may become politically unacceptable levels of unemployment. Active energy policy is thus a necessary concomitant to growth policy. We need an active energy policy in order to preserve our economic growth and employment and to bring inflation under control.

In addition to these domestic impacts, failure to pursue an active energy policy will lead to imbalances in payments and to pressure on exchange markets as countries respond differentially to oil price increases. It will lead also to further borrowing by developing countries on top of an already large external debt, bringing ever nearer the possibility of a major default, which would have major reverberations throughout the international financial system.

These problems all arise if world shortage of oil emerges gradually and without surprise. In addition, we face the possibility of a sudden disruption in oil supplies, either as a conscious political act or as a result of social turmoil. A sudden disruption would lead to all of the problems mentioned above, but the impact could be even more severe. A large disruption could cripple our industrial activity and transport. I can think of no other area that represents such a profound threat to the cohesion of Western countries as friends and allies and to the very viability of our economic system.

Of course, we have not simply sat by and done nothing in the face of these possibilities and projections. To guard against disruption, we have created in the International Energy Agency (IEA) an emergency-sharing system whereby oil will be allocated among countries in accordance with an agreed formula for any disruption in oil supplies in excess of 7%. We have also committed ourselves in the IEA to hold oil stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of imports. These stock levels were reached in some countries for the first time, ironically, after the disruption of production in Iran and the competitive scramble for oil during 1979. The United States is building a strategic reserve of oil, and other countries also have government stock programs.

To address the longer term scarcity of oil, the IEA has established a system of national ceilings in the framework of an aggregate import target, along with a system for monitoring national performance in relation to the ceilings. The IEA targets, if achieved, would eliminate the projected oil imbalance over the next decade.

A substantial adjustment to emerging oil shortage has already taken place in all industrialized countries. The United States, in particular, now has in place an impressive and comprehensive program to conserve energy, to encourage the substitution of other fuels for oil, and to increase oil production in the United States. The traditional one-to-one relationship between growth of gross domestic product and growth of demand for energy has been substantially reduced over the last several years in all industrial countries. But some of the adjustment that has taken place has been induced by higher-than-necessary prices and some has been induced by lower-than-desirable growth.

I do not want to suggest that higher oil prices than those that prevailed before 1974 are not a necessary part of our oil conservation efforts. They clearly are, and our consumers should pay the full cost of oil. High oil prices are a necessary part of the solution to the emerging shortage, but ever higher prices are also part of the problem. Oil is not your normal run-of-the-mill commodity. Consumption of oil is sufficiently great, and demand for oil is sufficiently insensitive to price increases in the short run, that sharp price increases have substantial macroeconomic effects, raising inflation and retarding growth.

Rapid increases in oil prices place economic policymakers in each of our countries in an impossible dilemma. In our modern economies wage earners call for increased wages to cover price increases coming from any quarter. They do no distinguish between price increases originating outside the country—a loss of real income to the country as a whole—and those originating inside. Policymakers can either sanction the higher oil prices, along with the induced wage increases, thereby encouraging inflation. Or they can resist this pass-through of oil price increases, thereby generating economic recession.

Oil price increases also create exceptionally acute problems for developing countries. Scarce foreign exchange, crucial for capital investment needed for development, must be diverted into higher oil payments. In 1973, for example, Brazil paid the equivalent of 12% of its export earnings for oil, and India paid 22% of its export earnings for oil. The corresponding figures for 1980 are estimated at 50% for Brazil and 60% for India.

IMF Quota Increase

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, OCT. 7, 1980[1]

This act authorizes U.S. participation in a 50% increase in quotas in the International Monetary Fund. The quota increase is essential to enable the IMF to support a stable international monetary system and the open world economy so important to our own economy and the strength of the dollar.

Our participation is important not only because we have a deep self-interest in the health of the world economy but also because our quota gives us important financial rights and influence over decisions in the international monetary system. Many Americans do not realize that of the entire membership of the IMF, the United States is itself the second largest user of IMF resources. For example, we drew $3 billion in German marks and Japanese yen from the IMF in November 1978—a critical part of our highly successful program to combat speculative attacks against the dollar and restore its strength and stability, which have remained ever since.

The appropriation for the quota increase passed the House by a large margin on September 25. The Senate was unable to complete action before it recessed last week. It is extremely important to our nation and the world that the Senate take this up as a priority item and complete legislative action when it reconvenes in November.

[1] Made on signing S.2271 into law. As enacted S.2271 is Public Law 96-389 approved Oct. 7, 1980 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 13). ■

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, NOV. 3, 1980

We have seen, during the past 12 hours, several developments in the hostage issue. These should be viewed as initial steps in a process which will require time, patience, and diplomacy. Reports from Tehran state that Ayatollah Khomeini has agreed with the militants that the hostages can be transferred to government control. We believe, as we have said previously, it is in our interest for the government to assume direct responsibility for the well-being and security of the hostages.

We welcome reports that the Algerian Government will be involved. Deputy Secretary Christopher has met with the Algerian Ambassador and discussed their role in connection with the actions of the Iranian Parliament. Finally, the reports from Tehran that the Prime Minister's office has established a working group in connection with implementation of the Parliament's decision are also welcome.

The President said yesterday that we cannot predict when the hostages will be home with us. We have affirmed that any decisions we make will be consistent with two fundamental objectives stated by the President—a solution must protect our national honor and vital interests and insure the safe return of the hostages. There has been progress; however, much remains to be done. We will continue to pursue our goals with patience, diligence, and determination. Americans are united in their desire to see their fellow citizens come home safely with honor and with pride in their nation.

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[1]Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 10, 1980. ■

Middle East Peace Negotiations

Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations, visited Israel and Egypt to discuss with Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat the current status of the Palestinian autonomy negotiations, August 29–September 5, 1980.

Following is a news conference he held on September 6.

Q. Why has Egypt agreed to resume the talks? What concessions have Israel and the United States made to encourage them to come back?

A. I think it's a mistake to focus on this notion of so-called concessions. What I found when I went on this trip, in both Egypt and Israel, was two leaders deeply determined to go back into negotiations in order to advance the prospects for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

President Sadat, as you know so well, is a man of peace. He felt that it would serve the cause of peace far better if he could go back to the negotiating table and undertake to talk about the issues rather than to allow them to remain in a suspended state.

It's trite, but it ought to be said, that the greatest impetus for negotiation and peace is the danger of war. President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, very definitely, recognize the dangers of an outbreak in the Middle East and what that might mean for the planet as a whole and the danger of a major conflagration.

In my discussions with President Sadat, I found that he was desirous of returning to the negotiating table, not because of so-called concessions but because he believed that the opportunity for making progress was now better perhaps than it had been, that there was a clear understanding on both sides of the concerns of the other, and that it would serve the interests of Egypt, the interests of Israel, and the interests of the United States for the negotiations to resume. It was just that simple!

Q. It's still a little unclear to me what the relationship is between the resumption of the autonomy talks and the holding of a later summit. Is progress in the former necessarily precedent to the latter?

A. No. Let me be clear about that because I think there has surfaced some apparent misunderstanding based on comment from either Egypt or Israel as to what was or was not agreed, and there ought to be no misunderstanding at all. The facts are very clear and mutually agreed upon.

The parties will resume the autonomy negotiations on a date to be mutually agreed. That date is now being discussed in the early stages and will, at the proper time, be announced. The summit will be held sometime before the end of the year and after the negotiations have resumed. Therefore, the two are agreed upon and the expectation is that we will, in due course, be able to give you the dates for each.

Q. Do you rule out holding a summit prior to the elections?

A. I don't think any of the parties contemplates a summit prior to the elections.

Q. The Foreign Ministry officials in Egypt are saying that what they agreed upon is to talk about preparations for the summit and not really resumption of negotiations. Is that your understanding or is that—

A. I would change your question by saying what the people in Egypt had said because Dr. Boutros Ghali [Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs] had made such a statement before I met with him the day before yesterday. After our meeting, we both held a joint press conference at which I said that the understanding is that the autonomy negotiations, when they are resumed, will deal with the substantive issues involved in the negotiations and also lay the groundwork for the summit meeting, and that, Dr. Ghali said, fully accords with his understanding.

Q. I think before leaving Israel—when you were in Egypt, you talked about your impressions of what the Israelis would be willing to do to facilitate the process of negotiations. Can you elaborate on that?

A. Yes. I was asked whether there had been any specific commitments or promises or assurances which I was able to convey to President Sadat. What I said was, rather than that, I conveyed impressions. From my discussions which had gone on for a number of hours with Prime Minister Begin, with members of his Cabinet, and with the autonomy team, I formed

certain judgments, certain impressions as to what might or might not happen in the future. These I conveyed to President Sadat. They dealt with the issues involved in the exchange of letters between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, and President Sadat found helpful the views I gave him based on these impressions.

Q. There are some reports, I believe, coming from Egypt that the first step in the resumed negotiations would be bilateral Egyptian-American talks with the possible formulation of a document. Is that planned?

A. Yes. In order to get talks resumed, you have to go through certain steps to lay the necessary preparatory groundwork; so there will be these stages, first, indeed, starting today and yesterday. Talks have been undertaken between the United States and Israel with reference to a document which we have put forward to both parties, variously called a heads of agreement or a memorandum of understanding.

This document, which we have produced at the suggestion of both parties, undertakes to codify both those points already agreed upon during the course of the negotiations and sets forth suggestions for dealing with most of the issues involved in the negotiations.

I delivered that document to Prime Minister Begin and also to Dr. Ghali. When we get back to the negotiations, I think the focus will be on that document. Right now, as I say, that document is being discussed bilaterally between us and the Israelis and, in a few days, will be discussed preliminarily between us and the Egyptians.

This will be followed up by further meetings on a bilateral basis, probably here in the United States. This, in turn, will be followed by the first of a trilateral session, probably at a lower level, dealing with these issues and this document. All of this will lead to the formal resumption of negotiations at a date to be determined some time in October.

Q. On which level are the talks now between the United States and Israel, and at which level will they be here in the States—the bilateral talks?

A. They are at a very high level in both countries. Dr. Burg [Yosef, Chief Israeli Negotiator for the Palestinian autonomy negotiations] and Dr. Ghali, for example, are involved in Israel and Egypt, and my deputy, Jim Leonard, is undertaking to talk to them on my behalf now. The visits here in the United States will also be at a similar level.

Q. Is that a draft of an autonomy agreement, in effect?

A. It's not a draft of a final autonomy agreement. It is a draft of an interim agreement which deals with most of the issues which would be involved in an autonomy agreement.

Q. How does that document deal with the points of disagreement? Does it present a draft of what the Americans think should be a compromise position or does it say "this language" or "this language" or "this language," presenting the various options?

A. The former rather than the latter. What we have tried to do, based on our discussions with the parties, over the months now—and I've told you this, I think, before—we have from time to time put forward issue papers, a little paragraph or two on various issues and, around those papers, had some kind of discussion or negotiation.

Based on those discussions and some ideas which we have evolved from our bilateral, as well as trilateral, talks, we have now formulated ideas which we think fairly take into account the concerns of each of the parties and, therefore, would not be alternative approaches, but we think sensible approaches to issues as diverse as land, water, security, and so forth.

Q. Throughout the process you've talked about the undesirability of holding a summit conference, feeling that once a summit had been called, it would be very tough to make any type of substantive accomplishments in the talks at any level below that. Why, at this point, was the decision made to go for a summit conference?

A. First, let me say that I have indicated, in the past, that I thought a summit conference without adequate preparation would not be something I would advise the President to undertake, because I said that before this happens, we ought to be sure that the groundwork has been laid and that we are at the point where a meeting of the chief executives would be profitable and fruitful.

The structure we've put together envisages that, that we will have a resumption of the negotiations, and then following that, there will be a summit which will undertake to deal with the issues that can be most fruitfully discussed.

Admittedly, we can't be certain of where we will be after the negotiations are resumed, as they go on. However, to go back to the first question that I was asked, one of the first things that President Sadat did want was a summit conference; therefore, if you look in terms of how this thing evolved, there was an agreement to a summit conference from Prime Minister Begin which was one of the things that President Sadat had clearly felt was important to him in going back to the negotiating table.

Q. Was there any discussion about what happens if the summit conference winds up with a lame-duck President? Is there any agreement not to set a date for a summit until after the election?

A. No, we didn't talk about that far-off possibility, but I think in due course, we will focus on it. The assumption is—and I think it is not a far-fetched assumption—no matter what happens in the election, the President will still be President between now and the end of the year.

Q. You say that after your talks in Israel you shared with President Sadat, I believe you used the words, your "judgments or impressions"—

A. Impressions, yes.

Q. —with the Israelis. Would you like to share some of those judgments or impressions with us?

A. I would like to, but I won't. Let me be candid with you. What I was trying to do was present to President Sadat what had emerged from some 5 or 6 hours of discussion with the Prime Minister and with the members of his Cabinet about issues that I knew were of foremost consequence to President Sadat and, by the same token, issues that are of foremost consequence to Prime Minister Begin.

It would not surprise you that the agenda for these discussions, if you will, were the exchange of letters between the two, and so therefore, I think I was able to bring to President Sadat, in this one-on-one very frank discussion, the results of my very frank discussions with Prime Minister Begin.

I think this was helpful. By the same token, I had some sense of the concerns of President Sadat which I was able to pass on to Prime Minister Begin before.

Q. Would you address yourself to the Jerusalem issue and give us your thoughts about to what extent the

ive. We made progress in the search for mutually acceptable answers to some of the difficult issues we are now confronting, and we discussed preparation for a summit meeting to be held during the next few months with the President, President Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin.

These discussions made unmistakably clear, as had my meetings with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin last month—that Israel and Egypt are deeply committed to these negotiations as (in their words) "the only viable path toward comprehensive peace in the Middle East." And for its part, the United States is committed to play its proper role as a "full partner" in these negotiations. In order to make clear what we conceive that role to be and how we hope to proceed, let me focus on a few basic questions.

Goals

First, what is it we are trying to achieve in these autonomy negotiations? The answer to that question arises directly from the Camp David meetings held a little over 2 years ago. As you remember, in September 1978, President Carter invited Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat to Camp David. What happened there became one of the most dramatic stories of our century. As a result of 13 days of intensive and difficult negotiations, the two most powerful states in the Middle East agreed to make peace after decades of hostility and flashes of outright war. Beyond that, the two nations—with the United States as a full partner—pledged themselves to the achievement of a broader peace that would extend throughout the region.

The Camp David agreement was in itself a momentous achievement. But it was only a beginning. For what was more important than the meeting itself was the process it set in motion. At Camp David the parties agreed upon three clear and specific goals.

First, they sought to achieve peace and a productive working relationship between Israel and Egypt.

Second, they set as their goal the provision of full autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza under a transitional arrangement, which would not exceed 5 years and which would involve the election of a self-governing authority by these Palestinian inhabitants. Both parties believed—and continue to believe—that such an autonomy arrangement would provide the next logical step in the quest for a broader peace. The parties explicitly agreed that this transitional arrangement must respect the security concerns of all parties, notably the security of Israel. In addition, it was agreed that Jordan would be invited to join the autonomy discussions and that the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza could join the delegations of Egypt or Jordan.

The **third,** and by far the most ambitious, goal set forth by the parties at Camp David was a comprehensive peace among all the parties of the region.

This was a dramatic agenda—one which electrified the world. The pledge of peace rightly brought the Nobel Prize to both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin. And now, 2 years after Camp David, it is timely and appropriate to ask: How far have we come toward achievement of these goals?

Progress

At the outset, we can observe with satisfaction that the first goal—peace between Israel and Egypt—has been achieved to a remarkable degree. A formal peace treaty was signed a year ago March. This treaty, let me remind you, marks a peace without victor or vanquished, entered into by two nations determined to reject a legacy of hostility and warfare. Since the treaty came into effect, both nations have scrupulously adhered to their commitments. Thus Israel has turned over to Egypt on schedule not only the major portion of the Sinai but also the Alma oil fields, despite the immense burdens that the loss of this oil imposes on the Israeli economy. For its part, Egypt has proceeded diligently to normalize its relations with Israel in the face of strong, even fierce reaction of its Arab neighbors and former allies.

Embassies have been opened, ambassadors exchanged. In civil aviation, in agriculture, in tourism, in other areas—Egypt and Israel have signed agreements that will enable their relations to move forward in defiance of their history of antagonism. Today the flag of Israel flies in Egypt and the flag of Egypt flies in Israel.

Beyond these tangible achievements, there has been an intangible one of perhaps even greater importance—an achievement in spirit. In that connection, I am reminded of Macauley's words: "It is not the machinery we employ but the spirit we are of that binds men together." Today an atmosphere of cooperation and trust prevails where only bitterness, suspicion, and hatred once reigned. Each time I sit down with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin and with my colleagues in these negotiations, I am reminded that the shifts in perception are deep and genuine. These changes reflect the steadily evolving attitudes of the people of both nations, for both Egypt and Israel have set their feet on the road to peace and cooperation. Both understand there can be no turning back. And both are determined that they will not turn back.

As to the second goal—the effort to achieve full autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza—Israel, Egypt, and the United States are now working to reach an agreement that will accommodate the principle of full autonomy for the Palestinians with the parties' legitimate and vital security interests.

From the beginning we have known that this would be an exceedingly difficult undertaking. The Camp David accords specifically call upon the parties to define the powers and responsibilities that would represent the "full autonomy" for the Palestinians to which both Israel and Egypt are committed. It is important to understand that no one has ever defined "full autonomy" in similar circumstances. So we are now engaged in grappling with this most difficult question and trying to find practical solutions to the complex and emotion-laden problems involved.

We have already made considerable and gratifying progress in agreeing upon a substantial number of such powers and responsibilities that both Israel and Egypt believe should be transferred to the authority. We have also made substantial progress in agreeing on the modalities—the mechanisms—for a free election in which the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza would participate to choose the members of the self-governing authority.

In recent weeks and months the negotiations have been disturbed by external disruptions which have diverted attention from the issues actually under negotiation. Such developments as violence on the West Bank, the seemingly endless stream of U.N. resolutions, and the various statements and actions touching on the status of Jerusalem—all have buffeted the negotiating process at the very time the parties were trying to focus on the most difficult and complex issues. For example, the deeply sensitive issue of Jerusalem was suddenly pushed from the wings onto center stage bringing with it predictable storm clouds and thunder claps.

The leaders at Camp David knew that the problem of Jerusalem would

need time for solution, and they agreed not to try to solve it in the current negotiations. They understood that Jerusalem touches the very souls of hundreds of millions of people—Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike. This is the reason for our belief that the city should remain forever undivided, with free access to the holy places for believers of all faiths. Its final status, however, can only be resolved at the right moment in an atmosphere of deep trust, cooperation, and understanding. And that moment has not yet come.

Remaining Issues

Until it does, there are other important issues to be dealt with. Now we are focusing on the several remaining critical and decisive issues in the negotiations.

- How can Israel be assured that its security interests will be fully preserved and protected?
- What arrangements can be worked out to assure that the water resources of the area are fairly and equitably shared among the parties?
- How should we undertake to deal with the problem of public lands in the West Bank and Gaza and the respective rights and claims involved?
- What should be the nature of the powers exercised by the self-governing authority during the transitional period, recognizing that the final status of the territories will have to be determined by agreement among Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians during that 5-year transitional period?
- And should the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem participate in the election of the self-governing authority?

These are immensely difficult problems; on all of them there have been, and will continue to be, intensive and arduous negotiations. But the fundamental point is that both Egypt and Israel clearly recognize that the self-governing authority must be credible and viable; that it must have real power over the lives of the people on the West Bank and Gaza; and that it must offer them meaningful participation in the decisions that affect their lives. By the same token, both sides agree that Israel's security must be fully preserved and protected and that the dangers of attack, terrorism, and disorder must be carefully guarded against.

Admittedly, the problems still unresolved are enormous. But we must look at them in the light of progress which has already been made, remembering that less than 2 years ago relatively few people here or elsewhere believed that peace between Egypt and Israel was even thinkable.

As you might expect, the difficulties in reaching agreement have been compounded by the fact that the Palestinians, for whom the self-governing body is intended, have thus far been unwilling to participate in the negotiations. I have talked with Palestinian leaders both on the West Bank and Gaza, as well as in this country, in an effort to learn firsthand about their concerns and aspirations. It is my belief that Palestinian involvement is possible if the parties can make real progress toward full autonomy and if the parties can persuade the Palestinians that the present peace process can, indeed, assure them a more promising future.

When I first entered these negotiations, I said that if I were a Palestinian I would not then have wanted to become involved in the negotiations. My point was that at that juncture the parties had not begun to focus on the substantive aspects of autonomy; rather they had dealt largely with procedures and semantics. But real and substantial progress has now been made toward giving the concept of "full autonomy" significant meaning and content. And I believe we are now at a point where the Palestinians should look long and hard at our process. And I hope they can be persuaded to do so.

Another concern we have had has been the refusal of Jordan to participate in the talks and the lack of support from Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states. We have met with King Hussein and have talked frankly with him about the progress of our negotiations. I have also met with Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia and King Hassan of Morocco. With all of them I have discussed our objectives in the negotiations and the reasons why we believe our course holds out the promise of a better way of life for the Palestinians. I can tell you that they are watching our negoti-

Anniversary of Lebanese President Sarkis' Inauguration

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, SEPT. 23, 1980[1]

Four years ago today, the nation of Lebanon, emerging from bitter civil conflict, inaugurated a new President and began the process of rebuilding and reconciliation. This anniversary of the inauguration of President [Ilyas] Sarkis is a fitting moment to reaffirm the great importance the Government of the United States and the American people attach to the free and democratic state of Lebanon.

The people of Lebanon have endured many difficult years. The scars of the tragic 1975–76 civil conflict remain. Nevertheless, the constitutional Government of Lebanon—under the leadership of President Sarkis—has made progress toward dealing with Lebanon's problems. The government has been rebuilding the nation's armed forces. It has worked to give greater authority to all national institutions. It has taken steps to promote economic and social development for all Lebanese.

The United States has warmly and consistently supported these efforts.

The Government of Lebanon, however, has faced and still faces challenges from within and without the country. There are those who still withhold cooperation from the government and seek their own independent objectives.

The United States firmly believes that all involved in the destiny of this important country have a vital interest in the development of the broadest possible national consensus in Lebanon. The United States calls on all to assist Lebanon's legitimate government to achieve this objective which will offer security, opportunity, and the glimpse of a better future for all of Lebanon's citizens.

The United States will continue to give full support to the achievement of Lebanon's basic national goals and will encourage others to do the same. The United States will continue to work with the elected Government of Lebanon to enhance the unity and cohesiveness of the Lebanese nation and to extend its authority throughout the country. The United States will continue to work to assure Lebanon's territorial integrity, its sovereignty, and its lasting independence.

[1] Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman John Cannon. ■

and as a result it suddenly hit one State with a flood of people. We have resettled 105,000 out of some 120,000 who came; but there are still some for whom, because they lack the skills to fit into our job market or because they can't speak English or have other limitations, it has been more difficult to find places to resettle. But it's the kind of job that Americans have found possible to do over the years.

Q. When it was first announced that we were going to—that we were having a situation because of the Iranian and Iraqi war—can you tell us anything more about that now or whether what we are hearing in the national press is—

A. It seems to have settled down into a more prolonged kind of struggle than was originally anticipated—certainly longer than was anticipated by the President of Iraq. The Iranians have found a capability for resisting and sustaining that resistance that many people did not credit them with. So it looks as though we have got a longer struggle ahead of us there than we expected.

Secondly, the risks for a widening war, beyond the territory of the two combatants, do not seem to be as high as they were a week or two ago. But we must never overlook the possibility that that may happen, that the war could spread to Iran's neighbors or to Iraq's neighbors. Then we would truly have an explosive possibility, for the obvious reason that the Western world's pipeline goes through the area.

Q. How much of an influence did the Americans—did the United States—have in the Saudi decision to up production of oil?

A. We are happy to see that happen. But I think in all candor it was a Saudi initiative, from my perspective.

They are really pretty responsible about their use of their resource. They understand that the rate of production, as well as the price of oil, affects their own economy as well as that of the consuming nations of the world, and they seek to use it in ways that will contribute to a stable supply and a stable price. I think that is what their motivation is in this situation.

They recognize that this war in that area creates high risks for them and their resource and that this resource is a means for them to contribute to stability which is in their interest as well as ours.

Q. How would you describe your relationship with Mr. Brzezinski? Would you say that it was strained like it was under your predecessor?

A. There is no strain at all in our personal relationship. We are both Poles, you know—we are not poles apart. [Laughter.]

We get along fine on a personal basis and you know he has a background in foreign policy. He is a very energetic, idea man, and the President likes to be exposed to that kind of thinking. He has a different slant on things than I do from time to time, but our differences of opinion are discussed and debated in a civilized way. Sometimes I win, sometimes I persuade him and sometimes he persuades me. That's his job, really, as coordinator.

The differences of opinion are not the result of personal strains in the relationship. They tend to be made to look that way in the media for obvious reasons—you people enjoy a fight more than you do a debate—so it has been made into a personal kind of thing. But it isn't as far as I am concerned. I can't speak for what it was with Mr. Vance and Mr. Brzezinski.

But to say that our personal relations are cordial—and they are—is not to say that we always agree. And the fact that we don't always agree doesn't generate any bitterness on his part or on mine—and it certainly doesn't generate any bitterness toward the President. We are both doing our respective jobs as best we can, as the President wants us to do, and I find that his decisions often are a balance of the two points of view: mine and Mr. Brzezinski. Often Mr. Brzezinski and I agree more often than perhaps the press believes.

Q. Do you think that that is the best way to handle foreign affairs in the United States—two separate advisers to the President having authority? Or shouldn't the Secretary of State have the total authority?

A. No, foreign policy advice comes to the President from many sources. The President's foreign policy breakfast every Friday morning is made up of anywhere from six to eight people, depending upon the particular issues we expect to deal with that morning and depending upon the inputs from the various areas concerned.

If the World Bank happens to be involved in the problem that comes to our attention then the Secretary of the Treasury may well be present. The President's General Counsel may be present. Or the Vice President may be present. The Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of State are usually present.

So there are a number of people, depending upon the issue and the problems, who may be gathered with the President on Friday morning to discuss foreign policy issues.

Now with respect to the National Security Council, that was created in the late 1940s, I believe, because during the war the Defense Department had grown enormously into a worldwide organization because of the nature of the war. And with obvious foreign policy implications, sometimes running at odds with the State Department, the NSC was created. I was just coming out of the war at that point, but I am told the NSC was created for the purpose of coordinating foreign policy. And that is still a very important part of its role.

It's understandable, since the National Security Adviser is in the White House, that if the President wants a quick perspective on a foreign policy problem that crosses his desk or some background in the course of the day for him to turn to his National Security Adviser who obviously has a lot of background in foreign policy. That has been happening for 30 years.

The job began to grow to its present dimensions, I am told, when George Bundy served as National Security Adviser to President Kennedy. Then it grew under Walt Rostow, and then Henry Kissinger expanded it to its present dimensions, and then Mr. Brzezinski.

But I have found with this President that it doesn't matter what seat you are holding. What he is interested in is what your advice is and how useful it is in dealing with a particular problem.

But to form a role of the role of the State Department as the foreign policy department—with 10,000 people spread all over this planet in consular offices and embassies all around the planet—that is the source of the President's foreign policy information. The source of information as to what problems are arising at any part of the globe on a 24-hour basis is the State Department, and it's the State Department analysts and it's the Secretary of State who are his channel of information and channel of analysis with bodies. That is not to say that he doesn't consult Mr. Brzezinski, because obviously, he does.

Q. Would you say that earlier—I believe it was when some new weapons policy—when that mention of that new nuclear weapons policy was released by Mr. Brzezinski and the press, as you said, reported that you acted rather violently against it—you didn't know that they were going to move ahead and release the information on the nuclear weapons policy. And I believe that was when, more recently, you had—they seemed to say that you had a violent reaction to Mr. Brzezinski's revealing that information. Was that much ado about nothing?

A. You see your very question reveals that the press did not tell you the story accurately. I did not react in any way that could be described as violent or even angry. I remember the incident very clearly.

I was traveling, I think, to the west coast on an Air Force plane and the story had come out that morning, which was written by a reporter named Burt of the *New York Times* revealing that the Presidential Determination 59 was about to be released involving strategic nuclear policy. And I was asked whether I had been informed of it. I'll tell you, my answer was: "No." Now is that a violent word?

Q. Was that all you had to say about it at the time?

A. That's all I had to say about it at the time.

Now since that time, the whole sequence of events has been described, and I have testified with [Defense Secretary] Harold Brown before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the development of the PD 59. And it was not the intention to exclude the Secretary of State, Mr. Vance or myself, but the development of PD 59, which was a document codifying the strategic nuclear policy which had previously been agreed to with the involvement of the State Department—that was supposed to have been taken up with Mr. Vance and then with me at the time that Mr. Vance left the Department and I came into the Department, so our involvement sort of fell through the cracks.

I came in, and immediately I was off to Europe with the NATO Defense Ministers, then at the Austrian state ceremony when I met with Mr. Gromyko, and then the Venice summit, and the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) Foreign Ministers conference in Indochina. In that period when I would otherwise have been consulted about the PD 59, it sort of fell through the cracks.

Now I have been assured that it is not the policy to ignore the State Department. The President personally assured me that the Secretary of State, obviously, should be involved in such decisions involving strategic nuclear policy. So the whole thing has been perfectly explained.

But when I was asked whether I had been involved, I had to give the honest answer, which was, no. It came as a complete surprise to me, but my reaction was not violent. Of course there are people who say that I have only to look at somebody to look violent, but I am not sure that is so. [Laughter.]

Q. The hostages have been in Iran for nearly a year. What is going on now? Is the Administration just kind of waiting to see what this Iranian-Iraqi thing is going to do? Are there any plans in the works? Are we talking to them more; are we talking to them less? What is being done?

A. No, we are not waiting for anything. We haven't waited for a year. We have been trying through indirect and direct means—increasingly direct means when the opportunity arises—to influence the gradually evolving Iranian leadership and political institutions to come to grips with the issue and to make a decision with respect to this.

We were hoping that as their political institutions form, as they had been, that someone with authority would finally be created who could come to grips with the issue.

As the Parliament has been put in place, we have tried more and more to get into touch directly with the emerging leaders.

When the Prime Minister was selected, for example, I wrote him directly. He read my letter publicly, and we had some reason to believe we would get a formal, written response in due course. Members of Congress have written to the Speaker of the Majlis—the Parliament. The hostage families have communicated on a compassionate basis. In addition to that, we have communicated through the Swiss Embassy, which protects our interests there in Iran in the absence of our own Embassy.

We have communicated indirectly through friends from many countries—some of them official and some of them unofficial—who had any possible access to people with influence in Iran.

The whole objective was designed to make increasingly clear to the Iranians that the hostage crisis was a problem to them and not an opportunity. And increasingly, they seem to be aware of that.

Until this war struck, we thought that they were beginning to move toward a position in the Majlis where they would take it up. They have continued, they have named a commission specifically charged to examine the question and to make recommendations to the Majlis, and they did this after the war began, so conceivably they may continue to debate it and discuss it and in due course respond to my letter.

Or if they prefer not to deal with our government directly, they might deal with the congressional letters. They seem to think the Congress isn't part of our government—I don't know why. Or they might simply broadcast through the public media their terms, the basis for negotiation, or whatever.

But increasingly for the last couple of months or more, all of them have been saying—the hardliners, the moderates, the clerics, and others—that the Parliament is now charged with dealing with the hostage question and will. We had thought that they were beginning to move toward that, so that we could at least begin to know on what basis we might be able to talk. Whether the war has delayed that, we will know in due course.

Q. Maybe about a month ago Democratic Presidential [inaudible] and he said that he felt the Ayatollah Khomeini didn't like President Carter, to put it mildly—in other words, this is what was holding up the release of the hostages. Do you think that is the case? Do you think it's a personal situation, the way the Ayatollah Khomeini feels about President Carter?

A. I have no way of knowing. We may be as uninformed as to his motives as the press seems to be about my attitude toward my job. [Laughter.]

I mean, its just not productive, I don't think, to try to speculate out loud about the motives of Khomeini or others. We don't know. There is no way of reading their minds. If you were to try to read his mind you would have to try to read his mind about Mr. Carter, about Mr. Reagan, about Mr. Ander-

facilities. They have also bombed Angolan towns and villages, forcing the population to flee into the bush. Occasionally they have also become embroiled with Angolan forces, although they seemingly have tried to avoid doing so. The most recent large South African military operation was conducted in June 1980, when the South Africans sent in a sizable force supported by air power to destroy the principal SWAPO base camp in southern Angola and numerous smaller bases.

In a statement before the U.N. Security Council hearings on that attack, Ambassador [William] vanden Heuvel said:

> . . . No principle enshrined in the U.N. Charter is more fundamental to the maintenance of good relations between states than mutual respect for the territorial integrity of all nations. South Africa's disrespect for this principle is intolerable to the international community. It is an affront to the people of Angola, with whose suffering and loss the people of the United States deeply sympathize. We should, and do, condemn it.

Angola has asserted that the South African attacks to date have cost the country well over $100 million in damages to its economy. Although casualty figures have not been confirmed, they are believed to be high. While the South African attacks are highly damaging in themselves, they also support Angolan fears of another South African invasion on the order of that of late 1975, when South African troops intervening in the Angolan civil war penetrated close to Luanda itself. The South African attacks are cited by the Angolans and the Cubans as the principal reason for the presence of Cuban combat troops. To date, the South African Government has not deterred the Angolan Government from pursuing a negotiated Namibia settlement nor from supporting SWAPO. However, delay in attaining agreement on implementation of the U.N. plan for Namibia only strengthens the hand of those who believe that increased military support to SWAPO is the only viable means to attain an independent Namibia.

The UNITA Insurgency. The MPLA has established control of the country through its control of the central government. Government administration and social services in the provinces, however inadequate, are provided by the Luanda government.

The MPLA appeal is national in character and, as such, is directed to a variety of racial and ethnic groups. UNITA, on the other hand, draws substantial support from the Ovimbundus and related subgroups, who comprise 45% of Angola's population. Although the movement conducts military operations with relative facility across wide areas of central and southern Angola, it cannot be said to exercise administrative control over or provide services to much if any territory. Much of UNITA's appeal to its tribal base is due to the charisma and shrewdness of its President, Jonas Savimbi.

Since its defeat in the 1975–76 Angolan civil war, UNITA has conducted guerrilla warfare against the central government. It continues to receive external assistance from Middle Eastern and European countries and from South Africa. UNITA's major military success has been to keep the important international Benguela railway virtually closed.

On balance, we view the hostilities between the MPLA and UNITA as a stalemate. The MPLA and their Cuban military supporters have shown themselves unable to diminish the military activities of UNITA. On the other hand, UNITA is unable to expand its operational areas beyond its areas of tribal support or consolidate control in its traditional areas of activities. Therefore, we see as alternatives either a prolonged conflict with attendant costs in human and material resources, with a potential for greater outside intervention and with serious consequences for regional stability and development, or a political settlement betwen the MPLA and UNITA.

The Economy. The severely depressed state of Angola's economy is a matter of critical concern to the MPLA. Today, only the petroleum sector of the economy is generating income at anywhere near preindependence levels; all other sectors are either stagnant or operate at a fraction of their prewar levels. Angola was formerly the world's fourth largest coffee producer and sixth largest diamond producer. Current activity in these sectors is perhaps one-fourth or one-third of previous levels. Once nearly self-sufficient in food production, Angola now imports a major portion of its requirements.

As a result of the South African attacks, fighting between the MPLA and UNITA, and recent droughts, international agencies have estimated that between 300,000 and perhaps as many as 800,000 persons in the central area of Angola are facing famine or severe food supply problems. The exodus in 1974 and 1975 of more than 300,000 Portuguese who supplied managerial and technical expertise left the economy crippled and dependent on technical expertise, mostly from Cuba, to keep government ministries and the economy operating at even a minimum level. The effective closure of the Benguela railway by UNITA has meant the loss of perhaps $100 million annually in income from transit of Zairian and Zambian goods.

Despite the general economic malaise, oil production at current high world market prices has enabled Angola to maintain a small overall surplus in its balance of payments. It is unlikely that meaningful economic development, especially outside the petroleum sector, will take place until political stability has been attained.

Soviet Pressure. Since Neto's death, available evidence points to a resurgence of Soviet attempts to exert influence in Angola. The Soviets may be more involved in directing and advising military operations. There is a more strident pro-Moscow tone in official statements and in the media, and the Angolans are under pressure to funnel lucrative contracts to Soviet or Eastern bloc suppliers rather than to Western corporations. The Angolans have resisted Soviet attempts to gain military bases, although it appears the Soviets do have limited use of naval maintenance facilities in Luanda, where Soviet naval ships occasionally call.

Pragmatism vs. Ideology. Historically, the MPLA has not been a monolithic party. This is true today. Many MPLA members are deeply concerned over Angola's severe economic problems and lack of development and are generally discontented with the scanty economic assistance provided by the Soviets and their friends.

MPLA policy has been undergoing intense review since Neto's death, and this likely will continue at least until the December 1980 party congress of the MPLA. In practice, the MPLA has maintained the essence of the foreign policies established by Neto—constructive participation in the Namibia negotiations and pursuit of better relations with the West and with Angola's neighbors. If these policies are to be maintained and pragmatic policies followed in other areas, they must be seen as producing results for Angola.

Elements within the MPLA point out that after 3 years of negotiations the West is unable or unwilling to "deliver" the South Africans on the Namibia issue and maintain that an enlarged armed struggle is the only way to realize an independent Namibia. They also point out that the "opening to the West" has produced neither diplomatic relations with the United States nor substantial Western economic assistance.

A Namibia settlement, problematic as it may be, would have an important impact on the political and economic scene in Angola. It would:

- Remove the threat of South African military attacks from Namibia and enable the Angolans to reduce the Cuban military presence, which they have stated publicly they would do;
- Sever, in the MPLA view, assistance to UNITA from South Africa;
- Allow the MPLA to divert human resources from the military to economic development and improve the climate for investment;
- Reduce Soviet leverage; and
- Validate the pursuit of pragmatic policies.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

NPT Review Conference Held in Geneva

The second international conference to review the implementation of the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was held in Geneva August 11-September 7, 1980. The U.S. delegation was headed by Ralph Earle II, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Following are Ambassador Earle's statements before the conference on August 12 and September 7.

AUG. 12, 1980[1]

The President of the United States has asked me to read the following message from him to this conference.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—which has now been in force for more than a decade—remains indispensable to the efforts of the nations represented at this conference to achieve a safer, saner, and more secure world. The acquisition of nuclear explosives by additional states would decrease the security of the states acquiring them, decrease the stability of the regions in which they are located, and increase the risk of nuclear conflict. In reviewing the operation of this treaty, we must not lose sight of its importance in helping to avert such dangers.

The United States recognizes that proliferation is only one aspect of the problem of controlling nuclear weapons. We must also vigorously pursue our efforts to curb the nuclear arms race. This goal—already difficult to achieve—could be rendered unattainable if the number of states with nuclear weapons were to increase. The United States also recognizes the contribution that nuclear power can make to meeting energy needs. But this contribution requires confidence that international nuclear cooperation will not be misused for military purposes.

For all these reasons, it is important that the Non-Proliferation Treaty be preserved and encouraged. The United States will give its fullest support to the fulfillment of this treaty and to the achievement of its objectives, which are so essential to a stable world order.

That concludes the President's message. I have asked that it be published and circulated as an official document of this conference.

Articles I, II, and III

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has the widest adherence of any arms control treaty in history. It now has 114 parties, of which 31 joined it since the beginning of 1975 and 16 since the close of the first review conference.[2] They include all members of NATO and the European Communities except France, all members of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 33 African states, 20 Latin American states, and 23 states in Asia and the Middle East.

Together with France—which has made clear that it will act as if it were a party to the treaty—these parties constitute a nonproliferation regime that represents:

- An aggregate population of over 2 billion;
- An aggregate gross national product of $7.7 trillion;
- 98% of the world's installed nuclear force capacity;
- 95% of nuclear power capacity under construction;
- All of the world's exporters of nuclear power reactors and all major exporters of key components and materials therefore;
- All of the world's exporters of enriched uranium;
- All of the world's exporters of heavy water;
- 94% of all foreign aid donations; and
- 87% of the funding of international financial institutions.

These figures are persuasive testimony to the significance of the participants in this regime. And these figures also demonstrate that—for nonparties—the road to developing a nuclear power program in the foreseeable future must be traveled in cooperation with one or more of the participants in this regime.

The primary purpose of this regime is, of course, to insure that international security and nuclear arms control are not threatened by an increase in the number of nuclear weapon states. In this respect, we should celebrate the fact that—notwithstanding their enormous peaceful nuclear capacity—the parties to the treaty have lived up to their undertakings to avert this shared danger.

But we must not be complacent. There are developments, in a very small number of countries that have not joined this regime, that are of serious

Clearly, we should seek measures that mitigate these dilemmas for both developed and developing countries. Domestic energy programs in the industrialized countries are necessary to accomplish this. In addition, actions by the developed countries to help augment alternative sources of energy in developing countries are in our own interests as well.

For these reasons, it is not appropriate to leave oil conservation entirely to "market forces." Private consumers of oil are guided in their decisions by present and future expected prices of oil. In their purchasing decisions they do not take into account the domestic and international macroeconomic costs associated with rapidly increasing oil prices.

There are two other costs not adequately taken into account by private decisionmakers. First, they do not take into account the total incremental cost to a nation arising from an increase in demand for oil. An increase in demand from a large country or by the industrialized countries as a group will increase the total bill for oil by driving up prices on all oil, as it did in 1979. The true cost to consumers of an incremental barrel of imported oil may be as much as twice its apparent cost, because it drives up oil prices.

Second, private consumers do not take adequately into account the risks of disruption. Private holders of oil ran down their stocks in 1978 when they could have built them cheaply and easily, but built up their stocks in 1979, thereby aggravating the oil shortage and driving the price of oil much higher than it need have been. And, of course, private consumers of oil give no concern in their purchasing decisions to national security or foreign policy considerations.

I sum up this discussion by arguing that the price mechanism must be supplemented—not replaced, but supplemented—by governmental action and guidelines encouraging or requiring conservation of oil. These actions are designed to protect the smooth functioning of our national economies. It is not sufficient to rely exclusively on the price mechanism.

I want, in concluding, to express doubts about another possible "solution" to the world oil problem. That is the suggestion that if we could only negotiate an agreement with the members of the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) over the price and supply of oil, we could restore some order to the world economy and then carry on with our national economic policies in confidence that they would not be disturbed by the oil sector in the ways that I have outlined above. This proposal presupposes, of course, that such an agreement could be negotiated with the OPEC countries at an acceptable cost. I want to raise a doubt whether such an agreement, assuming it could be negotiated, would in fact provide the security that its advocates claim for it.

We have now lived through a revolution in Iran, before 1979 the world's second largest oil-exporting country. Is there a credible agreement among nations that would insure us against a repetition of those events sometime during the next decade? And if there is not, should we not pursue policies which guard us against disruption of oil supplies, even if we did have such an agreement? We must, of course, engage in active and constructive dialogue with the oil-exporting countries. There are many interests we have in common, and we especially have in common the joint task of managing our actions so as to minimize disruption to the world economy. But I believe that we must rely principally on our own efforts to relieve the emerging shortage of oil in the coming years and to protect ourselves against sudden disruption of supplies.

Let me try to recapitulate. We should not be lulled into a false sense of security by the low year-to-year visability of population growth or by the present surplus of world oil supplies. Many other problems that we face—inflation, slow growth, higher unemployment, protectionism stemming from greater competiton from developing countries, degradation of the environment, even political unrest and terrorism—either stem from or are greatly aggravated by these two underlying factors. I have suggested, however, that there are actions we can take to deal with these basic underlying problems. If we wish to avoid economic crisis in the 1980s, we must push ahead with the important tasks of limiting population growth, augmenting food production, and reducing our demand for imported oil. ■

Extension of MFN Waivers for China, Hungary, Romania

by Rozanne Ridgway

Statement submitted to the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Finance Committee on July 21, 1980. Ambassador Ridgway is Counselor of the Department of State.[1]

I am pleased to have this opportunity today to testify on behalf of further extension of the President's waiver authority under Section 402 of the Trade Act, and specifically his authority to continue the waivers permitting most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment for the People's Republic of China, Hungary, and Romania. The extension of the waiver for China represents a first for that country following the entry into force on February 1, 1980, of the U.S.-China trade agreement. The President's waiver authority has proven to be a valuable device for furthering U.S. interests with Romania and Hungary, and we believe that it will also prove so in the case of China.

China

We are particularly pleased with the recent development of our relations with China. The U.S.-China trade agreement marked a significant step toward establishing a normal trade and economic relationship between our two countries. The agreement provides significant benefits and assistance to American businessmen while creating a solid foundation for continued expansion of economic ties. We anticipate that the trade agreement will contribute to growth in our trade and that the total two-way turnover will exceed $3 billion in 1980 with a large U.S. surplus.

Normal economic interchange with China is an essential element of our overall relations with Beijing. Our objectives in furthering and expanding relations with China are to build meaningful political, cultural, and economic relations. All of these objectives, we believe, will work to the mutual benefit of our countries.

With respect to emigration, Chinese Government policy is to facilitate applications by Chinese either to go abroad or to return to China. In accordance with this policy, substantially increased numbers of people have been authorized to leave China in the last 2 years. In the past 12 months, for in-

stance, over 75,000 Chinese have entered Hong Kong, the primary exit point, with Chinese Government exit permission. Our Embassy in Beijing has issued over 8,000 nonimmigrant visas in the same period. Since November 1978, over 16,000 Chinese have entered Hong Kong to apply for immigrant visas to join relatives in the United States. Thus, performance has accorded with policy. The major impediment to increased immigration from China to the United States at this time, in fact, is not Chinese policy or practice but rather the numerical limitations required by U.S. immigration law.

Romania and Hungary

Turning to Romania and Hungary, I would like to state briefly the general policy considerations on which our relations with the countries of Eastern Europe are based. I would like to note that I visited both countries 6 weeks ago, and received a first hand impression from the respective officials of the importance which both countries attach to their relations with the United States. In the course of my discussions, I reiterated the importance that we also attach to these relations and the concern which we have in the United States with regard to the respect of human rights.

During the 1970s, we made steady progress in our relations with most of the countries of Eastern Europe. This progress was especially noteworthy during the latter half of the decade. As we move into the 1980s, we remain committed to the course of attempting to strengthen these relations further. We do not hold the Eastern European countries accountable for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which they did not participate in and evidently were not consulted about. Thus, we continue to encourage a broad range of commercial, economic, political, and cultural relations with Hungary and Romania and with the other Eastern European countries as well. We require only that, as we have in the past, there be reciprocity and respect for our concerns.

We expect that the continuation of our efforts to expand relations with the individual Eastern European countries will provide the necessary framework within which to carry out more open and productive exchanges on many topics, including human rights, which are of interest to us. The continued expansion of trade and economic cooperation is also of direct benefit to U.S. industrial and agricultural producers and to U.S. consumers.

We continue to have basic disagreements with the governments of Eastern Europe on a wide range of questions dealing with political and religious freedoms, as well as with interpretations of basic human and social values. However, an activist policy of political, economic, and cultural exchange with these countries is a means of encouraging change and building on the diversity which has become more evident over the years.

Romania. Specifically concerning Romania, we believe that it is in our best interest to encourage Romania's determination to maintain its distinctive independent posture within the Warsaw Pact. In spite of apparent increased pressures toward conformity—mostly arising from Romania's energy problems—Romania has persevered in its commitment to formulate its own foreign policy. Romania's opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a recent case in point.

The numerous exchanges and high-level visits which we have conducted with Romania since the last hearings, including my own in June to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Romania, have afforded us new opportunities to emphasize the importance that we attach to freedom of emigration and to respect for all human rights. We believe that these discussions have produced significant results, as is shown by the increase in emigration to the United States and to Israel. We are well aware that many of Romania's policies do not conform with our own. However, the willingness of the Romanian Government to discuss various aspects of human rights questions, including such sensitive matters as the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Romania, represents a significant development.

U.S. trade with Romania, as will be elaborated by my colleagues, has grown and diversified considerably since the granting of MFN and last year reached a two-way total of $830 million.

Hungary. I am pleased to note that the constructive dialogue which has characterized U.S.-Hungarian relations since the return to Budapest of the Crown of Saint Stephen and the conclusion in 1978 of our bilateral trade agreement continues. Our ability to deal frankly with each other on a basis of mutual respect has persisted, despite the downturn in U.S.-Soviet relations. Both we and Hungary place emphasis on our commitments to full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, on the one hand, and to maintaining and extending the positive aspects of bilateral relations, on the other. Overall, there is a balance of interests and results. Economic and commercial relations have developed, while at the same time we have been able to expand relations under auspices of the Helsinki Final Act in the cultural and humanitarian fields, including a series of unprecedented visits by religious leaders.

Hungarian performance on emigration has continued to be positive. The number of problem cases outstanding at any one time remains small, and Hungary's record in resolving problem cases continues to be quite good. In fact, six of the seven cases we presented to the Hungarian Government last October have now been favorably resolved.

U.S.-Hungarian economic relations, as will be described later in detail, show promise of continued expansion to the benefit of both countries. In 1979 our two-way trade totaled $190 million, which represented a 14% increase from the previous year.

In conclusion, we believe that the continuation in effect of the waiver for China is essential for the future development of an enduring, friendly, and cooperative relationship with that country. Similarly, we believe that continuation of the waivers is also fully justified with respect to Romania and Hungary in view of the emigration records of both countries. It is apparent that the impact on our relations with these countries of MFN tariff treatment and the other trade and economic relationships which flow from our bilateral trade agreements has been most beneficial. These relationships also are an essential element in our ability to continue to develop broad and meaningful contacts both in the political and economic areas.

In view of these factors, the Administration strongly recommends the extension of the President's authority to waive Section 402 of the Trade Act to continue in effect the waivers for China, Hungary, and Romania and to permit the extension of future waivers to other countries as circumstances permit.

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

passing of the law by Israel, making it the eternal and undivided capital, to what extent does that present an obstacle to the negotiations?

A. As you know, the Jerusalem law was the factor which, I guess, more than anything else, led President Sadat to suspend the negotiations. The feeling in Israel was that the law really did not, in any substantive way, change the situation from what it had been before and, that as a matter of fact, Jerusalem was an issue which is not involved and should not be involved in the current negotiations.

I think for the moment, both parties recognize that we ought to be focusing on the issues which are central to the negotiations. At Camp David, it was understood, implicitly or explicitly, that Jerusalem would not be tackled until the time was right, that moving it center-stage under the white light of publicity when we were engaged in these negotiations destroyed the negotiations, derailed them, and that it was important to sort things out again and go back to our negotiations, recognizing we're not going to deal with the problems of Jerusalem now.

Under those circumstances, I hope we are at a point where we can go forward and that the Jerusalem issue will not be a factor which interferes with our making progress.

Q. On that very point, one of the open issues, as I understand it, was whether the East Jerusalem Arabs would be able to vote in autonomy elections. Do the suggestions that you have now put forth include a recommendation on that?

A. They are not covered in the document itself, but there has been discussion about that issue.

Q. Did the Prime Minister explain to you about his plans to move his office to East Jerusalem and what he intends to do about it?

A. We discussed that issue, and I conveyed the substance of that discussion to President Sadat. I will not discuss it here, I think. All I can say to you on that is, let's wait and see.

Q. You were on the record, I think, in *The Washington Post* the other day, saying that Prime Minister Begin agreed to postpone the move indefinitely.

A. I was on a bad record, then. No, I can't say that I ever said that nor can I ever say that he offered me that kind of an assurance. I didn't ask for that. What I did get was an impression as to what he might or might not do, and as I said before, let's just wait and see what happens.

Q. Related to that, did Prime Minister Begin discuss any other good will gestures with you; for example, the release of some Arab prisoners or the cessation of more settlements. If so, was today's report that there will be four new settlements a surprise to you?

A. No, I was not surprised by the announcement. We had had some discussion about that. We also had had a discussion about moves that might be made in the West Bank and Gaza on other things which I think you referred to, or which have been referred to, as so-called confidence-building measures. And once again, though I don't like to be unresponsive, all I can say to you is, let's wait and see what now happens.

Q. Can you shed any light at all on the interim agreement that the United States has presented? If it doesn't cover the issue of voting rights for East Jerusalem Arabs, what are some of the subjects that it does cover? And why wouldn't it cover that since that is one of the major—

A. Because that is one that still has to be discussed. That's the first point. In other words, I didn't say it covered every issue. I'm trying to say where we are so far and where we can see answers and how we would go at it.

Sure, it covers land, water, security, even settlements. I think that you ought not to have any feeling that this is a nonsubstantive document. It is a paper that undertakes to present positions on these issues that not only cover, as you might expect, a list of the areas of responsibilities and the areas to be under the aegis of a self-governing authority that I mentioned to you in the past but also now focuses on some of the toughest issues that, in the past I've said to you, have to be dealt with if we are to reach an agreement.

Q. What is the position on these four things? What is the U.S. recommending in these four areas you mentioned?

A. That I won't tell you. Let me just tell you again why. What I am trying to do is negotiate quietly, and if you want to know a hard chore, it's negotiating quietly in Israel or Egypt.

I'm trying to negotiate quietly to see whether the kind of suggestions we have put forward will be mutually acceptable. One sure way to keep them from being mutually acceptable is to tout them in the press and talk about American ideas rather than have them emerge from discussion among us. So I don't think it would be appropriate for me to disclose them.

Q. Are there political issues in the interim agreement covered? Are there some covered and some not covered? In other words, are these on technical issues, the interim agreement; basically, on land, water, security, that sort of thing? Or do they go into the autonomy election itself and the makeup of a constituent body? In other words, how much of the political issues are covered in this interim agreement?

A. They're covered. I don't want to mislead you. They're not fully covered. I don't want anybody to think that what I'm saying is we put down a piece of paper which covers everything about every issue. What I am trying to say is we have tried to approach each of the issues in a way that will make progress in dealing with them, political and nonpolitical alike.

Q. You just said that you were, in other words, misquoted about the comments of Prime Minister Begin to postpone his move into Israel indefinitely.

Do you have, then, an assurance from President Sadat that when and if Prime Minister Begin decides to move to East Jerusalem, that the negotiations, if resumed by then, will not be suspended again?

A. I'm not going to give you a double subjunctive answer. I, one, am not going to tell you—for reasons which I tried to explain—what I did or did not convey. I will merely tell you that the alleged quotation is inaccurate because I did not convey that. But I will tell you that I discussed with both of them that particular issue.

Q. Were you able to reach a satisfactory understanding with Israel on the question of settlements, which was one of the reasons that prompted Egypt to call off the talks?

A. We discussed the settlement issue. I think it's fair to say that Prime Minister Begin and his Cabinet are aware of our longstanding concern about settlements; our feeling that the proliferation of settlements has been an obstacle to the negotiations; that we feel that it does not advance the negotiations or the cause of peace for an un-

limited settlement policy to continue; the response to all this, I conveyed to President Sadat.

Q. Was there a satisfactory response?

A. Following what I told him, he agreed to go back into the negotiations, so I can only assume that President Sadat, who calculated this very carefully, thought that it, in some measure, responded to his concern.

Q. Were you, personally, impressed by the Israeli response? Do you think it is an improvement?

A. Over what?

Q. Over the question of settlements?

A. As you know, bluntly, we have never, in the past, been satisfied with their response, so I think this is a little better than the past, yes.

Q. President Carter indicated Thursday night that a summit will be, if necessary, or if needed—he said it twice—

A. Yes.

Q. Isn't it already set up, the summit?

A. No, it's not set up. But I think what the President meant was if the parties wanted a summit, if they felt it was necessary, he would be pleased to participate. Both parties have agreed that they do think it is necessary and a good idea, and so I think the President will participate.

Q. Do I understand correctly that on the powers of the self-governing authority, you have given some suggestions, but you haven't exhausted the issues? There are still some areas that are open that you haven't made suggestions on?

A. Yes. Most of them we've dealt with. When you say "the powers," you mean a listing of the powers to be exercised?

Q. Yes, and going back to an earlier question, the authorities, of the self-governing authority.

A. To a very large extent we've covered most of that. There are some that we have not yet covered, so it is not a complete thing.

Let me put it this way, as I think I've said to you before: We have, in the past, agreed on some 80% of the areas of responsibility to be conveyed to the self-governing authority; our discussions have focused on the so-called 20%. We are, in this new document, making progress with the additional 20%.

Q. On the East Jerusalem-Arab voting rights, are you intending, effectively, and are you signaling today that the intention is to put this off until the summit?

A. No, I'm not saying that. I'm saying that I think both sides recognize that it's an issue that has to be looked at. We're going to have to decide now the right time, the right place, the right way; what, if anything, has to be done preparatory to the summit, if it can be done.

Q. We know that Prime Minister Begin will be in Washington around the 11th. Will this occasion be used for full-scale talks on the autonomy between him and the President?

A. I doubt it. As you know, he's coming here on an informal visit which he told me about—I guess there's an anniversary for Jabotinsky that he's coming for to speak in New York—and while here, he will have an unofficial visit to Washington. He's been invited, I think, on November 11th, to meet with the President.

I don't think the contemplation is to turn this into a full-scale talk on the autonomy. I'd be surprised if autonomy did not come up in the course of his visit.

Q. Is it your hope that this document, once it's negotiated and completed to the satisfaction of all three parties, would then be released after a summit by the three heads of state?

A. I don't know. I don't want to presume, at this point, what I really don't know. What we have is a document that's going to be studied now in the weeks ahead and discussed among us.

It's not a ploy for a summit; it's an effort to reach agreement on at least some issues as an interim step toward full agreement. We haven't even got to the point of knowing whether we can get a full agreement on such a document and, if so, what the time of issuance is.

Q. Assuming that you do reach agreement on this document, what would be the stage that would follow?

A. I don't know. I mean, I think we would then talk with one another and say, what do we do with it now?

Q. Would the achievement of this document lead to the holding of elections on the West Bank and Gaza?

A. I think it would need more. No, it would need more work before we're ready for that. This is not a document—if that's what you're asking—is this a document which could be put before the Palestinians and say, vote on it? No, I don't think so, no.

Q. Was this the first time that such a document was presented to the parties, or had it been in circulation among the parties before?

A. There was an earlier document—a short draft document—which some weeks ago we presented to both parties and which we have discussed over the past weeks. We have now taken that short document—taking into account the results of our discussions—amplified it, added new provisions, and tried to put together now a more substantive document which can now become the focus of attention.

Q. How do you see the schedule or the timetable of all those stages that you described until the full-scale, three-side resumption of the talks? When do you expect those ministers to come here for the talks, and when do you expect a three-side meeting for the first time again?

A. I shouldn't try, without consultation with my colleagues, to give you a schedule now. I can surmise for you, as you can for yourself. If we are now engaged in some bilateral discussions which will continue—there will be the interruption of the Jewish holidays, as you know—then there will be some preliminary trilateral meetings—perhaps that will get us into October. Then I would assume sometime perhaps around the middle of October the full-scale negotiations might resume—maybe a little earlier, maybe a little later—I don't know. Something like that.

Q. I wonder if you could tell us where the idea for the draft document came from in the Administration—whether President Carter should be credited with the idea or you or former Ambassador Strauss [Ambassador Linowitz' predecessor] or who?

A. You're making it very difficult for my modesty, but let me first say I am responsible for the negotiations. My instructions from the President have been general: to proceed as seems best in order to advance the negotiations and the prospects for them.

ations with great interest—as the only game in town.

For over 30 years, the Arab-Israel conflict has provided fertile ground for the congenital nay-sayers and the traditional prophets of doom. Except for such historic moments as the visit of President Sadat to Jerusalem or the signing of the Camp David accords, the problems always loomed larger than the possibilities.

The Camp David process has been and is being criticized and denounced during past months as an inadequate and unpromising process. Some critics point out (correctly) that the Camp David accords do not settle the Jerusalem problem; that they do not answer Palestinian questions about the final status of the West Bank and Gaza; that they do not guarantee permanent Israeli security. Some—outside of the present negotiations, seduced by the illusion of easy answers and quick solutions—contend that the pace of the negotiations evidences their ineffectiveness and ultimate failure.

But I submit that all of these arguments miss the central point, for it was the genius of the negotiators at Camp David that they understood that all too many past efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East had failed precisely because they had grasped for too much too soon. They recognized that the issues in this region are so complex, the emotions so deep, the contending forces so many, the stakes so great, that the problems defy shortcut solutions. The wisdom of Camp David was to recognize this fact, to understand that bitterness dies hard while trust grows slowly. The key to Camp David was its recognition that the best hope for enduring peace lay in a phased process—one in which agreements attainable at one stage become building blocks for future progress on more difficult issues.

So by foregoing a quest for comprehensive "breakthroughs," Camp David itself became a breakthrough. By deciding to pursue peace in relatively modest steps, the parties at Camp David took a giant step.

What was sensible then remains sensible today. Our goal remains not dramatic breakthroughs but steady incremental progress. It was with full awareness of this that President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin last month reaffirmed their belief in the soundness of the Camp David approach and recommitted their countries to see this process through to success regardless of temporary difficulties that may intrude on the process. I find cause for hope—even some optimism—in this reaffirmation and in our subsequent negotiations.

Seabed Mining and Law of the Sea

by Elliot L. Richardson

Address before the American Mining Congress in San Francisco on September 24, 1980. Ambassador Richardson is Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference. He resigned on October 1, 1980, and was replaced by his deputy, Ambassador George H. Aldrich who will be Acting Special Representative.

Early in the last Law of the Sea Conference session in Geneva a friend gave me a bit of paper salvaged from a fortune cookie. Instantly recognizing its applicability to the conference, I taped it into my wallet and began showing it to my colleagues. It said: "This is the month when ingenuity stands high on the list."

The motto proved prophetic. At the beginning of the session an extensive list of stubborn issues remained outstanding. At its close only four were generally recognized as requiring further negotiation at next spring's final session. They are boundary delimitation and the "three Ps"—participation, the Preparatory Commission, and preparatory investment protection. In addition, a handful of less important but desirable improvements remain to be worked out.

Assuming that these last few problems are solved and that the balance of the entire interlocking structure is not destroyed at the final stage by formal amendments, we will then have a treaty which, in my judgement, the deep seabed mining industry and American industry in general should wish to see ratified.

The standards on which I base this judgment have not changed since just over 3 years ago I branded as "totally unacceptable" the seabed mining part of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT). Thanks to a lot of ingenuity and even more very hard bargaining, the present draft convention is vastly better than the ICNT. Since 1977,

Reasons for Hope

I know that to many people who have watched the agonies of the Middle East over the years, it seems surprising—even mystifying—that any negotiator on the Middle East can still be hopeful. Often I am asked how, in the light of the history of violence and hostility and deep-seated emotion, how, in the light of the difficulty of the issues and the slow pace of the negotiations, can I retain hope and even a measure of optimism?

There are several reasons for this. To begin with, I am a negotiator, and negotiators are by definition optimists. We had better be. The business of a negotiator, after all, is to try to fashion practical solutions from the most unpromising raw material. And I must admit I take some comfort from the thoughtful observation of that great American philosopher Casey Stengel who said: "They say you can't do it, but sometimes that doesn't always work." But I am also a realist, and as a realist I find reason for hope in the record that has been built since Camp David. Think of it: We have a peace treaty and normalized relations between Egypt and Israel; we have the demonstrated commitment of both countries to reach agreements in these negotiations; we have made significant substantive progress, even though there is still a distance to go; and we have the United States involved as a full partner in the process, permitting us to act as a catalyst and as a constructive spur to progress.

In a world torn by uncertainty and conflict, the continuing hostility between Israel and the Arab world can only be described as a crisis. In the Chinese language the word crisis is written by combining two other symbols—the symbol for "danger" and the symbol for "opportunity."

In the Middle East the danger is great and we know it. But the opportunity is also great, and that too we know. At this moment in history, we owe it to ourselves, to our children, and their children to do all we can to assure that our present opportunity is not lost.

Over 100 years ago, Ralph Waldo Emerson put very well the challenge and the opportunity we face in these words:

> If there is any period one would desire to be born in, is it not the age of revolution when the old and the new stand side by side and admit of being compared; when the energies of all men are searched by fear and by hope; when the achievements of the past era can be compensated by the rich possibilities of the new?
>
> This time, like all times, is a very good one, if we but know what to do with it.

[1] Press release 303. ■

roughly 135 changes have been made in the seabed mining provisions; 120 of these are improvements from our point of view. All the objectionable features of the ICNT that I denounced in 1977 have been replaced by fair and workable compromises.

The ICNT itself improved the navigational provisions of earlier texts. Since then the articles on protection of the marine environment, marine mammals, scientific research, and dispute settlement have also been improved; useful general clauses and an acceptable preamble have been added; and all but one of the final clauses—that relating to participation—have been satisfactorily negotiated.

The result by any standard is an unprecedented achievement for multilateral negotiation. That it was possible to find ways of accommodating such diverse and intense national interests can be accounted for only by the commitment of most participants to what they saw as an overriding and inspiring goal: the prevention of conflict and the extension of a generally agreed system of law to more than two-thirds of the Earth's surface.

General Considerations

Mere inspiration, I realize, will not lift manganese nodules from the deep ocean floor. As some of this audience can attest from firsthand experience, that requires creative engineering, sustained hard work, and entrepreneurial risktaking of a high order. Whether such risktaking will be justifiable and prudent during the next decade is a matter of business judgment which only the potential investors can decide.

In addition to assessing the risks normal to investment in a hard-mineral mining venture on land, seabed mining investors have had to reckon with the absence of a generally accepted legal regime. Our view, as you know, is that deep seabed resources may be recovered lawfully by any state or its nationals as an exercise of a traditional high-seas freedom. We see nodules as analogous to the living resources of the high seas—the fish—that are found beyond the 200-mile fisheries zone.

This is not merely a defensible position but one that rests on a solid foundation of established international law. There are, however, difficulties with it. One is that it is totally rejected by most governments, including those of all the developing countries. A second is that deep seabed nodules can't swim, and seabed miners aren't fishermen. Miners must have an exclusive legal right to a suitable ore body before they undertake the large, long-term investments necessary to recover and process the ore. Commercially exploitable manganese nodules, with negligible exceptions, do not occur in parts of the seabed subject to the resource jurisdiction of any nation. No nation can confer a right to mine them which is enforceable against the nationals of any other country. Indeed, the position that mining is a high-seas freedom cannot be squared with the assertion of any such power.

In our view, however, nations can license their own nationals to mine the deep seabed and can reciprocally agree to respect the licenses granted by other nations. The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, as you know, have each enacted legislation that would authorize such reciprocal licensing, not as an alternative to the Law of the Sea convention but to foster the continued development of seabed mining capability. It is likely that several other advanced industrial countries will in due course follow suit. The number of these countries, however, is not likely in the foreseeable future to exceed six or eight. Can they collectively provide sufficient security for seabed mining investment? This in itself is a question of some difficulty. The fact that there have been threats of reprisal is not, of course, dispositive: We have no way of knowing whether or not such threats would in fact be carried out or, if they were, what damage they might inflict. That there would be legal challenges to any claims purporting to rest on national legislation is certain; only the outcome is in doubt.

The only sure way of removing these threats and uncertainties, quite obviously, is through the establishment of a universally recognized international legal regime for the exploitation of deep seabed minerals. This is what the Law of the Sea treaty undertakes to do. How secure and how reasonable is the regime that would be established by the treaty?

Before I attempt to answer this question, I should like to make two preliminary points.

The first is that the real test of the viability of the regime is how it would work on the nonreserved side—that is, under a contract between a consortium of private companies and the proposed International Seabed Authority. While the treaty would permit all kinds of joint arrangements between private corporations and the Enterprise, the opportunity to negotiate a joint arrangement on an arm's-length basis depends on the existence of a realistic option to operate independently.

Second, I take it as a realistic assumption that the regime will operate in a manner consistent with the letter and spirit of its charter as embodied in the treaty. This has been made probable by the fact that the rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority will have been developed by the Preparatory Commission before the treaty enters into force and can be changed thereafter only by consensus. These specific and detailed directives will preclude actions relying on worst-case interpretations of general treaty language that have often been invoked by critics of the treaty. I would urge both the mining companies and the Senate of the United States, however, to defer a final decision on the treaty's merits until after the Preparatory Commission has completed its work.

Having established these ground rules, let's take a closer look at the system.

Viability of the System

To justify spending $1 billion on a single seabed mining project, an investor is entitled to insist on:

- Assured access to the opportunity to exploit a specific minesite;
- A fair chance to earn a return on investment commensurate with the risk undertaken;
- Solid protection against the arbitrary or unpredictable use or abuse of the Authority's power.

How adequately will the treaty satisfy these requirements? Rules, regulations, and procedures aside, this question can be addressed now since it is highly unlikely that there will be further changes in the text important enough to have any substantial effect on the answer.

Assured Access. To be assured of access to the opportunity for deep seabed mining, a prospective miner who has the necessary capital and know-how must be assured that the International Seabed Authority's contract approval process is fair, clear, and well-nigh automatic. The criteria spelled out in Annex III of the treaty satisfy this requirement. An applicant has only to be sponsored by a state party and to satisfy the financial and technical qualifications specified by the regulations. His plan of work must fulfill the specifications with

difficult to analyze because it involves commercial, political, and even psychological considerations projected into the relatively distant future.

Those who believe that the Moon Treaty creates a *de facto* moratorium draw upon lessons which they believe may be derived from the LOS negotiations and the involvement of American companies in ventures to mine the deep seabeds. It has been said that while the Moon Treaty does not foreclose the possibility that *governments* may one day undertake to exploit the resources of outer space, the treaty limits or forecloses free enterprise initiatives in outer space because of the ambiguity of the "common heritage" concept and uncertainty over the powers and operating procedures of a future international regime, as well as the rules and regulations the regime will adopt to govern exploitation.

It is argued that in an area that requires substantial investment in new technology, no private corporation would be willing to engage in the necessary 15–20 years of expensive research and development if there were a substantial risk that it would then be politically impossible for the company to enter the exploitation or commercial recovery phase of its project.

As part of our effort to assess this view, we have sought the views of major American aerospace and extractive industry companies and trade organizations. The replies thus far received are far from unanimous in support of this view—or in support of the Moon Treaty. About half of the respondents believe that the treaty would inhibit free enterprise from exploiting nonterrestrial resources, while the other half support the position of the ABA's international law section, i.e., that the treaty will be acceptable if its ratification includes the declarations and interpretations recommended by that section.

In analyzing this issue the proper approach, I believe, is to recognize that the Moon Treaty exists and to address, as the key question, whether a *de facto* moratorium based upon perceived uncertainties about the future is more likely to arise if we adhere to the treaty than if we do not.

Here again, there are different schools of thought which provide different answers. One is that if the United States refuses to become a party to the Moon Treaty at this time, and the treaty fails to gain wide acceptance, especially among other space powers, this would reduce the likelihood that negotiations will be convened for an international legal regime under the Moon Treaty. This approach, it is argued, would leave the United States with the option of acceding to the Moon Treaty at a later date or pursuing other alternatives.

The other school of thought expects wide adherence to the Moon Treaty. It is thus argued that because U.S. interests would be served by an acceptable, broad-based, international regime, the United States should put itself in a position to make such a regime acceptable through participation in the negotiations contemplated by the Moon Treaty. Although a degree of uncertainty would exist between now and the time the regime is developed, such uncertainty would exist even without the Moon Treaty, and certain steps can be taken to reduce uncertainty if it, in fact, produces undesirable consequences.

Supporters of this view point out that in assessing the uncertainties of the future, it should be borne in mind that, because of the efforts of American negotiators, the Moon Treaty contains rights which would be crucial to the successful establishment of a commercial exploitation operation. One example of such a right is that contained in Article 11(3). As explained at pages 6–7 of the report of the ABA's international law section, that provision was drafted so as to recognize the existence of property rights in natural resources moved or extracted from their original situs.

While it is the position of the United States that this right also exists under the 1967 treaty, our view is not universally shared, as I stated earlier, which means that adherence to the Moon Treaty would arguably provide us with useful reinforcement for the property rights involved. Moreover, as a party to the Moon Treaty, the United States and its nationals would be in a far better legal position to block efforts by other states to deny us such property rights.

Similarly, Article 8 of the Moon Treaty specifically establishes a right to place equipment and facilities on or below the surface of the Moon and forbids parties from interfering with the activities of other parties on the Moon. This provision could be vital in assuring that the general rights to explore and use the Moon and to have free access to all areas of celestial bodies—which rights are set forth in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty—cannot be utilized to interrupt or disturb exploitative operations by a party.

Of course, if the United States does not ahere to the treaty, American companies and financial institutions will eventually have to determine whether or not the 1967 Outer Space Treaty provides sufficient certainty for them to commit the tens of billions of dollars necessary for lunar exploitation.

We recognize that there are and will continue to be uncertainties as to the future of exploitation in outer space, and it may be that in due course Congress will wish to consider the unilateral enactment of national legislation establishing a legal framework for U.S. companies to engage in nonterrestrial exploitation.

In this context an analogy to the Law of the Sea negotiating environment may be appropriate. The recently enacted Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act (PL 96–283) acknowledges a period of investor uncertainty and proposes certain government backing. If investor insecurity regarding celestial exploitation poses a problem and the government wishes to encourage early exploitation of lunar resources by private industry, passage of a comparable bill appropriate to the lunar context might be considered. Because negotiation of a lunar resources regime cannot be expected to begin for 15–30 years, the United States would have ample time to put into place legislation tailored to the task. Nothing in the Moon Treaty prohibits such legislation.

As to other methods of reducing future uncertainties and thus encouraging private investment in the exploitation of nonterrestrial natural resources, we are, as I have indicated, studying the desirability of attaching to any instrument of ratification understandings and declarations possibly similar to those proposed by the ABA's international law section, which are obviously directed at eliminating to the greatest extent such uncertainties about the future. While the section's proposals have not yet been fully considered, it does appear that they are fully consistent with statements made by U.S. negotiators in the course of negotiations.

It might be useful to to add at this point that, should such declarations and understandings be incorporated in an instrument of ratification, they would not be, as some have contended, merely indications of U.S. intentions and without a legal effect. As a matter of customary treaty law, if other state parties to a treaty do not contest such declarations within a reasonable time, the declarations become an integral

part of the treaty relationship between the state making the declaration and each nonobjecting state. If the declarations are contested by another state, and the objecting state feels so strongly about the matter that it wishes to avoid having a treaty relationship with the United States which would incorporate the U.S. declarations, then it must state that there simply is no treaty relationship between the state making the declaration and the contesting state.

There are no circumstances under which the United States could be considered, as a matter of international law or domestic law, as having undertaken legal obligations inconsistent with Senate reservations or understandings. A U.S. domestic court could not construe our treaty obligations in a manner inconsistent with such qualifications, nor could an international tribunal.

Conclusion

The report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the basic precepts of which I set out at the commencement of my statement, concluded with the following words: "In ratifying this treaty the United States will give up nothing; but we stand to gain much from this commendable effort to allow law and common sense to precede power and competition into outer space." American space policy has been guided from the beginning by the spirit expressed in the Senate report, and this was the spirit and policy guiding the United States during the 7 years of negotiations on the Moon Treaty.

I have tried to explain what this and previous Administrations intended to accomplish by the Moon Treaty in the realm of exploitation of nonterrestrial natural resources, and I have attempted to set forth what we presently regard as the proper legal interpretation of the treaty. Although we have not completed our analysis of the treaty, as I conclude my statement I would like to sum up these legal points very briefly.

I think it is generally agreed that the treaty would place no legal limitations on the exploitation of celestial natural resources by any government or private entity beyond those already contained in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty; the only qualification would be that activities with respect to the natural resources of the Moon must be carried out in a manner compatible with the environmental protections contained in Article 7 and with the purposes specified in Article 11(7). Although the latter provision speaks of "equitable sharing," we do not regard that reference as in any way diminishing the exclusive right of the United States to determine how it shares the benefits derived from exploitation by it or its nationals.

In regard to the international regime referred to in Article 11(5), neither the "common heritage of mankind" concept as embodied in the treaty nor any other provision of the treaty would legally require any specific form of international arrangement for the regulation of the exploitation of Moon or other celestial body resources. Neither the treaty nor the "common heritage" concept gives rise to any specific obligation on states in regard to the establishment of such a regime except the commitment to engage in good faith negotiations to attempt to establish a mutually acceptable international regime to govern the exploitation of natural resources on celestial bodies when exploitation of such natural resources is about to become feasible.

While the common heritage concept in the context of Article 11 implies that every state party to the treaty has a significant interest in the possible future exploitation of nonterrestrial resources and that their views are to be given serious consideration at a future international conference to establish a regime, such an interest has long since been established by the legal principles incorporated in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

The Law of the Sea experience with the common heritage concept, while relevant, could not properly be regarded as legally controlling in the negotiations of any such future agreement on the legal regime. Article 11(1) of the Moon Treaty was intended to make clear that the common heritage concept in the Moon Treaty finds its meaning totally within the text of the Moon Treaty itself. During future negotiations as to the Moon regime there will undoubtedly be efforts to draw on the Law of the Sea experience, and there may also be references to such other multinational cooperative ventures in outer space as INTELSAT, an organization which itself establishes that the criteria set forth in Article 11(7) of the Moon Treaty can be met by institutional arrangements quite different than those contemplated in the Law of the Sea negotiations on seabed mining.

At any future negotiation to establish an international regime, there will, of course, be no legal obligation that agreement be reached at the conference or that the United States accept any results of the negotiations. The United States will be free at that time, as before, to assess the results against its own national interests and priorities. Any resulting treaty establishing an international regime specifically concerned with the exploitation of celestial natural resources would also have to be signed and presented to the Senate for its advice and consent before it would become binding on the United States. Refusal by the United States to accept any such international regime would not preclude either the United States or its nationals from unilaterally exploiting the natural resources of the Moon or other celestial bodies.

I should add that many of the foregoing observations on the Moon Treaty are considered and supported by the very comprehensive and valuable study by the Office of Technology Assessment, which was undertaken at the request of Senators Stevenson and Cannon, and is now nearing completion. For example, that study observes that the common heritage provision was worded so as to preclude the definition of the concept from being controlled by external sources, that the Moon Treaty contains no commitment to conclude a new treaty, and that the treaty cannot legally be interpreted as imposing a moratorium on exploitation.

Our study of the treaty will continue with a view to reaching final conclusions as to whether the United States should become a party thereto or whether we should remain aloof. We continue to believe that "law and common sense" are criteria which have served the national interests of the United States, and we will proceed with our study in this spirit.

[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Norway
Naturalization convention and protocol. Signed at Stockholm May 26, 1869. Entered into force June 14, 1871. 17 Stat. 809.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 3, 1980; effective Oct. 3, 1981.

Protocol amending the convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and property, signed at Oslo on Dec. 3, 1971 (TIAS 7474). Signed at Oslo Sept. 19, 1980. Enters into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Panama
Agreement relating to jurisdiction over vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Aug. 15 and Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Oct. 10, 1980.

Papua New Guinea
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Papua New Guinea, with related note. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 6, 1980. Entered into force Oct. 6, 1980.

Peru
Naturalization convention. Signed at Lima Oct. 15, 1907. Entered into force July 23, 1909. 36 Stat. 2181.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 24, 1980; effective Oct. 24, 1981.

Portugal
Naturalization convention. Signed at Washington May 7, 1908. Entered into force Nov. 14, 1908. 35 Stat. 2082.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Apr. 20, 1981.

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the U.S. Signed at Washington Oct. 16, 1980. Enters into force on a date to be mutually agreed by exchange of notes, upon the completion of internal procedures of both governments.

Saudi Arabia
Agreement concerning the testing of Saudi Arabian iron ore, relating to the technical cooperation agreement of Feb. 13, 1975, as extended (TIAS 8072). Effected by letter signed at Washington Aug. 5, 1980, with concurrences at Riyadh Sept. 15, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 15, 1980.

Agreement extending the project agreement of Sept. 27, 1975 (TIAS 8490), for technical cooperation in statistics and data processing. Letter dated Sept. 22, 1980 at Washington and confirmed Oct. 4, 1980, at Riyadh. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1980.

Sierra Leone
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Aug. 8, 1980. Effected by exchange of notes at Freetown Sept. 29, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 29, 1980.

Somalia
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Mar. 20, 1978 (TIAS 9222). Signed at Mogadishu June 25, 1980. Entered into force June 25, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of June 25, 1980. Effected by exchange of notes at Mogadishu Aug. 14 and 17, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 17, 1980.

Suriname
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. international military education and training (IMET) program. Effected by exchange of notes at Paramaribo Aug. 22 and 25, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 25, 1980.

Thailand
Agreement concerning a program to combat attacks by pirates on boat refugees in the Gulf of Thailand. Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok Sept. 30, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1980.

Togo
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. international military education and training (IMET) program. Effected by exchange of notes at Lome Mar. 10 and July 17, 1980. Entered into force July 17, 1980.

United Kingdom
Agreement extending the Polaris sales agreement of Apr. 6, 1963 (TIAS 5313), to cover the sale of Trident I weapons system. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Sept. 30, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1980.

Uruguay
Naturalization convention. Signed at Montevideo Aug. 10, 1908. Entered into force May 14, 1909. 36 Stat. 2165.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Oct. 20, 1981.

Venezuela
Maritime boundary treaty. Signed at Caracas Mar. 28, 1978.[3]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Oct. 10, 1980.

Zaire
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Kinshasa July 28, 1980. Entered into force Oct. 20, 1980.

[1] With declaration(s).
[2] With reservation(s).
[3] Not in force.
[4] Not in force for the U.S.
[5] With statement. ■

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Events pertaining to Iran may be found on page 47.

October 5
Portugal holds parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Francisco Sa Carneiro's Democratic Alliance wins 134 seats in the 250-member parliament.

West Germany holds parliamentary elections. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's coalition Government of Social Democrats and Free Democrats is returned to office.

October 6
Nigerian President Shehu Shagari makes official visit to U.S., Oct. 3–8, and to Washington, D.C., Oct. 7–8.

October 17
U.S.-Soviet delegates meet in Geneva to begin discussions of questions related to the limitation of certain U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces.

U.S. and Israel sign agreement to implement emergency oil supply guarantee of June 22, 1979.

October 18
Australia holds parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser's Liberal Party is returned to office.

October 23
Soviet Premier Kosygin resigns and is replaced by his First Deputy, Nikolai A. Tikhonov.

October 25
After a 5-week meeting in Belgrade, delegates of the 21st UNESCO general conference approves UNESCO's program and budget for the coming 2 years and establishes a new communications development clearinghouse. It also adopts a resolution which noted the McBride commission report."

October 30
Jamaica holds parliamentary elections. Edward Seaga of the Jamaica Labor Party replaces the Democratic Socialist Party of Prime Minister Manley.

Press briefing on international communications issues discussed at the 21st UNESCO general conference in Belgrade is held at State Department. ■

PRESS RELEASES

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*269	10/1	Program for Nigerian President Shagari's official visit to Washington, D.C., Oct. 7–8.
270	9/25	Muskie: news conference, New York.
271	10/2	Muskie: news conference, New York.
272	10/6	Muskie: address before the American Lutheran Church, Minneapolis.
273	10/6	Muskie: address before the Economic Club of Memphis and Memphis in May International Festival, Inc., Memphis.
273A	10/11	Muskie: question-and-answer session following Memphis address, Oct. 10.
*274	10/6	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, Oct. 23.
*275	10/6	U.S. Organization of the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), study group A, Oct. 22.
*276	10/6	Overseas School Advisory Council, Dec. 17.
*277	10/6	Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, Nov. 13.
*278	10/8	Fernando E. Rondon sworn in as Ambassador to Madagascar (biographic data).
*279	10/10	Jerrold Martin North sworn in as Ambassador to Djibouti (biographic data).
280	10/10	Muskie: press briefing, Memphis, Oct. 6.
*281	10/9	Lyle Franklin Lane sworn in as Ambassador to Paraguay, Aug. 27 (biographic data).
282	10/11	Muskie: address at Notre Dame University, South Bend.
283	10/14	Muskie: address at the Peace Corps rededication ceremony, Ann Arbor.
*284	10/16	Muskie: news conference, Buffalo, Oct. 14.
285	10/14	Muskie: address before the General Pulaski Association of the Niagara Frontier, Buffalo.
*286	10/14	1980 Protocol amending the interim convention on conservation of North Pacific fur seals.
*287	10/14	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC) Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on the carriage of dangerous goods, Nov. 6.
*288	10/14	SCC, SOLAS, panel on bulk cargoes, Nov. 12.
*289	10/14	Muskie: press briefing, Ann Arbor.
290	10/16	Muskie: remarks before the Woman's National Democratic Club.
*290A	10/17	Question-and-answer session following Woman's National Democratic Club address, Oct. 16.
*291	10/17	U.S., Portugal sign new fisheries agreement, Oct. 16.
292	10/19	Muskie: interview on ABC–TV's "Issues and Answers."
*293	10/20	Muskie: address before various organizations, Chicago.
*294	10/20	Muskie: address before the Inland Daily Press Association, Chicago.
*295	10/20	Harry E.T. Thayer sworn in as Ambassador to Singapore (biographic data).
*296	10/21	Muskie: address before group sponsored by the Missouri Athletic Club and KMOX, St. Louis.
*297	10/21	U.S., Costa Rica sign bilateral textile agreements, Sept. 22.
298	10/21	Muskie: address before group sponsored by the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee and the Institute of World Affairs, Milwaukee.
*299	10/23	U.S., Belgium bring new air agreement into force.
*300	10/27	Fourth Annual Caribbean Conference on Trade, Investment, and Development, Miami, Nov. 23–25.
*301	10/27	Muskie: address at the University of Scranton, Scranton.
*301A	11/5	Muskie: question-and-answer session following Scranton address, Oct. 27.
*302	10/28	Muskie: address before the Chamber of Commerce, Portland.
*302A	11/5	Muskie: question-and-answer session following Portland address, Oct. 28.
303	10/28	Muskie: address before the Economic Club, New York.
*303A	10/28	Muskie, Linowitz: question-and-answer session following New York address.
*304	10/28	Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea, Nov. 13–14 (partially closed).
*305	10/28	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, Nov. 13.
*306	10/28	SCC, SOLAS, working group on standards of training and watchkeeping, Nov. 18.
*307	10/28	SCC, SOLAS, working group on bulk chemicals, Nov. 13.
*308	10/28	SCC, SOLAS, working group on international multimodal transport and containers, Nov. 13.
*309	10/29	Muskie: question-and-answer session before Jewish Community Relations Council, New York.

*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

U.S.U.N.

Press releases may be obtained from the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.

No.	Date	Subject
*32	4/18	Spero: World Assembly on the elderly, ECOSOC.
*33	4/21	Vanden Heuvel: Lebanon, Security Council.
*34	4/22	"Earth Day" celebrated.
*35	4/22	McCall: statement at "Earth Day" celebrations, New York.
36	4/22	McHenry: address before the UNA-USA, Apr. 19.
*37	4/23	Morgenthau: development activities, ECOSOC.
*38	4/24	McHenry: Lebanon, Security Council.
*39	4/25	McHenry: address to the Washington Bar Association.
*40	4/28	Spero: human rights, ECOSOC.
*41	4/30	McHenry: Palestine, Security Council.
*42	5/1	McCall: address to the National Workshop on Christian-Jewish Relations, Dallas, Apr. 30.
*43	5/1	Spero: UNHCR assistance for the Horn of Africa, ECOSOC, Apr. 29.

respect to such matters as size of area, diligence requirements, and mining standards and practices—including those relevant to protection of the marine environment—that will also be set forth in the regulations. If these requirements are met, his plan of work *must* be approved; there is no discretionary basis for its rejection.

The determination that the applicant and his plan of work do in fact comply with the applicable criteria is the job of the Legal and Technical Commission. The Commission will have 15 members elected to 5-year terms, by a three-fourths vote of the 36-member Council, from among candidates nominated by states parties who meet the "highest standard of competence and integrity with qualifications in relevant fields." The Commission is obligated to base its recommendations solely on the provisions of Annex III and to report fully to the Council. The majority required for decisions by the Commission will be established in the rules, regulations, and procedures, and I expect our representatives on the Preparatory Commission to insist that this must be no more than a simple majority.

Any plan of work which the Commission finds consistent with the requirements of Annex III will be deemed approved by the Council within a fixed time unless the Council decides—by consensus—to disapprove it. While we would have preferred the "deeming" device to apply regardless of the Commission's findings, the conference—understandably, I think—felt that some organ of the Authority would have to attest to conformity with the applicable standards of Annex III. (Indeed, this would also have been true even of the simple licensing proposal originally advocated by the industrial countries.) The automaticity of the system could only be frustrated if three-fourths of the members of the Council made a conscious and determined effort to elect unsuitable Commission members who would ignore the requirements of the treaty.

The Production Ceiling. Although we were able to get agreement in Geneva that approval of a plan of work will no longer be tied to the availability of a nickel-production allotment, the timing of access still depends on the authorization of production under the ceiling. The very existence of the ceiling is, of course, objectionable from our point of view, but we and other consumers of seabed metals confronted a coalition of land-based producers and developing countries whose insistence on transitional protection against the loss of markets demanded some accommodation. As now formulated, the production ceiling is not likely to bar access for any qualified miner. The amount of permitted production is substantial, a "floor" has been added, and the constraint on seabed production is limited in duration.

Because the formula in the text is based on a projection forward of past trends, it is impossible to predict exactly what level of production will be allowed during the 15 years the limit will, in effect, apply. Taking 3.4% as a reasonable and conservative projection of the nickel-consumption growth rate (the Bureau of Mines' mid-range projection for the balance of this century) and 1988 as the earliest practicable startup date for commercial production, we find that the first group of miners to apply for production authorizations could produce annually an aggregate of about 200,000 tons of nickel. On the same assumptions, the limit would be 320,000 tons in 1992, 490,000 tons in 1997, and 590,000 tons in 2002.

In fact, the 15-year, trend-line growth rate for nickel consumption is currently about 3.9% and, if that rate were to hold up in the future, the tonnage allowed to seabed mining would be considerably higher. If future growth should turn out to be significantly lower than anticipated, the full effect would not be felt because of the "floor" provision in the formula. This substitutes a minimum 3% growth rate for any actual rate lower than 3%. Even if the growth rate fell as low as 2.2%, seabed miners could—if they thought they could make money in the kind of economic climate implied by such a discouraging trend—still supply up to 18% of the nickel market in the first year of production and up to 36% by the 15th year. Notwithstanding the share of production taken up by the Enterprise, acting alone or in joint ventures, there would still be sufficient tonnage under any reasonable set of assumptions to insure that private miners would get their authorizations when they need them. It is thus probable that market forces, not the production limitation formula, will determine how much nickel and, therefore, how much copper, cobalt, and manganese will be produced by the first generation of seabed mining projects.

Return of Investment. Capital outlay, operating costs, and metal prices, of course—not payments for the right to mine such as fees, royalties, and profit shares—are the dominant factors governing the return on any mining investment. The latter, nevertheless, must not be excessively burdensome, and in this respect the treaty's financial provisions are not worse than most other tax systems. The front-end load is modest in proportion to the size of the investment involved. It consists of an application fee, a sort of "ground rent" payable until production begins, and the cost of prospecting the minesite which is turned over to the Enterprise under the banking system. The application fee is tied to the actual cost of processing the application but is limited in any case to $500,000. The "ground rent" of $1 million per year is creditable against royalties (the "production charge") once production begins and is waived if a contractor is held up by a lack of tonnage under the production ceiling. The cost of prospecting a minesite is roughly $10 million.

Once production begins, the production charge and profit-share payments come into play. They take effect in two stages; the first before the investment has been recovered and the second afterward. In the first stage, the production charge is 2% of market value of the processed metals produced by the project. In the second stage, it increases to 4% unless the return on investment in a given year would fall below 15% if the 4% rate were applied, in which case the production charge reverts to 2% for the year. The profit-sharing payments are based on a graduated, incremental schedule. During the first stage, the rates are 35% for that income providing a return on investment of 10% or less, 42.5% for that income providing a return between 10% and 20% and 50% for that income providing a return in excess of 20%. In the second stage, the corresponding rates are 40%, 50%, and 70%. Unlike the production charge, which applies, in effect, to all proceeds, the profit share applies only to the actual fraction attributable to the mining portion of the project—or to 25% of total proceeds, whichever is higher.

Of course, this system of payments cannot be looked at in isolation. Miners will also have to pay national taxes, and the relationship between the two systems is important in determining the financial viability of a project. The question of how the U.S. tax system should take into account payments made by U.S. citizens to the Authority has yet to receive systematic attention. In my judgment, however, a tax credit for profit-sharing payments is likely to prove both

appropriate and necessary if seabed mining is to be conducted under the U.S. flag.

Transfer of Technology. Originally proposed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1976 as part of a package designed to win support for the "parallel system," some form of assistance to the Enterprise in acquiring technology has ever since been integral to any seabed mining deal. Since I came on board in 1977, our negotiating objectives have been to confine the obligation to its accepted purpose and to make sure that it did not undercut the miner's chance for a fair return on his investment. This has been a tough, hard-fought battle, but I believe that the outcome is tolerable.

One of the unacceptable defects of the ICNT was a provision making the transfer of technology a condition of obtaining a contract. The text now bars the Enterprise from invoking the technology transfer obligation until after the contract is in effect and until it has found, despite a good-faith effort including tenders for bids, that it cannot purchase the technology it needs on the open market. There may well be sellers glad to spread their research and development costs. And since the Enterprise can in any case acquire technology under a joint arrangement, it may never seek to obtain it by other means. If the Enterprise does have occasion to invoke the obligation, it must do so on the basis of "fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions," and any dispute as to the application of this standard is subject to commercial arbitration. The obligation expires, in any case, 10 years after the Enterprise has begun commercial production.

The technology covered is limited to the "specialized equipment and technical know-how . . . necessary to assemble, maintain and operate" the mining system. We successfully overcame a major effort by the Group of 77 to get the obligation extended to processing technology. We were also able to exclude manufacturing data. In the case of technology that he uses but does not own, the miner is required to obtain the owner's written assurance, which need not be legally binding, that the owner will be prepared to do business on a similar basis with the Enterprise. The miner must also be willing to try to acquire the legal right to transfer to the Enterprise the mining technology he uses but doesn't own if he can do so without substantial cost to himself.

That is not all, unfortunately. Despite our strong opposition, the technology-transfer provisions still contain the so-called Brazil clause. This clause allows one or more developing countries to take advantage of these provisions in the event that the Authority authorizes them to exploit the reserved site banked by the miner whose technology is sought, instead of keeping the site for the Enterprise. The problem is more political than practical, as there is little chance that the option will ever be exercised. Given the cost of buying the technology and meeting the other capital requirements of a mining project, it is scarcely conceivable that any developing country or group of developing countries will ever undertake seabed mining on their own. It would make far more sense, and it is thus far more likely, that they would choose instead to enter into some form of association either with the Enterprise or with a multinational company, both of which will have technology.

Protection Against the Abuse of Power. In addition to the assurance of access and the chance to earn a fair return on investment, the third essential requirement of a viable seabed mining regime is protection against the arbitrary or unpredictable use or abuse of power.

As I have already pointed out, one measure of protection is the barrier against distortion of the text erected by the fact that the Preparatory Commission will be charged with preparing the Authority's initial rules and regulations. The Commission will meet essentially full-time for perhaps 2 years. Experts will have more influence in such a forum than in the Law of the Sea Conference itself. The United States will have a head start in getting ready for the Preparatory Commission because implementation of our own legislation will require the preparation of similar rules and regulations. Our colleagues in the Commission will be aware, moreover, that the prospect of Senate advice and consent will be strongly influenced by the acceptability, or otherwise, of the rules and regulations. They will also be aware that the Authority is not likely ever to be created without our participation.

A second measure of protection against the abuse of power is the care with which the powers and functions of the Authority have been allocated. Although the text still refers to the Assembly as the "supreme organ" of the Authority, it is no longer possible to read this phrase in its present context as conferring power to usurp the executive role of the Council in managing the seabed mining regime.

Third, the Council itself has been prevented from taking majority action contrary to the vital economic interests of its seabed mining and consumer members. This was the most important single achievement of the Geneva session. Amendments to the initial rules and regulations adopted by the Preparatory Commission, which will govern matters critical to the conduct of mining operations, will now require a Council consensus. Consensus will also be needed for the rejection of a plan of work approved by the Legal and Technical Commission as well as for amendments to the treaty and measures to protect land-based producers. Most other issues will be subject to a three-fourths vote and the remainder to a two-thirds vote. Any new power assigned to the Council will require a consensus, if so provided in the rules and regulations conferring the power or if no voting rule is specified, and any dispute as to the voting category to which an issue belongs will be decided by the higher—or highest—of the majorities in question. Not least, the United States has now been effectively assured a seat on the Council by a new provision which gives each interest group or regional group entitled to representation the right to select its own representatives.

Fourth, the security of contract is explicitly protected both against action of the Authority and against amendment by the review conference. In fact, rules and regulations issued or revised subsequent to the conclusion of a mining contract cannot retroactively be applied to that contract—a provision which may warrant some modification in the case of environmental regulations.

As a final measure of protection in the event that none of the foregoing safeguards proves sufficient, provision has been made for the binding adjudication of disputes. The dispute settlement procedures can be summarized as follows.

- Any contractual dispute between a miner and the Authority, or a dispute as to whether the terms offered by a miner for the sale of his technology to the Enterprise, are within the range of fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions, may be taken to commercial arbitration by either party.

Pakistan's President Meets With President Carter

President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan called on President Carter on October 3, 1980. Following are remarks the two Presidents made to reporters at the conclusion of their meeting.[1]

President Carter

First of all, I'd like to express to the people of our country and Pakistan the deep honor that I consider having been paid to us and to our country by the visit of President Zia. I've told him privately and would like to express publicly that the people of the United States have the greatest admiration for the courage of the people and the leaders of the great nation of Pakistan.

They live in a troubled region. Their security has been threatened as has the security of other nations in the region. And the tenacity with which they've adhered to their own deep commitments for peace and for sharing their responsibility for the maintenance of peace has indeed aroused the renewed admiration of the entire world. In addition, the humanitarian attitude of the people of Pakistan in receiving hundreds of thousands of refugees from Afghanistan is a matter that causes great admiration for the people of President Zia's country.

In my State of the Union message this year, I pointed out that the independence and the freedom and security of Pakistan was very important to our country. On a mutual basis we understand that the relationship between our countries is of the utmost importance. Our commitment to consult very closely with Pakistan was expressed in an agreement signed in 1959; if Pakistan should be in danger, that commitment stands today as it did in 1959 and at the time of the State of the Union message that I delivered this January.

In addition, our countries share with almost every other nation on Earth the belief that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is contrary to the laws of peaceloving nations, contrary to the peace and stability of the entire world, and that the Soviets should withdraw their occupying forces immediately. This was expressed by more than a hundred countries through the United Nations earlier this year. Our commitment to this U.N. action still stands even though time has passed.

In addition, we are deeply grateful for President Zia's role as a spokesman for the Islamic conference. His recent visit to Tehran and then to Baghdad to try to limit the combat, the loss of blood, and also to bring to an early conclusion the war between Iran and Iraq is of great importance to us all.

And finally let me say that we are honored personally by his visit. He's a military man who received part of his training in our country. He's familiar with our nation. His knowledge of the sensitivities and ideals of America make him particularly dear to us. And his role now as the President of that great country has shown by all of his actions the political leadership and its worth not only to the people of Pakistan but to that entire troubled region and to our country as well.

President Zia, we are deeply grateful to you and your associates for coming here on a mission of great importance to the United Nations and now to Washington. We wish you well and express again the great value of the friendship that exists between our two people.

President Zia

Through the President of the United States, President Carter, I wish to thank you for giving me this opportunity.

I am very grateful to President Carter himself for giving me this opportunity, particularly at the time when he's so busy with a very crucial campaign at home. We wish him all the best.

I'm also very grateful to him for giving me this opportunity of establishing personal contact. Being an army man, I've learned one thing—that it is different talking man-to-man rather than communicating from 12,000 miles away. I have found it equally true today in my meeting with President Carter, whom I found exactly a little more than my expectations were—a man of deep understanding, a humane personality, and who has at the bottom of his heart love of humanity, the rights of men to live as men, as free men. As President of the United States, I found him a competent personality to bear the beacon of light that the free world expects of him to bear.

I think this meeting has been very purposeful. And if the relationship between Pakistan and the United States continues to be meaningful and pur-

Bangladesh President Meets With President Carter

JOINT STATEMENT, AUG. 27, 1980[1]

President Carter and President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh met for an hour today.

The two Presidents reviewed bilateral relations and discussed regional and international issues of mutual concern. They agreed to work for upholding the principles of the U.N. Charter and expressed opposition to foreign armed intervention or interference of any kind in the internal affairs of any country and called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan and Kampuchea. They also discussed the Middle East problem and stressed the need for a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of this problem at an early date.

President Ziaur Rahman thanked President Carter for the meaningful role played by the United States in economic cooperation with Bangladesh. He described the various measures adopted for social, political, and economic development in Bangladesh including restoration of democracy and also the launching of the new 5-year plan. President Carter expressed his personal admiration for the economic and political progress Bangladesh has made under President Ziaur Rahman's leadership and assured him of all possible cooperation in the successful implementation of the second 5-year plan.

Both Presidents noted with satisfaction the excellent state of relations between the two countries and agreed to work to further improve the friendship and understanding which already exist.

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 1, 1980 (list of participants omitted here). ■

Iran-Iraq Conflict

by Donald F. McHenry

Statement made in the Security Council on October 23, 1980. Ambassador McHenry is U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.[1]

For 1 month Iran and Iraq have been at war. Despite this Council's urgent call on September 28 for a cessation of hostilities, the tragic conflict still continues, bringing anguish and loss to countless innocent families in its wake.

Representatives of Iran and Iraq have both presented their views to this Council. Islamic, nonaligned, and other states continue their efforts to bridge the gap between the two sides and to lay the basis for a peaceful settlement of this tragic dispute. Their efforts deserve our vigorous support. But, as we are all aware, the responsibilities which the charter imposes on us here cannot and must not be delegated to others.

We are deeply concerned that this conflict be resolved with respect for the cardinal principles of international law that territory must not be seized by force and that disputes should be settled peacefully and not by armed invasion. The work of the Security Council in matters of peace and war is premised on the adherence of member states to such undisputed principles of international law. These principles have direct relevance to the actions which the belligerents must, as members of this Organization, undertake without delay.

First, member states of the United Nations have renounced war as a tool of national policy. Whatever the provocations adduced by Iran and Iraq and whatever they may understandably regard as the imperatives of self-defense, their charter obligations and the distress of their own civilian populations require them to cease hostilities.

Second, as members of the United Nations, Iran and Iraq have undertaken not to seek the acquisition of territory by force of arms. This is the law of the charter, and it is the rule that all members solemnly reiterated in 1970 when the entire membership of the United Nations adopted the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The declaration provides: "The territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal."

Third, as members of the United Nations, Iran and Iraq are bound to seek to settle their disputes by peaceful means. We in the Council, charged as we are with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, are bound to insist that they do so. Iraq's representatives have reasserted their government's respect for the United Nations and have consistently affirmed their government has no claims to Iranian territory. Territory claimed by both belligerents should be the subject of peaceful negotiations. The Council must work vigorously to assist Iran and Iraq to achieve a cease-fire, to begin withdrawal, and to initiate a process of negotiation in a manner acceptable to both. The United States has no specific proposal to offer as to the manner and form in which these negotiations should be undertaken, but we believe it imperative that the Council insist that they begin promptly.

Finally, we believe that a fourth universal principle of international law should also guide the parties in their search for the peaceful settlement of their differences. It seems to us essential to a lasting resolution of this conflict that both sides should solemnly undertake not to interfere in the affairs of the other.

All of us must be opposed to the dismemberment of Iran. The United States believes that the cohesion and stability of Iran is in the interest of the stability and prosperity of the region as a whole. The national integrity of Iran is today threatened by the Iraqi invasion.

We would also recall that every state has the right to choose its own forms of government and organize its domestic society, subject only to the obligations of international law. Statements and actions by national leaders intended to incite civil strife in another country cannot be condoned by the world community even in time of war and gravely undermine the efforts of those seeking to establish the foundations for a peaceful settlement.

The position of the United States from the beginning of this dispute has been clear. We will not take sides. But to declare that we will not take sides is not to declare that we intend to remain aloof or that we do not recognize our responsibilities to this Organization. The political ramifications of a continuing war need no elaboration. Neither are we indifferent to the threat which the conflict presents to a region which is of vital concern to the economic health of the world. We believe strongly that there must be no infringement of the internationally recognized freedom and safety of navigation in the Persian Gulf which is of such importance to the international community. We welcome the assurances given by both Iran and Iraq in this regard.

The United Nations was founded on a noble ideal: to save succeeding generations from what the charter rightly calls "the scourge of war." It would be foolish to assert that when the bitterness of years erupts into overt war, the oath of the peacemakers is easy to discern. The United States, however, believes deeply that the principles of international law to which I have referred do point the way forward to peace. It is inconceivable to us that Iran and Iraq wish the present suffering to continue. If both are prepared to respect the principles of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, of peaceful settlement of disputes, and of noninterference in the internal affairs of the other, it should be possible to bring this tragic conflict to an end without further delay and to do so in a manner which does justice to the legitimate concerns of both sides.

Centuries of armed disputes the world over have surely taught that the peace which is imposed by military superiority is no more than a truce. Only a settlement which Iranians and

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poseful, as we wish, and if Pakistan, a developing country, is smothered and helped in more than the economic field and if the burden, on humanitarian grounds, that we are bearing of over a million refugees from the neighboring country of Afghanistan is shared, as is being done by the United States of America, I think we'll have something to offer to humanity.

I once again thank President Carter for all his kindnesses, his hospitality, his generosity to receive me at this time when he's so busy, and my colleagues and my delegation. On my own behalf, on behalf of the people of Pakistan, through you, ladies and gentlemen of the press, I want to thank him and thank the people of the United States of America for the very practical understanding of the problems of Pakistan and people of Pakistan.

[1] Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 6, 1980. ■

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*44	5/2	Spero: assistance to the Kampuchean people, ECOSOC, May 1.
*45	5/7	McCall: proposed sale of 931 First Ave., New York, Community Board No. 6.
*46	5/8	McHenry: address at the University of Michigan, May 3.
*47	5/8	McHenry: statement on the death of Yugoslov President Tito, UNGA.
*48	5/8	Vanden Heuvel: occupied Arab territories, Security Council.
*49	5/12	McCall: address at Tougaloo College, Tougaloo, Miss., May 11.
*50	5/16	Petree: information, Committee on Information.
*51	5/19	McCall: TTPI, Trusteeship Council.
*52	5/19	Winkel: TTPI, Trusteeship Council.
*53	5/19	Petree: disarmament, Disarmament Commission.
*54	5/19	Formation of a joint N.Y. Police Department and FBI terrorism task force.
*55	5/20	Camacho: Mariana Islands, Trusteeship Council.
*56	5/20	Nakamura: TTPI, Trusteeship Council.
*57	5/22	Benton: UNICEF.
*58	5/23	McHenry: address to Operation Crossroads Africa, May 22.
*59	5/27	Spero: science and technology, Intergovernmental Committee on Science and Technology for Development.
*60	5/27	New York regional conference for women, June 2.
*61	5/30	McCall: TTPI, Trusteeship Council.
*62	6/2	Petree: Indian Ocean, ad hoc committee.
63	6/5	McHenry: occupied Arab territories, Security Council.
*64	6/8	McCall: address at the Cathedral Church of St. John the Divine.
*65	6/10	Petree: Indian Ocean, ad hoc committee, June 3.
66	6/13	McHenry: South Africa, Security Council.
*67	6/13	Petree: UNFICYP, Security Council.
*68	6/16	Kahan: Indian Ocean, Committee on the Indian Ocean.
*69	6/17	Petree: UNIFIL, Security Council.
*70	6/23	McHenry: address before the Council on Religion and International Affairs, June 19.
*71	6/23	Strasser: Virgin Islands, Subcommittee on Small Territories of the Special Committee on Decolonization.
*72	6/24	McHenry: Caribbean, Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development, IBRD, Washington, D.C.
*73	6/25	Vanden Heuvel: space, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
*74	6/27	U.S. delegation to the World Conference of the U.N. Decade for Women (biographic data).
*75	6/27	Vanden Heuvel: Angolan complaint, Security Council.
76	6/30	McHenry: status of Jerusalem, Security Council.
*77	7/7	McHenry: global negotiations, Committee of the Whole.
*78	7/8	McHenry: ECOSOC, Geneva.
79	7/11	Western five statement on Namibia.
*80	7/18	Ambassador McCall goes to the Caribbean.
81	7/24	Vanden Heuvel: Palestine, UNGA emergency special session.
*82	7/25	Kahan: Indian Ocean, ad hoc committee.
83	7/29	Vanden Heuvel: Palestine, UNGA emergency special session.
*84	7/30	McHenry: Zimbabwe membership, Security Council.
*85	7/31	Kahan: Indian Ocean, ad hoc committee.
*86	8/4	McHenry: address before the National Urban League.

* Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

Department of State Publications

Free, single copies of the following Department of State publications are available from the Public Information Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

The President

National Security Policy, American Legion, Boston, Aug. 21, 1980 (Current Policy #214).

Secretary Muskie's News Conference

Subjects: hostages, nuclear fuel to India, SALT and Soviet relations, seating Democratic Kampuchean regime at U.N., Poland, Foreign Service Act, Sept. 15, 1980 (Current Policy #218).

Africa

U.S. Policy Toward Liberia, Assistant Secretary Moose, House Appropriations subcommittee, Aug. 19, 1980 (Current Policy #210).

Arms Control

U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Secretary Muskie, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sept. 16, 1980 (Current Policy #219).

Essentials of Security: Arms and More, Secretary Muskie, Pittsburgh World Affairs Council, Sept. 18, 1980 (Current Policy #220).

Obligations of Peace, Secretary Muskie, U.N. General Assembly, Sept. 22, 1980 (Current Policy #225).

East Asia

U.S.-China agreements signed Sept. 17, 1980 (Selected Documents #18).

U.S.-China Relations (GIST, Sept. 1980).

Economics

World Economic Crisis in the 1980s?, Under Secretary Cooper, Alpbach European Forum, Alpbach, Austria, Sept. 1, 1980 (Current Policy #217).

Europe

Export Restrictions on U.S.S.R., Under Secretary Cooper, Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, Aug. 20, 1980 (Current Policy #211).

Eighth Semiannual Report: Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Dec. 1, 1979–May 31, 1980 (Special Report #73).

U.S. Partial Embargo on Grain Sales to the U.S.S.R. (GIST, Sept. 1980).

Human Rights

Human Rights and the National Interest, Deputy Secretary Christopher, American Bar Assoc., Honolulu, Aug. 4, 1980 (Current Policy #206).

Middle East

U.S. Relations With Persian Gulf States, Assistant Secretary Saunders' annual overview, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Sept. 3, 1980 (Current Policy #215).

U.S.-Libyan Relations Since 1969, Under Secretary Newsom, Senate Judiciary subcommittee, Aug. 4, 1980 (Current Policy #216).

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Prospects for Middle East Peace, Ambassador Linowitz, National Press Club, Sept. 18, 1980 (Current Policy #223). ■

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• The Seabeds Disputes Chamber is also available to any state party, to any party to a contract, and to any miner who applies for a contract. The Chamber has the power to correct abuses of discretion or actions taken in excess of power, including failure to approve a plan of work. The Chamber is an 11-member body selected by the Law of the Sea Tribunal from among its 21 members. The Chamber can also be called upon by a commercial arbitral tribunal to interpret the convention.

• Disputes between states parties may, at the option of either party, be brought before an ad hoc panel of the Seabed Disputes Chamber.

The Interim Problem

Up to now I have been talking only about the seabed mining regime that would come into existence after the convention enters into force. The acceptability of the ultimate regime, however, is inescapably affected by the situation that will exist during the interval between signature of the convention and its entry into force. The very existence of the convention as a document that may become binding upon the United States at some future date—depending upon when and whether we and others ratify it—creates uncertainties and therefore risks for the prospective miner. These uncertainities include:

• The possibility that he may be denied the eventual right to mine the particular site which he has spent large sums to explore and for which his equipment is specifically adapted;

• The worry that the Authority will find some unjustifiable excuse for refusing to approve his plan of work;

• Uncertainty as to obtaining the authorization of sufficient production under the production ceiling early enough to start mining as soon as everything else is ready to go; and

- The concern that he may not be allowed to continue mining without interruption if the treaty enters into force as to the United States after January 1, 1988, and after he has begun commercial production under our domestic legislation.

A well-drafted grandfather clause written into the treaty would, of course, give the miner complete protection against all these risks. It is obvious, however, that the conference will never go that far. For one thing, such a clause would preempt the Authority's role with respect to the first group of contracts; for another, it would be seen to give the nonreserved side of the parallel system an unjustified advantage over the reserved side. As I see it, the most we can realistically aim for is a combination of risk insurance under domestic legislation and some form of preparatory investment protection under the treaty which might include the right to continue mining until the Authority can act.

The chances of persuading the executive branch and the Congress to agree to risk insurance, which could be patterned on the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, have been enhanced by recent improvements in the text—for example, the clear provisions of Annex III and their elaboration in the rules and regulations—sharply reducing the likelihood of any of the worrisome possibilities which I enumerated a moment ago. The desirability of risk insurance is also influenced by the degree to which it would be in the national interest for the exploitation of seabed minerals to take place under the treaty rather than under domestic legislation. Although the national interests served by other parts of the treaty—air and naval mobility, for example, or protection of the marine environment—cannot make acceptable a treaty whose seabed mining regime is incapable of attracting investment, these other interests, when added to the national interest in the earliest practicable access to seabed minerals, may help to tip the scales in favor of risk insurance. Without such insurance, the development of seabed mining might have to be delayed until it is known for certain whether or not the treaty will enter into force as to the United States. Without such insurance, moreover, the seabed mining industry might see the prevention of delay as justifying the treaty's quick demise—an outcome contrary, I believe, not only to the national interest but to the interest of the industry itself.

Meanwhile, the chances of persuading the conference to agree on an adequate measure of preparatory investment protection would be improved if the interval between signature and entry into force could be used in ways that would enable the Enterprise to get an earlier start than would otherwise be possible. The parallel system has two parts, after all, and it is essential to each that the other succeed. One possibility, if some means of meeting the cost can be found, would be to use the interval to explore a minesite for the Enterprise. Another possibility would be a beginning on the training of the future employees of the Enterprise. Such possibilities, it seems to me, may offer a challenge and an opportunity: Whatever helps the capital "E" side of the system get off to a fast start could at the same time smooth the way for the small "e" side.

Seabed mining is in the truest sense a pioneering venture. So too is the effort of the world community to build the structure of a new international seabed mining regime on the proposition that the global commons are not subject to the jurisdiction of any state. It has been a difficult effort, the most difficult I have ever been a part of. But the same pioneering spirit and the same confidence in the future that have brought seabed mining and the seabed mining regime so close to reality can also assure a harmonious relationship between the two. And don't forget ingenuity—it still stands high on the list. ■

The Moon Treaty

by Roberts B. Owen

Statement before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on July 29, 1980. Mr. Owen is the Legal Adviser of the Department of State.[1]

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you to address matters related to the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, more frequently referred to as the Moon Treaty. Secretary Muskie regrets that he was unable to represent the State Department at these hearings.

However, as you are perhaps aware, State Department lawyers have regularly served on or chaired the U.S. delegation to the Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space—the Outer Space Committee—since its creation as an *ad hoc* body in 1958. It was in this subcommittee that the Moon Treaty, the fifth treaty directly related to man's activities in outer space, was in large part negotiated from 1972 to 1979. The treaty received the consensus approval of the Outer Space Committee on July 3, 1979, and it was approved by the U.N General Assembly on December 5, 1979. Since then, France, Austria, Chile, the Philippines, and Romania have signed the treaty but have not yet ratified it. The treaty will come into force once five states have ratified it and thus become parties.

Over the past 9 months the treaty has been both criticized and supported by a broad range of interests. For this reason, when the Administration began to examine matters related to possible signature of the treaty and its transmittal to the Senate, an interagency study of the treaty was initiated to insure that the various political, economic, and legal issues would receive the most careful consideration.

The study, which is still going forward, clearly should take into account the matters developed at the present hearings. Since the study is not complete, obviously I cannot now provide a definitive Administration position as to signature and ratification of the Moon Treaty, but perhaps my testimony will be helpful in clarifying, if not resolving, certain issues, particularly those of a legal nature.

The Administration's study will, of course, cover all aspects of the treaty. During the current hearings, however, I would anticipate a division of subject matter as among those appearing for different Federal agencies. I would expect a witness from the Department of Defense to deal with those provisions of the treaty relating to arms control, while the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will concentrate on the institutional context within which the treaty was negotiated and the issues relating to space exploration.

My focus will be upon those aspects of the treaty relating to the exploitation of nonterrestrial natural resources. It will be in this context that I will take up those issues to which you referred in your letter to Secretary Muskie on June 17, namely, the State Department's interpretation and views on the Moon Treaty, the development of U.S. policy with respect to the treaty, and our views of the "common heritage of mankind" concept. It is, of course, important that one keep in mind that the Moon Treaty is not limited to the exploitation issue, although that is the area which seems to have generated the most controversy. The arms control and space exploration provisions of the treaty also contain elements of political, military, and scientific significance to the United States.

1967 Outer Space Treaty

In the debate over the Moon Treaty, it is essential to bear in mind the existence and consequences of the first and most important treaty negotiated by the Outer Space Committee—the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, generally known as the Outer Space Treaty. Because of the fundamental importance of this treaty in assessing and understanding the Moon Treaty and U.S. positions during its negotiation, I wish to place on the record some specific language from the Outer Space Treaty, to which the Senate gave its consent without reservation and which has been binding upon the United States for the past 13 years.

> . . . The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind. [Article I]
>
> Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality . . . and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. [Article I]
>
> Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. [Article II]
>
> . . . The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. [Article VI]
>
> In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. [Article IX]
>
> All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. [Article XII]

The development of U.S. policy with respect to the Moon Treaty obviously had to be carried out within the legal context established by the Outer Space Treaty, which is not only legally binding upon us but also generally regarded as the cornerstone of U.S. space policy and vital to American interests in outer space. In fact, as is the case with the three outer space treaties negotiated immediately prior to the Moon Treaty, the Moon Treaty essentially represents an elaboration of the basic principles of the Outer Space Treaty. Against that background the present inquiry relating to the Moon Treaty should focus, presumably, on those areas where the Moon Treaty goes beyond the 1967 Outer Space Treaty in order to see how such provisions may affect the interests of the United States.

Negotiating History and Other Background

My testimony will often refer to the negotiating history of the treaty. This serves two purposes.

First, the negotiating history of any treaty is obviously relevant to complete understanding of the treaty, and arguments either pro or con the treaty can be better analyzed and judged with knowledge of how the treaty text came to be what it is. As a legal matter, the preparatory work of a treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion are, of course, recognized by

Iraqis can both regard as fair and equitable will create the conditions for the lasting peace which is their objective and the objective of all of us in the Security Council, where we are tasked to act on behalf of all the members of the United Nations.

[1] USUN press release 118. ■

Namibia

by Donald F. McHenry

Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 9, 1980. Ambassador McHenry is U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.[1]

I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak with you today on the subject of Namibia—a matter of importance to the Administration and one which I know has been a concern of the subcommittee for some time. I last addressed the subcommittee on the question of Namibia, also known as South-West Africa, on May 7, 1979. At that time I described in some detail the history of the Namibia dispute:

- The League of Nations' mandate given to South Africa to administer the territory following World War I;
- South Africa's steady imposition of its own system of apartheid on the territory and the subsequent 1966 decision of the U.N. General Assembly, with the support of the United States, to terminate South Africa's mandate;
- The ruling by the International Court of Justice that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal and that South Africa was obliged to withdraw; and
- South Africa's refusal to withdraw and the development of the armed struggle, led by the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

I also described the decision in April 1977, by the then five Western members of the U.N. Security Council—Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States—to jointly launch an unprecedented effort to find an internationally acceptable solution to the Namibian problem, based on the set of principles unanimously adopted by the U.N. Security Council in Resolution 385 in January 1976. I outlined some of the problems with which the five's settlement effort has been faced, and I explained the proposal for a settlement which the five placed before the U.N. Security Council on April 10, 1978.

That proposal includes among its key elements:

- The holding of free and fair elections for a constituent assembly leading to independence;
- The cessation of all hostile acts by all parties;
- The restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to base and the subsequent phased withdrawal from Namibia of all South African troops—that withdrawal to be completed 1 week after the certification of the elections;
- The administration of the territory during the transitional period leading to the elections by a South African-appointed administrator general, with all acts affecting the political process under the supervision and control of a U.N. special representative appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations.
- The introduction of a U.N. civilian and military presence to insure the observance of the terms of the settlement;
- The release of all Namibian political prisoners and detainees;
- The return of exiles; and
- The establishment of conditions for free and fair elections, including freedom of speech, movement, press, assembly, and the repeal of discriminatory or restrictive legislation.

When I last addressed the subcommittee on this subject, I indicated that both South Africa and SWAPO had agreed to the five's settlement proposal but that South Africa had not agreed to the U.N. Secretary General's plans for implementation of the proposal—plans which the five regarded as consistent with the original proposal which South Africa had accepted. SWAPO, on the other hand, had indicated its acceptance of the Secretary General's implementation plans and its readiness to move ahead with that implementation.

I would recommend my earlier testimony to the members of the subcommittee for a fuller discussion of the events which I have just recalled. Today, however, I would like to provide you with an update on the developments which have taken place since and with an assessment of the current state of our continuing settlement effort.

Recent Developments

In May of 1979 South Africa raised two principal objections to the Secretary General's plans for implementation. The one which then seemed to be South Africa's primary objection concerned the Secretary General's proposal that any SWAPO armed personnal inside Namibia at the start of the cease-fire would be restricted and monitored by the United Nations at designated locations inside Namibia. South Africa objected to this proposal on the grounds that it would provide SWAPO with bases inside Namibia. The five supported the Secretary General's proposal as a sensible way of dealing with the practical problem of monitoring those SWAPO armed personnel inside Namibia at the time of the cease-fire. The question became moot when the front-line states, in the interest of advancing the settlement effort, prevailed upon SWAPO to agree that upon South Africa's acceptance of implementation of the settlement plan, SWAPO would no longer insist on such designated locations. Those SWAPO armed personnel inside the territory at the start of the cease-fire would, therefore, be given the choice either of turning over their arms to the United Nations and participating peacefully in the electoral process or of being granted safe passage out of the territory.

The second South African objection concerned South Africa's insistence on the monitoring by the United Nations of SWAPO bases outside Namibia. South Africa maintained this insistence despite the fact that the five's proposal, which South Africa had previously accepted, made no such provision. In the view of the five, this factor had been adequately taken into account in determining the size and composition of the proposed U.N. presence during the transitional period. Moreover, the front-line states had committed themselves to insuring the scrupulous observance of the cease-fire, an assurance which the five had every reason to regard as genuine.

Nevertheless, in an effort to overcome this South African objection, the late President Neto of Angola proposed a compromise: the establishment of a demilitarized zone 50 kilometers on either side of Namibia's northern border with Angola and Zambia. Under this compromise, the U.N. forces would not only monitor the border from the Namibia side, as envisioned in the five's

original proposal, but also would be permitted to operate on the Angolan and Zambian sides of the border within the demilitarized zone. Both the South African Government and the Governments of Angola and Zambia would be permitted to retain certain forces within the 100-kilometer-wide zone at designated locations. No SWAPO forces would be permitted in the demilitarized zone. The South African forces would still be withdrawn from their side of the demilitarized zone 12 weeks after the cease-fire, in accordance with the provisions of the five's proposal.

In a letter to Secretary General Waldheim dated May 12, 1980, the South African Government stated that it had studied and evaluated the feasibility of the demilitarized zone. Among other things, South Africa in its letter asked that it be allowed to retain its forces at 20 designated locations within the demilitarized zone, about three times the number envisioned in President Neto's original proposal. Despite the fact that such a large number of locations was never envisioned, the front-line states, meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, on June 2, once again prevailed upon SWAPO to accept the South African insistence on 20 locations in the hope that this would lead to a final settlement. Angola and Zambia further agreed that their forces would have only seven such locations on their territories within the demilitarized zone.

These agreements were conveyed by front-line and SWAPO representatives to Secretary General Waldheim, who in turn conveyed them to the South African Government in a letter dated June 20, 1980. In his letter, the Secretary General expressed his hope that the forthcoming positions taken by the front-line and SWAPO in order to meet South Africa's remaining reservations about the demilitarized zone concept would now permit South Africa's early agreement to implementation of the settlement plan.

On August 29, South Africa sent a further letter to Secretary General Waldheim, replying to the Secretary General's letter of June 20. In its letter, South Africa sets forth a number of interpretations and assumptions about aspects of the settlement proposal and the demilitarized zone concept. It goes on to state that if these interpretations and assumptions are accepted, South Africa would be prepared to proceed with discussions on the implementation of the settlement plan.

I regret to say that this qualified willingness to discuss implementation of the settlement plan, while not unwelcome, nevertheless falls short of the clear-cut response that had been hoped for. Secretary General Waldheim and the five are currently giving the South African letter detailed study and analysis. For that reason, I am not in a position to comment further at this time on its substance.

Apart from the substance, however, I feel obligated to address at least briefly some of the other aspects of the South African letter that are certain to receive attention. The letter contains a number of allegations and interpretations of fact that can only be described as distorted. In particular, we regard the direct attacks on the Secretary General personally as both unhelpful and unjustified. I do not care to speculate on South Africa's motives in this regard, but I do wish to commend the Secretary General and the other parties involved for their restraint thus far in withholding comment.

If there is a genuine issue buried within the rhetoric of the South African letter, it is the issue of the impartial implementation of the U.N. settlement plan. In this connection, South Africa has charged that the U.N. General Assembly's designation of SWAPO as "the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people" raises questions as to the ability of the United Nations to supervise impartially the elections in Namibia, and South Africa has called on the United Nations to exhibit complete impartiality henceforth.

There are several comments which should be made here.

First, as South Africa is aware, the settlement plan for Namibia would be carried out by the Secretary General under the authority of the Security Council, not the General Assembly. The Security Council has never adopted or endorsed the disposition of the General Assembly to regard SWAPO as the sole representative of the Namibian people. On the contrary, Security Council Resolutions 385 and 435, on which the U.N. settlement plan is based, fully endorse the principle that the leadership of the territory must be determined through free and fair elections in which all political parties, including SWAPO, will be placed on an equal footing. Finally, it should be noted that significant elements of the Namibian people, including political parties and the Namibian council of churches—whose member churches comprise among their con-

Namibia—A Profile

Geography

Area: 320,827 sq. mi. (slightly smaller than Tex. and Okla. combined). **Capital:** Windhoek (pop. 61,369—1970).

People

Population: 1–1.25 million 1980 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 2.9%. **Ethnic Groups:** Africans and colored (90%), Europeans (10%). **Religions:** Protestant (70%), Catholic (18%), animist (12%). **Languages:** Afrikaans, English, German. **Literacy:** whites (100%), blacks (20%).

Government

Type: South Africa administers Namibia, originally under a League of Nations mandate (1920–66) and since 1966 illegally on a de facto basis. **Branches:** *Executive*—Administrator General (appointed). *Legislative*—National Assembly (60 members), not recognized by international community. *Judicial*—Supreme Court. **Political Parties:** Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), SWAPO-Democrats, Namibia National Front, Aktur, Reformed National Party (HNP). **Suffrage:** Universal adult.

Economy

GNP: $1.4 billion (1978 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 2.5–3%. **Per Capita Income:** $1,400. **Inflation Rate:** 12%. **Natural Resources:** Diamonds, copper, lead, zinc, uranium, lesser amounts of other minerals, fish. **Agriculture:** *Products*—livestock, corn, millet, and sorghum (subsistence). *Work Force*—62%. **Manufacturing:** Canned fish and beef, dairy products, tanned leather, textiles, clothes, mineral concentrates. **Trade (1977 est.):** *Exports*—$800 million: diamonds, copper, lead, uranium, fish, beef, cattle, karakul (sheep) pelts. *Imports*—$630 million: construction materials, fertilizer, grain and other food products, manufactured goods. *Partners*—South Africa, West Germany, U.K., U.S. **Official Exchange Rate:** 1 South African rand=US$1.27 (May 1980). **Economic Aid Received:** South Africa supplements revenues to finance development projects; no U.S. aid.

Principal Government Officials

Namibia: Administrator General—D. J. Hough. **United States:** Consul General—Alan W. Lukens (resident in Cape Town, South Africa).

the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to be a supplementary means of interpretation to be resorted to where the meaning of provisions is ambiguous or obscure. In this regard, the printing by the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of Eilene Galloway's admirable study of the negotiating history of the treaty and the committee's intention to print, as part of the record of these proceedings, Professor Carl Christol's detailed article on the common heritage concept in the Moon Treaty are invaluable in enhancing a general understanding of the treaty.

Second, in recent months there has arisen some controversy as to how the treaty was negotiated. For example, accusations have been made that in June 1979 the U.S. delegation to the Outer Space Committee surrendered to a negotiating attack by the U.S.S.R. and certain less developed countries, with the result that the final treaty represents essentially a Soviet-inspired text. The negotiating history of the treaty corrects such inaccuracies and sheds light on other matters related to the treaty.

The institutional context in which the treaty was negotiated, i.e., the Outer Space Committee and its Legal Subcommittee, should also be understood, and the NASA witness will discuss this aspect in detail. In this connection I will only say that because these bodies operate on the consensus principle, under which no proposal may be adopted over the opposition of a committee member, the Moon Treaty contains no provisions which were included over the objection of the United States or any other country. Such a process obviously necessitates a certain amount of accommodation to the interests and desires of others, but it also enables each state, including the United States, to protect fully its essential interests during the course of negotiations. Whether the United States adequately perceived its interests in the Moon Treaty negotiations has been questioned by critics of the treaty, but it should be understood that our negotiators were in no way forced to accept provisions in the treaty by being outvoted by a Soviet/Third World majority. There was no voting.

Finally, I will in my testimony make several references to the Law of the Sea (LOS) negotiations, either noting difficulties which critics of the Moon Treaty have with these negotiations or pointing out differences or similarities between the LOS negotiations and the Moon Treaty. It would be impossible to adequately address the Moon Treaty and the views of its critics without such references. However, I am not an expert on the LOS negotiations and do not intend to comment on their substance. The views of the Administration on the LOS negotiations are well known, and nothing in my testimony should be taken as in any way altering these views.

Historically, discussions leading to the Moon Treaty commenced in 1970 when Argentina pointed out to the Outer Space Committee's Legal Subcommittee that the use of the Moon's natural resources had already begun and that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty did not include specific regulations for this activity. Specifically, Argentina proposed a "draft agreement on the principles governing activities in the use of the natural resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies," article 1 of which provided that the natural resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies should be the "common heritage of mankind."

While no action was taken in the Outer Space Committee on the Argentine proposal, less than 1 year later Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko requested that the 26th session of the U.N. General Assembly consider the "preparation of an international treaty concerning the Moon." A Soviet draft text was submitted on June 4, 1971.

The United States was not enthusiastic about this initiative because we did not regard the Soviet text as constituting a significant advance in outer space law as it existed at that time. For example, the Soviet draft treaty gave little attention to the issue of exploiting natural resources. As the Soviet delegate subsequently explained, the ". . . basic purpose [of the 1971 Soviet draft] was that there should *not* be included in the draft Moon Treaty a provision concerning the regime for the use and exploitation of the Moon's natural resources." [Emphasis added.]

Nevertheless, a review of the Soviet text suggested to the United States that the Soviet initiative might be converted into one which would positively carry forward U.S. interests. In particular, it was considered that there was potential benefit for the United States in having a treaty which would cover all celestial bodies in the solar system, would mandate notification of intended activities on celestial bodies and the dissemination of information on their results, and which would lay the basis for a reasonable approach to the use of nonterrestrial natural resources.

Initial U.S. Positions on Exploitation Question

Regarding the matter of exploitation, the subject had occasionally arisen in the course of negotiations of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, but no specific provisions on exploitation appear in the 1967 treaty. The United States has long taken the position that Article I of that treaty, which provides that: "Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States . . . ," recognizes the right of exploitation. We were and are aware, however, that this view is not shared by all states or commentators, some of whom take the position that the nonappropriation provisions in Article VI of the 1967 treaty preclude exploitation of celestial natural resources and their reduction to private property.

In 1972, then, the United States saw in the Soviet draft an opportunity to make clear that the prohibition against national appropriation of celestial bodies contained in the Outer Space Treaty did not preclude the exploitation of nonterrestrial natural resources for any of three purposes: scientific investigation (such as the return of lunar samples to Earth), the sustaining of missions on celestial bodies, and exploitation for commercial purposes. Thus, while the United States saw no urgent need for the Moon Treaty in 1972—and this remained our view throughout the 7-year course of the negotiations—we did consider that important U.S. interests, including those related to exploitation, could be advanced via a Moon Treaty.

In discussing the development of U.S. policy on the exploitation matter, I wish to stress that the United States constantly maintained several themes, which I would like to set forth and illustrate through references to the negotiating history of the treaty.

First, the United States was willing to accept the concept that the natural resources of celestial bodies were the common heritage of mankind. Indeed, it was the United States which first proposed the phrase in the course of active negotiations. However, the U.S. view was—and is—that this concept embodies no substantive rules or a predetermined form of legal regime, and the United States has consistently

resisted efforts to give the phrase content which would be adverse to U.S. interests. In our view the phrase can acquire substantive meaning only by reference to the specific context in which it is employed.

Second, the United States has consistently rejected any suggestion that the Moon Treaty should impose a moratorium on unilateral exploitation of nonterrestrial natural resources pending the establishment of an international regime; indeed, we have insisted that even after such a regime is established, the right of unilateral exploitation will continue to be available to those states which do not choose to participate in such a regime.

Third, the United States has been aware of the vital role that American free enterprise can play in outer space, and the U.S. positions were designed to promote this role, both by insuring that nothing in the treaty would circumscribe this potential and by inserting into the treaty certain rights which would be important to commercial exploitation by private or public entities.

Fourth, our negotiators obviously were aware of developments related to the Law of the Sea negotiations; the two negotiations were somewhat parallel in time, and the two negotiating texts contain some common phraseology. However, the U.S. view was and is that the substance and meaning of the Moon Treaty should be determined independently of other international instruments and negotiations.

These were the principles which guided the United States when it inserted the exploitation issue into the Moon Treaty negotiations in 1972. It is, of course, entirely proper to examine the Moon Treaty and its negotiating history in order to determine whether the final product adequately meets the objectives we set for ourselves at the commencement of negotiations. This is one reason for the Administration's ongoing study of the treaty and, I assume, for these hearings. Obviously there are those who believe that the treaty falls short of our goals, just as there are those who believe they have been met. However, it should be clearly recognized that the three Administrations which approved the negotiating instructions on the Moon Treaty from 1972 to 1979, as well as to our negotiators consciously took into account America's stake in outer space exploitation and the role private investment could play in such exploitation. As to the importance of these matters, I am sure that both critics and supporters of the treaty are of one mind.

1972 U.S. Proposal on Exploitation

Returning to the negotiating history, the text on exploitation tabled by the United States during the very first negotiating round in April 1972 and the explanatory statement on this text by the U.S. representative, both of which may be found on page 14 of the Galloway study, are an excellent illustration of the U.S. approach to the exploitation issue. The 1972 U.S. text contained the statement—the antecedent to Article 11 of the Moon Treaty—that "the natural resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be the common heritage of all mankind." Paragraph 3 of the U.S. text made reference to the need "for the encouragement of investment," and the U.S. statement made clear that at a conference to negotiate an exploitation regime "participants would need to bear in mind not only common goals of economic advancement but the need to encourage investment and efficient development as well." Finally, paragraph 3 of the U.S. text recognized the possibility of such a conference being convened when practical utilization of nonterrestrial natural resources had "already begun," making it clear that the establishment of a regime was not to be a precondition for exploitation.

Proceeding from this seminal text and statement, I would now like to turn to the key issues of common heritage, moratorium, relationship to the LOS negotiations, and the role of private investment under the Moon Treaty.

The "Common Heritage" Concept

In advancing the common heritage concept in April 1972, the United States drew upon several sources—the 1969 Argentine proposal in the Outer Space Committee, President Nixon's 1970 statement on the seabeds, and Brazil's November 1971 proposal in the General Assembly that the Soviet draft Moon Treaty be revised to incorporate the common heritage principle. The United States did not and does not believe that the common heritage concept carried with it substantial legal baggage. Our position, in essence, was that the common heritage concept would not prejudice possible future exploitation but would simply parallel and conform to established space law, especially Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty which already established that celestial bodies as a whole and all parts of them are areas beyond national sovereignty, to which all states have free access, and that activities in such areas shall be for the benefit and in the interests of all countries.

This is what lay behind the U.S. statement in April 1972 that "on the broadest level of generality it seems right to state that such resources are part of the common heritage of all mankind." Given this context, it was, therefore, considered reasonable to agree that other states accepting the new treaty should be legally entitled to participate in future efforts to establish a legal regime to govern activities in such areas.

If the common heritage notion has any legal content, it would be a "procedural" one, specifically that for areas with the characteristics I have just enumerated, it would be appropriate for the international community to attempt to elaborate an international regime. It has even been argued that within the legal context just described—a context established by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty—an acceptable international regime might well be vital in order to provide the requisite legal stability for commercial-scale on-site exploitation; otherwise, given the right of free access by all states to all areas of the "commons" and the absence of a sovereign power to assure order, such exploitation might not be possible. So too, such a regime could reduce controversies over activities in the "commons."

Be this as it may, my point is that while the United States saw the convening of a conference to attempt to negotiate a regime as a reasonable outgrowth of the common heritage principle, the United States consistently resisted all efforts to establish the common heritage concept as embodying substantive rules or a predetermined form of legal regime.

As fully discussed in the Galloway study and Professor Christol's article, from the introduction of the common heritage concept in 1972 to April 1979, the Soviet Union adamantly rejected the inclusion of the concept in the Moon Treaty, citing various legal, philosophical, and political difficulties with the phrase. One of the more interesting Soviet arguments was that "mankind" was not a proper subject of international law, only states were. This is, in-

gregations more than half of the territory's adult population—support prompt implementation of the settlement plan.

Second, the United Nations has over the years established an excellent record for impartial peacekeeping operations in even the most difficult and demanding circumstances. We need only look at the examples of Cyprus and the Middle East. With regard to the Namibian settlement plan, the Secretary General of the United Nations has repeatedly and publicly given South Africa assurances of his complete impartiality and that of his U.N. staff in the implementation of the plan, most recently in his letter of June 20. In that letter, as on previous occasions, the Secretary General stated that the requirement of impartiality is one that applies to all parties to the settlement, and he has called upon South Africa to give a reciprocal assurance of its own impartiality in the implementation of the settlement plan.

Thirdly, as in any negotiation, each side in the Namibia dispute has taken positions with a view to maximizing their bargaining leverage with the other. These positions will inevitably be altered once a final agreement is reached and implementation of the settlement plan begins. In insisting that SWAPO now be denied that stature it presently derives from its recognition by some in the international community, South Africa is in effect seeking to extract a major concession without committing itself to an agreement. There is considerable wariness on the part of SWAPO and its supporters in the international community about abandoning the remaining positions and leverage they now enjoy, just as there is wariness on the part of South Africa about surrendering its advantages in the negotiations. The task that confronts the five and the Secretary General is to bring both sides to final agreement and to begin the implementation of the settlement plan, in which case most of the reservations currently voiced by both sides will become moot.

For their part, the five have made clear that their efforts to insure a fair settlement in Namibia will not cease once implementation begins. We will remain ready to do all in our power to insure that the provisions of the plan will be scrupulously adhered to, not least those which provide for the fair and equal treatment of all parties in the electoral process.

Let me say that we fully intend to pursue the major task before us, which is to complete the work and fulfill the promise of 3½ years of arduous negotiation in order to bring about an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia. We will, therefore, focus our attention in the days ahead on those substantive aspects of South Africa's position which must be addressed if a settlement is to be achieved. We are confident that the other parties involved, including the Secretary General, are prepared to proceed with the same determination and seriousness of purpose.

Need for Agreement

In this regard, let me say that, despite the 3½ years which have been spent already on this settlement effort, there is urgency to it. The situation inside Namibia is constantly changing, and those changes threaten to unravel the agreements which have already been reached. The most significant action inside Namibia has been South Africa's creation of a so-called council of ministers, composed entirely of members of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, the party which won the South African-supervised elections of December 1978. These elections were boycotted by major internal political parties as well as by SWAPO and not recognized by the five or by the international community. This council of ministers has been given considerable authority by South Africa, and the government seems to be scaling down the visibility and scope of the administrator general. In response to this action, the governments of the five released a statement on July 11, making clear their refusal to recognize the council of ministers and their insistence that the South African Government must continue to be held fully accountable for the implementation of the U.N. settlement plan.

The fighting along Namibia's northern border also increases, with losses to both SWAPO and South Africa ever growing and with South African raids into neighboring states becoming more frequent. The front-line states have given the five their cooperation and support, but their willingness to participate in this settlement effort cannot be taken for granted. Likewise, SWAPO's willingness to implement the settlement plan cannot be taken for granted. SWAPO has been brought to this point with considerable persuasion from the front-line states. If the settlement cannot soon be implemented, the front-line states and SWAPO may have second thoughts.

As I stated in my previous testimony, most African members of the United Nations are convinced that South Africa has never had any intention of proceeding with an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia. The front-line states believe that, since they have brought SWAPO to accept the settlement, it is now up to the five to obtain South Africa's agreement. If South Africa does not agree, there will be increasingly strong calls at the United Nations for us to support our own negotia-

Namibia

The following statement was issued by the Governments of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations on July 11, 1980.[1]

The Governments of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States continue to believe that implementation of the U.N. settlement plan and of Security Council Resolution 435 is the best available means of achieving an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia. The five governments remain resolute in their efforts to achieve that goal.

The governments of the five are, therefore, concerned by the South African Government's establishment of a "Council of Ministers" in Namibia. Such action raises legitimate questions as to South Africa's intentions and complicates an already difficult settlement process.

The governments of the five do not recognize the "Council of Ministers," just as they do not recognize the "National Assembly" in Namibia, which was based on the internal elections of December 1978 which the governments of the five regard as null and void. These developments do not alter the responsibility of the South African Government for the implementation of the U.N. settlement plan under the terms of Resolution 435. The five governments call on the South African Government to refrain from any action which could jeopardize the successful resolution of the negotiations.

[1] USUN press release 79. ■

tions by exerting real pressure, including economic sanctions if necessary, on South Africa to comply.

The South African Government meanwhile appears to be continuing its two-track strategy of participating in the five's settlement effort while at the same time taking actions inside Namibia which move toward an ill-conceived and doomed internal settlement. Concerning implementation of the settlement plan, South Africa has not made a decision to proceed with implementation. No one can say with certainty what South Africa ultimately intends, but a variety of reasons have been advanced as to why South Africa may hope to postpone a decision.

We have continually told the front-line states and other African nations that negotiation is a real alternative to the armed struggle in southern Africa. The settlement in Zimbabwe is certainly proof of that premise. But the settlement in Zimbabwe only came when the war was so advanced that the destruction of all of then-Southern Rhodesia was near. The challenge in Namibia is to achieve an internationally acceptable settlement before the armed struggle reaches that stage, as it otherwise eventually will—to avoid the bloodshed and devastation which the settlement in Zimbabwe has so vividly shown to be unnecessary.

At present, the key to an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia lies with the South African Government, and the five must continue their efforts to convince South Africa that such a settlement is their best alternative. We have come a long distance in this settlement effort—much farther than many skeptics originally thought possible—and I believe that a peaceful settlement is possible in the near future. Those who allow further delay must bear the burden of responsibility for the resulting deterioration. I believe that South Africa has in its government the leadership which is necessary to bring about a settlement. I hope that the South African Government will display the political wisdom and the political will, which is now all that is required, for the attainment of peace and independence in Namibia.

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[1] USUN press release 94. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture
Convention on the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at Washington Mar. 6, 1979.
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Oct. 10, 1980.
Ratification deposited: U.S., Oct. 23, 1980.

Antarctica
Recommendations, including agreed measures for conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora. Adopted at Brussels June 2–13, 1964. Entered into force July 27, 1966, except for III–VII, III–VIII, III–XI; Sept. 1, 1966, for III–XI; Dec. 22, 1978, for III–VII. TIAS 6058.
Notification of approval: Australia, Sept. 1, 1980, for III–VIII.

Measures relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty. Done at Santiago Nov. 18, 1966. Entered into force Oct. 30, 1968 for IV–20 through IV–28. TIAS 6668.
Notification of approval: Australia, Sept. 1, 1980, for IV 1–19 inclusive.

Measures relating to the furtherance of the principles and purposes of the Antarctic treaty. Done at Paris Nov. 29, 1968. Entered into force May 26, 1972, for V–1 through V–4 and V–9; July 31, 1972, for V–7 and V–8. TIAS 7692.
Notification of approval: Australia, Sept. 1, 1980, for V–5 and V–6.

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty. Done at Tokyo Oct. 30, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 10, 1973, for VI 1–7 and 11–15. TIAS 7796.
Notification of approval: Australia, Sept. 1, 1980, for VI–8, 9, and 10.

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty. Adopted at Oslo June 20, 1975. Entered into force Dec. 16, 1978, for VIII 6–8 and 10–14.
Notification of approval: Australia, Sept. 1, 1980, for VIII 1–5 inclusive.
Entered into force: Sept. 1, 1980, for VIII 3–4.

Atomic Energy
Agreement concerning the transfer of a research reactor and enriched uranium to Malaysia, with annexes, exchange of notes, and related letter. Signed at Vienna Sept. 22, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1980.
Signatures: IAEA, Malaysia, U.S., Sept. 22, 1980.

Protocol to suspend the agreement of July 11, 1969 (TIAS 6718), between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Portugal, and the U.S. for the application of safeguards and providing for the application of safeguards pursuant to the non-proliferation treaty of July 1, 1968 (TIAS 6839), and pursuant to the agreement of Nov. 18, 1977, between the U.S. and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in the U.S., with exchange of letters. Signed at Vienna Sept. 23, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 23, 1980.
Signatures: IAEA, Portugal, U.S., Sept. 23, 1980.

Protocol to suspend the agreement of Feb. 28, 1972 (TIAS 7294), between the IAEA, Switzerland, and the U.S. for the application of safeguards pursuant to the non-proliferation treaty of July 1, 1968 (TIAS 6839), and pursuant to the agreement of Nov. 18, 1977, between the U.S. and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in the U.S., with exchange of letters. Signed at Vienna Sept. 23, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 23, 1980.
Signatures: IAEA, Switzerland, U.S., Sept. 23, 1980.

Collisions
Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with regulations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587.
Accession deposited: Turkey, May 16, 1980.

Conservation
Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 8249.
Acceptance deposited: Japan, Aug. 6, 1980.[2]
Accession deposited: Central African Republic, Aug. 27, 1980.

Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 1973 on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249). Done at Bonn June 22, 1979.[3]
Acceptance deposited: Japan, Aug. 6, 1980.
Instrument of acceptance signed by the President: Oct. 8, 1980.

Consular
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Suriname Sept. 11, 1980.

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations, concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Suriname, Sept. 11, 1980.

Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.
Accession deposited: Vietnam, Aug. 26, 1980.[1]

deed, a standard Soviet position, one which is often used to oppose any notion that international law can provide individuals with human rights vis-a-vis their government.

Soviet opposition to the common heritage concept is not cited merely as a curiosity; it is useful in understanding the wording of Article 11(1) as it exists in the final text. During the informal negotiations at the 1978 Legal Subcommittee which resulted in the so-called Austrian draft, which subsequently was adopted almost unchanged as the Moon Treaty, the Soviets for the first time showed some flexibility regarding the common heritage concept; they insisted, however, upon an extremely qualified reference to the phrase, to wit: "*For the purposes of this Agreement*, the Moon and its natural resources shall be considered the common heritage of mankind, *which finds its expression in the relevant provisions of this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 5 of this article.*" The developing countries had difficulties with this language, but the final price of obtaining Soviet support for the treaty was the retention of the phrase "which finds its expression in the relevant provisions of this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 5 of this article." Thus, the intention behind the phrasing of Article 11(1) is exactly what the words imply, namely that the "common heritage" concept in the Moon Treaty finds its meaning solely within the Moon Treaty itself. On behalf of the United States, moreover, this interpretation was unequivocally set forth by Ambassador [Richard] Petree in his statement of November 7, 1979, before the U.N. Special Political Committee as it debated the treaty. This statement, on the record and uncontradicted, is legally authoritative as a matter of treaty interpretation under relevant international law.

Given the clarity of the legal position, it would be hard for anyone to argue that when the time comes to devise an international regime for the Moon, the inclusion of the common heritage phraseology in the treaty *legally* requires some particular type of regime. On the other hand, opponents of the Moon Treaty are not so much worried about possible legal requirements as they are about the practical consequences which they foresee as flowing from the use of the common heritage phraseology. They vigorously argue that, even though the common heritage phrase does not legally require any particular kind of Moon regime, nevertheless the phrase has taken on a particular meaning in the minds of some of those who will presumably be participating in the regime negotiations of the future.

Specifically they argue that to many countries of the Third World, the phrase "common heritage" essentially means common property and that such countries, when they come to the negotiating table, will do everything they can to force through a "U.N. style" international regime with one vote per state, under which any kind of unilateral exploitation of the Moon's resources would be forbidden on the ground that what belongs to all belongs to no one. In short, there are those who believe that, to the extent that the United States wants to retain the right to exploit the resources of celestial bodies, the inclusion of the common heritage concept in the Moon Treaty has brought about irretrievable prejudice.

There is, of course, an opposing point of view. Thus it can be argued with equal vigor that, when the parties to the Moon Treaty assemble 15–30 years from now to negotiate about an international regime, each party will bring to the table arguments favoring its own self-interest. Those whose self-interest will be advanced by reference to a particular definition of the common heritage concept will speak in these terms, and those whose self-interest will be advantaged by a different definition will argue to the contrary. Under this theory, in other words, any phraseology in the Moon Treaty which does not have legal consequences is really not going to control the course of future bargaining, which will in any event be governed by self-interest. Consistent with this theory the United States might be well-advised to participate in any negotiations for an international regime in order to help shape the best possible regime—and refuse to agree to one that is unsatisfactory.

Conversely, the treaty's critics think that, at best, a U.S. commitment to a negotiation that may not take place for 15–30 years is premature and that at worst the terms of those negotiations are not likely to produce a satisfactory result. They argue that there is no pressing reason for the United States to endorse a long-range approach to celestial resources based on politically charged terminology which could skew the basis on which regime negotiations would proceed. They also question the degree of freedom we would have to walk away from regime negotiations taking place under a treaty to which, by our adherence, we would have given greater respectability.

This position is opposed by the strong school of thought which favors international cooperation as envisaged by the Moon Treaty and which sees heavy political and other costs in a refusal by the United States to become a party to a treaty because of objections to language supported by the United States during negotiations, particularly when that language only commits states parties to negotiate, not to accept, an international regime.

The bottom line is that with respect to the common heritage concept, there are two strongly contrasting views as to the costs and benefits which would flow from U.S. adherence to the Moon Treaty. It is precisely because of these differences of view that the interagency task force is now proceeding with its study.

In connection with the question whether the United States should sign and ratify the treaty, serious consideration could be given to the recommendation of the American Bar Association's (ABA) international law section, which proposes that the meaning of "common heritage" be clarified through the inclusion, in the instrument of ratification, of an additional explanatory interpretation. Assuming ratification, I am not persuaded, pending further study, of the necessity of such clarification, but the substance of the proposal is generally satisfactory, subject perhaps to certain very minor modifications. For example, to my mind the common heritage concept affirmatively connotes that an effort will be made to establish a mutually acceptable international regime, and the section's clarification does not mention the point. In any event, the desirability of an interpretive statement along the ABA lines will be carefully studied.

The Moon Treaty and LOS Treaty

This line of discussion naturally leads to a broader discussion of the relationship—or lack thereof—between the Law of the Sea negotiations and the Moon Treaty. I have already noted that certain similarities do exist in terms of language, and, of course, both deal with the exploitation of natural resources in a "global commons," if that term may properly be

applied to outer space. However, while the Law of the Sea experience, along with other examples of international efforts at cooperation, will be relevant, it is by no means clear that a future regime for nonterrestrial natural resources will, as a political matter, be decisively influenced or controlled by the LOS regime, regardless of its merits. There are, after all, significant differences in the economic, political, and legal contexts of the two potential regimes. I would like to point out three factors in this regard.

• Most immediately, the LOS negotiations are almost completed, while negotiations for a regime to govern exploitation of celestial natural resources will not be undertaken until such exploitation "is about to become feasible" (Article 11(5)), i.e., at least 15–30 years from now. The lessons to be learned from the LOS experience will by then be available and can be taken fully into account by the United States and other interested states.

• The desire of land-based producers for particular conditions on the extraction of resources from the deep seabeds resulted from fear that these resources would be directly or indirectly competitive with resources they produce. However, this consideration will not necessarily be present in negotiations on a regime to govern celestial exploitation, in that it is the view of NASA experts that resources from the Moon are, within currently foreseen economics, not competitive with terrestrial resources. The present thinking is that the value of lunar resources is predominantly in the reduced transportation costs for building structures in space or on the Moon itself. The "producer/consumer" dynamics which have helped shape the LOS exploitation regime would not, therefore, automatically be transposed to another context.

• The LOS treaty is not the only model for a future celestial exploitation regime. In outer space, the international community's experience with the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT) and the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) would also be assessed, and in 15–30 years time other models of international cooperation will almost surely be available.

In sum, however difficult negotiations for the seabed regime have been, there are enough differences between the circumstances in which the LOS treaty is being negotiated and those in which the regime for extraterrestrial exploitation will be negotiated in some 15–30 years to preclude an automatic transposition of the results of the LOS treaty into the extraterrestrial context.

In this regard, it has been argued by critics that the Moon Treaty establishes vague terms of reference for a future negotiation—e.g., "common heritage," "rational management," "equitable sharing"—which many nations are likely to define in ways prejudicial to our interests. In the critics' view, the compromise which would emerge from this negotiation could thus be less satisfactory than if the negotiation began within a more favorable context.

The argument the other way is that, as I have already stated, parties to the negotiations will argue their self-interest, and vague phraseology without legal content will not control the course of the negotiations. Moreover, the U.S. Government has declined to adhere to unacceptable international agreements, and there is no reason why we should depart from the great tradition in this context. Indeed, it may be argued that a failure by the United States to sign the Moon Treaty would give rise to the greater danger that a U.S. absence from the negotiations for a Moon regime will lead to a significantly worse regime than would evolve if the United States participated.

Legal Moratorium

The next point I would like to address is the much-debated question whether the Moon Treaty establishes, as a legal or *de facto* matter, a moratorium on the exploitation of nonterrestrial natural resources, pending the development, through future negotiations, of an international legal regime.

The argument that there is a legal moratorium is generally based on two provisions of the Treaty.

First, it is said that anything denominated as the "common heritage of mankind" can only be exploited with the approval of an international regime. It would, therefore, follow, according to this view, that no exploitation could occur until such a regime is established.

Second, since Article 11(5) provides for negotiating an international regime " . . . to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible," it is argued that a fair reading of this provision would be that a moratorium is imposed until the regime is established.

Again there are responsive arguments. The negotiating history of the treaty—from the April 1972 U.S. text on through Ambassador Petree's comprehensive statement in November 1979—is replete with unequivocal statements by the United States that we would not accept a moratorium and that the common heritage concept did not imply a moratorium. Specific proposals for a moratorium were advanced by some states, were decisively rejected, and form no part of the treaty. Moreover, Article 11(8) of the treaty provides that "all activities," with respect to natural resources, shall be carried out in a manner compatible with the purposes of the regime set forth in Article 11(7), and this provision was specifically included in the treaty to establish principles which would cover exploitation carried out *before* establishment of an international regime.

Similarly, as the report of the ABA's international law section has pointed out, Article 11(3) was drafted in such a way as to make clear that there should *not* be such a moratorium [Report at 6–7]. According to the international law section: "No moratorium was either intended or established" [Report at 7]. Quite the contrary: As made clear in Ambassador Petree's statement, the treaty contemplates that the nationals of a state party may exploit the resources of outer space outside the context of an international regime—either before such a regime is established or in the event a state chooses not to join an established regime.

Conceivably, other states may claim that there should be such a moratorium, but there is no reason why such a claim should interfere with our right to proceed in accordance with our own understanding of the treaty. The proposed clarification on this point suggested by the ABA's international law section is fully consistent with our understanding of the treaty, although, again, we have not yet reached a conclusion as to whether, if the United States is to sign and ratify the Moon Treaty, it is really necessary to include such an interpretation in an instrument of ratification.

De Facto Moratorium

I think it is fair to say that the central focus of those who oppose American adherence to the Moon Treaty hinges on whether the treaty creates a *de facto*, as opposed to a legal, moratorium on exploitation. The issue is necessarily

Treaties

Environmental Modification
Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980. TIAS 9614.
Accession deposited: Vietnam, Aug. 26, 1980.

Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference July 1–22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signatures and acceptances deposited: Dominica, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Sept. 29, 1980; Djibouti, Oct. 1, 1980.

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund, formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference July 1–22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.
Acceptance deposited: Zimbabwe, Sept. 29, 1980.

Human Rights
Optional protocol to the international covenant on civil and political rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.[4]
Ratification deposited: Peru, Oct. 3, 1980.

International Court of Justice
Declarations recognizing as compulsory the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court.
Declaration deposited: Barbados, Aug. 1, 1980.[2]

Nationality
Convention establishing the status of naturalized citizens who again take up their residence in the country of their origin. Signed at Rio de Janeiro Aug. 13, 1906. Entered into force May 25, 1908. 50 Stat. 1317.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Oct. 20, 1981.

Pollution
Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.
Ratification deposited: Japan, Oct. 15, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Dec. 29, 1972, on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter. TIAS 8165. Done at London Oct. 12, 1978.[3]
Instrument of acceptance signed by the President: Oct. 8, 1980.

Convention on long-range transboundary air pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979.[3]
Ratifications deposited: Hungary, Sept. 22, 1980; Portugal, Sept. 29, 1980.

Property, Intellectual
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Accession deposited: Gambia Sept. 10, 1980.

Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700.
Accessions deposited: Tunisia, Aug. 6, 1980; Turkey, July 31, 1980.

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 (TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.[3]
Accession deposited: Tunisia, Aug. 6, 1980.

Seals
Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, with annex and final act. Done at London June 1, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 11, 1978. TIAS 8826.
Ratifications deposited: Argentina, Mar. 7, 1978; Chile, Feb. 7, 1980; Japan, Aug. 28, 1980.

1980 protocol amending the interim convention of Feb. 9, 1957, as amended and extended (TIAS 3948, 5558, 6774, 8368), on conservation of North Pacific fur seals. Done at Washington Oct. 14, 1980. Enters into force on the date on which instruments of ratification or acceptance have been deposited by all the signatory governments.
Signatures: Canada, Japan, U.S.S.R.,[5] U.S., Oct. 14, 1980.
Approval deposited: U.S.S.R.,[5] Oct. 17, 1980.

Shipping
U.N. convention on the carriage of goods by sea, 1978. Done at Hamburg Mar. 31, 1978.[3]
Accession deposited: Tunisia, Sept. 15, 1980.

South Pacific Commission
Agreement amending the agreement of Feb. 6, 1947, as amended (TIAS 2317, 2458, 2952, 5845, 8120), establishing the South Pacific Commission. Done at the 18th South Pacific conference held in Noumea from Oct. 7–12, 1978. Entered into force June 4, 1980.
Acceptances deposited: Australia, Oct. 5, 1979; Fiji, Sept. 20, 1979; France, June 4, 1980; Nauru, Aug. 17, 1979; New Zealand, Nov. 2, 1979; Papua New Guinea, Apr. 14, 1980; Solomon Islands, Sept. 18, 1979; Tuvalu, Sept. 27, 1979; U.K., Oct. 3, 1979; U.S., Nov. 28, 1979; Western Samoa, Oct. 8, 1979.

Telecommunications
Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), as revised, relating to the aeronautical mobile (R) service, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva Mar. 5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1979.
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Oct. 8, 1980.
Ratification deposited: U.S., Oct. 22, 1980.
Entered into force: U.S., Oct. 22, 1980.
Approval deposited: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, July 17, 1980.

Terrorism
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532.
Accession deposited: El Salvador, Aug. 8, 1980.[2]

International Convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17, 1979.[3]
Signatures: Austria, Oct. 3, 1980; Iraq, Oct. 14, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Philippines, Oct. 14, 1980.

U.N.
Charter of the U.N. and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1945. 55 Stat. 1600.
Admitted to membership: St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sept. 16, 1980.

UNIDO
Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.[3]
Signatures: Korea, Paraguay, Oct. 7, 1980; Suriname, Sept. 19, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Tanzania, Oct. 3, 1980.
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, Oct. 10, 1980.

Women
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Adopted at New York Dec. 18, 1979.[3]
Signature: Dominica, Sept. 15, 1980.
Ratification deposited: Dominica, Sept. 15, 1980.

BILATERAL

Argentina
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Buenos Aires and Washington Sept. 4 and 26, 1980. Enters into force on the date mutually agreed upon by the administrations, after it is signed by the authorized representatives of both administrations.

Bangladesh
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Oct. 4, 1974 (TIAS 7949), with agreed minutes. Signed at Dacca Sept. 5, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 5, 1980.

Belgium
Air transport agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 23, 1980. Entered into force Oct. 23, 1980.

Naturalization convention. Signed at Brussels Nov. 16, 1868. Entered into force July 10, 1869. 16 Stat. 747.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Oct. 20, 1981.

Canada
Protocol to amend the convention for the protection, preservation, and extension of the sockeye salmon fisheries in the Fraser River System of May 26, 1930, as amended (50 Stat. 1355, TIAS 3867). Signed at Washington Feb. 24, 1977.
Ratifications exchanged: Oct. 15, 1980.
Entered into force: Oct. 15, 1980.

Protocol amending the convention of Mar. 2, 1953, for the preservation of the halibut fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea (TIAS 2900). Signed at Washington Mar. 29, 1979.
Ratifications exchanged: Oct. 15, 1980.
Entered into force: Oct. 15, 1980.

Agreement amending and supplementing the agreement of Mar. 9, 1959, as amended and supplemented (TIAS 4192, 5117, 5608, 6236, 7408, 9003), governing tolls on the St. Lawrence Seaway. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 7, 1980. Entered into force Oct. 7, 1980.

Interim arrangement relating to the fisheries for albacore tuna off the Pacific coasts of the U.S. and Canada. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Aug. 21, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 21, 1980.

Convention with respect to taxes on income and on capital, with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington Sept. 26, 1980. Enters into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Colombia
Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 3, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9515, 9645, 9713), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Bogota July 31 and Aug. 11, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 11, 1980.

Costa Rica
Naturalization convention. Signed at San Jose June 10, 1911. Entered into force May 9, 1912. 37 Stat. 1603.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Oct. 20, 1981.

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at San Jose Sept. 22, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1980; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Agreement on a consultative mechanism relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at San Jose Sept. 22, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1980; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Denmark
Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters, with patent addendum and appendices. Signed at Copenhagen Sept. 29, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 29, 1980.

Egypt
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Oct. 4, 1979 (TIAS 9793), with agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo Aug. 27, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 27, 1980.

El Salvador
Naturalization convention. Signed at San Salvador Mar. 14, 1908. Entered into force July 20, 1908. 35 Stat. 2038.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Oct. 20, 1981.

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at San Salvador June 18, 1980. Entered into force June 18, 1980.

Finland
Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters. Signed at Helsinki Sept. 26, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 26, 1980.

France
Technical exchange and cooperation arrangement in the field of light water reactor safety research, with appendices. Signed at Paris and Washington July 16 and Sept. 12, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 12, 1980.

Agreement on research participation and technical exchange in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Loss of Fluid Test (LOFT) research program with appendix. Signed at Paris and Washington July 30 and Sept. 12, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 12, 1980.

Haiti
Naturalization treaty. Signed at Washington Mar. 22, 1902. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1904. 33 Stat. 2101.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Oct. 20, 1981.

Treaty extending the time within which may be effected the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of naturalization signed Mar. 22, 1902 (33 Stat. 2101). Signed at Washington Feb. 28, 1903. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1904. 33 Stat. 2157.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Oct. 20, 1981.

Honduras
Naturalization convention. Signed at Tegucigalpa, June 23, 1908. Entered into force Apr. 16, 1909. 36 Stat. 2160.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Oct. 20, 1981.

Israel
Contingency implementing arrangements for the memorandum of agreement of June 22, 1979 (TIAS 9533), concerning an oil supply arrangement, with related letter. Signed at Washington Oct. 17, 1980. Entered into force Oct. 17, 1980.

Korea, Republic of
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 23, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9039, 9350, 9566, 9758), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Sept. 8, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 8, 1980; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Liberia
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Monrovia Aug. 13, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 13, 1980.

Lithuania
Treaty defining liability for military service and other acts of allegiance of naturalized persons and persons born with double nationality. Signed at Kaunas, Oct. 18, 1937. Entered into force July 20, 1938. 53 Stat. 1569.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 24, 1980; effective Oct. 24, 1981.

Mexico
Minute 260 of the International Boundary and Water Commission amending and extending Minute 240, as amended and extended (TIAS 8712, 9290), relating to emergency deliveries of Colorado River waters for use in Tijuana. Signed at El Paso Aug. 11, 1979.
Entered into force: Dec. 7, 1979.

Minute 263 of the International Boundary and Water Commission amending and extending Minute 240, as amended and extended (TIAS 8712, 9290), relating to emergency deliveries of Colorado River waters for use in Tijuana. Signed at El Paso Aug. 6, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1980.

Morocco
Agreement to establish the U.S.-Moroccan Joint Committee for Economic Relations. Signed at Washington Sept. 25, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 25, 1980.

Nicaragua
Naturalization convention. Signed at Managua Dec. 7, 1908. Entered into force Mar. 28, 1912. 37 Stat. 1560.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 24, 1980; effective Oct. 24, 1981.

Supplementary naturalization convention. Signed at Managua June 17, 1911. Entered into force Mar. 28, 1912. 37 Stat. 1563.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 24, 1980; effective Oct. 24, 1981.